SYMBOLIC LOGIC

AND

ITS

APPLICATIONS

SYMBOLIC LOGIC
AND

ITS

APPLICATIONS

BY

HUGH MAcCOLL
B.A. (LONDON)

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND

39

CO.

PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1906

All rights reserved

PREFACE
volume may be regarded as the final con
centrated outcome of a series of researches begun in
1872 and continued (though with some long breaks)
THIS

little

article entitled

My

until to-day,

"

Probability Notation

which appeared in 1872 in the Educational Times,

and was republished in the mathematical Reprint," con
tains the germs of the more developed method which I
in the Proceedings of the London
afterwards
No.

2,"

"

explained
But the most impor
Mathematical Society and in Mind.
tant developments from the logical point of view will be

found in the
eight

which

contributed within the last

or nine years to various magazines, English

French.
in

articles

these I

Among

may

especially

in the Athenceum, portions of

Mind and

and

mention those

which

have

of these magazines) copied into

(with the kind permission
this brief epitome.

Readers who only want to obtain a clear general view

of symbolic logic and its applications need only attend to
46 to
22 to 24,
1 to 18,
the
portions:
following

53,

Students

who have

in ordinary logic

46

112

76 to 80,

to 59,

may

five

to

chapters,

144

to 150.

pass elementary examinations

restrict their reading to

62 to 66,

Mathematicians
last

to 120,

76 to 109,

1 to 18,

112.

be principally interested in the

156 but readers
114 to
from

will

vi

PREFACE

who wish

to obtain

system and

its

a complete
mastery of

my

symbolic

applications should read the whole.

They

will find that, in

the elastic adaptability of its notation,

it bears
very much the same relation to other systems
(including the ordinary formal logic of our text-books)
as algebra bears to arithmetic.
It is
this nota-

mainly

tional

adaptability that enables

it

to solve with ease

and

many

important problems, both in pure logic

and in mathematics (see
75 and
157), which lie
wholly beyond the reach of any other symbolic system
within my
knowledge.
simplicity

HUGH
August 17th, 1905.

MAcCOLL.

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

...

ECS.

1-3. General principles

Origin of language

CHAPTER
4-12. Definitions of symbols

......

CHAPTER

of propositions

II

Application to grammar

CHAPTER
18-24. Paradoxes

Classification

Examples and formula)

13-17. Logic of Functions

PAGE

...

III

Propositions of the second, third, and higher

12

degrees

CHAPTER IV
25-32. Formulas of operations with examples

worked

Venn s
20

problem

CHAPTER V
33-38. Elimination

Solutions of implications and equations

Limits of statements

27

CHAPTER VI
39-43. Jevons

"

Inverse Problem

"

its

complete solution on

the principle of limits, with examples

vii

33

CONTENTS

viii

CHAPTER

VII
PAGE

SECS.

44-53. Tests of Validity Symbolic Universe, or Universe of

Discourse No syllogism valid as usually stated
.

CHAPTER
54-63.

The nineteen

39

VIII

traditional syllogisms all deducible from

Criticism of the technical

one simple formula

words

and
undistributed
The
Canons unreliable other and

distributed

usual syllogistic

49

simpler tests proposed

CHAPTER IX
64-66

(a).

Given one premise

Enthymemes
the

conclusion,

to

find

of a syllogism

and

the

missing premise
Strongest conclusion from given premises

66

CHAPTER X
67-75.

To

from which we can prove a

given complex statement, and also the strongest
conclusion deducible from the statement Some
find the weakest data

contested problems

Existential Import

Comparison

positions

of symbolic

of

Pro

methods

70

CHAPTER XI
76-80.

The nature
because

of inference

The words

if,

therefore)

Causation and discovery of causes

and

80

CHAPTER XII
81-89. Solutions of

some questions

set at

recent examina

86

tions

CHAPTER

XIII

90-113. Definitions and explanations of technical terms often

used in logic Meaningless symbols and their uses ;
Induction : inductive
mathematical examples
reasoning not absolutely reliable

mathematics

Infinite

and

a curious case in

infinitesimal

91

CONTENTS

CALCULUS OF LIMITS
CHAPTER XIV
SECS.

114-131

PAGE

Application to elementary algebra, with examples

CHAPTER XV
1,32-140.

Nearest limits

....

Table of Reference

106

117

CHAPTER XVI
141-143. Limits of two variables

Geometrical illustrations

123

CHAPTER XVII
144-150. Elementary

and

of

probabilityMeaning

independent

in

probability,

dependent
with geo

metrical illustrations

128

CHAPTER XVIII
151-157. Notation

for Multiple
Integrals
quire the integral calculus

....

Problems that

re

132

ALPHABETICAL INDEX
(The numbers indicate the sections, not the pages.)

Alternative,

7,

Induction, 112
Inference, nature

41

Ampliative, 108
Antecedent, 28
Cause, 79

Infinite

Complement, 46
Connotation, 93
Consequent, 28
Contraposition, 97
Contrary, 94
Conversion, 98
Couturat s notation, 132 (footnote)
Dichotomy, 100

Dilemma, 101-103
Elimination, 33-38
Enthymeme, 64
Equivalence, 11, 19
Essential, 108

tions, 72,

Factor,

7,

import
73

of

proposi

28

17

Illicit process,

63 (footnote)

Immediate inference, 91
Implication, 10, 18

76-80

Jevons s inverse problem/ 39-43

Limits of statements, 33
Limits of variable ratios, 114143
Major, middle, minor, 54
from
Material,
distinguished
Formal, 109
Meaningless symbols, 110
Mediate inference, 91
Modality, 99
Multiple, 28
Particulars, 49
Ponendo ponens, &c., 104-107
90
Strong statements, 33, 34
Subalterns and subcontraries, 95,
96
Syllogisms, 54
Transposition, 56
Universals, 49
Universe of discourse, 46-50
Venn s problem, 32
Weak statements, 33, 34
Sorites,

Formal, 109
Functions, 13-17

Grammar,

of,

infinitesimal, 113

Product, 7

Excluded Middle, 92
Existential

and

SYMBOLIC LOGIC
INTRODUCTION
IN the following pages I have done my best to
explain in clear and simple language the principles of
a useful and widely applicable method of research.
Symbolic logic is usually thought to be a hard and
abstruse subject, and unquestionably the Boolian
system
and the more modern methods founded on it are hard
and abstruse. They are, moreover, difficult of application
and of no great utility. The symbolic system explained
1.

volume is, on the contrary, so simple that

an ordinary schoolboy of ten or twelve can in a
very
short time master its fundamental conceptions and learn
in this little

to

apply

its

rules

and formulae to practical problems,

mathematics (see
114, 118).

especially in elementary
Nor is it less useful

in

the

higher branches of
papers published in the
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society abundantly

mathematics, as

my

series of

There are two leading principles which separate

my symbolic system from all others. The first is the
principle that there is nothing sacred or eternal about
symbols that all symbolic conventions may be altered

prove.

when convenience
to new conditions,

requires it, in order to adapt

or to new classes of problems.

them
The

symbolist has a right, in such circumstances, to give a

to any old symbol, or
arrangement of

new meaning

symbols, provided the change of sense be accompanied

by a fresh definition, and provided the nature of the

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

1, 2

problem or investigation be such that we run no risk

The
of confounding the new meaning with the old.
second principle which separates my symbolic system
from others is the principle that the complete state

ment

or proposition

is

the real unit of

all

reasoning.

Provided the complete statement (alone or in connexion

with the context) convey the meaning intended, the
words chosen and their arrangement matter little. Every
argument, however complex, is built up of
and whenever a simple elementary
of the alphabet, is sufficient to
a
letter
as
such
symbol,
indicate or represent any statement, it will be a great
to repre
saving of time, space, and brain labour thus

intelligible

individual statements

sent
2.

it.

The words

and

statement

proposition

are

usually

In

my symbolic system,
synonymous.
regarded
however, I find it convenient to make a distinction,
albeit the distinction may be regarded as somewhat
I define a statement as any sound, sign, or
arbitrary.
as

symbol (or any arrangement of sounds, signs, or symbols)

employed to give information and I define a proposition
;

as a statement which, in regard to form, may be divided

into two parts respectively called subject and predicate.

Thus every proposition

is

a statement

but we cannot

A nod,
that every statement is a proposition.
a
a shake of the head, the sound of
signal gun, the
national flag of a passing ship, and the warning Caw

affirm

"

"

of a sentinel rook, are,

by

this definition, statements

but

the
The nod may mean I see him
not propositions.
the warning
I do not see him
shake of the head,
Caw of the rook, A man is coming with a gun," or
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

and so on. These propositions

Danger approaches
and
more
precisely what the simpler
specially
express
statements express more vaguely and generally. In thus

"

taking statements as the ultimate constituents of sym

reasoning I believe I am following closely the
gradual evolution of human language from its primitive

bolic

2,

INTRODUCTION

3]

forms to its complex developments in the

or living, of which we have knowledge
dead
languages,
can
be little doubt that the language or
There
now.
prehistoric

languages of primeval man, like those of the brutes

around him, consisted of simple elementary statements,
indivisible into subject and predicate, but differing from
those of

even

the

in

uninherited

order of

highest

being

more

or

less

brutes

in

being
conventional and

From their
therefore capable of indefinite development.
grammatical structure, even more than from their com
munity of roots, some languages had evidently a common
others appear to have started independently
origin
but all have sooner or later entered the prepositional
stage and thus crossed the boundary which separates
all brute languages, like brute intelligence, from the
;

human.
Let us suppose that amongst a certain prehistoric
the sound, gesture, or symbol S was the understood
This sound or
representation of the general idea stag.
3.

tribe,

symbol might also have been used, as single words are

often used even now, to represent a complete statement
or proposition, of which stag was the central and leading
The symbol S, or the word stag, might have
idea.
vaguely and varyingly done duty for
"

or

see a

"

is

"It

or

stag,"

&c.

is

stag
stag,"
coming,"
Similarly,
the customary language of the tribe, the sound or
symbol B might have conveyed the general notion of

in

bigness,

and have varyingly stood

for the

statement

"

It

see a big thing coming," &c.

big"
By degrees
men
would learn to combine two such sounds
primitive
or signs into a compound statement, but of varying
form or arrangement, according to the impulse of the

is

or

"

moment, as SB,
might mean I

or BS, or S B or S
see a big stag," or

&c.,

any of which

The stag is
or
A big stag is coming," &c. In like manner some varying
K
The
arrangement, such as SK, or S &c., might mean
"

"

big,"

"

"

stag has been

killed"

or

"I

have

killed

the

stag,"

&c.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

3,

Finally, and after many tentative or haphazard changes,

would come the grand chemical combination of these
linguistic atoms into the compound linguistic molecules
which we call propositions.
The arrangement S B (or
some other) would eventually crystallize and permanently
The stag is
and a similar form S K would
signify
These are two
permanently mean The stag is killed."
complete propositions, each with distinct subject and
On the other hand, S B and S K (or some
predicate.
other forms) would permanently represent The big stag
and
The killed
These are not complete pro
"

big"

"

"

"

"

stag."

positions
they are
for their predicates.

merely qualified subjects

development

On

waiting
these general ideas of linguistic

have founded

my

symbolic system.

CHAPTER
4.

THE symbol A B

individual
if

then

haired."

denotes a proposition of which the

B the predicate. Thus,

the subject and

is

aunt, and B represents brown-haired,

the
represents
My aunt is brownproposition
Now the word aunt is a class term a person

represents

AB

my

"

may have

several aunts, and any one of

them may be

To distinguish between
them we may employ numerical suffixes, thus A l3 A 2
A 3 &c., Aunt No. 1, Aunt No. 2, &c. or we may
distinguish between them by attaching to them different

represented by the symbol A.

attributes, so that
B would mean
red-haired aunt, and so on.

brown-haired aunt,
Thus, when A is a

my

AR my

class term,

of

whom

let

example,
"

the race

by

me."

AB

denotes the individual (or an individual)

which the proposition A B is true. For

or of

and

Then

mean
mean

"the

H,

which

the complex proposition

has been sold by me," or

"

horse";
"

let s

/ sold

The
I

w mean

or

short for

is

"

let

it"

"

it

"it

won

has been sold

(H w )

s
,

represents

which won the race

have sold the horse which
horse

EXPLANATIONS OF SYMBOLS

W 4-61J

SS

won the

Here we

race."

of horses,

Hr H H
2

are supposed to have a series

Hw

which

&c., of

are also supposed to have a series, S 1?

which, at some time or other, I sold
;

asserts that the individual

Vy

vv

is one
and we
S 2 S &c., of things
and the proposition
;

3>

of the

first series

H,

Thus the suffix w

If we inter
the exponent s predicative.
is adjectival;
we
the
suffix
and
exponent,
get
proposition
change
the horse which I have sold won
which asserts that
The symbol H w without an adjectival
the
belongs also to the

second series

S.

"ETJ,

"

race."

merely

suffix,

asserts

that a

or the

horse,

won

horse,

the race without specifying which horse of the series

H H
lf

&c.
2>

small minus before the predicate or exponent, or

an acute accent affecting the whole statement, indicates
means The horse has been caught
Thus if
denial.
c
then H~ c or (H ) means The horse has not been caught!
In accordance with the principles of notation laid down,
the symbol H_ c will, on this understanding, mean
The
horse
horse which has not been caught" or the
uncaught
so that a minus suffix, like a suffix without a minus, is
5.

"

"

"

"

"

"

The caught horse

The symbol H c
assumes
c
H
which asserts that The horse has been
the statement
caught."
Similarly H_ c assumes the statement H~.
denotes non-existence, so that O lf 2
6. The symbol
&c., denote a series of names or symbols which
3
adjectival.

("

")

"

correspond
realities.

as

before,

to nothing in our universe of admitted

and C the same meanings
Hence, if we give

the symbol

will

assert

that

"

The

horse

caught does not exist which is equivalent to the statement

that
No horse has been caught." The symbol H^,
"

which denies the statement

as

"

The

horse caught does

caught."

symbol
exist"

or

H
"

H, may

exist,"

or

"

therefore be read

Some horse has been

Following the same principle of notation, the

c
may be read An uncaught horse does not
Every horse has been caught." The context
"

would, of course, indicate the particular totality of horses

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

TSS
LOO

6-8

For example, H c may mean Every horse

that escaped has been caught," the words in italics
being
understood. On the same principle H: denies H? c and
may therefore be read Some uncaught horse does exist"
or
Some horse has not been caught."
B
D
7. The symbol A x C
or its usually more convenient
D
B
B D
A
-C
or
synonym
(without a point) A C asserts two
things
namely, that A belongs to the class B, and that C

referred

"

to.

"

"

belongs to the class

that

it,

<(

AB + C D

is

or, as

logicians

and that

B"

an alternative

asserts

B, or

belongs to the class

else

more

is

"C

briefly express

The symbol

D."

namely, that

to the class

"

Either

"

or, as

it is

more usually and briefly expressed, that Either A is B,

or C is
The alternative A B + C D does not necessarily
"

D."

AB

and C are mutually

propositions
exclusive neither does it imply that they are not.
For
B
and C D
example, if A means
Alfred is a barrister
that

imply

the

"

means

"
"

Charles

"

is

Alfred

AB + C D

that

doctor,"

ABC D

then

and

barrister,

asserts

Charles a

a doctor

is

Charles

"Either

Alfred

is

that

asserts

while

doctor

barrister,

or

which (apart from context)

a statement

does not necessarily exclude the possibility of A B C D that

B
both A
and C D are true.^
Similar conventions hold
,

good

for

AB C DE F

ventions
as
(

(1)

we

B D
(A C )

and

AB + CD + E F

various

get

= A- B + C- D

A B C- D / = A- B + C D

(4)

&c.

From

self-evident

(A

(2)

these con

such

formulae,

+ C D = A- B CJ-D
)

A B + c-y = A- B C D

(3)

In pure or abstract logic statements are represented

letters, and we classify them according to

8.

by single

attributes as true, false, certain, impossible, variable, respec

tively

denoted by the

Thus the symbol

that

is false,

that

Greek

five

ABCD
1

letters

E* asserts that

is certain,

that

T,

i,

e,

is

is impossible,

tj,

0.

true,

that

To preserve mathematical analogy,

and C D may be called factors
A B C D and terms of the sum A B + C D though, of course,
these words have c[uite different meanings in logic from those they
A"

of the product

bear in mathematics.

EXPLANATIONS OF SYMBOLS

8-101

SS
00

-I

(possible
asserts that

only

is

The symbol

instance.

The symbol
uncertain).
true in a particular case or

but

variable

is

AT

more than

asserts

this:

it

always true (or true

within the limits of our data and defini

asserts that

in every case)

certain, that

is

is

The symbol
only
probability is 1.
a
in
false
is
that
asserts
particular case or instance;
in
it says nothing as to the truth or falsehood of
than
more
A
asserts
The
instances.
other
symbol
it asserts that A contradicts some datum or defini
this
that

tions,

its

77

and A are simply

one case, and raises no

Thus

tion, that its probability is 0.

each refers only to

to data or probability.
general question as
assertive;

that

it

^A"

is

(A

The symbol

a variable) is equivalent to A
neither impossible nor certain, that

is

is,

asserts

that

In other words, A asserts that

is possible but uncertain.
nor 1, but some proper
neither
A
is
the probability of
fraction between the two.

means (A B ) C

A BC

The symbol

9.

it

asserts* that the

statement A belongs to the class C, in which C may

BCD
means
denote true, or false, or possible, &c.
Similarly A
30 1
is
evident
it
definition
From this
and so on.
B

(A

that

t7)
,

",

1 1
*

nor

et

or

not necessarily

is

A
AB CD

equivalent to

The symbol
means (A B C- D or
10.

an implication, and
D
synonym (A- + C )*. It may be

is

its

)",

It is impossible

without

C belonging

called

read in various ways, as (1)

belongs to the class B, then
(3)

generally equivalent to

ie

that

AB

CD

(2) If
C belongs to the class
can belong to the class

to the class

implies

(4) It

is

certain that

does not belong to the class B or else C belongs

Some logicians consider these four
to the class D.
but all
do not
equivalent, while others

either

propositions

ambiguity

may

be avoided by the convention, adopted

B
The symbol A BC must not be confounded with the symbol A C which
B C
nor with the
sometimes use as a convenient abbreviation for A A
B C which I use as short for A B + A
symbol A
*

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

8
that

here,

the

AB CD

symbol
B

(A"

+ CD

Each

are

they

and

synonyms,

means (A B

D
C"

that
or

1?

10 11

[SS
LOO

each, like

its

synonym

more than
and A (for
and A T respec

therefore usually asserts

B
D
B
D T
(A C- ) and than (A~ + C ) because
any statement A) asserts more than A
1

A"

tively (see
8).
B
11. Let the proposition
be denoted by a single
letter a
then a will denote its denial A~ B or (A 8 )

When each letter denotes a statement, the symbol

A B C is short for (A B)(B C). It asserts that A
The symbol (A = B)
implies B and that B implies C.
means (A B)(B A).
The symbol A B (which may
:

be called an inverse implication) asserts that A is implied

in B
it is therefore
The symbol
equivalent to B A.
:

A B C
!

short

is

for

(A

it
is
therefore
C)
we thus use single letters

B)(B

When
equivalent to C B A.
to denote statements, we
get numberless self-evident or
:

To
easily proved formulae, of which I subjoin a few.
avoid an inconvenient multiplicity of brackets in these and
in other formulae I lay down the convention that the
sign
of equivalence ( = ) is of
longer reach than the sign of
implication ( ), and that the sign of implication ( ) is of
:

longer reach than the sign of disjunction or alternation( + ).

Thus the equivalence a = /3 y means a = (j3: y), not
:

(a

= /3)

and

y,

A+B

+ $) = xa + xp\
(a + /3) = a /3
(4)

(I) x(a
(3)

(7)
(9)

= x:ap-,

(A:B:C):(A:C);
(A!C)!(A!B!C);

a:/8 = /8
(6) a +
!

:x

+ /3

C)

= (a
:

x)(j3 :x)

+ A ) (12) (A + A ) (13) (AA

+ A*/ (15) A A
(A +
= (A
A (17) A = (A
(18)
A = (AY; (20) e:A = A (21) A =
Ae-A; (23) Aiy =
;

A":

A"

A"

)";

(19)

(22)

17.

(16)

:a

A + (B

x, not

(A C)
(A
(10) (A C) (A B C)

(8)

(II) (A
(14)

(2) (a/3)

(5) (x:a)(x:p)

+ B)

x means (A

17

A"

x).

RR
O5

LOGIC OF FUNCTIONS

11-141

-J

These formulae, like all valid formulae in symbolic

whether the individual letters represent
logic, hold good
certainties, impossibilities, or variables.
12. The following examples will illustrate the

working

of this symbolic calculus in simple cases.

+ B Cy = A (B C) - A (B + C = A B + A C
= A- (B- C = A- (B + C~ )
(2) (A + B- C
=
+ A )(B* + + C
=
A
B
A
(A B y = A*(A- + B(3) (A- +
= A*
+
+ A B- = A
=
B
B~
and
for A A- +B
(an impossibility),
(A

(1)

C"

).

(A"

A"

B")

(B<

rj

CHAPTER
SYMBOLS

13.

the forms F(x), f(x),

of

called Functions of

II
&c.,

are

of x means an expression
denotes a
a symbol

When
containing the symbol x.
function of x, the symbols <(),
denote what

(f)(x),

A function

x.

<p(x)

&c., respectively
put for x, when /3

</>(/3),

becomes when a is
As a simple mathematical ex

<p(x)

put for x, and

2
ample, let (f)(x) denote 5x
2
denotes 5a
3a + 1
so on.

is

<p(a)

can see that ^)(4)

1) =

<(

69, that ((1)

and so

9,

3x

on.

Then, by definition,
in mathematics

and any tyro

3,

that

As an example

(/>(0)

that

1,

in symbolic logic,

denote the complex implication (A B) (A* B*).

e
B e ), which is easily
Then
will denote (A B) (A
*
will denote
while
formula
seen to be a valid
let

(p(x)

<p(e)

</>($)

9
(A B ), which is not valid.
are
14. Symbols of the forms F(#, y\
y), &c.,
called functions of x and y.
Any of the forms may be
employed to represent any expression that contains loth the
Let (p(x, y) denote any function of x
symbols x and y.
and ?/ then the symbol (p(a, /3) will denote what
y)

(A

B)

(f>(x,

<p(x,

Any formula
values (or meanings),

is

<f>(x)

ar

lt

called valid

x-2,

#3,

&c

when

of x.

it is

true for all admissible

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

10

14-16

[8S
LOO

becomes when a is put for x and /3 for y. Hence,

x)
denote what
y) becomes when x and y inter
For example, let B = boa-constrictor, let
change places.
R = rabbit, and let
R) denote the statement that
</>(?/,

will

(j>(x,

<p(B,

The

"

swallowed the

boa-constrictor

that the symbol

follows

It

rabbit."

that

assert

The

"

rabbit
B)
swallowed the boa-constrictor."
15. As another example, let T (as usual) denote true,
and let p denote probable.
Also let
p) denote the
will

</>(R,

<>(T,

implication (A B f
probable that A and
T

P
(A.

BP ) T which
,

are both true,

asserts that
it

is

"

If

it

true that

is

and

are both probable!

Then (p(p, T) will denote the con
If it is true that
verse (or inverse) implication, namely,
"

and
both

are both

probable, it is

little

probable that

and

are

consideration will show that

p)
T).
always true, but not always
16. Let
denote any function of one or more con
stituents
that is to say, let (p be short for
or for
true."

<p(r,

is

<p(p,

<p

(p(x, y),

that
its

is,

<p(x),

The symbol

asserts that (p is certain,

true for all admissible values (or meanings) of

&c.

constituents

sible,

that

is,

(p

the symbol

(p**

asserts that

is

of its constituents

the symbol

impos

<p

false for all admissible values (or

means

meanings)
e

<~

1?
<~

which

<p

asserts that (p is neither certain nor impossible ; while

asserts that (p is a meaningless statement which is neither
<p

w = whale, h = herring,
denote
the statement
h)
small whale can swallow a large herring!
We

true nor false.

c

= conclusion.

For example,

Also

let

let

<p(w,

that

"

get
.

(p\w,

li)

<p(h,

w)

$\w,

c),

a three-factor statement which asserts (1) that it is certain

that a small whale can swallow a large herring, (2) that
it is impossible that a small
Iwrrijig can swallow a large

whale, and (3) that it is unmeaning to say that a small

whale can swallow a large conclusion.
Thus we see that
y), F(x, y), &c., are really blank forms of more or less
cf>(x,

SS
00

GRAMMAR

APPLICATION TO

171J

16

11

complicated expressions or statements, the blanks being

and the symbols or
represented by the symbols x, y, &c.,
words to be substituted for or in the blanks being a, /3,
a/3,

&c., as

/3,

the case

may

be.

y) be any

proposition containing the

(p(x,
words x and y and let
z), in which z is substituted
for ?/, have the same meaning as the proposition (p(x, y).
Should we in this case consider y and z as necessarily

Let

17.

of the

<p(x,

same part

English, are but

of speech

In languages which, like

inflected, the rule generally holds

found useful in teaching grammar to

little

be
from the narrow conventional view of
but
beginners
rule would not be accepted as absolute.
the
grammarians
for
Take,
example, the two propositions He talks non
and He talks foolishly." They both mean the
sense

good and

may

"

"

"

yet grammarians would call non-sense a

Here
while
noun,
they would call foolishly an adverb.
conventional grammar and strict logic would appear to
The truth is that so-called "general
part company.

same thing

grammar,"

or a collection of rules of construction

classification applicable to

The

possible.

complete

all

languages

alike,

is

and

hardly

proposition is the unit of all

in which the separate words are

reasoning; the manner

combined to construct a proposition varies according to
In no
the particular bent of the language employed.
the
Consider
same.
the
is
it
two languages
exactly
following example.
let

K = has

= His

been killed, and

His son has been

let

"

proposition

Let S

son,
<(S,

killed

A = in

let

Africa,

K, A) denote the
in

Africa"

By

symbolic conventions, the symbol (p(S, A, K), in

and A have interchanged places,
which the symbols
His son in Africa has been
denotes the proposition
Do these two propositions differ in meaning?
killed."
Let S A denote his son in Africa (to
Clearly they do.

our

"

and let
distinguish him, say, from S c his son in China),
A denote has been killed in Africa (as distinguished
,

from

has

been

killed

in

China}.

It

follows

that

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

17, 18

A, K) must mean S*, whereas

mean S KA In the former, A has the force

<(S,

<t>(S,

K, A)

of

an

referring to the noun S, whereas, in the latter,

the force of an adverb referring to the verb K.
in general, as regards symbols of the form
x

has

And

K Ay A
,

the letter

must

adjective

z>

denotes the leading or class idea, the

point of resemblance, while the subscripta x, y, z, &c.,
denote the points of difference which distinguish the
Hence
separate members of the general or class idea.
&c.,

that

it is

adjectives,

when
or

denotes a noun, the subscripta denote

adjective-equivalents;

whereas when

denotes a verb, the subscripta denote adverbs, or adverbWhen we look into the matter closely, the
equivalents.
of verbs, to indicate moods or tenses, have
really the force of adverbs, and, from the logical point
of view, may be
For
regarded as adverb-equivalents.
inflections

if S
denote the word speak, S x may denote
S may denote will speak, and so on just as when
S denotes He spoke, & x may denote He spoke well, or He
spoke French, and S y may denote He spoke slowly, or He
So in the Greek expression
spoke Dutch, and so on.
oi rore
then
men, or the men of that time),
avOpwTroi (the
the adverb TOTC has really the force of an
adjective, and

example,

spoke,

may

?/

be considered an

adjective- equivalent.

CHAPTER

III

THE main

cause of symbolic paradoxes is the

words
in current
ambiguity
Take, for
language.
the
words
When we say, If
example,
if and implies.
in the centigrade thermometer the
mercury falls below
1

8.

of

"

water will freeze," we evidently assert a

general
law which is true in all cases within the limits of
tacitly
understood conditions.
This is the sense in which the
zero,

word
is

if is used throughout this book (see

It
10).
understood to refer to a general law rather than to

PARADOXES AND AMBIGUITIES

18, 19]

13

So with the word implies. Let M z

F
The mercury will fall below zero" and let
denote
The
Water will freeze."
denote
preceding conditional
z
F
which
statement will then be expressed by M
a particular case.

"

"

But

convention

this

implies the proposition

forces us to accept some

the proposition

asserts that

paradoxical-looking formulae, such as y x and x e, which

hold good whether the statement x be true or false.
:

The former asserts that if an impossibility be true any

statement x is true, or that an impossibility implies any
The latter asserts that the statement x
statement.
(whether true or
other words) that
will

is

true

is

true.

e,

or

(in

The paradox

more curious when we change x

still

appear

if

any certainty

implies

false)

into e

We

formula, or x into Y\ in the second.

asserts that any im
then get the formula
e, which
reason why the
The
possibility implies any certainty.
in the

first

>/

formula appears paradoxical to some persons is

e to
probably this, that they erroneously understand
mean Q^ Q and to assert that if any statement Q is
But
impossible it is also certain, which would be absurd.
last

tj

rj

mean

does not

simply means

this

74)
(see
by definition it
asserts that the statement
;

y, which

(i/e

is an impossibility, as it evidently is.

Similarly,
x means (yx ) and asserts that rjx is an impossibility,
which is true, since the statement rjx contains the im
We prove x e as follows
possible factor tj.
tje

11

tj

= =

=
For

>;,

since

7
:

denial of any certainty is some

That, on the other hand, the
20).
formula is evident
is not a valid

for it clearly fails in the case ty

19.

sign

e.

the

impossibility (see

implication Q*

>>

Other paradoxes
of equivalence

Taking

Q = n,

we get

from the ambiguity of the

In this book the statement

arise
).

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

14

= /3)

19,

20

not necessarily assert that a and /3 are

that
they have the same meaning, but only
synonymous,
that they are equivalent in the sense that each implies
(a

does

the other, using the word implies as denned in

10.
In this sense any two certainties, e l and e y are equivalent,

however

different in
*7

for the denial of

Again we

and so are any two im

but not necessarily two different
We prove this as follows. By

meaning

and 2
possibilities,
i
$2
and
variables,
1
definition, we have
r)

any

certainty e x is

some

impossibility

tj

have, by definition,

But we cannot

any two variables, 9 1 and O y

For example, $ 2 might be
necessarily equivalent.
the denial of 0^ in which case we should get
assert that

are

The symbol used

to

assert

that

any two statements,

a and

the sense of each

/3, are not only equivalent (in
the
but
also
but
other)
implying
synonymous, is (a
/3)
this being an awkward symbol to
the
employ,
symbol

used instead.
symbol
temporarily denote the word
possible, let p denote probable, let q denote improbable, and
let u denote uncertain, while the
have
6, r,
symbols e,
(a

/3),

it

though

asserts less, is generally

20. Let the

TT

rj )

We
w=
A(A

their usual significations.

have (A

7r

= A-

1}

and

),

by definition,
and A? will
is
greater than

while A^

respectively assert that the chance of A

These conventions
J, that it is less than J.
nine-factor formula

shall then,

give us the

PARADOXES AND AMBIGUITIES

901J

15

an
2) that the denial of a truth is
denial of a
the
that
and
4)
(3,
untruth,
conversely;
is an improbability, and conversely; (5, 6) that
probability
* is an
impossibility, and con
the denial of a certainty

which

asserts (1,

versely

(7

that the denial of a variable

is

a variable

that the denial of a possibility is an uncertainty,

(8, 9)
and conversely. The first four factors are pretty evident
Some persons might reason,
the other five are less so.
W
for example, that instead of (TT ) we should have (ir J*
* is not
that the denial of a
merely an uncer

possibility

single concrete example

tainty but an impossibility.
The state
not correct.
is
the
that
show
will
reasoning
"

ment

"

possibility

but

to-morrow

rain

will

It

"

denial

its

may

It will

be considered a

not rain

to-morrow,"

The formula
though an uncertainty is not an impossibility.
U
denote
Let
follows
as
be
Q
any state
proved
(T/) may
of
statements
a
collection
of
out
random
at
ment taken
:

certainties,

containing
W

prove

(TT )

impossibilities,

is
equivalent to proving

(^y = Q- (Q f =
:

for

Q.

(Q y =

e
>

and (Q

To prove that

(TT )*,

Q<

+ Q*

Q*>

and
Q"

To
Thus we

variables.
M

(Q

e
:

(Q

whatever be the statement

on the other hand,

not valid,

is

we have only to instance a single case of failure. Giving

e
Q the same meaning as before, a case of failure is Q
for we then get, putting Q, = V
;

*
or its synonym A-,
By the denial of a certainty is not meant (A*)
which denies that a particular statement A is certain, but (Ae) or its
This state
statement A e
synonym A e the denial of the admittedly certain
ment Ae (since a suffix or subscriptum is adjectival and not predicative)
truth of
assumes A to be certain for both A x and its denial A. x assume the
not mean
"the denial of a possibility" does
A* (see
Similarly,
4, 5).
"

"

A-

but AV, or
statement ATT.

its

synonym

(A*)

the denial of the admittedly possible

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

16

21

may seem

21. It

paradoxical to say that the pro

r
not
position
quite synonymous with A nor A with
A yet such is the fact. Let K It rains. Then A
It docs not rain ; AJ
it is true that it rains ; and A
it

is

The two propositions

and
false that it rains.
in
the
sense
that
each
the
other
equivalent
implies

is

=
=

are

but
they are not synonymous, for we cannot always substitute
the one for the other.
In other words, the equivalence
T
A
not
does
)
(A
necessarily imply the equivalence
;

A) = ((A

For example, let 0(A) denote A e then

).
T e
Te
denotes
)
(A ) or its synonym A (see
13).
Sup
A
now
that
denotes T a variable that turns out
pose
true, or happens to be true in the case considered, though
it is not true in all cases.
We et
(f>(

<p(A.

never a

for a variable is

certainty,

though

it

may

turn out

true in a particular case.

Again,

we

get

means

for 6 T

which is a formal certainty.

T
though we have A = A yet

(0 T )

case, therefore,

In this

<(A)

not

is

a
Next, suppose A denotes
equivalent to ^(A ).
variable that happens to be false in the case considered,
though it is not false always.
get
T

We

for

no variable (though

it

may

turn out false in a parti

On the other hand,

cular case) can be an impossibility.

we get
l

<(A

for 0;

means

= (A - A - &? = (0;)* = = e
)

(0

case, therefore,

which

e<

is

a formal certainty.

though we have

A =A

In this

l
,

yet

<^>(A

is

not

It is a remarkable fact that

equivalent to <(A ).
nearly
all civilised
languages, in the course of their evolution,

as if impelled

by some unconscious

instinct,

have drawn

DEGREES OF STATEMENTS

21, 22]

17

between a simple affirmation A and the

A is true; and also between a simple
denial A and the statement A that A is false.
It is the
first step in the classification of statements, and marks a
faculty which man alone of all terrestrial animals appears
this distinction

statement

that

to possess (see

22, 99).

As already remarked,

my system of logic takes

account not only of statements of the second degree, such
a
as A ^, but of statements of higher degrees, such as A a/3y
a^5
A
&c.
But, it may be asked, what is meant by state
22.

ments of the second,

subject

is itself

synonym (A

^)

is

when the primary

The statement A a/3y or its

third, &c., degrees,

a statement

a statement of the

first

degree as re

but as it is synonymous
gards its immediate subject A
a
with (A / Y it is a statement of the second degree as
regards A and a statement of the third degree as regards
a^

tt

Viewed from another

A, the root statement of the series.
a
standpoint, A may be called a revision of the judgment
A, which (though here it is the root statement, or root
judgment, of the series) may itself have been a revision
of some previous judgment here unexpressed.
Similarly,
be called a revision of the judgment A a and so
(A")^ may
on.
To take the most general case, let A denote any
th
complex statement (or judgment) of the n
degree.
If it be neither a formal certainty (see
109), like
e
e
a) nor a formal impossibility, like (a/3
a) it may
(aft
,

be a material certainty, impossibility, or variable, according

to the special data on which it is founded.
If it follows
necessarily

from these data,

it is

a certainty, and

we write

incompatible with these data, it is an impossi

and
we
write A* if it neither follows from nor is
bility,
with
our data, it is a variable, and we write
incompatible
A 6 But whether this new or revised judgment be A e or
A or A it must necessarily be a judgment (or state
th
ment) of the (?i+l)
degree, since, by hypothesis, the
statement A is of the n ih degree.
Suppose, for ex
;

if it is

7*

ample,

denotes a functional statement

y,

(p(x,

z)

of

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

18
th

the n

degree,

(or values)

<p

which may have m different meanings

the different
2
3 &c., depending upon
(/>

meanings x v x z x 3

Of these

[^ 22-24

y v yz yy

&c.,

different

&c., z v z z zy &c., of x, y,
,

of A, or its

meanings

synonym

z.

let

<,

If A, or its synonym
one be taken at random.
y, z),
be true for r meanings out of its m possible meanings,
then the chance of A is r/m, and the chance of its denial
A is (m r)/m. When r m, the chance of A is one,
<j)(x,

and the chance of A is zero,

When r = o, the chance of A is
so that

is one,

we write

T?

(A

so that
zero,

we

write

A^A )

and the chance of

When r

*.

some number

is

than m and greater than o, then r/m and (m r)/m

e
are two proper fractions, so we write A (A )
But, as
6
e
A
this
revised
A?
A
or
or
we
whether
before,
get
less

fl

judgment of the first degree as

th
root
A, is a judgment of the (n+ l)
regards its expressed
For
degree as regards some unexpressed root ^(x, y, z).

judgment, though

0e

9
9
so
then A will denote
denote
the
of
will be a judgment (or statement)
fourth

if

instance,

that

it is

it

degree as regards \J/-.

23. It may be remarked that any statement A and
T
its denial A are always of the same degree, whereas A
and A their respective equivalents but not synonyms (see
1

one degree higher. The statement

and confirmation of the judgment A
while A is a revision and reversal of the judgment A.
We suppose two incompatible alternatives, A and A to
be placed before us with fresh data, and we are to decide
which is true. If we pronounce in favour of A, we con
T
if we
firm the previous judgment A and write A
pro
nounce in favour of A we reverse the previous judgment
A and write A
21), are

19,

is

of

a revision

Some

24.

of

"

false
it

that

must be

it is not correct to speak

sometimes true and sometimes
must be true always and if false,

logicians say that

any statement as
if

true, it

"

false always.

To

this I reply, as I did in

my

seventh paper published in the Proceedings of the London

VARIABLE STATEMENTS

24]

Mathematical Society, that

true and sometimes

mean

the

that

when

false,"

or

"

"

say
is a

or

symbol, word,

19

is

sometimes
I

merely

of

words,

variable,"

collection

denoted by A sometimes represents a truth and some

For example, suppose the symbol A
times an untruth.
Mrs. Brown is not at home."
denotes the statement
This is not a formal certainty, like 3>2, nor a formal
like 3
2, so that when we have no data but
impossibility,
Mrs. Brown is not at
the mere arrangement of words,
"

<

"

we

are justified in calling this proposition, that is

to say, this intelligible arrangement of words, a variable, and
6
If at the moment the servant tells me
in asserting A
home,"

Mrs.

Brown

home

"

I happen to see
Brown walking away in the distance, then / have
data and form the judgment A which, of course,
"

that

Mrs.

not at

is

fresh

implies

because

its

denial

my

contradict
instead

In this

case

Mrs.
("

say that

Brown

is

data, the evidence of

"

is

at

home

my

eyes.

certain,"

")

would
But if,

in the
seeing Mrs. Brown walking away
see her face peeping cautiously behind a
through a corner of a window, I obtain fresh

of

distance,

curtain

data of an opposite kind, and form the judgment A?,

In this case I say that "A is im
which implies A
statement represented by A,
the
because
possible,"
is not at home," this time contra
Mrs.
Brown
namely,
dicts
data, which, as before, I obtain through the
1

"

my

medium

what
is

of

is
it

is

my

different

when

different

when she

two
it

To say that the proposition

proposition when it is false

like saying that Mrs.

is true, is

person

is out.

eyes.

when

she

is

in from

from

Brown

what she

is

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

20

[25

CHAPTER IV
25.

THE

following three rules are often useful:

(1)
(2)

(3)

In the last of these formulae, O x denotes the first variable

of the series O
r g Q y &c., that comes after the last-named
in our argument.
For example, if the last variable that
has entered into our argument be 9 then X will denote
y
In the first two formulae it is not necessary to state
4
which of the series
e
the e in
&c., is
,

<(e),

represented by

<?

g,

nor which of the series

by the

>y

>?

>?

3,

&c., is

represented

19, we have always

proved in
=
an d (nx ^ly}^ whatever be the certainties ex and
( x
e
and whatever the impossibilities j x and
v
Suppose,
y
for example, that \|^ denotes
tj

in

<(>/);

for, as

y)>

9j

A-B

We

C^CrAB

get
:

2)

so that the fourth or bracket factor of

\^ may be omitted
without altering the value or
In this
meaning of \J/-.

operation

we assumed the formulae

(/ =

(1)

>/);

(2) (ae

= o);

(3) fo

+ a = a).

Other formulae frequently required are

/

=A +B
/

(5) (A + BJ^A B
(6) e + A = e;
(7) AA^iy;
(8) A + A =e;
=
=
(9)
(10) i/
e;
(11) A + AB = A
(12) (A + B)(A + C) = A + BC.

(AB)

(4)

rj-

FORMULAE OF OPERATION

26, 27]

26. For the rest of this chapter

we

shall exclude the

consideration of variables, so that A, A T

sidered mutually equivalent, as will also
this

21

A will be con
A A A*. On
e

understanding we get the formulae

(I)

(3)

From

A0(A) = A0(e);

A((A =
)

AB

(6)AB>(A

AB

<(A

others, such as

= AB
?)
B) = AB 0(7,
B = AB

B)

<(A,

(7)

(4)

we derive

these formulae
(5)

(2)

A<(>7);

<(e,

17);

<07,

e),

/
and so on; like signs, as in A<(A) or A /
in the
),
same letter, producing
and unlike signs, as in
B 0(B) or B<(B ), producing
The following ex
amples will show the working of these formulae
<^)(A

<f>(e)

<(>?).

Let

Then
B) = AB C + A BC
AB 0(A, B) = ABXAB C + A BC

we

<(A,

get

B^(A, B) = A B(AB C + A BC
/

Then,

= A B(C y=A BC.

let
0(B, D) = (CD + C D + B C
B D ^(B, D) = B D CCD + C D + B C /
/

Next,

= B D (C + C )
=B D e =B D =
/

/ /

i7.

25 would,
The application of Formula? (4), (5), (11) of
of course, have obtained the same result, but in a more
troublesome manner.

any product ABC any statement-factor is

any other factor, or combination of factors,
If in any sum (i.e.,
the implied factor may be omitted.
27.

If in

implied in

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

22
alternative)
the sum of

These

A + B + C,

rules

any term implies any

others, the implying term

any

are

expressed

27, 28

other, or

be omitted.
by the two

may

symbolically

formulae

(A:B):(AB = A);

(1)

+ B = B).

(A B) (A

(2)

virtue of the formula (x a)(x /3)

x a/3, these two
be
combined
into
the
may
single formula

By

formulae

(A:B):(AB = A)(A + B = B).

(3)

As the converse of each

holds good, we get

of

these three formulae also

A:B = (AB = A)=:(A + B = B).

Hence, we get A + AB = A, omitting the term AB, because
it
and we also get A(A + B) = A,
implies the term A
A
the
factor
+
B, because it is implied by the
omitting
(4)

factor A.

A B

is
A), and B is a
equivalent to (AB
follows
that
the
AB,
consequent B may be
called a factor of the antecedent A, in any implication A B,

28. Since

factor of

it

and

same

that, for the

A may

reason, the antecedent

be

called a multiple of the consequent B.

The equivalence
of
B and (A AB) may be proved as follows

(A = AB) = (A AB)(AB
= A AB = (A
:

The equivalence
as follows

of

A) = (A

The formulae assumed

:

AB)e

= A + B B = (A
(x

A)(A B) = e(A B) = A B.
A B and (A + B = B) may be proved
:

aft)

= (x

a)(x

in these
:

0),

B)(B B)
:

=A

B.

two proofs are

and a

+ p:x = (a: x)(&

x),

both of which

may be considered axiomatic. For to

If x is true, then a and /3 are both true
assert that
is
If x is true a is true, and
equivalent to asserting that
"

"

"

REDUNDANT TERMS

28, 2 J]

2tt

If either a
Also, to assert that
If
is equivalent to asserting that
if ft is true x is true."
"

if

is

true

ft is

true."
"

or

ft is

is

true x

is

true

is true, and
To discover the redundant terms

true x

X29.

"

of any logical

sum, or alternative statement.

These redundant terms are easily detected by mere
are multiples of)
inspection when they evidently imply (or
co-terms, as in the case of the terms underlined in
single

the expression

But when they

which therefore reduces to a y + fty
of two or
sum
the
but
do not imply single co-terms,
.

more co-terms, they cannot generally be thus detected

be discovered
by inspection. They can always, however,
includes all cases.
by the following rule, which
or alternative may be
sum
Any term of a logical
omitted as redundant when this term multiplied by the
denial of the sum of all its co-terms gives an impossible
the term must not
but if the product is not
product
statement
alternative
be omitted. Take, for example, the
17,

>/

CD + C D + B C + B D
Beginning with the

first

term we get

CD (C D + B C + B D = CD w + B + B e)
= CD (B ) =BCD
Taking
Hence, the first term CD must not be omitted.
next the second term C D we get
C D(CD + B C + B D / = C D(w 4- B e + B
(

>;

= C D(B /=BC D.
/

Hence, the second term

next take the third term

B C (CD

CD
BC

must not be omitted.

,

We

getting

+ C D + B D = B C ^D + eD + eD /
= B C (D + D / = B C =
)

//

This shows that the third term

BC

>/.

can be omitted as

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

24
redundant.

term

29-31

fSS
LOO

Omitting the third term, we try the

B D thus
B D (CD + CO))

last

= B D (Ce + C ?) = B D C

This shows that the fourth term

BD

cannot be omitted

as redundant if we omit the third term.

But if we retain
the third term B C we may omit the fourth term B

for

we then get

B D (CD + C D + B C

= B D (Ce + C ? + eC
=B D (C+c y=B D

/
>;=>;.

Thus, we may omit either the third term B C or else

the fourth term B D as redundant, but not both.
30. A complex alternative
may be said to be in its
,

simplest form* when it contains no redundant terms, and

none of its terms (or of the terms
left) contains any re
dundant factor. For example, a + ab + m + m n is reduced
to its simplest form when we omit the
redundant term ab,
and out of the last term strike out the
unnecessary factor m
For a + ab = a, and m + m n = m + n, so that the
simplest
form of the expression is a + m + n. (See
.

31.

To reduce a complex

31.)
alternative to its
simplest
a ft f to the denial of
ft)

form, apply the formula (a +

the alternative. Then
a + ft to
apply the formula (a/5)
the negative
compound factors of the result, and omit
the redundant terms in this new result.
Then

develop
the denial of this
product by the same formulae, and go
through the same process as before.
The final result
will be the
simplest equivalent of the original alternative.
Take, for example, the alternative given in
30, and
denote it by
We get
<p.

m n=
= (. + m + m n) = a m (m n) = a!m (m + n = a
= (0 = (a!m n = a
f

<f>

What

I here call its

simplest form I called its
primitive form
third paper in the
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society;
but the word
WOTfl
nrimiflVo is
ia Vloy/^l-rr r-^
^_i.
primitive
hardly appropriate.
"

"

"

"

my

"
"

"

METHODS OF SIMPLIFICATION

32]

:!!,

25

As another example take the alternative

AB C + ABD + A B D + ABD + A B D,
and denote it by
Then, omitting, as we go along, all
terms which mere inspection will show to be redundant,
we get
(f>.

= AB C + AB( D + D + A B (D + D)
= AB C + ABe + A B e = AB C + AB + A B
)

= A + B + C)(A + B A + B)
= A + B C)(A + B) = A B + AB C.
= (A B + AB C) = A + B )(A + B + C

)(

Applying
terms,

we

B C ) may

the

find

test

of

29

to

redundant
term (AC or

discover

that the second or fourth

be omitted as redundant, but not both.

We

thus get
cf>

either

of

= AB + A B + B C = AB + AC + A B
which may be taken

as

the simplest form

of<.

32. We will now apply the preceding principles to

an interesting problem given by Dr. Venn in his
Sym
bolic Logic" (see the edition of 1894, page 331).
Suppose we were asked to discuss the following
set of rules, in respect to their mutual consistency and
"

brevity.

The

Committee shall be chosen from

Committee.
General
amongst the
No one shall be a member both of the General
/3.
and Library Committees unless he be also on the Finan
cial Committee.
y. No member of the Library Committee shall be on
the Financial Committee.
a.

Financial

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

26

[32

Solution.

Speaking of a member taken at random, let the

symbols F, G, L, respectively denote the statements
He will be on the Financial Committee." He will be
on the General Committee," He will be on the Library
as usual, for any statement that
Committee."
Putting
contradicts our data, we have
"

"

"

>/,

so that

= (F

afiy

G)(GLF

c/>

= (F + G)(G
7

<

)(G

:
>;)

FG + GLF + FL,
+ L + F)(F + L
7

we get

25, Formulae (4) and (5))

(See

= (F + GL

i/)(FL

antecedent

for the

Putting

+ L + F) = F G + F L + GL + FGL
7

term FGL being a multiple of the term GL 7 is

7
7
redundant by inspection, and F L is also redundant,
for the

because, by

29,

F L (F G + GL 7 )
7

Hence,

finally,
<

=F

L (eG

+ Ge) = F L
7

(G

+ G) = n
7

we get (omitting the redundant term FL)

= ($

= (F G + GL = FG + GL,
7

and therefore
a/3y

That

is

to

=$

= (FG + GL
7

say,

ij)

= (F

the three club rules,

replaced by the two simple rules F

If any member
assert, firstly, that

G)(G L

a,

/3,

y,

).

be

may

and

is

on the Financial

"

G L

which

Committee, he must be also on the General Committee,"

which is rule a in other words and, secondly, that If
any member is on the General Committee, he is not to be
on the Library Committee."
"

SOLUTIONS, ELIMINATIONS, LIMITS

33]

27

CHAPTER V
33.

FROM

the formula
(a

b)(c

ab

d)

+ cd

r\

number of implications can always be

form of a single implication,

the product of any

expressed in the

+ + 7 + &c.
of which the antecedent

17,

a logical

is

sum

(or alternative),

and the consequent an impossibility. Suppose the im

of any problem that contains
plications forming the data
the statement x

among

its

constituents to be thus re

duced to the form

Ax + B +

which

in

efficient of

is

may

rj,

the coefficient or co-factor of x, B the co

and C the term, or sum of the terms, which

contain neither x nor x

data

It is easy to see that the

also be expressed in the

(B

:)(.*.

:A

above

form

)(C:,,),

the form

which

is

When

the data have been reduced, to this form, the given

of implications, is said to be solved
or

equivalent to

product
implication,
with respect to x ; and the statements B and
(which are
less complex) are called the limits of x;
or
more
generally
* or
and
the antecedent B being the strong
superior limit
Since the
the weak or inferior limit.
the

consequent

When from

our data

we say that
AB:A:A + B, we say
A + B.
|3

a,

ct

is

we can

infer a:

that

AB

is

/3,

but have no data for inferring

For example, since we have

than
stronger than A, and A stronger

stronger than

j8.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

28
factor (B

the factor (C

which

>/),

AB + C

equivalent to

is

34

and our data also imply

),
implies (B
it follows that our data
imply
:

33,

*?.

Thus we get the

formula of elimination

which asserts that the strongest conclusion deducible

from our data, and making no mention of x, is the im

AB 4- C

plication

tj.

As

this conclusion is
equivalent to
C^ABy, it asserts that the state

the two-factor statement

ment C and the combination

impossible.
34. From this
or

(f)(x, y, z, a, b),

AB

are both

we deduce the

ing more general problem.

which

of statements

simply

solution of the follow

Let the functional symbol
the symbol
denote data
c^>,

any number of constituent statements

x, y, z, a, b, and which may be expressed (as in the
problem of
33) in the form of a single implication
the terms a, /3, y, &c., being more or
4- P + 7 4- &c.
less complex, and
involving more or less the statements
refer

to

>],

x, y,

z,

It is required,
firstly, to find successively in

I.

a,

any desired order the limits (i.e., the weakest antecedent

and strongest consequent) of x, y, z; secondly, to eli
minate x y, z in the same order and, thirdly, to find
t

the strongest implicational statement

(involving a or b,
but neither x nor y nor z) that remains after this
elimination.

Let the assigned order of limits and elimination be

Let A denote the sum of the terms
containing
the factor z let B denote the sum of the terms contain

2,

y, x.

ing the factor z and let C denote the sum of the terms
Our data being
we get
containing neither z nor z
,

<,

= (B

)(C

:
>/)

= (B

)(B

)(C

SOLUTIONS, ELIMINATIONS, LIMITS

34]

The expression represented by Az + Bz

is

-j-C

29

understood

30,
to have been reduced to
simplest form (see
z and z
The
31), before we collected the coefficients of
and the result after
limits of z are therefore B and A!
its

the elimination of

z is

A )(C
/

(B

:
>;),

= AB + C

which

rj.

To find the limits of y from the implication AB + C

we reduce AB + C to its simplest form (see
30, 31),
We thus get,
which we will suppose to be Dy + E/ + F.
:

as in the previous expression in

AB + C
The

17

= Dy + E/ + F

17

limits of y are therefore

/,

z,

(E y
:

D )(E D

)(F

and D and the

and y is

//).

result

after the successive elimination of z

(E

D )(F

17),

which

= ED + F

:
>/.

To find the limits of x from the implication ED + F

we proceed exactly as before. We reduce ED + F to its
simplest form, which we will suppose to be Gx + Ha/ + K,
:

>7,

and get

ED + F
The

r)

= Gx + Rx + K

,;

limits of x are therefore

= (H

after the successive elimination of

(H G )(K
:

n)

which

:x

G )(H G )(K
:

and

z,

y,

17).

result

is

HG + K

and the

,/.

z,
y, x having thus been successively
//,
eliminated, there remains the implication
which indicates the relation (if any) connecting the

The statements

GH + K

remaining

statements a and

constituent

b.

Thus, we

finally get

<t>

= (B:z: A

which A and
mention of z)

in

//

)(H x
:

G )(GH + K

?).

do not contain z (that is, they make no

and E contain neither z nor y G and
and the expression K
contain neither z nor y nor x
;

)(E

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

30

34, 35

PfiS

in the last factor will also be destitute of

(i.e.,

make

will

no mention of) the constitutents x, y z, though, like G

and H, it may contain the constituent statements a and b.
}

In the course of this process, since y a and a e are

whatever the statement a may be (see
18),
we can supply for any missing antecedent, and e for any
:

certainties

rj

missing consequent.
35. To give a concrete
example of the general prob
lem and solution discussed in 34, let
denote the data
<p

We

+ xyl + xy

xyza

+y

a.

get, putting (p for these data,

cf)

= (xyza + xyb -f xy z + y z a
= x y + byz + y z + abz + ax

17

when

>;,

the antecedent of this last implication has been

its
simplest form by the process explained in

reduced to

Hence we get

31.

<

- (/ + ab)z + (Uj}z + (x

putting

in

we get

34,

for

+ ab, B

the

elimination

of

and C

+C
are B and A
is AB + C

(E:z:
so that the limits of z

for by,

+ ax

)(AB

+ ax.

As

and the result

after

for

x y

*),

Substituting their

>/.

values for A, B, C, this last

implication becomes

which we
ab

+#

will
for

y,

denote by

and F

Dy + E/ + F

for a^.

Having thus found the

limits

iy,

putting

for

Thus we get

(i.e.,

the weakest ante-

SOLUTIONS, ELIMINATIONS, LIMITS

35,36]

31

cedents and strongest consequents) of z and ?/, we proceed

to find the limits of x from the implication ED + F y,
which is the strongest implication that remains after the
:

z and y.
Substituting for D, E,
values which they represent, we get

elimination of

DE + F
in

17

which G, H,

respectively denote

DE + F
our

)*i

= (H

Gke

+ Ha/ + K
n,

a,

G )(HG + K

We

rj.

//

:
>;)

this result

the values

fe

thus

final result is

To obtain

?,

= (B 2 A )(E
D )(H x G )(HG + K
= (by:z: a y + &V)(f y # + b x}(a x e)(r]
= (fey z afy + b fy)(y a!x + #)(a x}.

<

G, H,

+x

get

so that

+ axf

(ab

the

,,)

/)

we first substituted for A, B, D, E,

we had assigned to them then we
;

in the second factor,

omitted the redundant antecedent
the redundant consequent e in the third factor, and the
redundant certainty (n y), which constituted the fourth
*i

factor.

The

fact

reduces to the form

(17

(HG +

the fourth factor

that
:

/),

which

is

K:>/)

a formal certainty

in this particular problem,

of a or
be
can
implicationally affirmed in terms
nothing
or
x
or
b (without
either
z) except formal
y
mentioning
&c., which
certainties such as (ab a), (aaf 17), ab(a + b )
are true always and independently of our data ^).
36. If in the preceding problem we had not reduced
the alternative represented by Az + B^ + C to its sim
30, 31), we should have found for the
plest form (see
not ufy + Vy but
inferior limit or consequent of z,
be
this
it
From
b
supposed that the
x(a y + y).
might
(see

18),

indicates that,

>/,

z (in conjunction
strongest conclusion deducible from
our
limits
the
within
or
of,
with,
data) was not A! but
xAf
is
But
xAf.
formally stronger than A that

though

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

32

36-38

than A when we have no data but our

here
we
have other data, namely,
and
definitions,
we
shall
implies (as
prove) that A is in this case equiva
lent to xAf, so that
materially (that is to say, within the
limits of our particular data
neither of the two state
ments can be called stronger or weaker than the other.
This we prove as follows
is

to say,
stronger

<p

(f>

(f>)

$ .(z:K

f
:

= xA.

7
:

x)

(A

a proof which becomes evident

x)

(A

when

for

and

D
+

we

substitute their respective values a y

b y and a x
b x
for it is clear that y is a factor of the former, and x a
factor of the latter.
37. In the problem solved in
35, in which
our data, namely, the
implication
e

we took

Had we

xyza!

+ xijb + xy z + y z a

denoted
<p

y, x as the order of limits and of elimination.

taken the order y, x, z, our final result would have
z,

been
<t>

38.

= (z:y:b x + xz)(z + a

The preceding method

"limits"

my method

x)(z

a!

of finding

of logical statements

was suggested by,

/).

what

I call the

closely allied to, and

(published in 1877, in the
is

Proc. of the Lond. Math.

Soc.) for successively finding the
limits of integration for the variables in a

multiple

integral (see

138).

In the next chapter the method

will be
applied to the solution (so far as solution is pos
sible) of Professor Jevons s so-called
Inverse Problem,"
"

which has given

among

rise

to

logicians but also

so

much

among

discussion, not only

mathematicians.

JEVONS S

39]

33

PROBLEM"

"INVERSE

CHAPTER VI
BRIEFLY stated, the so-called "inverse problem"
Jevons is this. Let (f) denote any alternative,
It is required to find an im
such as dbc -f a!~bc + cib c
39.

of Professor

of implications,* that implies this

plication, or product
alternative.

Now, any implication whatever

implications) that
e

of

(p

or

as, for

(a

b)((p

is

example,
&c.,

tj),

(j),

must

any product
or

is

<p

or

:
<p

y,

or (abc

of

a multiple
:

ab)(e

(p),

necessarily imply the given

number

so that the

alternative

(or

equivalent to

of possible solutions

<p,

But though the problem as enun

really unlimited.
ciated by Professor Jevons is thus indeterminate, the
solutions may be restricted, and the
number of
is

possible

problem rendered far more interesting, as well as more

useful and instructive, by stating it in a more modified
form as follows
Let
denote any alternative involving any number of
:

</>

constituents, a,

implication

b,

(p

required to resolve the

into factors, so that it will take the
c,

It

&c.

is

form

(M a N)(P
:

Q)(R

S), &c.,

which the limits M and N (see

33) may contain
P
and
limits
the
not
but
Q may contain
b, c, &c.,
a;
R and S may
limits
the
b
a
nor
c, d, &c., but neither
c
and so on
b
nor
a
nor
neither
but
contain d, e, &c.,
of a con
limits
no
nearer
When
to the last constituent.
and e
limits
it
the
we
stituent can be found
give
its
con
latter
the
and
the former being its antecedent,
in

tj

sequent (see
*

at

18, 34).

Professor Jevons calls these implications

"laws,"

because he arrives

process, like that by which scien

laws of nature
so-called
investigators have often discovered the

them by a long tentative inductive

"

"

tific

(see

112).

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

34>

As

= abc

+ ab c

afbc

-f-

we have

a simple example, suppose

(j)

[39

the terms of which are mutually exclusive.

to its simplest

form

Reducing

we get

30, 31),

(see

(p

= bc + ab c

(p

f
,

and therefore

=( +
+ I c + aV + bc
1

+ 6 + c)

)(

tj.

This alternative equivalent of

may be simplified (see
31) by omitting either the first or the third term, but
not both so that we get
(/>

= l c + aV + &/

:
>y

= a 6 + tfc + 5c

Taking the

r
:

first equivalent of e
^, and (in order to find
the limits of a) arranging it in the form Aa +
+C
we get (see
33, 34)
:

B</

>?,

= rja + c
= (c a

V+
:

e)(c

+ &/)

(6 c
:

c)(rj

e).

Thus, we have successively found the limits of

34, 35).

But

since (a:e),

formal certainties, they

that we get

e
:<t>

The

(c

may

a)(c

c)

(*j

c),

and

(c

a, b, c
e)

(see

are

all

be omitted as factors, so

= (c

a)(c

= b).

of these two factors asserts that

any term of the
alternative
which
contains
c
must
also contain a.
given
(p
The second asserts that any term which contains c must
also contain b, and,
conversely, that any term which con
tains b must also contain c.
alter
glance at the
first

native
<p

given

will verify these assertions.

Observe that here and in what follows the

denotes an
symbol
In
34, 35 the symbol
denotes a given implication, which
may take either such a form as e a + /3 + -y + &c., or as a + p + y + bc. ??.

alternative.

JEVONS S

39 401J

We

will

now take

the second equivalent of

into three factors

and resolve

it

the limits of

a, b,

first

it

sight
e

resolving
the factor

$ = (I

a)(c

Jtf

namely,

(p,

by successively finding

= b).

might be supposed that the two ways

into factors

"

Proceeding as before, we get

c.

At

PKOHLKM

"INVERSE

gave

<p

different

of

since

results,

a) in the former result is replaced by the

But since the second factor
in
the latter.
factor (&
a)
=
to
both
results, informs us that b and c
b), common
(c
:

(c

are equivalent, it follows that the two implications

and // a are equivalent also.

we had taken the

If

namely, a b + b c + a
should have found

+ be

equivalent of
imsimplified form,

alternative
in

its

<

we

which either the factor (b a) or the factor (c a) may

For though
be omitted as redundant, but not both.

in

the factor
yet

(b

= b) alone neither implies (& a) nor

a),
= b) implies (c a), and (cf:a)(c = b) implies
:

(c

:a)(c

(</

This redundancy of factors in the result is a

in the
necessary consequence of the redundancy of terms
For the
at the starting.
alternative equivalent of
f
omission of the term a b in the alternative leads to the

(Jf

a).

<p

omission

the

of
f

factor

implicational

(aV

/),

or

its

and the omission of the

equivalent (b
term a!c in the alternative leads, in like manner, to the
:

a],

in the result

omission of the factor

(afc

tj),

or

its

equivalent

(c

n), in

the result.
40. I
"Studies

take
in

the

following

Deductive

Logic"

alternative

from Jevons

(edition of 1880, p. 254,

No. XII.), slightly changing the notation,

abed

+ abc d + ab cd + a

bcd

denote this alternative, and

Let
<p

+ a b cfd

let it

be required to

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

36

find successively the limits of

we are required to express 6

a, b,

c,

In other words,
form

d.

in the

[40

<p

(M

which

in

and

N)(P

Q)(R

rj

and

By

e.

S)(T

are not to contain a

U),

P and Q

are

and S are neither to con

and T and U must be respectively

neither to contain a nor &;

tain a nor b nor

the process of

34, 35,

we

get

Omitting the last two factors R c S

because they are formal certainties, we get
:

T d

and

= (d + bc + b c:a:bd + b c)(d :b:c + d).

f

e:(f)

glance at the given alternative

will verify this result,

(p

which asserts ( 1 ) that whenever we have either d or be or

f
b c, then we have a
(2) that whenever we have a, then we
have either bd or b c (3) that whenever we have d, then
we have b (4) that whenever we have b, then we have
either c or d; and (5) that from the implication e (p we
can infer no relation connecting c with d without making
mention of a or b or, in other words, that c cannot be
e is a
c
expressed in terms of d alone, since the factor
formal certainty and therefore true from our definitions
The final factor is
alone apart from any special data.
s
added
for
form
it
must
for
sake,
only
always have n for
In other words, when
antecedent and e for consequent.
we have n constituents, if x be the n ih or last in the
;

r\

order taken, the last factor must necessarily be y x e,

and therefore a formal certainty which may be left
:

Others of the factors may (as in the case

here) turn out to be formal certainties also, but

understood.
of

17

not necessarily.

We have found the limits of the constituents a, b, c, d,

taken successively in alphabetic order.
If we take the
reverse order d, c, b, a, our result will be

= (ab + ac + bcf
f

(p

f
:

ab)(ab

+ab

+ b),

SS
50

ALTERNATIVES

40 411J

37

b e and
a e
omitting the third and fourth factors
is
There
one
certainties.
formal
are
because they
point
Since every double
in this result which deserves notice.
a ft, it follows that
implication a x ft always implies
:

>/

(in the

bracket) ab

first

>/

-f ac -f lc

Now, the

implies ab.

latter is formally stronger than the former, since any

statement x is formally stronger than the alternative
But the formally stronger statement x, though it
x + y.
can never be weaker, either formally or materially, than
x -f- y, may be materially equivalent to x + y and it must
be so whenever y materially (i.e., by the special data of
Let us see
the problem) implies x, but not otherwise.
;

case, justifies the

whether our special data, in the present

ac
be
ab.
Call this implica
inferred implication ab
tion \f/\
By virtue of the formula a ft -f y x = (a x)
:

(ft

and

x)(y
be

(putting ab for a and for

we get

x),

ac for

x,

ft,

for 7)

\|/

= (ab
= (ac
= e(ac

ab)(ac

a)(ac
:

~b)(bc

ab)(bc
b)(bc

a}e

ab)

a)(bc

= (ac

= e(ac

ab)(bc

ab)

b)

b)(bc

a).

This asserts that (within the limits of our data in this

problem) whenever we have ac we have also b, and that

whenever we have be we have also a. A glance at the
will show that this is
given fully developed alternative
a fact (see
Hence, the inferred implication
41).
<p

ab

+ ac + be

ab

the fact that

is,

its

in this problem legitimate, in spite of

antecedent is formally weaker than its
,

consequent.
41.

An

alternative

and only when,

it

is

said to be fully developed when,

the following conditions

satisfies

or its denial, must

Firstly, every single-letter constituent,
be a factor of every term secondly, no term must be a
;

formal certainty nor a formal impossibility thirdly, all

the terms must be mutually incompatible, which means that
no two terms can be true at the same time. This last con
;

dition implies that

no term

is

redundant or repeated.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

38

For example, the

developed form of a

fully

+ aft + A To obtain this we

factors a + a and ft + ft and strike
because it is equivalent to (a + ft)
As another
given alternative a +
aft

ft.

to

required

Here we
ft

+ ft

first

is

ft

be

let it

example,

the fully developed form of a + ft y.

find the product of the three factors a + a,

We

y + y.
a

to

equivalent

and

-\-

multiply the two

out the term aft
the denial of the

find

and

41, 42

therefore,

(ft

y)

next find that

which is equivalent

finally,

to

ft

+ a y.

is

ft y)
(a
to a (ft

+y

),

Then, out of the

eight terms forming the product we strike out the three

terms a fty, a fty a ft y because each of these contains
,

either aft or ay, which are the two terms of a ft

ay
the denial of the given alternative a
The result
ft y.

be

will

a ft

which

y + a ft y

+ afty + a ft y + afty

is,

alternative a

+ ft y.

42. Let

denote a cde
<p

have

therefore, the fully developed form of the given

+ b cd + cd e + dd e

Here we

elementary constituents a, b, c, d, e so that the

product of the five factors (a + a), (I + b ), &c., will contain
5
2
Of these 32 terms, 11 terms will
(or 32) terms.
;

constitute the fully developed form of

and the re
(p,
maining 21 will constitute the fully developed form of its

denial

Let \^ denote the fully developed form of

and \// will, of course, only differ
in form ; they will be
logically equivalent.
Suppose the
alternative
to be given us (as in Jevons s
inverse
.

<p

<p.

Then the

alternatives

<p

"

and we are required to find the limits of the

constituents in the alphabetic order a, b, c, d, e, from
the data e \JA.
When we have reduced the alternative

problem

"),

\k to its simplest form,

we

shall find the result to be

<.

Thus we get
e

\J,

(p

(p

= ac + bde + c d + d e + abe

= (i:a: b c + ce )(n :b:d + c)(d

This

is

e)(e

tj

<?)(?

the final result with every limit expressed.

e).

Omit-

SS
O5

UNRESTRICTED FUNCTIONS

42-441

89

-I

and the inferior limit e wherever

limit
ting the superior
e because it is a
e
occur, and also the final factor
>/

they
formal certainty (see
e

xf,

= (a

b c

+ ce

get

d,

:^ = (e

= (e

a, b.

c,

e,

b c

b c

When

Our

+ ce)(r]
+ cc)(e

+ c)(d

)(1>

Suppose next we arc required

order

>/

we

18),

c)(e

d).

to find the limits in the

be

final result in this case will

+ l c)(a
+ Vc)(a

\e:ac
:

e)(j?

e)(rj

e)

c).

contains n constituents, the

number of possible permutations in the order of con
In an alter
stituents when all are taken is 1 .2.3.4... n.
42, the number
native of 5 constituents,, like the one in
43.

an alternative

<p

of possible solutions cannot therefore exceed 1.2.3.4.5,

For instance, in the example of
120.
which
42, the

in the order d, e, c, a, b (the last given), is

same as the solution in the order d, e, c, b, a ;
the
virtually
the only difference being that the last two factors in the
while in the
first case are (as given), rj a e and y b e

solution

a e that is to say,
b e and
second case they are
and
order
the
both, being certainties, may be
changes,
that when the order of
observed
be
It
will
omitted.
:

>/

limits

is

>/

prescribed, the exact solution

is

prescribed also:

no two persons can (without error) give different solu

tions, though they may sometimes appear different in

form

39, 40).

(see

CHAPTER
44.

LET F M (#,

y, z),

or

its

VII

abbreviated synonym

FM

when

re

the

present the functional proposition F(x, y, z),

values or meanings of its constituents x, y, z are unre
stricted ; while the symbol F r (#, y, z), or its abbreviated

Fr

synonym
F(#, y, z]

example,

represents

when the values

if

the
of

functional

x, y, z

proposition
For
are restricted.

x can have only four values. x r

x, 2

x# x

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

40

the four values y r y 2

then we write
2,, z y z 3

y y y^

and

44, 45

the three values

Fr and not F M But if each of

z may have any value (or
meaning)

the three symbols x, y,

whatever out of the infinite series xv x y xy &c., y y y y
v
y
then we write F M and not F r The suffix
&c., z v z2t 2g &c.
,

r is intended to suggest the adjective restricted,

u the adjective

suffix

as usual, assert
respectively that

impossible, that
is

understood to

x,

y,

is certain,

variable; but here the

is

mean

and the

The symbols F

unrestricted.

6
,

F^,

that

word

is

certain

true for all the admissible values of

in the functional statement F(x, y, z)

impossible
false for every admissible value of x, y, z in the

means

statement F(x,

and

z);

y,

means

variable

neither certain

nor impossible.
Thus F e asserts that F(x, y, z) is neither
it is
always true nor always false
synonymous with
;

F^F

45.

*,

which

From

formulas

synonymous with (F

is

^)

these symbolic conventions

we get the three

(1) (P.

Fr )

(2) (Fl

Ef)

(3) (F

Ff )
(

but the converse (or inverse) implications are not neces

sarily true, so that the three formulae would lose their

if we substituted the
)
sign of equivalence (
the sign of implication (:).
The first two formulas
need no proof; the third is less evident, so we will

validity
for

it

as

Let

follows.

<

formulas respectively.

we assume

to

(p 2

cf>

<

,
<p

prove
denote the above three

The first two being self-evident,

be a certainty, so that we get the

deductive sorites

F-XF7 Fj) [for

(F; F^ F; F^) [for (A
(F-

(FJ

/3

FfJ [for

a)(E

A-*A-* = A,

This proves the third formula

by

b)

(AB

ab)]

definition].

when we assume the

two fa and
To give a concrete illustration of
2
the difference between F M and F
let the symbol H
r
first

<

SYLLOGISTIC REASONING

45, 46]

41

horse, and let F(H) denote the state

Then F e (H) asserts
has been caught."
&c.. has been
that every horse of the series
r
2
that
F
asserts
not
one horse of
the
(H)
symbol
caught
and
the symtpl
been
has
the series
&c.,
caught
2
r
e
F
and
statements
the
both
denies
F^H), and
(H)
F*(H)
e
is therefore equivalent to
(H)
(H), which may be

represent the

ment

"The

word

horse

H H

T>

H H

T?

F"

more

expressed by F~ F~ the symbol (H) being left

&c. ?
This
But what is the series
2
p

briefly

H H

understood.

universe of horses

owned

~by

F"

may

the horse-dealer

mean,
or

it

for

example,

may mean

all the horses

a portion only

of these horses, as, for example, all the horses that had
If we write Fjt we assert that every horse owned
escaped.
horse-dealer has been caught;

the

by

if

we

Fj we

write

only assert that every horse of his that escaped has been
Now, it is clear that the first statement implies
caught.
the second, but that the second does not necessarily
imply the first so that we have Fj Fj, but not neces
The last implication F rF; is not
F<:Fjt
sarily
:

necessarily true

the fact that

for

all

the horses that

had escaped were caught would not necessarily imply

that all the horses owned by the horse-dealer had been
caught, since some of them may not have escaped, and
of these it would not be correct to say that they had
been caught.
The symbol F M may refer to the series

F r F2 F 3
F r F 2 F3
,

.,

.,

F 60
F 10

Fr may

while

refer only to the series

concrete illustration will

The same

evident the truth of the implications Fj Fj and

F* F* and also that the converse implications Fj Fj and
FJ F are not necessarily true.
46. Let us now examine the special kind of reasoning
called syllogistic.
Every valid syllogism, as will be shown,

make

is

a particular case of
(a

or, as it

may

my

general formula

p)(P 7) (a
:

y),

be more briefly expressed,

(a

7)

(a

7).

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

42

46, 47

Let S denote our Symbolic

Universe of
Universe, or
of
all
the
S
consisting
&c., real,
things
p S
unreal, existent, or non-existent, expressly mentioned or
tacitly understood, in our argument or discourse.
Let
denote any class of individuals
a
p
2 &c., forming
then
portion of the Symbolic Universe S
a
"

Discourse,"

2>

X X

accent) denotes the class of individuals

X (with grave
X r X &c., that
X

2,

do not belong to the class X; so that the individuals

Xj, X 2 &c., of the class X, plus the individuals X p X 2
&c., of the class X, always make up the total
Symbolic
Universe S r S 2 &c.
The class X is called the
,

complement
Thus, any class A and
its
complement A make up together the whole Symbolic
Universe S
each forming a portion
only, and both
the
whole.
forming
,

of the class X,

and

vice

versa.

47.

Now, there

two

are

mutually complementary
spoken of in logic that it is
convenient to designate them
by special symbols these
are the class of individuals which, in the
given circum
stances, have a real existence, and the class of individuals
which, in the given circumstances, have not a real exist
classes

which are

so often

The

ence.

class

first

is

the class

e,

made up

of the

To this class belongs every indi

v &c.
vidual of which, in the
given circumstances, one can
exists"
that is to say, not
truly say
merely sym
To this class therefore may
bolically but really.
belong
individuals

"It

We

town, triangle, virtue, vice.

may place virtue
in the class e, because the statement "Virtue
exists"
or "Vice exists"
really asserts that virtuous
or
vicious persons, exist
persons,
a statement which
horse,

and

vice

every

one would accept as

The second
individuals O
p

true.

class
2,

&c.

is

the class

To

0,

made up

dividual of which, in the

given circumstances,
It does not exist
truly say
-that is to
"

not exist
exists

the

we can

"

though (like everything

To this class
symbolically."
really,

of

this class
belongs every in
It does
say,
else named) it
"

necessarily belong

REALITIES AND UNREALITIES

w 47-491J

S$

43

mermaid, round square, flat sphere. The Symbolic

Universe (like any class A) may consist wholly of realities

centaur,

&c.

e2 ,

or it may
or wholly of unrealities O r
2 &c.,
the
When
members
both.
universe containing
,

be a mixed

A consist wholly of realities, or

class A is said to be a pure
the
wholly of unrealities,
least one reality and also at
at
A
contains
when
class
Since
a mixed class.
called
is
it
least one
Ar A 2

of

&G.,

any

class

unreality,
are
e and

mutually complementary, it is clear

with e.
that e is synonymous with 0, and
limits of the class
the
in
48. In no case, however,
fixing

the classes

given circumstances be overlooked.

The horse caught
is read
For example, when the symbol
6, 47),
does not exist or No horse has been caught" (see
the understood universe of realities, e r e y &c., may be a
e,

must the

context or

"

"

limited

number

Hr H
statement H

of horses,

and in that case the

that

&c.,

merely

that limited universe the individual

had

escaped,

asserts that to

the horse caught,

does not deny the
c,

or a horse caught, does not belong; it

of a horse being caught at some other time,
possibility
or in some other circumstances.
Symmetry and con
into
that the admission of any class
venience

our

require
symbolic universe

must be always understood to

also in the same universe of the

imply the existence

complementary class A.

Let

and

be any two classes

46); if A and
that are not mutually complementary (see
B are mutually exclusive, their respective complements,
A and B, overlap; and, conversely, if A and B are

mutually exclusive, A and B overlap.

49. Every statement that enters into a syllogism of
the traditional logic has one or other of the following
four forms

X is Y (2) No X is Y
X is Y (4) Some X is not

(I) Evert/
(3) Some
It is

evident that (3)

Y.

is

simply the denial of

(2),

and (4)

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

44

From

the denial of (1).

get

X? Y = Every

49 50
fS
LoO

the conventions of

6,

(3)

Y (2) X Y = No X
X Y = X; = SomeXis Y;

(4)

X! Y = X:=Some

(1)

is

is

is

47,

we

not Y.

The first two are, in the traditional logic, called universals ;

the last two are called particulars; and the four are
respec
tively denoted by the letters A, E, I, 0, for reasons
which need not be here explained, as they have now
only

The following is, however, a simpler

and more symmetrical way of expressing the above four
standard propositions of the traditional
and it has
logic
historical interest.

the further advantage, as will

appear later, of showing
how all the syllogisms of the traditional logic are
only
particular cases of more general formulae in the logic of
pure statements.
50. Let S be any individual taken at random out of
our Symbolic Universe, or Universe of Discourse, and let
x
x, y, z respectively denote the three
SY
propositions S
,

Then

S/, z must respectively denote S~

z
S~
By the conventions of 46, the three propositions
/
x, y, z, like their denials a/,
y z are all possible but un
certain
that is to say, all six are variables.
Hence, we
a/,

must always have x e y\

and never tf
(x\
nor / nor z\
Hence, when x, y, z
Y
z
x
respectively denote the propositions S S S the proposi
,

nor y

nor

(?/>,

(/>

tions (x

nor x

(which are respectively synony

mous with aT, y-*, z~v) must always be considered to form
part of our data, whether expressed or not; and their
denials, (x
(y tj), (z rf) must be considered impossible.
With these conventions we get
:

rj)

(y

rj)

(z

(1)

X is Y = S x S Y = (x y) = (xy y
Some X is not Y = (S x S Y / = (x y) = (xyT
No X is Y = S x S- Y = x y = (xitf

(A) Every (or

(0)

>/)

>;),

(E)

all)

Some X

is

Y=

S x :S-T/ =

iC

-"

GENERAL AND TRADITIONAL LOGIC

f,0]

In

this

way we can

traditional

every syllogism

express

terms of x

logic in

the

of

which represent

z,

y,

45

same subject S, but different

Since none of the propositions x y, z

three propositions having the

predicates X, Y, Z.

shown) can in this case belong to the class

values
or e, the
(or meanings) of x, y, z are restricted.
traditional
Hence, every
syllogism expressed in terms of

(as already

x,

y,

r\

must belong

statements

and not to

~F r

y,

(x,

to

the class of restricted functional

z),

or its abbreviated

synonym F r

the class of unrestricted functional statements

abbreviated synonym F M as this last

statement assumes that the values (or meanings) of the

Yu (x,

y,

or

z),

its

propositions x,

are

y,

The proposition F u

statement

constituent
r\

or

e,

44).
wholly unrestricted (see
assumes not only that each

(x, y, z)
x,

belong to the class

may

y,

as well as to the class 0, but also that the three

statements

need not even have the same subject.

denote
(x, y, z), or its abbreviation F,

x, y, z

For example,
the formula

let

(x

y)(y

This formula asserts that

"

(x

z)

If

x implies

z).

y,

and y implies

The formula holds good whatever

2, then x implies
be the statements

z."

x,

y,

whether or not they have

and
same subject S

the traditional logic) the

(as in

whether or not they are certainties, impossibilities, or

variables.
Hence, with reference to the above formula,
it is
always correct to assert F whether F denotes F u
When x, y, z have a common subject S, then
or F r

will

mean

F*

and

denote the syllogism of the

will

traditional logic called Barbara ;* whereas when x, y, z are

wholly unrestricted, F will mean Fjt and will therefore
be a more
formula, of which the traditional

general

Barbara will be a particular case.

*

X is

Z,"

which

is

is Y, and every Y
If every
x Sz
x SY
Y Sz
).
)
(S
(S
equivalent to (S

Barbara asserts that

"

is Z,

then every

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

46

But now

let F, or F(#, y,

z),

[50,51

denote the implication

(y.z)(y:x):(x:2>)

we suppose the propositions

If

x, y, z to be limited by
the
traditional syllogism
46, 50,
called Darapti will be represented
by F,, and not by
FM
Now, by the first formula of 45, we have F^

the conventions of

FM

and, consequently, F;

Thus,

if

Fw

be valid, the

We

valid also.

but

F M is not valid, for

F
fails in the case
by

find that

implication represented

Fj,

e
necessarily F~ F;
traditional Darapti must be

-not

the above
as

^(xz)"

it

then becomes
(i:*)(

which is equivalent to
which = (&/) = (ce) =

ee

1
:

rf

*,

and consequently to e
e
shown) F;
:

>/,

1i

1l

.x)i(as)-\

But

ri.

since (as just

does not necessarily imply F; e this discovery does not

justify
us in concluding that the traditional
Darapti is not valid.
The only case in which F fails is y\xzy, and this case
cannot occur in the limited formula F y
(which here repre
sents the traditional Darapti), because in F the
r
pro
,

positions x, y, z are always variable and therefore possible.

In the general and non-traditional
implication F M the case
,

x^iftf,

but

since

it is

51.

implies -^(xzy, is also a case of failure;

not a case of failure in the traditional
it

logic.

The

traditional Darapti, namely,

is also X, then some
is

and ever// Y
some logicians
the class

(I

"If

Z,"

is

every

is

Z,

thought by

formerly thought so myself) to

when

fail

and Z are
non-existent, while the classes
real but mutually exclusive.
But this is a mistake, as the
is

following concrete example will show.

Y = (0
Let

lf

P denote

the

the second, and

P = Every

and

8 ),

a>

Y
R = Some X

Z = (e r

s ),

Suppose we have

X = (*

premise of the given syllogism,

the conclusion.
get

first

We
Q = Every Y isX = ^

isZ = ^;
is

Z=

j/

three statements, n
r

*1

2,

>i

TRADITIONAL SYLLOGISMS

47

^r,l,f>2]

each of which contradicts our data, since, by our daia

in this case, the three classes X, Y, Z are mutually

Hence

exclusive.

PQ R =
:

so

that,

/;{

= (^

when presented in

Darapti does not

fail

,,
:{

= (,;// = ^

form of an

the

implication,

in the case supposed.

as

52. Startling

we have

in this case

it

may

(But see
however, it

sound,

52.)
is

demonstrable fact that not one syllogism of the traditional

is
neither Darapti, nor Barbara, nor any other
logic
valid in the form in which it is usually presented in our
text-books, and in which, I believe, it has been always
In this form,
presented ever since the time of Aristotle.
every syllogism makes four positive assertions it asserts
it asserts the
it asserts the second
the first premise
conclusion and, by the word therefore, it asserts that
:

conclusion follows necessarily from the premises,

that if the premises be true, the conclusion must be
Of these four assertions the first three may be,
true also.

the
i.e.

and often

are, false

the fourth, and the fourth alone,

is

a formal certainty. Take the standard syllogism Barbara.

Barbara (in the usual text-book form) says this
:

therefore every A is
every
If valid it
this
denote
B, C)
syllogism.
values
whatever
must be true
(or meanings) we give to
=
camel.
~B
let
A
Let
bear, and let C
a.ss,
A, B, C.
the
If \|/-(A, B, C) be valid,
following syllogism must
"

Every

Let

is

is

C."

>^(A,

therefore be true

"

Every

camel; therefore, every

syllogism really true ?

ass is a bear

ass is

camel."

every bear

is

Is this concrete

it contains three
Clearly not
the
above
false statements.
form, Barbara
Hence, in
we not just
have
(here denoted by \J/-) is not valid for
if
we
adduced a case of failure ? And
give random
values to A, B, C out of a large number of classes taken
;

haphazard

(kings, queens, sailors, doctors, stones, cities, horses,

French, Europeans, white things, black things, &c., &c.), we

shall find that the cases in which this syllogism will

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

48

52, 53

turn out false enormously outnumber the cases in which

will turn out true.
But it is always true in the following
form, whatever values we give to A, B, C
it

"

If every

is

B,

and every

Suppose as before that

C = camel.

Let

A=

is

ss,

C, then every

that

is

B = bear, and

C."

that

denote the combined premises, Every

ass is a bear, and
every bear is a camel" and let Q denote
the conclusion, "Every ass is a camel."
Also, let the
as is customary
denote the word therefore.
symbol
The first or therefore -form asserts P Q, which is
equivalent^ to the two-factor statement P(P:Q); the
second or if-form asserts only the second factor P Q.
.

"

.".

The

therefore-form vouches for the truth of P and Q,

which are both false the if-form vouches only for the
;

implication P Q which, by definition,

means (PQ ) and is a formal certainty. (See 10.)
53. Logicians may say (as some have said), in answer
to the
preceding criticism, that my objection to the usual
truth

the

of

77

form of presenting a syllogism

is
purely verbal that the
are
understood
to be merely hypothetical,
premises
always
and that therefore the syllogism, in its general form, is
not supposed to guarantee either the truth of the
premises or the truth of the conclusion. This is virtually
an admission that though (P .*. Q) is asserted, the weaker

statement (P

Q)

is

the one really meant

that though

they only mean

If P
then
But why depart from the ordinary commonsense linguistic convention ?
In ordinary speech, when
logicians assert

"

"

therefore

Q,"

Q."

we say
truth of

"

we do

P is true, therefore Q is
P but when we say If P

true,"

we vouch

for the

then Q is
said in the Athenceum, No. 3989
"

not.

As

is

true,

true,"

Why

should the linguistic convention be different in

logic ?
?
Where is the advantage ? Suppose a general,
whose mind, during his past university days, had been over-imbued
with the traditional logic, were in war time to
say, in speaking of an
untried and possibly innocent prisoner,
He is a spy therefore he
"

Where

is

the necessity

pointed out this equivalence in Mind, January 1880.

TRADITIONAL SYLLOGISMS

53, 54]

49

must be shot, and that this order were carried out to the letter. Could
he afterwards exculpate himself by saying that it was all an un
fortunate mistake, due to the deplorable ignorance of his subordinates
that if these had, like him, received the inestimable advantages of a
logical education, they would have known at once that what he really
meant WHS // he is a spy, he must be shot ? The argument in
;

defence of the traditional wording of the syllogism

It

no exaggeration

is

is

exactly

say that nearly

to

parallel."

all fallacies

of the little conjunction, If.

Mere
as
if they were certainties.
are
accepted
hypotheses

are

due

to neglect

CHAPTER
54. IN the notation of

50, the following are the nine

traditional logic, in their usual

teen syllogisms of the

As

order.

VIII

customary, they are arranged into four

is

divisions, called Figures, according to the position of the

"

middle term

"

middle constituent), here denoted

(or

This constituent y always appears in both pre

by y.
The constituent z, in
but
not in the conclusion.
mises,
the traditional phraseology, is called the
major term,"
"

and the

constituent x the

"

minor

term."

the premise containing z is called the

and the premise containing x the
Also, since the conclusion

X
X

is

Z,"

is

not

and of Z

or

"

Z,"

Some
it

as the

is

major premise,"
minor premise."
All
always of the form
"

"

is

"

or

"

No X

usual to speak of

is

is

As usual

predicate.

FIGURE

= (y
= (y

Darii

=(y:z)(x:y Y:(x:z

Ferio

z)(x
z )(x

-:4

y)

*:

y)

(x

(x

or

"

Some

subject

in text-books, the

Celarent

Z,"

as the

major premise precedes the minor.

Barbara

Similarly,

"

z)

z)

:8:

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

50

FIGURE
:

FIGURE

y)

(x

(x

/)

z)

(x

y}

(x

(x

z)

z)

= (y z}(y x)
= (y z*) (y x)
= (y z)(y x
Datisi
=
(y z )(y x)
Felapton
=
Bokardo
(y z) (y x)
Ferison = (y :/)(?/: a/)

Darapti
Disarms

54

= (z y )(x
Camestres = (z y)(x
= (z /)0
Festino
= (z y)(x
Baroko
Cesare

TS
LO

(x

(x

z}

z)

(x

(x

(x

z)

FIGURE 4
Bramantip = (z y)(y
:

Camenes
Dismaris

Fesapo
Fresison

= (z
= (z
= (z
^ (z

y)(y

}(y

x)

x)

(y

y )(y

(x

x)
x)

(x

(x
:

z)

(x

(x

z)
:

z)

the symbols (Barbara)^, (Celarent) &c. denote,

w
44, these nineteen
functional statements
respectively, when the values of

Now,

let

in conformity with the convention of

their constituent statements x,

y, z are unrestricted ; while
the symbols (Barbara),., (Celarent),., &c., denote the same
functional statements when the values of x,
y, z are restricted
as in

50.

The syllogisms

with the suffix

real

syllogisms

r,

(Barbara),., (Celarent) r &o.,

indicating restriction of values, are the
of the traditional
logic; and all these,
,

without exception, are valid

irithin the limits of the
understood restrictions.
The nineteen syllogisms of general
logic, that is to say, of the pure logic of statements,

GENERAL LOGIC

f)4-5G]

&c., in

namely, (Barbara)^ (Celarent),,,

unrestricted in values, are

51

which

x,

//,

are

more general than and imply

the traditional nineteen in which

x, y, z

are restricted as

and four of these unrestricted syllogisms, namely,

and (Fesapo) w fail
(Darapti) M (Felapton) w (Bramantip)
in

certain

in

cases.

tt ,

(Darapti)w

in

fails

the

case

(Felapton)tt and (Fesapo) M fail in the case y\xz

(Bramantip),, fails in the case z\x yy.

y\xzy,
y* t

and

55. It thus appears that there are two Barbaras, two

Celarents, two Darii, &c., of which, in each case, the one
belongs to the traditional logic, with restricted values

y z\ while the other is a more

which the traditional syllogism is a
Now, as shown in 45, when a general

constituents

of its

x,

general syllogism, of
particular case.

Fw

law

with unrestricted values of its constituents, implies

Fr with restricted values of its constituents,
the former is true absolutely and never fails, the same
,

a general law
if

may be said of the latter. This is expressed by the

formula Fj F,e
But an exceptional case of failure in F M
does not necessarily imply a corresponding case of failure
:

..

Fr

in

F~

for

e
:

tion F^

though Fj

F;,)

is

is

a valid formula, the implication

F;. is

(which

F;

equivalent

to

the converse implica

For example, the

not necessarily valid.

general and non-traditional syllogism (Darapti)M implies

the less general and traditional syllogism (l)arapti),..

The former
in

the

fails

traditional

but
cannot occur
limit the statement

the exceptional

in

syllogism

this

case

^(xz)

11

case

because of the restrictions which

Hence, though this case of
y to the class
50).
(see
failure necessitates the conclusion (Darapti);/, we cannot,

from

this

conclusion

infer

conclusion,
6

the

further,

but incorrect,

Similar

(Darapti);
reasoning applies to
the unrestricted non- traditional and restricted traditional
.

forms of Felapton, Bramantip, and Fesapo.

56. All the preceding syllogisms, with many others not
recognised in the traditional logic, may, by means of the
formulae of transposition a:

/3

= /3

:af

and

a/3

\y = ay:/3,

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

52

be shown to be only particular

(,?;

y)(y

three

z)

(x

which

z),

examples

cases

this

Two

Lot

clear.

or
y, z)

<p(x,

Referring to the

denote this standard formula.

list

in

we get

54,

Baroko = (z y)(x
:

z)(z

Thus Baroko
formula
<p(x,

is

y, z)

y)

y)

(x

(x

z)

which, by transposition,

= (p(x,

y)

z,

?/).

obtained from the general standard

by interchanging y and z.

Next, take the syllogism Darii.

we

of the formula

Barbara.

expresses

make

will

56, 57

Transposing as before,

get

= z)(x :z):(x: ?/)

=
z x).
z)(z x) (y x)
We get (see 54)
Next, take (Darapti),..
= (y z)(y x) (x z = (y zx) (xz itf
(Darapti),.
= (y xz)(xz
= (y: xz)(xz
(y
= since, by the
for, in the traditional logic, (y
Darii

=
= (y

(//

z)(x

/)

(x

(//

:>i

:rj)

50, y

>/)

vention of

<(?/,

for, in the

variable

y)(y x)
:

y)(z

(x

/)

x)(y x)
:

By

following

(p(y,

z,

con

<f>(y,

xz,

rj).

:rj

ij }

finally,

rj)

(z

rj)

must be a
we get

yx

tj).

similar reasoning the student can verify the

list

54-56):

(see

Barbara

(p(x, y, z)

Hence,

possible.

= (z y)(y x)(x :z ):n

= (z: yx)(y x) n

yx )(yx :*i):ij = (z: yx)(yx

traditional logic, (z:j) =
since z

= (p(z,
(Bramantip),.
57.

and therefore

tj)

variable, and, there

Thus, finally (Darapti),,

always possible.
take
We get
Lastly,
(Bramantip),..

= (z
= (z
=

r],

must always be a

fore,

(Bramantip),.

rj)

(p(x,

?/,

/)

= Darii = Datisi
= Ferison = Fresison
= Camenes
;

= Celarent = Cesar e
y = Ferio = Festino
= Camestres
(p(z y, x)
:

<p(x,

z,

SS 5
55

7-5 91-

TESTS OF SYLLOGISTIC VALIDITY

53

= Disamis = Dismaris
y) = Baroko
=
=
Bokardo (p(y, xz n)
x, z)
(Darapti)
= (Fclapton) = (Fesapo),.
xz,
= (Bramantip)r
yx,
It is evident (since x:y = y \x) that (p(x, y, z) =

(p>(y,

x,

z)

<p(x,

z,

<p(y,

tj)

(f>(z,

58.

tj)

<(y,

so that all these

x) in the preceding list
when
we
valid
remain
change the order ot
syllogisms
their constituents, provided we, at the same time, change
For example, Carnestres and Camenes may
their signs.
each be expressed, not only in the form (f)(z, y, x), as in
the list, but also in the form
y z ).
59. Text-books on logic usually give rather compli
test the validity
cated rules, or
canons," by which to
These we shall discuss further
of a supposed syllogism.
on (see
62, 63); meanwhile we will give the following
which
are simpler, more general, more reliable, and
rules,

cf)(z,

<p(x,

"

more

easily applicable.

Let an accented capital letter denote a non-implication

that is to say, the denial of an impli
(or
particular
cation
while a capital without an accent denotes a
"

"),

universal
Thus, if A denote
simple implication (or
f
x y, then A will denote (x y)
Now, let A, B, C denote
A B C denote their
while
any syllogistic implications,
valid
syllogism must have
Every
respective denials.
").

one or other of these three forms

(1)

that

is

AB:C;

AB C

(2)

to say, either the

(3)

AB

two premises and the conclusion

as in (1);
universals
implications (or
or one premise only and the conclusion are both non"

are all three

")

as in (3),
implications (or "particulars") as in (2); or,
while
universals
both premises are implications (or
"

"),

the conclusion

is

a non-implication

"

(or

particular

").

any supposed syllogism does not come under form (1)

nor under form (2) nor under form (3), it is not valid ;
If

that

is to

say, there

will

be cases in which

it

will fail.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

54

59

fS
LO

The second form may be reduced to the first form by

transposing the premise B and the conclusion C and
r

AB C is equivalent to AC B,
changing
each being equivalent to AB C
When thus trans
formed the validity of AB C that is, of AC B, may be
tested in the same way as the validity of AB C.
The
their signs

for

tj.

x z, in
be
or
affirmative
for
If,
may
negative.
example,
He is not a soldier. But if
z = He is a soldier ; then z
z=ffe is not a soldier; then z f He is a soldier. The
conclusion C being, by hypothesis, x z, the syllogism
test

is

which

Suppose the conclusion

easy.

to be

AB

if

C,

valid,

becomes

(x-.y.z)

(x

(see

11) either

or else (x

z),

which the statement y

term
Y, not mentioned

in

refers to

z)

(x

z),

the middle class (or

x z. If any
cannot
be
reduced
to either
supposed syllogism
of these two forms, it is not valid
if it can be reduced
to either form, it is valid.
To take a concrete example,
let it be required to test the
validity of the following

"

")

in the conclusion

AB C
:

implicational syllogism

If no Liberal approves of Protection,

though some Liberals
of fiscal Retaliation, it follows that some
person or persons who
of fiscal Retaliation do not
approve of Protection.

Speaking of a person taken

a

Liberal

let

at

P = He approves

random,

of Protection

R = He approves of fiscal Retaliation.

the syllogism.
We get
To get
(see

let

Also, let

approve
approve

L = He
and

denote

rid of the non-implications, we

transpose
and change their signs from

56)

affirmative,

is

let

them

negative to

thus

transforming them

This transposition gives us

into

implications.

TESTS OF SYLLOGISTIC VALIDITY

601
SS59
vv

55

-*

Since in this form of Q, the syllogistic propositions are

the combination
universals
three implications (or
7
of premises, (L P )(R P), must (if Q be valid) be equi
valent
"

all

"),

L P R7

either to

which P

in

the letter

is

or conclusion

L R7
:

to

but the factors

L P

P) of

second

the

or

7
:

7
;

new consequent
7

L:P and P R

factors

out in the

left

Now, the

L P

or else to

L P and
equivalent to the premises
or transposed form of the syllogism

7
L P R are not
R P in the second

of

L P and P

(which

is

equivalent

are equivalent to the premises in

transformed form of the syllogism Q.
:

Hence Q is valid.
As an instance of
AB C, we may give

a non-valid syllogism of the form

ys in the two premises have different signs,

the
one
the
being negative and the other affirmative,
nor
form
the
take
can
neither
combined premises
xiyiz
the form x y z which are respective abbreviations for

for since the

(x\y)(y\z) and (x:y

fore not valid.
60.

)(y* :%

The syllogism

).

The preceding process

for

is

there

of
testing the validity

and AB C apply to all

syllogisms of the forms
the values of their
whether
syllogisms without exception,

AB C
:

constituents

x,

y,

be restricted, as in the traditional

general logic of state

But as regards syllogisms in general logic of the
ments.
7
form AB C (a form which includes Darapti, Felapton,
traditional logic), with
Fesapo, and Bramantip in the
two implicational premises and a non-implicational con
for in general
clusion, they can only be true conditionally;

logic,

or unrestricted, as in

my

no
distinguished from the traditional logic)
therefore
It
a formal certainty.
syllogism of this type is

logic

(as

becomes an interesting and important problem

to deter-

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

56

mine the
be held

conditions

We

valid.

60, 61

on which syllogisms of this type can

have to determine two things, firstly,

weakest premise (see

33, footnote) which, when
to
two
the
premises given, would render the syllo
joined
a
formal certainty ; and, secondly, the weakest con
gism

the

when assumed throughout, would render

dition which,

As will be seen, the

the syllogism a formal impossibility.
to
is
a
method we are going
explain
general one, which may
be applied to other formulae besides those of the syllogism.

AB C

The given implication

implication
cations (see

ABC

:
>/,

in

is

equivalent to the

which A, B, C are three impli

59) involving three constituents x, y, z.

Eliminate successively x, y, z as in
34, not as in
finding the successive limits of x, y, z, but taking each
variable independently.
Let a denote the strongest con
clusion deducible from ABC and containing no reference
to the eliminated

Similarly, let

x.

/3

and y respectively

denote the strongest conclusions after the elimination of

y alone (x being left), and after the elimination of z alone
Then, if we join the factor a or /3
(x and y being left).
or

to

the premises

(i.e.

the antecedent) of the given

the syllogism will become

AB C

implicational syllogism
a formal certainty, and therefore valid.
:

That

is

to say,

be a formal certainty and so will AB/3 C

7
and
C
Consequently, AB (a + /3 + y } C is a
formal certainty so that, on the one hand, the weakest
premise needed to be joined to AB to render the given

ABct

will

AB/

AB C

valid

a formal certainty} is the

on
the other, the weakest
/3
and,
datum needed to make the syllogism AB C a formal
impossibility is the denial of a -f /3 -f y, that is, a/3y.
61. Take as
an example the syllogism Darapti.
Here we have an implication AB C in which A, B, C

syllogism

alternative

+7

-}-

(i.e.

respectively denote the implications (y x\ (y

:

By

the

method

of

z),

34 we get

ABC = yx + yz + xz
f

tj

Ma;

+ NX + P

?,

say,

(x

).

CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY

61]

57

which M, N, P respectively denote the co-factor

the co-factor of x and the term not containing x.

of x,

in

The

MN -f P

in

which

so that the premise required

when

strongest consequent not involving x

= z, = y, and P = ?// so that
is

hero

Thus we get a = y:rj,

we eliminate x is (y
:

n)

>?,

we have

MN + P:? = ^ + X:

= ?/(* + /):

17

and therefore

should be a formal certainty, which is a fact for, getting

rid of the non-implications by transposition, this complex
;

implication becomes
(y

x)(y

and

this

is

z)(x

which = (//

z)

xz)(xz

if)

(,?/

rj) t

(y :*i)\

a formal certainty, being a particular case of

the standard formula

<f)(x,

which represents Barbara

y, z),

both in general and in the traditional logic (see

55).
AB
C
from
manner
in
the
same
alone
Eliminating y
so that the complex
we find that /3 = xz v = x z
:

implication
(y

x](y

z)(x

(x

That it is so is evident by
should be a formal certainty.
that the implication PQ Q,
inspection, on the principle
for all values of P and Q, is a formal certainty.
Finally,
This is the same
we eliminate z, and find that 7 = ?/
:

>?.

we obtained by the elimination of x, as might

have been foreseen, since x and z are evidently inter
result as

changeable.

Thus we obtain the information sought, namely, that

</

_j_

/3

4.

the weakest premise

premises of Darapti to
certainty in general logic
(y

v)

+ (xz

v}

make

be joined

to

this

syllogism

to

is

+ (y

/
:

>

7)

which

= if* + (xz)^

the

formal

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

58

61, 62

and that a/3y, the weakest presupposed condition that

would render the syllogism Darapti a logical impossi
therefore

is

bility,

+ (xz)-*}

(y*

= i/\xz)\

which

Hence, the Darapti of general

logic,

values of

fails in

constituents

its

x, y,

z,

with

unrestricted

the case

y\xzj>

but in the traditional logic, as shown in

50, this case
cannot arise.
The preceding reasoning may be applied

Felapton and Fesapo by simply chang

to the syllogisms

into /.

ing
Next, take the syllogism Bramantip.

ABC = yx
and giving
get

=z

a,

(3,

=z
/3

r}
,

+7

==*-

-f

zy

+ xz

Here we get
tj,

y the same meanings as

Hence, a/3y = z
y = (x yy.

(aj

y)

H|

Thus, in general

we

before,
r

ri

>,

(x y)

>,

logic,

and
Bra

when we assume z~^ -f (x y)^,

mantip
and a formal impossibility when we assume ?\x y^ but
in the traditional logic the latter
assumption is inadmis
sible, since z* is inadmissible by
50, while the former is
is

a formal certainty

obligatory, since
tion Z-*.
62.

The

implied in the necessary assump

is

it

tests

validity

the

of

traditional

logic

turn

mainly upon the question whether or not a syllogistic

term or class is
distributed
or
undistributed.
In
ordinary language these words rarely, if ever, lead to
any ambiguity or confusion of thought; but logicians
have somehow managed to work them into a

In the proposition
tangle.
said to be distributed, and

In the proposition
class

Some
position
said to be both
Some
position
undistributed,
"

"No

are said to be
is

Y,"

All

"

is

the class
is

both

Y,"

Y,"

perplexing
the class
is

undistributed.

the class

distributed.

the class

X and the
In the pro

and the

undistributed.

is

not

and the

Y,"

class

class

are

Finally, in the pro

the class
is said to be

distributed.

DISTRIBUTED

62]

UNDISTRIBUTED

<

59

Let us examine the consequences of this tangle of

Take the leading syllogism Barbara, the
technicalities.
no one will question, provided it bo
which
of
validity
its

and

Y, then

all

is

"

conditional form, namely,

expressed in

all

is

If

all

Being, in this

Z."

is

Z,

form

admittedly valid, this syllogism must hold

good whatever values (or meanings) we give to its con
It must therefore hold good when
stituents X, Y, Z.
X, Y, and Z are synonyms, and, therefore, all denote the
In this case also the two premises and the
same class.
52),

(see

three truisms which no one

conclusion will be

dream of denying.
say All
the class
"

X is
X is

now

Consider

would

one of these truisms,

Here, by the usual logical convention,

said to be distributed, and the class Y

Y."

But when

undistributed.

and

are

same

synonyms they

may, at the
same time and in the same proposition, be both dis
and undistributed! Does not this sound like
tributed
denote the same

a contradiction

class,

so that the

class

Speaking of a certain concrete

collec

tion of apples in a certain concrete basket, can we con

All the
sistently and in the same breath assert that
"

"

and that

All the apples

of
out
the dilemma
get
and secure consistency if on every apple in the basket we
Can we then con
stick a ticket X and also a ticket Y ?
are
all the
that
assert
distributed, but
apples
sistently

apples are already distributed

Do
are still undistributed ?
"

"

we

that

all

the

apples are undistributed

Clearly not

for

apple an X
every
apple
we can
which
classes
the
In
ordinary language
apple.
are
undistributed
and
as
distributed
respectively qualify
this
text-books
of
our
in
the
exclusive
logic
mutually
Students of the traditional
is evidently not the case.

also a

is

apple, and every

logic

should therefore disabuse their minds of the idea

and undistributed neces
distributed

that the words

mutually exclusive, as they do in

is anything but a forced
everyday speech
and fanciful connexion between the distributed and

sarily refer

to

classes
;

or that there

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

60
undistributed

current English and the

undisturbed of logicians.

of

and

distributed

[62

Now, how came the words

to be employed by

tributed

distributed

technical

and

undis

logicians in a sense

which

plainly does not coincide with that usually given them ?

No
is
Since the statement
is
equivalent to the
in which (see
statement "All X is
46-50) the

"

"

Y,"

class

non-Y) contains

(or

all

the individuals of the

Symbolic Universe excluded from the

"

Some

class Y, and since

is
the
equivalent to Some
distributed and
undistributed in text

not

is

definitions of

"

"

is

Y,"

books virtually amount to this that a class X is dis

regard to a class Y (or Y) when every
individual of the former is synonymous or identical with
:

tributed with

some individual

or other of the latter

this is not the case,

regard to the class

ment All
is

"

then the class

is

and that when

undistributed with

Y
"

Hence, when in the state

(or Y).
we are told that X is distributed with

regard to Y, but that Y is undistributed with regard to X,

this ought to imply that
and Y cannot denote exactly

the
"

All

But

same

is

In other words, the proposition that

Some Y is not
ought to imply that

class.

"

"

X."

no logician would accept this implication, it is

clear that the technical use of the words
distributed
and undistributed to be found in logical treatises is
In answer to this
lacking in linguistic consistency.
as

criticism, logicians introduce psychological considerations

and say that the proposition All
is
gives us infor

X Y
mation about every individual, X X &c., of the class X,
but not about every individual, Y Y &c., of the class Y
and that this is the reason why the term X is said to be
distributed
and the term Y undistributed.
To this
"

"

2,

1}

1?

explanation it may be objected, firstly, that formal logic

should not be mixed up with psychology
that its for
mulae are independent of the varying mental attitude of
individuals

and, secondly, that

mation-giving

or

non-giving

if

we accept

definition,

this

infor

then we should

DISTRIBUTED

62]

that

distributed,

is

known

is

known

fto

not that

say,

or inferred to

be distributed

to

UNDISTRIBUTED

<

and

61

undistributed, but

be distributed, while Y is
that the inference requires

further data.

upon the question we may

50 we
With the conventions of

To throw symbolic
proceed as follows.

light

have

X is ? = x:y, (2) No X is Y=a:/

Some X is Y =
/) (4) Some X is not Y = (x
(1) All

(3)

(a;

//)

is usually spoken of by
term )
positive class (or
as
and
the
as
the
positive class
subject
logicians
It will be noticed that, in the above
the predicate.
the non-implications in (3) and (4) are the

The

examples,

The
in (2) and (1).
respective denials of the implications
are as
and undistributed
distributed
definitions of
follows.

term ) referred to by the ante

(a) The class (or
cedent of an implication is, in text-book language, said to
and the class referred to by the conse
be distributed
;

is

quent

said to be

The

(/3)

undistributed.

class referred

to

said to be

is

by the

antecedent of a non-

undistributed

implication
referred to by the consequent is said to be
Definition (a) applies to (1) and

and the

class

distributed!

(2);

definition

Let the symbol X assert

and (4).
(/3) applies
M
that X is distributed! and let X assert that X is un
rf

to (3)

The class X being the complement of the

d
vice versa (see
and
class X,
40), we get (*X) = X
d
M=
X
From the definitions (a) and (,8), since
and ( X)
W=
d =
w
Y we therefore draAv the following
Y
and
( Y)
(Y)

distributed.

tt

rf

four conclusions

and

If

(1)

For

Y)

tt

=Y

XY

XMY

d
rf
in (4)
in (3)
(2)
M
d
us
definition
in (2) the
( Y)
(a) gives
d
Similarly, in (3) the definition (0) gives

rf

In

XM Y d

X Yw

in

tt

we change y

into x in proposition (1) above,

we

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

62

62, 63

X is X = x x. Here, by definition (a), we have

which shows that there is no necessary antagonism
between X d and X; that, in the text-book sense, the
same class may be both distributed and
undistri
buted at the same time.
"

All

"

get

X dX w

The

63.

six

canons of syllogistic validity, as usually

given in text-books, are

(1) Every syllogism has three and only three terms,

minor term, and the
namely, the major term, the
middle term (see 54).
(2) Every syllogism consists of three and only three
minor
propositions, namely, the
major premise, the
premise, and the conclusion (see
54).
1

(3) The middle term must be distributed at least

once in the premises and it must not be ambiguous.
(4) No term must be distributed in the conclusion,
;

unless
(5)
mises.

it is

one of the premises.*

nothing from two negative pre

also distributed in

We

can

infer

(6) If one premise be negative, the conclusion must

be so also and, vice versa, a negative conclusion
requires
one negative premise.
;

Let us

examine these traditional canons. Suppose

denote any valid syllogism.
The syllogism
it
must
hold
whatever
be
the classes to
valid,
being
good
which the statements x, y, z refer.
It is therefore valid
when we change y into x, and also z into x that is to
x, x,) is valid (
Yet this is
say,
13, footnote).
a case which Canon (1)
appears arbitrarily and need
to
exclude.
Canon
lessly
(2) is simply a definition, and
no
comment.
The
second part of Canon (3)
requires
to
all
applies
arguments alike, whether syllogistic or not.
\f/(X

z) to

//,

>//(./>,

Violation of

Canon

(4) is called

Illicit Process."

When

the term

illegitimately distributed in the conclusion is the major term, the fallacy

is called
Illicit Process of the Major
when the term illegitimately dis
tributed in the conclusion is the minor term, the
Illicit
fallacy is called
Process of the Minor" (see 54).
"

"

"

<;:

CANONS

,]

OF TRADITIONAL LOGIC

ft*

we want to avoid fallacies, we must

The first part of Canon (3)
also avoid ambiguities.
without
reservation.
The rule about
cannot be accepted
It is

evident that

if

the necessity of middle-term distribution does not apply

If every
is
to the following perfectly valid syllogism,
that
is
not
Y, and every Z is also Y, then something
is not
Symbolically, this syllogism may be expressed

"

Z."

in either of the two forms

(x:y)(z:y):(x

:z)

nzy y :(x

zT

(xy

Conservative logicians

who

.....
.....
cling to

still

(1)

(2)

the old logic,

impossible to contest the validity of this syllo

finding
to recognise it as a syllogism at all, on the
refuse
gism,
it

has four (instead of the regulation three]

X,
terms, namely,
Y, Z, Z, the last being the class con
all the individuals excluded from the class X.
taining
Yet a mere change of the three constituents, x, y, z, of
the syllogism Darapti (which they count as valid) into
their denials x y z makes Darapti equivalent to the

ground that

it

above syllogism.

For Darapti

is

and by virtue of the formula a

(l) in question becomes
(!,

:x )(y

:z"):(x

:zY

/3

= /3

a, the syllogism

.....

(4).

then

denote

z )
Thus,
\f/(o/, y
Darapti,
\f/-(#, y, z)
will denote the contested syllogism (1) in its form (4);
and, vice versa, if \^(#, y, z) denote the contested syllo
f
gism, namely, (1) or (4), then ^(x y z ) will denote
To assert that any individual is not in the
Darapti.
class X is equivalent to asserting that it is in the com
Hence, if we call the class X the
plementary class X.
if

non-X

class,

be read,

the syllogism in question, namely,

(,/:,/)(/:/):(./:.)

may

If every

non-Y

.....
is

(4),

a non-X, and every non-

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

64

[63

then some non-X is a non-Z."

For
to
which
asserts
it
that
is
(x
(x :z)
equivalent
for
an
individual
to
at
the
same
time
possible
belong
both to the class non-X and to the class non-Z.
In
also a non-Z,

is

1?

is

/)"

other words, it asserts that some non-X is non-Z.

Thus
read, the contested syllogism becomes a case of Darapti,
the classes X, Y, Z being replaced by their
respective
It is evident that
complementary classes X, Y, Z.
when we change any constituent x into x r in any syllo

gism, the words

change

and

distributed

undistributed

inter

places.

Canon

of the traditional logic asserts that

(4)

"

No

term must be distributed in the conclusion, unless it is

also distributed in one of the
This is another
premises."
canon that cannot be accepted unreservedly. Take the
syllogism Bramantip, namely,

and denote
within

by ^(z). Since the syllogism is valid

restrictions of the traditional logic (see
should be valid when we change z into /, and

it

50),

it

the

consequently

Here

(see

62)

into

We

z.

we get

Z"

should then get

in the first premise,

and Z d

the conclusion, which is a flat contradiction to the

Upholders of the traditional logic, unable to

in

canon.

deny the

validity of this syllogism, seek to bring it

within the application of Bramantip by
having recourse
to distortion of language, thus
:

"

If

every non-Z

is

Y, and every

is

X, then some

is non-Z."

w
treated, the syllogism, instead of having Z in
d
the first premise and Z in the conclusion, which would
contradict the canon, would have CZ) d in the first
premise

Thus

and

Z) in the conclusion, which, though it means exactly

the same thing, serves to "save the face" of the canon
and to hide its real failure and inutility.
(

TESTS OF SYLLOGISTIC VALIDITY

63]

Canon

(5) asserts that

two negative

We

"

premises."

can infer nothing from

show the

single instance will

The example

unreliability of the canon.

65

is

(y:x Ky:z ):(x

:z)

obtained from Darapti by simply changing z

and x into x
into z
It may be read,
If no Y is X,
and no
is Z, then
is not
something that is not
Of course, logicians may save the face of this canon

which

is

"

also
all

Z."

"

"

If
by throwing it into the Daraptic form, thus
is non-X, and all Y is also non-Z, then some non-X
"

But in this way we might rid logic of all

and the canon about negative premises would
then have no raison d etre.
Lastly, comes Canon (6), which asserts, firstly, that
if one
premise be negative, the conclusion must be

is

non-Z."

negatives,

"

and, secondly, that a negative conclusion

The objections to the
requires one negative premise."

negative;

preceding canons apply to this canon

to give

an appearance

of

validity

to

also.

In

order

these venerable

syllogistic tests, logicians are obliged to have recourse to

distortion of language, and by this device they manage to

make

their negatives look like affirmatives.

But when
has
thus
all
converted
into
real
logic
negatives
seeming
affirmatives the canons about negatives must disappear
through want of negative matter to which they can

The following three simple formulae

refer.

easily

applicable and

canons

(1) (x:y:z)

will supersede all

(z:y:x):(x:z

more

Barbara.

(x :z)
/

(2)

are

the traditional

(3) (y:x)(y.z}:(x .z

....

Bramantip.
Darapti.

The

first of these is valid both in

general logic and in
the traditional logic the second and third are only valid
in the traditional
logic.
Apart from this limitation, they
;

all

three hold good whether any constituent be affirma-

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

66
tive or negative,

and

63, 64

whatever order we take the

in

letters.
Any syllogism that cannot, directly or by the
a and aft
formulae of transposition, a /3
/3
ay /3,
be brought to one or other of these forms is invalid.

</

CHAPTER IX
GIVEN one Premise and the Conclusion,

find

to

the

missing Complementary Premise.*

64. When in a valid syllogism we are given one
can always find the
premise and the conclusion, we
with the one
which,
weakest
premise

complementary
imply the conclusion. When the given
such as
universal
conclusion is an implication (or
x z or x z the complementary premise required is found
For example, suppose we
readily by mere inspection.
have the conclusion x z and the given major premise
The syllogism required must be
54).
z:y (see

given,

will

"

")

either (x:y: z)

(x

or (x

the middle term being either y or y

mise of the first syllogism is y z which
.

(x

),

The major pre

is

not equivalent

Hence, the

first syllo
major premise z y.
The major premise of the
gism is not the one wanted.
second syllogism is y 2 and this, by transposition and
change of signs, is equivalent to z y which is the given
one
major premise. Hence, the second syllogism is the
wanted, and the required minor premise is x y
When the conclusion, but not the given premise, is

to the given

we proceed as follows.
a non-implication (or particular
universal
Let P be the given implicational (or
pre
mise, and C the given non-implicational (or "particular")
"

"),

"

")

conclusion.
*

Let

W be the required weakest premise which,

syllogism with one premise thus left understood

enthymeme.

is

called an

TO FIND A MISSING PREMISK

64, 65]

67

PW

We shall then have

C
joined to P, will imply C
which, by transposition, becomes PC
Let S be the
shall then
strongest conclusion deducible from PC.
.

have both

PC S and PC

We

These two implications

the
same
antecedent
PC, we suppose their con
having
S
and
to
be
We thus get S =
sequents
equivalent.
= S The weakest premise required
and therefore
:

denial of the strongest conclusion deducible

therefore
PC
from
(the given premise and the denial of the given
the

is

conclusion}.

For example,

the given premise be y.x, and the

let

given conclusion (x /)
:

We

are to have

Transposing and changing signs, this becomes

But, by our
also (see

fundamental

syllogistic

(y

therefore assume
z

(?/://,

= y:z

/
).

W=

and, consequently,
* is therefore
premise required

The weakest

we have

56)
(y:aOO* * ):(y:*

We

formula,

and the required syllogism

is

65 The only formula needed in finding the weakest

complementary premise are
.

(1) a:

The

(2)

(3)

two are true universally, whatever be the state

the third is true on the condition or*
/3, y
that a is possible
a condition which exists in the
first

ments

a,

*
The implication y z, since
would also answer as a premise
footnote, and
73).

in the traditional logic

but

it

it

implies (y

would not be the weakest

(see

33,

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

68

65, 66

traditional logic, as here any of the statements a, /3, y

may represent any of the three statements x, y, z, or any
of their denials x

ments

every one of which six state

possible, since they respectively refer to the six

classes X, Y, Z,
Z, every one of which is under
is

X/Y

stood to exist in our Universe of Discourse.

Suppose we have the major premise z:y with the

and that we want to find the weakest
z )
minor
We are to have
premise W.
complementary
conclusion (x

which, by transposition and change of signs, becomes

(z

This, by the formula a

):W.

.y)(x .z
:

= ft
/3

becomes

(z:y^:x )-.W.
But by Formula

(3)

we have

also

(*:y)(z:x ):(yxT.

= (yz )~^, and consequently

assume
We
= (yx J = y x. The weakest minor premise required
is therefore y\x\ and the
required syllogism is

therefore
1

(z:y)(y a) (a :*
:

which is the syllogism Bramantip.

As the weakest
premise required turns out in this case to be an implica
tion, and not a non-implication, it is not only the weakest
complementary premise required, but no other comple
mentary premise is possible. (See 64, second footnote.)
66. When the conclusion and given premise are both

we proceed as follows.
non-implications (or particulars
Let P be the given non-implicational premise, and C
the non-implicational conclusion, while
denotes the
"

"),

weakest complementary premise.

We shall
then have P
C or its equivalent
P, which we
obtain by transposition. The consequent P of the second
required

WC

THE STRONGEST CONCLUSION

6 6, 6 6 (a)]

69

universal
we
being an implication (or
have only to proceed as in 64 to find W. For example,
let the given non-implicational premise be (?/ z)
and
the given non-irnplicational conclusion (x z)
We are
"

implication

")

to

have

becomes

transposition this

By

W(x
The

z)

(y

z).

missing in the consequent y

P must therefore be

letter

WC

syllogism

is

The

x.

either (y x z)
:

one or other of

(y

z)

or else (y x

z):(y:z);

which must contain the implication

which the given non-implicational conclusion C

of

presenting (x

z)

and not the second

that

W=y

Hence

position,

for it is the first

WC

Now,

x.

WP

to

of these two syllogisms,

first

the implication

contains

re

WC

The syllogism

the denial.

is

must therefore denote the

C,

C,

is

and not the second

or

its

synonym x

equivalent,

z.

by trans

C 7 which is the syllogism required.

7
W, P C we find the syllogism sought

Substituting for
to be

(y:Xy :*) :(:)

and the required missing minor premise to be y x.

66 (a). By a similar process we find the strongest
One
conclusion derivable from two given premises.
we
have
the
will
suffice.
combination
Suppose
example
Let S denote the strongest
of premises (z y)(x y)
:

conclusion required.

We

get
7

(z

y)(x

y)

S,

is

which, by transposition,

(z

v/)S

(x

y).

The letter missing in the implicational consequent of the

7
second syllogism is z, so that its antecedent (z ?/)S
:

must be
either

x:z:y

or else x z
:

/
:

y.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

70

The

first

antecedent

is

strongest

must be the one denoted

and S = (x:z)
The

= x:z,

Hence, we get S

67

(a),

the one that contains the factor

z\y, so that its other factor x

by S

66

conclusion required

therefore (x

is

z)

CHAPTER X
67.

WE

will

now

new symbols, W(p,

introduce three

which we define as follows. Let A A 2 A 3

A m be m statements which are all possible, but of which
one only is true.
Out of these m statements let it be
<,

understood

Ar A 2 A
that A

that

rately) a conclusion

<p

down the
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

W<

V0 = V

this

^)

understanding we

...

= A. + A, +
1

+A
+A r
r

+A m

...

S0
S0

(6)

(7)

S^

The symbol
;

+ A2 + A +
= Ar+1 + Ar+2 +
1

+i>

following definitions

W0 = A

A r imply (each sepa

A r+2 A r+3
A imply
A
statements,
s+1 A s+2

lay

and that the remaining

A m neither imply (p nor
On
<

I;

while

means (W^)) 7 the denial of

means (S)) 7 the denial of S
,

W0 denotes
S<

denotes

the weakest statement that implies

the strongest statement that
<^>

33, footnote).
implies (see
than A + B, while A + B

A + B + C,

and

so

As
is

is

stronger formally

formally

than

stronger

we

are justified in calling

the weakest statement that implies
and in calling
(f),
on,

W<

S<

strongest statement

that

(f)

implies.

Since here the strongest conclusion

other and weaker conclusion. An

admit of the weaker conclusion

Generally

W<

the

and
S^>

a non-implication, there is no
implicational conclusion x z would also

(x

is

EXPLANATIONS OF SYMBOLS

67, 68]

71

as logical sums or alternatives ; but, in

present themselves
themselves as single
exceptional cases, they may present
From the preceding definitions we get the
terms.

formula,

(1)

= S( =
(W(/>

=S

W<

=W

The

(p}.

(3)
(2) Sc//
last of these three formulae asserts
(/>;

V<

(/>;

in our arbitrary uni

deny the existence of
verse of admissible statements, A r A 2 &c., is equivalent
to affirming that W<, S(, and (p are all three equivalent,

that to

V(/>

The statement V(, which

each implying the others.
the former
is not synonymous with
means
is absent from a certain list A r A 2
asserts that

V0

(V(/>),

V(/>

Am

which constitutes our universe of intelligible state

ments whereas V ^, which means (V<y, assumes the
in this list, and asserts
existence of the statement
,

V(/>

an impossibility, or, in other words, that it

The statement
contradicts our data or definitions.
The
cannot
be true.
statement
the
Vc/)
may be true;
sometimes
as
true
is
every
when,
statement
happens,
that

it

is

V<

V</>

term of the
implies

because

(p
it

series

Ar A2

The statement

Am

either
is

V<

or

implies

<j>

false,

necessarily

which ly definition neither

a statement of the class n whereas

that

asserts

V<,

implies (j) nor (p is

the class
every statement of
,

and

implies loth (p

rj

18) the implication n a

<

since

always true,
proved in
The state
a.
whatever be the statement represented by
that
down
laid
convention
the
also contradicts
ment
:

(as

V^

all

the statements

A A2
lf

Am

or
we may have
^/.
68. The following examples
W<

is

are possible.

will illustrate

Similarly,

the

mean

three symbols
Suppose our
ings of the
total (or "universe") of possible hypotheses to consist
of
of the nine terms resulting from the multiplication
S<.

W(/>,

the two certainties

product

A +

A"

V(/>,

+A

and

B +
6

B"

+ B*.

is

A B + A B^ + A B* +
4- A B + A
9

+ A B^ +
+ A B*.

A"B

e
B"

A"B*

The

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

72
Let

(j)

We

denote (AB)*.

get

W(AB/ = A B* + A*B
S(AB/ = A B* + A E + A B* = A^B* + A B~\
+ +
W(AB)- = S (AB) =
(See
S( AB)- = W (AB) =
+ B + A + A B*.
e

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

[68

A"

B"

A<B

6 9.)

A"

B<

(See

69.)

The first of the above formulae asserts that the weakest

data from which we can conclude that AB is a variable
is the alternative A B + A B 6 which
affirms that either
,

is

is

the alternative

and B variable, or else A variable and B certain.

The second formula asserts that the
strongest conclusion
we can draw from the statement that AB is a variable

certain

and

A^B* + A B^, which

asserts that either

and B possible.
Other formulae which can
be
easily
proved, when not
evident by inspection, are the
following
is possible

variable, or else

variable

(5)

(6)
(7)

(8)
(9)

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(1

4)

(15)

=
W(A +
=
A
W( + B)
S(A + B/
B)"

A"B"

A"B*

= S( A +
+A

B)"

= (A + B)

B".

=
+ + A B*.
S(AB) =
=
W(A:B) W(AB = A
S(A:B) = S(AB =
W( A B/ = S A B) = A B- + A
W(AB)

A"

B"

(16)
(17)

A"

)"

(18) S

The formulas (15) and (16)

may evidently be deduced
from (13) and (14)
by changing B into B
Formula
(17) asserts that the weakest data from which we can
.

APPLICATIONS OF SYMBOLS

68, 69]

conclude that

either

and
The formula

= S (A
=

B)

certain

is

impossible.

W(A

does not imply

B) =

uncertain, or

may

else

+ + A*B = (A
+ B- = A B- +

and

possible

be proved as follows

B<

(B

) (

AB

(A-

the alternative that

is

(A"

A-"B~

73

A^B"

A,
evidently, A^A^
69. All the formulae of

and B-B-^B".
68 may be proved from first
be deduced more readily
some
may
though

for,

principles,

from others.

Take, for example,

We

(1), (2), (3).

are

We first
S(AB) W(AB)-*.
required
write down the nine terms which constitute the product
find

to

W(AB)

A + A^ + A*

two certainties

of the

and

B +B +B

as

This done, we under dot every term that implies

which asserts that AB is a variable we underline

68.

in

(AB)

asserts that AB is
every term that implies (AB)" which
and we enclose in brackets every term
not a variable
We thus get
that neither implies (AB) nor (AB)"
,

A B + A B + AB +
C

By our

By

=A B +A B
e

definition also

S(AB)

A"B

.....

we have V(AB) e = A B

= W (AB)
= A B* + A*B + AE + A
= (A +
9

+ AXB

A*B"

67 we thus have

definitions in

W(AB)

B",

(1)

and therefore

for a

=a +a

We may similarly deduce

but they
formulae

may

(3)

and (4) from

first principles,

be deduced more easily from the two

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

74
as follows

W(AB)-

69, 70

=
+ AB)* = W(AB) + W(AB)
= A B + A*+B", from 68, Formulae 7, 13.
= S{(AB) +
= S(AB) +
}
= A B + A + + A B from
68, Formula
e

W{(AB)<

S(AB)-

(AB)"

S(AB)"

B"

14.

7,

The

70.

following

is

an example of inductive, or rather

inverse, implicational reasoning (see

11, 112).

The formula (A :x) -f (B :x) (AB :x) is always true;

when (if ever) is the converse, implication (AB x) (A x) +
:

(B

x), false

while

We

Let

denotes

(p c

(p

its

denote the first and valid formula,

converse formula to be examined.

get

a*

Hence

(see

the

Thus,

(afiya^p-

and

it

11),

(Ax

*,

+/3\ putting a

we

Ex

Ax

and

/5

for

Bx

get

y(A3G

converse

for

(Bx

implication

(AEx )\Ax
<p

fails

in

(Bx

the

case

which represents the statement

therefore also fails in

the case (a/3)V/3*, which

represents the statement

....

(2);

second statement implies the first.

The failure
in the second
may be illustrated by a diagram as

for the

of
(j>

on opposite page.

Out of the total ten points marked in this

diagram,
take a point P at random, and let the three
symbols
A, B, x assert respectively (as
propositions) that the

CERTAIN DISPUTED PROBLEMS

70,71]

75

bo in the circle A, that P will be in the

P will be in the ellipse x. It is evident
that
B,
that the respective chances of the four propositions A, B,
2
so that they are all variables.
x, AB are -$, -f^, T%-, T
point

will

circle

<j

chances of the three

It is also clear that the respective

Ax

statements AB,/,

Bo/, are 0,

2
^,

we

so that

also

9
have (ABx y(Ax )*(Ba/) which, by pure symbolic reason
we found to be a case of
ing,
t

We may

failure.

by

direct

as

follows.

asserts

appeal

show

also
to

the

ment which

be

without
a state

x,

material

is

follows

P cannot

that the

being also in the ellipse

it

diagram,
AB x

The implication

point
in both the circles A and

as

this

certainty,

from

necessarily

the

The implication
our diagram (see
109).
P cannot be in A without being in

special data of
x asserts that

a material impossibility, as
and B
inconsistent with the data of our diagram

x,

a statement which

is

it

is

is

same

impossible for the

x=

tj,

<t>

*i,

= A x) + (B
= (AB x) (A
(

<k

reason.

so that

we

x)
:

x)

Thus we have

AB

e,

get

(AB

+ (B

x)

ix)

=e
+ =

=n+1

= e:

tj

<?

>].

>]

c
equivalent,
logicians consider (p and
no distinction between the true (T)
draw
because they
and the certain (e), nor between the false (t) and the

The Boolian

impossible
or
certain

(>;).

<p

Every proposition

impossible,

the

is

with them either

propositions

which

call

The preced
variables (0) being treated as non-existent.
is
a
serious and
this
that
ing illustration makes it clear
fundamental
71.

error.

The diagram above

will also illustrate

two other
considered

which by most logicians

of
equivalent, but which, according to my interpretation
the
are
the word if, are not equivalent.
complex
They

propositions

are

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

76
"

conditional,

If

is

"

If

Expressed in

true."

of the

pretation

then if

is true,

the simple conditional,

my

and

A.

true

is

71, 72

[
is

and

true,"

are both true, then x

and with

notation,

my

inter

10), these con

conjunction if (see

A (B x) and AB x. Giving
AB the same meanings as in

ditionals are respectively

to the propositions A, B, x,

70 (all having reference to the same subject, the

random point P), it is evident that B x which asserts
that the random point P cannot be in the circle B
:

without being also in the ellipse x contradicts our data,

and is therefore impossible.
The statement A, on the
other hand, does not contradict our data; neither does its
t

denial

for both, in the

given conditions, are possible
uncertain.
Hence, A is a variable, and B x being
though
impossible, the complex conditional
(B x) becomes
,

which

tj,

possibility.

for

6",

is,

in the given conditions, a

certainty,
the figure that P cannot be in both

it is clear from
and B without being

(B

a;)

is
and therefore an im
equivalent to
But the simple conditional AB x, instead of

being impossible,

A
A

also

AB

always implies

in

x.

Hence,

imply the former, so that the two are not, in

equivalent.
72.
question

the

"Existential

make an

much

AB

all

cases,

discussed amongst logicians

of

Import

affirmation

though

the latter does not always

x,

Propositions."

or a denial A~ B

is

When we

do we, at the

same time,

Do we
?
implicitly affirm the existence of
affirm the existence of B ?
Do the four technical propo
sitions of the traditional
"All
is
11

No A

logic,

is

B,"

Some A

is

"

namely,

Some A

is

not

B,"

taking
each separately, necessarily
imply the existence of the
class A ?
Do they necessarily imply the existence of the
class B ?
My own views upon this question are
B,"

B,"

fully

explained in Mind (see vol.

Nos. 53-55); here

a brief exposition of them will suffice.
The convention
of a

"Symbolic

xiv., N.S.,

Universe"

46-50)

(see

leads to the
following conclusions

necessarily

88
Otf

EXISTENTIAL IMPORT

72 731

77

denotes an individual ;
containing the
any intelligible statement
individual
that
the
A,
by A
represented
implies
symbol
has a symbolic existence but whether the statement

when any symbol

Firstly,

then,

</>(A),

<(A)

implies that the individual represented by

existence depends upon the context.

Secondly,

any intelligible statement

when any symbol

<(A)

implies that the whole class

denotes a

has a real

class,

then,

containing the symbol

has a symbolic existence

implies that the class

A is wholly real, or wholly unreal, or partly real and partly
unreal, depends upon the context.
As regards this question of Existential Import," the

but whether the statement

<(A)

"

one important point in which I appear to differ from

The null class 0,
other symbolists is the following.

which they define as containing no members, and which

convenience of symbolic operations, define as con
members O r 2 3 &c.,
sisting of the null or unreal
is understood by them to be contained in every class, real
or unreal
whereas I consider it to be excluded from every
Their convention of universal inclusion leads
real class.
I,

for

Every
example, that
round square is a triangle," because round squares form
a null class, which (by them) is understood to be con
to

awkward paradoxes,

tained in every
to the directly

class.

as,

My

"

for

convention leads, in this case,

No
that
opposite conclusion, namely,
that
I
hold
because
is
a
round square
every
triangle,"
is
purely unreal class, such as the class of round squares,
such
real
from
class,
every purely
necessarily excluded
as the class of figures called triangles.
73.

"

Another paradox which

results

from

conven

this

tion of universal inclusion as regards the null class

is
All
is their
paradox that the two universals
it
that
is Y" are mutually compatible;
and "No

"

0,

"

is

the same time, and that

possible for both to be true at

this is necessarily the case when the class

is

null or
"

non-existent.

My

convention of a

"

Symbolic Universe

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

78

73,

74

leads, on the contrary, to the common-sense conclusion

of the traditional logic that the two propositions
All
and No
is
are incompatible.
is
This may
"

"

"

"

be proved formally as follows.

Let
We have
position to be proved.

=
<-/>

(.,

y)(x :y

(xy

) .ri

+ xy

= (xy

:rj):>]=

denote the pro

<p

)\syy*

[x(y

*j

+ y) :;}:;

= (xe :ri):rj = (x:f]):f] = (6:9j):v]

=
= (wT =
e.

ti:t]

In this proof the statement x is assumed to be a variable

byf the convention of 8 46. See also O850. It will be
the proposition just proved, is equiva
is Y
/) which asserts that All

noticed that
<p,

lent to (x\y):(x:
"

implies
74.

Some

"

is

"

Y."

Most symbolic logicians use the symbol

some other equivalent (such

assert that the class

is

as Schroeder

A~<

A4

B, or

B), to

wholly included in the class

and they imagine that this is virtually equivalent to my

symbol A B, which asserts that the statement A implies
the statement B.
That this is an error may be proved
:

easily

as

If the
statement

follows.

equivalent to the

hold good when

the statement

rj

A
:

statement

-<

denotes
>;,

by

e,

A B
:

be always

B, the equivalence

and

B
is

definition,

denotes

must

Now,
synonymous with
e.

(ley, which only asserts the truism that the impossibility

is an
v\z
(For the compound statement j/a,
impossibility.

whatever a may be, is clearly an impossibility because

has an impossible factor 17.)
But by their definition
the statement
e asserts that the class y is
wholly

it

-<

17

included in the class

that

every individual impossibility,

is also an individual
(either

which
whereas y

class of certainties e

formal certainty,
(See
18.)

is

to say,

asserts that

it

^^

q y &c., of the class tj

e
or
r
y or e 3 &c.) of the
is absurd.
Thus, rj e is a
e-

-<

e is

a formal impossibility.

CLASS INCLUSION

751

8
*

Some

75.
to

my

drag

AND IMPLICATION

79

74) have also endeavoured

logicians (see

formula

(A:BXB:C):(A:C)
into their systems

......

(1)

under some disguise, such as

....

(A^B)(B-<C)-e(A-:C)

(2).

but how
of ( 1 ) is clear and unambiguous
can we, without having recourse to some distortion of
of (2) ?
The symbol
language, extract any sense out

The meaning

<

(by virtue of their definition) asserts that every

A is also an individual of the

individual of the class

com

Consistency, therefore, requires that the

class B.

individual of
plex statement (2) shall assert that every
of the
individual
is
also
an
the class (A
C)
B)(B
the
how
can
double-factor
But
class (A
C).
compound
-<

-<

-<

statement

(A

<

B)(B

class contained in

C) be intelligibly spoken of as a
the single-factor statement ( A
C) ?
-<

<

It is
compound statement (A
an
implies the single statement (A-<C),
but
formula
(2)
by
expressed, not by their

true that the

is

quite another matter.

<

C)

implication

.....

C):(A-<C)

but that

B)(B

-<

(3);

The two formulae

(1)

and (3) are both valid, though not synonymous; whereas

their formula (2) cannot, without some arbitrary departure
from the accepted conventions of language, be made to
convey any meaning whatever.
The inability of other systems to express the new ideas
xy K xyz
&c., may be shown
represented by my symbols A.
69
This
Take the statement A
by a single example.
T
and
(unlike formal certainties, such as e and AB A,
in
unlike formal impossibilities, such as O and
rj) may,
my system, be a certainty, an impossibility, or a variable,
or investi
according to the special data of our problem
,

gation (see
A.

ee

22, 109).

But how could the proposition

be expressed in other systems

In these

it

could

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

80

[88
LOO 75,

76

not be expressed at all, for its recognition would involve

the abandonment of their erroneous and unworkable

hypothesis (assumed always) that true is synonymous

with certain, and false with impossible.
If they ceased to
consider

their

equivalent to their

(when it denotes
(A=l), and their

a proposition) as
(or their corre

sponding symbol for a denial) as equivalent to their

0), and if they employed their symbol (A=l) in

(A =

the sense of

the sense

statement

my
of my
60
A

symbol
symbol

in

A
A

6
,

and their symbol

(A=0)

their

would be extremely long and

intricate.

my

A.

A^B
= B), my

Using

accordance with usage) as the denial of (A

statement A would then be expressed by
(in

and

in

they might then express my

notation
but the expression
,

ee

by

This example of the difference of notations speaks for

itself.

CHAPTER XI
76.

LET

denote the premises, and

of any argument.
Then
true
or its synonym B
"),

.-.

("

("

is

the conclusion,

true, therefore
is true because

is
is

each of which synonyms is equivalent to

A(AB y, denotes the argument. That is to say, the
argument asserts, firstly, that the statement (or collec
true

tion

"),

of statements)

is true, and,
secondly, that the
coupled with the denial of B constitutes
an impossibility, that is to say, a statement that is incom
When the person
patible with our data or definitions.
to whom the argument is addressed believes in the truth
of the statements A and (AB y, he considers the
argument
valid
if he disbelieves either, he considers the
argument
invalid.
This does not necessarily
imply that he dis-

affirmation of

BECAUSE

76,77]

AND

THEREFORE

81

believes either the premises

or the conclusion B
he
be
convinced
of
the
truth
of
both
without
may
firmly
;

For the truth of

accepting the validity of the argument.
with
the
truth
of
B
does
not
coupled
necessarily imply
the truth of the proposition (AB y, though it does that

of

The statement (AB )

23) and therefore to A + B.

(ABO

(see

A( AB

A /. B,

But

AB
T

T
.

A(AB

equivalent to (AB
Hence we have

= A( A + B) = AB = A B
T

synonym A(AB

like its

Like

is

asserts not only that

asserts

A
AB

asserts that

it

/
T?

is

more than

true, but, unlike

but that it
with
our
data or
impossible
incompatible
definitions.
For example, let A.
He turned pale, and let
B ZTig is guilty. Both statements may happen to be
T
T
true, and then we have A B which, as just shown, is

A(AB

y, it

that

is

is false,

is

it

He
equivalent to A(AB )
yet the argument A /. B
turned pale
is
he
is
not
valid, for
therefore
guilty
/
the
weaker
statement
A(AB ) happens on this
though
1

("

")

occasion to be true, the stronger statement A(AB ) is

not true, because of its false second factor (AB y.
I call
17

because it asserts not merely (AB ) that

it is
that
he
turned pale without being guilty, an
false
assertion which may be true, but also (AB y, that it is
impossible he should turn pale without being guilty,
an assertion which is not true.
this factor false,

77.

The convention that

A B
.-.

shall

be considered
/

equivalent to A(A B), and to its synonym A(AB )

obliges us however to accept the argument A /. B as
valid, even when the only bond connecting A and B
r)

is

let

the fact that they are both certainties.

For example,
A denote the statement 13 + 5 18, and let B denote

the statement

4 + 6 = 10.

from our symbolic

are both
valid.
Yet here it is not easy to discover any bond of
connexion between the two statements A and B we
know the truth of each statement independently of
It follows

conventions that in this case

.-.

B and B /. A

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

82
all

We might, it is true,
deduction somewhat as

consideration of the other.

give the
follows

of logical

appearance

77, 78

By our data, 13 + 5 = 18. From each of these equals take away 9.

This gives us (subtracting the ,9 from the 13) 4 + 5 = 9. To each of
We then, finally, get
these equals add 1 (adding the 1 to the 5).
4 + 6 = 10; quod erat demonstrandum.

Every one must

feel the unreality (from a psycho

of
view) of the above argument yet much
logical point
of our so-called
rigorous mathematical demonstrations
;

are on lines not very dissimilar.

striking instance is
s demonstration of the proposition that any two

Euclid

a
sides of a triangle are together greater than the third
proposition which the Epicureans derided as patent even

who always took the shortest cut to any place

As marking the difference be
they wished to reach.
tween A /. B and its implied factor A B, it is to be
noticed that though A e and y A are formal certainties
(see
18), neither of the two other and stronger state
e and
The
ments, A
A, can be accepted as valid.
first evidently fails when A
and the second is always
to asses,

.*.

tj

false

for

though
factor

its

r\

x, like its

77,

synonym

second factor Y\\X

rj(t]

#), is false,

because,

necessarily true, its first

definition.
is

necessarily false by
Though in purely formal or symbolic logic it is
generally best to avoid, when possible, all psychological
YI

is

78.

considerations, yet these cannot be wholly thrust aside

when we come to the close discussion of first principles,

and of the exact meanings of the terms we use. The

words if and therefore are examples.
In ordinary speech,
when we say, If A is true, then B is true," or A is
true, therefore B is true," we suggest, if we do not
"

"

positively affirm, that the knowledge of B depends in

or other upon previous knowledge of A.
But

some way

in formal logic, as in mathematics,

absolutely necessary,

to

it is

convenient,

if

not

work with symbolic statements

CAUSE AND EFFECT

78, 79]

83

whose truth or falsehood in no way depends upon the

mental condition of the person supposed to make them.
Let us take the extreme case of crediting him with
On this hypothesis, the word
absolute omniscience.
or
its
would, from the
symbolic equivalent
therefore,
.-.

be as meaningless, In
subjective or psychological standpoint,
no matter what argument, as we feel it to be in the

argument

+ =

(7x9 = 63)

omniscient mind

all

1
3); for, to an
therefore (2
true theorems would be equally self-

evident or axiomatic, and proofs, arguments, and logic

But when we
generally would have no raison d etre.
and
define the
lay aside psychological considerations,
in
as
/.
or
its synonym
word therefore/
76, it ceases
,

to be meaningless, and the seemingly meaningless argu

ment, (7 x 9
3), becomes at once clear,
63). (2 -f 1

definite,

and a formal

79. In

order

to

certainty.

make our symbolic

formulae

and

operations as far as possible independent of our changing

individual opinions, we will arbitrarily lay down the

explana
following definitions of the word cause and
Let A, as a statement, be understood to assert
tion.
the existence of the circumstance A, or the occurrence
asserts the posterior or simul
of the event A, while

taneous occurrence of tbe event V and let both the

In
be true.
statement A and the implication A
is called
these circumstances A is called a cause of V
the effect of A and the symbol A(A V), or its synonym
A .*. V, is called an explanation of the event or circum
To possess an explanation of any event or
stance V.
;

phenomenon V, we must
two pieces of knowledge

therefore be in possession of
we must know the existence

or occurrence of some cause A, and we must know the

The product or combination
law or implication A V.
of these two factors constitute the argument A.-.V,
which is an explanation of the event V. We do not
call A the cause of Y, nor do we call the argument
A V the explanation of V, because we may have also
:

.*.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

84

79, 80

V, in which case B would be another sufficient

another sufficient
cause of V, and the argument B .-.
of
Y.
explanation
80. Suppose we want to discover the cause of an

.-.

event or phenomenon
or otherwise) that x

number

We

notice (by experiment

invariably found in each of a

x.
is

first

We

circumstances, say A, B, C.
therefore provisionally (till an exception turns up) regard
each of the circumstances A, B, C as a sufficient cause of
certain

x,

we

so that

A+B+C

of

x), or its equivalent

different circum
the
must examine

write (A x)(B x)(C

:

We

x.

stances A, B,
cumstance or

see whether they possess some cir

factor in common which might alone

to

account for the phenomena.

common

do have a

factor /.

(A :/)(B :/)(C

We

:/),

Let us suppose that they

We thus get (see 28)

+B + C :/
A +B + C :x,

which- A

before possessed the knowledge

so that

we have now

If / be not posterior to x, we may suspect it to be

Our next step should be to
alone the real cause of x.
seek out some circumstance a which is consistent with

but not with

stance a which

is

/,

B or C that is to say, some circum

sometimes found associated with f, but

or

not with the co-factors of

/ in A

or

or C.

If

we

find

that is to say, if we
that fa is invariably followed by x
then our suspicion is con
discover the implication fa x
firmed that the reason why A, B, C are each a sufficient
cause of x is to be found in the fact that each contains
\

the factor
sidered

/,

which may therefore be provisionally con

and independently of its co-factors, a

as alone,

cause of x.
moreover, we discover that
If,
while on the one hand fa implies x, on the other f a
that is to say, if we discover (fa x)(f a x ),
implies x
our suspicion that / alone is the cause of x is confirmed
sufficient

CAUSE AND EFFECT

80]

85

more strongly. To obtain still stronger confirmation

we vary the circumstances, and try other factors, /3, y, S,
consistent with /, but inconsistent with A, B, C and with
If we similarly find the same result for
each other.
still

these as for a

(fa

so that

x)(f a

3
aOC/"/

(fP

a/),
:

which =fa x :/+ a

which =f/3 x :/+ /3
:

(fy x)(f v * \ which =fy x :/+ y

x ) which = /8 x :/+ i
(fi
:

xWS

our conviction that

alone

is

a sufficient cause of x re

But by no
stronger and stronger confirmation.
inductive process can we reach absolute certainty that /
is a sufficient cause of x, when (as in the investigation of
ceives

natural laws and causes) the number of hypotheses or

for,
possibilities logically consistent with / are unlimited
;

eventually, some circumstance q may turn up such that

fq does not imply x, as would be proved by the actual

Should this
occurrence of the combination fqx
and in natural phenomena
bination ever occur
.

com
it

is

always formally possible, however antecedently improbable

the supposed law f:x would be at once disproved.
For,

since, by hypothesis, the unexpected combination

has actually occurred, we may add this fact to our

fqx
data e v

e
2>

&c.

so that

we

get

be read, It is certain that fqx has occurred.

The occurrence fqx implies that fqx is possible. The
of fx
and the
possibility of fqx implies the possibility
the
of
denial
of
the
/:
fx
implication
possibility
implies
The inductive method here described will be found,
upon examination, to include all the essential principles
of the methods to which Mill and other logicians have
This

"

may

x"

given the names of

Method

of Difference

112).

(see

of

Agreement

and

Method

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

86

CHAPTER

81, 82

XII

WE

will now give symbolic solutions of a few miscel

laneous questions mostly taken from recent examination

papers.
81. Test the validity of the reasoning, "All fairies are
mermaids, for neither fairies nor mermaids exist."

Speaking of anything S taken at random out of our

is a
symbolic universe, let/="It is a fairy" let m =
=
e
of
and
it
The
the
let
exists."
mermaid,"
implication
"it

"

argument, in symbolic form,

is

(/:O(n: ):(/:0
which = (/

e )(e

(/

).

is a "universal" (or
Since the conclusion /:
implica
the
of
the
59)
tion),
premises
syllogism, if valid, must (see
be either f:e:m or /: e m. This is not the case, so that
Of course,
the syllogism is not valid.
may replace e.
:

Most symbolic

logicians, however, would consider this

as
syllogism valid,
they would reason thus
By our
and
therefore
fairies
m.
all
Hence,
data,
/
"

/=

are mermaids, and all mermaids are fairies" (see

72).
82. Examine the validity of the argument
It is not
"

the case that any metals are compounds, and

it

is

in

correct to say that every metal is heavy

it may there
fore be inferred that some elements are not heavy, and
also that some heavy substances are not metals."
;

Let
let

m=

an element
a metal
and

"

"

it

is

it is

The above argument,

If
supposing the word

or
"

"

mises)

"

not a

"

it

let

is

compound

"

it is

heavy."

rather implication (always

understood before the pre

is

(m e)(m
:

Let

"

"

A=m

e,

let

B=m

li)

(e

h, let

h) (h

C=e

m)

h, let

D=

Ji

m, and

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES

82, 83]

87

denote the implication of the given argument.

then get

let

(f)

We

$ = AB

CD = (AB

since

In

that

order

AB C

and

x:yz = (x

y) (x

must both be

),

z).

be valid, the two implications

may

(p

AB D

C )(AB

Now, we have

valid.

59)

(see

AB C = AC B = (m
:

which

is

valid

h)

e)(e

that

some elements are not heavy

from the premises A and B

the validity of the implication

AB D = (m
:

li}

We next examine
We have

AB D

e)(m

h),

a legitimate con

is

clusion

asserts (e:h)

"

"

(m

Hence, C which

56.

by

(h

m)

Now, this is not a syllogism at all, for the middle term

also in
m, which appears in the two premises, appears
the

Nor

conclusion.

it

is

valid

the

as

subjoined figure
Let the eight points in
the circle m constitute the class m
let the twelve points in the circle e
and let the
constitute the class e

implication,

show.

will

circle h constitute
points in the

five

Here, the premises Every m is e, and some

are both true yet the conclusion, Some h
"

the class

h.

"

is

is

not

not h
m"

"

is false.

Hence, though the conclusion

conclusion
83.

is

is

legitimate, the

not.

Examine the argument,

"

No young man

is

wise;

for only experience can give wisdom, and experience

comes only with age."
Let = "he is younc/" let w = "he is wise"] and let

"he

has had

Also,

experience."

denote the

let
(f>

We

implication factor of the given argument.

<t>

= (e

)(y

e )

(y

= (y:e w
:

(y

have
:

).

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

88

The given implication

83-85

therefore valid (see

is

11, 56,

59).

Examine the argument, His reasoning was

but as I knew his conclusion to be false, I was
led to see that his premises must be false
84.

"

correct,

at once

also."

Let

P=

clusion

was

"

were

his premises

implication) was

valid."
Let
the argument to be examined.

<

= (P:C)C :P
= the valid form

and

true,"

Then P C =

true."

<p

We

"his

con

105)

get (see

Modus

of the

let

his reasoning (or rather

denote the implication of

"

tollendo tollens.

Thus interpreted
is valid.
But suppose the word
means
P
and
premises
Q, and not a single compound
(f>

"

"

We

statement P.

then ft
get

= (PQ:C)C

<

an interpretation which

WQ

the case

we

fails in

To prove

substitute for C, P,

values

>/,

85.

Not

C P*Q and

the case

1J

T>

also in

the latter case,

its failure in

their respective

exponential

and thus get

e,

>7,

(f)

"

:P

/e

r}}*}

(>

q e

(rj

rj)e

etj

= ee

rj

rj.

Supply the missing premise in the argument:

mistakes are culpable for mistakes are some

times quite unavoidable."
Let ra
is a mistake," let c
is
let
all

u=

"it

and

"

it is unavoidable,"

"it

culpable,"

denote the implication

(j)
of the argument.
Putting Q for the missing premise,
we get (see
59, 64)
cf)

= m
(

YQ

let

y = (m

)Q

u^

For this last implication to be valid (see

64), we must
have its premises (or antecedent) either in the form

m
The

first

or else in the form

form contains the antecedent

premise

the

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES

85-87]

89

The first form is therefore the

second form does not.
one to be taken, and the complete syllogism is
:

(ra

the

missing premise

(m
c

being

u),

u which asserts that

The original reasoning
,

nothing culpable is imavoidaUe."

in its complete form should therefore be, Since mistakes
are sometimes unavoidable, and nothing culpable is un
avoidable, some mistakes are not culpable."
86. Supply the missing premise in the argument,
Comets must consist of heavy matter for otherwise

"

"

"

they would not obey the law

Let

matter"

Putting

is

let

"it

and

let

comet"

"it

of

gravitation."

A=

consists of heavy
law of gravitation."

"it

obeys the

(j)

for the missing

= (h

<l>

premise understood,

argument, and

for the implication of the

we

get

:/)Q :(c:h) = (c:g:h):(c:

y:h = h

h),

the

so that
:g
64; tor
by application of
is c g, which asserts
understood
minor
Q
premise
missing
The full
all comets obey the law of gravitation."
that
,

"

reasoning

therefore (see

is

11)

(e:h)l(c: g)(g

h),

11)

or its equivalent (see

(c:g)(g:h):(e:h).
Comets consist of
be read,
the law of gravitation,
heavy matter for all comets obey
and everything that obeys the law of gravitation consists

In

the

"

form

first

it

may

of heavy matter."
87. Supply the missing proposition which will make
*
into a valid syllogism
the
enthymeme

following

"

Some

is

professional

men

are not voters, for every voter

householder."

Let

"

he

An

is

a professional

man,"

let

V=

"

stated.
enthymeme is a syllogism incompletely

he

is

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

90

and

voter"

H=

let

he

"

is

householder."

the implication of the argument, and

additional premise required to justify

We

have

Let

denote
<p

the weakest

the

conclusion.

11)

(see

= (P
= (P

87-89

V) (V H)W = (V
= (P
V)(V H)

H)W (P V)
V H) W
The strongest conclusion deducible from P V H is
P H.
We therefore assume P H = W and conse
which is therefore the weakest
quently W = (P H)
<

The complete argument

premise required.
this

"

voter

not

Some

professional

a householder, and

is

therefore

is

men

are not voters, for every

some professional men are

householders."

88. Put tho following argument into

syllogistic form,
and examine its validity
The absence of all trace of
paraffin and matches, the constant accompaniments of
arson, proves that the fire under consideration was not
due to that crime."
Let F = it was the fire under consideration
let A =
it was due to arson
let T = it left a trace of
paraffin
and matches
and let
denote the implication of the
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

<p

We

given argument.

= (F

<

)(

T)

get

(F

A ) = (F T

)(T

= (F:T

(F

:A / ):(F:A /

).

The implication of the given argument is therefore valid.

The argument might also be expressed unsyllogistically (in the

Let

T=

A=

let

"

the

modus
fire

tollendo tollens) as follows (see

105).
a trace of paraffin and matches
"

left

"

the

fire

was due

to the crime of arson

(see

denote the implication of the argument.

105)

which

is

let

(f)

89.
"

How

"

We

and
get

= T (A:T):A

the valid form of the Modus tollendo tollens.

Put the following argument into
syllogistic form:
can any one maintain that
is
pain
always an evil,

89 901J

TECHNICAL WORDS EXPLAINED

who admits

that remorse involves pain, and yet

8S
tjt)

91

may

"

sometimes be a
Let

E=

"

R=

it is

"It

real

is remorse";
"

an

good

evil

We

the argument.

let

causes

"it

pain";

let

denote the implication of

get (as in Figure 3, Bokardo)

and

let

<

=(R:PXP:E):(R:E),
But to reduce
been
we
have
form
the reasoning to syllogistic
obliged to
be a real
sometimes
Remorse may
consider the premise,
7
as equivalent to the weaker premise (R E) which
good,"
asserts that "Remorse is not necessarily an
which

is

a syllogism of the Barbara type.

"

evil"

only

As, however, the reasoning

weaker premise,

it

valid

is

must remain

valid

when we take the

when we substitute

the stronger premise; only in that case

it

will not

be

strictly syllogistic.

CHAPTER

XIII

be given definitions and explana

tions of some technical terms often used in treatises on

IN this chapter

will

logic.

90. Sorites.

Barbara.

This

an extension of the

is

syllogism

Thus, we have

Barbara^ (A B C) (A C)
:

(Sorites^

= (A:B:C:D): (A :D)

(Sorites)2

=(A B C D
:

E) (A
:

E)

&c., &c.

Taken

in the reverse order (see

be called Inverse

Sorites,

thus

Barbara = (A

= (A
(Sorites^

we

11)

get

B C)
D) (A B C

C)

&c.

(A

D).

what may

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

92

and Immediate

91. Mediate

proposition
in

When

Inferences.

91-94
from a

we infer another proposition \|/(^, 0)

more constituents of the first proposition
we call it Mediate Inference.
eliminated

(f)(x, y, z)

which one or

are

[SS
O)

"

left out. (or

"),

If all the constituents

of the first proposition are also

found in the second, none being eliminated, we have

For example, in
what is called Immediate Inference.
Barbara we have mediate inference, since from x y z
we infer x z the middle term y being eliminated. On
f
the other hand, when from x:y we infer ?/ x or ax y,
we have immediate inference., since there is no elimination
:

of

any constituent.

Law of Excluded Middle. This is the name given

B
B
The
the certainty A -f A~ or its equivalent a -f a.
individual A either belongs to the class B or it does not
92.

to

belong to the class

a formal certainty.
Intension

93.
tion.

as in

(AB) 2

and

an alternative which

Extension, or Connotation

is

evidently

and Denota

Let the symbols (AB), (ABC), &c., with brackets,

100, denote the collection of individuals, (AB) 1?
&c., or (ABC) r (ABC) 2 &c., common to the classes
,

inside the brackets

so that

with S AB nor S (ABC) with S ABC

,

S (AB)

will

(see

not be synonymous

With

9).

this inter

pretation of the symbols employed, let S be any individual

taken at random out of our universe of discourse, and
X
S (AB) be our definition of the term or class X.
let S

The term
and

to

is

said to connote the properties

individuals
&c., or
2
1

X X

the

denote

and B,
(AB) r

and B. As a
&c., possessing the properties
rule the greater the number of properties, A, B, C, &c.,
ascribed to X, the fewer the individuals possessing them

(AB) 2

other words, the greater the connotation (or inten

In A a
sion), the smaller the denotation (or extension).
the symbol a connotes as predicate, and in A a it denotes
or, in

as adjective.
94. Contrary
"

All

is

and

"

(or

The two

Contradictory.
:

y)

and

"

No

is

"

propositions
x y ) are

(or

TECHNICAL WORDS EXPLAINED

94-981J

SS
tjiJ

each being the contrary of the other.

called contraries,

The

93

All

"

propositions

is

"

and

"

Some

not

is

Y,"

x y and
respectively represented by the implication

its

denial (x

y)

being the

called Contradictories, each

are

50).
Similarly
contradictory or denial of the other (see
is
and Some
is
No
respectively repre
sented by the implication x y and its denial (x y } are

"

"

"

Y,"

called Contradictories.

The

95. Subcontraries.

and Some X is not

non- implications (x y
"

Y,"

Y"

may be

It is easily seen that both

cannot be false (see
73).

that both

is

the
respectively represented by
are called Suband (x y)
1

contraries.

"Some

propositions

The

but

true,

is
All
universal proposition
or
is
Some
or x y, implies the particular
or x y implies
is
and the universal No
(x y )
In each
or
not
is
Some
the particular
(x y)
called
is
or
the
cases
universal,
these
of
implication,

96. Subalterns.

"

"

Y,"

"

"

Y,"

Y,"

Y,"

the Subalternant, and the non-implication, or particular, is

That x y implies
called the Subalternate or Subaltern.
f
and
in
73;
by changing y into y
(x:y ) is proved
x y implies (x y)
that
this
also
and vice versa,
proves
:

97.

Contraposition.
to the formula

logicians

conventions of
"

All

non-Y

is

46,

let

\|/(T/,

:x

which, with the

that the proposition

All
the proposition

is

equivalent to
But other logicians define the word

Let
y) denote any proposition,
or 0, of the traditional logic (see
50); and
<p(x,

x) denote

implies, the

plication

name given by some

"

"

is non-X."

I,

x:y = y

50, asserts

differently.
98. Conversion.

A, E,

the

is

This

letters

<j>(x,

y)

any other proposition which the first

The im
x and y being interchanged.
\J/(y,

x)

is

called

When

Conversion.

the two implications

y) and ^(y, x) are equivalent,
as in x:y
the
other,
y:x and in
implying
(f>(x,

each

(x

version.

(y x
:

When

the conversion

the proposition

is

(p(x,

Simple Con
y) implies but is not
called

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

94
implied by
conversion
the

as in the case of (x :y)\(y: a/)

Conversion ly Limitation or

x),

all

these

Convertend

cases,

the antecedent

and the consequent

(p(x,

\^(y,

the

Per

called

is

In

accidens.

called

\|/-(y,

98-100

is

y)

is

a;)

called the Converse.

In the traditional logic any proposition

of the first degree is called a pure proposition, while
BC
BCD
or
&c., of a higher degree
any of my propositions
99. Modality.

AB

would generally be considered a modal proposition; but

upon this point we cannot speak with certainty, as
logicians are not agreed as to the meaning of the word
modal.
For example, let the pure proposition A B
assert that

"

then A Be might
Belgium" which would
"

Alfred will go to Belgium

be read "Alfred will certainly go to

be called a modal proposition.
Again, the proposition
A~ B which asserts that
will
not go to Belgium
Alfred
would be called a pure proposition whereas A Bt or its
B
B
synonym (A ) which asserts that A is false, would, by
most logicians, be considered a modal proposition (see
21, 2*2, and note 2, p. 105).
"

100. Dichotomy.

Let the symbols (AB), (AB ), (ABC),

with
be
understood to denote classes (as in
&c.,
brackets,
Boolian systems) and not the statements AB, AB 7 ABC, &c.
,

We

get*

A = A(B + B ) = A(B + B

)(C + C = &c.
= (AB) + (AB = (ABC) + (ABC + (AB
= &o.
x

Thus any

class

C)

+ (AB C

in our universe of discourse

into

may

be

two

mutually exclusive divisions;

then, by similar subdivision of each of these, into four
This process
mutually exclusive divisions and so on.
divided,

first,

of division into two, four,

eight, &c., mutually exclusive
*

The symbol (AB) denotes the

the symbol (AB

total of individuals

denotes the total number in

common

to

but not in

A and
;

and

TECHNICAL WORDS EXPLAINED

100-105]

95

The celebrated Tree of

called Dichotomy.
a picture illustration
affords
or
Ramean
Tree,
Porphyry,
division
of this
by Dichotomy. Jeremy Bentham wrote

divisions

is

"

enthusiastically of

the matchless beauty of the

Ramean

Tree."

101. Simple
symbolically,

It

may

or

Dilemma.

This,

expressed

the implication

is

be read,

either

Constructive

"

is

If

true,

is

and

&,

implies

then x

implies

x,

and

true."

This

102. Complex Constructive Dilemma.

is

the

im

plication

103. Destructive Dilemma.

It

may

be read,

either x or y

If

"

This

and

x,

implies

then either

is false,

is

or

B implies
B is

y,

and

false."

104. Modus ponendo ponens (see Dr. Keynes s "Formal

There are two forms of this, the one valid, the
Logic
").

other not, namely,

(A B)A B and (A B)B A.

:

The

first

the case

form

is

self-evident

A^B^ and

second form by

<p,

105. Modus tollendo

forms

the

case

first

is

evident

A~

in

denoting the

for,

fails

67-69)

(see

tollcus.

the second form

Of this

also there are

two

the second not, namely,

first valid,

(A B)B

The

in the case

we get

and (A B)A

the second

A^B^, and in the case A~

e
.

as before, in the
For, denoting the

fails,

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

96

105-108

TSS
L-OO

second form by
we get
A^B^ + A e B e
(See
67-69.)
106. Modus tollendo ponens.
This also has two forms;
the first valid, the other not.
They are
W<

<,

(A

The

(A

+ B)A

:B = A B (A
/

=
The second

and (AB)

A.

be proved formally as follows

may

first

+ B)A B

Y]

tj

+ B)

:>,

= +
(>,

,,):>,

e.

not valid, for

is

(AB) B

A=A B

= (A +

(AB)

//

=A

B)<;

both in the case (A + B) and in the case

To
(A + B/.
prove its failure in the last case, let
denote the given implication.
We get

which

fails

77

as already proved.

=$ =

A + B = 6, we

Therefore, putting

get

,,.

107. Modus ponendo

tollens.

This also has a valid and

an invalid form, namely,

(AB)

The

A B
:

+ B)B A
:

first is valid, for

(AB/A B
:

The second

is

(A

which

In the

= AB(AB)

r
:

=n

6.

not valid, for

+ B)B A = AB( A + B)
:

= AB

:
>/,

both in the case (AB) e and in the case

(AB/.
first case
the given implication becomes e ^,
and in the second case it becomes
y, which

fails

which =
also

and (A

//

rj.

108. Essential (or Explicative) and

Let x
Ampliative.
be any word or symbol, and let
be
any proposition
(p(x)

TECHNICAL WORDS EXPLAINED

108-110]

97

When
is, or follows neces
13).
containing x (see
a
which
definition
sarily from,
explains the meaning of the
word (or collection of words) x
then the proposition
<p(x)

called an essential, or an explicative,

proposition.
Formal certainties are essential propositions (see
109).
When we have a proposition, such as x or x~a or
is

<p(%)

-,

x a +x?, which gives information about x not contained

in any definition of x
such a proposition is called
;

ampliative.

proposition

follows

necessarily

109. Formal and Material.

formal certainty

when

it

is

called a

from our

or our understood linguistic conventions,

without further data and it is called a formal impossi

definitions,

bility,

when

it

is

inconsistent with

linguistic conventions.

when

It is

our

definitions or

called a material certainty

follows necessarily from some special data not

necessarily contained in our definitions.
Similarly, it is
called a material impossibility when it contradicts some
it

special
In this

datum

or data not contained in our definitions.

book the symbols e and

respectively denote
certainties and impossibilities without any
necessary
When
implication as to whether formal or material.
no special data are given beyond our definitions, the
certainties and impossibilities spoken of are understood
to be formal
when special data are given then e and re
denote
material certainties and impossibilities.
spectively
110. Meaningless Symbols.
In logical as in mathe
matical researches, expressions sometimes turn up to
which we cannot, for a time, or in the circumstances
rj

rj

Such expressions are

considered, attach any meaning.
not on that account to be thrown aside as useless.
The
meaning and the utility may come later; the symbol
1 in mathematics is a well-known instance.
From
*J
the fact that a certain

simple or complex symbol x

happens to be meaningless, it does not follow that every
statement or expression containing it is also meaningless.
For example, the logical statement A^ +
which
A"*,

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

98
asserts that

belong to

it, is

either belongs to the class x or does not

a formal certainty whether

and

mean

be

whether x be meaningless or
meaningless and x a certainty. We get

ingless or not,

Suppose

[110

also

+ A- =O + 0- = + e =
e

a:

A"

not.

e.

>7

Next, suppose

a certainty and x meaningless.

A* + A-

a;

Lastly, suppose

=e +

e-

>

-f

Let A^ denote any function of x that is,

x)
containing the symbol x and let
ment containing the symbol A. x so that
x ) is ^ function of a function of x (see
t

<f)(A

We

the symbol A^, though

that

get

any expression
be any state

<p(A

now

get

e.

and x both meaningless.

We

the statement
13).

intelligible

Suppose
most

for

values (or meanings) of x, happens to be meaningless

when x has a particular value a, and also when x has a
particular value /3.
Suppose also that the statement
is true (and therefore
(^(Aj,.)
intelligible) for all values of

x except the values a and

values of x the statement

/3,

<p(A. x )

but that for these two

becomes meaningless, and

therefore neither true nor false.

Suppose, thirdly, that

becomes true (and therefore intelligible) also for

the exceptional cases x = a and x = /3 provided we lay
<t>(A

x)

down the convention

meaningless symbol

Aa

or

definition

shall

that

the

have a certain

hitherto

intelligible

meaning m v and that, similarly, the hitherto meaning

less symbol
A^ shall have a certain intelligible mean
m
the hitherto meaningless symbols A a and
Then,
ing
2
.

will

henceforth

be synonyms of the intelligible

m
and
and
the general statement or formula
symbols 1
y
x ), which was before meaningless in the cases x = a
and x = P, will now be true and intelligible for all values
of x without exception.
It is on this principle that

Ap

<j>(A

MEANINGLESS SYMBOLS

110,111]

99

mathematicians have been led to give

meanings to the
and a n the first
originally meaningless symbols a
of which is now
synonymous with 1, and the second
,

with I..

Suppose we have a formula, cj)(x) = ^(x), which holds

good for all values of x with the exception of a certain
For this value of x we further
meaningless value 9.

become meaningless, while ^(x) remains

In this case, since (/)(?) is,
intelligible.
by hypo
thesis, meaningless, we are at liberty to
give it any
suppose

<(#)

to

still

convenient
previous

meaning that does not

definition

therefore, that

or

with

conflict

any
In order,
hold good

established formula.

the formula

^(x) may
x without exception (not
excluding even
the meaningless value 9), we may
legitimately lay down
the convention or definition that the hitherto
meaning
less expression ((9) shall henceforth be
synonymous
with the always intelligible
With
<p(x)

for all values of

expression

this convention,

had only a

the formula,

(f>(x)

restricted validity, will

= ^(x)

^(9).

which before
now become true in
f

all cases.

111. Take, for example, the formula,

*Jx^/x = x in
mathematics.
This is understood to be true for all

values of x\ but

the symbol

^/x, and conse

quently also the symbol Jxjx, become meaningless
when x is negative, for (unless we lay down further con
ventions) the square roots of negative numbers or

positive

fractions

are

non-existent.

Mathematicians, therefore,

have arrived

tacitly, and, as it were, unconsciously, at the

understanding that when x is negative, then, whatever

meaning may be given

to

the

symbol *J^ itself, the

2
shall be
^/x^/x, like its synonym (^/x)
synonymous with x and, further, that whatever meaning
it
may in future be found convenient to give to x/ 1,
combination

that meaning

must not

conflict

with any previous formula

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

100
or definition.

symbol ^/

111, 112

These remarks bear solely on the algebraic

which we have given merely as a concrete

the wider general principles discussed

1 now conveys
In
geometry the symbol ^/
previously.
and
one which
and
clear
a
intelligible meaning,
by itself
formula
of which
with
conflicts
in no way
any algebraic
illustration

it is

of

a constituent.

The reasoning by which we infer, or

of a general law by observa
existence
the
rather suspect,
is called Induction.
or
instances
cases
tion of particular
112. Induction.

Let us imagine a little boy, who has but little experience

of ordinary natural phenomena, to be sitting close to a
clear lake, picking up pebbles one after another, throwing
them into the lake, and watching them sink. He might
I
This is a stone
reason inductively as follows
(a)
sinks"
These
throw it into the water" (/3)
(7).
"

"

"

"It

three propositions he repeats, or rather tacitly and as it

were mechanically thinks, over and over again, until finally

he discovers

(as

he imagines) the universal law

a/3

7, that

water sink.
He
implies 7, that all stones throion into
continues the process, and presently, to his astonishment,
discovers that the inductive law a/3 7 is not universally
a/3

An

One of the pebbles

exception has occurred.
which he throws in happens to be a pumice-stone and
Should the lake happen to be in the
does not sink.
crater of an extinct volcano, the pebbles might be all
and the little boy might then have

true.

pumice-stones,
arrived inductively at the general law, not that all stones
So it is with every sosink, but that all stones float

The whole collective experience

law of nature."
millions of ages and
if
it
embraced
even
mankind,
extended all round in space beyond the farthest stars that
called

"

of

can ever be discovered by the most powerful telescope,

must necessarily occupy but an infinitesimal portion of
infinite time, and must ever be restricted to a mere
Laws founded upon
infinitesimal portion of infinite space.
data thus confined, as it were, within the limits of an

OF

"LAWS

112]

101

NATURE"

infinitesimal can never be regarded (like most formulae in

they
logic and in mathematics) as absolutely certain
;

should not therefore be extended to the infinite universe

of time and space beyond
a universe which must
for
remain
ever
This is a
necessarily
beyond our ken.
truth which philosophers too often forget (see

Many theorems

80).

most of the laws

in mathematics, like

of nature, were discovered inductively before their validity

could be rigorously deduced from unquestionable premises.

In some theorems thus discovered further researches have

shown that

their validity

is

restricted within narrower

Taylor s Theorem
supposed.
in the Differential Calculus is a well-known example.
Mathematicians used to speak of the failure cases of
limits

than was at

first

"

"

Taylor

Theorem, until Mr. Homersham Cox

at

last

investigated and accurately determined the exact con

ditions of its validity.
The following example of a

theorem discovered inductively by successive experiments

may not be very important but as it occurred in the
course of my own researches rather more than thirty
;

years ago, I venture to give it by way of illustration.

Let C be the centre of a square.
From C draw in a
random direction a straight line CP, meeting a side of

the square at P.

What

whose variable radius

The question

is

is

is

CP

very

the average area of the circle

?

any one with an

integral calculus and its
for

easy

of the

elementary knowledge
applications, and I found at once that the average area
I next
required is equal to that of the given square.
took a rectangle instead of a square, and found that the
average area required (i.e. that of the random circle) was
This led me to suspect
equal to that of the rectangle.
that the same law would be found to hold good in regard

The
symmetrical areas, and I tried the ellipse.
was what I had expected taking C as the centre
of the ellipse, and CP in a random direction meeting the
curve at P, I found that the average area of the variable
to all

result

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

102
circle

112

whose radius is CP must be equal to that of the

Further trials with other symmetrical
figures

ellipse.

confirmed

my

opinion as to the universality of the law.

Next came the questions Need the given

figure be
symmetrical ? and might not the law hold good for
:

C in any area, regular or irregular ? Further

again confirmed my suspicions, and led me to the
discovery of the general theorem, that if there be
any point
trials

any

given areas in the same plane, and we take any point C

anywhere in the plane (whether in one of the given areas

and draw any random radius CP

meeting the
of
area
at
a
variable
boundary
any given
point P, the
area
of
the
circle
whose
radius
is
CP
is
average
always
to
the
sum
of
the
equal
given areas, provided we con
or not),

when P
when P is

sider the variable circle as

positive
exit

from

is

a point of

a point of
any area, negative
entrance, and zero when P is non-existent, because the
random radius meets none of the given boundaries.
Next came the question Might not the same
general
theorem be extended to any number of
volumes
:

given

instead of areas, with an

average sphere instead of circle ?
Experiment again led to an affirmative answer that is
to say, to the
discovery of the following theorem which (as
No. 3486) I proposed in the Educational Times as follows
:

Some

lie about
matter where they be
Within such solid, or without,
Let s take a centre C.

No

From

shapeless solids

centre C, in countless hosts,

Let random radii run,

And meet a surface each at P,
Or, may be, meet with none.

Those shapeless solids, far or near,

Their total prove to be
The average volume of the sphere
Whose radius is CP.

K
OO

FINITE, INFINITE, ETC.

112, 1131

The

is

sphere, beware,

When

out at

103

positive

they

fly

But, changing sign, tis negative

When entrance there you spy.

One caution more, and I have done

The sphere is naught when P there s
:

none.

In proposing the question in verso instead of in plain

imitated the example of more dis
prose, I merely
Mathematicians, like other
tinguished contributors.

have their moments of exuberance, when they

The
burst forth into song just to relieve their feelings.
theorem thus discovered inductively was proved de
A fuller and therefore
ductively by Mr. G. S. Carr.

folk,

proof was afterwards

clearer

who succeeded Mr.

Miller

given by Mr. D. Biddle,

as

mathematical editor of

the Educational Times.

Much confusion of
113. Infinite and Infinitesimal.
words
is caused by the fact that each of those
used in different senses, especially by mathematicians.

ideas
is

and inadmissible para

To
non- Euclidean geometries.
avoid all ambiguities, I will define the words as follows.
The symbol a denotes any positive quantity or ratio too
and any
large to be expressible in any recognised notation,
As we may, in the
such ratio is called a positive infinity.
course of an investigation, have to speak of several such
ratios, the symbol a denotes a class of ratios called infinities,
the respective individuals of which may be designated

Hence

arise

most

of the strange

doxes of the various

by a

g,

&c.

An immensely

large

number

is

not

denote a million.
For example, let
necessarily infinite.
The symbol M M which denotes the millionth power of a
,

number

so inconceivably large that the ratio

has to the millionth part of an
miles
a
million
which
be
would
inch
negligible in comparison; yet this ratio
M
the infinities
is too small to be reckoned

million,

is

among

a p a 2 a s &c., of the class

,

a,

because, though inconceivably

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

104

large, its exact value is still expressible in

113

our decimal nota

we have only to substitute 10 6 or 1,000,000

for M, and we
The
get the exact expression at once.
a, denotes any negative in
symbol /3, or its synonym
tion

for

finity; so that /3 r /3 2
ratios, each of which

denote different negative

numerically too large to be
Mathematicians
expressible in any recognised notation.
often use the symbols oo and
oo
pretty much in the
sense here given to a and /3; but
unfortunately they
also employ oo and
oo
indifferently to denote expres,

/3y &c.,
is

1 3
sions such as -, -, &c., which are not ratios at

all,

but pure

non-existences of the class

Mathematicians
(see
6).
consider oo and
oo
equivalent when they are employed
in this sense; but it is clear that a and
a are not
lines
equivalent.
They speak of all parallel

straight
a point at infinity ; but this is
only an
abbreviated way of saying that all
straight lines which
meet at any infinite distance a or a or a &c., or /5
v
y
g
or /3
or /3
&c v can never be distinguished by
2
g
any
possible instrument from parallel straight lines; and
at

meeting

may, therefore,

for all practical

purposes, be considered

parallel.

The symbol
any

positive

expressible
k,

called

in

quantity or
in

any

h,

called a positive infinitesimal, denotes

too small
numerically to be

quantity or ratio

any recognised notation;

negative infinitesimal,
ratio too small

numerically

recognised

any positive

finite

a ratio neither

Let

notation.

number

or

too large nor

and the symbol

any negative

denotes

to

be

expressible

temporarily denote
ratio
that is to say,
c

too small to be
expres
our ordinary notation; and let
symbols of the
forms xy,x + y x-y &c., have their
customary mathe
matical meanings. From these conventions we
get various
self-evident formulae, such as
sible in

FINITE, INFINITE, ETC.

113]

(1)

(oa)-,

(4)

(7)

gy,

/,)

(5) G8

ar-af*;
(10) afiar-af*;

The

(3) (a-c)J;

(2) (ch)\(ck}

(eft?-,

+ cy

105

(6)

(8)

(11) of

+^

:;*r

(12) (hk)

formula asserts that the product of a positive

and a positive infinite is a positive infinite ; the tenth

first

finite

formula asserts that

if

any

ratio x

is

a positive

a positive nor a negative infinite.

formula asserts that the difference between

neither

is

infinite

NOTE

and a
1.

finite, it

The

third

a positive

positive finite is a positive infinite.

fuller discussion of the finite, the infinite,

and the

infini

Symbolic Reasoning" in
eighth article on
Mind. The article will probably appear next April.
NOTE 2. The four Modals of the traditional logic are the four terms
f
This pro
+
in the product of the two certainties A T + A and A +
tesimal will be found in

my

"

"

"

AJ>

duct

is

A + A^ + A A + A A*;
c

A".

is either
asserts that every statement
or necessarily false (A ?), or true in the case considered
it

1
necessarily true (A ),
but not always (A T A"), or false in the case considered but not always

See

99.

(A

A*).

CALCULUS OF LIMITS
CHAPTER XIV

WE

114.

will

begin

that

belongs

to

denote

symbol A*

asserts

x, the symbol x denoting

as positive, or negative, or zero* or

For example,

let

while

all

= zero*

A* + E y A* B y
same sense as in

A^B",

&c., are to be understood in the

10.

to

Let

the class

some such word

The symbols
imaginary, &c.

let

calculus

this

by applying

simple problems in elementary algebra.

The
any number, ratio, or fraction.

P= positive,
numbers

let

N = negative,

A.~

x
,

4and

or ratios not included

in one or other of these three classes are excluded

from

our Universe of Discourse

that is to say, left entirely
p
N
out of consideration.
Thus we get (6
6)
4)
(4
,

(P x

3 ),

+ P2

r
),

(N 1

(3

x o),

+ N2

N
)

and many other self-evident

for

mula?, such as

(1)(AB) =
N
(2) (AB) =
P

(3)(AB)

=
"

A/J
*

In this chapter and after, the

symbol 0, representing zero, denotes
not simple general non-existence, as in
0, but that particular nonexistence through which a variable
from a
passes when it

changes

positive infinitesimal to a negative infinitesimal, or vice versa.

106

(See

113.)

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

urn

-i

(7)

(rta;

107

= db) = (az - a&) = {(,* - J)} = a +

- &).

greater and /ess have a wider meaning

In algebra, when
than in ordinary speech.
x is greater than
we have (x of, we say that
whether a is positive or negative, and whether x is
Also, without any regard to the
positive or negative.
have (x aY, we say that x
when
we
x
or
of
a,
sign
is less than
Thus, in algebra, whether x be positive
or negative, and whether a be positive or negative, we

The words

115.

in algebra

"

a,"

"

a"

have
(x

From

this

- of = (x

it

follows,

+ a) = (x
p

(x

the symbols

>

and

>

>

a\ and

- a),

(x-3f =
In other

and

3.

(x>3),

to

words,

N
)

= (x

<

(x

+ af =

<

(,/;

a).

a,

- a)

We

than

is less

let a

Next,

get

and (x-3)* = (x<3).

that

assert

is

than 3
equivalent to asserting that x is greater
3 is negative is equivalent to
assert that x
that x

that

being used in their customary

<

a =

let

by changing the sign of

algebraic sense.

For example,

(x

positive
;

asserting

3.

= - 3. We get
p
(a-a) = OB+3) =
p

(a3>

-3)
-3).

=6

Let x

3)

(x>

Let x

>

(a;

we

we

get

+ 3) p = (6 + 3) p = e

(a certainty).

get

p
p
=e
3) = (x + 3) = (0 + 3)

is

while to

(a certainty).

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

108

x=

Let
(x

we

1,

>

x=

4,

positive values

and

between
O/) for

3)

=(-4 + 3) p =

evident that

It is

(a certainty).

we get

-3) = (0 +

(x>

115-117

get

p
- 1 + 3) p = e
3) = (x + 3) =
(

Let

of

(x>

and

x,

-3)

is

for

all

but that

a certainty (e) for all

negative values of x

x>

(an impossibility).

3 is

an impossibility

negative values of x not comprised between

and -3. With
-3) the case is reversed. The
- 3) is an
statement
for all
all

(x<

(x<

values of x and for

while

all
is

3)

(x<

impossibility (17)
positive
and
negative values between
a certainty (e) for all
negative

values of x not comprised between

for example, that
8
we get

and

3.

Suppose,

x=
N
N
-3) = (a + 3) = (-8 + 3) = e (a certainty).
1
we get
suppose x=
- 3) = - 1 + N =
(x
3)
(an impossibility).
;

(x<

Next,

<

116.

From

r,

the conventions explained in

115,

we

get

the formulae
(A>B)

and

{(

= (-A)<(-B),

A)>

B)}

and(A<B)

= (-A)>(-B);

= {( - A) - - B)} p = - A + B) p
N
i=(A-B) =
(

(A<B).

117. Let x be a variable number or

fraction, while
a constant of fixed value.
When we have (x af,
or its
synonym (x>a\ we say that a is an inferior limit
N
of x\ and when we have
(a?-a) or its synonym (x<a\
we say that a is a superior limit of x. And this defini

is

tion holds

+ af
(x + a)*
(x

good when we change the sign of a.

that -a is an inferior limit of

asserts

asserts that

is

a superior limit of

x.

Thus
x,

and

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

118,119]
118. For

let

example,

109

be required

it

the

find

to

superior or inferior limit of x from the given inequality

+6
3

Let

We

denote this given statement of inequality.

get

x-3

+6\ p _/ 9 _#-3

23

a;+6 Xl
Q\P

Hence,

is

an inferior limit of

given statement
of x lower

values of

A
2

than

-,

impossible for any positive value

is

and

also impossible for all negative

x.

119. Given the statements

In other words, the

a?.

denotes 3x

<

Find the limits of

x.

We

-304

and

and B,

in

denotes

which
-

- 3x

<

have

=(24-4^-36^-3)

21\ p _/

21
>

40/

Hence we get

AB =

^4

>

>

4o

40

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

110

119, 120

Thus x may have any value between the superior

11
limit

21

and the

limit

inferior

40

14

but any value of

x not comprised within these limits would be incom

For example, suppose x = 1
patible with our data.

We

get

possibility).

/6
-

- -1\

N
:

4/

/5
r
\3

- 3-IV
-

(a certainty).

4/

with

Thus, the supposition (x=0) is incompatible with

though not with A.
120. Next, suppose our data to be AB, in which

Thus the supposition (x=l)

though not with B.

x= 0.

Next, suppose

We

tj

\3

is

incompatible

get
(a certainty).

(an impossibility).

4y

denotes 62

>

4a; -f

1
15

denotes

tix

<

4# + -

We

4*

get

~4~

=
37

127

X>

T2

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

120,121]

111

Hence we get

AB = -

>

>

i/

12

(an impossibility)

13

5
>

In this

but the

itself;

121. Find

denotes

for

2#-l
x

what
what

for

and

positive,

A
combination AB

or B,
is

are

mutually

possible taken

is

impossible.

of

positions

>

AB

data

Each datum,

incompatible.

by

our

therefore

case

^-

x the ratio

is

when

negative,

positions

28
.

2x2

+ 84 _ 2(x - 4)(a? - 10)

29x

x(x

x(x-3)

3)~~

a denote positive infinity, and let ft

Also let the symbol (m, n)
denote negative infinity.
assert as a statement that x lies between the superior
limit
and the inferior limit n, so that the three

As

in 8

let

113,

symbols (m,
synonyms.

We

10J, 4,

0,

(m

n),

>x>

have

n),

and

(m

x) (x

are

n)

consider six limits, namely,

descending order, and the five
intervening spaces corresponding to the five statements
Since x must lie
(a, 10J), (10J, 4), (4, 3), (3, 0), (0, ft).
a,

3,

ft,

to

in

in one or other of these five spaces,

,

3)

we have

+ (3,

0)

+ (0,

ft).

Taking these statements separately, we get

(a,
(

0}, 4)

- )\x - 3) V
-1
(x
p
N
F
1 Oi) (a - 4) (a - 3)
1
(a
(a
p p
N
N
x
F
10J) (^
3)
4)\x 3)
(x
(x
4)
- 1 J) H (a - 4) N - 3)V F
- 3)
(#
0) (x
N
N
- 3) H (a - 4) N - 1 Oi) K F p
(0, ft) ^
(^
OJ)

(x

Oi)

Oi)"(a;

Oi)>

F"

4)"

(4, 3)
(3,

Thus, these

five

a;

"

<>

(a;

statements respectively imply

F FN F
p

1
,

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

112

the

or fraction

ratio

changing

121, 122

its

sign four

times as x passes downwards through the limits 10i,

F p =(a,
F N = (10i
That

to say, the

is

4)

between 4 and

ment that F
that x
3

and

is

is

+ (3,

statement that

lent to the statement that x

or

4,

Hence we get

3, 0.

3,

is

negative

either between

is

positive is

either between a

or between
is

0).

and

/3

equivalent

and the

to

equiva

and 10J,
state

the statement

10i and 4 or

between

else

0.

122. Given that

2^1 = 28

values of

_,
X

JC

to

find

the value or

x.

evident by inspection that there are two values of

It is

x which do not satisfy this

equation

When

=0, we

get

~=

and

they are

while

and

3.

evi-

dently a real ratio - cannot be equal to a meaningless

oo
ratio or
unreality

2x

a ._

(see

28

while
3

13).

?8

--=-_;

Again when

x= 3,

and evidently-

we

cannot

Q>

00

be equal to

(xQ)
A

Excluding

therefore

the suppositions

and (x=3) from our universe of

denote our data, and

let

F=

possibilities, let

^1
^
_

We

get

88
Ot)

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

122-1241

From our

data, therefore,
either 4 or 10J.

we conclude

must be

that x

--- --- 6-7x

844

13x

we have given

123. Suppose

113

3x

>

to find the limits of x.

Let

We

denote the given statement.

have

for
If in the given statement we substitute the sign
N
the sign
we shall get
Thus, the state3x
I3x
3
Q-7x is
is greater than
ment that
impos<

A=

>,

--84

>?.

48

----

-i

sible,

and so

is

iy

the statement that -

whatever value we give

that

--

---

-,

This

to x.

when reduced

is

equal to

sign

less

than

3x
G - 7x
---

evident from the fact

to its

simplest form,

of

is

is

8
,

which,

for

values

all

x,

.LOcX,

is

Hence - ---- must be

-- -

---

If in the given
for the sign
1

oX

so that, in this case,

the value of x.

124. Let
the limits of

A
x.

>

we
OX

is

to

statement we substitute the

shall get
U

a formal certainty, whatever be

2
denote the statement $

We

equivalent

have

3>2&;

to find

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

114

Here

fSS
l-OO

124-128

a formal certainty whatever be the value of x,

no real finite limits of x (see
113).
for the sign
we shall get
put the sign
is

so that there are

we

If

Here

>

a formal impossibility, so that no real value of

the equation v? + 3
It will be remem
2x.
bered that, by
114, imaginary ratios are excluded from
our universe of discourse.

is

satisfies

125. Let it be required to find the value or values of

x from the datum x
^/x=2. We get
(x

for (x

the

- Jx = 2) = (x - Jx - 2) = (x* + x* + x)
- Jx - 2) = x*(x (x
Jx - 2)

= 4)

implies X

datum

(x

126. Let

the

datum

it

(x

F
,

and x and #N are incompatible with

2).
^/x
be required to find the limits of x from
*Jx>2).

2)

for

0>4)

the

implies x

datum

(x

p
,

and x and

are incompatible with

,X

IJ

2)

127. Let it be required to find the limits of x from

the datum (x
At/x<2).

(%

=x

_j_
l

/x

x)(x

{(x*

2)0*

= x\x*
Here, therefore, x

<

2)

=x

=x

l)}"+x

2)

+ x = x\x

may have any

/x

(x

<

(x*

4)

^"i

4- T

2) +a;

+x

value between 4 and

zero, including zero, hut not including 4.

128. The symbol

gm

denotes any

number

or ratio

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

128, 129]

115

than ra, while Im denotes any number or ratio less

than m (see
The symbols f/^in, f/./m, g.jn, &o.,
115).
denote a series of different numbers or ratios, each greater

greater

than

in,

and

collectively forming the class gm.

Similarly,
l-^m, lz m, I 3m, &c., denote a series of different

the symbols

numbers

or ratios, each less than m, and

collectively
The symbol x gm asserts that the
forming the class Im.
number or ratio x belongs to the class gm, while x lm
asserts that x belongs to the class Im (see
The
4).
m -an is short for xgm x n the
m ln is
x
symbol
symbol
short forxgm x ln ; and so on (see
9, footnote).
These symbolic conventions give us the formulae

(2)
(3)

m=

= (x-m)
lm =
= (x-m) N
x
m
= x^ x = (x m)(x
xgm
N
= (x m) (x
=

(1) x^

(x>m)

(x<m)

ln

ln

>

<

n)

TZ,)

129. Let

We

and n be two

(n>

>

numbers

different

m).

or ratios.

get the formula

= (x m
>

To prove

this

we have

(since

>

n)

(a;

>n>

m}.

and n are different

numbers)
^>9"

= ar*.o( mg + nv)

for

= xgm m + ^ nn m = (K

mun + ngm = e

!/n

for

term the outside

in each

because

it

implied in the

is

bracket, since
plies

x>m.

(2) a*-

x>m>?i

Similarly,

= ^m + x

This formula

ln

may

ln

n)

+ (x

>

>

),

be omitted,
statement
in the
compound
factor

may

and
im
and
the
formula
get
prove

implies

we

>m>

x>n>m

x>n,

n lm = (x

<

<

n)

+ (x

<<

ml

be obtained from (1) by simply sub-

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

116

129-131

TSS
L-Oe)

stituting / for y
substitution.

130. Let m,

We

ratios.

2) x

and the proof

r

n,

obtained by the same

is

be the three different numbers or

get the formulae

lm

ln lr

= xlmm m + x
ln

lr

ln

n lm n lr + xlr r lm r ln

These two formulas are almost self-ovident but they

may be formally proved in the same way as the two
129 for since m, n, r are, by hypothesis,
formulas of
different numbers or ratios, we have
;

X 9^.gn.gr_ x gm.gn.gr ^

while

xgm

^ ^

formula a

ae,

and

gn 9r

by the alternative e l3 and omitted

When
129, we get Formula (1).
implied
we have multiplied x lm ln lr by the alternative e 2 and
omitted implied factors, as in
129, we get Formula (2).
The same principle evidently applies to four ratios, m, n,
r, s, and so on to any number.
multiplied

factors, as in

131.

in

If,

130,

limits of x, the three

mgn 9r

ngm

we suppose m, n, r to be inferior
terms of the alternative e 1? namely,

r9m 91\ respectively assert that

is the
nearest inferior limit, that n is the nearest inferior limit,
that r is the nearest inferior limit.
And if we suppose

m,

n, r to

be superior limits of

alternative

e2

namely,

ln lr
,

x,

the three terms of the

n lm

lr
,

lm ln
"

respectively

the nearest superior limit, that n is the

nearest superior limit, that r is the nearest superior limit.
For of any number of inferior limits of a variable x, the
nearest to x is the greatest; whereas, of
any number of
assert that

is

And since in
superior limits, the nearest to x is the least.
each case one or other of the limits m, n, r must be the
we have the certain alternative
and the certain alternative e 2 in the

in the

nearest,

ex

case,

latter.

former

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

131-133]

It is evident that

m may
ln

that

m gn may

nY(m

replaced by (m

r)

N
?i)

and

be replaced by (m

be replaced by (m
N

117

that

ln lr
-

n)

may

be

so on.

CHAPTER XV
WHEN

132.

#2

?!,

&c

^3>

our

shortens

we have

speak often of several

to

a variable

reasoning

a?,

to

it

limits,

greatly simplifies and

one

them,

register

after

another, as they present themselves, in a talk of reference.

The * symbol x m ,^ n asserts that x m is a superior limit, and

xn an inferior limit, of x.
The* symbol xm n r s asserts
that xm and x n are superior limits of x, while xr and xs
,

are inferior limits of

m
Xm
and

.n

Thus

x.

means (a? - m ) N (^ - a? n ) p or (xm

n ),
- xm )\x - xn }\x - xr ) p(x - xs ) p
.r. s means (x
.n

>x>x

so on.

133. The symbol xm

numerical

suffix

(with an acute accent on the

m) always denotes a proposition, and is
>

which is synonymous with

synonymous with (x xm
It
affirms
that
mth limit of x registered in
the
m ).
our table of reference is a superior limit.
The symbol
xm (with no accent on the numerical suffix), when used as
)",

(x<x

a proposition, asserts that the ??t th limit of x registered in

our table of reference is an inferior limit of x.
Thus

xm means
*

(x-xm )

my memoir

In

p
.

on La Logique Symbolique,

ct

ses

applications in the

du Congres International de Philosophic, I adopted the symbol

n
(suggested by Monsieur L. Couturat) instead of av. M an(^ #7. instead
xm n r g
The student may employ whichever he finds the more con

Bibliothequc
a;

of

>

From long habit I find the notation of the text easier but the
other occupies rather less space, and has certain other advantages in
the process of finding the limits. When, however, the limits have been
found and the multiple integrals have to be evaluated, the notation of the
venient.

text

is

preferable, as the other

151, 15G).

might occasionally lead

to

ambiguity

(see

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

118

134, 135

134. The employment of the symbol x m sometimes to

denote the proposition (x #m ) p and sometimes to denote
the simple number or ratio xm never leads to any
ambiguity for the context always makes the meaning
,

For example, when we write

perfectly evident.

is

it

that

clear
5

which

fraction -,

outside the

statement

Similarly,

is

(x

be marked in the table

to

as

x3 Y,

when we

A=

supposed

the third limit of x\ whereas the & 3

bracket, is affirmed to be equivalent to the

reference

of

the x% inside the bracket denotes the

(2,t-

and

is

therefore

statement

also.

write

+ 84

>

29a?)

= (x -

0|) + (x
x l +v 2 ,

4)

= (x-x y + (x-x Y =
2

we

A is equivalent to the alter

of which the first term x asserts

assert that the statement

native statement x l

+x

2>

a statement) that the limit x

10J) is an
1 (denoting
limit
of
and
the
second
term
asserts
that
x,
inferior
x$
the limit x 2 (denoting 4) is a superior limit of x.
Thus,
the alternative statement x + x asserts that
either x^
l
2
is an inferior limit of x, or else x
is a
superior limit
(as

"

of

x."

135. The

operations of

this

calculus of limits are

mainly founded on the following three formulae (see

129-131):

(3)

m .n = ^m .n(^m-^n)

P
-

In the first of the above formulae, the symbol x

xmxn and asserts that xm and xn are both
inferior limits
,

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

135, 136]
of

The statement

x.

119

x n ) asserts that x m
l>

(xm

is

greater

while
than xn and
v
x
on
the
the statement (x n
contrary, that
m ) asserts,
limit
129,
xn and not xm is the nearer inferior
(see
In the second formula, the symbol xm n asserts
131).
The state
that xm and xn are both superior limits of x.
y
and
there
ment (xm xn ) asserts that xm is less than xn
while the statement
fore a nearer superior limit of x
- xmY asserts, on the contrary, that xn and not xm is
(
The third formula is equiva
the nearer superior limit.
therefore a nearer inferior limit of

,<.

lent to

^m .n
and

136.

in

xm

*tt/

>

if xm is a superior limit, and xn an inferior

then x m must be greater than xw

asserts that

limit, of x,

of

When we

have

three inferior limits,

Formula

(1)

135 becomes

which a

asserts that xm is the nearest of the three

is the nearest, and y
In other words,

inferior limits,

/3

asserts that xn

asserts that xr

is

the nearest.

- (xm - xn Y(xm - x Y
= (xn -xm )\xn -x Y
fi
a

F
p
y=(x -xm) (xr -xn)
r

When we

have

three superior limits,

Formula

(2) of

135

becomes
in which, this time, a asserts that xm

is

the nearest of the

three superior limits, /3 asserts that x n is the nearest, and

7 asserts that xr is the nearest. In other words,

Evidently the same principle

number

may

of inferior or superior limits.

be extended to any

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

120

137, 138

137. There are certain limits which present themselves

so often that (to save the trouble of
consulting the Table
of Limits) it is convenient to represent them
by special
These are positive infinity, negative infinity, and
symbols.
zero

rather an infinitesimal).
Thus, when we have
x, in addition to the limits x 1 xz xs &c.,

(or

any variable

registered in the table, we may have always understood

the superior limit xa which will denote positive

infinity,

the limit x

which

will

denote

zero

(or rather, in strict

logic, a positive or negative infinitesimal), and the always

understood inferior limit x^ which will denote negative
infinity (see
113).
Similarly with regard to any other
variable y, we may have the three understood limits
ya
in addition to the registered limits
?/
7/0,
y 1} y z y 3 &c.
,

Thus, when we are speaking of the limits of x and

we
have^a = a = a; xQ = yQ =Q (or dx or dy)\ x = y = -a.
On the other hand, the statement xa^ m asserts that x lies
between positive infinity xat and the limit xm
registered in
the table of reference; whereas xm
,^ asserts that x lies
between the limit xm and the negative infinity x
Simi
?/,

?/

ft

ft

ft

larly,

#OT

,
<0

asserts that x lies

between the superior

limit

xm and the inferior limit

while
n asserts that x lies
between the superior limit
and the inferior limit xn
Thus, the statement xm
and
implies that x is

positive,

%. n implies that x is negative.

is
Also, the statement
synonymous with the statement x* and the statement x is
p
As shown in 134,
synonymous with the statement x
the employment of the
x
to denote a
sometimes
symbol
limit, and sometimes to denote a statement, need not lead
:

to

any ambiguity.

138. Just as in
finding the limits of statements in pure
33-40) we may supply the superior limit n
when no other superior limit is
and the inferior
logic (see

given,

limit

when no other

inferior limit is
given, so in find
ing the limits of variable ratios in mathematics, we may

supply the positive infinity a (represented by x a or y a or

&c., according to the variable in
question) when* no

2a

SS
33

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

138, 1391
-J

121

is
given, and the negative infinity /3
x
or z &c.) when no other inferior
or
(represented by
y^
limit is given.
Thus, when xm denotes a statement,
v
namely, the statement (x xm ) it may be written xa m
and, in like manner, for the statement xn which denotes
xn y*, we may write x n ,^ (see
137).
(x
135 may generally be
139. Though the formulae of
with
in
with
only one or two
easy problems
dispensed
first to such
them
will
nevertheless
we
variables,
apply

other superior limit

ft

ft

>,

make

problems, in order to
clearer

when we come

meaning and object

to more

their

them afterwards

to apply

complicated problems which cannot dispense with their aid.

9x negative;
Given that 7/# 53 is positive, and 67
of
x.
required the limits
We
Let A denote the first datum, and B the second.
get

TABLE

Hence, we get

By Formula

AB = Xa

(1) of

=a!A

>

135,

Xa

jfl?^ 2

we get

+J*1-

-*.!}

-477)
Thus
fore

= ^ + ^2^ = ^!
we get AB = #

(see

a /.i. 2

we

infer

that

=#

p
,

11,

Formula

.i-

From

for

Q = (63Q)
P

22, 23).

the data

AB

there

between x a and &\ that

53
In other words, x
and

lies

1>

is,

*"

between positive
greater than

53

infinity
,,4

or 7-.

is

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

139, 140

135 was not

Now, here evidently the formula of
for it is evident by mere inspection that x is
greater than # 2 so that ,x^ being therefore the nearest

wanted

inferior limit, the limit a\ is superseded and may be left

out of account.
In fact
implies B, so that we get

AB = A = #a

1.

140. Given
positive

Let

that

53

7x

is

negative

required the limits of x.

denote the first datum, and

and

67

9#

We

the second.

get

53

y
67
9 I

Hence, we get

By Formula
V. 2

135 we get

2 of

=X

Xl

X ?T

+X

= xr(-^-~

2 (

X2

+ %*

X lT

53

_ 469) N + % (469 - 477) N

= x ,9j+v = x
1

This shows
sedes the

AB =

::=
r>2

limit # 2

./3

,e

(see

11, Formulae 22, 23).

that

the nearer superior

distant superior limit

more

,i

x
y.p>

or
j

Thus

a;

and negative

lies

limit
;

x z super

so that

we

get

between the superior

infinity.

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

141]

123

CHAPTER XVI

WE

will now consider the limits of two variables,

with only numerical constants (see
156).
Suppose we have given that the variables x and y are
3x 2 and
both positive, while the expressions 2y
and
that
from
2#
both
these data
are
6
+
3y
negative
we are required to find the limits of y and x in the order

141.

and

first

y, a-

Let
data.

TABLE OF LIMITS.

A denote
We have

A = yV(2y -

3#

our whole
o

-6)
Beginning

with

bracket factor,

we

2) (3?y

N
.

the
get*

first

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

[141

the expression for

Substituting this alternative for y v %

A, we get

r o

2/r. o^-v.

omitting in the

~i

2/2

o^-v. i

2/i

o^i o

2/2

o^a

term the superior limit x a because it

and omit

first

superseded by the nearer superior limit x l

x because
ting in the second term the limit

is

it is
super
The next step is to apply
seded by the nearer limit x lt
We
Formula (3) of 135 to the ^/-factors ?/ r and y z
,

get
2/r. o

2/i

2/2

- 2/oV =

2/r. o(2/i

2/2

0^2

0(2/2

P
2/r. o(2/i)

XP

/3

-^ +

2/r. o

- 2/o) P =

P
2/2

o(2/2)

/
2/2

(2

2
-tf

2/2

2/1

<5

Y
/

0*3

Substituting these equivalents of

^=

0*1 2.0
.

2/2

0*a

and y z

7/ r

2/1

0*1

H~

we get

in A,

2/2

0*3

evidently ,^ is a nearer inferior limit than # 2 an(i

therefore supersedes ^ 2
while #3 is a nearer superior

for

x a (which denotes positive infinity), and there

#a
We have now done with the y-stateand
it
remains
to apply Formula (3) of
135
ments,
only
to the A - statements #
and
It
is
evident, however,
tl
by mere inspection of the table, that this is needless, as
it would introduce no new factor, nor discover
any incon
sistency, since fL\ is evidently greater than # that is, than
The process
zero, and r 3 is evidently greater than x v
therefore here terminates, and the limits are fully deter-

limit than

fore supersedes

r>0

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

141]

125

We

have found that either x varies between x l

and zero, and y between y and zero or else x varies
between 3 and x lt and y between y 2 and zero.
The figure below will illustrate the preceding process
The symbol x denotes the
and table of reference.
mined.

,.v

distance of any point P (taken at random out of those in

the shaded figure) from the line # and the symbol y
denotes the distance of the point P from the line y
,

The

?/i

of

y,

(>%

which

that

2/0

the data

equivalent of

first

is

the statement

asserts that y^ and y z are superior limits

zero) is an inferior limit of y, and that

( or

It is evident that
z?
(or zero) is an inferior limit of x.
is true for every
this compound statement
point P in

the shaded portion of the figure, and that it

for any point outside the shaded portion.
equivalent

2/2

0*3

of

the

data

tne

fi rst

term

is

the

which

in the quadrilateral contained

and the second term of which

ig

true

contained by the lines y 2 yQ

,

x^.

f r

not true

The

alternative

i>

is

2/i

final
.o#i .o

every point

lines y lt y0t x ly XQ
is true for the triangle

by the

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

126

U2

142. Given that if

4x is negative and ?/ + 2r
the
limits
of y and #.
positive
required
Let A denote our data.
get
TABLE OF LIMITS.

We

A
- ^t

2/3=
for (y

- 2 v^)

(2/

+ ^ V^)

T:

r^

We

"

is

rn

^Cj

#0=1

+2
P

/vj

^^C

impossible.

therefore

get

=
By Formula

=
=

2/3. i

2/2

8 (y

- ?/l) P =

2/

135 we get

(1) of

- 2/i) + 2/i(2/i ~ 2/s)

x-2 ^~4
P

2/3(2/3

^-

^-2)

4)

(see

127)

Therefore

We
2/2
2/2

3
i

now apply Formula

=
=
=

2/2

2/2

2/ 2

2/2

~ 2/s)
- 2/i)
1(2/2

3(2/2

i(*
l(

l>

=
=

(3) of

Jx + 2 V =
+ 2 V^ - 4)
1

2/2
2/2

s(2

1)

2/2

l(#

2/2

i( 2-?

+ Jx -2)p = /A
-

135, thus

^^

- ^2 ) P =

2/2

+
1^2

g JJ

126,

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

142, 143]

127

Thus the application of Formula (3) of

135 to y 2 3
introduces no new factor, but its application to the other
,

compound statement y.2 ml introduces the new statement

#2 and at the same time the new limit x 2
Hence wo
135 applied to xa A and
finally get (since Form 3 of
x v 2 makes no change)
,

A=

2/2

137, 138).

(see

.3^a .!+2/2 .i%.2

This result informs us that

either x lies between xa
x
and
and
(positive infinity)
y between the superior
lt
"

and the inferior limit y z

or else x lies be
?/ 2
tween x l and x 2 and y between y.2 and y^
The above

limit

figure will

show the position of the

limits.

With

this

geometrical interpretation of the symbols x, ?/, &c., all

the points marked will satisfy the conditions expressed
by the statement A, and so will all other points

bounded by the upper and lower branches of the parawith the exception of the blank area cut off by the

bole,

line y lt

143. Given that y

also negative

4a;

is

negative,

and y

required the limits of y and

Here the required

limits (though they

+ 2x

x.

may

be found

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

128

independently as before)
142.
the diagram in
this

143-145

be obtained at once from

difference between
142 is that in the present

may

The only

problem and that of

+ 2x

negative, instead of being, as before,

4^ is, as before, negative, y% will be,
positive.
as before, a superior limit, and y 3 an inferior limit of y
so that, as before, all the points will be restricted within

case y

is

Since y

But since y + 2x 4
the two branches of the parabola.
now changed sign, all the admissible points, while

has

still

keeping between the two branches of the parabola,

The result will be that the only
now be restricted to the blank

will cross the line y^.

admissible points will

portion of the parabola cut off by the line y^ instead

of being, as before, restricted to the shaded portion
within the two branches and extending indefinitely

A
the positive direction towards positive infinity.
that
at
of
142
will
show
the
the diagram
glance
in

required result

now

is
~
2/2

with, of course, the

3*2

same

V\ 3*1
.

2>

table of limits.

CHAPTER XVII
144.

THE symbol
when
B
,

the

numerator and denomi-

nator denote statements, expresses the chance that

is

true

on the assumption that B is true ; B being some state

ment compatible with the data of our problem, but not
necessarily implied

145. The symbol

by the

data.

j^

denotes the chance that

is

true

when nothing is assumed but the data of our problem. This

what is usually meant when we simply speak of the

is
"

chance of

A."

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

146, 147]

The symbol

146.

upon

and

the

_, or its

5(A, B), denotes

synonym

129

this is called the dependence* of the statement

statement B.

indicates

It

the

increase,

or

(when negative) the decrease, undergone by the absolute

A

when

chance

the supposition

is

added

to

our data.

ti

The symbol

or

<J

its

Jj

dependence of

synonym ^(A,

upon B

is zero.

Fig.

B), asserts that the

In this case the state-

Fig. 2.

1.

Fig.

3.

A is said to be independent oj the statement B

which implies, as will be seen further on (see 149), that
B is independent of A.
147. The symbols a, b, c, &c. (small italics) respectively

ment

A
represent the

symbols a

chances,

I/,

&c.,

A B C
,

Obscure

Tl
,

-, &c. (see

145); and the

respectively denote

&c., so that

we

ideas about

dependence

the chances

get

and

independence

in

bability have led some writers (including Boole) into serious errors.
definitions here proposed are, I believe, original.
I

pro

The

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

148

148. The diagrams on p. 129 will illustrate the pre

and definitions.
ceding conventions

Let the symbols A, B assert respectively as propositions

that a point P, taken at random out of the total number
in the circle E, will be in the circle A, that it
of
points

Then AB will assert that P will

be in the circle B.
P will
be in both circles A and B AB will assert that
B
and
circle
the
in
similarly
be in the circle A, but not
for the statements A B and A B
will

In Fig.

A=

we have

A~ _ ,_10

:;

AB_

"

13

AB =
e

In Fig. 2 we have

A=

=;
3

A _

AB_

AB_=

AB

In Fig. 3 we have

Ae

fi

,_=

TT

Similarly,
in Fig. 1,

in Fig. 2,
in Fig. 3,

A
= ---=--

we get
<$(B,

A)=+l;

c^(B,

A) = 0;

(B,A)=

fT

It is evident also that

-~

AB

"13"

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

149, 150]

131

149. The following formulae are easily verified

(1)

_,

^=

.?;

A
B

a
i

2)

^B = ?.J*A

.A

(6

~6 -B

6A

"A

of the above eight formulae shows that if

A
statement
is independent of another statement B,
any
then B is independent of A for, by Formula (2), it is
To the preceding
clear that
B) implies ^(B, A).

The second

<S(A,

eight formulae

may

be added the following

B_B
AB_A
~
~ A

AB_A
~

_B
~

_A_
;

A+

BABAB
A be

any statement, and

proper fraction; then A* is short
150. Let

= x,

which

asserts

AB
(AB)* means

convention gives us

of

is

x.

the

= #);

following

and

b (as

before) are short for

B
and

(1)

(3) (AB)*(A

+ B)* :(*+// = + &);

so

formulae,

(5)

x be any positive
the statement

for

chance

the

that

let

Similarly,

a and

BABAB

A+

(4)

on.

in

This

which

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

132

150, 151

_ B \ i^prove all these formulae, of which the

be proved as follows

It is easy to

may

last

B\

/A

A\

/A

The following chapter

A XO

requires

some knowledge

of the

integral calculus.

CHAPTER XVIII
151. IN applying the Calculus of Limits to multiple
integrals, it will be convenient to use the following
notation, which I employed for the first time rather

more than twenty years ago

"

Multiple Integrals

The symbols

Limits of
in a paper on the
in the Proc. of the Math. Society.

<(a?)#m

.n

"

xm

an(^

.n$(x

meaning.

The symbol

4>(x)x

>.

which

in

differ

)>

xm

the relative positions of

and
(p(x)

>.

ny

differ

also in

n l8 short for the integra

l(p(x)dx, taken between the superior limit x m and

the inferior limit x n
an integration which would be

tion

m
/If*
xn

m
xn (f)(x)dx.
xm n to the

jI

The symbol x m

left, is short for $(xm )

For example, suppose we have

,.

with

n (b(x],

or

dx<p(x)

the

symbol

<f>(xj.

f(f>(x)dx

lV

by substitution of notation, we get f

xn

= ^(x).
=

<t>(x)dx

Then,

<$>(x)x

,
.

^K#m)

"

^(n)

so that

we can thus

entirely

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

151-153]

133

dispense with the symbol of integration,

following concrete example.

Let

it

the

as in

f,

be required to evaluate the integral

TABLE OF LIMITS.

(X

(V.

te 1

+)

the

limits

given

(Xdx,

dy\

?/

<^2

being

as

The

full

table.

variation being

Integral zr

the

in

as follows, the order of

is

process

z, y, x.

yv

<#c

= (z

z2 )y r

x v ,o = (y

c)y^ 2^1
.

- ex) - (^ - cb) } x v o = (^ -exr

=
co?
bco.
x
+
+
\l\i
\tf
lex)
.

The

152.

evident

.= -#

(i)
(3)

m -.n^)= -#n .n4

=
^(a?)(AV M + AV r)

(8)
(9)

(10)

.m;

self-

Vn
^m n^V * =
Xm n + Xr s = X m

mfir

2)

<

Vm n^V
.

-\-Xr n

= Un

>

V..)^() = (^.. + av.W)

^X^m .n + ^..) = ^)(^ + ^.n).

(^., +

.,

153. As already stated, the symbol

numbers or

ratios.

The symbol

suppose the

number

xK
Thus,

numbers

means

y
is

and

missing,

=r

IB

and

A
#B

means

and

we may

understood.

means - x

is true on the
and y be any

2/B

either of these two

when

are propositions, denotes the chance that

Now, let x
assumption that B is true.

when

(5)

following formulae of integration are

A
.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC
The symbol

154.

Int

A.(x,

z)

y,

subject to the restrictions

154, 155

denotes the integral

of the statement A, the

[dxldyldz,
The symbol Int A, or
order of variation being x, y, z.
sometimes simply A, may be used as an abbreviation for
Int A(x, y, z) when the context leaves no doubt as to the
of the abbreviation.

meaning

155. Each
variables

x,

the

of
z

y,

TABLE OF LIMITS.

is

=1

taken at random be

tween
is

and

<

what

the chance that the

x y)
z(l

fraction

l-y-yz
be between

also

will
1

and

l .(Tl -0

Let the symbol Q,

as a proposition, assert that the value of the fraction in

question will

lie

between

We

data
145).

(see

and

Also, let

and

have

and

to find

let

denote our

which here

=
e

N denote the numerator z(l

y),

yz of the fraction in ques

y
tion
while, this time, to avoid ambiguity, the letter n
will denote negative, and p positive (small italics instead of,

the denominator 1

We get
n n
n
p
=
Q WD (N - D) + N D (N - D) p

as before, capitals).

Taking the order of variation x

get, since z

(N

(N -

is

y, z,

as in the table,

given positive,

- D) n = (z - Z,T + y-l Y = (zx-y-z

ii+*- IV
D)"

= (z - zv + y-

l)

= (zx-y-z+ l) n = ^.

we

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

155]

1:55

for Q,
Substituting these results in our expression
shall

we

have

Q= #
,1

#3

+ *2#2% = A

+ *S.

32/2

>.

22/2-

see table), we get

#
Multiplying by the given certainty r .o (

%.

Q=

Applying Formulae
137)

Q = ^2 fe2/3 +
= ^2
+ XV

%.

3^/2

now apply Formula

^3

135, we get (see

(2) of

22/2

0^/3

135

(3) of

^2"

for a/v.oQ-

expression

+%
+ ^3

%<>yy)yv

We

and

.2.o2/2-

results in our

Substituting these

XV

r3

+<
<)2/2

^ + ^0 ~ ^ = V + V =

= #2^2 -

we get

3.

(1)

#2.0

<%.!

2^2-

statements

to the

thuS

135, Form 3, intro

This shows that the application of
we have finished
that
duces no new statement in y so
with the limits of x, and must now apply the formulae of
135 to find the limits of y. Multiplying the expres
;

sion found for

XV

O /!

~
oQ

By applying

# ro Q by the datum
r2

?/2

3?/2

we

0,

/3

we

get

+ V

2?/!

.2.0

135, or by simple inspec

the formulae of

tion of the table,

y2

?/ r>0 ,

=y
r

2/3v.r
2/ 3
2/ 3
z
yz
get y y
and substituting these results in the right-hand
t

side of the last equivalence,

22/1

oQ =

32/2

we get

<

02/3

+^y

2?/V

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

136

The

155, 156

135, Form 3, to the y- statements

application of
no fresh statements in z, nor destroy any

will introduce

term by showing that it contains an impossible factor

We have therefore found the nearest limits of y and it
only remains to find the limits of z.
Multiplying the last
r\.

expression by the

Q A = Q#r $ v
,

The

datum

o^r o

r>0

(<% .

135,
application of
no change, since (z

effect

we get

^
Form

cess of finding the limits

3, to

therefore over

is

We

remains to evaluate the integrals.

Q
A

Int
r

Int

easy,

A = Int

it

only

get

x v Qy r
is

above

and

and the result

little

will
.

The pro

QA = Int
QA
A
.

for Int

the factor z v

ZQ ) P is a certainty.

^ =
v

The

integrations

are

log 2 (Naperian base), which

is

5
-.
9

156. Given that a is positive, that n is a positive whole

number, and that the variables x and y are each taken
at random between a and
a, what is the chance that
n
n+1
is
negative and {(# + y)
{(# + y)
}
a] positive ?

Let A denote our data y v ^x r 2 (see Table); let Q de

n
N
note the proposition
{(x + y)
#} and let R denote the
p
n+1
in which the exponent
proposition {(x + y)
a}
denotes negative, and the exponent P positive.
,

We

have

to find the

chance -^?, which =

Int

QRA
A

7?^

In this problem we have only to find the limits of

integration (or variation) for the numerator from the
compound statement QRA, the limits of integration for
the denominator being already known, since A = T/
2

CALCULUS OF LOUTS

156]

TABLE OF LIMITS

2/2=

x3

a"

x=a

-an -*

2/4=

?/=a+i

n+l
a"

an+l

x.

= a 41

We

The limits
take the order of integration y, A\
as they
in
the
after
one
another,
table,
being registered
For
are found, the table grows as the process goes on.
convenience of reference the table should bo on a separate
slip of paper.
will first

We

Th^n

suppose n to be even.

Hence QR = 2/ 3 .42/5 = 2/3 .4.5

datum y r 2 we get

and

multiplying

the

by

= (y^s + yr# Xy*^

= 2#5 + 5^5
^3 +
%)(2/2^5 + 2/5-%)

Q%r = yy
.

= (y
for

2/3

2/l

by application

of the

2/3

formulae of

135,

a?4-5

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

138

when

we have

a>

and

impossibility);
p
l\
n

2a

[156

and when

= %.

we have

a<

For

_i_

/
I

I\

an+l

a 11

We
in

x5

so that

x3

must now apply

always positive.

Form

135,

We

is

Vs. 5
2/3
get 2/3 2
Substituting these results, we get
y.

Q%1 =
.

2<%

2/3

2^6

Having found the

2 2-Y. 2

for

We

.7

!,

obtain

3/3

2^1

2/3

fi#6

the statements

3, to
2/3

8*1

a
s i

2/1

135
r<2

5<%.

2/3

=
.

s#V

y,

we must

get

5^1

2/r.

to the statements in x.

we

2/r. 5

limits of the variable

apply the three formulae of

Multiplying by the datum z?
.

2^1

+
7

2/1

5^3

these results immediately by simple in

spection of the Table of Limits, without having recourse

to the formulae of
135.
Applying the formulae of

135

X y. 7 ~

^3

Q%r. 2#r.

= QR A =

i/y b
2/3

=
2

= =

This

2.i

>

^2/3

ai

%!

get

+ //r
+
3^1
5^3

x Vm 3^!

5^1
.

>

we

Substituting these values,

for ai.

x which remain, we get

to the statements in

2/1

%. 3 +2/1

an(i a z.3

rl

5^3

7^1

7)

a l5

an impossibility).

the final step in the process of finding the

limits, and the result informs us that, when n is even,

QRA

is

only possible when a^ ( which

1) is an inferior
a.
In other words, when n is even and a is not
To find the
greater than 1, the chance of QR is zero.
chance when n is even and a is greater than 1, we have
is

limit of

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

156]

only to evaluate the integrals, employing the abbreviated

Thus
151.
notation of
Integral

A = Int

y Y ^\. ^ = (y\

QR A = yy

Integral

y^v. 2

yv r

+y

r>

2a)#

r>

%. 7

- 2^1 3 + (2/1 (2/3

.

2/ 5

)%. 7

J_

an + l

+x

= lan - a+

V 2a

- $ an - %a1l+l \

QR = Int QR A _ Int QRA

/^?5 A
4a
2

~A~

a n+l

\/

-an - a n +

\
l
.

/\

We

have now

the chance

to find

the same process as before

QRA = (yy^
^o

when n

is

odd.

By

we get

yJC V

namely, a^ and a3
To separate the
over.
not
yet
process
different possible cases, we must multiply the result
which here
obtained by the certainty (a x + a r )(a s -f
reduces to aj+% 3 + %, since a t is greater than a y

Here we have
so that the

inferior limits of a,

is

%)>

For shortness sake

let

denote

the

bracket co

in the result already obtained

x
denote y6 .2%.2 tne coefficient of

efficient (or co-factor) of

for

QRA;

and

let

QRA = (M^ + M^X^ + a v + %)

.3

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

140

% =

156, 157

Hence,
.i
(an impossibility).
r and
only two possible cases when n is an odd
number, the case a l (that is to say, a>a v which here
For the latter, a v 3
means a>l) and the case a r 3
for

a 13

tf

>/

are

there

we get

A
For the

IntK

first case,

8a

namely, the case

a>

1,

we

get

When

the integrals in this case are worked out, the result

will be found to be

^A = _/
O~R

_L\/
L\
1/1 - JLA
- a~+i
2tt - a
a+i
+

4a 2

a"

8a

fJ

OT?

The expression

for the

in the case

chance-^

a>l

and

j:\.

the expression for it in the case a

1 evidently
ought to
the
same
result
when
we
a=l.
This is
give
suppose
seen
to
be
the
for
we
when
fact;
easily
put a=l, each
<

expression gives

- as the value of the chance

o

157. The great advantage of this

that

"

Calculus of Limits

"

independent of all diagrams, and can therefore

be applied not only to expressions of two or three vari
ables, but also to expressions of four or several variables.
is

it is

Graphic methods are often more expeditious when they

only require

known curves

straight
;

lines or easily traced

and

well-

but graphic methods of finding the limits

of integration are, in
general, difficult when there are
three variables, because this involves the
perspective
representation of the intersections of curved surfaces.

CALCULUS OF LIMITS

157]

When

there are four or

cannot be employed at

141

variables, graphic methods

For other examples in pro

more
all.

bability I may refer the student to my sixth paper in

the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (June
and to recent volumes of Mathematical
10th, 1897),
Questions

and Solutions from

the

Educational

Times.

It

some readers to learn that as regards the

may
in
worked
155, 156, I submitted my re
problems
sults to the test of actual experiment, making 100 trials
and
in each case, and in the latter case taking a = 1
n=3. The theoretical chances (to two figures) are re
interest

the
spectively 56 and -43, while the experiments gave
close approximations of 53 and 41 respectively.

THE END

Printed by BALLANTYNE,

Edinburgh

&

HANSON
London

&

Co.

INDING SECT.

QCT 2 8

1982

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE

CARDS OR

SLIPS

UNIVERSITY OF

FROM THIS POCKET

TORONTO LIBRARY

MacGoll, Hugh
Symbolic logic and its

applications