A.C. No. 9317 (Formerly CBD Case No.

12-3615),
June 04, 2014
ADELIA V. QUIACHON, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JOSEPH ADOR A. RAMOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V. Quiachon
(complainant), against her lawyer, Atty. Joseph Ador A.
Ramos (respondent). The latter represented
complainant, who was then the plaintiff in a labor case
filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and in a special proceeding case filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).1 Complainant charges
respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation
of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.2
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable
decision on 26 November 2007. Upon appeal, it was
reversed and set aside by the NLRC in its Decision
dated 25 July 2008.3 On 24 October 2008, the NLRC
also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent on complainants behalf. A Petition for
Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but
it affirmed the NLRCs reversal of the LAs Decision. The
Notice of the CA Decision was received by respondent
on 23 November 2010.
After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant
would always ask respondent about the status of her
case. The latter always told her that there was no
decision yet.
Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in
respondents office waiting for him to arrive, she noticed
a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her
labor case printed thereon.4 Complainant asked the
secretary of respondent to open the envelope and was
surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of
Judgment of the CAs Decision. Thereafter, complainant
tried repeatedly to contact respondent, but to no avail.
When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured
her that it was alright as they still had six months to
appeal the case to the Supreme Court. After that final
meeting, no updates on the labor case were ever
communicated to complainant.
With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of
Roxas City dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied.
Once again, respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC
Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was
received on 28 October 2008.
On 28 November 2011, complainant filed the instant
disbarment Complaint5 against respondent.
In his Comment,6 respondent averred that complainant
was informed of the status of the case. He claimed that
he had told complainant that he cannot cite any error of
law or abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of

Appeals decision that necessitates a Petition for Review

with the Supreme Court;7 thus, he supposedly advised
her to respect the decision of the Court of Appeals. 8
Respondent prayed that a Decision be rendered
dismissing the instant disbarment Complaint for lack of
merit.
In a Resolution9 dated 13 June 2012, the Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
During the pendency of the proceedings, specifically on
5 February 2013, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint.10
In his Report and Recommendation dated 23 April 2013,
IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Almeyda)
declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
True enough, it seems clear that respondent had been
remiss in failing to update complainant in what had
happened to the cases being handled by respondent in
behalf of complainant. There was a failure to inform
complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that
thereafter prevented the client from exercising her
options. There was neglect in that
regard.11cralawlawlibrary
However, in spite of finding neglect on respondents part,
he recommended the dismissal of the case against him,
stating that with the decision to withdraw the complaint,
there does not appear basis to go ahead with the
proceedings since without the complaint, there will be no
basis to make any finding of liability.12
On 11 May 2013, a Resolution was passed by the Board
of Governors of the IBP resolving to adopt and approve
the Report and Recommendation of investigation
commissioner Almeyda. The case against respondent
was dismissed with a warning that a repetition of the
same act shall be dealt with more severely.
This Court finds this to be an opportune time to remind
the investigating commissioners and the members of the
Board of Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a
disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or
abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to
continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyerrespondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.13
In the present case, Almeyda recommended the
dismissal of the case against respondent, even after
finding that the latter had been negligent. On the basis of
this finding, the latter was declared to have been remiss
in failing to update complainant in what had happened to
the cases being handled by him in behalf of
complainant.14 Still, Almeyda recommended the
dismissal of the case, because without the complaint,
there will be no basis to make any finding of liability. 15
The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the
recommendation.

The IBP Board of Governors should not have supported

Almeydas stance.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter
to the attention of the Court.16 There is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the
bar.17 Public interest is the primary objective. We
explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,18
viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case
allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way,
exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges x x x.
In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated
Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, it should have
imposed the appropriate penalty despite the desistance
of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.
The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA
Decision without any justifiable reason deserves
sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an
appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and
allow their client to retain another counsel.19
In Abay v. Montesino,20 the respondent-lawyer and his
client disagreed on the legal course to be taken
regarding the appealed case. The lawyer therein
strongly advised the client to abandon the appeal and to
consider the other available remedies. The client, on the
other hand, wanted to pursue it. Without obtaining the
assent of his client, the respondent-lawyer deemed it
wise to abandon the appeal without informing the former.
In finding the respondent-lawyer guilty of negligence, the
Court explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Not filing an appellant's brief is prejudicial because, as
happened in this case, such failure could result in the
dismissal of the appeal. The conduct of respondent
shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that
he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client.
The abandonment by the former of the latter's cause
made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in
him. Even if respondent was "honestly and sincerely"
protecting the interests of complainant, the former still
had no right to waive the appeal without the latter's

knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable

or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have
properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the
client to appoint another lawyer.21
In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep
the client informed of the status of the case, but also to
avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote the
clients cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the
case entrusted to him.
All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause.22
Regardless of their personal views, they must present
every remedy or defense within the authority of the law
in support of that cause.23 Whenever lawyers take on
their clients cause/s, they covenant that they will
exercise due diligence in protecting the clients rights;
their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family makes
them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their
client/s and make them answerable to the client, the
courts and society.24
In Pilapil v. Carillo,25 this Court upheld the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend a lawyer from
the practice of law for six months after finding that he
had failed to file a petition for certiorari of the adverse
decision rendered in the case of his client despite the
latters repeated follow-ups.cra1awlaw1ibrary
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos is found
GUILTY of negligence and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt
of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of
respondent as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be served on the IBP as well as on the court
administrator, who is directed to circulate these copies to
all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7337

September 29, 2014

ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross

Immoral Conduct1 filed with this Court on September 18,
2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas
(respondent).

041021200
4

7932

5,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

041061200
4

7941

5,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

04/13/2004

7944

5,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

04/16/2004

7954

10,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

041301200
4

7977

10,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of
respondent relative to a labor case2 he filed against
Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On
February 26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
complainant and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester Lopez and
Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of
the following, to wit:
1. Backwages ........................... P146,726.67
2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand
Fom Hw1dred Ninety One Pesos & 64/100 (Pl89,491.60)
[sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office,
wjthin ten (10) days from receipt hereof
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued
relative to aforesaid decision. During the implementation
of said writ, however, complainant discovered that
respondent had already collected the total amount of
P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received
said amount in the following manner:
Voucher
No.

Amount

021051200
4

7802

P20,000.00

Attorney's fees

02/13/2004

7833

10,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

Date

Purpose

021261200
4

7848

10,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

03/12/2004

7894

20,000.00

Partial payment
for judgment

Total Amount:

P95,000.00

Complainant also discovered that respondent

misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is authorized
to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in
fact he is not. Consequently, complainant made several
verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the
amount of P95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of
P20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus,
complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the
Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City.
Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a
conference before the barangay to resolve the issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received
P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments, but
denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He
explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional
attorney's fees equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary
award, on top of the attorney's fees that may be awarded
by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses
respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the
total award of P189,491.60, the sum of P17,226.57
representing respondent's professional fees has to be
deducted, leaving a balance of P172,275.13.6 Then from
said amount, complainant proposed that he will get
P100,000.00 and the balance of P72,275.13 shall belong
to respondent as and for his additional 25o/o attorney's
fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred
while handling the case. However, after receiving the
amount of P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the
amounts of P20,000.007 attorney's fees, P17,000.00
earlier given to complainant, and P2,000.00 paid to the
sheriff, what was left to respondent was only
P56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way
below the promised 25o/o attorney's fees and refund of
expenses in the total amount of P72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will
still be receiving a sum greater than what he expects to
receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to
receive from spouses Lopez the sum of P93,491.60.
Adding the Pl 7,000.00 respondent previously remitted to
complainant, the latter will get a total amount of

P110,491.60. This amount, according to respondent,

exceeds the amount of P100,000.00 complainant agreed
to and expected to receive.

Lopez had already given respondent the total amount of

P95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards
granted to him by the labor tribunal.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

To make matters worse, respondent withheld and

refused to deliver to the complainant said amount, which
he merely received on behalf of his client, even after
demand. Complainant brought the matter before the
barangay, but respondent simply ignored the same.
Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the
respondent to render an accounting and return the
money after demand raises the presumption that he
converted it to his own use.14 His unjustified withholding
of the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action against him.15

On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the
Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation9 with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended
that the respondent be meted the penalty of two (2)
years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return,
in restitution all the amounts in his possession which are
due to complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees.10
On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-139,11 which approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice
of law for two years, but with the modification that
respondent should restitute the sum of P85,500.0012 to
the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to
promptly account to his client the funds received in the
course of his professional engagement and return the
same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the
utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their
fiduciary relationship."13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the
Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to "account for
all money or property collected or received for or from
the client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand,
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of
his client when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions
from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004 received
payments for attorney's fees and partial payments for
monetary awards on behalf of complainant from spouses
Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to
three months he had been receiving payment,
respondent neither informed the complainant of such
fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only
when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and being
implemented when complainant discovered that spouses

Respondent justifies his action by asserting that

complainant authorized him to receive payment. He
implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of
money he received from spouses Lopez to his additional
25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all
expenses he incurred for the case, in the total amount of
P72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount
of P95,000.00 the amounts of P20,000.00, P17,000.00,
and P2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his
dismay was only P56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, other than his self-serving
statements, there is nothing in the records which would
support respondent's claim that he was authorized to
receive the payments. Neither is there proof that
complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney's
fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly
incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did not
present any document, retainer's agreement, or itemized
breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support
his claim.1wphi1 In any event, even assuming that
respondent was authorized to receive payments, the
same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly
informing his client of the amounts he received in the
course of his professional employment. "The fiduciary
nature of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money
or property collected or received for or from the client.
He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the
property and money he has collected for his client."16
"The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees
on the money in his hands collected for his client does
not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting."17 Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by
the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney's
fees."18

In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for

and return the money when due and upon demand
violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack
of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action."19
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the
failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to account
for and to return money or property belonging to a client
has been suspension from the practice of law for two
years."20 Thus, the IBP Board of Governors did not err
in recommending the imposable penalty. Considering,
however, that this is respondent's first offense and he is
already a nonagenarian,21 the Court, in the exercise of
its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty
of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the
Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY
of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for one (1) year upon the finality
of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more
severly.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within
90 days from finality of this Resolution, the net amount of
P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from finality of this Resolution until the full amount is
returned. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive
will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Sanicas' record as a
member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 7904 : September 22, 2008]

RHODORA B. YUTUC V. ATTY. DANIEL RAFAEL B.
PENUELA

that on November 22, 2005, she engaged the services of

Penuela to handle, for an agreed fee of PhP 50,000, an
ejectment case against the occupants of her parents'
property in Kabangkalan City, Negros Occidental. For
the purpose, she executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of Penuela and gave him PhP 25,000 as
advance attorney's fees. Yutuc further alleged that a
year after returning from abroad where she was a
resident, she learned that Penuela had yet to file the
case. Her demand for the return of at least a part of the
attorney's fees thus advanced went, according to her,
unheeded.
In his answer filed in compliance with an order from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline, Penuela alleged that of the amount he
received, PhP 20,000 represented his acceptance fee
and the PhP 5,000 was to answer for filing fees,
transportation, and other similar expenses. Explaining
the non-filing of the ejectment suit, Penuela stated that,
as of January 3, 2006, a demand letter to vacate had
already been sent out, but he could not as yet file an
ejectment case because a Declaration of Heirship was
not yet in his possession. This document, so Penuela
alleged, was a jurisdictional requirement per a Court of
Appeals (CA) ruling he recently encountered.[1] He also
alleged telling Yutuc of the said requirement only on
October 5, 2006 upon her return from abroad and
explained, when asked, the reason why he was not able
to contact Yutuc's son, Erwin, or Yutuc's attorney-in-fact,
Bethel Esceller.
To the answer, Yutuc countered with a reply, to which
Penuela filed a rejoinder.
Following the submission by the parties of their
respective position papers, the Commission, thru
Commissioner Antonio S. Tria, submitted an
Investigation Report dated January 25, 2008 which the
IBP Board of Governors later adopted and forwarded to
this Court. In the report, the Commission recommended
that Penuela be adjudged guilty of negligence in
violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Canon 18, Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
respectively providing:
Canon 16, Rule 16.01.-A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Complainant Rhodora B. Yutuc charges Atty. Daniel

Rafael B. Penuela with misconduct and negligence and
seeks his disbarment.

Canon 16, Rule 18.03.-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal

matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Commission predicated its inculpatory finding on
Penuela's conflicting statements respecting the fees he
received, implying lack of candor on his part, inordinate
delay, and failure to file the ejectment case for which he
had already received an acceptance fee. The
Commission recommended that Penuela be meted the
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law.

In her sworn complaint, with enclosures, Yutuc alleged

The recommendation is well-taken.

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of

this Court dated 22 September 2008:
A.C. No. 7904 (Rhodora B. Yutuc v. Atty. Daniel Rafael
B. Penuela)

Attorneys are expected to exercise due diligence on

legal matters entrusted to them by their clients. Every
case they accept deserves their full attention, diligence,
and skill.[2] They too owe it to the court, their clients, and
other lawyers to be candid and fair.[3] In this regard, the
Rules of Court provides that a member may be
suspended or removed from office as an attorney for any
malpractice or misconduct in office.[4] A scrutiny of the
pleadings of both parties readily reveals Penuela's guilt
for misconduct, negligence, and lack of candor. A period
of one year after receipt of his acceptance fee is far too
long a time for a lawyer to prepare and file a simple
ejectment complaint. Recall that an SPA was executed
as early as November 22, 2005 to enable Penuela to file
the necessary complaint. His proffered excuse of still
needing an extrajudicial Declaration of Heirship as a
condition to such filing is disingenuous, to say the least.
The alleged precedent CA decision, entitled Spouses
Eduardo Gargar and Mismar Jumawan v. Milagros
Ciocon and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59005,[5]
Penuela cited as basis for requiring such declaration
was promulgated on May 8, 2006, or some six (6)
months after he agreed to accept the ejectment case.
Penuela's act of superimposing a new date, April 21,
2006, over the date November 22, 2005, the original
date of the SPA,[6] was a crude but dishonorable attempt
to mislead the Commission and eventually this Court.
Just as censurable was Penuela's bent on muddling the
facts of the case. The following excerpts from the
investigation report suggest as much:
In [respondent's] answer,[7] the entire case was for the
amount of Php 50,000.00, half of which was paid in
cash. Yet in his rejoinder to the Reply,[8] he makes a turn
around and asserts that "the total amount of the package
for the services of the undersigned respondent is not for
the Amount of Fifty Thousand (Php 50,000.00) [P]esos
but merely for the amount of Twenty Thousand (Php
20,000.00) Pesos as acceptance fee and the remaining
amount that was yet to be paid of Twenty Five Thousand
(Php 25,000.00) Pesos was intended for the expenses in
the execution of the judgment and demolition of the
houses of the supposed three (3) defendants."
Again, in his Position Paper, respondent asserts "The
Parties agreed that the entire case was for the amount of
Fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) Pesos. Out of said
amount Twenty Thousand (Php 20,000.00) Pesos will be
the retainership/acceptance fee of counsel, Five
Thousand (Php 5,000.00) Pesos will be used to cover
filing fee, transportation fees, mailing, paper,
reproduction, notarization and other related expenses."
(Footnotes added.)
In all then, Penuela, after receiving an advance from
Yutuc, has failed to render the legal services agreed
upon. A reciprocal effort towards complying with his part
of the bargain would have been becoming of Penuela,
as a professional of good will. But that kind of gesture
has already been overtaken by events. Penuela had
shown, through his dealing with Yutuc involving the

recovery of a piece of land from alleged illegal

occupants, a want of due diligence and basic candor
expected of members of the bar. We thus agree with the
findings of the Commission as to Penuela's culpability,
but not only for negligence. Accordingly, the Court
hereby adopts the Commission's recommendation with
modification that Penuela be made to account or return
to complainant Yutuc the PhP 25,000 he received with
legal interest from the time he received the same. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for
filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case, should
be immediately returned.[9] Once a lawyer accepts
money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is
established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client's cause.[10] The Code mandates that every lawyer
shall hold in trust all funds of the client that may come
into the lawyer's possession.[11] Since he was not able to
file the ejectment case, then reimbursement is proper to
prevent unjust enrichment on the part of Penuela.
The records of the Bar Confidant indicate that Penuela
does not have any record of administrative cases and
sanctions against him. Accordingly, the recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year would suffice to protect the interests of the public
and the legal profession. The Court reiterates that the
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution
and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar.[12]
Considering the serious consequence of disbarment,
said penalty shall be imposed only when the lawyer's
misconduct constitutes a criminal act and/or is
committed under revolting or scandalous circumstance
as to shock the common sense of decency.[13]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Daniel Rafael B. Penuela is
adjudged GUILTY of misconduct, negligence, and lack
of candor in the performance of his responsibilities to his
client in violation of Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is also ordered to return to
complainant Rhodora B. Yutuc, the amount of PhP
25,000 with legal interest of six (6) percent per annum
from the time of his receipt of the money on November
22, 2005 up to finality of this Resolution and twelve (12)
percent per annum from finality thereof until paid.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent's
personal record as attorney. Copies shall likewise be
furnished the IBP and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9115

September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL,

Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty.
Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and
unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by
private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil
(Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella
Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of
the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was
adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta
by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC.
PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the time of her
death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations
primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing
real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc.
(URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy
Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty
Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim
Uy Realty, Inc.3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca,
through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6
continuously failed and refused to comply with the court
order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-ininterest to all of Pacitas properties, as well as her
requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends
and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacitas
stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She
added that respondent mortgaged a commercial
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T133606 (subject property) in favor of Philippine Savings
Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an
existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15,
1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in
his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized
her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10
Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the
said property by executing the corresponding deed of
conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and
accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no
avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only
on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted
various legal actions and remedies that respondent and

URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her

pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13
respondent denied Rebeccas allegations and raised the
affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription.
He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases
raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of
the subject trust agreement. He also contended that the
parties transactions in this case were made way back in
1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed
until Bella came into the picture and instituted various
suits covering the same issue.14 As such, he sought the
dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the
payment of moral damages and attorneys fees by way
of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for the
reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of
a misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real
facts surrounding their dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation
with Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention,18
praying that the investigation of the charges against
respondent continue in order to weed out erring
members of the legal profession.19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis
Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent
guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of
suspension for a period of six (6) months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion to withdraw
did notserve as a bar for the further consideration and
investigation ofthe administrative case against
respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o investigation
shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant
to prosecute the same." Separately, the Investigating
Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping,
noting that disciplinary cases are sui generis and may,
therefore, proceed independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the
good moral character required from members of the Bar

when the latter failed to comply with the demands of

Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to
mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging
the subject property without the formers consent. In fine,
respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which
the above-stated penalty was recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the
members of the legal profession, engraves an overriding
prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of
the errant lawyers penalty depends on the factual
circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave
rise to the present administrative case largely constitutes
an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by
the parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebeccas motion
to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise
agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which
involves the subject propertys alleged disposition in
violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court
sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of
Rebecca which she takes as an invocation of her
rights under the subject trust agreement as well as
respondents acts of mortgaging the subject property
without the formers consent, sprung from his own
assertion of the rights he believed he had over the
subject property. The propriety of said courses of action
eludes the Courts determination,for that matter had
never been resolved on its merits in view of the
aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her
motion to withdraw that the allegations she had

previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the

real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that
respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature
and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire
satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully
convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in
law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of
facts, the observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water
so as to support the finding of "serious misconduct"
which would warrant its recommended penalty.1wphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that
respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as
admitted, mortgaging the subject property,
notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a
legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself
even to the slightest risk of committing a property
violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's
reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent
blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar,
but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a
lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by
the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating
Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is
his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of
this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00
would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to
pay a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's
record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2361 February 9, 1989

LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was
filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 5 February 1982 against respondent,
Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics,
alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an
ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to
her the rentals collected by respondent on different
dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he
report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only
after approximately a year from actual receipt that
respondent turned over his collections to complainant
after the latter, through another counsel, acquired
knowledge of the payment and had demanded the
same.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted
having received the payment of rentals from
complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the
complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the
complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his
success in collecting the rentals.
We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were conducted and the parties presented their
respective evidence.
After investigation, the Solicitor General submitted the
following Findings and Recommendation:
Findings:
The issue to be resolved is whether
there was unreasonable delay on the
part of the respondent in accounting for
the funds collected by him for his former
client, the complainant herein, for which
unprofessional conduct respondent
should be disciplined.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges
himself not to delay any man for money
or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. Under paragraph 11 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated
to report promptly the money of client
that has come to his possession and
should not commingle it with his private
property or use it for his personal
purpose without his client's consent viz:
Money of the client or
other trust property
coming into the
possession of the
lawyer should be
reported promptly, and
except with the client's
know and consent
should not be
commingled with his

private or be used by
him.
And paragraph 32 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics further requires a lawyer to
maintain a reputation for honesty and
fidelity to private trust:
... But above all, a
lawyer will find his
highest honor in a
deserved reputation for
fidelity to private trust
and to public duty, as an
honest man and as a
patriotic and loyal
citizen.
In the instant case, respondent failed to
observe his oath of office. It is
undisputed that the relation of attorney
and client existed between Licuanan
and Melo at the time the incident in
question took place. The records
disclose that on August 8, 1979,
respondent, as Licuanan's attorney,
obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor
against Aida Pineda whereby the latter
was directed by the City Court of Manila
to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals
from October, 1978 and succeeding
months thereafter.
When several months had elapsed
without them hearing a word from
Pineda, respondent decided to send her
a letter on February 4, 1980, demanding
that she pay the monthly rental of her
apartment otherwise he will be
constrained to take the necessary legal
action against her to protect the interest
of his client (Exhibit "A", p. 8, record).
On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to
the demand of Melo. She went to
respondent's office and paid him
P3,060.00 for which respondent gave
her a receipt for the said amount
representing her rental payments for
October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the
rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. "B", p.
9, Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980,
Pineda again went back to respondent
and paid the rentals of her apartment for
the months of March and April, 1980 in
the sum of P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10,
Ibid.). Not only that, respondent again
received from Pineda on June 30, 1980
rental payments covering the months of
May, June and July, 1980 in the total
sum of P540.00 (Exh. "D" p. 11, Ibid.).
And, on September 29, 1980, he
received and issued Pineda a receipt for
P540.00 covering rental payments for
the months of August, September and
October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.). After

four months had elapsed, or on January

23, 1981, he collected again from
Pineda the total sum of P720.00
covering the months of October,
November, December, 1980 and
January 1981 (Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.).
During the entire twelve-month period
that respondent had been receiving the
said rental payments of Pineda, he did
not bother to inform or report to
complainant about the said payments
and instead unnecessarily retained the
money. He allowed the money to
accumulate for a year and kept
complainant in the dark as to the
progress of the case. He did not even
attempt to tell her about the money that
had come into his possession
notwithstanding the fact that
complainant used to call him and inquire
regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn.,
Sept. 10, 1985).
It was only when Atty. Ponciano B.
Jacinto, the new counsel retained by
complainant, wrote respondent a letter
on May 4, 1981, advising him to
surrender the money to complainant that
he accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15,
Ibid.). But this was rather late because
as early as April 27, 1981, complainant,
not knowing that respondent had been
receiving the rental payments of Pineda,
instituted an administrative case against
her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society
accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising
from her alleged failure to pay the rent
of her apartment as ordered by the City
Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
037276 and claiming that she has
ignored and refused to pay her just
obligation (Exh. "G", p. 14, Ibid.).
This led therefore Pineda to bring an
action against her (Licuanan) for
damages before the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, for she allegedly
suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation arising from the unfounded
administrative case Licuanan filed
against her (Aida Pineda), since as
borne out by the records, she had been
paying her obligation religiously to the
lawyer of Licuanan, herein respondent
(pp. 48-52, record). Clearly, this
unfortunate incident would not have
happened had respondent been only
true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e., to be
honest and candid towards his client.
Thus, we find it hard to believe
respondent's defense that he kept the

money of complainant for a year merely

because he wanted to surprise her with
his success in collecting the rental
payments from Pineda. On the contrary,
it is very much discernible that he did
not surrender immediately the money to
complainant because he was using it for
his own benefit. Common sense dictates
that by unnecessarily withholding the
money of complainant for such length of
time, respondent deprived her of the use
of the same. It is therefore too credulous
to believe his explanation, which is
flimsy and incredible Respondent's
actuation casts doubt on his honesty
and integrity. He must know that the
"highly fiduciary" and "confidential
relation" of attorney and client requires
that the attorney should promptly
account for all funds and property
received or held by him for the client's
benefit, and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct, as succinctly
held by the Honorable Supreme Court in
the case of Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et
al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi,
Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65
SCRA 304, to wit:
A lawyer, under his
oath, pledges himself
not to delay any man for
money or malice and is
bound to conduct
himself with all good
fidelity to his clients. He
is obligated to report
promptly the money of
his clients that has
come into his
possession. He should
not commingle it with
his private property or
use it for his personal
purposes without his
client's consent. He
should maintain a
reputation for honesty
and fidelity to private
trust (Pars. 11 and 32,
Canons of Legal
Ethics).
Money collected by a
lawyer in pursuance of
a judgment in favor of
his clients is held in
trust and must be
immediately turned over
to them (Aya vs.
Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).
xxx xxx xxx

A lawyer may be disbarred for any

deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in his office as attorney or
for any violation of the lawyer's oath
(Ibid, sec. 27).
The relation between an attorney and
his client is highly fiduciary in its nature
and of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential in character, requiring a
high degree of fidelity and good faith (7
Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that special
relationship, 'lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property
received by them on behalf of their
clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. The fact that a
lawyer has a lien for fees on money in
his hands collected for his clients does
not relieve him from the duty of promptly
accounting for the funds received.
(Emphasis supplied).
In fine, we are convinced that
respondent is guilty of breach of trust
reposed in him by his client. Not only
has he degraded himself but as an
unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the
fair name of an honorable profession (In
re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David,
84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm.
Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he
placed his client in jeopardy by
becoming a defendant in a damage suit;
thus, instead of being a help to his
client, he became the cause of her
misery. He, therefore, deserves a severe
punishment for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57
Phil. 8, 11; In re Bamberger, April 17,
1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy, et al., vs. Atty.
Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.)
Clearly, respondent is guilty of
professional misconduct in the
discharge of his duty as a lawyer.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, we respectfully
recommend that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a
period of not less than one (1) year, and
that he be strongly admonished to
strictly and faithfully observe his duties
to his clients. (pp. 78-85, Rollo)
We find the foregoing findings well considered and adopt
the same but differ with the recommendation.
The actuations of respondent in retaining for his
personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of
P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his client, the
complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and
withholding information on the same despite inquiries
made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath
to which he swore observance, and an evident

transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics

particularly:
11. DEALING WITH TRUST
PROPERTY
The lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his personal benefit
or gain he abuses or takes advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the
client of other trust property coming into
the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly,
and should not under any circumstance
be commingled with his own or be used
by him. *
Indeed, by his professional misconduct, respondent has
breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has
shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which
should characterize an attorney-client relationship and
the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was
compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for
non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy
by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said
tenant against her By force of circumstances,
complainant was further compelled to engage the
services of another counsel in order to recover the
amount rightfully due her but which respondent had
unjustifiedly withheld from her.
Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we
are constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice
and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of
honesty and good moral character. He has violated his
oath not to delay any man for money or malice,
besmirched the name of an honorable profession and
has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him
by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the
severest punishment.
WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to
maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal
profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR
respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of
law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts
of the country and spread on the personal record of
respondent Atty. Manuel L. Melo.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6297

July 13, 2004

DOLORES D. PARIAS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. OSCAR P. PAGUINTO, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
A lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and
time to every case he accepts. A lawyer impliedly
warrants that he possesses the necessary diligence,
learning and skill to handle each case. He should exert
his best judgment and exercise reasonable and ordinary
care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of his client's
cause.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2001, complainant Dolores Dryden
Parias ("Parias") engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto ("Paguinto") to annul her
marriage to Danilo Soriano. They agreed that for the
legal services, Parias would pay Paguinto an
acceptance fee of P25,000, the filing fee of P2,500 and
other incidental expenses.
On 2 December 2001, Parias paid Paguinto P10,000 in
cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee. An
acknowledgment receipt evidenced this payment.1
Parias gave Paguinto a diskette containing a narration
of what happened between her and her estranged
husband Danilo Soriano. Parias also furnished
Paguinto with a copy of her marriage contract with
Soriano. Before the end of December 2001, Parias
gave Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee.
Sometime between January and April 2002, Parias
inquired from Paguinto on the progress of her annulment
case. Paguinto informed her that the case was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 64 ("RTCManila, Branch 64"), before Judge Ricaforte and that the
hearing was scheduled on 25 April 2002. Before the
hearing, Parias requested for a meeting with Paguinto
but the secretary informed her that the hearing was
cancelled. The secretary further informed Parias that
the judge reset the succeeding hearings originally
scheduled on 29 May 2002 and 26 June 2002 because
the judge was sick or out of town.
On the first week of July 2002, Parias went to the trial
court to inquire about her case but the court personnel in
RTC-Manila, Branch 64 informed her that there was no
such case filed in their court. Parias asked Paguinto
for the case number, date of filing, copy of the petition
and the court where the annulment case was pending.
Paguinto told Parias that the records were at his office
and that he was in Malolos, Bulacan attending to a
case. It turned out that there was no annulment case

filed in RTC-Manila, Branch 64. Paguinto promised to

return the money that Parias paid as down payment.
However, Paguinto returned the P10,000 only after
Parias filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
("CBD") of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP")
the present complaint for disbarment.
In the Order dated 14 February 2003,2 the CBD directed
Paguinto to answer the complaint. Paguinto asked for
an extension of 15 days to file his Answer. The CBD
granted the extension in the Order dated 19 March
2003.3 However, Paguinto failed to file his Answer within
the extended period and thus the CBD declared him in
default in the Order dated 15 July 2003.4 After the
hearing, Parias submitted her Position Paper praying
that the CBD declare Paguinto guilty of violation of Rule
16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
On 10 September 2003, Parias filed an Affidavit of
Withdrawal5 of the complaint. Parias stated that
Paguinto "personally explained exhaustively the reasons
why he failed to comply with his obligations" and she
realized that the complaint arose due to a
"misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and
miscommunication." Parias manifested that she was
withdrawing the complaint, as she was no longer
interested in pursuing the case.
On the same date, Paguinto filed a Manifestation and
Motion6 explaining that he failed to attend the hearing on
30 July 2003 because he was in Tabuk, Kalinga
attending a hearing in a criminal case for frustrated
homicide. He apologized to Parias for his actuations
claiming "himself solely to be blamed." He further
declared that he failed to timely prepare and file the
petition for annulment because he spends his time
mostly in Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Cavite where he
practices law catering to those "clients who have less in
life."
Commissioner's Report & Recommendation
The IBP designated Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
("Commissioner") as Commissioner to conduct a formal
investigation of the case. The Commissioner found
Paguinto negligent in performing his duties as a lawyer
and as an officer of the court. The Commissioner
declared that a lawyer has the duty to give adequate
attention, care and time to his cases, accepting only as
many cases as he can handle. Paguinto failed to comply
with this duty. The Commissioner recommended the
suspension of Paguinto from the practice of law for six
months.
The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commissioner.

Parias gave Paguinto P10,000 cash as partial payment
of the acceptance fee. Parias also gave Paguinto
P2,500 for the filing fee. Paguinto led Parias to believe
that he had filed the annulment case. Paguinto informed
Parias that the case was filed with the RTC-Manila,
Branch 64, before Judge Ricaforte. However, Parias
later found out that Paguinto never filed the annulment
case in court.
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("the Code") provides that a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected for or from the client.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client's cause.7 Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but
not used for failure to file the case must immediately be
returned to the client on demand.8 Paguinto returned the
money only after Parias filed this administrative case
for disbarment.
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity
to the cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case,
his acceptance is an implied representation that he
possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and
ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to
exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of
the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable
and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense
of the case.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time
to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails
in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence,
a lawyer must accept only as much cases as he can
efficiently handle, otherwise his clients' interests will
suffer.9 It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter. He must also
give adequate attention to his legal work.
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost
learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to
practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public
that the licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge
and diligence to manage their cases.10 The legal
profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family.
In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara,11 we ruled:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and must be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He shall serve his client with

competence and diligence, and his duty of entire

devotion to his client's cause not only requires,
but entitles him to employ every honorable
means to secure for the client what is justly due
him or to present every defense provided by law
to enable the latter's cause to succeed. An
attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests
commences from his retainer until his effective
release from the case or the final disposition of
the whole subject matter of the litigation. During
that period, he is expected to take such
reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his
client's interests may require.
And failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code. 12
Rule 18.01 of the Code is clear. A lawyer shall not
undertake a legal service that he is not qualified to
render. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer
shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. He has the duty to prepare for trial with
diligence and deliberate speed. Rule 18.03 of the Code
also provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence shall render
him liable.
One last point. Parias executed an Affidavit of
Withdrawal13 of the complaint stating that she was
withdrawing the administrative complaint against
Paguinto after realizing that "said complaint against the
respondent arose due to misapprehension of facts,
misunderstanding and miscommunication." Paguinto, on
the other hand, submitted a Manifestation and Motion
apologizing to Parias for his actuations and admitting
that he was "solely to be blamed." A compromise or
withdrawal of charges does not terminate an
administrative complaint against a lawyer,14 especially in
this case where the lawyer admitted his misconduct.
Parias's affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case
does not exonerate Paguinto in any way. We reiterate
our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos15 that
[A] proceeding for suspension or disbarment is
not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance. They are undertaken
solely for the public welfare. x x x The attorney is
called upon to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as

all good citizens may have in the proper

administration of justice
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Oscar P.
Paguinto GUILTY of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we penalize Atty. Oscar P.
Paguinto with SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS from
the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal
record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7902
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD,
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 31, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION

office as attorney and is thus unfit to continue

discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the
bar.
The complainant, Torben Overgaard (Overgaard)
engaged the services of respondent Valdez as his legal
counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed
against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of
legal fees of P900,000.00 as stipulated in a Retainer
Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his
obligations under their contract for legal services,
ignored the complainants request for a report of the
status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected
the complainants demands for the return of the money
paid to him.
Complainant Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment
against Valdez before the IBP. During the investigation,
respondent Valdez did not participate despite due notice.
He was declared in default for failure to submit an
answer and attend the mandatory conference. He did
not submit a position paper or attend the hearing.
On September 30, 2008, this Court held that respondent
Valdez committed multiple violations of the canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive
portion of this Decision states:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez
is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED
to immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the
amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November
27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial demand. A twelve
percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent
(6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of
promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof.
He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers
and documents received from the complainant.[4]

PER CURIAM:

xxxx

At bar is a Motion for Reconsideration,[1] dated, October

21, 2008 filed by respondent Godwin R. Valdez (Valdez),
praying that the September 30, 2008 decision of this
Court disbarring him from the practice of law be
reconsidered by remanding the records of the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission
on Bar Discipline. He further prays that the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline be directed to receive his
Answer, evidence and Position Paper and thereafter,
that he be absolved of the charges against him and that
his name be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.[2]

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration filed on October

21, 2008, by respondent Valdez, based on the following
grounds:

We have previously decided in Torben B. Overgaard v.

Atty. Godwin R. Valdez,[3] that respondent Valdez
committed malpractice and gross misconduct in his

I.
RESPONDENT HAD ABSOLUTELY NO
KNOWLEDGE THAT COMPLAINANT HAD FILED
CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND THAT THERE WERE
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AND AN
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

II.
HAD HE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY
TO BE HEARD, HE WOULD HAVE PRESENTED
STRONG, VALID AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES TO
THE CHARGES LEVELLED AGAINST HIM WHICH
DEFENSES, CORRECTLY APPRECIATED, WOULD
HAVE TOTALLY EXONERATED HIM. [5]
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
On the first issue, the respondent argues that the IBP
has no jurisdiction over him since proof of service of the
initiatory pleading to the defendant is a jurisidictional
requirement.[6] He states in his Motion for
Reconsideration that he had no inkling whatsoever of the
existence of the disbarment case filed by the
complainant.[7] He asserts that, in September 2006, he
abruptly abandoned his office at Suite 402 Pacific Irvine
Bldg., 2746 Zenaida St., at Makati City following
persistent and serious threats to his physical safety and
security x x x. [8] On the advice of his close friends and
clients to lie low and make himself scarce,[9] he stayed
for a few days in his residence at Imus, Cavite then
relocated to Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.[10] He has been
holding office and residing in Bukidnon since then, and
he only found out about the decision from a colleague in
Bukidnon who read the decision from the Courts
website.
He claims that because he abruptly abandoned[11] his
Makati office on September 2006, he was not able to
receive the demand letter[12] sent by the complainant.
[13] He was also not able to receive any of the notices,
orders and other papers pertaining to the disbarment
proceedings because at the time these were sent to his
Makati office address, he was already holding office in
Bukidnon.
Complainant Overgaard filed an Opposition/Comment to
the Motion for Reconsideration[14] on December 9,
2008. He counters that respondent Valdez was duly
notified of the charge against him and of all the
proceedings at the IBP,[15] since all notices were sent to
Suite 402 Pacific Irvine Bldg., No. 2746 Zenaida St.,
Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,[16] which is the
respondents office address indicated in his letterhead
and made known to the complainant and to the public.
He sent the respondent a letter dated November 27,
2006, demanding that the latter return the documents
and the P900,000.00 paid to him in relation to the case.
The demand letter was sent to the same address and
was received by one whose signature was RRJ, as
noted in the Registry Return Receipt.[17]
Complainant Overgaard argues that respondent cannot
claim ignorance of the disbarment case against him,
since this is a natural offshoot of a wrongful act.[18]
Complainant Overgaard points out that when respondent
Valdez left for Bukidnon, he already knew that the

complainant was looking for him and demanding the

return of the money and documents he received from the
complainant.[19] The November 27, 2006 demand letter
further contained a warning that [i]f [the respondent] will
not return the documents and the money within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, [the complainant] will bring the
matter to the proper authorities/forum for the redress of
[his] grievances.[20] The complainant denies that he or
his business partners know of respondents
whereabouts, and he argues that it is the respondents
duty as his counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a
system that efficiently takes into account all notices sent
to him.[21]
We hold that respondent was given reasonable notice of
the complaint for disbarment against him.
A copy of the Complaint as well as the Order[22] to
answer the Complaint was sent by the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline to the respondents Makati office
address, and it was duly received by the respondent.
The Registry Return Receipt[23] shows that it was also
received by one RRJ, whose signature appears on the
space for the signature of the addressees agent. The
respondent cannot claim lack of knowledge of the
complaint for disbarment against him when the
Complaint and the Order for him to submit an Answer
were duly received by his agent at his Makati law office.
Succeeding notices in connection with the disbarment
proceedings were also sent to the respondents Makati
law office. He cannot escape liability for his misdeeds by
feigning ignorance of the disbarment case, since the
notices in connection with the proceedings were sent to
his office address made known to the public and
properly received by his agent.
Respondent Valdez was given full opportunity, upon
reasonable notice, to answer the charges against him
and to present evidence on his behalf. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline was correct in proceeding
with the investigation ex parte, because it was due to the
respondents own fault and negligence that he was not
able to submit an answer to the Complaint and
participate in the investigation. Rule 138, Section 30
provides that an attorney should be heard before he is
removed or suspended; but if, upon reasonable notice,
an attorney fails to appear and answer the accusations
against him, the matter may be dealt with ex parte. Rule
138, Section 30 states:
SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended
from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the
charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if
upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer

the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the

matter ex parte. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents feeble excuse that he was no longer
holding office at his Makati office address at the time the
Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was sent
to him is unacceptable. Ordinary prudence would have
guarded against his alleged failure to receive the
notices. All notices to the respondent were sent to his
Makati office address, which was the address made
known to the public and to the complainant. This is even
the address printed on the letterhead of the Retainer
Agreement between the complainant and the
respondent. And although the respondent claims that he
had to make himself scarce[24] due to threats to his life
and safety, this does not mean that he avoids the
responsibility of taking account of his mail. The
respondent owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt
a system whereby he would be able to receive mail sent
to his law office during his absence. Assuming that
circumstances would justify the respondents abrupt
abandonment[25] of his Makati office, it absolutely does
not give him the license to abandon his clients as well.
This brings us to the second issue: whether or not
respondent committed multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and thus his disbarment
should be sustained.
The respondent argues that he did not abandon his
client. He denies that he refused to perform any of his
obligations under the contract for legal services between
himself and the complainant. He claims that he gave the
complainant legal advice, and that he searched for and
interviewed witnesses in relation to the cases he was
handling for the complainant.[26] He also denies that he
ignored the complainants requests for a report of the
cases entrusted to his care. He claims that he gave
periodic status reports on the result of his work, that he
returned the documents in connection with the case, and
that he rendered an accounting of the money that he
actually received.
We find that respondents disbarment should be upheld.
From the facts of the case, and based on his own
admissions, it is evident that he has committed multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his
client and without making sure that the cases he was
handling for his client were properly attended to during
his absence, and without making arrangements whereby
he would receive important mail, the respondent is
clearly guilty of gross negligence. A lawyer cannot simply
disappear and abandon his clients and then rely on the
convenient excuse that there were threats to his safety.
Even assuming that there were serious threats to his
person, this did not give him the permission to desert his

client and leave the cases entrusted to his care hanging.

He should have at least exercised reasonable and
ordinary care and diligence by taking steps to ensure
that the cases he was handling were attended to and
that his clients interest was safeguarded. If it was not
possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his
care, he should have informed the complainant of his
predicament and asked that he be allowed to withdraw
from the case to enable the client to engage the services
of another counsel who could properly represent him.
[27] Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared,
deserted his client and forgot about the cases entrusted
to his care, to the complainants damage and prejudice.
The respondent denies that he did not do anything in
connection with the cases included in the Retainer
Agreement. He asserts that he reviewed the documents
in relation to the case and gave the complainant
important advice. He claims that he travelled to Bato,
Camarines Norte to negotiate for an amicable settlement
with the members of the family of the adverse party in
one of the cases filed against the complainant.[28] He
also went to San Carlos City (Negros Oriental), Antipolo
City, and other parts of Metro Manila to interview and
search for witnesses for the cases that he was handling
for the complainant.[29]
The respondents disbarment is not anchored on his
failure to do anything in relation the cases entrusted to
his care, but on his abandonment of his client. He will
not be absolved from liability on the basis alone of these
inconsequential acts which he claims to have
accomplished because the glaring fact remains that he
has failed to perform his essential obligations to his
client, to the courts and to society. As the complainants
lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client
with competence and diligence.[30] This includes not
merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care and
giving the complainant sound legal advice, but also
properly representing his client in court, attending
scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required
pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrusted to his care
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for his client or the court to prod him to
do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of
his client in a state of uncertainty.
The respondents acts and omissions were not just a
case of inaction, but they amount to deceitful conduct
and are contrary to good morals. After assuring the
complainant that he would protect the latters interest and
attend to the cases included in the Retainer Agreement,
he abandoned his client. It was only after the
complainants own inquiry that he discovered that the
respondent never appeared in court to represent the
complainant in the cases filed against him, so much so
that he had no knowledge that warrants of arrest were
already issued against him. The respondent also failed

to enter his appearance in the civil case for Mandamus,

Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. After
receiving the complete amount of legal fees, giving the
complainant initial legal advice, and interviewing some
witnesses, the respondent just disappeared and the
complainant never heard from him despite his continued
efforts to contact the respondent.
The complainant put his trust in the respondent with full
faith that the latter would exert his best effort and ability
in the prosecution and defense of his clients cause. But
instead of devotion to his clients cause, the respondent
grossly neglected his duties to his client. After all the
representations he made to the complainant and after
receipt of the full amount of the legal fees, he absconded
from his responsibilities and betrayed his clients trust.
There is no excuse for this, and his gross negligence
and appalling indifference is unforgiveable.
On the Courts finding that the respondent refused to
return the money he received from the complainant
despite written and verbal demands and was not able to
give a single report regarding the status of the cases, the
respondent claims that he returned the documents to the
complainants representative in the middle of July 2006,
[31] and that he also gave an accounting of the money
he received sometime immediately after it was
demanded from him on July 25 or 26, 2006. The
respondent counters that although he initially received
the amount of P900,000.00, he gave P300,000.00 to two
intelligence operatives for locating witnesses in favor of
the complainant in Antipolo City and other parts of Metro
Manila.[32] He claims that only P600,000.00 was
actually received by him, and from this amount he drew
all expenses in connection with the complainants cases.
The respondent further avers that he made an
accounting of the P600,000.00 received by him and
offered to return P250,000.00, but it was the
complainants business partner who refused to accept
the P250,000.00 and insisted on the payment of the
whole amount.[33]
The complainant declared that he did not receive the
documents being demanded from the respondent, nor
did he receive an accounting of the money he paid to the
respondent. He stated in his Opposition/Comment to the
Motion for Reconsideration that the respondents empty
claims -- that he already returned the documents
sometime in the middle of July 2006 and that he
rendered an accounting of the money paid to him
immediately after July 25 or 26, 2006 -- are refuted by
the demand letter sent by the complainant on November
27, 2006, four months after the alleged time of return.
We agree with the complainant.
If the respondent had indeed returned the documents
sometime in the middle of July 2006, he would have

presented a receipt to prove such turnover of

documents. And if the respondent had indeed rendered
an accounting of the money that was paid to him, he
would have attached a received copy of the accounting
to his Motion for Reconsideration. But he failed to do
both. There was no proof presented. We cannot rely on
his bare allegation, especially when the complainant
demanded the return of the documents months after
they were allegedly returned.
Neither are we persuaded by the respondents
explanation as to how and where the P900,000.00 was
spent. He claims that out of the P900,000.00, he only
received P600,000.00 because he paid P300,000.00 to
two intelligence operatives. In paying the intelligence
operatives, he stated in his Motion for Reconsideration
that he deposited P100,000.00 to the Land Bank
account of one Investigator Operative Collado (Collado)
sometime in the second week of January 2006, and that
the rest of the P200,000.00 was personally handed by
him to Collado in the last week of January 2006 at
McDonalds restaurant at the corner of Pasong Tamo and
J.P. Rizal Streets at Makati City.[34]
Such an account offered by the respondent is insufficient
to free him from liability. If the respondent indeed paid
P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives with the
knowledge of the complainant, he would have presented
a receipt issued by Collado, and he would have also
presented a validated deposit slip or certification as
proof that he deposited the amount he claims to have
deposited to Collados account. His failure to attach proof
of payment of the P300,000.00 to the intelligence
operatives does not only make his defense flawed, it
also highlights his incompetence in handling the money
he received from the client.
It is a lawyers duty to properly account for the money he
received from the client.[35] If indeed the respondent
told the client that he would pay P300,000.00 to two
intelligence operatives, as he claims in his Motion for
Reconsideration, he should have held this money in
trust, and he was under an obligation to make an
accounting. It was his duty to secure a receipt for the
payment of this amount on behalf of his client. But he
failed to present any receipt or certification from Collado
that the payment was received. Since the respondent
was not able either to present an accounting of the
P900,000.00 paid to him upon the complainants
demand, or to provide a sufficient and plausible
explanation for where such amount was spent, he must
immediately return the same.
For these reasons, and those previously stated in the
September 30, 2008 Decision of this Court, we find that
respondent Valdez has committed multiple violations of
the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He has failed to observe the fundamental duties of

honesty and good faith and, thus, we sustain his

disbarment.
We must emphasize that the right to practice law is not a
natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise,[36] and it may be extended or
withheld by this Court in the exercise of its sound
discretion. As guardian of the legal profession, this Court
has ultimate disciplinary power over members of the Bar
in order to ensure that the highest standards of
competence and of honesty and fair dealing are
maintained. We find that the respondent has fallen below
such exacting standard and is unworthy of the privilege
to practice law.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED. This Courts en banc decision in Administrative
Case No. 7902 dated September 30, 2008, entitled
Torben B. Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CBD A.C. No. 313 January 30, 1998
ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of
PAN-ASIA INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES, INC.,
complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROSENDO MENESES III, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case against respondent Atty.
Rosendo Meneses III was initiated by a complaintaffidavit 1 filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7,
1994 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, the
Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International
Commodities, Inc. Herein complainant charges
respondent Meneses with the following offenses, viz.: (1)
malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public
defender; (2) dereliction of duty, by violating his oath to
do everything within his power to protect his client's
interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust
and confidence, due to his continued failure to account
for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid
to a certain complainant for the amicable settlement of a
pending case. 2
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell
Management and Consultant, Inc., a group of companies
which includes Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc.,
through its Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez,
engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Meneses.
While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled
various cases and was properly compensated by his
client in accordance with their retainer agreement. 3 One
of the litigations handled by him was the case of "People
vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa,"
pending before Branch 134, Regional Trial Court of
Makati. On December 24, 1993, respondent received the

sum of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in

said case, to be given to therein offended party, a certain
Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court settlement
and with the understanding that a motion to dismiss the
case would be filed by respondent Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent
failed to present to his client the receipt acknowledging
that Gleason received said amount. A verification made
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no
motion to dismiss or any pleading in connection
therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable
settlement was not finalized and concluded. Despite
repeated demands in writing or by telephone for an
explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents
pertaining to the aforementioned case, respondent
Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of herein
complainant.
The case was assigned by the Commission to
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for investigation.
Respondent was thereafter ordered to submit
his answer to the complaint pursuant to Section 5, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. 4 Two successive ex parte
motions for extension of time to file an answer were filed
by respondent and granted by the Commission. 5 On
November 14, 1994, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss, 6 instead of an answer.
In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had
no legal personality to sue him for and in behalf of PanAsia International Commodities, Inc. because his legal
services were retained by Frankwell Management and
Consultant, Inc.; that Navarro had not represented PanAsia International Commodities, Inc. in any case nor had
he been authorized by its board of directors to file this
disbarment case against respondent; that the retainer
agreement between him and Frankwell Management
and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of
December 31, 1993 according to the verbal advice of its
Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the case of
Arthur Bretaa was not part of their retainer agreement,
and Bretaa was not an employee of Frankwell
Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained him as
its legal counsel; and that the settlement of said case
cannot be concluded because the same was archived
and accused Bretaa is presently out of the country.
Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, 7 stresses that respondent Meneses is resorting
to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to
account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him;
that respondent's arguments in his motion to dismiss
were all designed to mislead the Commission; and that
he was fully aware of the interrelationship of the two
corporations and always coordinated his legal work with
Estrellita Valdez.
On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez resolved to deny said motion to
dismiss for lack of merit and directed respondent to file
his answer. 8 On January 2, 1995, respondent filed a
manifestation that he was adopting the allegations in his
motion to dismiss as his answer. 9 When the case was
set for hearing on February 9, 1995, respondent failed to
attend despite due notice. He thereafter moved to

postpone and reset the hearing of the case several times

allegedly due to problems with his health.
On the scheduled hearing of June 15, 1995, respondent
again failed to attend. The commissioner accordingly
received ex parte the testimony of complainant's sole
witness, Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary
evidence. 10 Thereafter, complainant rested its case.
Respondent filed a so-called "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Recall Complainant's
Witness for Cross-examination" 11 which was granted by
the Commission. 12 Estrellita Valdez was directed by the
Commission to appear on the scheduled hearing for
cross-examination.
Several postponements and resetting of hearings were
later requested and granted by the Commission. When
the case was set for hearing for the last time on May 31,
1996, respondent failed to attend despite due notice and
repeated warnings. Consequently, the Commission
considered him to have waived his right to present
evidence in his defense and declared the case submitted
for resolution. 13
On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline,
through its Investigating Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez, submitted its Report and Recommendation
14
to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The Commission ruled that the refusal
and/or failure of respondent to account for the sum of
P50,000.00 he received from complainant for the
settlement of the aforestated case of Lai Chan Kow and
Arthur Bretaa proves beyond any shadow of a doubt
that he misappropriated the same, hence he deserved to
be penalized.
The Commission recommended that respondent
Meneses he suspended from the practice of the legal
profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to
return the P50,000.00 he received from the petitioner
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution. It
further provided that failure on his part to comply with
such requirement would result in his disbarment. 15 The
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in its Resolution No. XII-97-133, dated July 26, 1997. 16
On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of
Resolution, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and the records of this case
through the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action
pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B. 17 It appears
therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a copy of
said resolution, with the investigating commissioner's
report and recommendation annexed thereto.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that respondent
Meneses misappropriated the money entrusted to him
and which he has failed and/or refused to account for to
his client despite repeated demands therefor. Such
conduct on the part of respondent indicating his
unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him, or
showing such lack
of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence, constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action extending to disbarment. 18

Respondent Meneses' misconduct constitutes a gross

violation of his oath as a lawyer which, inter alia,
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from his client.
Respondent was merely holding in trust the money he
received from his client to be used as consideration for
the amicable settlement of a case he was handling.
Since the amicable settlement did not materialize, he
was necessarily under obligation to immediately return
the money, as there is no showing that he has a lien
over it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to him in his professional
capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith
on his part is exacted. 19
The argument of respondent that complainant has no
legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines upon the verified complaint of any person.
The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing.
Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest
and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by
complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline
sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended
sanctions.
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel
for every person who may wish to become his client. He
has the right to decline employment 20 subject, however,
to the provisions of Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 21 Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. 22 Respondent Meneses, as counsel,
had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the
case and to respond within a reasonable time to his
client's request for information. Respondent's failure to
communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding
its requests for an audience or conference is an
unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the
developments in and the status of its case.
On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the
Court a copy of the letter of Atty. Augusto G. Navarro,
dated December 18, 1997, to the effect that although a
copy of the aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was
personally delivered to respondent's address and
received by his wife on October 9, 1997, he has failed to
restitute the amount of P50,000.00 to complainant within
the 15-day period provided therein. Neither has he filed
with this Court any pleading or written indication of his
having returned said amount to complainant. In line with
the resolution in this case, his disbarment is
consequently warranted and exigent.

A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the

resolution is in order. The dispositive portion thereof
provides that:
. . . Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses
is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years and is
hereby directed to return the Fifty
Thousand Pesos he received from the
petitioner within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this resolution. Failure on his
part to comply will result (i)n his
DISBARMENT. 23
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a
3-year suspension or disbarment, depending on whether
or not respondent duly returns the amount to
complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that
he shall only be suspended, subject to the condition that
he should make restitution as prescribed therein.
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the
imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been
the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot
be in the alternative, even if the law provides for
alternative penalties, 24 nor can such penalty be subject
to a condition. 25 There is no reason why such legal
principles in penal law should not apply in administrative
disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve
punitive sanctions.
Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of
respondent, the only possible and equivalent rule is in
malversation cases holding that the restitution of the
peculated funds would be analogous to voluntary
surrender if it was immediately and voluntarily made
before the case was instituted. 26 That evidently is not
the situation here. Also, the implementation of the
penalty provided in the resolution will involve a
cumbersome process since, in order to arrive at the final
action to be taken by this Court, it will have to wait for a
verified report on whether or not respondent complied
with the condition subsequent.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby
DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondent's personal records in this Court and
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together
with all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 1526

January 31, 2005

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED),

SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR.,
complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint1 for
disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23,
1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased).
Both parties are from Zamboanga City.
The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned
her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly
thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded
payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage
contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and
aware of impending suits for sums of money against her,
complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C.
Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of
helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social
humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles
covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga
City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her
creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of
sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable
consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he
would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her
creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A,
likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were
mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell
due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced
her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his
favor. As a result, respondent became the registered
owner of all the lots belonging to complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that
respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead,
he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her
land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her
real properties worth millions.1a\^/phi1.net
In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975,
respondent was required to file his comment on the
complaint.
Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is
premature since there is pending before the then Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No.
17812 for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity
of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him
involving the subject lots.

On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying

respondents motion and requiring him to submit his
answer.
In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent
denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He
averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to
various buyers, including himself, for valuable
consideration. On several occasions, he extended
financial assistance to complainant and even invited her
to live with his family. His children used to call her "Lola"
due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.
On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month
and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the
instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies
of complainants witnesses and the submission of its
report and recommendation.
On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the
case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004
of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows:
"A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the parties showed that all the properties of
the complainant are presently owned by the respondent
by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the
complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary
consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas
Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the
complainant on September 5, 1974.
It is evident from the records that respondent was the
one who notarized the documents involving the said
properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant
from her creditors which ended up in respondents name
like in the deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano
in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and
1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon
on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of
absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the
Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the
cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso
Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio
properties.

The foregoing legal activities and operations of the

respondent in addition to his having discussed, advised
and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and
liabilities to her creditors and even requested her
creditors for extension of time to pay complainants
accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for
consultation aside from representing complainant in
other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations
between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.
It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a
detailed report to the complainant on how he paid
complainants creditors without selling her properties.
Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them
out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was
one of the purchasers of complainants properties in
utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was
submitted by the respondent concerning the value of the
said sale of complainants properties.
As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and
honestly in his obligation and duty as complainants legal
adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the complainant in
ultimately putting complainants properties in his name
and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C.
Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter
where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of
the same for implementation hereof, subject to the
approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of
Governors."
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the
Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the
sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from
the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to
three (3) years.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors finding that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.l^vvphi1.net However, we
have to modify its recommended penalty.1a\^/phi1.net
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this
jurisdiction, provides:
"A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession."

Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring

for himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by
any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a
grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment.3 Such conduct on the part of
respondent degrades not only himself but also the name
and honor of the legal profession. He violated this
Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.4
Canon 17 of the same Code states:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him."
The records show that complainant reposed such high
degree of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that
when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him
her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing
that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her
creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust and
confidence when he did not sell her properties to others
but to himself and spent his own money to pay her
obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP
Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound
to render a detailed report to the complainant on how
much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to
her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other
buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records
show that she did not receive any amount from
respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully
and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel.
Undoubtedly, respondents conduct has made him unfit
to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen
below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have
been exacting in our demand for integrity and good
moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession5 and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.6 Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege.7 And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes
not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which
made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege
of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.8
Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his

integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal

profession.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his
best efforts and ability to protect the interests of his
clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence
and candor not only protects his clients cause; he also
serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law. Its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the legal profession.9
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so.10
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos ,11 we ordered the
disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old
aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later
refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro
vs. Meneses III ,12 we disbarred a member of the Bar for
his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he
received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs.
Limson ,13 we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers,
an attorney who extorted money from his client through
deceit and misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort ,14
an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for
misappropriating his clients money.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we
find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It
bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of
his clients financial plight to acquire the latters
properties for his own benefit is destructive of the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of
Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and
consistent with the need to maintain the high standards
of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the
legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty
of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the

practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the

Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

favor. As a result, respondent became the registered

owner of all the lots belonging to complainant.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts throughout the country.

Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that

respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead,
he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her
land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her
real properties worth millions.1a\^/phi1.net

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1526

January 31, 2005

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED),

SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR.,
complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint1 for
disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23,
1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased).
Both parties are from Zamboanga City.
The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned
her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly
thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded
payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage
contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and
aware of impending suits for sums of money against her,
complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C.
Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of
helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social
humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles
covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga
City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her
creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of
sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable
consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he
would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her
creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A,
likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were
mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell
due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced
her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his

In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975,

respondent was required to file his comment on the
complaint.
Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is
premature since there is pending before the then Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No.
17812 for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity
of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him
involving the subject lots.
On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying
respondents motion and requiring him to submit his
answer.
In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent
denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He
averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to
various buyers, including himself, for valuable
consideration. On several occasions, he extended
financial assistance to complainant and even invited her
to live with his family. His children used to call her "Lola"
due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.
On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month
and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the
instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies
of complainants witnesses and the submission of its
report and recommendation.
On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the
case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004
of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows:

"A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence

submitted by the parties showed that all the properties of
the complainant are presently owned by the respondent
by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the
complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary
consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas
Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the
complainant on September 5, 1974.
It is evident from the records that respondent was the
one who notarized the documents involving the said
properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant
from her creditors which ended up in respondents name
like in the deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano
in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and
1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon
on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of
absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the
Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the
cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso
Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio
properties.
The foregoing legal activities and operations of the
respondent in addition to his having discussed, advised
and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and
liabilities to her creditors and even requested her
creditors for extension of time to pay complainants
accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for
consultation aside from representing complainant in
other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations
between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.
It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a
detailed report to the complainant on how he paid
complainants creditors without selling her properties.
Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them
out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was
one of the purchasers of complainants properties in
utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was
submitted by the respondent concerning the value of the
said sale of complainants properties.
As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and
honestly in his obligation and duty as complainants legal
adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the complainant in
ultimately putting complainants properties in his name
and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C.
Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter
where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of

the same for implementation hereof, subject to the

approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of
Governors."
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the
Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the
sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from
the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to
three (3) years.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors finding that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.l^vvphi1.net However, we
have to modify its recommended penalty.1a\^/phi1.net
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this
jurisdiction, provides:
"A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession."
Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring
for himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by
any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a
grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment.3 Such conduct on the part of
respondent degrades not only himself but also the name
and honor of the legal profession. He violated this
Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.4
Canon 17 of the same Code states:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him."
The records show that complainant reposed such high
degree of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that
when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him
her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing
that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her
creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust and
confidence when he did not sell her properties to others
but to himself and spent his own money to pay her
obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP
Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound
to render a detailed report to the complainant on how
much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to

her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other

buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records
show that she did not receive any amount from
respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully
and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel.
Undoubtedly, respondents conduct has made him unfit
to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen
below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have
been exacting in our demand for integrity and good
moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession5 and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.6 Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege.7 And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes
not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which
made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege
of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.8
Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his
integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal
profession.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his
best efforts and ability to protect the interests of his
clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence
and candor not only protects his clients cause; he also
serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law. Its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the legal profession.9
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so.10
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos ,11 we ordered the
disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old
aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later
refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro
vs. Meneses III ,12 we disbarred a member of the Bar for
his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he

received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs.

Limson ,13 we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers,
an attorney who extorted money from his client through
deceit and misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort ,14
an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for
misappropriating his clients money.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we
find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It
bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of
his clients financial plight to acquire the latters
properties for his own benefit is destructive of the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of
Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and
consistent with the need to maintain the high standards
of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the
legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty
of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the
practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4349 December 22, 1997
LOURDES R. BUSIOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October
1994 but received by us on 21 November 1994,
complainant Lourdes R. Busios charged respondent
Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas,
Albay with having committed the crime of estafa under
Article 315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code by
misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00. Of this amount,
P30,000.00 was entrusted to respondent for deposit in
the bank account of complainant's husband, while
P2,000.00 represented the amount respondent

demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in

Civil Case No. 5814, when no such bond was required.
In the resolution of 18 January 1995, we required
respondent to comment on the complaint. Despite his
receipt of a copy of the resolution, respondent did not
comply, compelling us in the resolution of 17 July 1995
to require him to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure.
Again respondent failed to comply. Hence in the
resolution of 25 September 1996, we ordered him once
more to file his comment within ten (10) days from
notice, and within the same period, to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 or suffer imprisonment of ten (10) days
should he fail to so pay. In a Compliance and Motion
dated 24 October 1996, respondent transmitted the fine
of P1,000.00 by way of postal money order, but asked
for five (5) days from date to file his comment. As
respondent still failed to so file, we then declared, in the
resolution of 2 December 1996, that respondent was
deemed to have waived his right to file his comment, and
referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant
for reception of complainant's evidence and submission
of a report and recommendation thereon.
On 16 October 1997, the Bar Confidant, Atty. Erlinda C.
Verzosa, submitted her Report and Recommendation,
material portions of which read as follows:
Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands
charged with having misappropriated the sum of
P30,000.00 intended for his clients as well as
having deceived his clients into giving him the
sum of P2,000.00 purportedly to be deposited as
a bond in the case he was handling.
Complainant Lourdes R. Businos is one of the
heirs of Pedro Rodrigo who are the defendants
in Civil Case No. 1584, apparently a case
involving the properties of the late Pedro
Rodrigo, father of herein complainant.
Respondent was the counsel of record for the
defendants in the said case. On July 10, 1994,
complainant, representing her co-heirs,
executed a special power of attorney, appointing
and constituting respondent and/or Pedro
Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true and lawful attorney-infact with the following powers:
1. To attend to and represent me, testify, or
otherwise enter into compromise during the
pre-trial stage or other proceedings in Civil
Case No. 1584, entitled "Heirs of Rosario
Rodrigo-Reantaso, vs. Heirs of Pedro

Rodrigo Sr., et. al." now pending before the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ligao,
Albay;
2. To demand, collect and receipt for any and
all sums of money that may now be
deposited in said court by the defendant
Oas Standard High School or hereafter be
deposited by said defendant, due and owing
to me or said Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo, Sr.,
representing the rentals of said defendant
for the lease of the property involved in said
case; and
3. To sign, authenticate, issue and deliver any
and all deeds, instruments, papers and other
records necessary and pertinent to the
above stated transactions.
On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of
Ligao, Albay, Br. 12 issued an order, directing
the Clerk of Court "to release any and all
deposits of rentals made in connection with this
case (Civil Case No. 1584) to the defendants
Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo through Lourdes Rodrigo
Businos who were receiving the rentals from
Oas Standard High School prior to the institution
of this case."
In a letter dated August 10, 1994, the Clerk of
Court of RTC, Ligao informed herein
complainant that respondent had already
received the rental deposit of P25,000.00 on
even date (see Annex "C" to the complaint).
Respondent also received from Oas Standard
High School on August 17, 1994 the sum of
P5,000.00 as payment for rental of school site
for the month of July 1994 (See Annex "D" to the
complaint). The said sum was entrusted to
respondent with an obligation on his part to
deposit the same in the account of complainant's
husband at PNB, Ligao Branch. Instead,
however, of depositing the money, respondent
converted the money to his own personal use,
and despite several demands, he failed to return
the same to complainant. She was thus
constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and
an administrative case for disbarment against
him. Thus, on November 21, 1994, complainant
filed the instant administrative case against
respondent.
Complainant further accuses respondent for
demanding and receiving P2,000.00 from her
which he said will be used for the bond in Civil
Case No. 1584, but said amount was never

used as intended since no bond was required in

the said case. Thus, respondent merely
pocketed the said amount.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant, upon questioning by the
undersigned, testified that: She authorized
respondent to withdraw the money amounting
P35,000.00 representing the rental fee paid of
Oas Standard High School from the Clerk of
Court, with the instruction to deposit the same in
her savings account at the PNB. After she was
informed by the court that respondent had
already withdrawn the money, she expected in
vain to receive the money a week later in Tarlac
as respondent failed to effect the deposit of the
said sum in her account. She demanded from
him to give her the money, but he informed her
that he had already spent the same. He
promised, though, to pay her the said amount.
(pp. 7-8, TSN, Reception of Evidence, April 18,
1997). She clarified that respondent withdrew
only the sum of P30,000.00 from the Clerk of
Court, while the P5,000.00 was withdrawn by
respondent from Oas Standard High School
(TSN, p. 8). Despite several demands, both from
her and her lawyer, respondent failed to make
good his promise to give her the money he
withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas
Standard High School (TSN, pp. 11-13). She
was then constrained to file a criminal case for
estafa and an administrative case against
respondent sometime in November of 1994 to
recover the money in question (TSN, pp. 14-16).
On their third hearing of the estafa case
sometime in 1995, respondent came with the
money and paid complainant inside the
courtroom (TSN, pp. 15, 19-20). Because of this
development, she did not anymore pursue the
estafa case against respondent (TSN, p. 17).
She has no intention, however, of withdrawing
the instant complaint (TSN, p. 18).
She further testified that respondent demanded
from her the sum of P2,000.00 for the bond
required in the civil case. (TSN, p. 18).
Respondent did not give her a receipt for the
said amount. (TSN, p. 19). Respondent gave
back the P2,000.00 to complainant. He paid
complainant a total of P60,000.00 representing
the money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court
and Oas Standard High School, the P2,000.00
he got from complainant and attorney's fees,
which he undertook to foot as a way of
settlement. (TSN, p. 19).

Although complainant failed to submit the

original or certified true copies of the documents
in support of her complaint against respondent,
respondent's repeated failure to comply with
several resolutions of the Court requiring him to
comment on the complaint lends credence to the
allegations of the complainant. It manifests his
tacit admission thereto. We have no other
alternative, therefore, but to accept the said
documents at their [sic] face value.
There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of
having used the money of his clients without
their consent. As the evidentiary value of the
documents should be given more weight than
the oral testimony of complainant, we place the
amount illegally used by respondent at
P30,000.00 and not P35,000.00 as claimed by
complainant. Respondent's illegal use of his
client's money is made more manifest [by] his
letters to complainant, all promising the latter to
make good his promise to pay the money he
withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas
Standard High School (See Annex "E" to the
complaint).
It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath,
pledges himself not to delay any man for money
or malice and is bound to conduct himself with
all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to
report promptly the money of his clients that has
come into his possession. He should not
commingle it with his private property or use it
for his personal purposes without his client's [sic]
consent. He should maintain a reputation for
honesty and fidelity to private trust (Daroy vs.
Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a
judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust
and must be immediately turned over to them
(Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8).
Respondent, by converting the money of his
clients to his own personal use without their
consent, and by deceiving the complainant into
giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly
to be used as a bond which was not required is,
undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the
confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not
only has he degraded himself but as an
unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair
name of an honorable profession.

His belated payment of the amount he illegally

used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve
him from any liability if only to impress upon him
that the relation between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a
very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring high degree of fidelity and
good faith. In view of that special relationship,
lawyers are bound to promptly account for
money or property received by them on behalf of
their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct (Daroy vs. Legaspi,
supra).
Moreover, his repeated failure to comply with the
resolutions of the Court, requiring him to
comment on the complaint indicate the high
degree of irresponsibility of respondent.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco
Ricafort be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR.
While the findings are in order, the penalty
recommended is not commensurate to respondent's
infractions.
Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules
16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds;
contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains
in his hands money of his client after it has been
demanded he may be punished for contempt as
an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions; but proceedings under
this section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all

money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of
each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the
funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter
to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
Respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and
amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical
behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to
respondent, but to the noble profession to which he
belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and
confidence.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its
demand for integrity and good moral character from
members of the Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier (A.C. No. 3248,
18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 12-13), reiterated in
Fernandez v. Grecia, (A.C. No. 3694, 17 June 1993, 223
SCRA 425, 434), this Court declared:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients
require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his client, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar
should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do
honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing
should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the profession.
Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the
lawyer's oath, he became a guardian of truth and the
rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair

an impartial administration of justice a vital function of

democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow
as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not
be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority.
This is specially so, as here, where respondent even
deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him
to file his comment on the complaint, thereby
transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and
maintain the respect due the courts.
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct,
grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of
Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and
consistent with the urgent need to maintain the
esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal
profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to
DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT
from the practice of law. His name is hereby stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.
This resolution shall take effect immediately and copies
thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record; the National
Office and the Albay Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; the Philippine Judges Association; and all
courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
Lorenzo d. brennisen,
Complainant,

- versus -

atty. Ramon u. contawi,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 7481

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ
Promulgated:
April 24, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint
[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D.
Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi
for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his
lawyer's oath.
The Facts
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel
of land located in San Dionisio, Paraaque City covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21176 [2] of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a
resident of the United States of America (USA), he
entrusted the administration of the subject property to
respondent, together with the corresponding owner's
duplicate title.
Unbeknownst to complainant, however,
respondent, through a spurious Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) [3] dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged
and subsequently sold the subject property to one
Roberto Ho (Ho), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale [4] dated November 15, 2001. As a result, TCT No.
21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 150814
[5] issued in favor of Ho.
Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint against respondent for
having violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him
damage and prejudice.
In his counter-affidavit, [6] respondent denied
any formal lawyer-client relationship between him and
the complainant, claiming to have merely extended his
services for free. He also denied receiving money from
the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate
taxes on the property. Further, he averred that it was his
former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque (Roque)
and one Danilo Diaz (Diaz), who offered the subject
property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless,
respondent admitted to having confirmed the spurious
SPA in his favor already annotated at the back of TCT
No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and
because he was also in need of money at that time.
Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and received
his proportionate share of P130,000.00 from the
proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully
settled.
Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a
forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's
forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the
subject property.
In the Resolution [7] dated July 16, 2008, the
Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
During the mandatory conference held on
October 21, 2008, the parties stipulated on the following
matters:
1.
That complainant is the owner of a property
covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the Register of
Deeds of Paraaque;
2.
Respondent was in possession of the Owner's
Duplicate Certificate of the property of the complainant;
3.
The property of the complainant was mortgaged to
a certain Roberto Ho;
4.
The title to the property of complainant was
cancelled in year 2000 and a new one, TCT No. 150814
was issued in favor of Mr. Roberto Ho;
5.
The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February
1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and
was not signed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
6.
That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the
mortgage loan secured by the mortgagee on the
aforementioned property of complainant;
7.
That respondent did not inform the complainant
about the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his
property;
8.
That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr.
Roberto Ho;
9.
That respondent has not yet filed any case against
the person whom he claims to have falsified his
signature;
10.
That respondent did not notify the complainant
that the owner's copy of TCT No. 21176 was stolen and
was taken out from his office. [8]
In its Report [9] dated July 10, 2009, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through
Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that
respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the
property of his client without the latter's knowledge or
consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA. Hence,
in addition to his possible criminal liability for falsification,
the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent violated various
provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred and
his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report of Commissioner De
Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-248 [10] as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this

Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation

fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty
of falsification; making or using falsified documents; and
for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his dishonest acts,
Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED.
The Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether
respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he
mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which was
entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious examination of the records,
the Court concurs with the findings and recommendation
of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent acted with deceit when,
through the use of a falsified document, he effected the
unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's property
for his personal benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of
complainant's property without his knowledge or
consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale for his
own benefit. His contention that he merely
accommodated the request of his then financiallyincapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious
SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that
complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged. As
aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property were effected
using the owner's duplicate title, which was in
respondent's safekeeping and custody during
complainant's absence.
Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the
IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended his
disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Canon 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client which may come into his
possession.
Canon 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from client.
Canon 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag, [11] the Court disbarred
one of the respondent lawyers and ordered his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of

serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The

respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and
simulated transaction not only by notarizing a spurious
Deed of Sale, but also and even worse sharing in the
profits of the specious transaction by acquiring half of
the property subject of the Deed of Sale.
In Flores v. Chua, [12] the Court disbarred the
respondent lawyer for having deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared personally
before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He
was found guilty of grave misconduct.
In this case, respondent's established acts
exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the
bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. He
failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice
law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded
of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that [t]he
practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet
the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability. [13]
Moreover, respondent's argument that there was
no formal lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There
is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity,
for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. [14]
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus
finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as
recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP
Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
xxx or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice xxx (emphasis
supplied)
The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required. [15]
Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the
Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial
evidence has been more than satisfied.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U.
CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath and
the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is
DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the

Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts in the country for their information and
guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

FERMINA LEGASPI DAROY, LYDIA LEGASPI and
AGRIPINO LEGASPI, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPI, respondent.

AQUINO, J.:
Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and
Agripino Legaspi of Iligan City, in a verified complaint
dated March 10, 1970, charged Attorney Ramon Chaves
Legaspi of Cagayan de Oro City with malpractice for
having misappropriated the sum of four thousand pesos
which he had collected for them. They prayed that the
respondent be disbarred. 1 (He was 59 years old in 1974.
He passed the 1954 bar examinations with a rating of
75.75%).
The evidence shows that the complainants hired the
respondent in May, 1962 to represent them in the
intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz Velez-Gonzaga.
The complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio,
who was abroad, were adjudged as one of the six
groups of heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their
deceased mother, Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi, being a
daughter of the spouses. The heirs in a joint petition
dated April 11, 1969, which the respondent signed as
counsel for the complainants, agreed that the coconut
land left by the decedents would be divided into six
equal parts, that the administrator be authorized to sell
the land, and that, after payment of the obligations of the
estate, the net proceeds would be distributed among the
six groups of heirs. The probate court approved that
agreement in its order of April 29, 1969 (Spec. Proc.
Nop. 640 of the Misamis Oriental CFI, Exh. A).

The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to

know of the sale only when the respondent wrote a note
dated November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi,
wherein he stated "that the money we have deposited
may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00
o'clock". The respondent advised Teofilo Legaspito see
him on that date so that the money could be withdrawn
(Exh. B).
The complainants were not able to get the money on
December 8 because the respondent on December 7
sent to Mrs. Daroy a telegram countermanding his prior
advice and directing here to go to Cagayan de Oro City
on December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the money
(Exh. C). On December 9, a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a
handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy advising her not to go to
Cagayan de Oro City on December 10 because
according to the respondent "his postdated checks can
be paid and/or collected either Thursday or Friday yet"
(Exh. D).
In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs.
Daroy received another note, this time from the
respondent himself, "Cousin Ramon". The note
contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs. Daroy's
"Cousin Ramon" had withdrawn the money amounting to
P4,000 and had spent it. The letter, a sort of extrajudicial
confession or mea culpa on respondent's part, reads as
follows (Exh. E):
Dear Fermina,
I wrote this letter with the hope that you
will understand me. I have received
P4,000.00 our share in the case filed
and is now in my custody.
Previous (sic) I have a case wherein I
was forced to use our money to solve
my problem.
Now to pay the amount I have used, I
sold my jeep to Mr. Ricarte Gorospe, an
Employee of the BIR here in Cag. But I
am not paid as yet. So, I am waiting as
he will pay at 3:00 p.m. today and it's
close as I have promised to give it on
the 10th, I mean our money.
Kindly help me, defer the giving you of
the sum or at least until Thursday or
Friday, I bring it to you.
I know, my responsibility on this matter.

Thanks

It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent,

as to "counsel for Fermina Daroy et al.", received from
Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay the said sum of
P4,000 as "one (1) share in participation of my clients
Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with (the) order of
Judge B. K. Gorospe" in the aforementioned intestate
proceeding. The respondent signed a receipt for that
amount (Exh. L-1). The sheriff paid to Attorneys Angel
Quimpo, Leovigildo Tandog, Jr. and Teogenes Velez, Jr.
the respective shares of the other groups of heirs also in
the sum of P4,000 for each group. Those lawyers turned
over the amounts withdrawn to their respective clients
(Exh. L).
It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November
28, 1969 to Teofilo Legaspi that the money deposited
could be withdrawn on December 8, 1969, acted in bad
faith. He had already withdrawn the money before that
date. He concealed that fact from the complainants.
Before the disbarment complaint was filed several
demands were made upon the respondent to pay to the
complainants the amount which he had misappropriated.
He repeatedly broke his promises to make payment. As
complainants' patience was already exhausted, they filed
their complaint for disbarment on March 13, 1970. 2
Atty. Alfredo R. Busico, the lawyer for the complainants,
in a letter to this Court's Clerk of Court dated May 26,
1970, expressed the hope that preferential attention
would be given to the case. He said that he had "reliable
information from Cagayan de Oro City" that the
respondent "has been bragging that nothing will happen
to this case" (p. 20, Rollo).1wph1.t
The case was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In 1973 he
requested the City Fiscal of Iligan City to conduct the
investigation. 3 After the investigation was finished, the
case was set for hearing. The respondent did not appear
at the hearing.
Respondent Legaspi in his testimony admitted that he
received the said sum of P4,000 as shown in the receipt,
Exhibit D dated October 20, 1969. He said that after
receiving it he immediately wired Teofilo Legaspi at Iligan
City to see him (the respondent) in his office at Cagayan
de Oro City so that Teofilo Legaspi could tell him "the
proper disposal" of that amount.

Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October

21, 1969 and at their conference they supposedly
agreed that the sum of P700 would be deducted from
the P4,000 to cover the expenses which he (Legaspi)
described as "expenses involved from the parties
litigants, expenses seeking evidence and other
expenses relevant to the case" and "major expenses" in
the case (sic); that his attorney's fees would be
equivalent "to a share of the petitioners", an agreement
which was later placed in formal form (referring to 1968
extrajudicial settlement attached to his answer); that the
balance of P3,300 would be divided into six equal parts
(six because of the four Legaspi children, the father
Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that
under such division each participant would receive P412
each (P3,300 divided by six gives a quotient of P550 not
P412), and that he gave Teofilo the sum of P412. The
respondent did not present any receipt to prove that
alleged payment.
He said that at first Teofilo Legaspi told him to keep the
share of Vivencio Legaspi, who was abroad, but at the
end of October or the first week of November, 1969
Teofilo got from him (the respondent) Vivencio's share.
Again, the respondent did not ask Teofilo to sign a
receipt for Vivencio's share. After paying the shares of
Teofilo and Vivencio, the balance of the amount left in
respondent's possession amounted to P2,476.
According to respondent's version, the complainants
"refused consistently to receive" the said balance from
him because they wanted the full amount of P4,000. He
said that he had already paid to them the sum of P2,000
and that only the sum of P476 was left in his custody. He
did not present any receipt to prove the alleged payment
of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of
P476 to the complainants.

The truth is that he did not send any such wire. The
statement of the sheriff and respondent's office clerk in
their affidavits of March 18, 1975 that such a wire was
sent is false. What he sent to Teofilo Legaspi was a
handwritten note dated November 28, 1969 (Exh. B)
wherein the respondent made it appear that the said
sum of P4,000 was going to be withdrawn on "December
8, 1969 at nine o'clock". That the respondent in his
testimony and memorandum forgot that note, which is
Annex C of the complaint for disbarment and which he
admitted in paragraph 4 of his answer, is an indication
that he does not know the facts of his own case and that
he had no scruples in trying to mislead and deceive this
Court.
That note of respondent to Teofilo Legaspi, his telegram
and his letter (already quoted) to Mrs. Daroy dated
December 7 and 9, 1969, respectively (Exh. B, C and E)
overwhelmingly belie his fabricated theory that he
conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or in
the first week of November, 1969. He was tempted to
concoct a story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo
Legaspi because the latter is dead and could not refute
him. However, complainants' documentary evidence
refutes his prevarications, distortions and fabrications.
He attached to his memorandum (of which he did not
furnish complainants a copy) his Exhibit 2, a supposed
typewritten claim against him which totalled P10,406.05.
Exhibit 2 does not bear any signature. The respondent
wants to imply that the complainants were trying to
blackmail him. No probative value can be given to
Exhibit 2.
The flimsiness and incredible character of respondent's
defense are discernible in his Exhibit 1, which he
attached to his answer to the original complaint.

Mrs. Daroy, in rebuttal, denied that her father, Teofilo

Legaspi, received the sum of P412 from the respondent.
She said that her father never went to Cagayan de Oro
City to confer with the respondent. She said that there
was no agreement that the respondent would participate
like an heir in the partition of the sum of P4,000. She
denied that the respondent offered to pay her and her
brother and sister the sum of P2,746. She denied that
the respondent paid to the complainants P2,000.

Exhibit 1 as a carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial

partition executed in 1968 by the four children of
Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo
Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty. Legaspi, all the six
being described in the document as "the legitimate
children and sole heirs of Consuelo Gonzaga, who died
on March 12. 1941". Why the respondent was an heir of
Consuelo Gonzaga was not explained.

After a careful examination of the evidence, we find that

respondent's testimony cannot be given any credence.
In his memorandum he stated that after he received from
the sheriff "on October 29, 1969" the sum of P4,000, he
"immediately wired" his kinsman, Teofilo Legaspi, to
come to Cagayan de Oro City and that Teofilo "came on
October 21, 1969". Respondent meant October 20,
1969, the date of the receipt, Exhibit L-1.

In that curious instrument, the spaces for the day and

month when it was signed and acknowledged before a
notary, the spaces for the description of the fourth parcel
of land, the spaces for the shares adjudicated to the
heirs, the spaces for the instrumental witnesses and the
spaces for the numbers of the residence certificates and
the dates and places of issue were left blank. Yet the
instrument was signed by the above six persons and
duly notarized by a notary whose signature is illegible.

In that extrajudicial partition Consuelo Gonzaga was

alleged to have left four parcels of land located at Barrio
Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental which she inherited from
her father Aquilino Gonzaga. However, in the order of
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental dated
April 29, 1969 Consuelo Gonzaga inherited only a onesixth share in a parcel of land located at Maputi, Initao,
Misamis Oriental.
How Vivencio Legaspi, who, according to the instrument,
was a resident of Alameda, California, was able to sign it
and to appear before a notary was not explained.
The incomplete document, far from being of any help to
respondent Legaspi, casts a reflection on his
competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the
competency and integrity of the notary before whom it
was acknowledged. As already noted, it was made to
appear herein that respondent Legaspi was an heir of
Consuelo Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess
that status. The document does not even mention
whether the deceased died intestate.
That document has no connection with the P4,000 and
does not justify the misappropriation or breach of trust
committed by the respondent.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay
any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated
to report promptly the money of his clients that has come
into his possession. He should not commingle it with his
private property or use it for his personal purposes
without his client's consent. He should maintain a
reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars.
11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment
in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57
Phil. 8, 11).1wph1.t
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that
when an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of
his client after it has been demanded, he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to
a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for
any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).
"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and

confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity

and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that
special relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly
account for money or property received by them on
behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a
lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his
clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly
accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In re
Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).
The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a
gross violation of general morality as well as
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the
legal profession, "It deserves severe punishment" (Sturr
vs. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d
897).1wph1.t
A member of the bar who converts the money of his
client to his own benefit through false pretenses is guilty
of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office
of lawyer. The attorney, who violates his oath of office,
betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and
practices deceit cannot be permitted to continue as a law
practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as
an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of
an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25;
In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm.
Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131; See
Cabigao and Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil.
20).
We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice
and professional misconduct for having misappropriated
the funds of his clients. His manufactured defenses, his
lack of candor and his repeated failure to appear at the
investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Iligan and at
the hearings scheduled by this Court, thus causing this
proceeding to drag on for a long time, demonstrate his
unworthiness to remain as a member of the noble
profession of law. (See Capulong vs. Alio, Adm. Case
No. 381, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 491).
Taking into account the environmental circumstances of
the case, we hold that the proper disciplinary action
against the respondent is disbarment. Its salutary
purpose is to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of an officer of the court. It is premised on
the assumption that a member of the bar should be
competent, honorable and reliable, a person in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence (In re
MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and
honestly with his client and to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proven him

unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the

office of an attorney (6 Moran's Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 242).1wph1.t
The prayer of the complainants that the respondent be
ordered to pay them the said amount of P4,000 plus
attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses incurred in
the prosecution of this case amounting to more than
P1,000 cannot be granted in this disbarment proceeding.
That amount should be recovered in an ordinary action.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
*AC No. 6910 and 7922 (PDF Forms)

EN BANC
A.C. No. 9532

October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER,

Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint 1
filed by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher
(complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate
(respondent), . charging him for gross ignorance of the
law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B.
Pitcher (David),2 a British national who passed away on
June 18, 2004.3 Prior to his death, David was engaged in
business in the Philippines and owned, among others,
40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc.4
(Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to
settle the affairs of her deceased husband, complainant
engaged the services of respondent.5

On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with

Katherine Moscoso Bantegui Bantegui),6 a major
stockholder of Consulting Edge,7 in order to discuss the
settlement of Davids interest in the company.8 They
agreed to another meeting which was, however,
postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was
merely stalling for time in order to hide something,
respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as
scheduled.9
Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company
premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior to the
scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by
respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said
premises, assuring her that the same was legal.10
On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed
disappointment over the actions of complainant and
respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter
for the court to settle. She then asked them to leave,
locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate
key.11
Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent
of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock of the
Consulting Edge office door,12 which prevented the
employees thereof from entering and carrying on the
operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to
file before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
(Prosecutors Office) a complaint for grave coercion
against complainant and respondent.13 In turn,
respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil
cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the
recovery of David's personal records/business interests
in Consulting Edge.14 Thus, on January 17, 2005, the
two entered in Memorandum of Agreement,15 whereby
respondent undertook the filing of the cases against
Bantegui, for which complainant paid the amount of
P150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself
to pay respondent P1,000.00 for every court hearing.16
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutors Office issued a
Resolution17 dated October 13, 2004, finding probable
cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave
coercion. The corresponding Information was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
63, docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave
coercion case), and, as a matter of course, warrants of
arrest were issued against them.18 Due to the foregoing,
respondent advised complainant to go into hiding until
he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually,
however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion
case and stopped communicating with complainant.19
Failing to reach respondent despite diligent efforts, 20
complainant filed the instant administrative case before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission

on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 061689.

Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent
failed to file his answer to the complaint. The case was
set for mandatory conference on November 24, 2006,22
which was reset twice,23 on January 12, 2007 and
February 2, 2007, due to the absence of respondent.
The last notice sent to respondent, however, was
returned unserved for the reason "moved out." 24 In view
thereof, Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S.
Salvador III declared the mandatory conference
terminated and required the parties to submit their
position papers, supporting documents, and affidavits.25
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro
A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) issued a
Report and Recommendation,26 observing that
respondent failed to safeguard complainant's legitimate
interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion case.
Commissioner Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not
legally obliged to honor complainant as subrogee of
David because complainant has yet to establish her
kinship with David and, consequently, her interest in
Consulting Edge.27 Hence, the actions taken by
respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the
door of the company premises and the changing of its
lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the
counter legal measures to his actions, he abandoned his
client's cause.28 Commissioner Magpayo found that
respondents acts evinced a lack of adequate
preparation and mastery of the applicable laws on his
part, in violation of Canon 529 of the Code of Professional
Responsibity (Code), warranting his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six months.30
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforementioned Report and Recommendation in
Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011
(November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules.31
In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted
the Notice of the IBPs November 19, 2011 Resolution,
and referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.33
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and
Recommendation34 dated February 6, 2013, concluding
that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client
and failed to safeguard the latter's rights and interests in

wanton disregard of his duties as a lawyer.35 It deemed

that the six-month suspension from the practice of law
as suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty and,
in lieu thereof, recommended that respondent be
suspended for three years.36 Likewise, it ordered
respondent to return the P150,000.00 he received from
complainant as acceptance fee.37
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs
with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the
OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be evermindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For
his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless
of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free.38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair
and honest means to attain lawful objectives.39 These
principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code
which respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
xxxx

Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that

respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainants cause since he: first, failed to
represent her competently and diligently by acting and
proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds
of law; and, second, abandoned his clients cause while
the grave coercion case against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that
complainant's right over the properties of her deceased
husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As
such, the high-handed action taken by respondent to
enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the
latters interest in Consulting Edge i.e., causing the
change of the office door lock which thereby prevented
the free ingress and egress of the employees of the said
company was highly improper. Verily, a person cannot
take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits
of his theory. In the same light, respondent's act of
advising complainant to go into hiding in order to evade
arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as
proper legal advice since the same constitutes
transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue
of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to
his client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice,40 in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such
courses of action were not only improper but also
erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his client
with competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18
of the Code. In the same regard, he also remained
unmindful of his clients trust in him in particular, her
trust that respondent would only provide her with the
proper legal advice in pursuing her interests thereby
violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively
bear out that respondent completely abandoned
complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion
case against them; this notwithstanding petitioners
efforts to reach him as well as his receipt of the
P150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle
that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his
care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of
properly representing the client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting
the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging
their termination even without prodding from the client or
the court.41 Hence, considering respondents gross and
inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally
unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted
that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and
Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.

In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed

to file his answer to the complaint despite due
notice.1wphi1 This demonstrates not only his lack of
responsibility but also his lack of interest in clearing his
name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an
implied admission of the charges leveled against him. 42
In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable
for his infractions as herein discussed. That said, the
Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate
penalty to be imposed against respondent.
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held
liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those
committed by respondent were suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz, 43
a lawyer who neglected his client's case,
misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the
IBPs directives to submit his pleadings and attend the
hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two
years. In Small v. Banares,44 the Court meted a similar
penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal
service even after receiving money from the
complainant; to return the money and documents he
received despite demand; to update his client on the
status of her case and respond to her requests for
information; and to file an answer and attend the
mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva
v. Gonzales,45 a lawyer who neglected complainants
cause; refused to immediately account for his clients
money and to return the documents received; failed to
update his client on the status of her case and to
respond to her requests for information; and failed to
submit his answer and to attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP was suspended from the
practice of law for two years. However, the Court
observes that, in the present case, complainant was
subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for
the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper
and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not for
respondents imprudent counseling, not to mention his
act of abandoning his client during the proceedings,
complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors
of a criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior
degree of the prejudice caused to complainant, the Court
finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three years as recommended by the OBC.
In the same light, the Court sustains the OBCs
recommendation for the return of the P150,000.00
acceptance fee received by respondent from
complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement. While the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondentlawyers administrative and not his civil liability,46 it must

be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to

claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by
the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and
distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this case).
Hence, considering further that the fact of respondents
receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee from
complainant remains undisputed,47 the Court finds the
return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to
be in order.
WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is
found guilty of violating Canon 17 Rule 18.03 of Canon
18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
three 3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision,
with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to
complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher the
P150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter
within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant
the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts.
SO ORDERED.
*AC No.4945 (pdf form)

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by

Mariano R. Cristobal against Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta.
The facts are not disputed.
Complainant engaged the services of Renta Pe &
Associates Law Office for the filing of a "petition for
recognition for the minors Codie Darnell Green and
Matthew Darnell Green" before the Bureau of
Immigration. Respondent as the managing partner
signed the "Special Contract of Legal Services"2 in
behalf of said law office. Respondent also received from
complainant the "full and package price" of P 160,000 for
the filing of the petition for recognition.3 No such petition,
however, was filed.4
Thus, the instant complaint was filed against respondent
for the latter's failure to file the petition for recognition
and return the amount of P160,000 despite demand.
In his comment,5 respondent explained that the petition
for recognition was not filed because AnnethTan, the one
supposed to file the petition, misplaced it and did not
inform him of such fact. He also claimed that he begged
complainant to forgive him and assured him that he will
return the money. However, respondent failed to refund
the money on time for he was "hard up in funds."
Eventually, he was able to save enough and refunded
the money to complainant. Respondent likewise begs
forgiveness from the Court and promises notto repeat
his mistake.
In addition, respondent submitted complainants Affidavit
of Desistance.6 In the said affidavit, complainant said
that respondent cried for forgiveness and that he has
forgivenhim. Complainant confirmed that respondent had
already refunded the amount he paid.
We required Cristobal to file his reply to Atty. Rentas
comment. In his Reply,7 complainant confirmed the
contents of his affidavit of desistance, the refund made
by respondent and his act of forgiving the respondent for
the latters misdeeds.

A.C. No. 9925

September 17, 2014

MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Since the facts are not contested, we deem it more

prudent to resolve the case now rather than refer it to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
On complainants affidavit of desistance, we hold that its
execution cannot have the effect of abating the instant
proceedings against respondent in view of the public
service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A
case of suspension or disbarment is sui generisand not
meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case,

but isintended to cleanse the ranks of the legal

profession of its undesirable members in order to protect
the public and the courts. A disbarment case is notan
investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar.8
Under the established facts, we find that respondent
violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

reprimanded by the Court with a warning that he should

be more careful in the performance of his duty to his
clients.
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta LIABLE
for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and he is hereby
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

reads:

SO ORDERED.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT

WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x

A.C. No. 7965

November 13, 2013
AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Courts resolution is an administrative complaint1
filed by Azucena Segovia-Ribaya (complainant) against
Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin (respondent), the antecedents
of which are detailed as follows:
The Facts
On November 18, 2005, the parties entered into a
retainership agreement2 (retainer) whereby respondent
undertook to, inter alia process the registration and
eventually deliver, within a period of six (6 ) months,3 the
certificate of title over a certain parcel of land (subject
land) in favor of complainant acting as the representative
of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. In connection
therewith, respondent received from complainant the
amounts of P15,000.00 and P39,000.004 to cover for the
litigation and land registration expenses, respectively.
Notwithstanding the expenditure of the P39,000.00 given
for registration expenses (subject amount) and the lapse
of more than three (3) years from the retainers date,
complainant alleged that respondent, without proper
explanation, failed to fulfill his undertaking to register the
subject land and deliver to complainant the certificate of
title over the same. As complainant was tired of
respondents excuses, she finally decided to just
withdraw the subject amount from respondent. For such
purpose, she confronted the latter at his office and also
subsequently sent him two (2) demand letters,5 but all to
no avail.6 Hence, complainant was prompted to file the
instant administrative complaint.
In his Comment,7 respondent admitted that he indeed
received the subject amount from complainant but
averred that after receiving the same, the latters brother,
Erlindo, asked to be reimbursed the amount of
P7,500.00 which the latter purportedly paid to the land
surveyor.8 Respondent likewise alleged that he later
found out that he could not perform his undertaking
under the retainer because the ownership of the subject
land was still under litigation.9 Finally, respondent stated
that he wanted to return the balance of the subject
amount to complainant after deducting what Erlindo took

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter

entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
We have held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a
case, it is that lawyer's duty to serve the client with
competence and diligence.9
Here, it is beyond doubt that respondent breached his
duty to serve complainant with diligence and neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him. He himself admits that the
petition for recognition was not filed, seeks forgiveness
from the Court and promises not to repeat his
mistake.10 Complainant also submitted official letters11
from the Bureau of Immigration that indeed no such
petition was filed. That Anneth Tan supposedly lost the
petition for recognition and failed to inform respondent
cannot absolve him of liability for it was his duty not to
neglect complainant's case and handle it with diligence.
We note that while respondent failed to refund
immediately the amount paid by complainant, he
nevertheless exerted earnest efforts that he eventually
was able to fully repay complainant and begged
complainant's forgiveness.1wphi1
In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Bautista,12 we found Bautista
negligent in handling Voluntad-Ramirez's case and ruled
that he is guilty of violating Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. We admonished
Bautista to exercise greater care and diligence in the
performance of his duty to his clients and ordered him to
restitute to Voluntad-Ramirez P14,000 out of the
P15,000 acceptance fee. In said case, we cited Carino v.
Atty. De Los Reyes13 where the respondent lawyer who
failed to file the complaint-affidavit before the
prosecutor's office restituted the P10,000 acceptance fee
paid to him. The respondent lawyer in Carino was

from him, but was only prevented to do so because he

was maligned by complainant when she went to his
office and there, shouted and called him names in the
presence of his staff.10
In the Courts Resolutions dated December 17, 200811
and March 2, 2009,12 the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation. After both parties failed to
appear during the mandatory conference, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag
(Investigating Commissioner) required the parties to
submit their respective position papers.13 Complainant
filed her position paper14 on October 8, 2009, while
respondent failed to do so.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On November 6, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner
issued his Report and Recommendation,15 finding
respondent to have violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) for his failure to properly account for the money
entrusted to him without any adequate explanation why
he could not return the same. The Investigating
Commissioner found that respondents acts
demonstrated his "lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty to
his client, who entrusted him with money and documents
for the registration of the subject land."16 The
Investigating Commissioner likewise held that
respondents failure to return the subject amount,
despite being given "adequate time to return"17 the
same, "not to mention the repeated x x x demands made
upon him,"18 constitutes "gross dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and even misappropriation of money"19 in
violation of the above-stated rules. In view of the
foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.20
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation with modification, ordering the return
of the amount of P31,500.00,22 with legal interest and
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, to
complainant.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable for
violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the
IBP anent respondents administrative liability but deems
it proper to: (a) extend the recommended period of
suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months
to one (1) year; and (b) delete the recommended order
for the return of the amount of P31,500.00.
Anent respondents administrative liability, the Court
agrees with the IBP that respondents failure to properly
account for and duly return his clients money despite
due demand is tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01

and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which respectively

read as follows:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon
demand.1wphi1 However, he shall have a lien over the
funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for
in the Rules of Court.
Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of
the subject amount from complainant to cover for
pertinent registration expenses but posited his failure to
return the same due to his clients act of confronting him
at his office wherein she shouted and called him names.
With the fact of receipt being established, it was then
respondents obligation to return the money entrusted to
him by complainant. To this end, suffice it to state that
complainants purported act of "maligning" respondent
does not justify the latters failure to properly account for
and return his clients money upon due demand. Verily, a
lawyers duty to his client is one essentially imbued with
trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to
exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful
compliance. In this case, despite that singular encounter,
respondent had thereafter all the opportunity to return
the subject amount but still failed to do so. Besides, the
obligatory force of said duty should not be diluted by the
temperament or occasional frustrations of the lawyers
client, especially so when the latter remains unsatisfied
by the lawyers work. Indeed, a lawyer must deal with his
client with professional maturity and commit himself
towards the objective fulfillment of his responsibilities. If
the relationship is strained, the correct course of action
is for the lawyer to properly account for his affairs as well
as to ensure the smooth turn-over of the case to another
lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien exception23
under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code, the lawyer
should not withhold the property of his client.
Unfortunately, absent the applicability of such exception
or any other justifiable reason therefor, respondent still
failed to perform his duties under Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the Code which perforce warrants his
administrative liability.
The Court, however, deems it proper to increase the
IBPs recommended period of suspension from the
practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year in
view of his concomitant failure to exercise due diligence
in handling his clients cause as mandated by Rules
18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of

the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court
observes that respondent did not only accomplish his
undertaking under the retainer, but likewise failed to give
an adequate explanation for such non-performance
despite the protracted length of time given for him to do
so. As such omissions equally showcase respondents
non-compliance with the standard of proficiency required
of a lawyer as embodied in the above-cited rules, the
Court deems it apt to extend the period of his
suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months
to one (1) year similar to the penalty imposed in the case
of Del Mundo v. Capistrano.24
As a final point, the Court must clarify that the foregoing
resolution should not include a directive for the return of
the amount of P31,500.00 as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. The same amount was given by
complainant to respondent to cover for registration
expenses; hence, its return partakes the nature of a
purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during
an administrative-disciplinary proceeding. In TriaSamonte v. Obias,25 the Court recently held that its
"findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings
have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved
which are purely civil in nature meaning, those
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's
professional engagement as the same should be
threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature."
This pronouncement the Court applies to this case and
thus, renders a disposition solely on respondents
administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin is
found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon
16, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution
with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courts.
SO ORDERED
ADM. CASE NO. 5691
March 13, 2009
AVITO YU, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CESAR R. TAJANLANGIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

against him and a sentence of thirty (30) years of

imprisonment.2 After the motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial was denied by the trial court, instead of
filing an appeal, respondent filed a petition for certiorari3
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the trial courts
part in denying the motion. This petition was
subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals. Due to
respondents alleged error in the choice of remedy, the
period to appeal lapsed and complainant was made to
suffer imprisonment resulting from his conviction. In
depriving complainant of his right to an appeal,
respondent allegedly violated Rule 18.034 of the Code.
Moreover, complainant averred that respondent had
violated Rule 16.015 of the Code for failing to return the
bailbond to him in the amount P195,000.00 after having
withdrawn the same.6 Further, complainant stated that
respondent had failed to pay the telephone bill he had
incurred during his stay at complainants house.7

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed

by complainant Avito Yu against respondent Atty. Cesar
R. Tajanlangit for violation of Rules 18.03 and 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code).1

On the charge of violating Rule 18.03

Complainant alleged that he had engaged the services

of respondent as defense counsel in Criminal Case No.
96-150393 that resulted in a judgment of conviction

Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred and

be ordered to pay him the amount of P211,106.97 plus
interest.8
For his part, respondent clarified that his legal services
were engaged only after the denial of the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial and the supplement
thereto. His legal services were limited to filing the
petition for certiorari. Complainant, at the time, had
already been convicted by the trial court. Respondent
also explained that he had discussed with complainant
the merits of filing a petition for certiorari and that
complainant gave his conformity to the filing of the
same.9
Moreover, respondent averred that complainant had
authorized and instructed him to withdraw the cash bond
in order to apply the amount as payment for legal fees
and reimbursement for expenses. With regard to the
unpaid telephone bill, respondent alleged that he was
not presented a copy of the billing statement despite his
previous requests. He also contended that he had been
allowed to use the telephone to facilitate coordination
between him and complainant as he was then residing in
Bacolod City.10
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by Resolution of 16 July 2003.11
In his Report and Recommendation dated 2 December
2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, Jr., IBP Commissioner,
made the following findings:

xxx
x x x Considering that Respondent was only hired after
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial, Complainant is silent whether an appeal was still
available to him at that time. Complainant failed to state

the material dates when his first lawyer, Atty. Lacsamana

received the Decision dated 6 February 1998, when she
filed the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,
and when his second lawyer, Atty. Espiritu, received the
Order dated 23 April 1999.
While all of the lawyers who protected Complainants
cause were of the view that there was a need to present
additional evidence and/or hold trial anew, it is obvious
that Complainant singled out Respondent and blamed
him solely for his conviction.
At any rate, Respondent exhaustively explained his legal
basis for elevating the Order dated 23 April 1999 to the
Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari.
Considering that the Order dated 23 April 1999, which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,
Respondents argument that the said order is not the
proper subject of appeal is tenable. This is supported by
Section 1(a), Rule 43 and Section 9, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court. For another, a perusal of grounds
Respondent raised in the Petition is acceptable grounds
that warrant a new trial. At least two of the grounds
Respondent raised were: the negligence of former
counsel in failing to present evidence and new
discovered evidence. It is well-settled that these grounds
usually warrant the re-opening of evidence. Thus, it
cannot be said that Respondent acted negligently in
advocating Complainants cause.1avvphi1
xxx

which in itself constitutes the demand for its payment,

any payment (was) made by the Respondent.12
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that
respondent be directed to: (1) render an accounting of
the money he had received and to itemize the nature of
the legal services he had rendered, inclusive of the
expenses he had incurred in compliance with Rule 16.01
of the Code; and (2) to pay the amount of the unpaid
telephone bill. It was further recommended that
respondent be sternly warned that a similar offense in
the future would be dealt with more severely.13
On 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2005-83 adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner.14
The Court is in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.1avvphi1.zw+
Records show that respondent did not serve as
complainants lawyer at the inception of or during the
trial of Criminal Case No. 96-150393 which resulted to
the conviction of the latter. In fact, respondent was only
engaged as counsel after the withdrawal of appearance
of complainants lawyers and denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial and the supplement
thereto. At that time, complainant had already been
incarcerated. Significantly, complainant made no
mention of the availability of the remedy of appeal at the
time of respondents employment.

On the charge of violating Rule 16.01

x x x In the absence of evidence controverting
Respondents claim that a verbal agreement exists or an
amount different from what was agreed upon, it is
believable that indeed, Complainant knew of the fee
arrangement entered into with the Respondent, through
Ms. Javier, who acted in his behalf. It is also indisputable
that Complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney
dated 23 March 1999 authorizing the Respondent to
withdraw the cash bonds in several criminal cases on his
behalf. Thus, it was not all improper for Respondent to
withdraw the same.
xxx
While Respondent is entitled to be paid for the legal
services he rendered and expenses he incurred, it is still
Respondents obligation to render an accounting of the
money received.
xxx
Further, Respondent did not substantiate his claim that
he had paid for or tendered payment for the unpaid
telephone bill. While he contends that he previously
asked for the billing statement, it was allegedly not
shown to him. However, there is no showing that from
the time the instant disbarment complaint was filed,

More importantly, the Court finds adequate respondents

justification for filing the petition for certiorari instead of
an appeal. Indeed, there is no showing that respondent
was negligent in handling the legal matter entrusted to
him by complainant.
The Court also agrees with the IBP that it was not at all
improper for respondent to have withdrawn the cash
bonds as there was evidence showing that complainant
and respondent had entered into a special fee
arrangement. But, however justified respondent was in
applying the cash bonds to the payment of his services
and reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred, the
Court agrees with
the IBP that he is not excused from rendering an
accounting of the same. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,15 the
Court held that "(t)he highly fiduciary and confidential
relation of attorney and client requires that the lawyer
should promptly account for all the funds received from,
or held by him for, the client."16 The fact that a lawyer
has a lien for his attorneys fees on the money in his
hands collected for his client does not relieve him from
the obligation to make a prompt accounting.17
Finally, the Court concurs with the IBP that while it is true
that respondent was not presented a copy of the unpaid
telephone bill, the instant complaint itself constitutes the

demand for its payment. Considering that there is no

manifestation to the effect that the same has been paid,
respondent should accordingly be required to settle it.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Cesar R. Tajanlangit is ordered to render, within thirty
(30) days from notice of this Resolution, an accounting
of all monies he received from complainant and to
itemize the nature of the legal services he had rendered,
inclusive of the expenses he had incurred, in compliance
with Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 7332

June 18, 2013

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant,

vs.
RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Far the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1
for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella (complainant)
against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on
the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1,
and Rule 6.Q2, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code).
The Facts

On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal

dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City
Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII01-0128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter
(LA) Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May
13, 1999,2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant
P113,100.00 as separation pay and P73,608.00 as
backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LAs
Decision to the NLRC. In a Decision dated September
12, 2001,3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreons ruling and
instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant to his
former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th
month pay and service incentive leave pay, including
moral damages and attorneys fees. On reconsideration,
it modified the amounts of the aforesaid monetary
awards but still maintained that complainant was illegally
dismissed.4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision),5
the CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling with modification,
ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial
reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service
were not taken into account in the computation of his
separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the
motion and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the
same purpose.6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision
became final and executory.7
Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance
of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on
October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already
been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After
the lapse of five (5) months, complainants motion
remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second
Motion for Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months
thereafter, still, there was no action on complainants
motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant
proceeded to respondents office to personally follow-up
the matter. In the process, complainant and respondent
exchanged notes on how much the formers monetary
awards should be; however, their computations differed.
To complainants surprise, respondent told him that the
matter could be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how
much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant offered
the amount of P20,000.00, but respondent replied:
"make it P30,000.00." By force of circumstance,
complainant acceded on the condition that respondent
would have to wait until he had already collected from
PT&T. Before complainant could leave, respondent
asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the
latter P1,500.00.8

On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of

execution,9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the
premises of PT&T and collect the amount of
P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
PT&T moved to quash10 the said writ which was,
however, denied through an Order dated November 22,
2005.11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to
Quash dated December 2, 2005,12 the contents of which
were virtually identical to the one respondent earlier
denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental
motion on December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an
Order13 in open court, recalling the first writ of execution
he issued on November 7, 2005. He confirmed the
December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated
December 14, 200514 and eventually, issued a new writ
of execution15 wherein complainants monetary awards
were reduced from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00,
inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a
Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a Resolution
dated March 14, 2006,16 the NLRC annulled
respondents December 9, 2005 Order, stating that
respondent had no authority to modify the CA Decision
which was already final and executory.17
Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of
the Ombudsman,18 complainant filed the instant
disbarment complaint19 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting
money from complainant in exchange for a favorable
resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give
benefit and advantage to PT&T.
In his Comment,20 respondent denied the
abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he
merely implemented the CA Decision which did not
provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed
that he never demanded a single centavo from
complainant as it was in fact the latter who offered him
the amount of P50,000.00.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30,
2008,21 Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco
(Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent tried
to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical,
reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor
PT&T.22 He further observed that the confluence of
events in this case shows that respondent deliberately
left complainants efforts to execute the CA Decision
unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion
of the monetary award thereof. Notwithstanding their
agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent

later went as far as turning the proceedings into some

bidding war which eventually resulted into a resolution in
favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to
be guilty of gross immorality and therefore,
Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be
disbarred.23
On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP Resolution),24
adopting and approving Commissioner Limpingcos
recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and for
Respondents violation of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Code of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios,
Jr. is hereby DISBARRED.25
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is
guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01
and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
mans cause.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO

LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxxx
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not
use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
The above-cited rules, which are contained under
Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyers
responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the
overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in
any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct;
Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit
or proceeding or delaying any mans cause for any
corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is
particularly directed to lawyers in government service,
enjoining them from using ones public position to: (1)
promote private interests; (2) advance private interests;
or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public
duties.26 It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a
government office may be disciplined as a member of
the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.27
In this light, a lawyers compliance with and observance
of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into
consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue
in the practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both
a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession."28 This proceeds from the
lawyers duty to observe the highest degree of morality
in order to safeguard the Bars integrity.29 Consequently,
any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the
lawyers public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.30
In this case, records show that respondent was merely
tasked to recompute the monetary awards due to the
complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision
which had already been final and executory. When
complainant moved for execution twice at that
respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It
was only when complainant paid respondent a personal
visit on November 4, 2005 that the latter speedily issued
a writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November
7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the Court observes
that the sudden dispatch in respondents action soon

after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the

legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money
from the complainant.
The incredulity of respondents claims is further
bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal of
the November 7, 2005 writ of execution.
To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied
PT&Ts initial motion to quash through an Order dated
November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order in
open court on the basis of PT&Ts supplemental motion
to quash which was a mere rehash of the first motion
that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled
his earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution,
reducing complainants monetary awards from
P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution
and deposit fees.
To justify the same, respondent contends that he was
merely implementing the CA Decision which did not
provide for the payment of backwages. A plain and
cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the
truthfulness of the foregoing assertion. On point, the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The decision of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated September 12, 2001 and
October 8, 2002 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private
respondent Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as
computed by the Labor Arbiter) in lieu of reinstatement. 31
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRCs
rulings dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002
which both explicitly awarded backwages and other
unpaid monetary benefits to complainant.32 The only
modification was with respect to the order of
reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRCs rulings
which was changed by the CA to separation pay in view
of the strained relations between the parties as well as
the supervening removal of complainants previous
position.33 In other words, the portion of the NLRCs
rulings which awarded backwages and other monetary
benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to
the CAs award of separation pay in lieu of the NLRCs
previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion,
palpable as it is, can be easily deduced from the
records.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the
CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding that
the CAs award of separation pay denied complainants
entitlement to any backwages and other consequential
benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion for

Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution,34 respondent

stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is
very clear and categorical in directing PT&T to pay
complainant his separation pay ONLY in lieu of
reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T
to pay him his backwages, and other consequential
benefits that were directed by the NLRC because he
could no longer be reinstated to his previous position on
the ground of strained relationship and his previous
position had already gone, and no equivalent position
that the PT&T could offer. x x x.
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that
backwages are separate and distinct from separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded
conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally
dismissed.35 There is nothing in the records that could
confound the finding that complainant was illegally
dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were
all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor
arbiter, it is hardly believable that respondent could
overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to
backwages in view of the standing pronouncement of
illegal dismissal.1wphi1 In this regard, respondents
defense deserves scant consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise,
the Court gives credence and upholds Commissioner
Limpingcos and the IBP Board of Governors
pronouncement of respondents gross immorality.
Likewise, the Court observes that his infractions
constitute gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves
acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community.36 It treads
the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency.37 On the other
hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent
and not mere error of judgment."38
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred:

SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme

Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, as respondents violations clearly constitute gross
immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment
should come as a matter of course.1wphi1 However,
the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had
already been disbarred in a previous administrative
case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 39
which therefore precludes the Court fromduplicitously
decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court
deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount
of P40,000.0040 in order to penalize respondents
transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter
the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the
principle that the practice of law is a privilege41 accorded
only to those who continue to meet its exacting
qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity
which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility
to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it
is quintessential that its members continuously and
unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral
uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice
as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar
holds no place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is
hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and
gross misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03,
Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to
pay a FINE of P40,000.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V.
AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors
(BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated
March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended
the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang
(respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for
ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his
unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed
respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt
of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant
sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On
October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner
issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only
on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the
scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified
Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together
with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were
furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would
be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there
was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the
case would be submitted for resolution based on the
documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10
oclock in the morning or after the proceeding was
terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply
to respondents Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the
January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial Court
in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079,
ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay
complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00
and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of
12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid,
plus cost of suit.10
Complainants Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was
referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered

into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized.

After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his
legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in
court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid
respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and
P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to
Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the
latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00,
payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car.
Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent
being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without
interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that
Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot
she had previously purchased. She referred the matter
to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of
a case for reformation of contract with damages. On
November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter
received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00,
as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount,
respondent cited the high value of the land and the
sheriffs travel expenses and accommodations in Manila,
for the service of the summons to the defendant
corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees
paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled
Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development
Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds,
complainant also discovered that respondent was the
one who notarized the document being questioned in the
civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent
merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel
to handle complainants case. Upon reading a copy of
the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court,
complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the
documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2]
the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional
sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint
discussed the method of payment which was not the
point of contention in the case; and 4] the very
anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters
could be brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant,
requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or
emergency.16 Complainant obliged the request and gave
respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants
house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a
favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings
on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount

of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating

that it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00
shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff
Erlinda Foster. On November 2, 2010, respondent
insisted that the remaining amount be given by
complainant prior to the next hearing of the case,
because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance.
Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the
amount of P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainants case was
dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14,
2010, when she personally checked the status of the
case with the court. She went to the office of respondent,
but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave
her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant
and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration.
On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see
respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the
comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for
reconsideration; to include additional facts because the
Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documents unless these were amended; and to make
the additional averment that the defendant was using
false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to
complainant a copy of the reply with a message from
him that the matters she requested to be included were
mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however,
complainant discovered that these matters were not so
included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked
for P2,500.00 on respondents directive for the
reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to
the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that
oral arguments on the case had been set the following
month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate
the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him
a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies
of documents showing that respondent had been
acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007.
Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent,
requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from
her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing
fees. Respondent never replied.
Respondents Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years
old and had been engaged in the practice of law since
March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte
Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of
complainants case, but he qualified that he was not paid
his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as
counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have

received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00

for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00,
respondent averred that it was complainant, at the
behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount
to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for
his services. The transaction was declared as no loan
and he was told not to worry about its payment. As
regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing
fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was
persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the
handling of the case. He denied having said that the
sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel
accommodations. Complainants husband approved of
the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having
asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received
P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having
told her that the case would be discussed with the judge
who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing.
Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend the judge.
He never said that he would personally present a bottle
of wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrars comment as
to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since
complainant was fully aware that another counsel was
assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully
informed of the nature of her cause of action and the
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the
applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by
way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just
compensation for the services he had rendered in other
cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered
respondents defenses by making reference to the
receipts in her possession, all evidencing that
respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the
complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before
she met him. While respondent was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of
several documents involving Flying V, an oil company
owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned
Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of
P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never
considered as no loan.
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the
Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution,
dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against
respondent for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the

Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG
adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating
Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the
balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on
January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition
thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in
court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had
been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied
respondents motion for reconsideration but modified the
penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by
reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months.
Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance
of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to
P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Courts Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondents violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The
Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged
violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests.
The Court also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. It is well-established that a lawyers
conduct is not confined to the performance of his
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled
complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case
were worth more than the prescribed amount in the
rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of
the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred
by court employees. In other words, he resorted to
overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and

dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00

as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to
P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence.
For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who
was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would
propose such amount that would further burden her
financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was
more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just
to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is
likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual
amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and
good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.
Moreover, the fiduciary nature of the relationship
between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.28 Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used
for the purpose should be immediately returned. A
lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As
pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them.
Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts
presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to
return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and
other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives
money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive
and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent
displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for
the amount of P50,000.00 as representation expenses
allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case,
in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent
himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the
amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently
demanded and received the other half of the amount at
the time the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct
that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of

disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from

his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a
positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his
clients trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and
faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of
the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public
service and the administration of justice. In no way
should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage
the image of judges, lest the publics perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous
doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the
amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him
from any liability. The absence of proof that the said
amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To
tolerate respondents actuations would seriously erode
the publics trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as
early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as
he failed to inform his client of the status of the case,
and left the client to personally inquire with the court.
Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but
was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant
did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise
violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states
that [a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not
just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The
first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time,
he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or
P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency
but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These
transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned
by respondent. These acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated
to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably
acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the
records, particularly in the defenses raised by
respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the
exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of
P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Respondents assertion that the amounts were given to
him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus,
considered as no loan, does not justify his
inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and
receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter
failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of
integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present,

respondent has not yet paid his obligations to

complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that
deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of conduct
or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
the lawyers professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice
of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent
must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondents alleged representation of
conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who
concluded that complainant presented insufficient
evidence of respondents lawyering for the opposing
party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that [a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the
standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a
full disclosure of the clients most confidential information
to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client
can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is dutybound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the
lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing
conflicting interests.33 Thus, even if lucrative fees
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must
decline professional employment if the same would
trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a
written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is
substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of
complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which

he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot

ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document
being questioned in complainants case. While the
Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of
the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged,
the Court still finds that the purpose for which the
proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush
aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as
to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra
Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he
was the one who notarized the assailed document.
Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire
document or the intention of the parties as to some of its
provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in
action when he accepted complainants case, knowing
fully that he was involved in the execution of the very
transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial
fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel
would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent
that respondent was retained by clients who had close
dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no
record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited
not only because the relation of attorney and client is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but
also because of the principles of public policy and good
taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest
confidence of his client and represent him with undivided
loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the
entire profession suffers.34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred
or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation
of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the
practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character. 36 The
appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit;
(2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3)
grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney
for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good

demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the

court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal
of the trust of his client and, in general, the public.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three
(3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not
sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and
omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office
as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference
to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as
a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the
complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing
conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than
the penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the
money he borrowed from complainant in his private
capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that
it cannot order the lawyer to return money to
complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity
because its findings in administrative cases have no
bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyers professional engagement. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is
the determination of respondents administrative liability.
Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial
actions which the parties may choose against each
other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of
his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed
directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of
evidence required in civil cases is different from the
quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In
civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.40 In administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more
than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively
liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the
prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to
administrative cases which are, as a rule,
imprescriptible.42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent

to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the

balance of the filing fees he received from complainant,
as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client
relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount
of P50,000.00 which respondent received from
complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase
of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected
to his professional relationship with the complainant.
While respondents deplorable act of requesting the said
amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the
same as it was borne out of their professional
relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was
already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he
contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases
filed against him.

died leaving all his children as heirs to his estate; among

them is herein complainant Felicisima Mendoza Vda. De
Robosa (Felicisima). Eladio's children pursued the
application and executed a Special Power of Attorney2
(SPA) in favor of Felicisima. Their relative, Atty.
Mendoza, prepared and notarized the said SPA. They
also engaged the services of Atty. Mendoza as their
counsel in the proceedings before the CENRO and LMB.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the

Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.43
The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who, by their misconduct, have proven
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney.44

The CENRO and the LMB proceedings resulted in the

dismissal of Felicisima and her siblings' application for
Lot No. 2489 and the partial grant of their application for
Lot No. 3771.4 The Bureau of Lands issued an Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) covering one-third (VV) or
about 8,901 square meters of Lot No. 3771 in the names
of Felicisima and her siblings. Subsequently, Felicisima
and her siblings sold the land to Greenfield Corporation
(Greenfield) and received the amount of P2,000,000.00
as down payment.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V.

Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby
DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS
him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts
of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to
all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6056, September 09, 2015
FELICISIMA MENDOZA VDA. DE ROBOSA,
Complainant, v. ATTYS. JUAN B. MENDOZA AND
EUSEBIO P. NAVARRO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Juan B. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) for alleged deceitful
acts against his client, and Atty. Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr.
(Atty. Navarro) for negligence in the handling of his
client's defense in the collection case filed by Atty.
Mendoza.
Factual Antecedents
Eladio Mendoza (Eladio) applied for original registration
of two parcels of land (Lot Nos. 3771 and 2489) situated
in Calamba, Laguna before the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) at Los Banos,
Laguna and Land Management Bureau (LMB) in
Manila.1 While his application was still pending, Eladio

On February 20, 1993, upon the behest of Atty.

Mendoza, Felicisima signed a Contract for Service3
prepared by Atty. Mendoza. The said contract stipulated
that in the event of a favorable CENRO or LMB
resolution, Felicisima shall convey to Atty. Mendoza onefifth (1/5) of the lands subject of the application or onefifth (1/5) of the proceeds should the same property be
sold.

On October 15, 1998, Atty. Mendoza, joined by his wife

Filomena S. Mendoza, filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas a Complaint5 against
Felicisima and her siblings (Civil Case No. T-1080). Atty.
Mendoza claimed that except for the amount of
P40,000.00, Felicisima and her siblings refused to pay
his attorney's fees equivalent to 1/5 of the proceeds of
the sale of the land as stipulated in the Contract for
Service.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 Felicisima and her
siblings denied the "existence and authenticity of the x x
x Contract of Service," adding that it did not reflect the
true intention of the parties as they only agreed to pay
Atty. Mendoza PI,500.00 per appearance and up to
P1,500.00 for gasoline expenses. They also asserted
that, based on quantum meruit, Atty. Mendoza is not
entitled to the claimed attorney's fees because they lost
in one case and he failed to accomplish the titling of the
land awarded to them, which would have enhanced the
value of the property.
Felicisima and her siblings hired the services of Atty.
Navarro as their counsel in Civil Case No. T-1080.
On March 29, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of Atty. Mendoza and against Felicisima and her siblings.
The RTC ruled that Felicisima failed to substantiate her
claim that she did not enter into a contingency contract
for legal services with Atty. Mendoza, and ordered
Felicisima to pay Atty. Mendoza P1,258,000.00 (for the
land sold at P7,120,800.00) representing attorney's fees

as well as the total cost of suit.7

Atty. Navarro then filed a Notice of Appeal8 on behalf of
Felicisima. However, Atty. Mendoza moved for an
execution pending appeal with the RTC. Since no
opposition was filed by Felicisima and her siblings, the
RTC granted the said motion and issued a writ of
execution, which resulted in the levy and eventual
transfer of Felicisima's properties covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-433859 and T-433860 in favor
of Atty. Mendoza as the highest bidder in the execution
sale.9
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered Felicisima
to file an appellant's brief but Atty. Navarro failed to file
the same within the period granted by the CA.
Consequently, the CA dismissed Felicisima's appeal for
non-compliance with Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the
Revised Rules of Court.10
On June 3, 2003, Felicisima filed a complaint-affidavit for
disbarment before this Court against Atty. Mendoza for
allegedly deceiving her into signing the Contract for
Service by taking advantage of her illiteracy, and against
Atty. Navarro for dereliction of duty in handling her case
before the CA causing her properties to be levied and
sold at public auction.11
Felicisima alleges that Atty. Mendoza made her sign a
document at her house without the presence of her
siblings. Said document (Contract for Service) was
written in English which she does not understand. She
claims that Atty. Mendoza told her the document will
shield her from her siblings' possible future claims on the
property because she alone is entitled to the property as
her siblings did not help her in processing the application
for original registration. She was not given a copy of the
said document and she discovered only during the trial
that Atty. Mendoza anchors his claim over Vs of
proceeds from the sale of the land awarded by the
CENRO and LMB on the same document she had
signed.12
As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima claims that her case
before the CA was neglected despite repeated followups on her part. She also points out that Atty. Navarro
abandoned her case before the RTC when the latter
failed to file an opposition to Atty. Mendoza's motion for
execution pending appeal, which resulted in the loss of
her properties.13
In his Comment,14 Atty. Mendoza avers that he has been
a lawyer since 1954 and retired sometime in 1983 due to
partial disability. Fie went back to practicing his
profession in 1996 on a selective basis due to his
disability but completely stopped a year after. Being 82
years of age at the time of filing his comment, Atty.
Mendoza admits that he is now totally disabled, cannot
walk on his own, cannot even write and sign his name,
and can only move about with the help of his family for
he has been suffering from a severe case of "acute

gouty arthritic attack" which causes extreme difficulty in

moving virtually all his joints. He points out that he had
previously handled pro bono a concubinage case filed by
Felicisima against her husband, having yielded to her
repeated pleas as she was then financially hard-up and
psychologically distraught. For the application with the
CENRO and LMB, he agreed to be paid for his legal
services on a contingent basis, which contract was
subsequently found by the RTC to be valid. When it was
time to collect his attorney's fees, Felicisima and her
siblings refused to pay him without any justifiable reason
and even threatened to shoot him if he continued to
press for his compensation. This left Atty. Mendoza with
no other recourse but to avail of the judicial process to
enforce his claim.
Replying to the comment of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima
maintains that she did not understand the contents of the
Contract for Service and if it was truly their agreement
(contingent basis) they would not have given money to
Atty. Mendoza amounting to P66,000.00. in fact, she
points out that Atty. Mendoza failed to recover one of the
lands applied for and to have the land awarded to them
titled because he became ill. Further, she denies the
allegation that she and her siblings threatened to shoot
Atty. Mendoza for how could they do it to a lawyer who
will certainly have them jailed. Besides, he never
mentioned such incident during the hearing of the case.
On his part, Atty. Navarro asserts that he did his best to
win Felicisima's case although he was unsuccessful. He
explains that even before handling Felicisima's case, he
had been saddled by many cases involving politicians
and sympathizers, having previously served as councilor
in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for two
consecutive terms. He thus emphasized to Felicisima
that in order to "keep the case alive", he could file the
Notice of Appeal in her behalf, and instructed her to look
for another lawyer who has the time to attend to her
case and that she would return to him only when she
failed to get one. However, Atty. Navarro admits that
since he was too preoccupied with so many cases in the
local courts, he had altogether forgotten about
Felicisima's case, not having seen her again as per their
agreement.
Atty. Navarro avers that after a long time Felicisima
suddenly showed up at his office complaining why there
was no appellant's brief filed on her behalf at the CA. He
claims that Felicisima blamed her and even accused him
of conniving with Atty. Mendoza. Felicisima would not
accept his explanation and she obviously failed to
understand his earlier instruction as he had filed the
Notice of Appeal precisely to give her enough time to
secure the services of a new lawyer having told her that
he was quite busy with his other cases. He therefore
pleads for mercy and compassion if he had somehow
committed some lapses considering that this is the first
time he was charged administratively in his almost 39
years of law practice and that he is too willing to take
complainant's cause if not for such apparent

miscommunication between a lawyer and his client.15

On December 7, 2005, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.16
On November 6, 2006, Felicisima filed a position paper17
reiterating that Atty. Mendoza clearly abused the trust
and confidence she reposed in him, depriving her of her
material possessions by filing suit to enforce the
Contract for Service. She asserted that they could not
have entered into a contract with Atty. Mendoza for the
conveyance of a portion of the land to be awarded by the
Bureau of Lands as his attorney's fees because they
already agreed to pay his fee per hearing plus
transportation expenses and the sum of P40,000.00.
She contended that Atty. Mendoza should be held liable
for deceit and misrepresentation for tricking her to sign,
to her detriment, a document that she did not
understand.
As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima maintained that he
abandoned his responsibility to monitor and keep her
updated of the status of her case before the CA. She
also alleges that Atty. Navarro made it appear to her that
he had already filed the appellant's brief when, in fact,
there was no such undertaking. She thus prayed that
Atty. Navarro be held liable for negligence in the conduct
and manner of handling her case before the CA.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
After two postponements, the mandatory conference
was finally held on September 25, 2006 where all parties
appeared except for Atty. Mendoza. Upon termination of
the hearing, the parties were required to file their
position papers but only Felicisima complied.
On March 6, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) submitted
her Report and Recommendation18 finding Atty. Mendoza
guilty of taking advantage of Felicisima's ignorance just
to have the Contract for Service signed. She held that
Atty. Mendoza violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him, as well as Rule
20.04, Canon 20 which exhorts lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning matters of
compensation and to resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.19
As to Atty. Navarro, the Investigating Commissioner held
that his participation in politics affected his law practice
and caused him to forget about Felicisima's case.
Having failed to file the appellant's brief as ordered by
the CA, Atty. Navarro even filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appearance at a very late stage, leaving no time for
Felicisima to secure the services of another lawyer. His
infraction caused the eviction of Felicisima and her
children from their residence by virtue of the writ of

execution and public auction of her real properties. The

Investigating Commissioner further said that Atty.
Navarro's acts showed lack of diligence in violation of
Canon 18 of the CPR and his Lawyer's Oath.20
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that both
Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro be suspended for two
(2) years from the practice of law.21
On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution22 modifying the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation by
lowering the period of suspension from two (2) years to
six (6) months.
Atty. Navarro filed a motion for reconsideration23
contending that the IBP Board of Governors failed to
consider that after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, there
was no more lawyer-client relationship between him and
Felicisima. Insisting that there was a miscommunication
between him and Felicisima regarding his instruction that
she should engage the services of another lawyer after
the filing of the Notice of Appeal, he stressed that she
only later found it difficult to scout for a new lawyer
because she was being charged exorbitant acceptance
fees. Hence, Felicisima should be held equally negligent
in not hiring the services of another lawyer despite a
clear understanding to this effect. He further cites the
lack of communication between him and Felicisima,
which resulted in the late filing of the Notice of
Withdrawal that she volunteered to file a long time ago.
In her comment to Atty. Navarro's motion for
reconsideration, Felicisima reiterated that Atty. Navarro
should be held liable for negligence in failing to update
her of the status of the case and admitting such
oversight. She claims that despite several demands,
Atty. Navarro ignored them and made himself scarce.24
On February 28, 2012, the IBP-CBD forwarded the case
to this Court for proper disposition pursuant to Section
12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Among the records
transmitted was the Resolution dated January 15, 2012
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty.
Navarro.25cralawred
The Court's Ruling
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations
in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.
In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced,
the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of
the respondent.26 For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.27

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence

adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other.28 It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.29 Under
Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence, the court may
consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses'
interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in
the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it
does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with
the greater number.
After a thorough review of the evidence and pleadings
submitted by the parties, we hold that Felicisima was
able to prove her charges against Atty. Navarro but not
Atty. Mendoza.

application with the CENRO and LMB. Such finding was

based solely on the statements of Felicisima in her
affidavit-complaint. While Felicisima made a reference to
her testimony before the RTC, she did not attach the
transcript of stenographic notes of the said testimony
detailing the circumstances of her signing the Contract
for Service. Neither is the receipt by Atty. Mendoza of the
sum of P40,000.00 after Felicisima and her siblings sold
the land, by itself an indication of fraud and deceit in the
execution of the Contract for Service.
Upon the other hand, Atty. Mendoza presented the RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. T-1080 dated March 29, 2000,
the relevant portions of which state:cralawlawlibrary
It is not disputed that Atty. Mendoza was paid PI,000.00
for every appearance and he was also given P300.00 for
hiring a vehicle and driver for each scheduled hearing.
He also received P40,000.00 from Felicisima Mendoza
when defendants' one-third portion of Lot No. 3771 was
sold.

Contract for Service with Atty. Mendoza

a contract for contingent fees

Atty. Mendoza filed the instant case to collect one-fifth of

the sale price of defendants' land which was sold for
P7,120,800.00 or the amount of P1,424,000.00 minus
the amount of P40,000.00 he received, or the amount of
P1,384,000.00.

The Contract for Service dated February 20, 1993

reads:cralawlawlibrary
That the client hereby employs the Attorney as their
counsel for the titling and recovery of their two parcels of
land situated at Barangay Maunong, Calamba, Laguna,
[Lot] No. 2489 with an area of approximately 21,784
Square Meters and [L]ot No. 3771 with an area of more
or less 26,703 and in consideration of the services of the
attorney, the client agrees to pay the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

During her testimony, Felicisima Mendoza admitted the

authenticity of the Special Power of Attorney whereby
her brothers and sisters authorized her to secure the
services of the plaintiff Juan Mendoza adding that it was
in writing, in English and was explained to her before
she signed it; that on the basis of the authority given her
by her brothers and sisters she engaged the services of
Atty. Mendoza; that the signature in the document,
entitled Contract of Service, is that of her name which
she signed in "his house."

1. For the prosecution of said proceedings (titling and

recovery of the said parcels of land and hearing at the
Land Management Bureau, Manila, and at the Office of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office at Los Bafios, Laguna the client will give the
Attorney one fifth (1/5[)] of the said two parcels of land or
one fifth (1/5[)] of the selling price of the said properties if
sold.

On the basis of the evidence, the Court finds no ground

to support Felicisima's claim that she did not enter into
any written agreement with the plaintiff, Juan Mendoza,
for the latter to render legal services and the
corresponding compensation therefor as set forth in the
Contract of Service. However, the Court finds that the
amounts received by the plaintiff Juan Mendoza from
defendant Felicisima Mendoza during the course of his
legal services for the twenty hearings in the amount of
P1,300.00 per hearing or a total of P26,000.00 should
also be deducted from his claim of P1,384,000.00
leaving an unpaid balance of PI,258,000.00 due plaintiff
Juan Mendoza for legal services rendered the
defendants.31chanrobleslaw

Said Attorney hereby accepts said employment on said

terms and conditions and to do his best care, skill and
ability, and at all times to protect the rights and interest
of said client.
2. That the expenses of the proceedings, and such
others as filing fees, expenses of publication, costs
legally taxable and all others shall be for the account of
the client.30chanrobleslaw
We cannot sustain the finding of the IBP that Atty.
Mendoza misled Felicisima into signing the above
contract which supposedly was intended to protect her
from the claims of her siblings who did not spend for the

Given the above finding of the RTC that Felicisima in

fact entered into a contract for legal services with Atty.
Mendoza, thus debunking her defense in her Answer
denying the existence and authenticity of the said
document, it appears that Felicisima raised the issue of
voluntariness of her signing the Contract for Service only
during the hearing when she supposedly testified that,
having reached only Grade IV and trusting completely

her lawyer cousin, Atty. Mendoza who told her that the
document will protect her from the claims of her siblings,
she actually signed the Contract for Service.32 The RTC,
however, found the evidence adduced by Felicisima as
insufficient to defeat Atty. Mendoza's claim for attorney's
fees. Said judgment had attained finality and even
pending appeal was already executed on motion by Atty.
Mendoza.
It bears to stress that a contingent fee arrangement is
valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as
valid and binding but must be laid down in an express
contract.33 The validity of contingent fees depends, in
large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount
fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the
case.34 Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for
a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence
exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud
or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly
excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved
party.35
Apart from the allegations in her affidavit-complaint,
Felicisima failed to establish by clear and satisfactory
proof of the deception allegedly committed by Atty.
Mendoza when she agreed in writing for the latter's
contingent fees. Fraud and irregularity in the execution
of their contingency fee contract cannot be deduced
from the fact alone that Atty. Mendoza filed suit to
enforce their contract.
Atty. Navarro 's Gross Negligence
With respect to Atty. Navarro, the facts on record clearly
established his failure to live up to the standards of
diligence and competence of the legal profession.
Lawyers engaged to represent a client in a case bear the
responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with
warmth, zeal and utmost diligence.36 They must
constantly keep in mind that their actions or omissions
would be binding on the client.37
In this case, Atty. Navarro agreed to represent Felicisima
and her siblings in Civil Case No. T-1080 and as their
counsel he filed the Answer with Counterclaim. He
likewise attended the hearings of the case until the RTC
rendered an adverse judgment. However, after filing the
Notice of Appeal, nothing was heard of again from him.
He did not file any opposition when Atty. Mendoza
moved for execution pending appeal, which resulted in
the sale of Felicisima's properties at public auction and
eventual eviction of Felicisima and her children from the
said premises. Worse, he failed to file an appellant's
brief despite receipt of the order from the CA directing
him to do so within the period specified therein, and to
file a motion for reconsideration when the appeal was
dismissed due to non-filing of such brief. His motion for
extension of time to submit an appellant's brief was filed
93 days late and was thus denied by the CA. Barely a
week after, he filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance

bearing the conformity of his clients which was granted.

It is evident from the foregoing that Atty. Navarro failed to
inform Felicisima of the status of the case so that the
latter was surprised upon being served the eviction order
of the court and eventual dismissal by the CA of their
appeal.
Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03
further provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Thus:cralawlawlibrary
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence and
champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy
or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal
profession.38chanrobleslaw
Atty. Navarro's asseveration that he had instructed
Felicisima to look for another lawyer and given them the
Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance for them to file in
the CA, fails to convince. If it is true that he did not agree
to continue being Felicisima's counsel before the CA, he
should have immediately filed the Notice of Withdrawal
of Appearance himself after filing the Notice of Appeal.
Despite receipt of the order to file appellant's brief from
the CA, he did not inform Felicisima about it nor did he
inquire from the latter whether they already secured the
services of a new counsel. That such withdrawal was
filed long after the expiration of the period to file
appellant's brief and the denial by the CA of the motion
for extension also belatedly filed by him, clearly indicate
that he never updated Felicisima on the status of their
appeal, such information being crucial after Atty.
Mendoza succeeded in having the judgment executed
pending appeal.
Atty. Navarro, in fact, admitted that he forgot about
Felicisima's case due to his political activities. Despite
having received notices from the CA, he allowed the
period of filing the appellant's brief to lapse and failed to

file a motion for extension before such period expired.

He did file a motion for extension but only three months
later and when such motion was denied, he finally
moved to withdraw from the case. There being no
appellant's brief filed, the CA granted Atty. Mendoza's
motion to dismiss the appeal. Under the circumstances,
Atty. Navarro was grossly negligent in his duties,
resulting in great prejudice to Felicisima who lost her
properties to satisfy the judgment in favor of Atty.
Mendoza.
We have held that the failure of counsel to submit the
appeal brief for his client within the reglementary period
constitutes inexcusable negligence39 an offense that
entails disciplinary action.40 The filing of a brief within the
period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also
to the court.41 The failure to file an appellate court brief
without any justifiable reason thus deserves sanction. 42
Atty. Navarro's negligent handling of Felicisima's case
was exacerbated by his failure to inform her of the status
of her case. There was no mention in his pleadings of
any attempt on his part to contact Felicisima at the
crucial stages when Atty. Mendoza moved for execution
pending appeal and the CA sent a directive for the filing
of the appellant's brief. If indeed, he had already
instructed Felicisima to look for another lawyer, he
should have apprised her of these developments and
explained to her the urgency of filing the notice of
withdrawal of appearance and entry of appearance of a
new counsel she may have already engaged.
Atty. Navarro's failure to communicate vital information to
his client violated Rule 18.04 which
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.chanrobleslaw
The lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly updated
on the developments of his case is crucial in maintaining
the client's confidence. Indeed, the relationship of
lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever
present the need for the lawyer to inform timely and
adequately the client of important developments
affecting the client's case. The lawyer should not leave
the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the
client's interests.43
In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other
pleading before an appellate court, this Court has
imposed suspension from the practice of law for periods
ranging from three to six months, and in most serious
cases, even disbarment.44
We find the recommendation of the IBP-Board of
Governors to suspend Atty. Navarro from the practice of
law for six months appropriate under the circumstances.
Considering that this is his first administrative offense,
such penalty, and not disbarment as prayed for by
complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the

interest of the public and the legal profession. For this

Court will exercise its power to disbar only in clear cases
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eusebio
P. Navarro, Jr. GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months effective upon finality of this Decision,
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
violation shall be dealt with more severely. The charges
against Atty. Juan B. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A.C. No. 8708 (CBD Case No. 08-2192), August 12,
2015
SPOUSES BYRON AND MARIA LUISA SAUNDERS,
Complainants, v. ATTY. LYSSA GRACE S. PAGANOCALDE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before us is a Complaint filed by spouses Byron and
Maria Luisa Saunders (complainants) against Atty. Lyssa
Grace S. Pagano-Calde (respondent) for allegedly
misappropriating P530,000.
THE FACTS
The antecedent facts of the case as shown by the
records are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Complainants obtained the services of respondent in
relation to the sale of a property located at 1 Tacay
Road, Quezon Hill, Baguio City (subject property),
registered in the name of Virgilio J. Gaerlan (Virgilio).
Respondent also represented complainants in the case
involving the partition of the subject property.
On 12 January 2005, a Deed of Conditional Sale was
supposedly entered into by complainant Maria Luisa with
her brother Virgilio who was represented by their mother,
Adelia J. Gaerlan (Adelia), as his attorney-in-fact. In view
of this transaction, complainants gave respondent the
following amounts: 1) P500,000 representing partial
payment of the purchase price and to be held in trust for
Adelia;1 and 2) P60,000 for various expenses such as
P30,000 for the publication of summons, P15,000 for
commissioners fee, and P15,000 for the last will and
testament of Adelia.2redarclaw
The sale did not push through. A case for partition of the
subject property was then instituted.
Subsequently, sometime in 2007, complainants
demanded the return of P500,000, P15,000 for
commissioners fee, and P15,000 for the last will and
testament of Adelia.

According to complainants, when they demanded the

return of the money, respondent told them that it was in
a term deposit. She failed, though, to present any detail
such as proof of deposit. She also failed to meet with
complainants to discuss matters on the pending civil
case related to the sale of the subject property.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that the money
had already been turned over to Adelia on 14 November
2005. She presented an Acknowledgment Receipt3
allegedly signed by Adelia. It was contended that
respondent merely complied with the provisions of the
Deed of Conditional Sale, in which the parties agreed
[t]hat in the event that the vendee shall not make full
payment of the purchase price on or before 31 October
2005, then the partial payment made shall be forfeited in
favor of the vendor.4 Complainants failed to pay the
purchase price on 31 October 2005, so respondent gave
Adelia the P500,000 being held in trust in accordance
with the parties agreement.
Receipt of the money was, however, denied by Adelia.
The continued refusal of respondent to return the money
prompted complainants to file a criminal case for estafa.
They claimed that respondent produced the dubious
Acknowledgment Receipt supposedly signed by Adelia
only after the filing of the criminal case. A copy of the
case records was also attached to the Position Paper of
complainants. The documents include, among others: 1)
the Affidavit of Adelia denying receipt of P500,000 from
respondent;5 2) the Resolution of the Prosecutors Office
finding probable cause for the prosecution of respondent
for the crime of estafa;6 and 3) a Questioned Documents
Report dated 28 October 2008 issued by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) stating that a comparative
examination of the specimen signatures of Adelia and
the signature on the Acknowledgment Receipt dated 14
November 2005 revealed that they were not written by
one and the same person.7redarclaw
Spouses Saunders filed a complaint with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio-Benguet Chapter.
This complaint was referred to the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). However, the parties failed to
attend the mandatory conference set by the Commission
despite repeated postponements and resettings.
Commissioner Waldo G. Rebolos gave them an order to
file their respective Position Papers, instead, to which
they complied.
THE IBP-CBDS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Waldos, finds that
complainants and respondent had diametrically opposed
allegations that led to the filing of a criminal case for
estafa against her in Baguio City. Because of the
pendency of the criminal case and the fact that the main
issue in this administrative case is whether respondent
actually delivered the amount of P500,000 to Adelia
Gaerlan, the issue of whether the former has in fact
misappropriated the funds she held in trust for her client
cannot yet be resolved.

The IBP-CBD recommends that the case be dismissed

without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case for
estafa against respondent.
In a Resolution dated 26 February 2010,8 the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation by the IBP-CBD after finding that
the same is fully supported by evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules.
THE COURTS RULING
This Court does not agree with the recommendation of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
Disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer even if they involve
the same set of facts.9 A finding of guilt in the criminal
case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in
the administrative case. Conversely, the acquittal does
not necessarily exculpate one
administratively.10redarclaw
In Yu v. Palaa,11 the Court held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note
that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even
if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound
judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal
case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted
upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to
apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
membership in, the legal profession during the whole
period that the criminal case is pending final disposition,
when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court.
The pendency of the criminal case should not be a
reason to dismiss the complaint of the client against the
lawyer. The Court must make a separate determination
of the administrative liability of the lawyer to preserve the
integrity of the legal profession.
At this point, we cannot yet ascertain the full liability of
respondent with respect to the money entrusted to
respondent, as this proceeding should not preempt the
outcome of the factual determination of the estafa case.
Nonetheless, a determination of whether a violation of
the lawyers oath was committed by respondent may still
be made.
This Court finds the following pertinent provisions of the

Code of Professional Responsibility applicable to this

case, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
The Complaint was triggered by allegations regarding
how respondent had dealt with complainants money.
There is evidence that she fell short of her undertakings
to her clients. She does not deny their allegation that she
failed to meet with them on several instances, making
them wonder about the status of the money they had
entrusted to her.
The claim of respondent that the money was already
delivered to Adelia following the terms of the Deed of
Conditional Sale is not believable. A reading of the
statements of respondent herself would reveal that she
did not personally apprise complainants about the
alleged delivery of P500,000 to Adelia despite their
persistent pleas for the return of the amount. It took a
while for respondent to respond to the queries of
complainants. In fact, she did not rebut their allegation
that the Acknowledgment Receipt dated 14 November
2005 purportedly signed by Adelia was produced only
after the estafa case had been filed against the former.
Neither did respondent explain why complainants were
not furnished a copy of the Acknowledgment Receipt.
If respondents claim of delivery is true, we find it strange
that the money was still delivered to Adelia on 14
November 2005, despite respondents knowledge of
Virgilios revocation of the power of attorney as early as
January 2005. Respondent admitted in her Reply to
Complainants Position Paper12 that complainants
discovered the revocation when the Deed of Sale was
denied registration upon its presentation to the Register
of Deeds on January 2005.13 From her own statement,
she was aware that Virgilio had already revoked the
power of attorney given to Adelia as early as January
2005. Adelia did not have the authority to sign, much
less to receive, the partial payment on behalf of Virgilio.
As lawyer for complainants, she ought to have protected
her clients cause and not have given the money to
Adelia.
The supposed Deed of Conditional Sale provided for the
forfeiture of the partial payment in favor of the vendor if
the vendee failed to pay on or before 31 October 2005. It
is worth emphasizing that respondent was representing
complainants who were the vendees in the transaction.
Had she fulfilled her duty, respondent should have
pointed out to her clients that Adelia did not have the
authority to sign on behalf of Virgilio as he had already
revoked Adelias authority as early as December 2004.
The Deed of Conditional Sale had therefore no force and
effect as far as Virgilio, the registered owner of the

subject property, is concerned, and Adelia therefore had

no right to demand the money.
Simply stated, respondent cannot take cover behind the
supposed required compliance with the provisions of the
Deed of Conditional Sale, since it was incumbent upon
her to raise concerns regarding the execution of that
document. The revocation of the authority of Adelia and
the subsequent filing of a Petition for Partition, in which
complainants were also represented by respondent, are
clear indications that there were issues in the conditional
sale that should have prompted respondent to withhold
the money from Adelia to protect the interest of
complainants, the formers clients.
Lawyers have the duty to apprise their client of the
status and developments of the account they are
handling. They must be consistently mindful of their
obligation to respond promptly, should there be queries
or requests for information from the client.14 The Code
exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal
processes and the courts, but also mandates the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship. Respondent clearly fell short of the
demands required of her as a member of the bar. Her
inability to properly discharge her duty to her clients
makes her answerable not just to them, but also to this
Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public.
Given the crucial importance of her role in the
administration of justice, her misconduct diminishes the
confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the
profession.15redarclaw
Lawyers are bound to protect their client's interest to the
best of their ability and with utmost diligence.
Respondent should know that every case that lawyers
accept deserves their full attention, diligence, skill and
competence regardless of its importance. It is their
sworn duty to protect the interest of their client and to
defend it within the authority of the law.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.16 Considering, that this is the first
offense of respondent, the Court resolves to reprimand
her, with the admonition that she must observe a higher
degree of fidelity and diligence in the practice of her
profession.17redarclaw
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LYSSA GRACE S.
PAGANO-CALDE is given the penalty of REPRIMAND,
with a STRONG WARNING to observe a higher degree
of fidelity in the practice of her profession.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10662 [Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654],
July 07, 2015
JUN B. LUNA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DWIGHT M.
GALARRITA, Respondent.
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
Before us is a disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight
M. Galarrita for his failure to deliver to his client,
complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement
proceeds he received after entering into a Compromise
Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client's
consent.
On April 7, 2010, Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed an AffidavitComplaint1 against his lawyer, Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita
(Atty. Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita's legal
services in filing a foreclosure Complaint2 on October 14,
2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca,
Quezon.3 The Complaint against one Jose Calvario
(Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00
from Luna. This loan was secured by a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage4 over a parcel of land in Quezon
Province.5 Due to non-payment of the loan, Luna filed
the Complaint praying for payment of the obligation with
interest, and issuance of a foreclosure decree upon
Calvario's failure to fully pay within the period.6redarclaw
The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pretrial, followed by Luna's presentation and offer of
evidence.7redarclaw
Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the
other party after his formal offer of evidence.8 They
submitted the Kasunduan9 (Compromise Agreement)
before the trial court on February 14, 2006.10 It provided
that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment
for his mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna would cause
the removal of the encumbrance annotation on the land
title.11 The trial court approved12 the Compromise
Agreement in its February 20, 2006 Decision.13redarclaw
Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed him of
this Compromise Agreement, and did not deliver to him
the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty. Galarrita had
received.14redarclaw
Luna's Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel's
Report15 dated August 12, 2003 where Atty. Galarrita
proposed and provided justifications for settlement, and
waived any compensation for his services in the case: 16
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Please take note that Mr. Jose Calvario is willing, able
and ready to pay you IN CASH the full amount of One
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), no
more no less. While we are aware that it's your desire to
fight this case to its ultimate legal conclusion, allow us
nonetheless, to present the pros and cons of having this
case be amicably settled.
Point One: He has in his possession the original copy of
the checks you issued showing that upon signing of the
Contract Of Real Estate Mortgage, he received from
you Eighty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php88,000.00) only.

Meaning, he has already paid in advance his interest of

12% or the equivalent of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(Php12,000.00) when the contract was signed.
Consequently, it is useless for us to argue before the
court that his principal indebtedness amounted to One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00). Hence, if
you accept the compromise settlement of One Hundred
Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), you stand to
gain Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (Php22,000.00).
....
Rest assured, your undersigned counsel leaves it to your
better judgment as to whether he deserves to be paid for
his legal services regarding this case against Mr. Jose
Calvario.
Repeat, I will no longer ask from you any compensation
for my services regarding this case.17 (Emphasis in the
original)
Atty. Galarrita wrote Luna the following: Counsel's
Reports, Requests for Funding, and Statements of
Accounts in relation to case developments, retainer's
fees, and reimbursement for expenses
incurred.18redarclaw
After learning of the settlement, Luna wrote Atty.
Galarrita: "I was so surprised when you went into plea
agreement for Compromise Agreement without my
knowledge [a]nd beyond to [sic] what we had
discussed."19 Atty. Galarrita replied through the Letter20
dated January 27, 2006, stating in
part:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Jose
Calvario because I am certain that in this kind of case, a
compromise is better than WINNING it.
Everything is transparent. You even told me that you are
not interested to acquire the land that's why you signaled
your approval of a compromise.
I was hoping that you already understood my situation.
As I have told you, I can't waste my time going to
Gumaca every now and then. Traveling time is too
precious for my cases here in Metro Manila.
The point is: I did not receive any appearance fee for the
numerous hearings conducted there despite sending
several statements of accounts (SOA) to your office.
If that's the case, why prolong the agony?
Why bother after all to pursue this case when indeed,
you are not interested to acquire the land and you are
not bent in spending the right remuneration for your
undersigned counsel?
I have nothing to hide. The money will be deposited in
my savings account because I just could not handle that
amount of cash in my pocket.21

In his Letter22 dated February 27, 2006, Luna

wrote:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Yes I'm not interested with that lot in Quezon, [and this
is] the reason why I'm the one who propose to them
[that] [w]e settle this case on our own without any lawyer,
they are the one[s] who insist to go to Court. . . . This is
what we come out to [p]ropose to them, with the right
amount to cover all those only been spent including
Acceptance fee. You even waive[d] your fee on this, for
every hearing which I couldn't understand, [y]et we end
up that we still going [sic] to pursue this case, it was
discussed during my trip there. [This is] [t]he reason I'm
too surprised with your plea Agreement without my
knowledge.23
Luna mentioned that the delay in retainer's fee payments
was due to Atty. Galarrita's negligence in handling the
case.24redarclaw
In his Letter25 of the same date, Atty. Galarrita explained:
"The reason this case was archived [was] because I
could not attend several hearings for lack of meal and
transport allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon. . . . that's
moot and academic because this case was not
dismissed by the court, at all."26 Atty, Galarrita then
stated that "[f]or all my shortcomings as a lawyer, I now
ask forgiveness. . . . But let it not be said that I betrayed
you and your cases."27redarclaw
In August 2009, Luna received a letter from one of the
heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma C. Tayag, seeking delivery
of the land title since they paid the P100,000.00
settlement amount.28 Another heir, Lutchiare Calvario,
wrote Luna in September 2009 again demanding
delivery of title.29redarclaw
Luna alleged in his Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Galarrita
has not remitted the P100,000.00 to date.30 He prays for
Atty. Galarrita's disbarment.31redarclaw
In his Verified Answer,32 Atty. Galarrita prays for the
dismissal of the disbarment Complaint.33 He argues that
he entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney34 that includes this purpose.35
He regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments
and possible settlement before he entered the
Compromise Agreement.36 He submits that Luna "'slept'
on his rights."37redarclaw
Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General
Retainership Agreement,38 Luna shall pay him P4,000.00
monthly.39 Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of
November 17, 2006, and after four years with no
revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna's unpaid
obligation amounted to P208,000.00.40 He listed other
unpaid amounts for his legal services.41 Atty. Galairrita,
thus, argues for an application of the rule on retaining
lien.42redarclaw
Atty. Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription under
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar

Discipline.43 More than four years elapsed since their last
communication in 2006 when the Compromise
Agreement became final.44redarclaw
In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, 45
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating
Commissioner46 found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule
16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended "his suspension from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year[.]"47redarclaw
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No. XX-2013441,48 adopted and approved with modification the
Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation in that Atty. Galarrita is recommended
to be "suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months and [o]rdered to [r]etum the amount of One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant
without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for
retainer's fee against complainant."49 The Board of
Governors denied reconsideration in its May 3, 2014
Resolution No. XXI-2014-270.50redarclaw
The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that "no motion
for reconsideration or petition for review was filed as of
November 17, 2014."51 In any case, it is this court that
has the authority to discipline members of the
bar.52redarclaw
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty.
Galarrita should be held administratively liable for
entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client
complainant Luna's consent, then refusing to turn over
the settlement proceeds received.
This court acknowledges the recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors,
with modification increasing the period of suspension
from the practice of law to two (2) years.
I
Those in the legal profession must always conduct
themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings.53redarclaw
Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard
of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the
Code [of Professional Responsibility]."54redarclaw
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct
themselves "according to the best of [their] knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [their] clients[,]"55 and to "delay no man for money
or malice[.]"56redarclaw
These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers

with their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature

of their relationship.57 Clients entrust their causeslife,
liberty, and propertyto their lawyers, certain that this
confidence would not be abused.
Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita
with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged land in
Quezon Province. However, without complainant Luna's
consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled this case with
the other party.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial
powers of attorney are necessary in the following
cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to
arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a
judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action
or to abandon a prescription already acquired[.]"
The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure
special authority from their clients when entering into a
compromise agreement that dispenses with
litigation:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case
by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and
in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their client's litigation, or
receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the
full amount in cash.58 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of
Attorney to enter into compromise agreements, but as
found by the Investigating
Commissioner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe
that Complainant had not given any authority for the
Complainant [sic] to enter into Compromise
Agreement at that precise stage of the trial. Firstly,
the Complainant was not made a party to the
Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was not
abroad when the agreement was executed. Secondly,
there was no indication that he had agreed to the
amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for his withdrawal of
the complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably informed
of the execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment
of the P100,000.00 and came to know of the same only
much later.
Respondent argued that Complainant had previously
executed a Special Power of Attorney wherein he
authorized the former to "enter into possible amicable
settlement or submit any matter to arbitration and
alternative modes of dispute resolution, simplification of
the issues, the necessity of amendment to the
pleadings, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof the limitation of the number of
witnesses, the advisability of preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner, the propriety of rendering

judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of

dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be
found to exist, the advisability of suspending the
proceedings, offer matters that may properly be
considered under Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure." It would seem, however, that despite the
authority given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot
justify Respondent's representation in the Compromise
Agreement on February 14, 2006. To dissect, the SPA
was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month
before the filing of the Complaint for Foreclosure of
Mortgage. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the
authority given therein to Respondent to enter into a
possible settlement referred only to a possible
settlement that could be secured or firmed up
during the preliminary conference or pre-trial of the
case. In fact, the tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA
was precisely executed in order to constitute
Respondent as Complainant's representative during the
preliminary conference or pre-trial.
Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the
authority given to Respondent can be liberally
interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the
Compromise had been executed, still the Respondent
may not have faithfully performed his sworn duty to his
client. During the mandatory conference, it was
established that at the time the compromise was
executed the Complainant was not abroad and,
therefore, given the current information technology it
would have been easy or convenient for Respondent to
have informed his client about it. Admittedly, his failure in
this regard had only given Complainant the reason to
cast doubt on his real intention in agreeing to the
compromise agreement for and in his behalf.
It would seem, however, that by Complainant's act of
demanding the amount from Respondent, the former
may have already ignored the issue on the lack of
authority on his part thus curing the defect on the latter's
authority to enter into the same.59 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."60 Members of
the bar must always conduct themselves in a way that
promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession."61redarclaw
Even though complainant Luna effectively abandoned
the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita's lack of authority
to compromise the civil case when he demanded the
payment of the settlement proceeds, this does not erase
his acts of abusing the trust and confidence reposed in
him by complainant Luna.
II
Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to
promptly inform complainant Luna of the former's receipt
of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused
to turn over the amount to complainant Luna.

This court has held that "any money collected for the
client or other trust property coming into the lawyer's
possession should promptly be reported by him [or
her]."62 ( Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
....
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed
or refused to remit amounts received for and on behalf of
their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from
suspension for six months, to suspension for one year,
or two years, and even disbarment[,]"63 depending on the
circumstances of each case.
In Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata,64 respondent received four
checks totalling P225,000.00 from his client's employer
after signing a Quitclaim and Release pursuant to their
compromise agreement.65 Despite full payment of
settlement award, respondent only remitted P45,000.00
to his client and refused to deliver the balance.66
Respondent explained that he delivered P90,000.00 to
his client's wife, but his secretary misplaced the signed
receipts, and he deducted his 25% attorney's fees of
P56,250.00 from the award.67 The balance left was only
P750.00.68 This court found Atty. Ishiwata guilty of
violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law
for one (1) year, and ordered him to restitute to
complainant the amount of PI54,500.00 representing the
balance after P45,000.00 and the 10% attorney's fees
had been deducted from the settlement
award.69redarclaw
In Aldovino v. Atty. Pujalte, Jr.,70 respondent received
P1,001,332.26 from the Branch Clerk of Court
corresponding to the six shares of his clients in the
estate of their deceased mother, but respondent only
delivered P751,332.26 to his clients.71 Respondent
explained that he deducted P250,000.00 as his
attorney's fees, while complainants countered that
respondent could only retain P14,000.00 as they already
paid him P86,000.00 for his services.72 This court found
Atty. Pujalte, Jr. guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the

practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to

return to complainants the amount of
P236,000.00.73redarclaw
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,74 respondent received
P255,000.00 from the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court
representing the monthly rentals deposited by the other
party in the ejectment case respondent handled for his
client.75 Respondent did not inform his client of this
transaction and failed to reply to the final demand letter
for accounting.76 Respondent did not file an Answer to
the administrative Complaint despite notice, and failed to
appear at the mandatory conference.77 This court found
Atty. Langit guilty of violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him
from the practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered
him to restitute to complainant the amount of
P255,000.00 with 12% interest per annum.78redarclaw
In Bayonla v. Reyes,79 respondent should have delivered
to her clients the amount of P123,582.67the net
amount of Bayonla's share in the expropriation
compensation after deducting respondent's 40% share
as attorney's feesbut respondent only delivered
P79,000.00 and refused to remit the P44,582.67
shortage.80 This court found Atty. Reyes guilty of violating
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, suspended her from the practice of law
for two (2) years, ordered her to pay complainants the
amount of P44,582.67 with 12% interest per annum, and
render accounting and inventory.81redarclaw
In Jinon v. Jiz,82 respondent received P45,000.00 from
his client for transfer of title expenses.83 His client later
learned that respondent had been collecting the rentals
from the property amounting to P12,000.00, yet
respondent only turned over P7,000.00.84 Complainant
terminated respondent's legal services and demanded
the return of the amounts.85 Respondent countered that
his legal services covered negotiation and sale of the
property for a fee of P75,000.00.86 This court found Atty.
Jiz guilty of violating Rules 16.01, 16.03, and 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him
from the practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered
him to pay complainant the amount of P45,000.00 with
6% legal interest per annum from date of demand until
finality of Decision, then 12% until fully paid.87redarclaw
In this case, respondent Atty. Galarrita entered into the
Compromise Agreement involving complainant Luna's
property without informing him. Even though
complainant Luna forewent the lack of authority issue,
respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad
faith by refusing to turn over the P100,000.00 settlement
amount received. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Investigating Commissioner found
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that
Respondent had been advised of Complainant's
supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario's payment of

P100,000.00. Despite R[es]pondent's allegations that he

had informed Complainant about his so-called counsel's
report, it remains undisputed that the Complainant did
not give him any express approval of the same.
There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude
that Respondent had committed bad faith in entering into
the Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to
November 2010, or a period of four (4) years,
Respondent failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had
collected from Mr. Calvario to Complainant. Worse, he
failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the
same. He kept the money and claimed he had the right
to retain the same invoking the counsel's right to a
retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that Complainant had
incurred accrued attorney's fees which he is bound to
pay under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it is not
amiss to state that he entered into the said agreement
with the odious motivation to hold on to it and pave the
way for the payment of his attorney's fees. In so doing,
he violated the trust reposed in him by his client and
violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of [Professional
Responsibility.
As to Respondent's invocation of the lawyer's retaining
lien and his retention of the money, the undersigned
deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of
Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer to apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client." But this provision assumes that
the client agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of
attorney's fees and as to the application of the client's
fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements, in which
case he may deduct what is due him and remit the
balance to his client, with full disclosure on every detail.
Without the client's consent, the lawyer has no
authority to apply the client's money for his fees, but
he should instead return the money to his client,
without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his
unsatisfied fees.
....
On Respondent's argument that prescription has already
set in against Complainant, suffice it to state that the
rules have already been supplanted by a new set of
rules which do not anymore carry the same.88 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Administrative proceedings require only substantial
evidence.89 This court accepts and adopts the findings of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors,
but with modification increasing the period of suspension
from the practice of law to two (2) years considering that
respondent Atty. Galarrita not only compromised
litigation without complainant Luna's consent, but also
refused to turn over the settlement proceeds to date.
III
This court sustains the order for respondent Atty.
Galarrita to return the amount of P100,000.00 to

complainant Luna.
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar,90 the parties entered a Deed
of Assignment after which respondent received
1*937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for
the townhouse and lot.91 However, respondent did not
turn over this .amount to developer Crown Asia, and no
copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant. 92
This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of
law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant's
prayer for the return of the P937,500.00.93redarclaw
Ronquillo held that "[disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its
officers."94 Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited to a
determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar."95redarclaw
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil
liability determination from disciplinary proceedings
"remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are
purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in
a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." 96
This court has thus ordered in administrative
proceedings the return of amounts representing legal
fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant
relief in administrative proceedings when respondent's
civil liability was already established:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although the Court renders this decision in an
administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the
Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair
and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client's funds or
property should be required to still litigate in
another proceeding what the administrative
proceeding has already established as the
respondent's liability. That has been the reason why
the Court has required restitution of the amount involved
as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortem v.
Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra,
Small v. Banares, supra.97 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of
the P100,000.00 but justifies his refusal to turn over the
amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien. 98 The
Rules of Court provides for attorney's retaining lien as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 37. Attorney's liens. - An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession and may
retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the

satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the

same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client
and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same
right and power over such judgments and executions as
his client would have enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.99
First, "lawyer[s] [are] not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate [their] clients['] money for [themselves] by
the mere fact that the client[s] [owe] [them] attorney's
fees."100 They must give prompt notice to their clients of
any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their
clients.101redarclaw
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides for a lawyer's duty to "account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client."
Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these
duties, warranting his suspension from the practice of
law.
Second, the elements required for full recognition of
attorney's lien are: "(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2)
lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and
papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's
fees."102redarclaw
Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of
all these elements. However, this is not the main issue in

this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his

retaining lien defense was not established. Counter
evidence even exists such as respondent Atty.
Galarrita's Letter dated August 12, 2003 waiving any
compensation for his services in the foreclosure case. 103
Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty.
Galarrita's negligence in handling the case, and lack of
supporting receipts for the incurred expenses
respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to
reimburse.104redarclaw
Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this
case is without prejudice to the filing of a collection case
for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is
ORDERED to return to complainant Jun B. Luna the
amount of P100,000.00, with legal interest of 6% per
annum from February 2006105 until fully paid, without
prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's
fee against complainant Luna.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent Atty.
Galarrita's records as attorney. Copies shall likewise be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary