Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Wayne E. Baker
University of Mchigan
University of Michigan
Modernization theorists from Karl Marx to Daniel Bell have argued that
economic development brings pervasive cultural changes. But others, from
Max Weber to Samuel HuntinglOn, have claimed that cultural values are an
enduring and autonomous influence on society. We test the thesis that economic development is linked with systematic changes in basic i>a/ues. Using
data from the three waves af the World Values Surveys, which include 65
sacieties and 75 percent of the world 's population, we find evidence of both
massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural traditions. Economic development is associated with shifts away from absolute
norms and values toward values that are increasingly rational, toleran!,
trusting, and participatory. Cultural change, however, is path dependent.
The broad cultural herilage of a society-Protestant, Roman Cathalic, Orthodox, Caefucian, ar Communist-leaves an imprint on values that endures
despite mademization. Moreover, the dif.terences between the values held by
members aj different religions within given societies are much smaller than
are cross-national dif.terences. Once establshed, such cross-cultural differences become part of a naiional culture transmitted by educational institutions and mass media. We conclude with sorne proposed revisions of modemization theory.
me
.f.
a!ly charged issues such as abortion and euthanasia have grown increasingly salient
(DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Hunter
1991; WiUiams 1997), and a resurgence of
fundarnentalist Islam has established a rnajor
cleavage in intemational politics.
Well into the twentieth century, modernization was widely viewed as a uniquely
Western process that non-Western societies
could fol1ow only in so far as they abandoned their traditional cultures and assimilated technologically and rnorally "superior"
Western ways. But during the second half of
the century, non-Western societies unexpectedly surpassed their Western role models in
key aspects of modernization. East Asia, for
example, attained the world's highest rate of
economic growth. Using official exchange
rates, Japan had the highest per capita income of any major nation in the world, led
the world in autornobile manufacturing and
consumer electronics, and had the world's
highest life expectancy. Today, few observers would attribute moral superiority to the
19
In recent years, research and theory on socioeconomic development have given rise to
two contending schools of thought. One
scbool emphasizes the convergence of values
as a result of "modemization"-the overwhelming economic and political forces that
drive cultural change. This school predicts
the decline of traditional values and their replacement with "modern" values. The other
school of thought emphasizes the persistence
of traditional values despite economic and
political changes. This school assumes that
values are relatively independent of economic conditions (DiMaggio 1994). Conse-
21
22
ment increased, the role ascribed to religion tions of a society. Following this tradition,
and God dwindled. Materialistic ideologies Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that tbe
arose with secular interpretations of history, world is divided into eight major civilizaand secular utopas were to be attained by tions or "cultural zones" based on cultural
human engineering operating through ratio- differences that have persisted for centuries.
These zones were shaped by religious tradinally organized bureaucratic organizations.
The emergence of postindustrial society tions that are still powerful today, despite the
seems to be stimulating further evolution of forces of modemization. The zones are Westprevailing worldviews, but it is moving in a ern Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Isdifferent direction. Life in postindustrial so- lamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese,
cieties centers on services, and hence life be- Hindu, African, and Latn American zones.
comes a "game between persons" in which
Scholars from various disciplines have obpeople "live more and more outside nature, served that distinctive cultural traits endure
and less and less with machinery and things; over long periods of time and continue to
they live with, and encounter only, one an- shape a society's political and economic perother" (Bell 1973: 148-49). Less effort is fo- formance. For example, Putnam (1993)
cused on producing material objects, and shows that the regions of Italy in which
more effort is focused on communicating and democratic institutions function most sucprocessing information. Most people spend cessfully today are those in which civil socitheir productive hours dealing with other ety was relatively well developed in the ninepeople and symbols. Increasingly, one's for- teenth century and even earlier. Fukuyama
mal education and job experience (1995) argues that a cultural heritage of
help develop the potential for autonomous "low-trust" puts a society at a competitive
decision-making (Bell 1973, 1976). Thus, disadvantage in global markets because it is
the rise of postindustrial society leads to a less able to develop large and complex sogrowing emphasis on self-expression cial institutions. Hamilton (1994) argues
(lnglehart 1997). The hierarchical organiza- that, although capitalism has become an altions of the industrial age required (and al- most universal way of life, civilizational faclowed) little autonomous judgment, whereas tors continue to structure the organization of
service and knowledge workers deal with economies and societies: "What we witness
people and concepts, operating in a world in with the developrnent of a global economy is
which innovation and the freedom to exer- not increasing uniformity, in the form of a
cise individual judgment are essential. Self- universalization of Western culture, but
expression becomes central. Furthermore, rather the continuation of civilizational dithe historically unprecedented wealth of ad- versity through the active reinvention and
vanced industrial societies, coupled with the reincorporation of non-Western civilizational
rise of the welfare state, mean that an in- pattems" (p. 184). Thus, there are striking
creasing share of the population grows up cross-cultural variations in the organization
taking survival for granted. Their value pri- of capitalist production and associated manaorities shift from an overwhelming emphasis gerial ideologies (DiMaggio 1994; Guilln
on economic and physical security toward an 1994).
increasing emphasis on subjective well-being
The impression that we are moving toward
and quality-of-life (Inglehart 1977, 1997). a uniform "McWorld" is partly an illusion.
Thus, cultural change is not linear; with the As Watson (1998) demonstrates, the seemcoming of postindustrial society, it moves in ingly identical McDonald's restaurants that
a new direction.
have spread throughout the world actually
Different societies follow different trajec- have different social meanings and fulfill diftories even when they are subjected to the ferent social functions in different cultural
sarne forces of economic development, in zones. Although the physical settings are
part because situation-specific factors, such similar, eating in a McDonald's restaurant in
as cultural heritage, also shape how a par- Japan is a different social experience from
ticular society develops. Weber ([1904] eating in one in the United States or Europe
1958) argued that traditional religious values or China. The globalization of communicahave an enduring influence on the institu- tions is unmistakable, but precisely because
23
and Romana. The number of respondents interviewed in these surveys averages about
1,400 per country. These data are available
from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) survey
data archive at the University of Michigan. 2
THE EVIDENCE
Measures
Data
Our main data source is the World Values
Surveys, the largest investigation ever conducted of attitudes, values, and beliefs
around the world. This study carried out
three waves of representative national surveys: in 1981-1982, 1990-1991, and 19951998. It covers 65 countries on ali six inhabited continents, and contains more than 75
percent of the world's population. These societies have per capita annual gross national
products ranging frorn $300 to more than
$30,000, and their political systems range
from long-established stable democracies to
authoritarian states.
We use the most recent data for the 65
countries. Data for the following 50 societies are from the 1995-1998 wave: United
States, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Great Britain, East
Germany, West Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Poland, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Mexico, Pero, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela. Most of the 1995-1998 surveys were
carried out in 1996, but Argentina, Australia,
China, Croatia, Ghana, Nigeria, Japan,
Puerto Rico, Russia, Slovenia, Taiwan and
the United States were surveyed in 1995; Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, West and
East Germany, Macedonia, Pakistan and Poland were surveyed in 1997; Bosnia, Great
Britain and New Zealand were surveyed in
1998. Data for 15 societies are from the 1990
European Values Survey: Canada, France,
Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Northem Ireland,
Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Our thesis implies that economic development is linked with a broad syndrome of distinctive value orientations. Does such a syndrome exist? Inglehart (1997) analyzed aggregated nation-level data from the 43 societies included in the 1990--1991 World Values Survey and found large and coherent
cross-cultural differences. The two most important dimensions that emerged tapped
seores of variables and demonstrated that the
worldviews of the peoples of rich societies
differ systematically from those of low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and religious norms and beliefs.
These two dimensions reflect cross-national
polarization between traditional versus secular-rational orientations toward authority;
and surviva/ versus self-expression values.
Each society can be located on a global map
of cross-cultural variation based on these two
dimensions (Inglehart 1997:81-98).
We use the term "traditional" in a specific
sense here. In the course of human history,
thousands of societies have existed, most of
which are now extinct. These societies had a
vast range of characteristics. Infanticide was
common in hunting and gathering societies,
but became rare in agrarian societies; homosexuality was accepted in sorne preindustrial
societies; and women are believed to have
dominated political and social life in sorne
preindustrial societies. Although the full
range of "traditions" is di verse, a mainstream
version of preindustrial society having a
number of common characteristics can be
identified. All of the preindustrial societies
for which we have data show relatively low
levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and
homosexuality; tend to emphasize male
dominance in economic and poltica! life,
deference to parental authority, and the im2
24
Individual Leve!
.91
.70
.89
.61
.82
.61
.82
.60
.72
.51
.86
.59
.81
.58
.80
.59
.78
.54
.56
.44
Source: Nation-Jevel and individual-leve) data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-1991 and 19951998 World Values Surveys.
Note: The original polarities vary. The above statements show how each item relates to the given dimension, based on a factor analysis with varimax rotation. Number of cases for nation-level analysis is 65; total
N for individual-leve! is 165,594 (smallest N for any of the above items is 146,789).
portance of family life, and are relatively authoritarian; most of them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics. It would be a gross oversimplification
to assume that ali known preindustrial societies had similar characteristics, but one can
meaningfully contrast the cultural characteristics of industrial societies with those of this
mainstream version of preindustrial society.
There are various ways to measure the
character of societal cultures. We build on
prior findings by constructing comparable
measures of cross-cultural variation that can
be used with ali three waves of the World
Values Surveys at both the individual leve!
and the national leve!. Starting with the variables identified in analysis of the 1990-1991
25
26
Item
Correlation
.89
.88
One of responden!' s main goals in life has been to make bis/her parents pro ud.
.81
.76
.75
.72
.72
.71
.66
.65
.63
.61
Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being. .60
Respondent seldom or never discusses politics.
.57
.57
.57
.56
.56
.56
If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.
.53
One must always !ove and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior.
.49
.45
.43
.41
27
Jtem
SURVJV AL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:
Men make better political leaders than women.
.86
.83
.83
.81
.78
.76
Respondent has not attended meeting or signed petition to protect the environment.
.75
Wben seeking a job. a good income and safe job are more important than
a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you Jike. b
.74
.74
A child needs a home with both a father and mother to grow up happily.
.73
.73
One must always !ove and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior.
.71
When jobs are scarce, men ha ve more right to a job than women.
.69
.69
Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.
.68
Responden! does not have much free choice or control over bis/her life.
.67
.67
Responden! does not favor less emphasis on money and material possessions.
.66
.66
.64
.65
.62
Tolerance and respect for others are not the most importan! things to teach a child.
.62
.60
.60
.56
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
would be a good form of government.
.58
Responden! has not taken part and would not take part in a boycott.
.56
.55
.45
.42
Source: Natinn-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-1991 and 1995-1998 World Values
Surveys.
Note: The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the survivaUselfexpression dimension, as measured by the items described in Table l.
Outgroup index.
b Job
motivation index.
28
29
_._,
G ennany
Protestant
Europe
- -.
Englishspeaking
South
Asia
U.S.A.
-1.5
-1.0
-.5
.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Survival/Self-Expression Dimension
30
1.8
~---------------------------~
1.3
$5,000
.8
to
$15,000
GNP per caplta
c.--.....
.3
1
'f
Morethan
$15,000
GNP per cepita
or----.2
"5
o
-.7
Lessthan
$2,000
"O
~ -1.2
-1.7
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-.5
.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
SurvlvaUSelf-Expnl8alon Dlmenslon
Figurt! 2. Economk Zones for 65 Societies Superimposed on Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation
Note: Ali but one of the 65 societies shown in Figure 1 fit into the economic zones indicated here; only
the Dominican Republic is mislocated.
Source: GNP per capita is based on the World Bank's Purchasing Power Parity estimates as of 1995, in
U.S. dollars (World Bank 1997:214-15).
31
31
How Real Are the Culhlral Zo1ns?
While the placement of each society in Figure 1 is objective, detennined by a factor
analysis of survey data from each country,
the boundaries drawn around these societies
are subjective, using Huntington's (1993,
1996) division of the world into several cultural zones. How "real" are these zones? The
boundaries could have been drawn in various ways because these societies have been
influenced by a variety of factors. Thus,
sorne of the boundaries overlap others. For
example, the ex-Communist zone overlaps
the Protestant, Catholic, Confucian, Orthodox, and Islamic cultural zones. Sirnilarly,
Britain is located at the intersection of the
English-speaking zone and Protestant Europe. Empirically, it is close to all five of the
English-speaking societies, and we included
Britain in that zone, but with only slight
modification we could have put it in Protestant Europe, for it is also culturally close to
those societies.
Realty is complex: Britain is both Protestant and English-speaking, and ts empirical
position reflects both aspects of reality. Similarly, we have drawn a boundary around the
Latin American societies that Huntington
postulated to be a distinct cultural zone. All
l O of these societies show similar values in
global perspective, but with only minor
changes we could have defined an Hispanic
cultural zone that included Spain and Portugal, which empirically also resemble the
Latin American societies. Or we could have
drawn a boundary that included Latin
America, Catholic Europe, the Phlippines,
and Ireland in a broad Roman Catholic cultural wne. AH these zones are conceptually
and empirically justifiable.
Figure 1 is based on sirnilarity of basic values-but the map also reflects the relative
distances between these societies on many
other dimensions, such as religion, colonial
influences, the influence of Communist rule,
social structure, and econornic level. The influence of many different historical factors
can be surnmed up remarkably well by the
two cultural dimensions on which this map
is based, but because these various factors do
not always coincide neatly, there are sorne
obvious anomalies. For example, East Germany and Japan fall next to each other: Both
33
Traditional/Secular-Rational
Ex-Communist zone (: 1)
Real GDP per capita, 1980
Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980
Percentage employed in service sector, l 980
Adjusted R2
.424"
.496"'
.216
.370"
.025
English-speaking zone {= 1)
Real GDP per capita, 1980
Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980
Percentage employed in service sector, 1980
-.300"
.394'*
.468""
Adjusted R
(3.10)
(3.57)
(1.43)
(3.04)
(.19)
(4.83)
.553 "''"'"
(2.24)
(2.12)
.331"
(2.06}
.63
(-2.65)
(3.02)
(3.98)
(1.48)
(2.56)
.146
.434"'
(l.93)
.319"
.61
.47
(-3.29)
.195
(1.72)
.448** ..
(3.94)
African zone ( = 1)
Real GDP per capita, 1980
Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980
Percentage employed in service sector, 1980
-.189
.211
.108
.602**
(.98)
(2.97)
.224
(l.13)
.60
.51
(-1.65)
(1.72)
.021
.502..
(.22)
(2.81)
.320
(l.85)
(3.79)
.468***
.59
.43
Adjusted R2
(.51)
(2.04)
(3.87)
.070
.258'
.542"'"'"'
.212'
.469 ..
(2.08)
(2.90)
(2.63)
.455'*
.62
.40
Adjusted R2
(1.26)
(2.31)
(3.13)
.152
.304'
.432 ..
-.457**"'
.567*-**
(-6.94)
(4.77)
(1.28)
.154
.80
.42
Adjusted R2
Adjusted R2
(.67)
.232'
.362"
.so
-.342''
Confucian zone (= 1)
Real GDP per capita, 1980
Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980
Percentage employed in service sector, 1980
(-4.80)
(4.13)
.73
.50
Orthodox zone ( = 11
Real GDP per capita, 1980
Percentage employed in industrial sector, 1980
Percentage employed in service sector, 1980
-.393"'
.575 ...
.098
Survival/Self-Expression
.397" ..
.304..
(4.15)
(2.83)
(4.76}
.sos..
.56
-.020
.491 ''
(-.21)
(2.90)
.323'
(1.95)
.59
49
49
Number of countries
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Reduced Ns reflect missing data on one or more independent
variables.
'"p< .001 (two-tailed tests)
''p < .01
'p < .05
34
oe
1I 1
1 -....
i5i
.3
'
\
'.!
QI
-.2
~
~
35
Belglum
France
A.-
ltaly
Uruguay
!i>oin
-.7
~
~
1- -1.2
-1.5
-1.0
-.5
.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Survival/Seff-Expression Dimension
Figure 3. Historically Protestant, Historically Catholic, and Historically Communist Cultural Zones
in Relation to Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation
60
Confucian
Taiwlm
Belglum
llllly
Aumta
10
Ex-Communlat
aoc:ielies In italicS
$5,000
$9,000
$13,000
$17,000
$21,000
$25,000
cally shaped the national culture of given societies, but that today their impact is transmitted mainly through nationwide institutions, to the population of that society as a
whole-even to those who have little or no
contact with religious institutions. As Figure
5 indicates, the empirical evidence clearly
supports the latter interpretation. Although
historically Catholic or Protestant or Islamic
societies show distinctive values, the differences between Catholics and Protestants or
Muslims within given societies are relatively
small. In Germany, for example, the basic
values of German Catholics resemble those
of German Protestants more than they resemble Catholics in other countries. This is
true in the United States, Switzerland, The
Netherlands, and other religiously mixed societies: Catholics tend to be slightly more
traditional than their Protestant compatriots,
37
Protestant
1.3
~
~
West Gennany
eCatholic
ProtestantP.
.8
swn:mand Neth!rl~nds
Catholic
.3
'f.!!
ii
TOfeS/anl
ea;',,otic
Historically
Protestant
- .2
Historical/y
Catholic
-.7
Protestant
Muslim
"ti
~ -1.2
u.s.
Catholic
Christian
-1.7
Nigeria
Muslim
-2.2~
-2.0
-1.0
-.5
.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Survival/Self-Expression Dlmension
Figure 5. Differences between the Religious Groups within Religiously Mixed Societies on Two Dirnensions of Cross-Cultural Variation
ism shaped them, even though today (as a result of immigration, relatively low Protestant
birth rates, and higher Protestant rates of
secularization) they may have more practicing Catholics than practicing Protestants.
These findings suggest that, once established, the cross-cultural differences linked
with religion have become part of a national
culture that is transmitted by the educational
institutions and mass media of given societies to the people of that nation. Despite globalization, the nation remains a key unit of
shared experience, and its educational and
cultural institutions shape the values of almost everyone in that society.
The persistence of distinctive value systems suggests that culture is path-dependent.
Protestant religious institutions gave rise to
the Protestant Ethic, relatively high interpersonal trust, and a relatively high degree of
social pluralism-all of which may have
contributed to earlier economic development
38
societies.
39
Model 1
.066'
(.031)
.052 ...
(.012)
Percentage enrolled in
education
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
.086'
(.043)
.131"
(.036)
.042
(.029)
.122*"
(.030)
.051'"
(.014)
.023
(.015)
(.011)
.080..
(.027)
.052...
(.011)
.061"*'**
.030'
(.012)
-.01
(.01)
Ex-Communist (= 1)
.952'"
(.282)
1.05"
(.351)
Historically Catholic (= 1)
-.409'
(.188)
-.767"
(.216)
Historically Confucian (= 1)
1.57"'
(.370)
1.39"'
(.329)
Adjusted R 2
.42
.37
.50
.53
.57
.70
Number of countries
49
46
49
49
49
49
Table Sb.Uustandardized Coefficients from the Regression of Survival/Self-Expression Values on lndependeut Variables Measuriug Modernization and Cultural Heritage
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
.090'
(.043)
.095'
(.046)
.056
(.043)
.120"
(.037)
.098"
(.037)
(.017)
.011
(.015)
.035'
(.015)
.019
(.014)
.018
(.013)
-.920
(.204)
-.883''"
(.197)
-.411"
(.188)
.509'
(.237)
.415"
(. l 75)
Independent Variable
.042"*
( .000)
-.054
(.039)
Percentage enrolled in
education
-.005
(.012)
Ex-Communist (= 1)
.672'
(.279)
Historically Protestan!(= l)
.144"'"'"
-J .182""
(.240)
Historically Orthodox ( = 1)
Adjusted R 2
.63
.63
.66
.74
.76
.84
Number of countries
49
46
49
49
49
49
1.3
.8
i5
-
.3
-.2
1
~
j
-.7
~ -1.2
-1.7
U.5.Al5
lnitial survey
Last survey
-2.2 '--~~-'-~~~l-.~~....L~~---L~~~...L....~~.....JC~~~J--~~-'----'
1.5
2.0
-1.0
-.5
o
.5
1.0
-2.0
-1.5
Survlval/Self-Exprenlon Dlmenslon
Figure 6. Change Over Time in Location on Two Dimensions of Cross Cultural Variation for 38 Societies
Note: The 38 countries included are those for which time-series data are available from the earliest to the
lates! time points in the World Values Surveys.
41
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania ali experienced economic decline during the 1990s,
showing an average negative growth rate of
5 .8 percent from 1990 to 1997. Another
group of ex-Communist countries-China,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia-showed
positive growth rates, averaging 4.0 percent
during this period. Ali five societies that experienced economic collapse shifted toward
an increasing emphasis on survival values,
while three of the four publics that experienced economic growth shifted in the opposite direction. Similarly, among the former
group, only two shifted toward increasingly
secular-rational values, while among the latter group, three out of four did so.
The trend toward modern values is not irreversible. While this seems to be the prevailing trend among industrialized societies,
the combination of economic, political, and
social collapse that afflicted the former Soviet Union during the 1980s and 1990s
clearly reversed this trend, bringing growing
misery, distrust, rejection of outgroups, xenophobia, and authoritarian nationalism. 8
The eight developing and low-income societies for which we have time-series data
show two contrasting patterns: There is little
evidence of secularization-only two of the
eight societies shifted toward the secular-rational pole (Chile and Mexico); Argentina,
Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey do not shift. Yet most of these societies
do show sorne movement from survival values toward self-expression values-only Nigeria and South Africa do not.
Secular-rational values became more widespread in most advanced industrial societies
8
42
come increasingly secure and a growing segment of the younger generation has come to
take survival for granted. A country's GDP
per capita provides a rough indicator of the
degree to which survival is secure, but war,
disease, crime, and other factors also are significant. The best indicator of existential security during one's formative years, is the
country's life expectancy from 1900-1910
(during the childhood of our oldest respondents) to the present. Although we do not
have such time-series data for most of these
countries, we do know that life expectancies
were relatively low at the start of this century and have risen dramatically in ali societies that have experienced economic
growth, improved diet and improved medica! care, and related factors. Even in the
United States (already the richest society on
Earth), life expectancy in 1900 was only 48
years, and today it is 76 years. Societies with
high life expectancies today tend to be societies that have experienced relatively large
increases in existential security since 1900.
Thus, we would expect to find strong correlations between a given society's life expectancy and the size of the intergenerational
value differences in that society, and we do.
Intergenerational value differences are greatest in the societies with the highest life expectancies. Across 61 societies, the correlation between 1995 life expectancy and the
size of the intergenerational difference in traditional/secular-rational values is .56, significan! at the p < .001 leve!; and the correlation between life expectancy and the size
of the intergenerational difference in survivaUself-expression values is .4 l, also significant at the p < .001 leve!.
Figure 7 shows the leve! of traditional/
secular-rational values for seven birth cohorts born during the 70-year span from
1907 to 1976. A graph attempting to depict
the age dfferences among 60-some societies
would be unreadable. Thus, to convey the
overall pattern in parsimonious fashion, we
grouped societies into four categories based
on their economic histories during the twentieth century: ( 1) The "advanced industrial
democracies" have 1995 per capita GNPs
over $!0,000 (based on World Bank purchasing power parity estimates) and have experienced substantial economic growth during
the twentieth century (which is the main rea-
43
.40
e:
1
!o
.20
a: -.20
.:..
tll
:;
-.40
tll
'llflf>"
e:
o
=-.60
0eveloping
'a
-.80
~ff'
'lfl?111 1
1111111111111111111111111
1I!1 I
soc.:.,... -
11111
etieSd
___
_ _ me
__
Low-inco
-1.0 ~~---~-----'-----.J'-----'------'----L--...J
1907-1916 1917-1926 1927-1936 1937-1946 1947-1956 1957-1966 1967-1976
Birth Veer
times higher than in 1950; and (4) the "lowincome societies" include all countries with
real per capita GNP below $5,000-a group
that experienced the least long-term growth,
with real per capita GNP in 1992 being only
2.0 times higher than it was in 1950. 9
As Figure 7 indicates, the young are markedly less traditional than the old in the ad9 Ideally, we want to have economic data since
the first decade of the twentieth century to coincide with the birth years of our oldest cohon. For
technical reasons, comparable data from before
1950 are not available.
-----
~----------------------------.
soc1et1es
oe"e\~'~111111111111111111111
~1111
11111
1111111
11111
Low-Jncome societiea
1!111111111~
\8\\e&____ _
uf\\s\~-
--------
.c~""--~--
-1.0
--
Birth Year
vanced industrial democracies and in the exCommunist societies. But this holds true
only in societies that have experienced substantial economic growth since 1950. The
steep slope indicates that younger groups
have much more secular-rational worldviews
than do older groups in both capitalist and
ex-Communist industrial societies. The slope
is less steep in developing societies, and in
low-incorne societies the young and the old
are about equally likely to hold traditional
values.
While change in economic conditions
seems to play a significant role in differences
across birth cohorts, that is only part of the
story. Thus, the older groups that were
brought up in ex-Comrnunist societies exhibit
stronger secular-rational values than do those
of comparable age in any other type of society. Their formative years were characterized
by rapid economic growth during an era when
Communism seemed to be surpassing capitalism. Moreover, they were subjected to
powerful campaigns to eradicate religion and
45
46
1981
19901991
1995Net
1998 Change
25
-15
11
-5
-2
Belgium
Canada
38
Finland
France
East Germany
West Germany
Great Britain
13
20
35
23
33
25
lceland
JO
lreland
Northern lreland
South Korea
Italy
88
67
29
48
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
12
88
69
60
47
14
40
31
14
53
Sweden
Switzerland
U ni ted S tates
45
17
35
40
13
17
- 3
25
-11
-10
+2
- 1
o
+2
27
-2
11
- 1
- 1
13
13
- 1
40
10
38
-15
14
11
-3
43
59
25
55
-18
60
6
9
34
9
14
15
+8
16
+7
85
6
74
- 11
8
33
+2
-9
-5
Ex-Communist Societies b
Belarus
Bulgaria
Hungary
Latvia
Poland
16
Rus si a
Slovenia
35
74
South Africa
Turkey
61
+6
+18
-2
-15
+4
-3
-17
63
65
-9
88
87
-1
+9
38
70
44
+6
Greeley 1998), our data show modestly declining church attendance even in this country-a trend also found in the General Social
Surveys from 1989 to 1998 (Smith 1999).
Among the ex-Communist societies, however, the pattem is quite different: Five of the
seven societies for which we have time-seres data show rising church attendance.
Among developing societies we find a mixed
pattem, with roughly equal numbers of countries showing rising and declining rates of
attendance. 11
A decline in the prevalence of traditional
religious values characterizes industrialization, but not necessarily the postindustrial
phase. The need for security is not the only
attraction of religion. People have always
sought answers to such questions as: Where
do we come from? Where are we going?
Why are we here? The need for answers may
be especially acute in the face of disaster, but
it does not die out in postindustrial society.
Spiritual concems will probably always be
part of the human outlook. The established
churches today may be on the wrong wavelength for most people in postindustrial societies, but new theologies, such as the "theology" of environmentalism, or New Age beliefs, are emerging to fill an expanding niche
(Baker 1999). With the rise of postindustrial
society, allegiance to the established religious institutions continues to decline. but
spiritual concems do not. Wuthnow (1998)
argues, for example, that the decline of organized religion in America is accompanied by
the rise of spiritual concems, a shift from
what he calls a "spirituality of dwelling"
(emphasizing sacred places) to a "spirituality of seeking" (emphasizing a personal
quest for new spiritual avenues). Wuthnow's
thesis seems relevant beyond the American
context. Postrnaterialists are less attached to
traditional forms of religion than are materialists, but they are more likely to spend time
thinking about the meaning and purpose of
life. And in the three successive waves of the
World Values Surveys, concem for the mean11
47
1981
19901991
1995Net
1998 Change
Australia
Belgum
Ca nada
Fnland
France
East Gerrnany
W est Gerrnany
Great Britain
lceland
lreland
Northem Ireland
ltaly
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Uni ted States
25
9
36
14
10
16
20
22
29
38
31
6
11
19
18
9
50
21
13
28
12
10
13
14
16
+4
-8
-2
o
6
16
-7
o
-4
l7
40
41
29
6
11
15
18
8
26
48
-4
-5
+11
+3
-2
-1
o
12
26
-7
+8
-1
17
50
-9
20
+12
+3
+I
+8
+9
+1
ExCommunist Societies b
Belarus
Bulgaria
Hungary
Latvia
Russia
Slovenia
21
8
7
22
9
10
14
10
17
19
15
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
India
Mexico
Nigeria
South Africa
Turkey
49
83
61
44
57
87
58
60
44
50
+25
+4
-3
+12
-10
87
50
87
74
71
71
81
+21
+JO
32
56
48
ing and purpose of life became stronger in Table 8. Percentage Saying Tbey "Often" Thlnk
About tbe Meaning and Purpose of
most advanced industrial societies.
Life,
by Country and Year
The subjective importance of religious beliefs has changed little in most advanced in1990- 1995Net
dustrial democracies. For example, the Country
1981 1991
1998 Change
World Values Surveys asked, "How important is God in your life?" (This variable is a Advanced Industrial Democracies
Australia
34
44
+ 10
particularly effective indicator of overall reBelgium
22
29
+7
ligiosity and was a component of the tradiCanada
38
43
+5
tional/secular-rational values dirnension).
Finland
32
38
40
+8
The percentage choosing "10," the highest
France
36
39
score on the question's 10-point scale, de+3
East Germany
47
clined only slightly in advanced industrial
40
+7
dernocracies (see Table 7). Although the pubWest Germany
29
30
41
+12
lics in the overwhelrning majority of these
Great Britain
34
36
+2
societies reported lower rates of church atlceland
39
36
-3
tendance, only about half of these societies
lreland
34
25
+9
show declining emphasis on the importance
Northern Ireland 29
33
+4
of God, and the mean change is a decline of
29
39
South Korea
+JO
only 1 percentage point. Religious feeling
48
ltaly
36
+12
holds up even more strongly in the rest of the
21
21
26
Japan
+5
world. In ali six of the ex-Communist societ21
31
Netherlands
+10
ies for which we have time-series data, the
Norway
26
31
32
+6
irnportance attached to God increased. A
Spain
24
27
24
o
similar pattem held in most of the developSweden
24
20
28
+8
ing and low-income societies: The imporSwitzerland
44
43
-1
tance of God in one's life increased in five
United States
48
48
46
-2
of the eight societies, and in one of the soceties in which it did not increase (Nigeria), it Ex-Communist Societies b
Belarus
35
47
+12
remained at an extremely high level.
Bulgaria
44
33
-11
The subjective importance of God declined
China
30
26
-4
slightly in advanced industrial democracies,
Estonia
35
but increased in the world as a whole. But
39
+4
even in advanced industrial societies,
44
45
Hungary
+I
broader spiritual concerns have become more
43
Latvia
36
+7
widespread. The World Values Surveys' re41
42
Lithuania
+I
spondents were asked, "How often, if at ali,
41
45
+4
Russia
do you think about the meaning and purpose
Slovenia
37
33
-4
of life?" Four alternatives were offered: "often," "sometimes," "rarely," and "never." Developing and Low-lncome Societies'
Argentina
30
57
51
+21
The percentage saying that they "often"
37
Brazil
44
-7
think about the meaning and purpose of life
54
Chile
50
-4
increased in 26 of the 37 societies for which
23
28
India
-5
we have time-series data, and the increase
40
32
39
Mexico
+7
was most pronounced in the advanced indus50
60
Nigeria
-JO
trial democracies, where 16 of our 20 societ46
South Africa
38
57
+8
ies show increased interest in spiritual conTurkey
38
50
+12
cerns (Table 8). The power of the established
hierarchical churcbes may be declining, but
Sixteen of 20 advanced industrial democracies
the rise of postindustrial society does not increased; mean change = +6.
necessarily dirninish interest in religion. Inb Of ei-Communist societies, 6 of 9 increased;
deed, the evidence suggests that it leads to mean change: +J.
growing interest in spiritual concerns,
'Of developing and low-income societies, 4 of 8
broadly defined.
increased; mean change = +3.
CONCLUSION
49
Second, the secularization thesis is oversimplified. Our evidence suggests that it applies mainly to the industrialization phasethe shift from agrarian society to industrial
society that was completed sorne time ago in
most advanced industrial societies. This shift
was linked with majar declines in the role of
the church, which led Marx and others to assume that, in the long run, religious beliefs
would die out. The shift from agrarian to urban industrial society reduces the importance
of organized religion, but this is counterbalanced by growing concems for the meaning
and purpose of life. Religious beliefs persist,
and spiritual concerns, broadly defined, are
becoming more widespread in advanced industrial societies.
Third, cultural change seems to be path
dependent. Economic development tends to
bring pervasive cultural changes, but the fact
that a society was historically shaped by
Protestantism or Confucianism or Islam
leaves a cultural heritage with enduring effects that influence subsequent developinent.
Even though few people attend church in
Protestant Europe today, historically Protestant societies remain distinctive across a
wide range of values and attitudes. The same
is true for historically Roman Catholic societies, for historically lslamic or Orthodox
societies, and for historically Confucian societies.
Fourth, it is misleading to view cultural
change as "Americanization." Industrializing
societies in general are not becoming like the
United States. In fact, the United States
seems to be a deviant case, as many observers of American life have argued (Lipset
1990, 1996 )-its people hold much more traditional values and beliefs than do those in
any other equally prosperous society (Baker
1999). If any societies exemplify the cutting
edge of cultural change, it would be the Nordic countries.
Finally, modemization is probabilistic, not
deterministic. Economic development tends
to transform a given society in a predictable
direction, but the process and path are not
inevitable. Many factors are involved, so any
prediction must be contingent on the historical and cultural context of the society in
question.
Nevertheless, the central prediction of
modernization theory finds broad support:
so
Economic development is associated with
major changes in prevailing values and beIiefs: The worldviews of rich societies differ
markedly from those of poor societies. This
does not necessarily imply cultural convergence, but it does predict the general direction of cultural change and (in so far as the
process is based on intergenerational population replacement) even gives sorne idea of
the rate at which such change is likely to
occur.
Ronald lnglehart is Professor o/ Political Science and Program Director at the lnstitute for
Social Research at the University of Michigan.
He helped found the Euro-Barometer surveys and
is Chair o/ the executive committee of the World
Va/ues Surveys. His research deals with changng belief systems and their impact on social and
political change. His most recent books are Modemization and Postmodemization: Cultural, Economic, and Poltica] Change in 43 Societes
(Princeton University Press, 1997) and Human
Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook
(with Miguel Basanez and Alejandro Moreno,
University of Michigan Press, 1998). Author of
more than 125 publications, he has been a visting professor or visting scholar in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Nigeria and has served as a
consultant to the U.S. State Department and the
European Union.
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51