Macariola v.

Asuncion Case Digest

Macariola
v.
Asuncion,
(En Banc), J. Makasiar

114

SCRA

77,

May

31,

1982

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon.
Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June
8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he
later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was
complainant
Bernardita
R.
Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot
according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the
plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated
as
Lot
1184-A
to
1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a
portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion.
Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries
Inc.
wherein
Judge
Asuncion
was
the
president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil
Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming
a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot
1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of
the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a
decision
dismissing
the
complaints
against
Judge
Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia
Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated
March
27,
1971
that
Judge
Asuncion
be
exonerated.
Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated
any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously
decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a
private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte
constitute
an
"act
unbecoming
of
a
judge"?
Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an

"act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his

private
and
business
activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies
only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot
1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8,
1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within
the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to
litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly
from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier
purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in
Civil
Case
No.
3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on
from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce
must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not
with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no
enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent
Judge
Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019
because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had
obviously
no
relation
or
connection
with
his
judicial
office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their
immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that
their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
VILAS
220

v.

CITY
US

OF

MANILA
345

FACTS:
Petitioners are creditors of the city of Manila before the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding
that the present municipality is a totally different corporate identity from the previous one
and
is
not
liable
for
the
debts
of
the
Spanish
municipality.
ISSUE:
Is the present municipality liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the
cession
to
the
United
States?

HELD:
The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a
mere change of sovereignty is one which is without a shadow of moral force. The city,
acting as a corporation, possesses two kinds of powers: governmental and public. In
view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for the
presuming their total dissolution as a consequence of military occupation or territorial
cession. The cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The
present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to
the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to
all of its liabilities. All three of plaintiffs in error are entitled to judgment.

LINDASAN vs COMELECFACTS:
Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled
"An Act Creating theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
was passed. Lidasan came to know later onthat barrios Togaig and Madalum just
mentioned
are
within
the
municipality
of
Buldon,
Province
of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang,also in the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato
voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precints forvoter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that
RA 4790 be nullified forbeing unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in
creating Dianaton, it wouldbe including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato
ISSUE:
Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato -to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill
which may be enactedinto law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill?
HELD:
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did notinform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did
not apprise the people in thetowns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected bythe bill that
even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
thep r e j u d i c e o f h i s o w n p r o v i n c e . T h e s e a r e t h e p r e s s u r e s w h i c
h h e a v i l y w e i g h a g a i n s t t h e constitutionality of RA 4790

PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATIONThe Philippine Association of Colleges and

Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No.2706 as amended by Act
No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate theownership
of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first
besecured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to
own and operate aprivate school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the
discretion to ascertain standards that mustbe followed by private schools. It also
provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certaintextbooks from being
used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by
the Constitution,and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before
such person could exercise saidright, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a
practice abhorrent to our system of law andgovernment. PACU also avers that such
power granted to the Secretary of Education is an unduedelegation of legislative power;
that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis orthe standard
upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books
grantedto the Secretary amounts to censorship.ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as
amended is unconstitutional.HELD:No. In the first place, there is no justiciable
controversy presented. PACU did not show that itsuffered any injury from the exercise of
the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by thesaid law.Second, the
State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitutionprovides for state control of all educational institutions even as it
enumerates certain fundamentalobjectives of all education to wit, the
development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and
vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control
ofprivate education was intended by the organic law.Third, the State has the power to
ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. Thisis still part of the
power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS
G.R. No. L-11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311
FACTS:
Plaintiff was involved in an accident concerning him and a General Hospitalambulance resulting in him
being incapacitated. He sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. Act No. 2457
was
enacted
in
his
favor
which
reads:

"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.

"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for
damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March
twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any , to which the claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against
the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the attorney-General of the Philippine Islands
is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defend
said Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State is immune from suit.
HELD:
The accident was due to the negligence of the ambulances chauffeur. As the negligence was
committed by an agent or employee of the government involving tort, the inquiry arises whether the
government is legally liable for damages. The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers
or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government
does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs
since that would involve it in all its operations in endlessembarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
would be subversive of the publicinterest. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity
from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend
his liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense. The State is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization
of branches in the public service and in the appointment of its agents. The responsibility of the State is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim. Read full text

Froilan vs Pan Oriental Shipping

waiver of sovereign immunity

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING

G.R. No. L-6060

September 30, 1954

FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-appellant,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.

Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping
Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying
P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance
of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping
Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The
Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action
of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet
restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had
repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question
but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin
be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after
hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of
replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its
possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason
that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said
authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession
of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful
owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case
praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be
foreclosed.

Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.

Discussions:
When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of the
mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so,
it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a
complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to
the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions
open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses
he might have against the state.

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)
US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.
The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States.

US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio
de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.

In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company
did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also
asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the
subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or
any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider
but to no avail.

Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able
to invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and
Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of
respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation and
against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the
satisfactionof a judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable
Guillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs
of RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal
served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of
military and civilian personneland for maintenance and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed
prohibition proceedings against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave
abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of Execution against
the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment arenull and void.
Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of theConstitution.It isa
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of sovereignty that the stateas
well as its government is immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from suit,not
because of any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that therecan
beno legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.The State may not
be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand soundsense from a basic concept is
that public funds cannot be the object of agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent to be sued had
been previously granted andthe state liability adjudged.The universal rule that wherethe State gives its
consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limitclaimants actiononly up
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since the government fundsand properties maynot be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy suchjudgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public
policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the correspondingappropriation as required by
law.Thefunctions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,asappropriated by law

Zandueta v. Dela Costa

November 28, 1938

G.R. No. L-46267

NATURE
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta
against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring
the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office,
and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by
placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent
FACTS
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable
Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial
District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by
the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the date
on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization
Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new
ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District,
with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan-The
National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having acted on
said ad interim
appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of
said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his appointment and
qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner,
acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts-On May 19, 1938, the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad
interim appointment of said petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the
Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his
appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him
to repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by
virtue of the assailed statute
HELD

When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a
judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment
to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to
another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district
formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the
discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he
abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality
of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily
accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new
office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the
discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the
performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or
reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have
abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus
Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123).
He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment
may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal
exigencies. In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the
ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in
accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the petitioner believed that
Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the
appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he
believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards
resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law
is unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal
rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office
and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the
necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the
office to which he was appointed, he would later be stopped from questioning the
validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment
was issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the
same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.