Land Titles and Deeds Complete Compilation of Cases

1
Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Wigmore II SR Edition
CONCEPT OF TITLE AND REGISTRATION
ISSUE: Was the contract of sale valid? YES
Is a public document needed for transfer of ownership? NO
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
History
Concept of the term Land Title
Kinds of Estates
Types of Estates
Title versus Deed
Mode of acquisition
SPS DALION V. CA (1990)
Petitioners: Spouses Dalion

Respondents: CA and Sabesaje, Jr.
Ponente: Medialdea, J.
Doctrine: A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which
means that the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular
form is required for its validity.
Short version: A land was registered in Dalions name. He
allegedly sold this to Sabesaje. Dalion denies the sale ever
happened (saying his signature was forged) and also says that
assuming the signature was valid, sale is still invalid because it
was not executed in a public document. SC says Dalions
argument is wrong. In a contract of sale, no particular form is
required.
A land in Southern Leyte was declared in the name of Segundo
Dalion. Sabesaje sued to recover ownership this land based on a
private document of absolute sale, allegedly executed by
Segundo Dalion.
Dalion, however, denied the sale, saying that:
The document was fictitious
His signature was a forgery, and
That the land is conjugal property, which he and his wife

acquired in 1960 from Saturnina Sabesaje as evidenced
by the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta."
The spouses denied the claims of Sabesaje that after executing
a deed of sale over the parcel of land, they had pleaded with
Sabesaje to be allowed to administer the land because Dalion
did not have livelihood.
Spouses Dalion admitted, however, administering 5 parcels of
land in Southern Leyte, which belonged to Leonardo
Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956.
The Dalions never received their agreed 10% and 15%
commission on the sales of copra and abaca.
Sabesaje's suit, they say, was intended merely to harass and
forestall Dalion's threat to sue for these unpaid commissions.
TC decided in favor of Sabesaje and ordered the Dalions to
deliver the parcel of land in a public document.
CA affirmed.
HELD: RE: VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT

People who witnessed the execution of the deed positively
testified on its authenticity.
They stated that it had been executed and signed by the
signatories.
RE: PUBLIC DOCUMENT
The provision of NCC 1358 on the necessity of a public
document is only for convenience, not for validity
enforceability.
or
That this be embodied in a public instrument is not a requirement

for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land
Dalion argued:
That the sale is invalid because it is embodied in a

private document.
That "acts and contracts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real
rights over immovable property must appear in a public
instrument." (NCC 1358 par. 1)
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that the
sale is perfected by mere consent.
No particular form is required for its validity.
Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may

reciprocally demand performance (NCC 1475, NCC),
i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of ownership of
the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the
vendee to pay the thing sold (NCC 1458).
The trial court thus rightly and legally ordered Dalion to deliver to
Sabesaje the parcel of land and to execute corresponding formal
deed of conveyance in a public document.
Under NCC 1498, when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution is equivalent to the delivery of the
thing.
Delivery may either be actual (real) or constructive.

Thus delivery of a parcel of land may be done by
placing the vendee in control and possession of the
land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public
instrument (constructive).
(ADDITIONAL: The authenticity of the signature of Dalion was
proven by the testimony of several witness including the person
who made the deed of sale. Dalion never presented any
evidence or witness to prove his claim of forgery.
Dallions claim that the sale is invalid because it was not made in
a public document is of no merit. This argument is misplaced.
The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document
is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a
requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of
land that this be embodied in a public instrument. Sale is
perfected upon meeting of the minds of both parties.)

LAWS IMPLEMENTING LAND REGISTRATION
certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year

after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar
private respondent from questioning his ownership.
PURPOSES OF LAND REGISTRATION

LEE TEK SHENG VS. CA
FACTS: After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek
Sheng filed a complaint against his father (private respondent)
for the partition of the conjugal properties of his parents.
The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land
registered in petitioners name are conjugal properties.
The PR contends that the lots were registered under Leoncios
name only as a trustee because during the registration, Leoncio
was the only Filipino in the family.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for
the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal
regime.
To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the
pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it was
denied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the
purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep
the property within the power of the court pending litigation. CA
affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.
Petitioners contention: The resolution of an incidental motion for
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was improper to thresh
out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership
cannot be passed upon in a partition case and that it would
amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28
years ago.
Private respondents contention: The evidence of ownership is
admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land
registration proceedings when the courts jurisdiction is limited.
A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds:

(1) If the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of
the adverse party
(2) When the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of
the party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly
shown to concur in this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens is only for the purpose of announcing to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in
partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the
property. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking
annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. Besides, an
action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens is proper.
REPUBLIC VS CA
These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of
reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals are existing and
whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for.
2 lots of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and
twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches,
Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. The originals of those titles
are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not
destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding
cancelled titles for those two lots are intact in the registry of
deeds.
ISSUE: WON the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is valid.

HELD: Yes. Petitioners claim is not legally tenable. The
annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case
amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral
attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best
evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case,
contrary to petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being
assailed by private respondent. What the latter disputes is the
formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioners
The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada,

a widow residing at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila,
filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a
petition dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title
covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915. She alleged that she
was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number
of which she could not specify, was "N.A." or not available. The
petition was sworn to on November 16, 1967 before Manila
notary Domingo P. Aquino.
On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on June 14, 1968. The notice of hearing was
published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in
three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished
the supposed adjoining owners. The registers of deeds of
Caloocan City and Rizal were not served with copies of the
petition and notice of hearing.
State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the
Government, did not oppose the petition. Laborada presented
her evidence before the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin

Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of
title which was not available and which was issued to Maria
Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The transfer certificate of
title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The
plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable
action on the petition.
The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to
reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915 in the name of Laborada.
The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It became final and
executory.
Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to
Laborada on August 14, 1968 Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(N.A.) 3-(R).
missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on

that directive, the register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N.A. 4(R).
Five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title,
Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a
resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco, Manila, which was
the same address used by Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used
first the address 2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to
Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 34146R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos
Engineering Corporation allegedly for P250,000. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the corporation.
Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots Nos. 915A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land Registration
approved the subdivision plan. The register of deeds cancelled
TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven
titles to Laborada.
On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the
cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and the
titles issued subsequent thereto. Judge Salvador, who had
ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases
for cancellation were assigned, issued restraining orders
enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer and Commissioner
of Land Registration from accepting or recording any transaction
regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
In another and later case, one Francisco S. Bombast, single,

residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the
lower court a petition dated November 16, 1967 for the
reconstitution of the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot
No. 918.
The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer,

filed separate answers containing mere denials. The
Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma answers
wherein he interposed no objection to the issuance of the
preliminary injunction sought by the State.
She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that
the title was "N.A" or not available. She claimed to be the owner
of the lot and that the title covering it was destroyed during the
war. Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on
the same date, November 16, 1967, before Manila notary
Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with
Laborada's petition was not explained.
After a joint trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and

Laborada filed amended answers wherein they pleaded the
defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.
The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January
31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition, the notice of hearing for
Bombast's petition was published in the Official Gazette. It was
posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and copies
thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining owners. But no
copies of the petition and notice of hearing were served upon the
registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who
would be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title
and who could certify whether the original of the title was really
missing.
Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was
not opposed by the government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and
Conrado de Leon; Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969
granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or
"not available" title was issued to Regino Gollez who sold the
land to petitioner Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title
was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for
that land by Gollez and Bombast. The technical description of the
land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land
Registration who submitted a report recommending the
reconstitution of the title.
The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the
On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit
himself) rendered a decision in the two cases holding that the
State's evidence was insufficient to establish its ownership and
possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A &
A Torrijos Engineering Corporation were purchasers in good faith
and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable
and annullable.
Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution
he had ordered allegedly in conformity with law, could not be
attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and
their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the
originals before the reconstitution". The State appealed.
CA affirmed RTC and held that the reconstitution can no longer
be set aside and that if there were irregularities in the
reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State,
as the party that made possible the reconstitution, should suffer
the loss. The Court of Appeals cited section 101 of Act 496 to
support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the
registration of any other person as owner of such land".
ISSUE: W/N the reconstituted titles were valid
HELD: NO. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate
Court and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity
of the reconstituted titles which, although issued with judicial
sanction, are no better than spurious and forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution

proceedings were simply devices employed by petitioners
Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the usurpation
and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban
land with considerable value.
The crucial and decisive fact is that two valid and existing
Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of
Laborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption
that the two titles were destroyed during the war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud
foisted on the courts of justice. It was a stultification of the judicial
process.
One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and then
(2) decided the two subsequent cases for the cancellation and
annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government ipso facto
nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the
evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of
Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two
proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith.
Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and
cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and
not fictitious titles or titles which are existing.
It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title
that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The
reconstitution proceedings are void because they are contrary to
Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the
titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds
and do not require reconstitution at all.
As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory
laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases
would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an
instrument for landgrabbing or to sanction fraudulent
machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to
undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair
the Torrens system of registration.
The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that it was a
purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because the
title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such
title was reconstituted. That circumstance should have alerted its
officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of
deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found
that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
Republic is held as the owner.
2)
The only one of said parcels to which attention need be

given in the present appeal is Parcel A.
3) The adjoining owners of the land were informed of such
application, but no one went to question it so they were
declared in default.
4) The same application was published in two newspapers.
5) The record shows that each of said persons received a copy
of said notice, including the representative of the heirs of
Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record
further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff
of the city of Manila, that said notice was posted upon the
land in question. The record further shows that said notice
had been published in two daily newspapers of the city of
Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.
6) The City of Manila questioned in court the borders of Parcel
A. The Court ordered the correction but none was executed.
7) The court approved the application and Consuelo was given
the titles.
8) In 1912, the City of Manila applied for the correction of the
title because it covered a public road.
9) It was also in 1912 the Consuelo went to court to ask for a
correction of the title because there were 2 buildings which
were not included in the title, although it was in the
application.
10) She sold the same to Masonic Temple Assoc.
11) During the hearing, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, owners of
the adjoining land, appeared in court questioning the title.
12) The Court granted the motions of the City of Manila and
Consuelo.
ISSUE: Whether or not personal notice to all of the persons
interested in an action for the registration of real property under
the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of
said registration.
HELD: NO. Personal notice of the pendency of the original
petition had been given and that a publication of the same had
been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and
32 of Act No. 496.
The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made a
certificate showing that that notice had been issued and
published in accordance with the law.
Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears and
answer within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing,
order a general default to be recorded and the application
(petition) be taken for confessed.
By the description in the notice "To all whom it may concern," all
the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by
the default and order. The court shall not be bound by the report
of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof."
The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the
contention of the appellants. It seems to directly contradict the
requirements of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to
the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.
MARIA CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS VS RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:
1) Maria Consuelo applied for a registration of title of 4 parcels
of land in 1906. (under torrens system)
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section

38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every
decree of registration shall bind the land and quite the title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,

including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or
citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it
may concern.'"
It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not
by law required to give any notice to any person. The law
requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31
and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause
other or further notice of the application to be given in such a
manner and to such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is
seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved
from any obligation whatsoever to give motive to any person of
the pendency of his application to have his land registered under
the Torrens system.
Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for
persons who have suffered damages for the failure on the part of
court officials to comply with the law. His remedy is not to have
the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within
the provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a
remedy against the applicant unless he can show, within a period
of one year after the decree of registration and the granting of
the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or
interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent
purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the present
case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for the
sale of the land to an innocent purchaser had been terminated.
There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the
slightest degree.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496,
are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing
with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon the claimants within the state or
notice by name to those outside of it.
(ADDITIONAL: notice was served to the heirs of Enriquez:
Records show that the counsel of Enriquez received a notice.
Even if it is denied by the party, personal notification is not a
requirement of the law. Registration is a proceeding in rem and
not in personam. It is the only practical way that allows the
Torrens system to fulfill its purpose.)
LEGARDA VS SALEEBY
FACTS: A stonewall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda
and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands
is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in
1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in
favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under
the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the
latter included the stonewall and the strip of land where it stands.
ISSUE: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement
which has been registered under the name of two persons?
HELD: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act
496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where
two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet
title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of
the title, except claims which were noted at the time of

registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has
entered into the Torrens system.
TIBURCIO VS PHHC
FACTS: Tiburcio et al filed an action alleging that for many years
prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they and their
ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive
and continuous possession as owners of the land in litigation;
that they have been cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits
exclusively; that from time immemorial up to the year 1955, they
have been paying the land taxes thereon; that in 1955 defendant
Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title
thereto claiming that its title embraces practically all of plaintiffs
property, while the other defendant University of the Philippines
began also asserting title thereto claiming that its title covers the
remaining portion; that PHHC are not innocent purchasers for
value, having had full notice of Tiburcio et als actual possession
and claim of ownership thereof; and that the inclusion their
property within the technical boundaries set out in PHHC and
UPs titles was a clear mistake and that at no time had
defendants predecessors-in-interest exercised dominical rights
over their property.
(Plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate
in 1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his
sole heirs a tract of land located in Quezon City; that said
plaintiffs have always been in actual, open, notorious and
exclusive possession of the land as owners pro-indiviso; that
sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the land
claiming that the same is embraced and covered by their
respective certificates of title; that defendants acquired their
respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and
claim of ownership of plaintiffs and as such they cannot be
considered innocent purchasers for value.)
It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed
under the operation of the Torrens system since 1914 when it
has been originally registered in the name of defendants
predecessor-ininterest. It further appears that sometime in 1955
Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the
original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of
petitioners property, while defendant University of the Philippines
likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of land
which embraces the remainder of the property.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners right to file the present action has
prescribed; YES
W/N they are guilty of laches; YES
HELD:
PHHC and UP own the subject property; Petitioners guilty of
laches-assuming
arguendo
that
their
action
for
reconveyance had not yet prescribed.
It is, therefore, clear that the land in question has been registered
in the name of defendants predecessor-in-interest since 1914

under the Torrens system and that notwithstanding what they
now claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements
prescribed by law for their validity, they (Petitioners) have never
taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted
the present action.
In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years before they
woke up to invoke what they now claim to be erroneous
when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land
in the name of defendants predecessor-in-interest.
Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and
jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside
within one year after entry on the ground of fraud provided
no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property
(Section 38, Act No. 496)
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the
one-year period within which to review the decree of registration,
the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof
becomes incontrovertible (Section 38, Act No. 496).
The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period within
which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time
within which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to
property is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the oneyear period to set aside the decree, the object of the Torrens
system which is to guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would
be defeated.
There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired
the property said defendant knew of any defect in the title
appearing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrance. The
same thing is true with regard to defendant University of the
Philippines. Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be
purchasers for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to
protection under the law.
The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle:
"A person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He
is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which
are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To
require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of
the Torrens system.
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs action for reconveyance had
not yet prescribed, their right however to bring the instant action
may be considered barred by laches for not having taken the
action seasonably after title to the property had been issued
under the Torrens system. It appears that the property in
question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only
on October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto
when they brought the present action.virtua1aw library
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing
the complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial
notice of its own records in Land Registration Case No. L-3
invoking in support of their contention the principle that a court
cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases even when such cases had been tried by the same court
and notwithstanding the facts that both cases may have been
tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is
considered to be the general rule, the same is not absolute.
There are exceptions to this rule.
"In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of

proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection
with the matter in controversy.
Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration."
Petitioners do not dispute the fact that appellant Marcelino
Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same person
who filed the application in Land Registration Case No. L-3 for
the registration of the same parcel of land which application was
denied by the court. It appears that in that registration case the
oppositors were the Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation,
Tuason and Co., and the Bureau of Lands. Although the
University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in
effect it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason
and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be
said that in the two cases there is not only identity of subjectmatter but identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
res judicata.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA
CAPAY, ET AL
FACTS: A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was
mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public
auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction
alleging the mortgage was void because they did not receive the
proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was
filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the
Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the
TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was
cancelled and a new one was entered in TRBs name without the
notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed
recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a
decision declaring the mortgage was void for want of
consideration and thus cancelled TRBs title and issued a new
cert. of title for the Capays.
Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to
Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who
were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent
buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good
faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a
pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice
was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book
constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with
adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith
upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation.
The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute
while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
Whether or not TRB is liable for damages
RULING: The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be
valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties.
When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no

lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and
is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the
registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers
obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and for
value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they
filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in
the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out
the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the
property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as
null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure
proceeding has no legal effect.
However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner
of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in good
faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away
to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays
the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to
Santiago.
LACBAYAN VS. SAMOY
FACTS: Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy
(respondent) had an illicit relationship. During their relationship,
they, together with three more incorporators, were able to
establish a manpower services company. The company acquired
five parcels of land were registered in petitioner and
respondents names, allegedly as husband and wife. When their
relationship turned sour, they decided to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing
a Partition Agreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to
the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will
go to respondent. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, Samoy
refused.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition
of the said properties.
Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to live
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of
marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring
real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More

importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or
petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which
necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is
a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties.
2. No. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot
be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast,
the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often
than not, represented by that document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the
property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a
property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
Other topic:
Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership
over the subject realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the
Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to
include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist
on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to
sign.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of
his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled coownership over the said properties.
TORRENS SYSTEM
Respondents contention: He purchased the properties using his

own personal funds.
A. Concept, Background and Purpose
RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.
ISSUES:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the
issue of ownership.
2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the
Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack?
HELD:
1. No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue
of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
LU VS MANIPON
FACTS: On 5/9/81 Juan Peralta executed a deed of sale by
installment in favor of Spouses Manipon which he agreed to sell
by installment to said spouses 350 sq. meters of the 2078 sq.
meter lot he owned. This said DOS was not registered with the
RD.
On 6/10/81, Juan Peralta mortgaged the lot to Thrift Savings and
Loan Association (TSLAI) but he failed to pay the loan he
obtained for which the mortgage was constituted so it was
judicially foreclosed and sold to TSLAIN for P62, 789.18 who

was the highest bidder. TSLAI then sold the same for P80,000.00
to the petitioner who caused the subdivision of the said lot into 5
lots (one of which was Lot 5582-B-7-D which was sold to
respondents. This said lot is now covered by TCT No 171497)
On 7/30/83, Juan Peralta executed a DOS in favor of
respondents after the couple paid a total amount of P8K for the
subject lot, but said DOS was not registered.
On 1/22/90 petitioner wrote respondents regarding the presence
of the latters house which was being occupied by them and
efforts were made to settle the dispute but to no avail. On
2/26/90, petitioner commenced the action alleging that he is the
owner of the lot in question which was being occupied by
respondents and further claims his ownership was confirmed by
the RTC of Urdaneta and for reasons unknown to him,
respondents constructed a house thereon on 1/22/90.
In answer, respondents claim that petitioner is a buyer in bad
faith because he knew for a fact that they already bought Lot
5582-B-7-D from the original owner of said lot and have been
residing since 1981 even before he bought the 2078 sq. meter
lot. They also claimed that petitioner had knowledge of their
claim because when the whole lot was foreclosed, they shared
the same dilemma with petitioner who also bought a lot with the
2078 sq.meter lot of Juan Peralta.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith,
which was affirmed by the CA
ISSUES:
Who has better right over disputed property? Was petitioner a
buyer in bad faith?
What should be the purchase price of the disputed lot?
HELD: Petitioner claims that from the time they fully paid for the
lot until they received a notice to vacate, they did not do anything
to perfect their title and are now estopped for questioning his
ownership over it. The court has held that in estoppel, a person
who by deed or conduct induces another to act in a particular
manner is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude
or course of conduct that causes loss or injury to another. This is
not applicable to the present case as respondents exercised
dominion over the [property by occupying and building a house
on it.
Registration is not the equivalent of a title, it only gives validity to
the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. It was not
established as a means of acquiring title to private land because
it merely confirms but does not confer ownership. Preferential
right of the first registrant of real property in case of double sale
is always qualified by good faith under Art 1544 of the civil code.
A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the
protection of the law, for it cannot be used as shield for fraud.
if there had been no registration, and the vendee who first took
possession of the real property in good faith shall be preferred.
Petitioner is evidently not a subsequent purchaser in good faith
so respondents have a better right to the property.
It seems that the main reason why petitioner bought the entire lot
from TSLAI was his fear of losing the 350 sq.m. lot he bought
sometime in 1981 which also forms part of Lot 5582 B-7, having
been aware of the defects in the title of TSLAI is concerned he
cannot now claim to be a purchaser in good faith even if he
traces his ownership to TSLAI who was a purchaser in good
faith- the latter not being aware of the sale that transpired
between respondents and Juan Peralta before subject lot was
sold in a public auction. Even assuming that petitioner was not
aware of the sale between Peralta and respondents, he cannot
be considered a buyer in good faith as he has personal
knowledge of respondents occupation of lot, this should have put
him on guard. The purchaser may not be required to go beyond
the title to determine the condition of property but a purchaser
cannot also ignore facts which would put a reasonable man on
his guard and claim he acted in good faith under the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
On bad faith: Petitioner denies being a purchaser in bad faith.
He alleges that the only reason he spoke to the respondents
before he bought the foreclosed land was to invite them to share
in the purchase price, but they turned him down.
Petitioners contention is untenable. He might have had good
intentions at heart, but it is not the intention that makes one an
innocent buyer. A purchaser in good faith or an innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys property and pays a full and
fair price for it, at the time of the purchase or before any notice of
some other persons claim on or interest in it.
Petitioners contention is untenable. He might have had good
intentions at heart, but it is not the intention that makes one an
innocent buyer. A purchaser in good faith or an innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys property and pays a full and
fair price for it, at the time of the purchase or before any notice of
some other persons claim on or interest in it.
Purchase Price: The CA modification exempting respondents
from paying petitioner is flawed, because the RTC had ordered
Juan Peralta to refund the P18,000 paid to him by petitioner as
the purchase price of the disputed lot. Thus, the trial court
correctly ordered (1) respondents to pay petitioner P13,051.50
plus legal interest for Lot 5582-B-7-D and (2) the third-party
defendant Peralta to refund to respondents the P18,000 they had
paid for the lot. The CA ruling would unjustly enrich respondents,
who would receive double compensation
LEGARDA VS SALEEBY
When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a party

cannot base his preference of title thereon, because the law will
not protect anything done in bad faith. Bad faith renders the
registration futile. Thus, if a vendee registers the sale in his favor
after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale
of the same property to a third party, or that another person
claims said property under a previous sale, or that the property is
in the possession of one who is not a vendor, or that there were
flaws and defects in the vendors title, or that this was in dispute,
the registration will constitute x x x bad faith, and will not confer
upon him any preferential right. The situation will be the same as
FACTS: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda

and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands
is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in
1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in
favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under
the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the
latter included the stonewall and the strip of land where it stands.
ISSUE: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement
which has been registered under the name of two persons?

HELD: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act
496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where
two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet
title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of
the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has
entered into the Torrens system.
CAPITOL SUBDIVISIONS VS. PROVINCE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL
7 SCRA 60 (1963)
FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part
of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin
Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916.
Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned
Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000,
payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title
issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his
name.
Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including
Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he
again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the
Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by
the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed
and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as
purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and
another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank.
In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose
Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in
annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will
remain with the Bank until full payment.
an alleged right of lease.

For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the
Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor
stipulation.
When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949,
plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was
discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial
Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff
made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made
representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of
said occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given
by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in
question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation
proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began the
construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further
claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title
was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its name
only for assessment purposes.
And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot
knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there and that
he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only
until 1950.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in
question in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.
HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently
prove that they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several
circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been
consummated.
First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the
expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication in the
newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a
deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as
regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to BacolodMurcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated
without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was
not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a
second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which
would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged
to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated
without the Banks knowledge and participation.
Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell
the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly
stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by
necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his

contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the
payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.
LAKBAYAN VS SAMOYE
Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute

sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot
378 was issued.
It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in
1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the
property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under
FACTS: Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy

(respondent) had an illicit relationship. During their relationship,
they, together with three more incorporators, were able to
establish a manpower services company. The company acquired
five parcels of land were registered in petitioner and
respondents names, allegedly as husband and wife. When their

relationship turned sour, they decided to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing
a Partition Agreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to
the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will
go to respondent. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, Samoy
refused.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition
of the said properties.
Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to live
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of
marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring
real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.
Other topic:
Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership
over the subject realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the
Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to
include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist
on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to
sign.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of
his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled coownership over the said properties.
B. Advantages of the Torrens System
Respondents contention: He purchased the properties using his

own personal funds.
C. Registration under the Torrens System as Proceedings In
RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.
Rem
ISSUES:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the
issue of ownership.
2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the
Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack?
D. Modes of Registering
E. Procedure
PD 1529
HELD:
1. No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue
of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or
petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which
necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is
a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties.
2. No. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot
be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast,
the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often
than not, represented by that document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the
property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a
property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
A. Land Registration
RICARDO CHENG vs RAMON GENATO and SPS. DA JOSE
G.R. NO. 129760, December 29, 1998
FACTS:
Ramon Genato is the owner of two parcels of land located at

Paradise Farms, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
September 6, 1989: Genato entered into an agreement with

the Da Jose Spouses over said land. The agreement
culminated in the execution of a contract to sell gor which
the purchase price was P80.00 per sq.m. It was in a public
instrument and contained the stipulation that: after 30 days,
after having satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth
and authenticity of documents vendee shall pay the
vendor the full payment of the purchase price.
The Da Jose Spouses asked for an extension of 30 days

when it failed to verify the said titles on the condition that a
new set of documents be made seven days after.
Pending effectivity of said extension period, and without due

notice to Spouses Da Jose, Genato executed an affidavit to
annul the Contract to Sell. This was not annotated at the
back of his titles right away.
October 24, 1989: Ricardo Cheng went to Genatos

residence and expressed interest in buying the subject
properties. Genato showed Cheng the copies of his titles
and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell
with the Da Jose Spouses. He likewise showed Cheng the
affidavit to annul contract to sell.
Despite these, Cheng still issued a check for P50,000 upon

the assurance that the previous contract will be annulled.
10

The Da Jose Spouses met Genato at the Office of the

Resgistry of Deeds by coincidence, and were later shocked
of Genatos decision to annul the contract and protested
regarding the matter. They reminded Genato that the 30 day
extension period was still in effect and they are willing to pay
the downpayment.
Genato later continued with their contract, informed Cheng
of hi decision and returned to the latter, the downpayment
paid. Cheng however contended that their contract to sell
said property had already been perfected.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the contact to sell between Genato and Spouses Da
Jose was validly rescinded.
2. W/N Chengs own contract with Genato was not just a
contract to sell but of a conditional contract of sale.
HELD:
1. NO. In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is
a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an
obligatory force. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code cannot be
made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no
default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day
extension period has not yet expired.
The contention of the Da Jose spouses that no further condition
was agreed when they were granted the 30-day extension period
from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their contract
to sell should be upheld. Also, Genato could have sent at least a
notice of such fact, and there being no stipulation authorizing him
for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance
on his titles and make it available to other would be buyers, it
bolstered that there was no default on the part of the Da Jose
Spouses. Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice,
verbal or written, to the Da Jose spouses for his decision to
rescind their contract.
2. IT WAS A CONTRACT TO SELL. The Court ruled that if it was
assumed that the receipt is to be treated as a conditional
contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it
was subject to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to
sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be
cancelled or rescinded a condition never met, as Genato, to
his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed himself by
respecting and maintaining his earlier contract with the Da Jose
spouses.
Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract
between herein respondents first in time, it was also registered
long before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer (PRIMUS
TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the
title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have
been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose
spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the
transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes
unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is
indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.
NB: "Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any
entry made in the books of the registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it is
the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other real rights.
B. Purpose and Effect of Registration in General

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG vs CA
G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998
FACTS:
After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng

filed a complaint against his father (private respondent) for
the partition of the conjugal properties of his parents.
The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land

registered in petitioners name are conjugal properties.
The PR contends that the lots were registered under

Leoncios name only as a trustee because during the
registration, Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case

and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner
the conjugal regime.
To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the

pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it

was denied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice was
not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and
(b) also to keep the property within the power of the court
pending litigation. CA affirmed the decision. Hence this
petition.
Petitioners contention: The resolution of an incidental

motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was
improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed
lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition
case and that it would amount to a collateral attack of his
title obtained more than 28 years ago.
Private respondents contention: The evidence of ownership

is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or
land registration proceedings when the courts jurisdiction is
limited.
ISSUE: W/N the notice of lis pendens would amount to a

collateral attack of Leoncios title obtained more than 28
years ago. NO (W/N annotation of a notice of lis pendens is
valid. YES.)
HELD: The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any
case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a
collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best
evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
11

confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case,
contrary to petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being
assailed by private respondent. What the latter disputes is the
formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioners
certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year
after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar
private respondent from questioning his ownership.
A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of
the adverse party
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly
shown to concur in this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens is only for the purpose of announcing to the whole
litigation over said property.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in
partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the
property. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking
annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. Besides, an
action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens is proper.
REPUBLIC VS BENJAMIN GUERRERO
G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006
FACTS:
December 1964: Benjamin Guerrerro filed with the Bureau

of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales Application covering a
parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. This
application was approved and Miscellaneous Sales Patent
was issued subsequent thereto.
Angelina Bustamante later filed a protest with the Bureau of

Lands claiming that Guerrero obtained the sales patent
through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of
material facts. This was however dismissed by the Director
of lands and further affirmed by then Minister of Natural
Resources.
Through a MFR, an ocular investigation and relocation

survey found out that 83 sq. m. of the titled property of
Guerrero is under actual physical possession of Marcelo
Bustamante, husband of Angeluna. Thus, upon the directive
of the Office of The President, the Director of Lands
instituted a petition for the amendment of plan and technical
description.
Guerrero opposed said motion through a motion to dismiss

but however was dismissed thereafter. However, the RTC
ruled in favor of Guerrero stating that the Republic failed to
prove its allegation that Guerrero obtained the sales patent
and certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation.
RTC also ruled that the original certificate of title in the name
of Guerrero acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility
after the expiration of 1 year from the entry of the decree of
registration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Republic has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Guerrero procured
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT through fraud
and misrepresentation.
2. W/N Guerreros title acquired the characteristic of
indefeasibility.
HELD:
1. NO. The property in question, while once part of the lands of
the public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales
arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of
public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens
system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903.
Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is
required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact
that the person named is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon
noted or what the law warrants or reserves.
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No.
496 and becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said
that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to
property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a
person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or revise
a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. However, the
Republic in this case failed to prove that there is actual and
extrinsic fraud to justify a review of the decree. It has not
adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent
employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and
the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to
prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in
question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such
fraud.
2. YES. Guerreros title, having been registered under the
Torrens system, was vested with the garment of indefeasibility.
NB: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it
was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be
unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to
accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions
laid down by the law are satisfied.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to
lands but merely a system of registration of titles to lands, justice
and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to
bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the
States agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud
or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the
Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to
any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may
arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens
12

system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency
of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.
LEGARDA VS SALEEBY
G.R. NO. L-8936, October 2, 1915
FACTS:
Legarda and Saleeby are owners of adjoining lands in

Manila.
There exists a stone wall between said lots.
In 1906, the said wall and the land where it stands was
registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda.
In 1912, Saleeby also applied for registration of his lot which

included the same stone wall and strip of land where it
stands. This was later granted and title was issued in favor
of Saleeby.
ISSUE: Who should be the owner of the land and its
improvement which has been registered under the name of
two persons.
HELD: Act 496 providing for the registration of titles under the
torrens system actually provides for no remedy. However, the
rule is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same
between the same parties. In view of the fact that all the world
are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is
forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to
the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which
are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with
certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present.
A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse,
open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the
torrens system can ot be defeated by prescription (section 46,
Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All
persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
NB: The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put
a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su
casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it
cannot be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land
under the torrens system is judicial. It is clothed with all the forms
of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world.
It is an action in rem.
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are
parties, including the government. After the registration is
complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no
innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all
parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same
questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the
law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the
owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only
may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in
open document a precise and correct statement of the exact
status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence
of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered
titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even
by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by
law.
BARANDA VS GUSTILO
GR 81163, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI
(now RTC) of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No.
4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT No. 6406 in
the name of Romana Hitalia.
The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the
names of petitioners Baranda and Hitalia.
The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez,
Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the
ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot
No. 4517.
The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently
acquired by Perez, Gotera and Susana.
Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was
questioned by Perez and others so a motion for reconsideration
was filed.
Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042)
for the execution of judgement in the resolutions issued by the
courts.
In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827)
involving the same properties. (NOTE: This time three cases na
ang involve excluding the case at bar.)
The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to
issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to
each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.
In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of
Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.
13

However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of
Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new
certificate of title.
ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
CASTRO, J.:
This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the

notice of lis pendens in the new certificates.
Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting
Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec
77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to
annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate
of title.
HELD: Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It
shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register
an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore,
and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in
doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda
to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of
Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall
be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the
Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds. ... ."
The function of ROD is ministerial in nature
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds
did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance
of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should
have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land
Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and
Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section
117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The
statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to
register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and
leaves no room for construction.
FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from

Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of
Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original
certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married
to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to
the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to
register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer
certificate of title.
Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the
following grounds:
That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the
name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by
legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;
That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses
sign the document; but
Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale
was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole
property without violating the existing law.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance
of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of
Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the
corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of
October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that the Mandamus
does not lie because the adequate remedy is that provided by
Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151 dismissed the petition, with costs
against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in
refusing to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.
HELD: No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent
show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on
succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these
do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the
deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of
deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of
competent jurisdiction.
A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic
Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion
when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed
or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said
section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken
with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify
the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,
after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken on the doubtful question.
*ADDED BY SIR
14

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA VS. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA
G.R. NO. 193038, MARCH 11, 2015
FACTS: In 1988, when Shirley and Rogelio were still engaged,
Shirley (respondent, then working as a domestic helper in
Israel, sent money to Rogelio, upon his request, for the purchase
of a residential lot in Marikina which they will use as their
residence when they eventually marry each other. On
September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the house and lot.
Upon her arrival in 1989, Shirley settled the balance of the equity
through SSS financing and paid the succeeding monthly
amortisation. On October 31, 1989, TCT No. 171963 was issued
by the Registry of Deeds in Rogelios name. They were married
in 1990 and lived on the same property. Shirley then returned to
Israel for work; thereat, she received information that Rogelio
brought home another woman in the conjugal house, and she
also learned that Rogelio introduced the woman as her wife.
She then filed two cases against Rogelio, one for Concubinage,
and one for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property; the
latter she withdrew but later re-filed on January 29, 1993. In
between, she learned of Rogelios intention to sell the property.
She thus advised the interested buyers, including Josephine
Nobleza of the pendency of the cases she filed against Rogelio.
Still, Rogelio sold the property to Josephine Nobleza (petitioner)
thru a Deed of Absolute Sale on December 29, 1992, without
Shirleys consent in the deed. In a Decision rendered on May
16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a decision granting the
petition for legal separation and the dissolution of the community
property of Shirley and Rogelio. On August 27, 1996, Shirley
filed a Complaint for Rescission of Sale and REconveyance
against Josephine before the RTC to reconvey the property the
latter bought from Rogelio. After trial, the RTC rendered
judgment in favour of Shirley, rescinding the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 29, 1992 between Rogelio and Josephine,
and for Josephine to reconvey the property to Shirley. Josephine
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter affirmed with
modification the RTC judgment. Hence, Josephine sought
recourse with the Supreme Court via petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Josephine is a buyer in good faith of the
property.
RULING: We deny the petition. Petitioner is not a buyer in good
faith.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right or
interest in the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by
the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any
notice of claims or interest of some other person in the property.1
It is the party who claims to be an innocent purchaser for value
who has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is not
enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. 2 To
successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith,
the presumption is that first and foremost, the buyer in good
faith must have shown prudence and due diligence in the
exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did
everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection
and defense of his/her rights and interests against prejudicial or
injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The
prudence required of a buyer in good faith is not that of a person
with training in law, but rather that of an average man who
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibration of our technical rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is nil.'3 A buyer in good faith does his homework and

verifies that the particulars are in order such as the title, the
parties, the mode of transfer and the provisions in the
deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such
prudence can be shown by making an ocular inspection of the
property, checking the title/ownership with the proper Register of
Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into
the minutiae such as the parameters or lot area, the type of
ownership, and the capacity of the seller to dispose of the
property, which capacity necessarily includes an inquiry into the
civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent
is secured when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a property
in the possession of another to be in good faith, he must exercise
due diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the
surrounding facts and circumstances like what any prudent man
in a similar situation would do.4
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that she is a buyer in good
faith of the subject property which is titled under the name of the
seller Rogelio A. Nuega alone as evidenced by TCT No. 171963
and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724.5
Petitioner argues, among others, that since she has examined
the TCT over the subject property and found the property to have
been registered under the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is
an innocent purchaser for value and she is not required to go
beyond the face of the title in verifying the status of the subject
property at the time of the consummation of the sale and at the
date of the sale.6
We disagree with petitioner.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by
merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other
surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.
In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong,7
petitioners therein as does petitioner herein were also
harping that due to the indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there was
nothing in the TCT of the property in litigation that should have
aroused the buyers suspicion as to put her on guard that there
was a defect in the title of therein seller. The Court held in the
Spouses Raymundo case that the buyer therein could not hide
behind the cloak of being an innocent purchaser for value by
merely relying on the TCT which showed that the registered
owner of the land purchased is the seller. The Court ruled in this
case that the buyer was not an innocent purchaser for value due
to the following attendant circumstances, viz.:
In the present case, we are not convinced by the petitioners
incessant assertion that Jocelyn is an innocent purchaser for
value. To begin with, she is a grandniece of Eulalia and resides
in the same locality where the latter lives and conducts her
principal business. It is therefore impossible for her not to acquire
knowledge of her grand aunts business practice of requiring her
biyaheros to surrender the titles to their properties and to sign
the corresponding deeds of sale over said properties in her favor,
as security. This alone should have put Jocelyn on guard for any
possible abuses that Eulalia may commit with the titles and the
deeds of sale in her possession.8
Similarly, in the case of Arrofo v. Quio,9 the Court held that while
the law does not require a person dealing with registered land to
inquire further than what the Torrens Title on its face indicates,
the rule is not absolute.10 Thus, finding that the buyer therein
failed to take the necessary precaution required of a prudent
15

man, the Court held that Arrofo was not an innocent purchaser
for value, viz.:
In the present case, the records show that Arrofo failed to act as
a prudent buyer. True, she asked her daughter to verify from the
Register of Deeds if the title to the Property is free from
encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that the Property is
within the neighborhood and that she conducted an ocular
inspection of the Property. She saw the house constructed on the
Property. Yet, Arrofo did not even bother to inquire about the
occupants of the house. Arrofo also admitted that at the time of
the sale, Myrna was occupying a room in her house as her
lessee. The fact that Myrna was renting a room from Arrofo yet
selling a land with a house should have put Arrofo on her guard.
She knew that Myrna was not occupying the house. Hence,
someone else must have been occupying the house.
Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the house, and
if a lessee, who received the rentals from such lessee. Such
inquiry would have led Arrofo to discover that the lessee was
paying rentals to Quino, not to Renato and Myrna, who claimed
to own the Property.11
December 29, 1992. However, the Community Tax Certificates of

the witnesses therein were dated January 2 and 20,
1993.13 While this irregularity is not a direct proof of the intent of
the parties to the sale to make it appear that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed on December 29, 1992 or before
Shirley filed the petition for legal separation on January 29, 1993
it is circumstantial and relevant to the claim of herein petitioner
as an innocent purchaser for value.
That is not all.
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, the civil
status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while petitioner as
buyer was indicated as single, viz.:
ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with
postal address at 2-A-2 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina,
Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR
And
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and
with postal address at No. L-2-A-3 Ladislao Diwa St.,
Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as
the VENDEE.14
An analogous situation obtains in the case at bar.

The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the
seller Rogelio himself who was therein also described as
single. However, as in the cases of Spouses Raymundo and
Arrofo, there are circumstances critical to the case at bar which
convince us to affirm the ruling of both the appellate and lower
courts that herein petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.
First, petitioners sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale,
was residing near Rogelio and Shirleys house the subject
property in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City. Had petitioner
been more prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if
Rogelio had the capacity to dispose of the subject property. Had
petitioner been more vigilant, she could have inquired with such
facility considering that her sister lived in the same Ladislao
Diwa Village where the property is located if there was any
person other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the
subject property.
To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their
neighbors at Ladislao Diwa Village including petitioners sister
not to engage in any deal with Rogelio relative to the purchase
of the subject property because of the cases she had filed
against Rogelio. Petitioner denies that respondent had given
such warning to her neighbors, which includes her sister,
therefore arguing that such warning could not be construed as
notice on her part that there is a person other than the seller
himself who has any right or interest in the subject property.
Nonetheless, despite petitioners adamant denial, both courts a
quo gave probative value to the testimony of respondent, and the
instant petition failed to present any convincing evidence for this
Court to reverse such factual finding. To be sure, it is not within
our province to second-guess the courts a quo, and the redetermination of this factual issue is beyond the reach of a
petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law may
be reviewed.12
Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale also pose question on the claim of petitioner that
she is a buyer in good faith. As correctly observed by both courts
a quo, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated on
It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly claimed

that Rogelio is single under TCT No. 171963 and Tax
Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724, his civil status
as seller was not stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale further
creating a cloud on the claim of petitioner that she is an innocent
purchaser for value.
As to the second issue, we rule that the appellate court did not
err when it modified the decision of the trial court and declared
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void
in its entirety.
The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of
the subject property is Rogelio alone, respondent was able to
prove at the trial court that she contributed in the payment of the
purchase price of the subject property. This fact was also settled
with finality by the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70, and affirmed by
the CA, in the case for legal separation and liquidation of
property docketed as JDRC Case No. 2510. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads:
Xxx
Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the parties prior to
their marriage forms part of their community property regime,
xxx
From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial
contribution for the purchase of the house and lot covered by
TCT 171963. Thus, the present lot which forms part of their
community property should be divided equally between them
upon the grant of the instant petition for legal separation. Having
established by preponderance of evidence the fact of her
husbands guilt in contracting a subsequent marriage xxx, Shirley
alone should be entitled to the net profits earned by the absolute
community property.15
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised
on proof of respondents financial contribution in the purchase of
the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in
determining whether a piece of property is community property
for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
16

Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all
the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration
of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded
from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those
excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92
of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by
either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor
that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse;
however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits
as well as the income, if any, of such property.
As held in Quiao v. Quiao:16
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties
of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage
or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value
each one may have originally owned.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the
exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the
absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless
of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their
marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelios name appears
in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses
Shirley and Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990.
Rogelio, on his own and without the consent of herein
respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property via a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 or during the
subsistence of a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96 of
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code
of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal property is
void, viz.:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the

disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.17
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that
Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the written
consent of respondent or the authority of the court. Without such
consent or authority, the entire sale is void. As correctly
explained by the appellate court:
In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject
property to defendant-appellant Josefina on 29 December 1992
or during the existence of Rogelios marriage to plaintiff-appellee
Shirley, without the consent of the latter. The subject property
forms part of Rogelio and Shirleys absolute community of
property. Thus, the trial court erred in declaring the deed of sale
null and void only insofar as the 55.05 square meters
representing the one-half (1/2) portion of plaintiff-appellee
Shirley. In absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells (their) property,
such sale is void. The consent of both the husband Rogelio and
the wife Shirley is required and the absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale null and void including the portion of
the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio who
contracted the sale with defendant-appellant Josefina. Since the
Deed of Absolute Sale x x x entered into by and between
defendant-appellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio dated 29
December 1992, during the subsisting marriage between
plaintiff-appellee Shirley and Rogelio, was without the written
consent of Shirley, the said Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its
entirety. Hence, the trial court erred in declaring the said Deed of
Absolute Sale as void only insofar as the 1/2 portion pertaining to
the share of Shirley is concerned.18
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into
the contract of sale with petitioner and acknowledged receiving
the entire consideration of the contract under the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner
for the reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the
subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the
absolute community of property shall only be liable for x x x
[d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited x x x. As correctly stated by the appellate court, there
being no evidence on record that the amount received by
Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2010 and July 21, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70235 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable

to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the
MODES OF ACQUIRING LAND TITLES
17

A.
Title by Public Grant
1.
The Regalian Doctrine, Concepts and Effects
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SOFRONIO G.

SAYO
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge

approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and
ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,

has taken the present recourse in a bid to have the March 5,
1981 decision annulled as being patently void and rendered in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The
Solicitor General contends that
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS: The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed

an original application for registration of a tract of land identified
as Lot No. 7454 having an area of 33,950 hectares.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director

of Lands and the Director of Forestry.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3,
1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and
among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel,
namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the
Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of
Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products,
Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support

of their petitions for registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest
Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise
agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not
given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise
accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision
approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the
"patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take
immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor

General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot
7454 is public land. According to them, as pointed out in the
application for registration, the private character of the land is
demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;

2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341
hectares;
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their

predecessors-in-interest;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by
the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000

hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the

compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as
owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area,
1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees.
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August

16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of
Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives,
the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish
system of land registration as private property owned by Don
Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the
Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be
confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under
the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the
land involved belongs to the State.
18

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents have registrable

rights over Lot 7454. No
HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands not otherwise

appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence, it is that all applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain.
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and

convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other
means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain.
The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to

substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or
mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of
possession and title.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document

relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above
mentioned)
to
the
effect
that
according
to
the
Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in
1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish
system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato
Bayaua.
But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish
document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be
considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made
during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting
primary evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious document
on which to base any finding of the private character of the land
in question.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to
the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the

judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared
null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness
however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration
Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity
to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the
property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA and LEON
PASAHOL
G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban

Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First Instance
of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question
(Lot 444) by purchase from its original owners and thereafter,
actual, continuous, public and adverse possession by them
tacked on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding
30 years.
Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the

cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an
ongoing cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No. 444 was
declared public land by CFI Bataan.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial

court's decision which granted the private respondents' petition
to reopen the cadastral registration proceeding of the lot in
dispute and ordering its registration in the names of the
respondents.
In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the decision of

the appellate court as being contrary to law on the ground that it
held that the subject land is agricultural and alienable land of the
public domain and that the same can be subject to acquisitive
prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession.
19

The petitioner maintains that unless the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources,
reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or
disposable, its status as military reservation or forest land
remains unaltered and no amount of physical occupation and
cultivation thereof can change it to agricultural land and bring it
within the provisions of the Public Land Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a bona fide claim of

ownership as to entitle them to registration and title over the
subject land. NO
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the fact remains that the
subject land has not yet been released from its classification as
part of the military reservation zone and still has to be
reclassified as alienable public land with the approval of the
President of the Philippines as required by the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275.
Therefore, the SC cannot sustain the appellate court's ruling that
the land in dispute is no longer part of the military reservation on
the basis of a mere proposal to classify the same as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. A proposal cannot take
the place of a formal act declaring forest land released for
disposition as public agricultural land. To sustain the appellate
ruling would be to pre-empt the executive branch of the
government from exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of
the public domain.
It was ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of

Appeals, (129 SCRA 689, 692-693) that:
The classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains as unclassified land
until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition, This is also in consonance with the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979])
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever

possession Applicant may have had, and, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership.
MATEO CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE

PHILIPPINES
212 US 449, 41 PHILG.R. No. L-2746
December 6, 1906
JUSTICE HOLMES
HOW IT REACHED THE COURT:
Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was
the government of the United States appealed to the Court of
first instance of Benguet (they were taking the property for public
and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for
registration) and this was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme
Court. This was brought to the US Supreme court by writ of error.
FACTS: Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30
years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held
the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the
owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and
maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle
on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot
custom. There was no document of title issued for the land when
he applied for registration. The government contends that the
land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law,
all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with
permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against
the Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish
occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed a petition alleging
ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.
PREMILINARY ISSUES: That even if Carino was able to have a
title over the land, he could not have it registered because
Benguet was one of the excluded provinces in the Philippine
Commissions act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS
GOVERNING
THE
HOMESTEADING,
SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS...). But that law dealt
with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under
the Spanish law. Carino argued that he could register the land
under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered the
entire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register
the land if ownership can be maintained.
MAIN ISSUE: WON the land in question belonged to the
Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Governments argument: Spain had title to all the land in the
Philippines except those it saw fit to permit private titles to be
acquired. That there was a decree issued by Spain that required
registration within a limited time. Carinos land wasnt registered
and so in effect it became public land.
HELD: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted title to his land.
USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does
not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost all his
rights to the land this would amount to a denial of native titles
throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have granted
to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.
Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and
rights acquired there by the US would be for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights
embodying the safeguards of the constitution, it provides that
'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. It
would be hard to believe that that any person didnt include the
20

inhabitants of Benguet. Nor it meant property to refer only to
those lands which had become such under a ceremony (of
registration) many of the people of the land may have not even
heard of.
have always sustained the public character for having been

formed by reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that
it is accretion)
X
Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the Philippine

commission may prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting
titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to
those cases where the land was admitted to be public land. The
US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every
native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still
remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?
In cases like this one, the presumption would and should be
against the government. As far back as memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership,
it was never public land. It would not be proper to just let the
conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it
really meant to use the rights acquired by them for the benefit of
the inhabitants thereof.
The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some
lands, irrespective of any royal grant. They didnt intend to turn
all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was
admitted: that if they werent able to produce title deeds, it is
sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required
everyone to get a document of title or else lose his land, it does
not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who
wrongfully occupied royal lands. IT doesnt appear that the land
of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to
have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree
provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove
possession for the necessary time. There were indications that
registration was expected but it didnt mean that ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to
confer title to them but to establish it.
Law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what,
by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived,
was his property, through a refined interpretation of an
almost forgotten law of Spain.
Judgment reversed.
LEE HONG KOK V. DAVID
G.R. NO. L-30389 DECEMBER 27, 1972
FACTS: Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an
order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to
public auction) was made by the Director of Lands on June 18,
1958, covering Lot 2892.
X
On the basis of the order of award of the Director of

Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register
of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.
Land in question is not a private property as the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud

- But there was no fraud in this case.
ISSUES:
W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO
X W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES
HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for
nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from the
grant made in his favor by respondent officials)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or

the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void
patent. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government. Private parties like the plaintiffs
cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved
are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had
they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of
Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Well-settled Rule: no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government.
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is
more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered
property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a
Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has
likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of 5
years.
Imperium v. Dominium
Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty
Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this
term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
FACTS: There were two petitions for review on certiorari
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared
the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor
of private persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of
Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that
the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as
forest land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar
as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters
was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed
and registered in his name.
21

ISSUE: WON the lot in question can be subject of registration
and confirmation of title in the name of the private person.
HELD: The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within
the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it
was classified as "public forest.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The possession of forestlands, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore,
the lot in question never ceased to be classified as forestland of
public domain.
2. The Regalian Doctrine vs RA 8371 IPRA
ISAGANI CRUZ V. DEPT. OF ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
G.R. NO. 135385, DECEMBER 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of
the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground
that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation
they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and
the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote,
Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained.
Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources
somehow against the regalian doctrine.
3. Concept of Native Title
MATEO CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES
212 US 449, 41 PHILG.R. No. L-2746
December 6, 1906
JUSTICE HOLMES
HOW IT REACHED THE COURT: Plaintiff applied for registration
of a certain land. Initially it was the government of the United

states appealed to the Court of first instance of Benguet (they
were taking the property for public and military purposes. The
CFI dismissed the application (for registration) and this was
affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. This was brought to
the US Supreme court by writ of error.
FACTS: Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30
years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held
the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the
owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and
maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle
on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot
custom. There was no document of title issued for the land when
he applied for registration. The government contends that the
land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law,
all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with
permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against
the Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish
occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed a petition alleging
ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.
PREMILINARY ISSUES: That even if Carino was able to have a
title over the land, he could not have it registered because
Benguet was one of the excluded provinces in the Philippine
Commissions act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS
GOVERNING
THE
HOMESTEADING,
SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS...). But that law dealt
with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under
the Spanish law. Carino argued that he could register the land
under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered the
entire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register
the land if ownership can be maintained
MAIN ISSUE: WON the land in question belonged to the
Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Governments argument: Spain had title to all the land in the
Philippines except those it saw fit to permit private titles to be
acquired. That there was a decree issued by Spain that required
registration within a limited time. Carinos land wasnt registered
and so in effect it became public land.
HELD: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted title to his land.
USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does
not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost all his
rights to the land this would amount to a denial of native titles
throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have granted
to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.
Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and
rights acquired there by the US would be for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights
embodying the safeguards of the constitution, it provides that
'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. It
would be hard to believe that that any person didnt include the
inhabitants of Benguet. Nor it meant property to refer only to
those lands which had become such under a ceremony (of
registration) many of the people of the land may have not even
22

heard of.
Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the Philippine
commission may prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting
titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to
those cases where the land was admitted to be public land. The
US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every
native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still
remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?
In cases like this one, the presumption would and should be
against the government. As far back as memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership,
it was never public land. It would not be proper to just let the
conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it
really meant to use the rights acquired by them for the benefit of
the inhabitants thereof.
The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some
lands, irrespective of any royal grant. They didnt intend to turn
all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was
admitted: that if they werent able to produce title deeds, it is
sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required
everyone to get a document of title or else lose his land, it does
not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who
wrongfully occupied royal lands. IT doesnt appear that the land
of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to
have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree
provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove
possession for the necessary time. There were indications that
registration was expected but it didnt mean that ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to
confer title to them but to establish it.
Law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what,
by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived,
was his property, through a refined interpretation of an
almost forgotten law of Spain.
Judgment reversed.
4. Concept of Time Immemorial Possession
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND TABANGAO REALTY
FACTS: On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an
application for Original Registration of Title over three parcels of
land.
Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it
acquired the above-mentioned lots by purchase from its previous
owners as evidenced by the corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it
is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been in actual
possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from
the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession
and occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-ininterest has been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the
whole world and in the concept of an owner.
Tabangao Realty alleged that the plant of the Liquefied

Petroleum Gas (LPG) Company is partly erected on the subject
lots which improvements are owned by it (applicant). {There is a
lease contract between LPG and Tabangao}
Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed,
the applicant in the alternative applied for the benefits under CA
No. 141 as amended and thus alleged that together with its
predecessors-in-interest it had been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful and adverse possession of the subject lots for more
than 30 years.
Geron (Tabangos witness) testified that the applicant-corporation
was duly organized and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and is authorized to acquire land by
purchase and develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange,
lease and hold for investment or otherwise, real estate of all
kinds.
He also testified that the subject properties in this case were
purchased by Tabangao Realty as evidenced by Deed of Sale
and that the taxes of the properties were properly paid by the
corporation.
Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with
regard to the ownership, possession and the status of the lots
subject of the application.
Loida Maglinao (from the Bureau of Forest Development)
testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and
disposable area of the public domain and no forestry interest is
adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest Development.
RTC and CA granted the petition of Tabangao. Hence, this
appeal by the Republic.
ISSUE: WON Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over
three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City
applied for.
HELD: NO. The ruling of the CA was erroneous. There is a
presumption that all lands belong to the public domain of the
State.
An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must
conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee simple, for
the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public
domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either
by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant
and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private
property even before the Spanish conquest.
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no
title at all. Its claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on
possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared
public land by decision of the Cadastral Court. Such being the
case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree) is barred by the prior
judgment of the Cadastral Court.
The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under
the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no longer be the
23

subject of registration by voluntary application under Presidential
Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by resjudicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no
title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one
under the Torrens System of registration."
There is no sufficient evidence that Tabangao Realty was in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
lands for 30 years.
Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its
possession and that of its predecessors in interest. "The
applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate
the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are
mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession."
"Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property."
In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly
established by competent evidence.
Hence, the application for registration of the properties must be
denied. (Ruled in favor of the Republic.)
and occupation of the subject land under abona fideclaim of

ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondents have not presented tangible proof to establish this
kind of possession. At best, they have only given a tax
declaration on 1949, but this is merely indicia of ownership.
2nd Issue:
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that thelandsubject of theapplication (or claim)
isalienable ordisposable. To support this, Respondents have
merely relied on the survey plan of a geodetic engineer. This is
insufficient under the law. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government agency to establish that
the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion
of the public domain.
Petition GRANTED. The registration is DENIED.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO V.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This is a claim of a huge parcel of land covering lands in
the provinces Nueva ecija, Bulacan, and in cities including
Quezon City. (The most fantastic land claim ..)
5. Burden of Proof to Defeat Doctrine

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. AVELINO R. DELA PAZ,
ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, AND GLICERIO
R. DELA PAZ, REPRESENTED BY JOSE R. DELA PAZ
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: Respondents filed a case to register a parcel of land
covering almost 25,800 square kilometres situated in Taguig.
They alleged that they came into the possession of the land thru
their parents who have been continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner
since 1987. The Republic (Petitioner) opposed the application on
the ground that they have not been in continuous, uninterrupted,
open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of
owner, but the RTC ruled in favour of the Respondents. The
Republic interposed an Appeal to the CA, but it was also denied,
the court reasoning that Respondents have established their
right to the parcel of land.
Petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and
adverse possession was sufficiently established by evidence.
2. Whether the land is part of the alienable part of public domain.
HELD:
No. It has not been sufficiently established.
This case involves 2 cases, which prior to being decided by the

SC were consolidated. The first case was a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against Ocampo, Buhain,
and Dela Cruz. In the complaint, it was alleged that the
defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz) were able to secure from the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to a portions of the
claimed estate. In the end, the lower courts ruled in favor of
Ocampo - Dela Cruz, declaring that the Torrens titles of the
defendants cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title,
Titulo Propriedad no. 4316.
The 2nd case is a petition for letters of adiministration over the
intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban. This
involves a prayer to be declared as administrator. This case
eventually ended in the same manner as the first case - the
Titulo de Prorpriedad was declared void and of no legal force,
therefore the lands covered by the Titulo are not within the estate
of the deceased.
ISSUE: W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and
therefore the lands covered or claimed under such title are not
included in the estate of the deceased.
HELD: The Titulo is null and void. It has been defeated by the
title of the defendants under the Torrens system. It is settled that
by virtue of Pd no 892 which tool effect on Feb 16 1976 the syte
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished
and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their
lands coverd thereby to be registered under the Land
Registration Act within 6mos from date of effectivity of the said
decree.
Civil Law: Land Registration

1st Issue:
Respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title) with the said decree

should have been presented during trial.
B. Title by Acquisitive Prescription
1.
Types of Prescription
24

2.
3.
4.
5.
Prescription vs Laches
Periods for Acquisitve Prescription
Prescription, Co-ownership and Trusts
Effect of Fraud
C. Title by Accretion
1.
Concept of Accretion
NEW REGENT SERVICES V. TANJUATCO
April 16, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a

Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract,
Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and
the Register of Deeds of Calamba. NRSI alleged that in 1994, it
authorized Cuevas, its Chairman and President, to apply on its
behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its
right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his
name by paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands. On January
2, 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement
over their shares of stock in the corporation. Then, pending
approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas
assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000. On March
12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order, which
approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco.
Transfer Certificates of Titles were then issued in the name of
Tanjuatco. NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this
case on the right of accretion. It submitted in evidence, titles to
four parcels of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name
of Tanjuatco.
ISSUES:
1)
W/N the complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of

contract, reconveyance and damages against Tanjuanco
may prosper
2)
W/n NRSI has claim over the subject property base on the
right of accretion
3)
W/N Cuevas is an innocent purchaser in good faith
RULINGS:
1. No. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer
property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal
owner.22 In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites

must concur:
(1) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming
ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name
of the defendant;
(2) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was
procured through fraud or other illegal means;
(3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value; and
(4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already
become final and incontrovertible but within four years from the
discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an
implied trust.
Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.
2. No. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article

457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers.
It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the

benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must
show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the
conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this
regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has
satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the

lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) registered in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of land
formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, which under Article
502 (1) of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion.
The Certification issued by the forester confirms that said lands
were verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable lands
certified and declared as such on September 28, 1981. Clearly,
the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer
ownership thereof to respondent.
3. Yes. Tanjuatcos titles were derived from Original Certificates
of Title in the name of no less than the Republic of the
Philippines. Hence, we cannot validly and fairly rule that in
relying upon said title, Tanjuatco acted in bad faith. A person
dealing with registered land may safely rely upon the correctness
of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
25

oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition
of the property. This applies even more particularly when the
seller happens to be the Republic, against which, no improper
motive can be ascribed. The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco
an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value
is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the
full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he
has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the
property.
respondent filed an application for registration of the two lots

pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law alleging that it
and its predecessor-in-interest had possessed the land for more
than 30 years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the
application on the ground that the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a
corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to hold
alienable lands of the public domain and that the land applied for
is a public land. After hearing, the trial court ordered the
registration of the two lots in the name of private respondent.
Hence this appeal by the Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Iglesia ni Cristo may acquire or hold
lands of public domain.
2.
Elements of Accretion; Art 457 of the NCC
D. Title by Reclamation
1.
2.
RA 1899
Ownership of Reclaimed Land
E. Title by Voluntary Transfer

1.
Modes of Voluntary Transfer in general
F. Title by Involuntary Alienation (overview)

1.
2.
Forcible Acquisition by the Government

Forcible Acquisition by Private Persons
G. Title by Descent or Devise

H, Title by Emancipation Patent or Grant
1.
2.
Certificate of Land Transfer is not Title

Conditions for Acquisition of an Emancipation
3.
Patent
Transferability
I. Lands of the Public Domain
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

Director of Lands vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII,
and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented
by ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister
G.R. No. L-55289. June 29, 1982
FACTS: In 1933, Iglesia ni Cristo, private respondent, a
corporation sole duly existing under Philippine laws, acquired two
lots with a total area of 313 square meters from Andres Perez,
who had possessed the property since 1933 and had declared
the same for tax purposes. On September 13, 1977, private
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits a

corporation sole or a juridical person like the Iglesia Ni Cristo
from acquiring or holding lands of the public domain; that said
church is not entitled to avail of the benefits of Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Law which applies only to Filipino citizens or
natural persons; and that the subject lots are not private lands
because possession by the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest has not been since time immemorial and because land
registration proceeding under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Law presupposes that the land is public.
The provision in the Constitution that "No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; Art. XIV,
Sec. II of the Constitution is not the decisive consideration for the
denial of the registration in favor of appellee. It is the view that
the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the
enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment
of religious profession and worship without discrimination or
preference. (being) forever . . . allowed." Here the Iglesia Ni
Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area
involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square
meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is
therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads to the
conclusion that the balancing process, which finds application in
constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when two
provisions in the Constitution maybe relevant to a certain factual
situation, it calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent
Judge allowing the registration.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. JUDGE FLORELIANA
CASTRO-BARTOLOME
114 SCRA 799
JUNE 29, 1982
FACTS: The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165
sqm.) with an assessed value of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the
Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who had consequently
purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3rd of July 1947, the
original owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently
filed for the confirmation of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that
was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The Meralco
consequently filed an appeal with the following contentions:
1. The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and
the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years had essentially
been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive
prescription. Thus, the constitutional prohibition banning a private
corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable.
26

2. It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for
itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could
secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified
to apply for a judicial confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete
title.
2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is
recognized.
3. Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to
private property is contingent on the judicial confirmation of title.
RULING:
1. NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the
Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified from applying for
the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Furthermore, according
to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution
prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, not to exceed 1000 hectares in
area. In fine, only natural persons and citizens of the Philippines
are allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA.
2. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private
property is contingent upon (1) fulfilling the necessary condition
of possession by the predecessors-in-interest for the statutory
period of 30 years; and (2) the judicial confirmation of the title by
the Court of First Instance. C.J. Fernando concurred with the
decision, but accepted that a conversion indeed took place.
Note: J. Teehankee dissented and traced the line of
jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to Herico which maintained
that the conversion or acquisition effectively happens by the
operation of law, ipso jure, as soon as it can be conclusively
presumed, juris et de jure, that all the conditions for the
confirmation of the grant have been met. According to his
reasoning, upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions,
the confirmation of an imperfect title is only a formality.
DIRECTOR OF LAND VS IAC AND ACME
FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented
by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land. The possession
of the Infiels, members of Dumagat tribes, over the land dates
back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. The
possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse andpublic from 1962 to the present and
tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from
whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962,
hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial. The land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public
land or within the public domain. Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.
The ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela. Acme donated part of
the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela.
ISSUES:
1.
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2.
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their

acquisition by private corporations or associations appliesNO
HELD:
1. YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to

a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public

domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the

lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title
as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to

confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares.
VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO vs. the RELIGIOUS OF THE
VIRGIN MARY (Feb. 28, 1989)
FACTS: A cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of
Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement and
adjudication of title to a large tract of land situated in the City of
Iligan.
Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably presented
an answer to the petition. She alleged that she was the owner, by
purchase, of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries
comprehended in the cadastral proceeding. As owner, she had
been in possession of both lots for fifteen (15) years, and her
predecessors-in-interest, for sixty (60) years. Title to the same
parcels of land was however claimed by the Religious of the
Virgin Mary. In its answer, it averred that it had bought the lots
from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had been in possession as
owner thereof for over four years, and its possession and that of
its predecessors was immemorial.
The Cadastral Court rendered judgment, declaring that the
evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio
had in truth sold the lot to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in
virtue of a deed of sale dated April 12, 1956.
De Ocsio now asserts that as the private respondent is a
religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural persons.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention was correct.
27

HELD: No. Private respondent, a religious corporation, may
obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.
Open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public
land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public
Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private property, and a
juridical person who thereafter acquires the same may have title
thereto confirmed in its name.
In this case, a private corporation had purchased the land
originally of the public domain from parties who had, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest,
possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. It had
thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
The prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against
acquisition or registration of lands by or in behalf of private
corporations do not apply to public lands already converted to
private ownership by natural persons under the provisions of the
Public Land Act. In the present case, Virginia Ong de Ocsio and
her predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No. 1272 for
the period and under the conditions prescribed by law for
acquisition of ownership of disposable public land prior to the
sale of the property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary,
confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is, under the
precedents referred to, entirely in order.
Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the
control, management, protection and administration of a division
of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never
released as alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under
the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable
under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed a civil

case for the annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title
involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles

issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in
1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to
the petition for reconstitution are valid.
HELD: No. The OCT and the subsequest TCTs are not valid. The
lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain.
IGNACIO PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

(January 21, 1997)
FACTS: On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the

Philippine Islands, issued Executive Order No. 40 which
reserved for provincial park purposes a land situated in the
Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the
Philippine Commission.
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay ordered

the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order
No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo. Diego Palomo donated
these parcels of land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and
Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost

during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition
for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay. The
Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Titles.
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued

Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not
alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District
Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject
lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and
subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the
present. Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park
purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest

land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable
and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it
into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

(March 16, 1987)
FACTS: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared

public land in a decision rendered before the last war in
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone
28

and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097 to perfect their rights and
register their titles to said lots, having allegedly acquired
ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase
from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same
including that of the herein Respondents, has always been
continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the
concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years.
The petition was approved and the Commissioner of Land

Registration was directed to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration of said land.
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a

petition for review of the decrees of registration under Section
38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding decision
of the lower court, on the grounds that the parcels of land subject
matter of the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are
portions of the public domain, admittedly within the unclassified
public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on
or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not
have a registerable title to the land subject matter of the
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could

legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under the
Public Land Act, as amended.
HELD: No. It cannot be claimed by the respondents. Section

48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public
agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are
excluded. They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in
a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the Torrens System.
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at

all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant
under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that
private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months
and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved,
counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio
San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, which includes
the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the
forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither

private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have
possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as
disposable agricultural land.
REPUBLIC vs. DE GUZMAN

(Feb. 28, 2000)
FACTS: Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title
were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador
De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After
trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent De Guzman.
The Republic now raised the issue in a petition that the trial court
erred in not declaring that the de Guzman have not overthrown
the presumption that the lands are portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and that they have
fulfilled the time required by law to justify confirmation of an
imperfect title.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released
as agricultural land only in 1965 while the petition for
confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents
only in 1991. Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels
of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991
was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the
required thirty (30) year period possession requirement
under Sec. 14, P.D. 29and R.A. No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject

property complied with law, the Court of Appeals reasoned out
that
(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and
disposable only in December, 1965, however, records
indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees'
predecessor-in-interest, was already in possession of the
property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It
follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing
of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitao's
possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years
period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has
been converted to private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the time required by law to justify

confirmation of an imperfect tile is satisfied in this case.
HELD: No. It is not satisfied. In the case before us, the property
subject of private respondents' application was only declared
alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land
incapable of private appropriation. It cannot be registered and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it
into private property, (unless) and until such lands were
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in
1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be
29

considered in the counting of the thirty year possession
requirement.
Moldex Realty also opposed, stating that a part of one of the

parcels of the land overlapped with lands it owned.
The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply

unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
The RTC handed down its Judgment granting the respondents

application for registration ofthe first lot but deferred the approval
of registration of the second lot pending the segregation of 4,243
square meter portion thereof which was found to belong to
Moldex. It rendered an amended judgment later, granting
registration of the second lot. The OSG and Moldex appealed
with the CA, which reinstated the earlier RTC decision. The OSG
appealed.
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private

respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the
time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by the
applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to
them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was
declared alienable until the time of their application, private
respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years.
We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession
prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the
fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in
good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained
classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have
acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with
cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not
capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property.
Possession of the land by private respondents, whether
spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents had a valid claim over the two
parcels of land (NO)
HELD: The following are the requisites required by law for the
registration of land.
Applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 must sufficiently
establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier. These the respondents must prove by no
less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
OCENPO
The respondents best evidence to prove possession and

ownership over the subject property were the tax declarations
issued in their names. Unfortunately, these tax declarations
together with their unsubstantiated general statements and mere
xerox copies of deeds of sale are not enough to prove their
rightful claim.
REPUBLIC VS JUANITO MANIMTIM

(G.R. No. 169599 March 16, 2011)
Well settled is the rule that declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land
when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the
disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes
in the names of the applicants for registration or of their
predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership.
They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
FACTS: Respondents filed with the RTC two applications for

registration and confirmation of their title over two (2) parcels of
land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City. The
respondents alleged that they are the owners pro indiviso and in
fee simple of the subject parcels of land; that they have acquired
the subject parcels of land by purchase or assignment of rights;
and that they have been in actual, open, public, and continuous
possession of the subject land under claim of title exclusive of
any other rights and adverse to all other claimants by themselves
and through their predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial. In support of their applications, the respondents
submitted blueprint plans of Lot 3857 and Lot 3858, technical
descriptions, certifications in lieu of lost geodetic engineers
certificates, declarations of real property tax, official receipts of
payment of taxes, real property tax certifications, and deeds of
absolute sale.
The OSG opposed the petition, alleging, among others, that the
respondents have not proven actual, open, public, and
continuous possession of the land from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
REPUBLIC VS TEODORO RIZALVO

(G.R. No 172011 March 7, 2011)
FACTS: On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo,
Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land
registration court, an application for the registration of a parcel of
land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706, located in Bauang,
La Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple
of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land
by virtue of a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962, and
that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his
claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 22206
for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of real
property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the
application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
an Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
30

since June 12, 1945or earlier and that the tax declarations and
tax payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject
property was a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private
acquisition.
The Land Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union thereafter certified that the
subject parcel of land was within the alienable and disposable
zone and that the applicant was in actual occupation and
possession of the land.
The MTC, acting as a land registration court, approved the
application for registration, which the OSG appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was in open, continuous,
adverse, and public possession (OCENPO) of the land in
question in the manner and length of time required by law as to
entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. (NO)
HELD: Requisites for the registration of a title:
Under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first,
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification
and report dated July 17, 2001 submitted by Special Investigator
Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union,
states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable
and disposable zone.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to
ownership and possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed
that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-ininterest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings
are binding upon this Court absent any showing that the lower
courts committed error.
However, the third requirement has not been satisfied.
Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of
the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana
P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration No. 11078 for the year
1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax
receipts beginning in 1952. What is required by law is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945or
earlier.
Under Section 14(2) applicant is likewise not entitled to
registration of title through prescription, since the 30-year period
will only commence from the moment the State expressly
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. There was
no such declaration in this case.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS HON. SALVADOR REYES
AND PIDC AND TAMAYO
(GR No L-27594 November 28, 1975)
FACTS: Applicant Alipio Alinsunurin sought the registration of
title under Act 496 a vast tract of land, containing an area of
16,800 hectares, more or less, situated at the municipality of
Laur, province of Nueva Ecija.
On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed the application,
claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not
in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application; that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the military
reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation
No. 237.
In 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for
substitution of parties, requesting that the Paraaque Investment
and Development Corporation be considered as the applicant in
his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership
and dominion over the property
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the
land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the
Spanish regime and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted the
ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir,
Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land
thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death
sometime in 1944.
The lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land
applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to be registered in favor
of Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation (2/3 of
the land was adjudicated to PIDC), and the remaining 1/3 portion
to Tamayo.
ISSUE: W/N PIDC or its predecessors-in-interest have been in
OCENPO of the subject property (NO)
HELD: The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion
posesoria issued in the name of Melecio Padilla. However,
neither the original of the said titulo de informacion posesoria,
nor a duly authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in
evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged
copies of the document.
Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of
Deeds, on the basis of the "List of Possessory Information Titles
(Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the corresponding supporting
documents of which are kept in the vault of said office, the name
of Melecio Padilla does not appear among those listed as
holders of informacion posesoria titles. There is another factor
which weighs heavily against the claim of the applicant. The
alleged informacion posesoria covers an area of "seis mil
quiiones, poco mas e menos" or an equivalent of 16,800
hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the time of the
supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land in excess
of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25,
31

1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of public land in
excess of one thousand (1,000) hectares
possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 under the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894.
Also under Spanish law, in order that an informacion posesoria

may be considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that
the holder thereof has complied with the provisions of Article 393
of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of

Quezon filed his opposition to the application alleging that neither
the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had sufficient
title of the land applied for nor had they been in possession
thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application and that the same is public
land.
It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been

legally converted into a registration of ownership because
Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of Article
393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has
been in open possession of the land; that an application to this
effect be filed after the expiration of 20 years from the date of
such registration; that such conversion be announced by means
of a proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court order
the conversion of the registration of possession into a record of
ownership; and that the Registrar make the proper record thereof
in the Registry."
Constancio dela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition even as

he supported the government's contention that the lands applied
for are part of the public domain. Tan averred that he had
possessed the land as lessee for a period of more than thirty five
(35) years. She said that the lands were converted into fishponds
and had been subject of a sales application sometime in 1963.
11 The application to purchase filed by Constancio is still pending
before the Bureau of Lands.
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900,

barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion
posesoria, could not have converted the same into a record of
ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to
Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
Lower court decision: After hearing, the trial court rendered

judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the
applicants and declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as owned by the
government subject to the rights of the lessee, Constancio dela
Pena Tan, pending the approval of his sales application.
It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that

neither applicant Paraaque Investment and Development
Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's predecessorsin-interest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation" of the property in
question, "under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title."
The CA ruled that lots 1-5 should be registered under the names
of Tesalonas siblings.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant,

and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to
be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession,
the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without
substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not
sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession of public land, however long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS TESALONA
(GR No. 66130 September 8, 1994)
FACTS: On June 23, 1971, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia
Tesalona filed an application for registration of five (5) parcels of
land with the CFI of Quezon, Gumaca Branch. They alleged that
they acquired the lands through succession from their mother
Magdalena.
They said that their great grand mother Maria Rosita Lorenzo
acquired 7.4343 hectares of land located in Quezon under a
The Director of lands filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2.
(NO)
HELD: Submission of tracing cloth plan is mandatory which the
Tesalonas were not able to comply. To begin with, the original
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in
evidence by private respondents. Such omission is fatal to their
application as the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is
a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
While a blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382 as surveyed for the
Heirs of Magdalena Lizada was presented before the trial court,
the same falls short of the mandatory requirement of law.
The original tracing cloth plan, together with the duplicate copy of
their application for registration of land title were under the
custody of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) at that time.
But such does not relieve the private respondents of their duty to
retrieve the said tracing cloth plan and submit it before the court.
In the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, this Court clearly
declared that if the original tracing plan was forwarded to the
LRC, "the applicants may easily retrieve the same therefrom and
submit the same in evidence." This was not done. Assuming that
the same was in their possession during the trial, private
respondents should have made it available to the trial court for
verification.
The proofs presented by Tesalonas were questionable and the
basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, herein private
respondents, is a Spanish title, a possessory information title
issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares. But
private respondents did not submit the original of the possessory
32

information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible
copy of a Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing
the land grant of 1896.
(Also this part of the Courts decision is more connected with
the topic of OCENPO)
Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy area and were
as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees.
This belies the contention of herein private respondents that said
lots were planted to coconuts in 1909 and, thereafter, to palay
and other seasonal crops. Being swampy area covered by
mangrove trees and the like, these lots may very well be
considered and classified as forest lands. In the case of Heirs of
Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry we declared that:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way place.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the
Spanish regime or under the Torrens System, nullifies the title.
VICTORIA V REPUBLIC
FACTS: On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana
Victoria applied for registration under the law of a 1,729-square
meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of that city. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), representing the respondent Republic of the Philippines,
opposed the application in the usual form.
The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence
showed that the land is inside the alienable and disposable area
under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the
Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968.
Victoria testified that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly,
openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the
early 1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared
as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years.
On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision granting the
application for registration and finding that Victoria.
The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of

Appeals (CA), pointing out in its brief that Victoria failed to
present evidence that the subject property is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and that she failed to
establish the kind of possession required for registration.
Victoria in her reply attached to her brief a Certification dated
November 6, 2006 issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), verifying the subject property as
within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Ca reversed MeTCs decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership
of the property.
RULING: Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree has
three requisites for registration of title:
(a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain;
(b) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and
(c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There are no material differences between Sec. 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. Sec. 14(1) operationalizes the registration of such lands of
the public domain.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the
government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as
declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.
Besides, the record shows that the subject property was covered
by a cadastral survey of Taguig conducted by the government at
its expense. Such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage
landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such
survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a
survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the
public domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in
the middle of the metropolis.
SOUTH CITY HOMES V REPUBLIC
33

The subject of this dispute (lot No.5005) is a strip of land
between two lots owned by the petitioner.
The record shows that Lot 2381 was purchased on installment
basis by Basilia Dimaranan, and Lot 2386 was acquired under
similar condition by Fernando Guico, both from the Friar Lands
Division of the Bureau of Landsin the year 1910. Eight (8) years
thereafter, installment-payment for Lot 2386 was completed in
favor of Basilia Dimaranan. On the other hand, Lot 2381 was on
September 12, 1911 assigned to Bartolome Pea who continued
and completed the installment payments culminating into the
issuance in his name of Patent No. 19138 on September
26,1919. From Bartolome Pena, Lot 2381 was acquired by Fidel
M. Cabrera, Sr. and the title was transferred to his name (Exh.
"F") while Lot 2386 was acquired by the Garcias (Exh. "J-2") On
August 27,1981, Lot 2386-A was sold by the Garcias to the
applicant South City Homes, Inc. (Exh. "J"). Lot 2381 was on
February 25,1977 sold by Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. to Koo Jun Eng
(Exh. "G") who in turn assigned the property to the applicant in
February of 1981 (Exh. "H"). 4
It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should be
registered in its name for either of two reasons. The first is that
the disputed strip of land really formed part of Lots 2381 and
2386-A but was omitted therefrom only because of the
inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral surveys. The second
is that it had acquired the property by prescription through
uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner, by itself
and its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.
For its part, the Republic of the Philippines argues that the
elongated piece of land between the two lots now owned by the
petitioner used to be a canal which could not have been
appropriated by the purchasers of the adjacent lots or their
successors-in-interest. Neither could it be deemed included in
the lots now owned by the petitioner because their respective
technical descriptions indicate otherwise. Prescription is also not
applicable because the petitioner has not established the
requisite possession of the lot, as to manner and length, to justify
judicial confirmation of title in its name.
The parties also differ on the nature of the disputed lot. The
petitioner insists it is patrimonial property of the State, being part
of the so-called Friar Lands, while the Republic maintains it is
part of the public domain and cannot therefore be acquired by a
private corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner own Lot 5005.
RULING: To argue that Lot No. 5005 is really a part of the other
two lots owned by the petitioner is to oppose the obvious. What
is obvious is the technical descriptions of the two lots whose
areas do not include the strip of land between them. The
petitioner points to the original survey of the lands in 1906 which
states that the two lots adjoin each other, without mention of
what is now Lot No. 5005. But it forgets that it has itself
suggested that the old surveys were inaccurate, which could
explain the omission.
If it is true that there was no canal between the two lots at the
time of their survey, then the disputed strip of land should have
been included as part of either of the two adjoining lots. It was
not. The petitioner itself insists that the canal, if there ever was
one, had disappeared after it had been filled with silt and dirt.
The result was the segregation of a third and separate lot, now
known as Lot No. 5005. Notably, the area of that dried-up canal
is not negligible as to come under what the petitioner calls the
allowable margin of error in the original survey.
As we have already rejected the contention that the third lot was
part of the other two lots, the petitioner must fall back on its claim
of acquisitive prescription over it as a separate lot. Its submission
is that its possession of the lot dates back to "time immemorial,"
by which tired phrase it is intended to convey the idea that the
start of such possession can no longer be recollected. Indeed, it
can be. The petitioner's possession does not in fact go back to
"time immemorial," but only to the recent remembered past.
It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of the Civil
Code:
In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area
greater, or less, than that expressed in his title, prescription shall
be based on the possession.
This possession, following the above quoted rulings, should be
limited only to that of the successor-in-interest; and in the case of
the herein petitioner, it should begin from 1981 when it acquired
the two adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question
thinking it to be part of the other two.
It follows that when the application for registration of the lot in the
name of the petitioner was filed in 1983, the applicant had been
in possession of the property for less than three years. This was
far too short of the prescriptive period required for acquisition of
immovable property, which is ten years if the possession is in
good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land is public.
The weakness of the petitioner's position prevents this Court
from affirming the claim to the lot in question either as part of the
two other lots or by virtue of acquisitive prescription. And having
made this ruling, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the
land is patrimonial in nature or part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SEC 22
CHING V CA
FACTS: By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at
No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No.
78633 was deemed cancelled.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston,
Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate son
Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the
estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the
"Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November
23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at
34

the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after
presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed
administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and
letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 5153, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among
those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p.
75, Ibid.).
RULING: The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens

Title must be filed in the original land registration case, RTC,
Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance
with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as
amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere
incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114
SCRA 748 [1982]).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him
was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private respondent
Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No.
6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and
cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession
(p. 33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad
Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137
(not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private
respondent's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980, p.
55, Ibid.).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in

interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when
the summons was published he could not have been notified at
all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have
been held.
An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against

Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979
alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been
residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known
whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may
be served by summons and other processes only by publication;"
(p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his
estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February
7, 1979.
The summons and the complaint were published in the
"Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19,
1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which
to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on
motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in
its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation of
evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June
15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the
complaint to be duly substantiated by the evidence, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true
and absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No.
91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property
in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching Leng
and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy
of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing
in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby
ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of
title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro
Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati,
Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees that may be required
therefor, including the realty taxes due the Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property
and cancellation of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead
man and/or his estate be bound by service of summons and
decision by publication.
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for
19 years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private
respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15,
1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27,
1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land
and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su
casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land (National Grains
Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A
strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued
and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against
any "information possessoria" or title existing prior to the
issuance thereof not annotated on the title.
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
A. For Individuals
RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain

on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir.
His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of

partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided
into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio
in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or free portion shall
go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez en nudapropriedad.
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with
35

the widows usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski.
Respondents opposed such partition, arguing that the granting of

a usufruct in favor of Wanda is invalid because it violates the
constitutional prohibition on aliens owning property in the
Philippines (Sec. 5, Art. XIII, 1935 Constitution).
ISSUE: W/n the granting of usufruct to Wanda is valid.
HELD: YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID. Art XIII, Sec 5 (1935):

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of
the public domain in the Philippines.
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also
testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this
provision does not apply to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a

Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land
BUT an alien may be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over
a parcel of land in the Philippines.
Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is

upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor
of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
PHIL. BANKING CORP. V. LUI SHE

FACTS: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza
were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila.
The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a
Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a
long-time lessee of a portion of the property, having a monthly
rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the
entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already
well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind,
crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live
with, but she was taken cared of by Wong.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the
Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November 15, 1957,

a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then
already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino
Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee
was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement;
the monthly rental was P3,120. Ten days later (November 25),
the contract was amended so as to make it cover the entire
property, including the portion on which the house of Justina
Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360.
On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong the option
to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten
years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option was
conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for
which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one
extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another fixing
the term of the option at 50 years. Both contracts are written in
Tagalog. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she
bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into
with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959)
she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various
contracts were made by her because of machinations and
inducements practised by him, she now directed her executor to
secure the annulment of the contracts.
Both parties however died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and
Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by
his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, While Justina
Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine
Banking Corporation that the lease contract should have been
annulled along with the four other contracts because it lacks
mutuality, among others.
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at
any time withdraw from this agreement." It is claimed that this
stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides
that "the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."
ISSUE: Was the contract between Wong and Justina Santos
enforceable?
HELD: No. The contract of lease, as in this case, cannot be
sustained. However, to be sure, a lease to an alien for a
reasonable period was valid, so was an option giving an alien the
right to buy real property on condition that he is granted
Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also an option to
buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot
sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years,
then it became clear that the arrangement was a virtual transfer
of ownership whereby the owner divested himself in stages not
only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus
disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership.
It was just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow,
the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately
all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in
an alien. And yet this was just exactly what the parties in this
case did within this pace of one year, with the result that Justina
36

Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow
concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against
alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land
subject-matter of the contracts was ordered returned to the
estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine
Banking Corporation.
REPUBLIC V. QUASHA
FACTS: Respondent William H. Quasha, an American citizen,
acquired by purchase a parcel of land with permanent
improvements thereon locates at 22 Molave Place, Forbes Park,
Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal. The said property had
an area of 2,616 sq. m., described in and covered by TCT No.
36862. Quasha filed this petition claiming that his ownership of
the properties in question, made possible through the Parity
Amendment between the USA and the Philippines which grants
to US citizens the right to acquire lands in the Philippines,
continues notwithstanding the termination of the effectivity of the
Amendment.
Petitioner Republic, on the other hand, contended that the land
acquired by respondent is a private agricultural land, and that
Quashas acquisition of such violates Sec. 5, Art. XIII of the
(1935) Constitution. Such argument is based upon the express
provision in the Parity Amendment which only extended the right
of aliens to acquire and utilize lands only to public lands
(agricultural, timber and mineral lands of public domain). Despite
such argument, the CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of
Quasha, holding that his acquisition of the said private
agricultural land is valid.
ISSUE: W/n respondents acquisition of the property in question
is valid despite his status as an alien.
HELD: No. The Court, upon examination of the Parity
Amendment, found that the same only establishes an express
exception on two provision of the (1935) Constitution, to wit: (a)
Sec. 1, Art. XIII, regarding disposition, exploitation, development
and utilization of agricultural, timber and mineral lands of public
domain and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (b)
Sec. 8, Art. XIV, regarding operation of public utilities. Moreover,
the Court reiterated that in cases of laws such as the Parity
Amendment, the same shall be given a strict construction. Since
the said Amendment merely extended the right in question to
Americans with respect to public lands, the said Amendment
could not be further construed to mean that they can also do the
same to private lands such as the property in question.
Furthermore, Quashas argument that US citizens are always
qualified to acquire lands via the 1935 Constitution is untenable,
for that a provision of the Ordinance appended to the 1935
Constitution (Sec. 17), which is re-enforced by Sec. 127 of the
Public Land Act of 1936 (CA 141) provides that such rights of
non-Filipinos only exist during the existence of the
Commonwealth and before the Republic of the Philippines is
established. Therefore, it is clear that US citizens can only
acquire and utilize lands of public domain via the implementation
of the Parity Amendment.
HULST V. PR BUILDERS
FACTS: Petitioner Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his spouse, both

Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with respondent
PR Builders, Inc., for the purchase of a 210-sq. m. residential
unit in respondents townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan,
Laurel, Batangas. Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission of
contract with interest, damages and attorneys fees before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) upon
respondents failure to comply with its verbal promise to
complete the project by June 1995. The complaint was then
decided in favor of Hulst, which was followed upon by a Writ of
Execution issued on August 21, 1997.
Pursuant to a subsequent Alias Writ of Execution, the Sherrif
levied on respondents 15 parcels of land. The respondent then
filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy on the ground that
the Sherrif made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised
value of the levied properties at P 6,500 per sq. m. is P
83,616,000 which is over and above the judgment award. The
said levy was then set aside pursuant to an Order.
ISSUE: W/n petitioner should be entitled to recovery despite the
Contract to Sell he entered into with respondent is void for
violating the Constitutional prohibition against aliens owning real
property in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. Sec. 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits
aliens from owning lands in the Philippines, thus the Contract to
Sell between Hulst and PR Builders is void pursuant to Article
1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code. However, void contracts such
as the one in the present case are subject to exceptions, in the
case at bar being provided in Article 1414 of the Civil Code. Such
exception allows a party to recover whatever he lost provided
that the illegal purpose of the void contract has not yet been
accomplished.
It is important to take note that the contract in question is a
Contract to Sell and not a contract of sale. Therefore ownership
is not transferred to the alien (Hulst) yet, and as an effect no
illegal purpose has been accomplished. Article 1414 therefore
finds application in the instant case.
In view of this, petitioner is entitled to recover what he has paid,
but only with respect to the amount of P 3,187,500 which was the
purchase price paid to PR Builders. Petitioner is not entitled to
damages, interests, and attorneys fees since the contract which
is the source of such is void. In addition, he is required to return
to respondent the excess of what he received from the levy
pursuant to the principle against unjust enrichment.
FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO vs. JOAQUIN TENG
QUEEN TAN, TAN TENG BIO, DOLORES TAN, ROSARIO TAN
HUA ING, and TO O. HIAP
FACTS: Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's action for
annulment of contract with damages.In 1938, petitioner Filomena
Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan,
Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving
herein respondents his widow, To O. Hiap, and children
Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and
Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the death of Tan Tai or on August
11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin, became a naturalized
Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18,
1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate
37

with sale, whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to
Joaquin.
On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of
Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935
Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs are not allowed to inherit the land
owned by Tan Tai because the sale of the land to him violated the
1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
HELD: Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an answer
to the complaint, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds of
(a) Lack of cause of action, the plaintiff being in pari delicto with
the vendee, and the land being already owned by a Philippine
citizen;
(b) Laches; and
(c) Acquisitive prescription.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining the first two
grounds invoked by the movants.Independently of the doctrine of
pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled and
recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was an
alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the
property, of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine
citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to own land. The litigated
property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no
longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Laches also militates
against petitioner's cause. She sold the disputed lot in 1938. She
instituted the action to annul the sale only on July 15, 1968. What
the Court said in the cited Sarsosa case applies with equal force
to the petitioner.
it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her
rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction of
inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting
her claim to the litigated property. Respondent, therefore, must
be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.The appealed
order is affirmed.
the Philippines.
RULING: The sale of the land in question was consummated
sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not
acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary
succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified
to acquire the land in question.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land
is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.
SC sets aside the order of reconstitution of title.
RA 9225
REPUBLIC V CA AND SPS LAPINA
FACTS: On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347
and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of
91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo
Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent
spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to
embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties
have presented their respective evidence, the court a
quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to
the lots.
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application

for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality.
FACTS: Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco,

Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,
Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to
Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designated as Lot 398
and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at
the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.
ISSUE: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a

parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen
of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA
141)?
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First
Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for
annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed
the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition
against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land,
including residential, commercial or industrial land.
Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in
RULING: In the case at bar, private respondents were

undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired
vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in
the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by
their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In
addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong
materials on the contested property, now occupied by
respondent Lapias mother.
38

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is

the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to
register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7
and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following
pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no

private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of

this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee
of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is

similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution
which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of

this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private
land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no

other law has been passed by the legislature on the same
subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in
favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine
citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at
the time they applied for registration of the properties in question,
said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the
registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already
private in character since private respondents' predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June
12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to
be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private
land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the
purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential
land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered
the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply
for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the
subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce
be approved.
MATHEWS VS TAYLOR
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into
law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of one thousand square meters, in the case of
urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to
be used by him as his residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same,
the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum
herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands
for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added to those
already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum
areas herein authorized.
FACTS: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor

(Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their
marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a
1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at ManocManoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of
P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to
a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort
were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn
ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of
Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sublease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with
respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as
lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property
for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a
39

Notary Public.
land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and

renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the
Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages
against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his
funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the
Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyns husband; any transaction involving said property
required his consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the

Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N an alien husband can nullify a lease contract

entered into by his Filipina wife bought during their marriage. NO
HELD: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not
allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save
only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and
more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own
lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled
issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional
provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular
property be declared as part of their fathers estate; that they be
reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the
name of another; that an implied trust be declared in their
(aliens) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack
of consent.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease
between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public
lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated
vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins
claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering
into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject
property was part of the conjugal/community property of the
spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality
to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his
wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion
of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a
right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
G.R. NO. L-630. NOVEMBER 15, 1947
FACTS: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot
from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December 1941. The registration
was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to
accomplish the said registration but was denied by the Register
of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and he
cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the
case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a
HELD: No. Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the

conservation and utilization of natural resources. The said
provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its
purpose is to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for
the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the
nation. Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands, the court held that in determining whether a parcel of land
is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually
agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural
purposes. Hence, public agricultural land was construed as
referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral.
Therefore, it includes residential lands (except by hereditary
succession).
(ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION PARA MAS MAINTINDIHAN)
The Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is
agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural,
but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time
the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were
classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral,
and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was
construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or
mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be
presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional
Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was
this well-known classification and its technical meaning then
prevailing.
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in
section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as
including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the
Constitution.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,
"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public
agriculture lands" under the Constitution are classified into
agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other
purposes.
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands
of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber
and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the
enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of
the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore,
acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural
public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has
been followed by our Supreme Court in much subsequent case.
Residential, commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the
public domain must have to be included in one or more of these
classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity; therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the
40

Government judicial, legislative and executive have always
maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands
include residential lots.
Scope of Private Agricultural Lands
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue
through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands.
It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public
agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens.
Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure
the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections
must, therefore, be read together for they have the same
purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the
persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are
the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
The subject matter of both sections is the
non-transferability of "agricultural land"
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes
same technical meaning should be attached
under section 5.
same, namely, the

to aliens. Since
residential lots, the
to "agricultural land
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not

including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the
result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not
only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire
subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building
homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in
appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief,
p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of
Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the
report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of
Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional
Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation.
They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the
sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2
Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.)
Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can
be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of
possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening
of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two of our most
important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when
we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence
will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we
going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in
those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.)
Approval of R.A. No. 133

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic
Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of
any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of
expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such
real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition
makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly
agricultural and private lands that are residential or commercial.
The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in
favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a
legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the
Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be
sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure
would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which
would have been deemed also permissible under the
Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that
such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such
opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify
that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely
excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary,
they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes,
Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens
may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including
residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without
costs.
EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA & PACITA W.

VALLAR vs VICTORIANO T. CUENCO
G.R. No. L-33048. April 16, 1982
FACTS: The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the
northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at
Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now
Camiguin province).
The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia
Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now
deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, who were Filipino citizens.
Epifania who was then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a
Chinese, Ong King Po who later took actual possession and
enjoyed the fruits of the property.
Ong King Po later litigated the property to Victoriano Cuenco, a
naturalized Filipino who immediately took possession of the
property.
Epifania later usurped the controverted property who later sold
one-half of the property to Pacita Vallar.
Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the property
as it was only to evidence her indebtedness to Ong King Po.
41

Cuenco then filed a case for Forcible Entry against Epifania
before the MTC which was later dismissed since the question of
possession could not be properly determined without first settling
the issue on ownership.
Cuenco later filed a case in the CFI for recovery of possession
and ownership of the said land. The CFI rendered a decision in
favor of Epifania and Vallar.
The CA later reversed the Decision decreeing instead that
Cuenco was the owner of the litigated property.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the property? CUENCO.
HELD: No private lands shall be transferred or conveyed to
aliens.
There should be no question that the sale of the land in question
in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from
the beginning, because it was a contract executed against the
mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an
expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.
Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she
could have been declared entitled to the litigated land.
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now
in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would
be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner
Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a
qualified person.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's
vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise
inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26
years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable
neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to
the litigated property.
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner
of the property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, GUILLERMO GONZALVES
G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989
FACTS: The case principally concerns Chua Kim Uy @ Teng Be,
who became a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1977.
Chua Kim was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un.
When Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, his adopted son Chua Kim,
took possession of the properties acquired by him in 1934.
Chua Kim filed a petition for the issuance of confirmation and
registration of title of the lots to his name. His petition was
granted by the CFI of Quezon.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
challenged the correctness of the Order and appealed it to the
Court of Appeals. However, CA affirmed RTCs ruling. Hence this
appeal.
Respondent contended that the conveyances to Chua Kim were

made while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to his taking oath as a
naturalized Philippine citizen on January 7, 1977, at a time when
he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the
Philippines (ART XIII, SEC. 5, 1935 Constitution; ART. XIV, Sec.
14, 1973 Constitution); hence, his asserted titles are null and
void.
ISSUE: WON the registration of the lots under the name of Chua
Kim was valid. YES
HELD: Conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his
acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization is valid .
Be this as it may, the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine
citizenship should foreclose any further debate regarding the title
to the property in controversy, in line with this Court's rulings
relative to persons similarly situated.
In Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547, for
instance, the ruling was as follows:
...The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee.
Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more
public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to
recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified
person.
The lots in question were conveyed to Gregorio Reyes Uy
Un in December 1934, so 1935 constitution is not applicable.
Plainly, the conveyances were made before the 1935
Constitution went into effect, i.e., at a time when there was no
prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands
by aliens.
Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands
thus purchased by him, and his ownership was not at all affected
either:
by the principle subsequently enunciated in the 1935
Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire lands in
the country, since that constitutional principle has no
retrospective application, or
by his and his successor's omission to procure the registration
of the property prior to the coming into effect of the
Constitution.
Chua Kim acquired the lots through succession in 1946.
Since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in San Narciso,
Quezon, in 1946, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in
continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner, as the
putative heir of his adoptive father without protest whatever from
any person.
Note: Chua Kim because a naturalized Filipino citizen only on
January 1977.
It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the property in
concept of owner, and his status as adopted son of Gregorio
Reyes, that were the factors that caused his involvement in Civil
Case No. C-385 of the CFI at Calauag, Quezon, at the instance
of the original parties thereto, 22 and his participation in the
Compromise Agreement later executed by all parties. As already
42

mentioned, that compromise agreement, approved by judgment
rendered on July 29, 1970, implicity recognized Chua Kim's title
to the lands in question.
SOCORRO VASQUEZ vs.LI SENG GIAP and LI SENG GIAP &
SONS
G.R. No. L-3676, January 31, 1955
FACTS: Vasquez sold and transferred to Li Seng Giap, then
Chinese citizen, a parcel of land together with a house in Tondo,
Manila.
In 1940: Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto Li Seng Giap &
Sons, Inc., whose shareholdings then were owned by Chinese
citizens, the property, together with the improvements thereon,
and duly registered under a TCT.
Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on 1941,
Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. is now a Filipino corporation, 96.67
per cent of its stock being owned by Filipinos, and duly
authorized by its articles of incorporation to own, acquire or
dispose of real properties.
Vasquez filed an action to rescind the sale on the ground that the
Li Seng Giap was an alien and under the Constitution incapable
to own and hold title to lands.
The Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with cost
against Vasquez.
ISSUE: WON Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. is allowed to acquire the
property. YES.
HELD: The subsequent naturalization of Giap and transfer to
a Filipino corporation cured the defect.
The majority of the Court has ruled that in Sales of real estate to
aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions
of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed
to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in
pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party.
Vasquez argued that if at the time of the conveyance of the real
property Giap was incapable of holding title to such real estate,
the contract of sale was null or void and may be annulled, and
his subsequent naturalization as a Filipino citizen cannot retroact
to the date of the conveyance to make it lawful and valid.
However, if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko
case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The
title to the parcel of land of the Giap, a naturalized Filipino
citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the
parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per
cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos.
Action for annulment not Rescission
The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon
any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil
Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion
or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment
under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II, on nullity of contracts, based
on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of

such lesion or damages.
ONG CHING PO vs CA and SOLEDAD PARIAN
G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994
FACTS: Spouses Soledad Parian and Ong Yee bought a parcel
of land in Fundidor Street, San Nicolas from Ong Joi Jong. The
transfer was in a notarized Deed of Sale and was also registered
(Exhibit A). Subsequently, Ong Yee died.
Soledad filed unlawful detainer against her brother-in-law Ong
Ching Po contending that she entrusted the administration of the
house to Ong Ching Po while the spouses were residing in Ilo-ilo
but when her husband Ong Yee died, she asked Ong Ching Po
to leave the house.
On the other hand, Ong Ching Po filed an action of
reconveyance and damages against Soledad contending that he
has the right over the land because Ong Joi Jong sold it to him.
The Deed of Sale (Exhibit B) presented by Ong Ching Po says
that the reason why the title is constituted in the name of
Soledad was that Ong Ching Po was not yet a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: Which of the two Deed of Sales has more probative
value? (Soledad Parians or Ong Ching Pos)
HELD: It is the Deed of Sale in favor of Soledad Parian that must
be given value. We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner
Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a dummy to
have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name
because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property
in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention
would be giving a high premium to a violation of our
nationalization laws.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he
was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property.
Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B"
has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary
to law.
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale presented by Soledad
Parian is duly notarized document.
Other issues:
Was the sale made with due consideration? Yes it appears
that the price for the land was paid out of Soledad Parian and
Ong Yees conjugal funds. Such transaction is a common
practice in Filipino-family affairs.
Was there delivery? Yes. Even though there was no physical
possession of the spouses because they were residing in Ilo-ilo,
under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the
sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if
from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred."
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of
German descent. He is an electrical engineer by profession, but
43

worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the
Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country
two years thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino
citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and
board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia
for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney,
for a massage where he met respondent Ederlina Catito, a
Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City.
Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was
married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany
and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found
employment as a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub. Alfred
followed Ederlina to the Philippines where they cohabited
together in a common-law relationship. During the period of their
common-law relationship, Alfred acquired in the Philippines real
and personal properties valued more or less at P724,000.00.
Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from
owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's
name would appear in the deeds of sale as the buyer of the real
properties, as well as in the title covering the same.
Alfred and Ederlina's relationship deteriorated. Alfred wrote
Ederlina's father complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life
savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He
further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the
properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded
the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had
"stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.
Alfred filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial
Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of
ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and
damages.
the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public

policy.
MULLER v. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent
Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany

from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00.
The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner

under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of
Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing,

drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for

separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ederlina.

Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to recover the property.
HELD: No. The Supreme affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. According to the Court, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he
acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than the
respondent. Petitioner is fully aware that he wasdisqualified from
acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even before he
purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the
constitutional prohibition, he had the deed of sale placed under
the respondent's name as the sole vendee thereof.
Being a party to an illegal contract, petitioner cannot come into a
court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out
because one who loses his money or property by knowingly
engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own
moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To
allow petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which

terminated the regime of absolute community of property
between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it
ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered

the assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held
that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the
44

purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer
of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners ownership
over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the
house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the major portion of

a lot which he acquired by purchase under the deed of sale in
favor of his engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino
citizen because of the Filipino citizenship of his mother and the
naturalization of his father Donato Reyes Yap.
ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the

funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of respondent

Jose A. Rico, son of maximino Rico, sold the remaining portion of
that lot to the petitioner who had his rights.
HELD: No. Respondent was aware of the constitutional

prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was
created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in
cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification
from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention
of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but
also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that
equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant
case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as

opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents
part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent
to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARAVILLAS vs.

HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA
G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983
FACTS: Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in

favor of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap who was then a
Chinese national. After the lapse of nearly fifteen years from and
after the execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato Reyes
Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen and allowed to take his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Donato Reyes Yap, has been in possession of the lots in

question since 1939, openly, publicly, continuously, and
adversely in the concept of owner until the present time.
ISSUE: WON the sale of residential lot in question to a Chinese
national is null and void in spite of the fact that the vendee had
been a naturalized born Filipino citizen.
HELD: The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee.
Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more
public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to
recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified
person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez
vs. Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons:
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but
also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko
case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations
of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
VICENTE GODINEZ vs. FONG PAK LUEN
G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983
FACTS: The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold

by their father Jose Godinez to defendant Fong Pak Luen. Said
defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his codefendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above
described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata.
Navata was aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak
Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under
the law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property;
that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said
parcel of land as purported contract of sale executed by Jose
Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non-existent.
The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does not state
a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the
property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as his
sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of
45

action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged
document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27,
1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a
result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under
Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a written
contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right
of action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November
27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30,
1966, beyond the 10-year period provided by law.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but was denied.
The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost or destroyed

certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an
approved plan and technical description.
Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of the RTC decision alleging that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the case.
The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the
proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their
predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot
because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not
qualified to own the subject land.
CA declared the reconstitution void. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.
HELD: No. Prescription may never be invoked to defend that

which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity
from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract
of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether
void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely prohibited. It is enough to
stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is
unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an
argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in
1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the
constitutional prescription was never intended to apply.
As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien

vendee later sold the same property to Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property.
Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to

own the subject property.
LEE VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. 128195 October 3, 2001
FACTS: Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee
Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situated at the corner of
Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.
In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the
RTC of Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of the lot.
(Alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to Lee Liong
was lost or destroyed during World War II.)
Petitioners Elizabeth and Pacita alleged that they were the
widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting,
who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot.
Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that the ownership of the land

had been settled in two previous cases of the Supreme Court,
where the Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest,
Lee Liong.
They also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land
through actual possession of the lot and their consistent payment
of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the
decision in the reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would
amount to circumventing the constitutional proscription against
aliens acquiring ownership of private or public agricultural lands.
ISSUES:
WON Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the
Philippines. NO
WON the reconstitution was valid. NO
HELD: Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the
lot was already acquired by Filipino citizens Lee Liong was
disqualified to acquire the land under the 1935 Constitution. The
sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in
March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire private
agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus,
Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land
in question.
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an
alien did not validate the transaction. It was still contrary to the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the
public or private domain.
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General.
This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor
General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of
reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty
years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action.
Prescription never lies against the State.
The land is now in the hands of Filipinos.
The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has
been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs,
petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the
Solicitor General does not dispute.
46

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.
As a result of a quasi-reorganization of PHILSECO to settle

its
huge obligations to PNB, the National Government's
shareholdings in PHILSECO increased to 97.41% thereby
reducing KAWASAKI's shareholdings to 2.59%.
If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently

becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.
After a series of negotiations between the APT and KAWASAKI,

they agreed that the latter's right of first refusal under the JVA be
"exchanged" for the right to top by five percent (5%) the highest
bid for the said shares. They further agreed that KAWASAKI
would be entitled to name a company in which it was a
stockholder, which could exercise the right to top.
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified

Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the
invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
On September 7, 1990, KAWASAKI informed APT that Philyards

Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right to top.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the

original certificate of title must be based on an owners duplicate,
secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to
be reconstituted.
Reconstitution was void for lack of factual support
In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical
description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This
renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support.
A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the reissuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership
of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject
of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession
of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the
issue of ownership of the land.
The SC Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
CA.
B. For Corporations
JG SUMMIT V. CA
G.R. No. 124293 January 31, 2005
FACTS: January 27, 1997 - the National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation,
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) for the
construction, operation and management of the Subic National
Shipyard, Inc. (SNS) which subsequently became the Philippine
Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the
JVA, the NIDC and KAWASAKI will contribute P330 million for
the capitalization of PHILSECO in the proportion of 60%-40%
respectively.
JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, one of the bidders objected to this right

to top agreement.
CONTENTION OF JG SUMMIT:
That a shipyard like PHILSECO is a public utility whose
capitalization must be sixty percent (60%) Filipino-owned.
Consequently, the right to top granted to KAWASAKI under the
Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the sale of the
87.67% equity of the National Government in PHILSECO is
illegal not only because it violates the rules on competitive
bidding but more so, because it allows foreign corporations to
own more than 40% equity in the shipyard.
ISSUE: WON KAWASAKI had a valid right of first refusal over
PHILSECO shares under the JVA, considering that PHILSECO
owned land until the time of the bidding and KAWASAKI already
held 40% of PHILSECOs equity. YES!
HELD: The right of first refusal is a property right of
PHILSECO shareholders, KAWASAKI and NIDC, under the
terms of their JVA. This right allows them to purchase the shares
of their co-shareholder before they are offered to a third party.
The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant this right to
each other, by itself, does not constitute a violation of the
provisions of the Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos
and Filipino corporations.
As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if PHILSECO still owns land, the
right of first refusal can be validly assigned to a qualified Filipino
entity in order to maintain the 60%-40% ratio. This transfer, by
itself, does not amount to a violation of the Anti-Dummy Laws,
absent proof of any fraudulent intent. The transfer could be made
either to a nominee or such other party which the holder of the
right of first refusal feels it can comfortably do business with.
One of its salient features is the grant to the parties of the

right of first refusal should either of them decide to sell, assign
or transfer its interest in the joint venture.
Alternatively, PHILSECO may divest of its landholdings, in

which case KAWASAKI, in exercising its right of first refusal,
can exceed 40% of PHILSECOs equity. In fact, it can even be
said that if the foreign shareholdings of a landholding corporation
exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign stockholders ownership of the
shares which is adversely affected but the capacity of the
corporation to own land that is, the corporation becomes
disqualified to own land. This finds support under the basic
corporate law principle that the corporation and its stockholders
are separate juridical entities.
November 25, 1986 - NIDC transferred all its rights, title and
interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
In this vein, the right of first refusal over shares pertains to the
shareholders whereas the capacity to own land pertains to the
47

corporation. Hence, the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot
deprive stockholders of their right of first refusal.
No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a
landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed
foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from
owning land.
REGISTER OF DEEDS RIZAL VS. UNG SUI SI TEMPLE
G.R. No. L-6776
May 21, 1955
FACTS: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused
to accept for record a deed of donation executed in due form
by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of
residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal in favor of the unregistered
religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through
three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly
accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and
deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf
of the latter and its trustees.
When elevated, the lower court upheld the decision by saying
that appearing from the record that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a
religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and
administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the
opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions of the
sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the
Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its
citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens
adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the
Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question
should not be admitted for admitted for registration. Hence, this
appeal.
inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign

nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is
obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to
acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be
controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands
that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership
should be composed of Filipino citizens. To permit religious
associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural
lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien
religious land holdings in this country.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO VS. LRC
G.R. NO. L-8451
DECEMBER 20, 1957
FACTS: Mateo Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of Davao
City, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in Davao City in
favour of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao,
Inc. (RCAAD Inc.). RCAAD, Inc. is a corporation sole organized
in accordance with Philippine laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian national, as actual incumbent (or administrator).
The Register of Deeds (ROD) Davao required the said
corporation to submit an affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of
the members thereof are Filipino Citizens for purposes of
registration. In the required affidavit, RCAADI Inc. said that the
totality of the Catholic Population of Davao would become the
owner of the property bought to be registered.
ROD being doubtful as to the registerability of the land, the
matter was referred to the Land Registration Commission (LRC).
ISSUE: WON a deed of donation of a parcel of land

executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder,
trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be
registered or not.
After proper hearing, LRC rendered a resolution holding that

the vendee RCAADI Inc. was not qualified to acquire private
lands in the Philippines in the absence of conformity to the
constitutional requirement of at least 60% of the capital,
property, or assets belonging to a Filipino Citizen, as postulated
under Sections 1 and 5 of Article 8 of the Constitution. That it is
not owned by the Filipino Citizens but rather the only
incumbent Msgr. Thibault who is a Canadian Citizen, hence, the
denial of registration of the subject property to ROD Davao.
HELD: NO. The Constitution makes no exception in favor of

religious associations.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but later denied.

Subsequently, an action for mandamus before the SC is filed.
The Constitution provides that Save in cases of hereditary

succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.
RCAAD Inc. alleges that under the Corporation Law as well as

the settled jurisprudence on the matter, petitioner is qualified
to acquire private lands for the establishment and
maintenance of places of worship. That by acquiring private
lands, the petitioner is not considered the owner but rather a
mere administrator. That there are more than 80% of Filipino
Citizens who are Roman Catholic in Davao as per the Bureau of
Census records which signifies that the mentioned constitutional
requirement has been fully satisfied.
Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of

Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural
lands and other natural resources to "corporations
or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines).
The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to
ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire
agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled
by Filipinos.
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no
capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional
On the other hand, respondent averred that though the

petitioner does not own the land, yet he has control over
the same. With full power to administer, alienate, encumber,
and sell or dispose of thereby exercising all rights of ownership
on the property. Also, respondents say that a conglomeration of
people cannot just be pointed out as the recipient
beneficiaries of the Catholic Church. This set-up, according to
the petitioners, falls short of trust.
48

ISSUE: WON the petitioner RCAADI Inc. is qualified to own
private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the
provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution? YES
HELD: Under the circumstances of the present case, it is
safe to state that even before the establishment of the Phil.
Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every
corporation sole (special form of corporation usually associated
with clergy)then organized and registered had by express
provision of law, the Corporation Law or Public Act No. 1459, the
necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name
private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its
functions or ministry. A corporation sole is created not only to
administer church properties but also to hold and transmit
the same to his successor in said office.
That the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church of the Constitution
has no nationality and did not have in mind the religious
corporation sole when they provided that 60% of the capital
thereof be owned by Filipino Citizens.
Thus, if this constitutional provision were not intended for
corporation sole, it is obvious that this could not be
regulated or restricted by said provision.
Corporation soles cannot be considered aliens because they
have no nationality at all. In determining, therefore, whether the
constitutional provision requiring 60 % Filipino capital is
applicable to corporations sole, the nationality of the constituents
of the diocese, and not the nationality of the actual incumbent of
the parish, must be taken into consideration. In the case at bar,
even
if
the question of nationality be considered, the
aforementioned constitutional requirement is fully met and
satisfied considering that the corporation sole in question
(RCAAD Inc.) is composed of an overwhelming majority of
Filipinos.
With these, the LRC resolution which holds that the petitioner
corporation sole is not qualified to acquire private land is hereby
reversed. The ROD is ordered to register the deed of sale
subject of the litigation.
UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES, as

owner of BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL vs. HON.
JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, as Presiding Judge of
the CFI of Davao del Norte, and MELENCIO B. DELENA and
MAURO GEMENTIZA as Co-Executors of the Testate Estate
of DAVID, Jacobson
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been
a resident of the Philippines for more than thirty years and up to
the time of his death in 1970. He left a will in which he "devised
and bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of
his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua Plantation Co., inc. which
was incorporated under Philippine law in 1948. This corporation
was the registered owner of a tract of land in Pantuhan Davao
del Norte, with a total area of about 445 hectares acquired by
virtue of a sales patent issued to it in 1953.
Judge Sebastian disallowed the above-described legacy on the
ground that it was in effect an alienation of private agricultural
land in favor of a transferee which was not qualified under the

Constitution of 1935. The finding was that the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital was owned by the United Church Board for
World Ministries (UCBWM) which was a non-stock corporation
organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by
the state legislature of Massachussets .
The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of the
1935 Constitution, which barred foreigners, including Americans,
from acquiring agricultural lands in this country except only by
hereditary succession.
United Church came to this Court, contending that the
constitutional provisions were not applicable because the object
of the legacy was not land but shares of stocks. Moreover, even
assuming that what was really involved was a transfer of land,
the petitioner was nonetheless qualified to acquire it under the
provisions of the Parity Amendment and the Laurel-Langley
Agreement.
The Solicitor General disagreed at first, insisting that the legacy
was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution and did not come under
any of the allowed exceptions. During the protracted exchange of
pleadings among the parties, however, certain events transpired
to considerably change the original situation and, consequently,
also the position of government.
The documents submitted in this case that at the time the will
was executed in 1966, the land on which the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital was situated was already registered in the
name of the Mindanao District Conference, an affiliate of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines (PUCC). It was this
non-stock corporation, organized in 1949 under Philippine law
with a 100% Filipino membership, that owned and was operating
the Hospital at the time of Jacobson's death. Later, the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself incorporated as a
charitable institution, with Filipinos constituting the majority of its
membership, and on December 16,1970, became the successorin-interest of the UCCP to the devised parcel of land.
To prove these Brokenshire presented the articles of
incorporation of the UCCP and the Hospital and their
corresponding certificates of registration issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the licenses issued by the Board of
Medical Sciences for the operation of the Hospital to the UCCP
from 1968 to 1972 and to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital,
Inc. from 1973 to 1974, and the certificate of title over the subject
land in the name of the "Mindanao District Conference,
commonly known as the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital."
These facts were not brought earlier to the attention of the
probate court by the former counsel of the Hospital, Atty. Juan V.
Faune for reasons that do not appear in the record. It was for
such
omission
(the
new
counsel
would
call
it
"misrepresentation") that Atty. Faune was replaced by Atty.
Rodolfo D. de la Cruz, who disavowed his predecessor's
representations. At any rate, the above-stated documents have
now made it clear that the United Church for Christ in the
Philippines and not the United Church Board for World Ministries
was the owner of the Hospital at the time of the execution of the
win in 1966 and of the testator's death in 1970. It is also not
disputed that such ownership passed to the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital itself upon its incorporation in 1970 when it
thus became the proper party-in-interest to claim the property
directly devised by Jacobson to it.
49

ISSUE: May Brokenshire be registered as the owner? YES

HELD: Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the
owner of the Hospital at the time of the effectivity of the will and
that the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the defect in
the will should be deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of
the property to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our
consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a ctitizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Thus,in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, where a Filipino
citizen sold her land to an alien who later sold it to a Filipino, we
held that the invalidity of the initial transfer to the alien was
corrected by the subsequent transfer of the property to a citizen.
A similar ruling was made in Godinez v. Fong Pak Luen,
involving a similar set of facts, where we also cited Vasquez v. Li
Seng Giap, and Herrera v. Luy King Guan. In Yap v. Maravillas,
we validated the sale of agricultural land to an alien who, after
the purchase, was naturalized as a Filipino and so became
qualified to acquire it. The facts were slightly different in De
Castro v. Teng, where, upon the death of an alien who had
purchased a residential lot, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial
partition of his estate and transferred the land to one of his sons
who was a naturalized Filipino. We also sustained the sale.
WHEREFORE, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. is hereby
substituted for the United Church Board for World Ministries as
petitioner in this case and DECLARED to be qualified to accept
the legacy of the late David Jacobson. The petition as thus
modified is GRANTED. The order of the respondent judge dated
December 9, 1971, and his Resolution dated December 9, 1971,
are SET ASIDE. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.
NATURE OF DUTY TO ISSUE DECREE: MINISTERIAL
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA,
ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS,
REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA
GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA
GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S.
GOMEZ (now deceased) represented by his wife, LETICIA Y.
GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB,
JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN
Y. GOMEZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G.
ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila,
and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original
Registration, Land Registration Commission, Quezon City,
Metro Manila
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that
12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez.
Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited
by Jose Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the
property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the

application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On
August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final
and executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office (GLRO) to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the
12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was
already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law,
land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the
subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverios
recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land
Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has become
final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the
Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the
decree of registration and certificate of title. That once the
judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree
of registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on
approving the adjudication even after it had became final
and executory. YES
2. Whether or not the respondents Acting Land Registration
Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of
Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, have
no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration
pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order for
issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do
so being purely ministerial. NO
HELD:
1. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration
of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
The Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has
not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now
NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated
and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
2. Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration
officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial
in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and
with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion
in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their
duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect,
as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and
their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called
upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral
land registration proceedings .
REPUBLIC V NILLAS
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
50

FACTS: On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas
(Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.
On 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros
Oriental rendered a decision, acting as a cadastral court,
adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements
thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their
title to their respective lots and their continuous possession
thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the
decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. One
of these lots was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion and
Engracia Calingacion.
Nillas parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, by way of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, acquired the said lot through various
purchases they effected from the Eugenia and her heirs between
the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by
three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the
Spouses Abierra.
In turn, Nillas acquired the lot from her parents through a Deed of
Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite the rendition of the 1941
CFI Decision, no decree of registration has ever been issued.
Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration.
On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding merit in
the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the
1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding
decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941
Decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by
motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special"
proceedings such as land registration cases.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription
and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes
that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon
judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues. Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be
enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.
ISSUE: WON prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive
a judgment in a land registration case. NO (What is the nature of
duty to issue Decree? Ministerial.)
HELD: NO, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and instead
affirmed the assailed rulings of the lower courts.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary
civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not
expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by
some other specific law or legal modality such as land
registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration
proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of
land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary
proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact.

Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such
ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision
and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land
registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue,
the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree
(PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of
final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the
contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not
specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense
ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being
there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of
execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration
cases in the first place.
Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure that
interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the
issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is
imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor
even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The
obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court
(that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of
registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the
judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of
the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the
Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on
the officers charged with their performance and thus
generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their
part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the
prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of
such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate
goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final
and definitive determination of real property ownership in the
country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner
after the judgment in the land registration case had attained
finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property
Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration
cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to
be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not
have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the
purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within
which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is
xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or enforced against the
adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk
to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor
has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in
whom the land is ordered to be registered.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing
that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred
51

subsequent attacks to the adjudicates title over the subject
property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate
as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued,
which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final
decisions status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its
very own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often
invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different case
altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republics
arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding
that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the
standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay
incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its
effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the
prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner
to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that Nillas
needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the
original adjudicates her predecessors-in-interest-in order to
entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of
the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in
interest. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not
offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof.
1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will

run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of
registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a
mere ministerial act which may be compelled through
mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a
decree of registration.
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial

function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held inValmonte
and Jacinto vs. Nable:
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or

cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before
the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of
amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where
the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation
therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to
fit the said decision.
As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48
Phil., 227, 234:
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented

by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR. vs. LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
PANGANIBAN, J:
FACTS: Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A

which was approved by the trial court. Upon motion of
petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to
issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the
LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which sought
to be registered by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No. 3, over which
TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand,
Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de
Buenaflor, which was issued as a transfer from TCT No. 6595.
The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding decree of
registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration
system, and destroy the integrity of the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by
mandamus to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that
the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens
certificate of title? NO
HELD: NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the
name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second
decree for the same land would be null and void, since the
principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land
only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are
seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration

must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the
certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical
description of the land. This requires trained technical
men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a
parcel of land included in an application are ordered
registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be
entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law
very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land
Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code,
section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by

the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the
administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly
be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of
the General Land Registration Office acts not as an
administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an
administrative one .
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not
compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving
the exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be
awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the performance
of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right
is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a
matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious,
objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded.
But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt
or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
52

A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a

question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to
decide for or against one of the parties. As stated earlier, a
judicial act is not compellable by mandamus. The court has to
decide a question according to its own judgment and
understanding of the law.
It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of
registration.
However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this
Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its
study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the
property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report
thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of
this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate
speed according to the facts and the law.
Case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The

LRA, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a
quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included
in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days
from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration
court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the
decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as
herein discussed.
REMEDIES
HEIRS OF MANUEL ROXAS VS CA
FACTS: Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for

Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in
Tagaytay. In support of its application for registration they
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990,
executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor who bought the property
from Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months
earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990
and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration
Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna while Trinidad
de Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified because she was not
named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant.
Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record
Newsweekly. After an Order of general default was issued, the
trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case.
On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels of
land had previously been applied for registration at the CFI of
Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision
has been made.
February 13, 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's
application for registration. Consequently RTC issued the Order
for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after it ordered
the application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon

dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked
to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas
learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun
Corporation's name. Hence, she filed a petition for review before
the RTC to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that
Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud, alleging that her
signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun Corporation intentionally
omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining
owner in the application for registration submitted to the LRA,
such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing
RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud and
dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April
15, 1992.
CA affirmed the findings of RTC, ruling that Roxas failed to and
demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely
constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of
annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Was there actual fraud on the part of Maguesun Corp. to
warrant the reopening and the setting aside of the registration
decree?
HELD: The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corp.
committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration
sought to be reviewed by Roxas.
Actual Fraud; Defined.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive
fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means
of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.
Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an
actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded
as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved
in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud
were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to
the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or
extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to
be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened
and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case
(Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes
an intentional omission of fact required by law.
Intentional Omission of Name
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the RTC
only the following names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon
Luna, Provincial Road. The court found that the some words are
53

typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the
word "provincial" typed over correction fluid.
However, Maguesun Corporation, annexed a differently-worded
application for the petition to review the application of the Roxas
where in instead of PROVINCIAL ROAD, the name ROXAS
appeared.The discrepancy which is unexplained appears
intentional.
It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court
into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application
as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the
same application which formed the basis for the LRA in sending
out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the
full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those
of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the
search made to find them. Maguesun Corporation failed to
comply with this requirement.
Possession in OCENO
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the
property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.
Maguesun Corporation also that the subject land was
unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker
resided in the subject property. Maguesun Corporation is likewise
charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy,
for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property,
knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a
buyer to have inspected the property prior to the sale such that
the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could
have been made facilely.
Maguesun
Corporation
intentional
concealment
and
representation of Roxas interest in the subject lots as possessor,
occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the
reopening and review of the decree of registration.
Concealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas
Mention of the late President's name as well as that of Trinidad
was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for
Maguesun Corporations tax declarations and as predecessor-ininterest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the
law requires to be stated in the application for registration.
Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and
possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the
time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons
concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will,
therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or
claims.
Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper
of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural
requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of
procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as
possible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in the
land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified
thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact
that publication was not made in a newspaper of general
circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's
right or title to the land.
Forgery and Discrepancies

A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the
irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the
case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun
Corporation's direct participation in the execution and
preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia
which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent
purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample
signatures in several documents executed by Trinidad. The
questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have none
of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures
characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the
general public, as well as the demise of the late President on
April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field,
Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to
have been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit,
there is no reason why she should state facts other than the
unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.
HEIRS OF ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118436 March 21, 1997
FACTS: On July 2, 1990, Maguesun Management and

Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an
Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land.
In support of its application for registration, Maguesun
Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10,
1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the
purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn,
bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad
de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months
earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990
and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration

Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Authority or NALTDRA) to 3 parties on the basis of Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon
vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant
or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the
proceedings. Publication was made. After an Order of general
default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration
Authority reported, among other things, that the subject parcels
of land had previously been applied for registration in Land
Registration Case by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but
no decision has been rendered thereon. Eventually, on February
13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration.
54

Consequently, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case

applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked
to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas
learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun
Corporation's name.
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review

before the Regional Trial Court, to set aside the decree of
registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed
actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties
she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A.
Roxas, and that her family had been in open, continuous,
adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in
the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they
applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land
titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida
Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature
was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number
of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In
addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that
Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an
adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application
for registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such
that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As a
result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petion for review of the registration

may be granted.
HELD: YES. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens

System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws
relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a
registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of
the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under
the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another party. Absence,
minority or other disability of any person affected, or any
proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered
grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529)
as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of
registration. It is further required that a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration be filed within one year from
the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and
dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to
an innocent purchaser.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive

fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means
of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. 19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an
actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded

as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved
in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud
were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to
the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or

extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to
be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened
and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case
(Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes
an intentional omission of fact required by law. For fraud to justify
a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the
facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or
resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their
opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are
entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation

committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration
sought to be reviewed by petitioner.
Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation

intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as
having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the
property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose
Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in
number 5 of the same application that the subject land was
55

unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker
resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation's
intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's
interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant
constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the
decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas
family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving
their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.
provided that no innocent purchaser for value will be injured

thereby.
ESCONDE vs.DELFIN
G.R. No. L-67583, July 31, 1987
TIONGCO vs. DE LA MERCED

G.R. No. L-24426 July 25, 1974
FACTS: Petitioner Tiongco and the other claimants of the lots in

question were deprived of their rights without due process of law,
through the fraudulent machinations of deputy clerk of court
Pascual Cando. There was in that case a pronouncement by this
Court, that even if a decree in a cadastral proceeding is infected
with nullity in view of a clear denial of procedural due process,
still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title
issued in pursuance thereof is protected. The best that could be
is to stress what was considered its obiter aspect. That does not
suffice, for the reference to the rights vested in an innocent
purchaser for value is based on express statutory language,
allowing the filing of a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest.
ISSUE: Whether under the circumstance of there being an

innocent purchaser for value, there could still be a review of a
decree of registration?
FACTS: Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in

the "Application for Registration of Title". The application was
granted in a "Decision", and private respondent received copy
thereof on the same date. Said parcel of land is now covered by
an OCT .On February 13, 1978 said private respondent Ramon
filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses
Francisco and Basilisa Esconde.The petitions filed a motion to
quash which was then denied.
On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second

alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to
turn over possession of the premises to private respondent and
the same was granted in the Order of November 21, 1983.
Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino M. Constantino of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold
in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on
the ground that they have filed a civil action for reconveyance.
ISSUE: May the action for reconveryance prosper?

HELD: No. A decree of registration secured through fraud is
valid, although annulable, upon petition filed within one (1) year
after entry of the decree, in the absence of an innocent
purchaser for value, whereas a decision rendered without notice
to the parties of record is void for lack of due process.
Indeed, acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can

deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial
proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the
same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary
notwithstanding." Nonetheless, the next paragraph was explicit
on the point that the reopening on the ground of fraud was
predicated on "no innocent purchaser for value [being] injured
thereby." Thus: "Now then, if a decree issued in pursuance of
a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within (1)
year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that
the same, if entered in compliance with a decision suffering from
a fatal infirmity, for want of due process, may be reviewed, set
aside and cancelled upon petition filed within the same period,
HELD: An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable

remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for
the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the
land to him. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a
landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action,
after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the
reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does
not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set
aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person
who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the
real owner thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance
does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to
transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the
rightful owner.
56

Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that
reconveyance is not the proper remedy. As earlier stated, there
was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the
proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud
had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period
of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long
expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land
should be adjudicated to the registered owner.
Moreover, petitioner's action for reconveyance had already

prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real property on the
ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken
place from the issuance of an original certificate of title.
that since they are also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are
entitled to their respective shares over the land in question.
Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved unavailing since
private respondents ignored petitioners' demands.
In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now

joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for
"Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial
court alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private
respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father
in making him execute the said documents.
In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's

action was already barred by the statute of limitations since the
same should have been filed within four years from the date of
discovery of the alleged fraud.
MARQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
ISSUE: Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.
FACTS: During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr.

and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1)
Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel;
(6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10)
Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio. Sometime in 1945, the
spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square
meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly described
in TCT No. 47572, 1wherein the constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in

1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication"
vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property described in
TCT No. 47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled
and TCT No. 33350 2 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed

a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land described in
TCT No. 33350, as well as the house constructed thereon to
three of this children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2)
Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the
exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. As a result of
the donation, TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572
was issued in private respondents' name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual

possession of the land. However, when petitioners learned about
the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded
HELD: It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952;

thus, succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil
Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her
legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent therein,
and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael
Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property by
executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the
sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another,

misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir
of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and
managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his
name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was
established. Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to
prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence,
obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold. Prescinding from the
foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the
petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court of Appeals?
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based

on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the isuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purpose
of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT
No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus,
considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May
57

31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that
prescription had not yet barred the action.
LINZAG VS CA
FACTS: Jose Linzag and the heirs of Cristobal A. Linzag are
members of the non-Christian tribe known as the Kalagan tribe of
Mati, Davao Oriental.
Jose and Cristobal claim to have inherited from their deceased
parents, a parcel of land, otherwise known as Waniban Island,
part of the Mati Cadastre
At the cadastral azproceeding Cristobal filed his claim over said
Lot. Another claimant, one Patricio Cunanan, likewise filed a
claim. Salvador filed a motion to award the Lot as an
uncontested lot, in his favor and alleged that he had acquirepd
the rights of Cunanan and that Cristobal had withdrawn his
answer/claim in favor of Cunanan (said to be acquired through
fraud)
The cadastral court, declared that Salvador and his
predecessors-in-interests had been in peaceful, OCEA
possession of the Lot in concept of an owner for a period of at
least 30 years; that Salvador was the successor-in-interest of
original claimant Cunanan; and that the lot was a non-contested
lot.
4 February 1977- filed an action for annulment of title and
reconveyance with damages (dismissed) (Civil Case No. 571)
The Linzags filed an amended complaint wherein they alleged
that they and their predecessors-in-interests had been in actual,
lawful, peaceful, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession
and occupation of the land since the Spanish regime up to the
present; the lot was ancestral land of the Linzags; the lot had
been included in a prior land registration case filed by Cunanan
which was decided against him, with the land registration court
holding that the land was part of the public domain,
The Linzags filed with the CA, a petition for the annulment of
judgment (bar CA-G.R. SP No. 35877)
CA dismissed the petition for being barred by the previous
judgment on ground of res judicata.
The petition for review with the SC was not filed within the
extension period granted to the petitioners. the SC issued a
Resolution stating that no appeal was taken on time by the
petitioners and the judgment had already become final and
executory
ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred when it dismissed the petition for
the annulment of judgment. NO.
2. WON the an action for annulment of judgment was the proper
remedy against the challenged decision of the CA. NO.
HELD:
1. Reason why the annulment of judgment should be
dismissed
The claim of petitioners that the judgment in Civil Case No. 571
does not bar CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 because the former was for
annulment of title only, while the latter was for annulment of the
judgment, is palpably unmeritorious
the first three requirements for the application of the doctrine
of res judicata are present in this case.
An action is barred by a former judgment if (1) the former

judgment is final; (2) the court which rendered it has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment
on the merits; (4) there must be, between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action.
1.) The judgment in Civil Case ( the annulment case) having
already become final as pronounced in the Supreme Court
Resolution, the first requirement for the application of res
judicata is, therefore, present.
2.) The CFI of Davao Oriental undoubtedly has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.
3.) The judgment was on the merits as it was rendered after a
determination of which party is right and was not merely based
on a preliminary or technical issue. A reading of the decision of
the TC shows that it was based on matters of substance and not
merely on technical points.
4.) There is also an identity between the parties in this petition
and that in Civil Case 571. The petitioners in this case, Jose
Linzag and the Heirs of Cristobal Linzag are likewise the plaintiffs
in Civil Case 571. The defendants in Civil Case 571 are also the
private respondents in this case.
The subject matter between the two cases are also identical. It
is the parcel of land known as Waniban Island in Mati, Davao
Oriental and the certificate of title covering such property.
B) the remedy of annulment of judgment allowed in Section

9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 was no longer available to petitioners.
Such is available only where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioners.
Here, petitioners had, in fact, availed of an action for
reconveyance where they litigated the grounds for annulment of
judgment. There would be no end to litigations if parties who
have unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies
or lost them through their fault would still be heard in an action to
annul the judgment.
2.) The Proper Remedy
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA
in an action to annul a judgment of a RTC is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, where only questions of law may be
raised.
Petitioners, however, have availed of the special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
No special reasons exist in this case to justify resort to Rule 65.
A. Res Judicata
58

Under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment complained of,
while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. It is
likewise settled that, generally, the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 will not be allowed as a substitute for
failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45 or for the
lost remedy of appeal.
The wrong choice of remedy thus provides another reason to

dismiss this petition.
PEOPLE VS CAINGLET
FACTS: On December 13, 1962 Wilfredo G. Cainglet was

prosecuted before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Sur for falsification of public and/or official documents in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2230 and 2231 under two informations which we
quote hereunder:
That on or about April 22, 1959, in the municipality of Ipil,
province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and in other places
with in the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, Wilfredo G. Cainglet, a private individual, in order to
deceive the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in
rendering a decision in Cadastral Case No. N-19, LRC Cad. Rec.
No. N-184, declaring Lot No. 8492, Pls-248 and its
improvements as the private property of the herein accused,
through false and fraudulent representations, did then and there
ilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with full knowledge of the falsity
of its contents, prepare and/or caused to be prepared the
hereinbelow described document, to wit:
Judicial Form No. 106, otherwise known as an Answer under
Section 9 of Act No. 2259, duly subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Andres Bersales, a person duly authorized by law
to administer oath, wherein the accused deliberately made the
following untruthful statement of facts: (1) That he is the owner of
Lot No. 8492, Pls-248; (2) That he is the owner of the buildings
and improvements existing on the land; (3) That he has been in
possession of said land as owner for over 3 years; (4) That the
said land was acquired by occupation and purchase from a
predecessor-in-interest; (5) That his predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession thereof for almost thirty (30) years; (6) That
there is no person having interest to the said land; which
allegation of facts as contained in the above-mentioned
document are necessary and essential, as required under
Section 9 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act,
in order that any person claiming to have an interest on the land
subject of the cadastral proceedings, may present his claim and
thus preventing the Court from declaring the land as public land;
CONTENTION OF CAINGLET
Cainglet moved to quash the afore-quoted informations on the
ground that they contain averments, which if true, would
constitute an excuse or justification, invoking Section 2(g) of Rule
133 of the Rules of Court.1 The averments referred to consist in
the statements in the informations that in Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur declared Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 with
improvements thereon to be the private properties of Wilfredo G.
Cainglet. Such judicial pronouncement which has become final,
as can be inferred from the information, allegedly runs counter to
the charge that accused falsely claimed said real estate to be his
own private properties.
ISSUE: WON the final judgment in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC
Cadastral Record No. N-184 declaring Wilfredo G. Cainglet
owner of Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 bars his subsequent
prosecution for falsely stating in his answers in said Cadastral
Case that he possessed and owned Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492?
NO
HELD: It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in
a cadastral proceeding a proceeding in rem is binding and
conclusive upon the whole world, reason is that public policy and
public order demand not only that litigations must terminate at
some definite point but also that titles over lands under the
Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends
the stability of the countrys economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium.
However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the registration of
lands is not absolute. It admits of exceptions. Public policy also
dictates that those unjustly deprived of their rights over real
property by reason of the operation of our registration laws be
afforded remedies. Thus, the aggrieved party may file a suit for
reconveyance of property2 or a personal action for recovery of
damages against the party who registered his property through
fraud,3 or in case of insolvency of the party who procured the
registration through fraud, an action against the Treasurer of the
Philippines for recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund.4
Through these remedial proceedings, the law, while holding
registered titles indefeasible, allows redress calculated to prevent
one from enriching himself at the expense of others. Necessarily,
without setting aside the decree of title, the issues raised in the
previous registration case are relitigated, for purposes of
reconveyance of said title or recovery of damages.
In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute
for perjury the party who obtains registration through fraud, such
as by stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of
applicants in cadastral proceedings. For Section 116 of the Land
Registration Act states:
SEC. 116. Whoever knowingly swears falsely to any statement

required to be made under oath by this Act shall be guilty of
perjury and liable to the penalties provided by laws for perjury.
TRANSFEREE FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH
ARGUELLES VS TIMBANCAYA
FACTS: Defendant Guillermo Timbancaya appeals directly and

on purely questions of law the decision of Palawan CFI. The trial
court ruled that the property, subject of plaintiffs action for
reconveyance and by virtue of a compromise agreement and
judgment in Special Proceedings No. 211, was owned jointly
59

one-half thereof by Caridad Arguelles and the other half by
Guillermo and Alberto Timbancaya.
During the special proceedings for Intestate Estate of Jose

Arguelles, the court rendered a decision, in conformity with a
compromise agreement, adjudicating one half of the land to
Arguelles and the other half to the Timbancayas. It also ordered
both parties to pay for the coconut trees planted in their
respective portions of the land, which they relinquish in favor of
the other.
owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights
of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. This
remedy is distinct from that authorized by Section 38, which has
for its purpose the reopening of the decree of title, on the ground
of fraud, within 1 year from its issuance. Judgment appealed
from affirmed.
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
Contrary to the agreement and judgment in the special

proceedings however, Timbancaya was able to have the original
certificate of title cancelled and have a new CT issued in his
favor covering the whole land (June 5, 1961), despite Arguelles
actual open and continuous possession of one half of the
property even before the filing of the special proceedings.
Upon knowing the issuance of the TCT, Arguelles filed the instant
case for reconveyance (April 30, 1965). Timbancaya, for his part,
alleges that Arguelles has no right to the property in question
because she is not an heir of the estate of the late Jose
Arguelles despite the decision in the special proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N TCT had already become indefeasible, since almost

four years have lapsed before action was filed
RULING: No. The rule that a decree of registration once issued

becomes final and incontrovertible 1 year after its issuance is not
relevant to the case at bar.
Arguelles does not question the validity of the OCT but instead
seeks the annulment of the TCT, which was issued to
Timbancaya after the judgment by compromise and based on his
misrepresentation in the Register of Deeds. Timbancaya had
claimed that he and his brother are the exclusive owners of the
property as the only legitimate children and surviving heirs of
(their) parents Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyesa
representation contrary to his previous admissions that they are
not the legitimate children of the deceased Spouses Jose
Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, but the sons of Rufina de los
Reyes with her first husband, Joaquin Timbancaya.
In this case, the action to annul the title or action for

reconveyance has its basis in Section 55 of Act 496, which
provides that in all cases of registration procured by fraud the
A.
Voluntary dealings
B.
Involuntary Dealings
MAMUYAC VS ABENA
FACTS: Gregoria PIMENTEL was the owner of the 2 parcels of

land in LA UNION she sold and conveyed on June 1, 1926, to
Pedro ABENA. On January 27, 1927, Pimentel again sold and
conveyed the same parcels to Tiburcio MAMUYAC.
The document of sale, in favor of Abena was duly inscribed in the
registry of property of the province on January 31, 1927, and
from April, 1927, said parcels of land were declared for taxation
in the name said Abena.
The document executed in favor of the Mamuyac on January 27,
1927, was neither inscribed in the registry of property nor were
the parcels of the land declared for taxation in the name of the
latter.
Mamuyac instituted an action against Abena for the recovery of
the parcels of land but both trial court and CA favored Abena.
ISSUE: Who has better rights over the property.
HOLDING: ABENA.
Alleged Contract of Mortgage in favor of Mamuyac
Mamuyac contends that he has a better right over the parcels of
land involved because of possession claimed by him by virtue of
an alleged private contract of mortgageexecuted in his favor on
January 4, 1935. It is sufficient answer to this contention that "in
order that a mortgage may be deemed to be legally constituted, it
is indispensable that the instrument in which it appears be a
public document and be recorded in the property register.
Therefore, a mortgage in legal form was not constituted by said
private document." Even were we to accord validity to the
mortgage, article 1473 of the Civil Code, invoked by him, applies
only to the determination of presence between sale and sale.
60

Mamuyacs alleged possession vs. Abenas registered Deed
of Sale
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, thatMamuyachad
been in possession of said properties by reason of the alleged
contract of mortgage executed in his favor, on January 4, 1925,
and were to accord legal effect to the document of sale of
January 27, 1927, which was not recorded in the registry of
property, still his right cannot prevail over that of Abena who had
duly registered his deed of sale.
No actual delivery to Abena
Mamuyacs contention that Abena's ownership and preference
over the property in question is not complete because of lack of
material delivery of the possession to him by the vendor is not
well taken, for the reason that the execution of the public
document of sale in favor of Abenais equivalent to the delivery of
the realty sold.
CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES F. ARAGON vs. EMILIA E.
DE LEGARE and COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This is an action for annulment of certain deeds of sale
and conveyance covering a parcel of land, together with the
improvements existing thereon, situated in the municipality of
San Juan, province of Rizal, and for damages.
Emilia E. de Legare, was the owner of a parcel of land, together
with a residential house erected thereon, situated at No. 146 Sta.
Mesa Boulevard Extension, San Juan, Rizal, her ownership
being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21253,
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of
Rizal. This property was mortgage to a secure a loan in favor of
Tomas Soriano which is properly annotated in the title.
At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 29, 1953, while in
her house an unknown man intruded into the room, approached
the plaintiff, covered her mouth, and, pressing a knife on her
side, demanded that she give him P10,000.00 if she did not like
to be killed. John Legare her adopted son concluded that, that
man was a huk afraid of their lives John had Emilia and their
maid signed a piece of document. John said that the document is
a letter concerning some compensation she was to receive from
the Veterans Administration. Since she could not read though
she can wife signed the said paper and so as their made. After
which John instructed them to pack up their things and that they
will live in a hotel for the meantime for safety reason.
After a month of staying in a hotel she Emilia decide to go back
to her house and only to find out that there were already people
living there.
It turned out that John had sold the property to herein petitioners.
The piece of paper that she signed was a deed of sale in favour
of John.
John had the title transferred to his name and subsequently
transferred to herein petitioner with full knowledge of the
encumbrances and only after john had the title transferred to his
name then the petitioner paid for the purchase price.
ISSUE: Were the herein petitioners purchasers in good faith and
for value of the properties here contested? Yes
RULING: A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of

another, without notice that some other persons has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Good
faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another.
It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon its
face, and no one would have questioned its authenticity since it
was duly acknowledged before a notary public. Moreover, even if
the petitioners had the opportunity to compare the signature of
the respondent on the deed of conveyance with a specimen of
her genuine signature, the effort, nonetheless, would have been
in vain since the respondent's signature on the document was
admittedly hers. Lastly, it should not be overlooked that the
respondent, during the whole period of the negotiation, was
nowhere available to confirm or deny the execution of the deed.
She was then in hiding, or, hidden, at the Windsor Hotel in
Manila.
The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners
themselves could hardly have been wanting. The records show
that they did not rely solely and fully upon the deed of sale in
favor of John W. Legare and the fact that John had then in his
possession the corresponding certificate of title of the registered
owner. They demanded more. They insisted that the sale in favor
of John W. Legare be first registered and that the transfer in their
favor be thereafter likewise registered. It was only after all these
were complied with that they paid the purchase price. In other
words, the petitioner spouses relied not really on the documents
exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but, on the registerability of
those documents. This in Our view, satisfies the measure of
good faith contemplated by law.
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was
fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a
registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which he
subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have
indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and
conveys no title (Director of Lands v. Addison, 49 Phil. 19).
However, we have also laid down the doctrine that there are
instances when such a fraudulent document may become the
root of valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of
title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to
the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the
vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate
(Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).
Besides, the records of this case reveal that the herein
respondent is herself not entirely free from blame. We note that
when John presented to her the document which turned out to be
a bed of conveyance in his favor, she readily affixed her
signature thereto upon the simple representation of John that it
was a document pertaining to her claim with the U.S. Veterans
Administration. She could have asked her maid to read the
contents of the same for her and yet she did not. These, we
believe, amount to a lack of prudence and precaution on the part
of Mrs. Emilia de Legare.
GLORIA R. CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMY V.
SUZARA and MANUEL R. VIZCONDE
61

FACTS: Gloria R. Cruz was the owner of Lot 10, BLK. 565, PSD38911, with an area of 747.7 square meters, together with the
improvements thereon, situated at 22 Bituan St., Bgy. Doa
Imelda, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 242553 in her name;
in 1977 she and respondent Romeo V. Suzara lived together as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage; in September
1982, solely out of love and affection for Suzara, she executed a
deed of absolute sale over Lot 10 in favor of Suzara without any
monetary consideration; thereafter, Suzara registered the
document in his favor and used the property as collateral for a
bank loan P350,000.00; he however failed to pay the loan so that
after four (4) years the mortgage was foreclosed. She paid the
bank P40,638.88 to restructure the loan resulting in the
extension of the redemption period to two (2) years.
However, without her knowledge and before the expiration of the
extended period, Suzara redeemed the property. She tried to talk
to him but he avoided her. Finally, to protect her interest, she
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which she filed with the
Register the Deeds of Quezon City asserting that her sale in
favor of Suzara was null and void for lack of consideration and
being contrary to law and public policy. Moreover, the said
property was already been sold by Suzara to Manuel Vizconde.
Petitioner contends that she and respondent Suzara were
common-law husband and wife, the sale between them was void
and inexistent, citing Art. 1490 of the Civil Code. She argues that
the consideration of "love, affection and accommodation" for the
sale was not a valid cause for the conveyance of the property as
there was no price paid in money or its equivalent, and since her
sale to Suzara was null and void the issue of its illegality cannot
be waived or ratified; resultantly, the sale by Suzara to his corespondent Vizconde must also be declared null and void the
latter being a purchaser in bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vizconde is a buyer in bad faith.
RULING: We cannot sustain petitioner. Although under Art. 1490
the husband and wife cannot sell property to one another as a
rule which, for policy consideration and the dictates of morality
require
that
the
prohibition
apply
to
common-law
relationships, 4 petitioner can no longer seek reconveyance of
the property to her as it has already been acquired by
respondent Vizconde in good faith and for value from her own
transferee.
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property the
court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright
cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered
under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is
contrary to the evident purpose of the law.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law
will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine
the condition of the property.
Even if a decree in a registration proceeding is infected with
nullity, still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens
title issued in pursuance thereof is protected. A purchaser in
good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property

and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person.
We cannot grant petitioner's prayer to have respondent
Vizconde's certificate of title declared null and void. Neither can
we order the reconveyance of the property to petitioner.
Vizconde being a purchaser of registered land for value in good
faith holds an indefeasible title to the land. This is without
prejudice however to any appropriate remedy petitioner may take
against her erstwhile common-law husband, respondent Suzara.
SPS. SONYA & ISMAEL MATHAY, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPS. TEODULFO & SYLVIA ATANGAN, SPS.
AGUSTINA & AMOR POBLETE, SPS. EDUARDO &
FELICISIMA TIRONA
FACTS: A.) Civil Case No. TM-175 (Spouses Atangan vs.
Spouses Mathay and RegisterDeeds of Cavite)Involves two parcels of land (Lot No 2186-A and Lot No. 2186C)covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT No. T-195350
and TCTNo. 195351) issued in the name of Spouses Atangan.
Sps. Atangan alleges that they are owners of two (2) parcels of
landpurchased from Spouses Tomas Lucido and Eustaquia
Villanueva as evidenced by the deed of sale and by the Transfer
Certificates issued. They immediately took possession of the
same and paid the corresponding realty taxes.
Atagan alleges that the vendees titles were transferred to them
by virtue of a decision on the Civil case (Lucido vs Batallones
and Petronilla Quimio, Director of Lands, and Registers of Deeds
of Cavite). Batallones and Quimio, on the other hand are the
vendees of the lands from the Bureau of Lands.
Sale of the parcel of lands in favor of the heirs of Batallones and
Quimio was evidenced by Deed of Conveyance duly issued by
the Bureau of Lands
Sps. Atagan further alleges that Mathays (defendant) have
enclosed a portion of said property with a fence without their
consent.
The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were also
issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses Atagan
asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a product of
forgery because it was based on an alleged transferred
certificate in favor of Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay who have
no right whatsoever on the real estate in question. Upon
investigation, it was certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said
titles were falsified and forged.
Atagan therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays have
no basis in law and that the same was illegally procured on the
basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled and the Mathays
have no righto take possession of the property in question. They
also demand moral, irreparable damages and attorneys fee for
the same.
B.) Civil Case No. TM-180 (Spouses Poblete vs. Spouses
Mathay and the Registerof Deeds of Cavite)
62

Involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Juana
Batallones and Gaudencio Quimio which was allegedly sold to
Spouses Poblete as per Deed of Conditional Sale.
Spouses Poblete alleges that they are registered owners of a
parcel of land having purchased the same from Juan Battallones
and Gaudencio for themselves and on behalf of their co-heirs as
evidenced by Deed of Sale. The spouses took possession of the
land and alleges that the defendants (Spouses Mathay) have
enclosed a portion of the said property with a fence without the
consent and against the will of the plaintiffs.
The vendees whose titles were transferred in favor of the
plaintiffs have obtained the title by virtue of the decision by the
court on the civil case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Onate
Batallones and Petronilla Q.Quimio, Director of Lands, the
Register of Deeds of Cavite). The heirs of Onofre Batallones and
Modesta Quimio are the vendees of the land form the Bureau of
Lands as evidenced by a Certification issued by the Record
Officer of the District Land Office.
declaration. They allege that the defendants (Spouses Mathay)

have enclosed among others the property in question with a
fence and took physical possession thereof without their
knowledge and consent.
issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses Tirona asserts
that the said title issued to Mathays was a product of forgery and
falsification because it was based on an alleged transferred
Spouses Tirona therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays
have no basis in law and that the same was illegally procured on
the basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled and the
Mathays have no right to take possession of the property in
question. They also demand moral, irreparable damages and
attorneys fee for the same.
The sale of the subject parcel of land from the Bureau of Lands
in favor of the heirs of Batallones and Quimio was also
evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance duly issued by the Bureau
of Lands.
The lower court decided for the defendant spouses Mathay and
against the plaintiffs in the three consolidated cases. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the plaintiff-appellants.
Thus, the appeal.

issued with a title covering the said land. Spouses Poblete
asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a product of
forgery because it was based on an alleged transferred
ISSUES:
WON Spouses Mathay can be considered buyers in good faith.
WON Spouses-private respondents own the individual properties
in question.
Spouses Poblete therefore prays that since the title of the

Mathays have no basis in law and that the same was illegally
procured on the basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled
and the Mathays have no right to take possession of the property
in question. They alsodemand moral, irreparable damages and
attorneys fee for the same.
C.) Civil Case No. TM-206 (Spouses Tirona vs. Spouses Mathay,
et. al).
Spouses Motas bought a parcel of land (Lot 2186-B) covered by
a Transfer of Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite
from David Quimio as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
They were issued by a Transfer Certificate (TCT No. T-203730).
Vendors David Quimio, Sr., et. al, are the previous registered
owners of the said land as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT No.T-192530). They obtained rights and interest
thereon from their predecessors who were vendees from the
Bureau of Lands which was then confirmed in a decision on a
Civil case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Batallones and Petonila
Quimio).
The subject land was subdivided into eight lots as evidenced by
a Subdivision Plans. The subdivided lots were bought by the
Spouses from Motas in good faith, and were therefore issued
with Transfer Certificates of Title.
Spouses Tirona are the one paying the corresponding real
property taxes thereon and were issued with corresponding tax
HELD: Spouses Mathay cannot be considered as purchasers in

good faith because prior to the fencing of the subject land,
neither they nor their predecessors-in-interest (Banayo and
Pugay) ever possessed the same. At the same time the property
was sold to petitioners (Mathays), the private respondents were
not only in actual possession of the same but also built their
houses thereon, cultivated it and were in full enjoyment of the
produce and fruits gathered therefrom.
Although it is a well-settled principle that the person dealing on a
registered land need not go beyond the certificate of title, there
are still circumstances which would put party on guard and
prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to
him. It is expected from the purchaser of a valued price of a land
to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the
occupants, in concept of owner. Failure of a prospective buyer to
take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his
part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking
the rights of a purchaser in good faith. In addition, before the
fence around subject property was erected, private respondent
communicated their objection to the fencing of the area by
petitioners but they were ignored by the Mathays, who continued
enclosing the premises under controversy in the present of
armed men employed by them.
2. The Spouses-Private respondents are the valid owners of the
individual properties in question because all the subsequent
certificates of title including the petitioners titles are void for the
same were forged and falsified. It was further proved that the
titles issued to Mathays are void forth allegedly Sales Certificate
executed by Tomas Lucido in favour of Pedro Pugay was not
signed by the said Tomas Lucido. Neither does it bear the
signature of the latter. It further proved that the deeds showed by
Banayo and Pugay were not for the individual property in
63

question. The circumstances surrounding the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale by Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay in
favor of the spouses Sonya Mathay and Ismael Mathay further
showed that it did not comply with the legal formalities and was
not duly notarized. Furthermore, the residence certificates of
vendors Banayo and Pugay appeared to be of dubious source.
The Spouses Mathay utterly failed to discharge the burden of
proving the sustainability of their posture of them being buyers in
good faith. Furthermore, the title of Pedro Banayo and Pablo
Pugay relied upon by them has been shown by preponderance
of evidence to be the product of forgery. Petition is DISMISSED
for the lack of merit, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.
COL. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED, substituting by his heirs,
namely, BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUIS CESAR DELA
MERCED, BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED(MACATANGAY)
and MARIA OLIVIA M. PAREDES vs. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and SPOUSES
VICTOR and MILAGROS MANLONGAT
FACTS: This case involves five registered parcels of land
located within the Antonio Subdivision, Pasig City Lots 6, 7, 8,
and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 (subject properties).
These lots were originally owned by, and titled in the name of,
Jose C. Zulueta (Zulueta), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 26105 which contains several lots other than
the subject properties within the Antonio Subdivision.
Later, the Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots contained in
TCT No. 26105 to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed on the
mortgaged properties, including the subject properties. Upon
consolidation of GSISs ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas
name was cancelled, and TCT No. 23554 was issued in GSISs
name.
Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners predecessor,
Francisco Dela Merced (Dela Merced), later on substituted by his
heirs, filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the GSIS
foreclosure on the subject properties (Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of
Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8) on the ground that he, not the
Zuluetas, was the owner of these lots at the time of the
foreclosure. Dela Merced also impleaded Victor and Milagros
Manlongat, who were claiming Lot 6, Block 2 by virtue of a sale
executed by the GSIS in their daughters (Elizabeth Manlongat)
favor. Dela Merced argued that, due to the nullity of GSISs
foreclosure over the subject properties, it had no ownership right
that could be transferred to Elizabeth Manlongat.
After a protracted litigation, the SC rendered a Decision in the
petitioners favor and nullified GSISs foreclosure of the subject
properties because these lots were never part of its mortgage
agreement with the Zulueta spouses. Pursuant to the finality of
the Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution which GSIS
opposed on the basis of Section 39 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA
8291 which allegedly exempts GSIS funds and properties from
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court
processes. A writ of execution was finally issued, however, first
by the RTC and then by the CA. The GSIS filed a petition for
review before the SC which was denied by the latter.
After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption, petitioners
encountered more problems with the execution of the Decision.
According to the RD of Pasig City, Policarpio Espenesin, he
could not cancel the titles of GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 because it
no longer had title over these two lots and had already conveyed
the same to two other persons. Hence, the RD claimed that the
writ of execution must first be modified to include the cancellation
of derivative titles of the GSIS title.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the GSIS can still raise the issue of exemption
II. Whether a final and executory judgment against GSIS and
Manlongat can be enforced against their successors-in-interest
or holders of derivative titles
III. Whether an order to cancel title to a particular property
includes an order to provide technical descriptions and segregate
it from its mother title
HELD:
(1) The issue of GSISs alleged exemption under RA 8291 had
been finally decided against when this Court denied GSISs
petition for review. GSISs attempt to resurrect the same issue by
interjecting the same in this proceeding is barred by the principle
of "law of the case," which states that "determinations of
questions of law will generally be held to govern a case
throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination
has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last
resort."
(2) A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole
litigation over the said property. It is not disputed that petitioners
caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 23554 of the
lots in question. The current holders of the derivative titles to
these lots were aware of such annotation when the individual
titles were issued to them. Ineluctably, both were bound by the
outcome of the litigation.
(3) The order contained in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is for
the RD to cancel GSISs titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8,
Block 8, inter alia. Whether these titles are individual or
contained in a mother title is of no consequence. The RD has to
cause their cancellation. If the cancellation can only be carried
out by requiring GSIS or the Bureau of Lands to provide the
necessary information, then they can be compelled to do so.
Otherwise, the Courts decision would be rendered inefficacious,
and GSIS would retain ostensible ownership over the lots by the
simple expedience that they are included in a mother title,
instead of individual titles. That result is manifestly contrary to the
Courts ruling and would subvert the very purpose of bringing this
case for a complete resolution.
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY (HBSTC)

V. CA
(AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)
FACTS: Each of private respondents entered into separate
contracts to sell with TransAmerican Sales and Exposition
(TransAmerican) through the latters Owner/General Manager,
Engr. Jesus Garcia, involving certain portions of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 19155, located at No. 45
Gen. Lim Street, Heroes Hill, Quezon City, together with one unit
three-storey townhouse to be built on each portion, as follows:
64

Respondent Pablo N. Arevalo purchased the portion of land
denominated as Unit No. 5 for the amount of P750,000.00
on August 21, 1988 and had already fully paid the purchase
price on September 3, 1988;
Respondent Alfredo Lim purchased the portion of land
denominated as Unit No. 1 for the amount of P800,000.00
on December 22, 1988 and fully paid the same upon
execution of the agreement on the same day;
Respondent Francisco A. Uy purchased the portion of land
denominated as Unit No. 6 on October 29, 1988 in the
amount of P800,000.00 payable in installments and had
allegedly made a total payment of P581,507.41. He ordered
to stop the payment of all [postdated] checks from
September 1990 to November 1995 on the ground of noncompletion of his unit and had later learned of the
foreclosure of the property;
Respondent spouses Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. and Lilian
Soriano purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit
No. 3 on February 15, 1990 in the amount of P1,600,000.00
and had allegedly made a payment of P669,960.00. They
had stopped paying because of non-completion of the
project and had later learned of the foreclosure of the
property;
Respondents Alfredo Lim and Santos Lim purchased the
portion of land denominated as Unit No. 7 for P700,000.00
on October 1988 and had been fully paid as of March 18,
1989; Santos Lim subsequently sold and assigned his share
of the property to private respondent Felisa Chi Lim on May
12, 1989.
It is stipulated in their respective contracts that their individual
townhouses will be fully completed and constructed as per plans
and specifications and the respective titles thereto shall be
delivered and transferred to private respondents free from all
liens and encumbrances upon their full payment of the purchase
price.
However, despite repeated demands, Garcia/TransAmerican
failed to comply with their undertakings.
On May 30, 1989, Engr. Garcia and his wife Lorelie Garcia
obtained from petitioner Home Bankers Savings and Trust
Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company) a
loan in the amount of P4,000,000.00 and without the prior
approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), the spouses mortgaged eight lots covered by TCT
Nos. 3349 to 3356 as collateral. Petitioner registered its
mortgage on these titles without any other encumbrance or lien
annotated therein. The proceeds of the loan were intended for
the development of the lots into an eight-unit townhouse project.
However, five out of these eight titles turned out to be
private respondents townhouses subject of the contracts to
sell with Garcia/TransAmerican.
When the loan became due, Garcia failed to pay his obligation to
petitioner. Consequently, petitioner instituted an extrajudicial
foreclosure8 on the subject lots and being the highest bidder in
the public auction, a certificate of sale in its favor was issued by
the sheriff on February 26, 1990. Subsequently, the sheriffs
certificate of sale was registered and annotated on the titles of
the subject lots in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
On November 8, 1990, private respondents filed a complaint with

the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA),
HLURB, against Garcia/TransAmerican as seller/developer of the
property and petitioner, as indispensable party, for non-delivery
of titles and non-completion of the subdivision project. They
prayed for the completion of the units, annulment of the
mortgage in favor of petitioner, release of the mortgage on the
lots with fully paid owners and delivery of their titles, and for
petitioner to compute individual loan values of amortizing
respondents and to accept payments from them and damages.
Petitioner filed its Answer contending that private respondents
have no cause of action against it; that at the time of the loan
application and execution of the promissory note and real
estate mortgage by Garcia, there were no known individual
buyers of the subject land nor annotation of any contracts,
liens or encumbrances of third persons on the titles of the
subject lots; that the loan was granted and released without
notifying HLURB as it was not necessary.
The OAALA rendered its decision in favor of private respondents,
ruling that the mortgage is unenforceable and ordering the
cancellation of the annotations of the Certificate of Sale in favor
of petitioner. The OAALA likewise ordered the delivery of the
TCTs that cover the private respondents townhouses. Petitioner
appealed the said decision but the same was affirmed.
In this present Petition, HBSTC contends that, granting arguendo
that the mortgage is unenforceable, it is not obliged to go beyond
the certificates of title registered and had every reason to rely on
the correctness and validity of those titles.
ISSUE: W/n a mortgagee is obliged to look beyond the certificate
of title prior to entering into the transaction in question.
HELD: Yes. While the cases cited by petitioner held that the
mortgagee is not under obligation to look beyond the certificate
of title when on its face, it was free from lien or encumbrances,
the mortgagees therein were considered in good faith as they
were totally innocent and free from negligence or wrongdoing in
the transaction. In this case, petitioner knew that the loan it was
extending to Garcia/TransAmerican was for the purpose of the
development of the eight-unit townhouses.
Petitioners insistence that prior to the approval of the loan, it
undertook a thorough check on the property and found the titles
free from liens and encumbrances would not suffice. It was
incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the status of the lots
which includes verification on whether Garcia had secured the
authority from the HLURB to mortgage the subject lots.
Petitioner failed to do so. We likewise find petitioner negligent in
failing to even ascertain from Garcia if there are buyers of the
lots who turned out to be private respondents. Petitioners want
of knowledge due to its negligence takes the place of
registration, thus it is presumed to know the rights of
respondents over the lot. The conversion of the status of
petitioner from mortgagee to buyer-owner will not lessen the
importance of such knowledge. Neither will the conversion set
aside the consequence of its negligence as a mortgagee.
Judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of banks to
investigate, examine and assess the real estate offered as
security for the application of a loan. We cannot overemphasize
the fact that the Bank cannot barefacedly argue that simply
65

because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any
encumbrances or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any
other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the
subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure.
one which could have been avoided by ordinary prudence,

cannot be invoked by the one who made it in order to
annul his contract. A mistake that is caused by manifest
negligence cannot invalidate a juridical act. (Emphasis
supplied.)
DOMINGO REALTY, INC. AND AYALA STEEL

MANUFACTURING CO., INC. V. CA AND ANTONIO M. ACERO
(VELASCO, JR., J.)
Prior to the execution of the Compromise Agreement, respondent

Acero was already aware of the technical description of the titled
lots of petitioner Domingo Realty and more so, of the boundaries
and area of the lot he leased from David Victorio. Before
consenting to the agreement, he could have simply hired a
geodetic engineer to conduct a verification survey and determine
the actual encroachment of the area he was leasing on the titled
lot of petitioner Domingo Realty. Had he undertaken such a
precautionary measure, he would have known that the entire
area he was occupying intruded into the titled lot of petitioners
and possibly, he would not have signed the agreement.
FACTS: Petitioner Domingo Realty filed a complaint against

private respondent Acero for recovery of possession of three
parcels of land located in Cupang, Muntinlupa. Acero allegedly
constructed a factory building for hollow blocks on a portion of
these lands. In Aceros answer, he claimed that he merely leased
the land from David Victorio who in turn assailed the validity of
petitioners TCTs by claiming that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the property for more than 70
years and that the TCTs emanated from spurious deeds of sale.
A Compromise Agreement was eventually executed by the
parties-in-interest which prompted the RTC to adopt the same in
its Decision. Petitioner, in order to implement the Decision, filed a
motion asking permission to conduct a re-survey of the subject
properties, which was granted in an Order dated Jan. 22, 1988.
Acero subsequently filed a motion to nullify the said Agreement,
claiming that the re-survey would violate the Agreement since the
whole area he occupied will be adjudged as owned by petitioner.
The same was denied. The results of the re-survey showed that
the land occupied by the factory of Acero is covered by the TCTs
of petitioner. Petitioners (with Ayala Steel being the transferee)
filed a motion for execution on Dec. 10, 1991 which was
approved on Jan. 15, 1992.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for the annulment of the Order
granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution on the ground that
the survey plan (results of the re-survey by petitioners) violated
the Compromise Agreement in such a way that he will be forced
to vacate the whole of the property he was occupying instead of
vacating only a portion of the same (since the compromise
agreement was only as to a portion of the land occupied by him
which 2000 sqm more or less). The same was denied.
In the CA, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and the
annulment of the RTC Order granting the execution of the
judgment. The CA ruled in favor of him, holding that his belief
that he would only be vacating a portion of the property he was
occupying was a mistake that is a basis for the nullification of the
compromise agreement.
ISSUE: W/n the compromise agreement should be set aside on
the ground of mistake.
HELD: No. it is presumed that the parties to a contract know and
understand the import of their agreement. Thus, civil law expert
Arturo M. Tolentino opined that:
To invalidate consent, the error must be excusable. It must
be real error, and not one that could have been avoided by
the party alleging it. The error must arise from facts
unknown to him. He cannot allege an error which refers to
a fact known to him, or which he should have known by
ordinary diligent examination of the facts. An error so
patent and obvious that nobody could have made it, or
In this factual milieu, respondent Acero could have easily averted

the alleged mistake in the contract; but through palpable neglect,
he failed to undertake the measures expected of a person of
ordinary prudence. Without doubt, this kind of mistake cannot be
resorted to by respondent Acero as a ground to nullify an
otherwise clear, legal, and valid agreement, even though the
document may become adverse and even ruinous to his
business.
Moreover, respondent failed to state in the Compromise
Agreement that he intended to vacate only a portion of the
property he was leasing. Such provision being beneficial to
respondent, he, in the exercise of the proper diligence required,
should have made sure that such matter was specified in the
Compromise Agreement. Respondent Aceros failure to have the
said stipulation incorporated in the Compromise Agreement is
negligence on his part and insufficient to abrogate said
agreement.
DBP V. THE ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA
ECIJA
(NARVASA, J.)
FACTS: On June 13, 1980, the Development Bank of the
Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented for registration to the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's
certificate of sale in its favor of two parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034,
both in the names of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina
Calison, which said institution had acquired as the highest bidder
at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The transaction was entered
as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry Book and DBP
paid the requisite registration fees on the same day.
Annotation of the sale on the covering certificates of title could
not, however be effected because the originals of those
certificates were found to be missing from the files of the
Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and could not be
located. On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to
reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution was ordered by
that court in a decision rendered on June 15, 1982. For reasons
not apparent on the record, the certificates of title were
reconstituted only on June 19, 1984.
66

On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted
titles of the certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191 on the
basis of that same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of
Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take on the
solicitation, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration by consulta raising two questions: (a) whether the
certificate of sale could be registered using the old Entry No.
8191 made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original
copies of the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on
June 19, 1984; and (b) if the first query was answered
affirmatively, whether he could sign the proposed annotation,
having assumed his duties only in July 1982.
The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had
been rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility of
accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered
because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title
involved. For said certificate of sale to be admitted for
registration, there is a need for it to be re-entered now that the
titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new entry fees,"
and by-passed the second query as having been rendered moot
and academic by the answer to the first. Aggrieved, DBP
appealed the resolution to the CA.
ISSUE: W/n the refusal of the ROD to annotate the reconstituted
titles is proper.
HELD: No. The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a
reading of the cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529, and particularly
of the provision therein referring to the Register's act of making a
primary entry as "...a preliminary process in registration...," as
depriving of any effect a primary entry without a corresponding
annotation thereof on the certificate of title to which the
instrument subject of said entry refers.
That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire
context of said Section 56 which in another part also provides
that the instrument subject of a primary entry "... shall be
regarded as registered from the time so noted ...," and, at the
very least, gives such entry from the moment of its making the
effect of putting the whole world on notice of the existence the
instrument on entered. Such effect (of registration) clearly
attaches to the mere making of the entry without regard to the
subsequent step of annotating a memorandum of the instrument
subject of the entry on the certificate of title to which it refers.
Indeed, said Section, in also providing that the annotation, "...
when made ... shall bear the same date ..." as the entry, may be
said to contemplate unspecified intervals of time occurring
between the making of a primary entry and that of the
corresponding annotation on the certificate of title without
robbing the entry of the effect of being equivalent to registration.
Neither, therefore, is the implication in the appealed resolution
that annotation must annotation entry immediately or in short
order justified by the language of Section 56.
Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between
primary entry and proposed annotation in this case has not been
of DBP's making. Though it was under no necessity to present
the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected for
purposes of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be
recorded was an involuntary transaction, and the record is silent
as to whether it presented them or not, there is nonetheless
every probability that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the lands
covered by those titles and it is usual in mortgage transactions
that the owner's duplicates of the encumbered titles are yielded
into the custody of the mortgage until the mortgage is

discharged. Moreover, the certificates of title were reconstituted
from the owner's duplicates, and again it is to be presumed that
said duplicates were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the
reconstitution proceedings.
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees
were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was registrable on
its face. 11 DBP, therefore, complied with all that was required of
it for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the
certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could not
be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals
of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be
found, since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone
was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of
Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of
those documents.
It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the
process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as the
appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation
which through no fault on its part, had to be deferred until the
originals of the certificates of title were found or reconstituted.
FLOR MARTINEZ V. ERNESTO G. GARCIA AND EDILBERTO
M. BRUA
(PERALTA, J.)
FACTS: Respondent Brua was the registered owner of a parcel
of land located in Mandaluyong, Rizal covered by TCT No.
346026. The same property was mortgaged several times, as
evidenced by annotations found at the back of its TCT. On Oct.
22, 1991, Brua sold the property in the amount of P 705K to
Garcia, as partial payment of the formers mortgage
indebtedness to the latter. Garcia then registered the said deed
with the ROD of Rizal and TCT No. 5204 was issued in Garcia
and his wifes name. However, the several annotations at the
back of the previous title were carried over, such as Entry no.
2881 showing a notice of levy on execution in favor of petitioner
Flor Martinez.
It appeared that the annotations found at the back of the title of
the subject property in favor of petitioner, i.e., Notice of Levy on
Attachment and/or Levy, Notice of Levy on Execution, and
Certificate of Sale, were all made in connection with petitioner's
action for Collection of Sum of Money, in which a decision was
rendered in favor of petitioner, where the RTC ordered
respondent Brua to pay the former the amount of P244,594.10,
representing the value of the dishonored checks plus 12%
interest per annum as damages and the premium paid by
petitioner for the attachment bond. The decision became final
and executory as respondent Brua failed to appeal the same,
and a notice of levy on execution was issued. A public auction
was subsequently conducted, where the subject property was
awarded to petitioner as the sole bidder in the amount of
P10,000.00, and a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor.
On February 9, 1994, respondents Garcia and Brua filed with the
RTC of Pasig, Branch 267, an Action to Quiet Title, initially
against petitioner due to the encumbrances/liens annotated on
respondent Garcia's new title. They contended that these
encumbrances/liens were registered subsequent to the
annotation of respondent Garcia's adverse claim made in 1980,
and prayed that these be canceled. Subsequently, the complaint
67

was amended to include Pilipinas Bank as an additional
defendant. Petitioner and Pilipinas Bank filed their respective
Answers thereto.
The RTC dismissed Garcias action. In so ruling, the RTC found
that the adverse claim which respondent Garcia caused to be
annotated on the previous title of the subject property, i.e, TCT
No. 346026, on June 23, 1980 was predicated on his interest as
a mortgagee of a loan of P150,000.00, which he extended to
respondent Brua; that respondent Garcia's adverse interest was
merely that of a second mortgagee, as he was not yet the
purchaser of the subject property as of said date; that when the
judicial liens, i.e., Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy and
Notice of Levy on Execution, were caused to be registered by
petitioner on respondent Brua's title on January 8, 1981 and July
8, 1998, respectively, by virtue of petitioner being adjudged
judgment creditor by Branch 60 of RTC Makati, respondent
Garcia's claim became inferior to that of petitioner.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA said that a subsequent
sale of property covered by a certificate of title cannot prevail
over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the
certificate of title previous to the sale; that while one who buys a
property from the registered owner need not have to look behind
the title, he is nevertheless bound by the liens and
encumbrances annotated thereon; and, thus, one who buys
without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses
consequent to such failure.
ISSUE: W/n petitioner has a better right with respect to the
property in question.
with the knowledge that the subject property sought to be levied

upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as
or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Thus, no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA when it held
that the notice of levy and subsequent sale of the subject
property could not prevail over respondent Garcia's existing
adverse claim inscribed on respondent Brua's certificate of title.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property,
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act No. 496 (now
P.D. No.1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone
is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of
the registered owner thereof.
Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. A
purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price
for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the
property. Here, petitioner admitted on cross-examination that
when she registered her notice of attachment in 1981 and the
levy on execution on July 11, 1988, she already saw respondent
Garcia's adverse claim inscribed on respondent Brua's title on
June 23, 1980.
HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN v. IAC
G.R. No. L-69303July 23, 1987; Guttierez, Jr., J.:
HELD: No. Petitioner contends that the adverse claim of

respondent Garcia inscribed on the title of the subject property is
but a notice that the latter has an interest adverse to respondent
Brua's title, to the extent of P150,000.00 secured by a real estate
mortgage, and such adverse claim cannot be considered
superior to that of a final sale conducted by the sheriff by virtue
of a court judgment that has attained finality.
FACTS: On April 24, 1975, a civil case entitled Maria Marron v.

Felicisimo Bazar and Fe S. Bazar was filed before the then CFI
of Manila, Br. XIII. This action sought to compel defendants
Bazar to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No.
2-A covered by T.C.T No. 100612 in favor of Maria Marron.
Sec. 12, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
On January 27, 1976, while the above case was still pending,
private respondent Marron caused the annotation of a notice of
lis pendens at the back of T.C.T. No. 100612.
SEC. 12. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons. The

levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment
obligee over the right, title and interest of the judgment obligor
in such property at the time of the levy, subject to liens and
encumbrances then existing.
Clearly, the levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner
of the property levied upon. He merely obtains a lien. Such levy
on execution is subject and subordinate to all valid claims and
liens existing against the property at the time the execution lien
attached, such as real estate mortgages.
Respondent Garcia's adverse claim, which refers to the deed of
mortgage executed by respondent Brua in his favor, was
annotated on respondent Brua's title registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as Entry No. 49853. The
adverse claim was already existing when the Notice of Levy on
Execution, as well as the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner,
was inscribed on July 11, 1988 and September 2, 1988,
respectively; and, hence, the adverse claim is sufficient to
constitute constructive notice to petitioner regarding the subject
property. When petitioner registered her Notice of Levy on
Execution on the title of the subject property, she was charged
On February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in favor of Maria

Marron and the judgment having become final and executory,
she filed a motion for execution which was granted. To this, a writ
of execution was granted but the Bazars refused to surrender
their title and to execute the required deed of sale.
On November 29, 1978, the lower court ordered the Clerk of
Court to execute the deed of sale. But upon presentation of the
said deed to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration, the
Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court order in
order to cancel the new title issued in favor of one Maria
Marasigan. This is due to a prior deed of absolute sale in favor of
such person executed on December 18, 1974. However, it was
only on July 5, 1977 that such deed was registered; hence,
Marasigans title bears with it the above notice of lis pendens.
The Bazars filed a petition for relief of the February 24 judgment
and while this was pending, the moved to set aside the same on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons. Meanwhile,
Marrons Land Registration Court case was dismissed by CFI
Manila, Br. XIII for said court acting as an L.R.C. cannot act
under summary proceedings for having only limited and special
68

jurisdiction. Then, Marron filed another civil case to cancel
Marasigans TCT. This was denied for being premature. But, on
appeal, the IAC ruled in favor of Marron by virtue of the notice of
lis pendens. Hence, this petition by the heirs of Marasigan, the
latter having died in the course of the proceedings.
ISSUE: WON THE PARTY WHO BOUGHT IT WITH A NOTICE
OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF HER TITLE
HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
AS AGAINST THE PARTY IN WHOSE FAVOR THE NOTICE
WAS MADE.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court, stating that this question is resolved in favor of the party
who had the notice annotated and who won the litigation over the
property, Maria Marron in this case.
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved
in a litigation and serves as a notice to the whole world that one
who buys the same does it at his own risk. It was also a clear
notice to Maria Marasigan that there was a court case affecting
her rights to the property she had purchased.
In the case at bar, although Marasigan acquired the property in
question on December 18, 1974 or a little over four (4) months
before the filing of Marrons civil action against the Bazars, the
transaction became effective as against third persons only on
July 5, 1977, when it was registered with the Register of Deeds
of Manila. It is the act of registration which creates constructive
notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act 496, as amended by
Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529)
provides: Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every
conveyance x x x affecting registered land shall, if registered,
filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering.
PATENTS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CA/MORATO
GRN 100709 NOVEMBER 14,1997
PANGANIBAN, J.;
FACTS: In December 1972, respondent Morato filed a free
patent application on a parcel of land which was granted but with
the condition that the land shall not be alienated or encumbered
within five years from the date of issuance of the patent.
Respondent mortgaged a portion of property in 1974 and another
portion was based to another party whereby a house and
warehouse were respectively constructed. RTC and CA found
that there was alienation because the land was merely based
adding that the improvement and not the land itself.
approval of the application for a term of five years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period.
Encumbrance has been defined as anything that impairs the use
or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on
the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon
property.
Respondent Morato, although the land mortgaged/leased does
not significantly affect his possession and ownership, cannot fully
use or enjoy the land during the duration of lease contract. The
prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land
grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every application.
Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law, Morato had only
an inchoate right to the property; such property remained a
public domain and therefore not susceptible to alienation or
encumbrance.
SUMAIL VS JUDGE OF CFI OF COTABATO
FACTS: On June 3, 1952, Gepuliano filed Civil Case No. 413 in
the Court of First Instance of Cotabato against petitioner
Dawaling Sumail, alleging among other things that he was the
owner of the lot in question by virtue of a Free Patent and an
Original Certificate of Title; that he had been in possession of the
land since 1939 continuously, publicly, and adversely up to June,
1949, when Sumail by means of force, threats and intimidation
entered the parcel and divested him of possession; that several
demands had been made for the surrender of the possession of
the land which demands defendant had rejected.
On July 27, 2952, and said to be intended as counter-complaint
to Civil Case No. 413, Sumail, defendant in said case, filed Civil
Case No. 420 in the same court against Gepuliano and the
Director of Lands for the purpose of cancelling Certificate of Title
V-23 covering lot 3633, alleging that Gepuliano thru fraud and
misrepresentation had filed with the Bureau of Lands a falsified
application for free patent for the lot, stating in his application that
the parcel was not occupied or claimed by any other person and
that he had entered upon it and introduced improvements
thereon
The Director of Lands contended that the complaint of Sumail
called for the cancellation of a free patent issued by the Director
of Lands over a parcel of public land and that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter because under the Public
Land Act, the Director of Lands had executive control over the
concession or disposition of the lands of the public domain, and
that his findings as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when
approved by the Secretary of the Department
TC dismissed the case
ISSUE: WON TC still has jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not the base and/or mortgage of a portion of

realty acquired through free patent constitute sufficient ground
for the nullification of such land grant.
RULING: Public Land Act, Sec 118 states:
Except in favor of Government or any of its branches lands,
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
HELD: No
RATIO: We agree with the Director of Lands and the trial court
that the latter had no jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 420
which was filed for the purpose of cancelling the Patent issued
by the Director of Lands on lot No. 3633 and also for the
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title V-23 issued to
69

Gepuliano on the basis of his free patent. Under section 122 of
Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act, when any
public lands in the Philippines are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or public or private corporations, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation of the said Act and
shall become registered lands and that the instrument of
conveyance in the form of a Patent, before its delivery to the
grantee shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for registration,
and that once registered therein a certificate of title shall be
issued as in other cases of registered land.
In ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands,
courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision
or decree, only when application for review is filed by the party
aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. Here, there was no decree of registration because
instead of an application for registration under the Land
Registration Act Gepuliano applied for free patent under the
Public Land Act. Assuming that even in bringing public land
grants under the Land Registration Law, there is a period of one
year for review in cases of fraud, how shall that period of one
year be computed? For all practical purposes we might regard
the date of the issuance of the patent as corresponding to the
date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases,
because the decree finally awards the land applied for
registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the
Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys
the land applied for to the applicant.
The purpose and affect of both decree and patent is the same.
Now, further assuming that Civil Case No. 420 of the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato filed by Sumail was intended as a
petition for review of the public land grant and conveyance to
Gepuliano, on the ground of fraud, was it filed within the period of
one year? The answer is in the negative. As already stated, free
patent No. V459 was issued in the name of Gepuliano on
September 26, 1949, while Civil Case No. 420 was filed in court
only on July 21, 1952, or almost three years after the issuance of
the free patent. It is, therefore, clear that the trial court no longer
had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in Civil Case No. 420
RP V HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA
393 SCRA 361
FACTS: On Dec. of 1978, Alejaga Sr. filed a Free Patent
Application with the District Land Office is Roxas City. On March
of 1979, the free patent was ordered to be issued to him. The
Defendant (Register of Deeds) also issued the OCT for the
parcel of land.
On April of that same year, Ignacio Arrobang requested the
Director of Lands in manila, through a letter, to investigate for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in
favor of Alejaga Sr. The investigator, Isagani Cartagena
recommended to the Director to file a civil proceeding to cancel
the Free Patent issued to Alejaga Sr.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General
instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and
Title and Reversion against Alejaga Sr. He died pending the
proceeding. He was substituted by his heirs.
The RTC declared the Patent null and void, and the CA reversed
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Torrens Title can be declared null and
void despite its indefeasibility?
HELD: No. A Free Patent may be issued where the applicant is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines; is not the owner of more
than twelve (12) hectares of land; has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to
disposition, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 6940; and has paid the real taxes thereon while the
same has not been occupied by any person.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of
title is issued, the land covered thereby ceases to be part of
public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens
Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon
the expiration of one year from the date of such issuance.
However, a title emanating from a free patent which was secured
through fraud does not become indefeasible, precisely because
the patent from whence the title sprung is itself void and of no
effect whatsoever.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title [is] issued, the land covered by them ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes private property.
Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. However, this
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud
and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the
registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by
itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrants already existing
one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode
of acquiring ownership.
REMEDIES
AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS: On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed Civil

Case No. U-2286 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners.
Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under
the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the parcel
of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is
now in the possession of petitioners.
Petitioners answered that the land which was formerly a part of
the river is owned by them by reason of accretion and accession
due to the big flood that happened in 1920. They contend that
since 1920, they and their predecessors in interest occupied and
exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the
abandoned river bed in question abutting their respective riparian
lands continuously up to the present to the exclusion of all other
persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon and that they have
introduced improvements thereon by constructing irrigation
canals and planting trees and agricultural crops thereon 6 and
converted the land into a productive area.
70

During the pendency of the said case, the petitioners filed a

complaint (Case No. U-2649 ) against the Director of Lands and
Spouses Agpoon with the CFI of Pangasinan for annulment of
title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of
land. They allege that the land in question belong to them. They
further contend that it was only on April 13, 1971, when
respondent spouses filed a complaint against them, that they
found out that the said land was granted by the Government to
Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to
which Original Certificate of Title No. 2370 was issued in the
latter's name and that the said patent and subsequent titles
issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land, an
abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore,
cannot be the subject of a public land grant.
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time
a certificate of title was issued pursuant to a public grant, said
title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void if the
property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and
an action to annul the same does not prescribe. Moreover, since
herein petitioners are in possession of the land in dispute, an
action to quiet title is imprescriptible. 20 Their action for
reconveyance, which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in
ones possession, is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed
possession for a number of years gave them a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the
adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her title.
On June 21, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil

Case U-2286 in favor of the Respondents.
On June 24, 1974, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, acting
on the motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands
and spouses Agpoon, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No.
U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in
the case of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. 12 that an action to
annul a free patent many years after it had become final and
indefeasible states no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether the action to annul a free patent many years
after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of
action.
RULING: No. The facts alleged in the complaint, which are
deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to
dismiss, constitute a sufficient cause of action against private
respondents. In the case at bar, it was admitted in the stipulation
of facts that the land was formerly an abandoned river bed
formed due to natural causes in 1920. It was likewise admitted
that the riparian owners of the lands abutting said abandoned
river bed were the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in interest
and that since then and up to the present, they have been
occupying and cultivating aliquot portions of the said land
proportionate to the respective lengths of their riparian lands and
that they are the real and lawful owners of the said land as
decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the law then in force
that time. With that being said, then, the land in question was
and is of private ownership and, therefore, beyond the
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. The free patent and
subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The
indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued
pursuant to a patent may be invoked only when the land involved
originally formed part of the public domain. If it was a private
land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are
a nullity.
The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the
expiration of one year, after the entry of the decree, pursuant to
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, does not apply where
an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title
issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are
null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to
issue them at all, the land in question having been withdrawn
from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the
patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another person.
Such an action is different from a review of the decree of title on
the ground of fraud.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and VICENTE L. YUPANGCO, JR.
G.R. No. 128531 October 26, 1999
(FULL TEXT)
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether in a proceeding
for the issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, the
Solicitor General is required to be notified, such that failure to
give such notice would render the proceedings void. Both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the
negative. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent Vicente Yupangco is the owner of a unit in a
condominium building in Legaspi Street, Makati City, as
evidenced by Certificate of Title No. 7648. Because his aforesaid
certificate could not be located, he filed, on January 28, 1994, in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati, a petition for the
issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of his lost
copy, pursuant to 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree). The trial court ordered the Registrar of Deeds of Makati
to comment on the petition and thereafter set the case for initial
hearing.
On February 11, 1994, the Registrar of Deeds of Makati filed a
manifestation that she had no objection to the petition. After
hearing private respondent's evidence, the trial court rendered,
on December 15, 1995, its decision granting the petition,
declaring as invalid the missing copy of the certificate of title, and
ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati to issue a new owner's
duplicate certificate of title in the name of private respondent. A
copy of this decision was furnished the Solicitor General.
On February 5, 1996, the Solicitor General moved for
reconsideration of the trial court's decision on the ground that no
copy of private respondent's petition or notice thereof had been
given to him. His motion was, however, denied. The Office of the
Solicitor General then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
which, in a decision 1 dated March 5, 1997, affirmed the order of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Private respondent's petition before the trial court was anchored
on 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which
provides:
71

Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicatecertificate.

In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title,
due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone
in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a
duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or
for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the
facts of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered
owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in
interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the
issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost
duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like
faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree. 2 (Emphasis
added)
Nothing in the law, however, requires that the Office of the
Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceedings for the
issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title. In contrast,
23 of the same law, involving original registration proceedings,
specifically mentions the Solicitor General as among those who
must be notified of the petition. Similarly, 36 provides that the
petition for registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by
the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Lands.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, invokes 35(5),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
which provides:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of
the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned
or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Represent the Government in all land registration and related
proceedings . . .
He contends that, in view of this provision, it was mandatory for
the trial court to notify him of private respondent's petition and
that its failure to do so rendered the proceedings before it null
and void. 3
The contention has no merit. The provision of the Administrative
Code relied upon by the Solicitor General is not new. It is simply
a codification of 1(e) of P.D. No. 478 (Defining the Powers and
Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General) which similarly
provided:
Sec. 1. Powers and Functions. (1) The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head
of the office concerned, it shall also represent government
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It

shall have the following specific powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
e. Represent the Government in all land registration and related
proceedings . . . .
It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be
notified of proceedings for the issuance of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title. Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the
Office of the Solicitor General represents the government in land
registration and related proceedings. Even so, however, the
request for representation should have come from the Registrar
of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to the case. Here,
there is no dispute that the Registrar of Deeds of Makati was
notified of private respondent's petition, but she manifested that
her office had no objection thereto. The Solicitor General does
not question the propriety of the action and manifestation of the
Registrar of Deeds, nor does he give any reason why private
respondent's petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title should be denied. Instead, he claims that the
fact that he was given a copy of the decision is an admission that
he is entitled to be notified of all incidents relating to the
proceedings.
This is not correct. Considering that the law does not impose
such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to the
Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was at
most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect.
This case should be distinguished from our rulings in cadastral
registration cases 4 and original land registration proceedings 5
which cases require that the Solicitor General be notified of
decisions and hold as decisive, for the purpose of determining
the timeliness of the appeal filed by the government, the date of
his receipt of the decisions therein and not that of the Director of
Lands or of his other representatives. 6 The issue and the
applicable laws in those cases are different.
The important role of the Office of the Solicitor General as the
government's law office cannot be overemphasized. Its powers
and functions, however, should not be rigidly applied in such a
manner that innocuous omissions, as in the case at bar, should
be visited with so grave a consequence as the nullification of
proceedings. After all, no prejudice to the government has been
shown.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
NEW DURAWOOD V. CA
FEBRUARY 1996
R.A. No. 26, 13 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds,
while P.D. No. 1529, 109 governs petitions for issuance of new
owner's duplicate certificates of title which are lost or stolen or
destroyed. (The former is expressly provided for in P.D. No.
1529, 110.)
In Demetriou v. CA (238 SCRA 158, 162 [1994]), we ruled that if
a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and
72

the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction.
Consequently, the decision may be attacked at any time. In case
at bench, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were not "lost
or destroyed," hence, there was no necessity for the petition filed
in the trial court for the "Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate
Certificates of Title x x x." In fact, the said court never acquired
jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Hence, the
newly issued duplicates are themselves void.
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to reconstitute the original certificate

of title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, in the names of
SATURNINO PINOTE, married to Maria Igot, JUANA, IRINEO,
PETRA (not Pedro) and PETRONILO, all surnamed Pinote.
Pursuant to the court's order, Original Certificate of Title was
issued in the names of the alleged brothers and sisters,
Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not
Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.
It is obvious that this lapse happened because of failure to follow

the procedure in P.D. No. 1529:
1)
No notice of loss or theft sent to the Register of Deeds.
2)
107 provides that in case of the refusal or failure of the
holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the
remedy is a petition in court to compel surrender thereof to the
Register of Deeds, and not a petition for reconstitution.
On October 1, 1979, Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, as alleged counsel

for the heirs of Pedro, Juana and Saturnino Pinote, supposedly
all deceased, filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's
order, and sought the re-opening of the proceedings and the
modification of the June 7, 1979 order, for, while Otto's main
petition for reconstitution based on the Municipal Index of
Decrees, alleged that Lot 2381 was decreed in the names of
Irineo, Juana, Saturnino, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed
Pinote, the court's order of June 7, 1979 ordered the
reconstitution of the title in the names of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo,
Petra (instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.
RECONSTITUTION
HEIRS OF THE LATE PEDRO PINOTE vs. HON. JUDGE
CEFERINO E. DULAY
The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that they "learned of the error"
only on September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made
the inquiry and obtained a copy of the court order.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS: On September 30, 1978, Francisco P. Otto, representing
his mother Petra Pinote, filed in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Cebu, at Lapu-Lapu City, a verified
petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title to Lot
2381 of the Opon Cadastre, which was supposedly adjudicated
to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed
Pinote. The petition alleged that the original, as well as owner's
duplicate certificate of title, were burned in the Opon municipal
building during World War II, and the same could not be located
despite diligent search; that there were no annotations or liens
and encumbrances on the title affecting the same; that no deed
or instrument affecting the property had been presented for
registration; and that, based on the plans and technical
description, the area, location, and boundaries of Lot 2381 were
described therein.
A copy of the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in
the Official Gazette, furnished to all the adjoining owners, and
posted by the Sheriff at the main entrances of the Provincial
Capitol Building, the City Hall, and the Public Market of LapuLapu City, at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. The court
also ordered copies of the notice and order to be sent to the
Registers of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City and Cebu, the Director of
Lands, and the Commissioner of Land Registration, directing
them to show cause, if any, why the petition may not be granted.
It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of
the registered co-owners Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or their heirs, so that they could
have been heard on the petition.
As there was no opposition to the petition when it was called for
hearing, the lower court commissioned its Clerk of Court to
receive the evidence.
Based on the Commissioner's Report, as well as the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by Francisco Otto in support of
his petition, including a supposed abstract of the decision of the
cadastral court, the Court issued an order directing the Register
Under Republic Act No. 26, a petition for the reconstitution of a

lost or destroyed original certificate of title for registered land
may be filed with the Court of First Instance "by the registered
owner, his assigns or any person having an interest in the
property" from any of the sources enumerated therein, and in
accordance with the procedure outlined in the same law.
Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order: (1) owner's duplicate certificate; (2) mortgagee's
or lessee's duplicate certificate or co-owner's copy; (3) a certified
copy of the certificate of title previously issued by the Register of
Deeds or by a legal custodian thereof, (4) an authenticated copy
of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (5) a
document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property,
the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and (6)
any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title. The index of decree which mentioned "Pedro
Pinote" is neither controlling nor conclusive as it is not an
"authenticated copy of the decree of registration pursuant to
which the original certificate of title was issued." Accordingly, the
Court is justified in granting this petition on the bases of the
decision of the cadastral court which is accompanied by the duly
approved plan and technical description of the property.
On January 2, 1980, the heirs of the late Pedro Pinote; namely,
Rufina-Pinote-Aying, Antonina Pinote-Silawan, Ramona Pinote
Vda. de Guod and Julian Pinote, filed their notice of appeal.
On May 10, 1980, the court denied due course to the appeal.
Hence, this petition for mandamus and/or certiorari filed by the
heirs of Pedro Pinote praying that respondent court be ordered to
give due course to their appeal or to amend the order of June 7,
1979, by striking out Petra and putting in Pedro instead as one of
the co-owners of Lot 2381.
73

ISSUE: Whether the reconstitution proceedings should be
reopened and the order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979
should be rectified or amended.
HELD: Yes. It invited the court's attention to a substantial
variance between the petition for reconstitution and the court's
order of reconstitution, for while the unopposed petition alleged
that the registered co-owners of Lot 2381 were Saturnino, Juana,
Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, as evidenced
by the entry in the Municipal Index of' Decrees, the Order of
Reconstitution dated June 7, 1979, on the other hand, identified
the co-owners as "Saturnino Pinote, married to Maria Igot,
Juana, Irineo, Petra and Petronilo all surnamed Pinote . .
The error adverted to in the motion for reconsideration is
substantial for it affects the participation and interest of Pedro
Pinote (or his heirs) in Lot No. 2381, an interest that appeared in
the petition for reconstitution and in the notice of hearing issued
by the court, but which disappeared from the court's order of
reconstitution dated June 7, 1979, having been replaced by
"Petra Pinote" instead.
The more important issue is the validity of the order of
reconstitution:
As the petition for reconstitution of title was a proceeding in rem,
compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26 is a condition sine
qua non for the conferment of jurisdiction on the court taking
cognizance of the petition. Considering that both the petition and
the court's notice of hearing, referred to the reconstitution of the
title of Lot 2381 in the names of the registered co-owners,
Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had
jurisdiction only to grant or deny the prayer of the petition as
published in the notice of hearing.
The court could not receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote,
instead of Pedro, is a registered co-owner of Lot 2381. The
reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and
within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of
the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed
in its original form and condition. The purpose of the
reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the
same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by
law; in the same form they were when the loss or destruction
occurred.
Hence, in Bunagan, et al. vs. CFI of Cebu, et al., 97 SCRA 72,
where the certificate of title was decreed in the names of
"Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," the reconstitution of the
title in the names of "spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia
Icong" was held to be "a material change that cannot be
authorized."
The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is hedged in by the four
walls of the petition and the published notice of hearing which
define the subject matter of the petition. If the court oversteps
those borders, it acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction in the
case.
On the basis of the allegations of the petition and the published
notice of hearing, the heirs of Pedro Pinote had no reason to
oppose the petition for reconstitution for the rights and interest in
Lot 2381 of their ancestor, Pedro Pinote, were not adversely
affected by the petition. It was only when Pedro's name (and in
effect, his interest in Lot 2381) disappeared from the court's
order of reconstitution that his heirs had cause to rise in arms as
it were, and ask for the reopening of the case.

There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with
extreme caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles to land
under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding has
many times been misused as a means of divesting a property
owner of the title to his property. Through fraudulent
reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover that
his certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a
reconstituted title in someone else's name. Courts, therefore,
should not only require strict compliance with the requirements of
R.A. 26 but, in addition, should ascertain the identity of every
person who files a petition for reconstitution of title to land. If the
petition is filed by someone other than the registered owner, the
court should spare no effort to assure itself of the authenticity
and due execution of the petitioner's authority to institute the
proceeding.
It should avoid being unwittingly used as a tool of swindlers and
impostors in robbing someone of his title.
It does not appear that the above precautions had been taken in
this case. We note that:
(1) The registered owners (or their heirs) had not been
individually notified of the filing of Otto's petition for
reconstitution.
(2) His authority, if any, and that of Atty. Ramon Codilla, to
represent all the registered co-owners of Lot 2381 in the
reconstitution proceeding, does not appear to have been
investigated by the court.
(3) It does not appear that the court verified Atty. Porfirio
Ellescas' authority to appear as counsel for the movantsintervenors, Pedro, Juana and Saturnino Pinote (who are
also supposed to be represented by Atty. Codilla), and their
heirs.
(4) Neither did it ascertain the identities of the heirs of Pedro,
Saturnino and Juana who filed the motion to reopen the
reconstitution proceedings.
(5) We are intrigued why the heirs of Juana and Saturnino
Pinote, through Atty. Ellescas, asked for reconsideration of
the court's order dated June 7, 1979 since their interests in
Lot 2381 were not adversely affected by the court's order
dated June 7, 1979.
(6) It does not appear that the court carefully ascertained the
genuineness of the abstract of the decision of the cadastral
court (which the petitioners alleged to be uncertified).
(7) Ascertaining which is correct or wrong: the abstract of the
decree, or, the Municipal Index of Decrees calls for the
reopening of the reconstitution proceeding and the careful
examination of all available evidence as to who are the true
registered co-owners of Lot 2381, for the Court may have
unknowingly changed the ownership of Lot 2381 by vesting
title in a stranger or impostor.
The respondent court is ordered to reopen the proceeding for
reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381, with due notice to each of
the registered co-owners, the adjoining property owners, and
others who are required by law to be notified. They should be
separately furnished by respondent Francisco P. Otto, at their
respective residential addresses, with copies of the petition and
its annexes. The petitioners herein should be allowed to
intervene in the proceeding in order that their or their
predecessors' interest, if any, may be heard.
74

STRAIT TIMES VS CA
G.R. No. 126673, August 28, 1998
FACTS: Private Respondent Regino Pealosa allegedly lost his
owners duplicate of two land titles (TCT No. T-3767 and T28301). He filed a verified petition before the RTC-Tacloban for
the issuance of new owners duplicates. Thereafter, the RTC
granted the petition and declared the lost titles (T-3767 and T28301) as null and void and ordering the ROD-Tacloban City to
issue to Strait times, new owners duplicates of said titles.
Said judgment became final and executory on June 7, 1994.
Subsequently, on October 10, 1994, Strait Times caused a
Notice of Adverse Claim to be annotated on T-28301.
Strait Times claims that it bought the Lot covered by T-28301
from Conrado Callera who, purchased it from Regino Penalosa
in whose name T-28301 was registered. Its duly authorized
representative, Atty. Rafael Iriarte, had been in possession of the
said lot with the owners duplicate of T-28301 since August 14,
1984. Strait Times thus seeks to annul and set aside the Order of
the RTC with respect to the issuance of a new owners duplicate
of T-28301 on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
Strait Times argues that the allegedly lost duplicate certificate of
title has been in the possession of Atty. Iriarte all the while. They
claim that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue a new title
because the original title was not lost.
Regino Penalosa on the other hand counters that jurisdiction
over judicial reconstitution of lost or destroyed title is vested in
the RTC under Sec. 110, BP Blg. 1529, in relation to RA 26.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a new title
since the original title was not lost. YES. RTC HAS NO
JURISDICTION. (W/N the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the
aforementioned Order. NO.)
HELD: It has been established in the case of Serra Serra vs CA
that if a certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the
possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void
and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. In
the present case, it is undisputed that the allegedly lost owners
duplicate certificate of title was all the while in the possession of
Atty. Iriarte, who even submitted it as evidence. Indeed, Regino
Penalosa has not controverted the genuineness and authenticity
of the said certificate of title. These unmistakably show that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new
duplicate, and the certificate issued is itself void.
Indeed, Respondent Court, private respondent and the solicitor
general invoke the suspicious nature of petitioner's claim of title
over the land in dispute in order to bar the application of the said
cases. The matter of title, however, will have to be determined in
a more appropriate action, not in an action for the issuance of the
lost owner's duplicate certificate of title, or in a proceeding to
annul the certificate issued in consequence of such proceeding.
The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new
duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership
of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a
lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the
land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest
ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular

property.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE SYSTEM
vs. HON. NICANOR S. SISON
FACTS: On February 4, 1970, the Heirs of Don Mariano de San
Pedro, Domingo Cecilia and the Urban Agro Products Inc.,
private respondents herein, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a, verified petition for reconstitution of the transfer
certificates of title covering Lot Nos. 946, 947 and 948 of the Tala
Estate, Caloocan City, which were allegedly lost during the last
World War.
Petitioners prayed that the transfer certificates of titles covering
the said lands be reconstituted in their names on the basis of the
plans and technical descriptions attached to the petition. On April
6, 1970, the trial court issued the order granting the petition for
reconstitution.
Two years thereafter, or on July 17, 1973, the Isabela Cultural
Corporation filed a motion to set aside the order of April 6, 1970.
It mainly alleged that the order was null and void on ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition because
the order of February 5, 1970 setting the petition for hearing was
published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and not in the Official
Gazette, as prescribed under Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 26; that
said order was likewise a patent nullity for having been issued
without actual and personal notice upon Isabela, the actual
possessor and registered owner of Lots Nos. 946, 947 and 948.
On September 4, 1973, petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System, MWSS for short, a government corporation,
filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for leave to intervene and for
admission of its motion to set aside the order of April 6, 1970.
MWSS claimed that for failure to publish the notice of hearing in
the Official Gazette, as required by Section 13 of Rep. Act No.
26, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the petition
for reconstitution, much less to issue the order of reconstitution;
and that granting arguendo that the court did acquire jurisdiction
over the petition, the reconstituted titles cannot prevail over the
existing titles of MWSS.
Private respondents opposed the above motions of Isabela and
MWSS, advancing in support thereof, that, while Rep. Act No. 26
provides that publication of the notice of hearing be made in the
Official Gazette, the publication thereof in the Manila Daily
Bulletin is authorized by Section 1 of Rep. Act 4569 and,
therefore, constitutes substantial compliance with the law.
Acting on these motions, the trial court, this time presided by
respondent Judge Nicanor Sison, issued the order of March 27,
1974, setting aside the order of April 6, 1970 and declared
cancelled and of no further force and effect.
On May 15, 1974, the other private respondents, namely:
Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., Constancio B.
Maglana and Francisco Artigo filed a motion to intervene and to
set aside the order of March 27, 1974. They claimed to have
legal interest in the subject matter of the proceedings for being
innocent purchasers for value and holders of transfer certificates
of title derived from the reconstituted titles.
75

After submission of the opposition, reply and rejoinder,
respondent Judge Sison issued the questioned order of
September 4, 1975, ruling that since the petition for
reconstitution is a proceeding in rem, the publication of the notice
of hearing, whether made in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, was sufficient compliance with
the provisions of Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 26, in relation to
Rep. Act 4569.
thereof A fortiori, such proceedings for 'reconstitution' without

actual notice to the duly registered owners and holders of
Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land
officials and judges who disregard these basis and fundamental
principles will be held duly accountable therefore.
NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES & DEALINGS WITH
UNREGISTERED LANDS
ISSUE: WON the questioned orders authorizing the issuance of

reconstituted titles over the same lands must be struck down
HELD: There is no dispute that the notice of hearing of the
petition filed before the respondent court was never published in
the Official Gazette.
The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the
Official Gazette are mandatory and juristificational requisites.
A proceeding for judicial reconstitution of lost certificate of title
partakes of the nature of a land registration and cadastral
proceeding, where publication of the notice of initial hearing in
the Official Gazette is required.
Considering that petitioners are holders of subsisting certificates
of title which have not been cancelled either by judicial or
administrative process, the questioned orders authorizing the
issuance of reconstituted titles over the same lands must be
struck down. Needless to state, the anomalous situation where
two persons hold separate titles over the same lands cannot be
countenanced.
Courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining such
petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of title,
particularly where the petitions are flied, as in this case, after an
inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged loss.
Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure that
indispensable parties, i.e., the actual owners and possessors of
the lands involved, are duly served with actual and personal
notice of the petition (not by mere general publication),
particularly where the lands involved constitute prime developed
commercial land . . . The stability and indefeasibility of the
Torrens System would have been greatly imperiled had the
appellate court's judgment granting reconstitution prevailed,
resulting in two holders of Torrens certificates over the same
lands. We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and
controversies that have been spawned by the reckless and hasty
grant of such reconstitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles as
well as the numerous purchasers who have been victimized only
to find that the 'lands' purchased by them were covered by
forged or fake titles or their areas simply 'expanded' through
'table surveys' with the cooperation of, unscrupulous officials.
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by
duly issued existing Torrens titles cannot be the subject of
petitions., for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles
filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the
cancellation of such existing titles. The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution
of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already
covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly
registered owners. The very concept of stability and
indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System
registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two
certificates of title over the same land to two different holders
BUREAU OF FORESTRY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

FILOMENO GALLO
G.R. No. L-37995
August 31, 1987
FACTS: In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4

parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing an
approximate area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied
said parcels of land having bought them from the estate of the
late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in
turn from Canuto Gustilo in 1934.
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that

neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have
sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be
registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said
lands for at least 30 years.
The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain

portions of the lands, with an area of approximately 19.4
hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland
Block.
In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of land

from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted in place of
the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title.
Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute

petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor, since supervision and
control of said portion have been transferred from the Bureau of
Forestry to the PFC.
76

In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the
registration of the 4 parcels of land in the name of Filomeno
Gallo. It ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4
hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within a Timberland
Block, petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these
lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural
purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural
lands.
ISSUE: WON the classification of lands of public domain by the

Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or
mineral can be changed or varied by the court. NO
HELD: Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland

block classified and certified as such by the Director of
Forestry in 1956. The lands are needed for forest purposes and
hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the
subject of registration proceedings.
Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for
the Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land
is more valuable for forest purposes than for agriculture.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department and not of the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court
which determines the classification of lands of the public domain
but the Executive Branch, through the Office of the President.
Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their
title by prescription since the application filed by them
necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for
are part of the public domain and cannot be acquired by
prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law
that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
REPUBLIC vs VERA
1983
FACTS: G.R. No. L-35778: In 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez
filed with the lower court an application for registration of title
under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the
Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093
square meters, more or less.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the
application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to
private appropriation.
The Commissioner of Land Registration submitted a report that
the lot is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of
Mariveles, Province of Bataan.
Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, alleged that he is the owner of the

land applied for, having inherited the same from his parents,
consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started
possessing the land in 1938; that about 8 hectares of the land is
planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that
kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the
land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records
were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous,
open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner. 2 witnesses
corroborated Luisitos claim.
G.R. No. L-35779: On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma
Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in
the CFI of Bataan two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of
Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan,
containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and
378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and more
particularly described and Identified as portions of Lot 626,
Mariveles Cadastre.
The Chief Surveyor filed a report in the lower court, stating that
the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to have
been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as
required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Neither does it appear to overlap with any previously titled
property under Act 496.
The provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors
of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied
for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.
Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the
government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of
Leonides B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan
which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya,
Mariveles, Bataan containing an approximate area of EIGHTY
TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and described in the
attached photocopy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed for
Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable
and Disposable Block, certified by the Director of Forestry as
such on February 16, 1972."
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two
separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16,
1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and
adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and
Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
The Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre
was declared public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court
dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court
is without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application
for voluntary registration under Act 496. Petitioner likewise
stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to
registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been
subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the
Cadastral Act.
ISSUE: Whether the lots may be registered. NO
RULING: It is noteworthy that as per the report of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, the land subject matter of
the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the
77

Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case
No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot
No. 626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that
"portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11,
1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in
any part of the lands object of the petition is required by Section
9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or
within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving
the details required by law.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did
not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or
failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were
then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their
respective claims would have been issued to them. The
Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public
lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their
rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world.
Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the
same issues already determined by final judgment.
Even if it is not barred by res judicata, it is to be noted that in the
instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to
show that only portions of the entire area applied for are
cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the
State. The possession of public land however long the period
thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State. Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit
convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the
concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period
required by law.
1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent
was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for
registration and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title.
Thereafter, an Original Certificate of was issued to [respondent]
by defendant Register of Deeds.
On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel

in a letter-complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for
an investigation of the District Land Officer for irregularities in the
issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of [respondent].
The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila,
recommended to the Director of Lands the appropriate civil
proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title in the name of
[respondent].
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan from the

defendant Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as
PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount of P100,000.00 on
August 18, 1981. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage in favor of defendant PNB.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General

instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and
Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of Roxas City
and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free
Patent Application.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in procuring the patent.
HELD: Yes. A preponderance of evidence showed manifest fraud

in procuring the patent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE

ALEJAGA SR
G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002
FACTS: On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga,

Sr. filed with the District Land Office, Roxas City, a Free Patent
Application covering a parcel of land. It appears that on
December 27, 1978, when the application was executed under
oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his
investigation and verification of the land to the District Land
Office, Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the
District Land Officer of Roxas City approved the application and
the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the applicant. On March 16,
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in

accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Under Section
91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true.
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires

sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land
is located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to
present their claims. Note that this notice and the verification and
investigation of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an
78

application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of
Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free

Patent was dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other
hand, the Investigation & Verification Report prepared by Land
Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau
of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. In that
Report, he stated that he had conducted the "necessary
investigation and verification in the presence of the applicant."
Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth, the violation of
the rule cannot be condoned because, obviously, the required
notice to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and

investigation allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and
beyond the pale of the Public Land Act. As correctly pointed out
by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been
done only after the filing of the application. Hence, it would have
been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own
investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day
before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent. It
must also be noted that while the Alejagas insist that an
investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that it
preceded the filing of the application.
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation

was conducted is not sustained by the Verification &
Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature. Their
reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty is thus misplaced. Since Recios signature does not
appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no
presumption that an investigation and verification of the parcel of
land was actually conducted.
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners

contention that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is
void. Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the
Certificate of Title. The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis
for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in consequence
thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former. Verily,
we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the
Alejagas patent and title was tainted with fraud.
Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year

after the issuance of the latter. However, this indefeasibility of a
title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the
registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by
itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrants already existing
one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode
of acquiring ownership.
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the

State -- even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an
action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has
been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Further, this
indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as
to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been
committed in securing the title.
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title

cannot be invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the
title by means of fraud. Public policy demands that those who
have done so should not be allowed to benefit from their
misdeed. Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions filed
by the State to recover its own property acquired through fraud
by private individuals. This is settled law.
ISSUE: Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued,

there is another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 proscribes the encumbrance of a
parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within
five years from its grant. The prohibition against any alienation or
encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the
approval of every application.
ISSUE: Indefeasibility of Title
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any

right or title to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or
homestead patents; or any improvements thereon. They are
forbidden from enjoying such right, title or interest, if they have
not secured the consent of the grantee and the approval of the
secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes
other than education, charity, or easement of way.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of

title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the
public domain and becomes private property. Further, the Torrens
In the case at bar, the Free Patent was approved and issued on
March 14, 1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title was
issued on the same date. On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years
79

after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained from
Respondent PNB a loan. Despite the statement on the title
certificate itself that the land granted under the free patent shall
be inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate
mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the land.
A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed

with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and
cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI,
purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no
records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii)
the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in
question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation
established under Proclamation No. 423.
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr.

falls squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section
118 of the Public Land Act. A mortgage constitutes a legal
limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the mortgage
would necessarily result in the auction of the property.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later

offered in evidence) the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as
its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent,
then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and B as its Exhibits
"1" and 2, respectively.
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent,
within five years from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not
have encumbered the parcel land granted to him. The mortgage
he made over the land violated that condition. Hence, the
property must necessarily revert to the public domain, pursuant
to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI

Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI
QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in
Exhibit A is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged
his signature appearing in the same document and denied ever
signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding
office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad
stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed
involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being
outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SOUTHSIDE

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC.
FACTS: The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration
of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99
hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in
Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both in the active and
retired services, and their respective families, have been
occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by
the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized
mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI
was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk
of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30,
1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly
executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad,
Jr. of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The
total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was
P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert

witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon
who testified that Palads signature in Exhibit A is genuine. Mrs.
Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying
that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the
LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full
of the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the Republics complaint as it
considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no
longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on
appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: W/N the JUSMAG area, during the period material,
alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can
or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
RULING: Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable
character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively
been separated from the military reservation and declared as
alienable and disposable.
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by

the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR,
a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced
and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken
by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that
the puported signatures in the document are forgeries.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or
for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land
thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
sale or other disposition until again declared alienable.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued

Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT
No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village
Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation.
Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches

that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not
open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared
as disposable and alienable public land.
80

And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification
as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or
by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its
status as part of a military reservation remains even if
incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military
camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the
questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part of the FBMR as
originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while
private respondent SHAI would categorically say that the
petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that subject land
is within military reservation,and even dared to state that the
JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se its
own evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence both
the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described the property
as situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is
now renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint,
invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably
invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage to
prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title
embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence,
beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by
Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not plausibly be the
requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a
disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding
stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the
transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is
unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not
usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials
or agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private
respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed
transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is
necessarily void ab initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences
deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the authenticity of
such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the
deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads
allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the
PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both

experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at
the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in
an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same
day to Pasig City to appear before the notarizing officer. The
deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped
Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14
p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was
issued. In other words, the whole conveyance and registration
process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch
is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in
the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized
contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a
deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land
application to purchase required under Section 89 of the Public
Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale and of
documents usually accompanying an application to purchase,
inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation.
The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date
November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC,
Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a
subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence of
records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and
Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at
the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that
the deed of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No.
6030203 as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase
price An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to
prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its
evidence of the required payment, it failed to present and offer
the receipt in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no
such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be
adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the
document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI,
paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding
amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100
denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes
credulity to the limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the
basis of such Deed are declared void and cancelled
81

Land Titles and Deeds Complete Compilation of Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Land Titles and Deeds Complete Compilation of Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Petitioners: Spouses Dalion

The document was fictitious

His signature was a forgery, and

That the land is conjugal property, which he and his wife

HELD: RE: VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT

That this be embodied in a public instrument is not a requirement

That the sale is invalid because it is embodied in a

No particular form is required for its validity.

Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may

Delivery may either be actual (real) or constructive.

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

LAWS IMPLEMENTING LAND REGISTRATION

certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year

PURPOSES OF LAND REGISTRATION

A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds:

ISSUE: WON the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is valid.

The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada,

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on

In another and later case, one Francisco S. Bombast, single,

The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer,

After a joint trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

The only one of said parcels to which attention need be

MARIA CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS VS RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ

The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

the title, except claims which were noted at the time of

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

"In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More

Respondents contention: He purchased the properties using his

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a party

FACTS: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

an alleged right of lease.

Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute

FACTS: Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

Respondents contention: He purchased the properties using his

C. Registration under the Torrens System as Proceedings In

RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.

Ramon Genato is the owner of two parcels of land located at

September 6, 1989: Genato entered into an agreement with

The Da Jose Spouses asked for an extension of 30 days

Pending effectivity of said extension period, and without due

October 24, 1989: Ricardo Cheng went to Genatos

Despite these, Cheng still issued a check for P50,000 upon

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

The Da Jose Spouses met Genato at the Office of the

B. Purpose and Effect of Registration in General

After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng

The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land

The PR contends that the lots were registered under

Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case

To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the

Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it

Petitioners contention: The resolution of an incidental

Private respondents contention: The evidence of ownership