Professional Documents
Culture Documents
On April 13, 1955, the petitioner People of the Philippines filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order granting bail to respondent Castelo. It
was
denied
by
respondent
Judge
on
April
20,
1955.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As originally scheduled, the hearing on the motion for new trial was held
on April 14th at which hearing City Attorney Salva of Pasay City appeared
for the prosecution. In the course of the hearing which lasted until April
20th, Manila City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles also appeared for the
prosecution. In support of the motion for new trial, the affidavit of
recantation of Robles was presented and he himself testified extensively;
so did Judge Hermogenes Calauag, Mrs. Felicidad Manuel, Atty. Alejandro
de Santos and Liceria Siasoy, mother of Robles. For the prosecution,
seven affidavits were presented, marked as Annexes H, H-1, H-2, H-3, H4, H-5 and H-6, made by public officials such as Judge Luis B. Reyes who,
during the main trial of the case before Judge Rilloraza, acted as assistant
Manila City Fiscal, Hon. Arsenio H. Lacson, Mayor of Manila and some
members of the Manila City Police Department, all denying the acts of
violence, force or intimidation attributed to them by Robles. Immediately
after the last hearing on April 20, Judge Bocar in an order of the same
date granted the motion for new trial and set aside the decision of
conviction rendered by Judge Rilloraza as regards Castelo, and he set the
new trial for April 25th. The same order denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order granting bail. Thereafter, Solicitor General
Ambrosio Padilla filed the present petition forcertiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the orders of respondent
Bocar
granting
bail
and
granting
new
trial
to
respondent
Castelo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After a hearing held before this Court in Baguio on April 23, 1955, on the
prayer in the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
at which hearing the Solicitor General and counsel for Castelo appeared
and orally argued for the petitioner and respondents, respectively, a writ
of preliminary injunction without bond was issued, enjoining respondent
Bocar not to proceed with the new trial as set by him for April 25th.
Another hearing was held before this Court in Baguio on May 5, 1955, at
which hearing Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor
General Jose Bautista appeared and argued for the petitioner and Solicitor
Troadio Quiazon also appeared for the petitioner, and Attys. Mariano H.
de Joya and Estanislao Fernandez appeared and argued for respondents,
and Attys. Roberto A. Gianzon, Alejandro de Santos, Constancio M.
Leuterio and Felicisimo Ocampo also appeared for respondents, and
respondent Oscar Castelo himself appeared and addressed the Tribunal on
his
own
behalf.
Thereafter,
the
case
was
submitted
for
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The theory of the petitioner as may be gathered from the pleadings and
the oral argument of its representatives, is that respondent Bocar
presiding over the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain, much less to
grant the motion for new trial because the case involves a death
sentence, and that even if he had said jurisdiction, he gravely abused his
discretion in granting it, considering the circumstances surrounding the
case. On the other hand, counsel for respondents maintain that
respondent Bocar had jurisdiction to grant the new trial as in ordinary
criminal cases, and that in the exercise of that jurisdiction he did not
commit any abuse of discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The case is without established judicial precedent; it is one of first
impression, and realizing the importance and far-reaching effects of a
decision on the matter we have given it special attention and considerable
study and thought. In ordinary criminal cases where the penalty imposed
is life imprisonment or less, there is no question that the trial court
imposing the sentence may grant a motion for new trial. Not only this, but
under section 1, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, the trial court even on its
own motion but with the consent of the defendant may grant a new trial.
The legal provision which has sown doubt or effected conviction in the
mind of counsel for petitioner is section 9, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
which provides as follows:
SEC. 9. Transmission of record in case of death penalty.-The records of all
cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of
First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for review and judgment as law and
justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the
clerk of the Supreme Courtwithin twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen
days, after rendition of sentence. The transcript shall also be forwarded
without unnecessary delay.
The Solicitor General argues that under the above-quoted section, after
the rendition of a death sentence the trial court is completely divested of
all jurisdiction over the case which, regardless of whether the accused
sentenced to death appeals or not, automatically goes to the Supreme
Court for review of the sentence, the records of the case to be forwarded
to it within 20 days. He further claims that a defendant under a death
sentence is not deprived of his right to file a motion for new trial but that
any such motion should be addressed to and resolved by the Supreme
Court, all this, because of the extreme importance of the case, the
defendant's life being at stake. On the other hand, counsel for
respondents maintain that there is absolutely no reason why an accused
under a death sentence, whose life is in the balance should be deprived of
the rights enjoyed by defendants in ordinary criminal cases such as the
right to file a motion for new trial before the trial court to be resolved by
the same court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The automatic review by this Tribunal of a decision or sentence imposing
the death penalty is intended primarily for the protection of the accused
(U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 520). It is to insure the correctness of the
decision of the trial court sentencing him to death. The Supreme Court
under this automatic review is called upon to scrutinize the record and
look for any errors committed by the trial court against the defendant. In
such review this Tribunal may find errors committed in his favor but such
errors are not exactly the object of the said review because even if found
to be such, their correction by this Tribunal would be vain and of no
practical utility because the sentence cannot be made more severe; the
penalty of death already imposed is the extreme, the highest penalty of
death already imposed is the extreme, the highest penalty imposable
under the law. We repeat that the whole purpose of the automatic review
by this Court of a death sentence is to find and correct errors committed
by the trial court against the accused such as finding him guilty of the
crime deserving the death penalty when in fact the offense committed
was less serious, or a finding against him of the existence of aggravating
circumstances or a qualifying circumstance, not supported by the record,
or failing to compensate proven aggravating circumstances with equally
proven mitigating circumstances. In other words, the law providing for
automatic review of a death sentence seeks to favor the defendant. If this
is the case, then such defendant should and must be accorded at least
the same rights, privileges and opportunities for acquittal or reduction of
his sentence, enjoyed by other accused sentenced to penalties lower than
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It might be argued as does the Solicitor General that a defendant
sentenced to death is not being deprived of the right to move for new
trial, only that said motion for new trial must be addressed to the
Supreme Court and resolved by it instead of being addressed to and
decided by the trial court. That is but partly correct, for should such
motion for new trial before this Tribunal be denied, for the defendantmovant, that is the end of the trial. He cannot and may not pursue his
remedy to a higher court because there is none. The Supreme Court is
the highest Tribunal of the land, where all roads of relief and legal
remedies lead to an end. In other words, he has only one chance for the
granting of new trial. On the other hand, a defendant in an ordinary
criminal case sentenced to say,reclusion temporal or arresto mayor, may
petition the trial court for a new trial. If it is denied there, he appeals his
case to the proper appellate court and there renews his petition for new
trial. In other words, he has two chances and opportunities to be granted
a new trial, while one sentenced to death, fighting for his life has only one
chance and one opportunity. That would be unreasonable and illogical.
Since as we have already stated the purpose of an automatic review of a
There is and there must be a reason for that portion of section 9, Rule
118, that provides that the records in a case of death sentence should be
forwarded to the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court within 20 days but
not earlier than fifteen days after rendition of sentence. Why this
prohibition of not sending up the records before the expiration of 15
days? It is because within those 15 days, despite the automatic review
contemplated by law the trial court retains complete jurisdiction and
control over the case and over its decision. Within that period, as in
ordinary cases, the trial court may modify its decision by decreasing but
not increasing the penalty or acquit the defendant, or grant motion for
new trial filed by the defendant, or even on its motion with the consent of
the accused, grant a new trial. A motion for new trial automatically
suspends the running of the period of 15 days and so the sending up or
transmission of the records to the Supreme Court for automatic review is
necessarily suspended. There is also a relation between the period of 20
days and the 15 days mentioned in section 9, Rule 118. The difference
between 20 and 15 days is 5 days. In other words, after the expiration of
the 15 days, the Clerk of Court must transmit the records to the Supreme
Court within 5 days. This period of 5 days is also found in section 8 of the
same Rule 118 which provides that upon an appeal being taken in a
criminal case (ordinary criminal case involving no death sentence), the
Clerk or Judge of the court with whom the notice of appeal had been filed,
must within 5 days from the filing of the notice, transmit to the Clerk of
Court of the appellate court the complete record of the case. The same
thing must be done in a case involving a death sentence if the accused
files his notice of appeal; the Clerk of Court must send up the record
within 5 days thereafter. He need not wait for the expiration of the 20
days mentioned in section 9, Rule 118. But one may ask, why does
section 9, Rule 118 provide for 20 days but does not do so in section 8 of
the same rule? It is because in a death sentence case the records go up
to the Supreme Court anyway whether or not the accused appeals, but
within the period of 15 days after the promulgation of the sentence, the
trial court will not know until the 15 days have expired whether or not the
accused appeals, and so cannot send the record to the Supreme Court
within that period, unless of course the accused himself files his notice of
appeal or does nothing and let the period of 15 days lapse in which case
the Clerk of Court will within 5 days thereafter send up the records of the
case to the Supreme Court. But in ordinary criminal cases where the
sentence is less than death, covered by section 8 of Rule 118, if the
defendant does not do anything within the period of 15 days, then the
sentence becomes final and the records remain with the trial court; so,
there is no occasion, much less the necessity of providing for the period of
20 days as is done in section 9. We therefore believe and hold that the
trial court in a case involving the death penalty has the right to entertain
and grant a motion for new trial in case it finds the motion
meritorious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Now comes the other question. Did respondent Judge Bocar in granting
the motion for new trial gravely abuse his discretion to such an extent
that his action is equivalent to an excess of jurisdiction? In support of the
motion for new trial filed before him, there was an affidavit of recantation
by Rogelio Robles. Instead of accepting this affidavit as sufficient to
justify the granting of a new trial he set the same for hearing on April
14th at which hearing Pasay City Fiscal Salva appeared for prosecution.
The hearing was continued until April 18th and again continued on April
20th and during the last two hearings Manila City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles
appeared in collaboration with Fiscal Salva. At the hearing, besides
Robles, his mother Liceria Siasoy and Atty. Alejandro de Santos testified.
Rogelio Robles gave extensive testimony but the prosecution waived its
right to cross-examine him. Judge Hermogenes Calauag, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City and Mrs. Felicidad Manuel also
testified for the defense. Both were cross-examined by Fiscal Angeles.
During the hearing there was prolonged argument by the prosecution and
defense counsel. In the absence of proof to contrary, we must presume
that Judge Bocar after listening to the testimonies and arguments must
have been convinced of the sincerity of Rogelio Robles not only in his
affidavit but also in his testimony given before him and that based on this
conviction
Judge
Bocar
granted
the
motion
for
new
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But the petitioner maintains that in order to be in a position to consider
and pass upon the motion for new trial Judge Bocar should have reviewed
the entire record including the testimony of the witnesses and this he
could not have possibly done for the reason that at the time, the
stenographic notes taken of the testimonies of the witnesses during the
hearing which lasted about one year had not yet been transcribed, and
that even if and when transcribed, they would cover from eleven to
twenty thousand pages. As we understand the case, and after reading the
pleadings filed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and listening to the oral argument during the two
hearings held before us in Baguio, we do not agree with petitioner that it
was necessary to go over the whole records of the case, including the oral
and documentary evidence. We must bear in mind that of the eight
defendants sentenced to death by Judge Rilloraza, only one, Oscar
Castelo, was filing a motion for new trial; so only the evidence for and
against him introduced during the trial was material and relevant to the
motion for new trial. It was then the consensus that the only direct
evidence linking Castelo to the killing of Monroy was the testimony of
Rogelio Robles. Counsel for respondents informed this Court during the
oral argument that Fiscal Salva himself made this statement or
declaration to Judge Bocar could and when Fiscal Salva was asked by us
to verify this assertion, he assured us that it was true. In a potion of his
decision Judge Rilloraza reviewed and analyzed the testimony of Robles.
Not being very long, Judge Bocar could have easily read and studied this
portion of the decision to apprise himself of what Robles had said during
the hearing about the alleged participation of Castelo in the killing.
Furthermore, and this is important, where the newly discovered evidence
claimed and sought to be presented during a trial is entirely different and
independent of the evidence introduced during the main hearing as for
instance, the newly discovered evidence is the testimony of one witness
intended to contradict the testimony of another witness who testified
during the main hearing, then it would be necessary to review and study
said testimony during the main hearing, consider it in relation to the
newly discovered evidence and see whether it was probable that the latter
if presented and admitted would outweigh or offset the testimony in the
main hearing to such an extent that it would change the judgment. But in
the present case, the facts are different. The witness sought to be
introduced at the new trial, Robles, is the same witness who testified in
the main hearing directly implicating Castelo in the commission of the
offense charged, and the theory of respondents is that Robles is
repudiating his previous testimony and recanting it on the ground that he
gave it not voluntarily but due to intimidation, duress, and violence. So
that, if the respondents can prove during the new trial sought that Robles'
testimony in the main hearing was all false and that at the new trial he
would testify freely and voluntarily and truthfully that Castelo had no
participation whatsoever in the killing of Monroy, then the main concern
of Judge Bocar is passing upon and considering the merits of the motion
for new trial was not so much what Robles said at the main hearing but as
to his sincerity and truthfulness in his affidavit in support of the motion
for new trial and in his extensive testimony during the hearing on the
motion for new trial. If Robles was sincere and truthful in his testimony on
the motion for new trial, then there was reason to believe that his
testimony at the main hearing linking Castelo to the killing of Monroy was
of doubtful value, and therefore, the motion for new trial could properly
be
granted
as
in
fact
it
was
granted
by
Judge
Bocar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is true that as was said by this Tribunal in the case of U. S. vs. Dacir,
26 Phil., 507, as a rule a motion for new trial is not granted when the
motion is based on an affidavit of recantation whose effect is to free the
appellant from participation in the commission of the crime; but it was
also held in that case that there are exceptional cases as where it is made
to appear that there was no other evidence sustaining the judgment of
conviction other than the testimony of the recanting witness and this
Court actually granted a new trial in said case altho the motion was based
on mere affidavits of the main prosecution witness changing his story or
account of the commission of the crime, after the trial. As already stated,
Judge Bocar was not satisfied with the mere affidavit of Robles but set the
motion for new trial for hearing and required the defense to present
evidence in support of the motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
the fact that under the theory of the prosecution, Castelo is the
mastermind who decided and directed the killing and in fact said
prosecution would appear to have more or less concentrated its attention
and efforts on him as regards the presentation of evidence. As we have
already said, the main hearing besides being protracted, was far from
peaceful and pleasant. At times it was turbulent. Judge Bocar should and
must have known all this, and also that there was no assurance that it
would not be repeated at the new trial, at least as regards the time to be
consumed to conduct and terminate it. This, specially when Robles in his
affidavit and in his testimony given in support of the motion for new trial,
he openly accused of having practices and committed acts of violence and
intimidation on him, or tampering with his testimony government officials
like Mayor Lacson of the City of Manila, Fiscal Luis B. Reyes, now Judge of
the Court of First Instance, and officers of the Manila Police Department,
and these officials would perhaps if not probably, take the witness stand
to explain if not to deny the accusations against them, as they have
already done by means of affidavits. It might be said figuratively that
respondent Judge, as it were, rushed in where angels fear to
tread.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We repeat that Judge Bocar should have known that he could not possibly
conduct the new trial up to its termination considering that his temporary
detail to the trial court was expiring at the end of the month, unless he
unduly rushed it and did not accord the parties sufficient time and
opportunity to present their evidence. In fact, there is reason to believe
that it was his action in ordering the new trial on April 25th before him,
with only about six days to go, that alerted and alarmed the prosecution
and gave it the impression and inspired the belief which it expressed and
alleged in its present petition and in support thereof, that respondent
Judge would most probably render another judgment acquitting Oscar
Castelo,- sort of railroading his case to an acquital. We are not sure that
had Judge Bocar merely granted the motion for new trial and not decided
to conduct said new trial himself, intending to finish it within the very
limited time of about five or six days, or should the new trial have been
granted by Judge Rilloraza who rendered the decision of conviction, the
herein petitioner would have filed this petition to question the jurisdiction
and power of a trial court to grant a new trial in a case of death
sentence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In justice to respondent Judge, however, we should also say that there is
nothing in the record nor in any incident in relation with his actuations in
the case that would reasonably warrant the suspicion, much less the
belief, that he was out to acquit Oscar Castelo. We presume all judges to
be honest and men of integrity unless proven otherwise. It is said that
respondent Judge stated or manifested in the presence of counsel, while
considering the motion for new trial that it were better if the motion had
been presented before another judge because he (Bocar) had very little
time for it because of his temporary detail. And as to his seeming hurry in
issuing the order granting the motion for new trial on April 20, 1955,
almost immediately after the termination of the hearing, it should be
stated that he as well as the lawyers had the impression that under Rule
118, section 9, he had only 20 days from the rendition of the judgment
within which to decide the motion for new trial, and April 20th was the
last day. Of course, as we have already said, this period of 20 days is not
rigid, inflexible, much less jurisdictional; if defendant files a notice of
appeal, say the first day of second day after the promulgation of the
decision, then the record will be elevated to the Supreme Court within 5
days therefrom without having to wait for the expiration of the 20 days;
and that the filing of a motion for new trial not only interrupts and even
does away with the 20-day period mentioned in section 9, Rule
118.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In conclusion, we hold that in a case where the death sentence is
imposed, the trial court as in ordinary criminal cases may entertain and
grant a motion for new trial, conduct the same and thereafter decide the
case anew as regards said defendant to whom the new trial was
granted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the legality and propriety of the
order granting bail to respondent Castelo, considering the question
involved as moot. Upon the granting of the motion for new trial the
decision of Judge Rilloraza as regards Oscar Castelo was automatically set
aside and as to him, the case reverted to its original status before
judgment. We understand that he was then under bail. Unless there are
reasons to the contrary, he should be accorded his original status of being
out on bail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing , the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
hereby denied. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
ordered dissolved. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
3.
[G.R.
No.
L-55808.
August
28,
1984.]
Batiquin
&
Associates
for Petitioner.
The
sum
of
P50,000.00
in
cash;
"b) The balance of P450.00 out of P800.00 representing petty cash left at
the
office
of
Sultan
Express
Tours;
"c) The diamond ring or in the alternative, its value: P35,000.00;
"d) The gold wrist watch costing $200.00, or in the alternative its value
P1,500.00
($200.00);
"e)
Deeds
"f)
Deed
"g)
of
sale
of
of
sale
Registration
"h)
plaintiffs
covering
papers
two
her
of
parcels
of
TORANA
her
Cash
land;
car;
cars;
receipts;
"i) Vouchers for 1974 and 1976 relative to the operation of local tour
business;
"j) Evidentiary papers and documents against defendant and his wife,
together
with
other
papers
related
thereto;
"2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 the latter
paid to the First Integrated Bonding and Ins. Co. for the issuance of a
replevin bond, representing the reimbursement thereof; and the amount
of
P5,000.00
as
attorneys
fees.
"Costs
against
the
defendant."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
On January 25, 1980, Alazas filed his notice of appeal and deposited with
the
clerk
of
court
his
cash
appeal
bond.
enforcing the writs of execution dated November 14, 1980 and December
10 (should be December 19) 1980 and from further proceeding with or
carrying out the auction sale of the levied properties. On January 16,
1981 we issued a preliminary mandatory order ordering the respondents
deputy provincial sheriff and/or the clerk of court as ex-oficio sheriff of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I to release or restore
possession of the three (3) cars to herein petitioner or to the Paramount
Finance Corporation. The Paramount Finance Corporation made a demand
on respondent deputy provincial sheriff for the return of two of the three
cars scheduled to be sold by public auction as the owner
thereof.chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
The pivotal issue raised in the instant petition centers on the respondent
courts November 11, 1980 order granting execution pending appeal.
The petitioner contends that the respondent court abused its discretion in
not approving the record on appeal despite no objections from the private
respondent, in violation of Section 7, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
petition also states that the respondent courts various acts in relation to
the withholding of approval of the record on appeal clearly show partiality
towards
the
private Respondent.
There is no dispute that the petitioner took steps to perfect his appeal
within the reglementary period. Thus, on January 25, 1980, the petitioner
filed his notice of appeal and deposited with the clerk of court his cash
appeal bond. On February 9, 1980, he filed his record on appeal and set
the
hearing
and
approval
thereof
on
February
14,
1980.
While it is true that initially the respondent court may not be faulted for
withholding the approval of the record on appeal in view of a petition
for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals by the petitioner challenging
the respondent courts initial order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal, the same does not hold true when after the appellate
court granted the petition and set aside the execution pending appeal, the
respondent court still withheld any action on the record on appeal.
Parenthetically, it was the courts own fault that its order had to be raised
to
the
appellate
court.
Section 7, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Hearing and approval of record. Upon the submission for approval of
the record on appeal, if no objection is filed within five (5) days, the trial
judge may approve it as presented or, upon his own motion or at the
instance of the appellee, may direct its amendment by the inclusion of
any matters omitted which are deemed essential to the determination of
the issue of law or fact involved in the appeal. If the trial judge orders the
amendment of the record, the appellant, within the time limited in the
The respondent court ignored without comment the petitioners pleas for
due process. Alazas questioned the resubmission of the February 4, 1980
motion after the Court of Appeals had set aside the order granting it
because of the circumstances surrounding its issuance. The court was also
silent on the memorandum discussing the nine (9) months inaction when
the memorandum was filed pursuant to the courts order.
Premised on the foregoing concatenation of circumstances clearly showing
not only grave abuse of discretion but also improper judicial conduct, this
Court is constrained to censure the respondent judge. A judges official
conduct and his behaviour in the performance of judicial duties should be
free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that private respondent filed
objections to the record on appeal.chanrobles law library : red
WHEREFORE, the order of execution pending appeal dated November 11,
1980 and the writs of execution dated November 14, 1980 and December
19, 1980 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Judge of the Regional Trial Court to
whom the case below has been assigned is directed to give due course to
the petitioners appeal and to elevate the records to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. The Temporary Restraining Order and the Preliminary
Injunction enjoining the enforcement of the writs of execution and the
public auction sale are made permanent. Costs against the respondents.
For the reasons abovestated, the respondent judge is also censured for
improper
judicial
conduct.
SO
Teehankee, Actg. C.J.,
Fuente, JJ., concur.
ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera,
Plana,
Relova
and
De
la
PAMPLONA,
PER CURIAM:
In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge
Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 30, San
Pablo City, is charged with various corrupt practices detrimental
to the administration of justice.
Per resolutions of the Court, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944 was
referred to Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera of the Court of
Appeals, 1 and Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959 to Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, 2for investigation, report and
recommendation. In the meantime, we directed respondent judge
to go on leave. 3 On 27 October 1993, we ordered the
consolidation of the complaints. 4
Thereafter, in compliance with our directives, Justice Corona IbaySomera and Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez
submitted their reports. We shall deal with respondent's
administrative liability on the basis of the investigators' findings
and recommendations. 5
I. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944
The complaint in this case was initiated by a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" dated 28 August 1992 of complainants Rizalia Capuno
and Thelma Villanueva, mother and daughter, respectively, thus
(1) Na si Pedro Calara, Jr. ay nagdemanda ng "writ of
possession" laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa sala ni Judge
Ausberto Jaramillo ng RTC-San Pablo City.
(2) Na pagkatapos ng makapagbigay ng "writ of
possession" si Judge Jaramillo laban kay Rizalia Capuno
sa nasabing kaso, ay nagpunta si Sheriff Leonardo Ho
sa bahay ni Rizalia Capuno at sinabi kay Rizalia na
gusto siyang makausap ni Judge Jaramillo.
14
raffled to the respondent's sala; that one of the basic issues raised
in the petition was the mental capacity and the sound disposition
of the testator; that this issue was already passed upon by
respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 849(92); that during the
pendency of the probate proceeding, respondent judge called the
parties to a conference at Roo's Place, a public restaurant in San
Pablo City; that the meeting started at eight o'clock in the evening
and lasted until midnight; that the purpose of the meeting was to
discuss possible settlement of the probate case; that shares and
other properties were discussed except the car; that respondent
intentionally omitted to include the car in the list of properties
which he himself prepared so he could still make use of the car;
that despite the fact the complainant was named executrix in the
will, respondent appointed Rosevelinda Calingasan and Antonio
Azcarate as joint special administrators; that such order was
issued without notice and hearing; that her motion for
reconsideration on this ground was denied; that, shortly after,
respondent judge ordered complainant to produce stock
certificates in the name of the late Pastor S. Marino, the books of
the corporation, and other papers; that she moved for
reconsideration of this order but the same was denied; that the
joint special administrators filed a motion to cite complainant in
contempt for her refusal to obey the order of respondent; that in
view of the insistence of the respondent to continue hearing the
probate proceedings, complainant moved for the inhibition of
respondent judge; that respondent threatened to cite complainant
in contempt because of her statement that respondent had
custody, possession and enjoyment of the luxury car of the
corporation; that he set the hearing for the contempt proceeding
on 29 January 1993 at eight-thirty in the morning; and, that as a
result, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari.
In his answer, respondent submits that complainant has no valid
cause of action against him. He explains that the car was in the
possession of the court, although on few occasions, he drove it
merely to inflate the tires or to recharge the battery. The car also
needed minor repairs and the expenses were paid for by the
corporation which appropriated P10,000.00 for the purpose.
However, he insists, there was not instance that he demanded
money, food for valuables from complainant.
With regard to the telephone call using the name "E. Pilapil,"
respondent claims that he wanted to be discreet with his
calls. 27 He only wanted to get the names of the two (2) persons
whom complainant mentioned earlier who could help him secure
exemption from the Gun Ban. He never called up complainant to
Court
him. 32 Undeniably, his free use of the car during and after the
pendency of the guardianship proceedings for over a year
constituted a corrupt practice under Sec 7, par. (d), of R.A.
6713, 33 i.e., acceptance by a public officer of a favor from any
person in the course of his official duty.
Respondent judge did not only exhibit a personal interest in the
vehicle but also accepted the offer to use it. In fact, by his own
admission, he drove it several times. In the conference held at
Roo's Place, respondent judge purposely omitted the car in the
list of properties belonging to the estate of Pastor S. Marino. We
are not persuaded by his argument that the car was not part of
the decedent's estate. His later testimony revealed that the
parties then desired to include all properties even those which
supposedly belonged to the deceased but deeded to the
corporation. 34 The car was one such property, but respondent
never volunteered its inclusion. He justified his omission by saying
that the car was not mentioned in the discussion. Understandably,
no one dared to do so as they were fully aware that respondent
was in possession and enjoying the use of the car. Besides, he
should have been the one to call the attention of the parties about
the existence of the vehicle as belonging to the estate. Obviously,
he did not want to part with the vehicle.
Respondent judge even personally supervised the maintenance of
the car beyond what the duties of his office would call for. He had
the scratches of the car repainted, the tires inflated and the
battery recharged six (6) times. All the expenses for the
reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up, repainting and battery
recharging were charged against the P10,000.00 appropriated by
the Board of Directors of PSM Development Corporation. 35 The
records do not however disclose who kept the P10,000.00. Neither
was there any accounting of the expenses nor any statement
made on the amount left of the P10,000.00. Considering the extra
pains taken by respondent in the upkeep of the car, the possibility
that the P10,000.00 was in his possession is not remote.
Respondent's conduct in this regard cannot be any different from
that of a judge who was removed from office because of manifest
interest in a vehicle in custodia legis by spending for its repairs
and thereafter using it for her benefit and convenience. 36
Another reprehensible conduct of respondent which distresses us
was his availment of the battery recharging service of Cortes
Battery Shop free of charge. 37 In so doing, respondent
compromised his exalted position as a judge. It bears repeating
that integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a
necessity. We dismissed a judge who not only had the seats of his
"Lite Ace" van repaired but also received new seat covers both for
free from a litigant. 38 Likewise, we terminated the services of a
judge upon finding that he accepted the benefit of riding regularly
in Sarkies Tour Buses free of charge. 39
Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to conflicting
interests in society cannot be overemphasized. As the visible
representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and
confidence of our people in the judicial system. They are
particularly mandated not only to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary but also to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in their actions. 40 For judges sit as
the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last
recourse where all other institutions have failed. 41 Sadly,
respondent judge carelessly disregarded these stringent judicial
norms. Worse, his acceptance of the Galant Super Saloon for his
personal use and convenience as well as his evident personal
interest in it have defiled the "public trust" character of the
judicial
office.
These
serious
transgressions
cannot
be
countenanced.
By
his
actions,
respondent
has
clearly
demonstrated his difficulty and inability to keep up with the
conduct required of judges. Consequently, he should not be
permitted to stay a minute longer in office. We have repeatedly
held that there is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. 42
WHEREFORE, for his gross misconduct and violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, and his
violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, and Canons 1 and 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, respondent
JUDGE AUSBERTO JARAMILLO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch
30, San Pablo City, is DISMISSED from the service with prejudice
to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits and privileges, if any. This dismissal shall
be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.
sala
for
a
lunch
picnic
particularly
at
Atty. Delizo's house. Judge Aggabao and Atty.
Betguen
go
with
Atty. Beltejar for a lunch to a nearby restaurant
too. These result to unfair judgment prejudicial to
the case of the adverse party. To cite examples
Civil Case No. ____________ Taganas vs.
Allagones, PP vs. Gaudencio Blas and other cases.
Atty. Betguen and Atty. Agnes Hernando ask for a
fee in any document he or she prepares, such as
affidavits, contracts, Deed of Sale and also ready
documents needed for his or her signatures as ExOfficio Notary Public with the assistance of Elsa V.
Manuel their fee collector but they do not declare
in the Record Book.
Elsa V. Manuel, Staff II In-Charge of Criminal
Cases that are disposed in the Office of the Clerk
of Court usually ask for a fee ranging from
TWENTY (P20.00) PESOS to FIFTY (P50.00)
PESOS from the person who wants to withdraw
the property bond.
3. Discourtesy in the course of official duties.
Judge Aggabao shouts with insulting angry words
at prosecuting Fiscals or their witnesses during
hearing, scolds Stenographic Reporters and utter
uncourteous words at them in the Courtroom. . . .
4. Dishonesty
Stand fans and typewriters issued by the Supreme
Court were taken at [sic] their houses by Judge
Aggabao and Atty. Betguen for their personal use.
...
5. Disgraceful and immoral conduct
As Executive Judge, subordinate woman employee
asks his advice about her problem she
encounters. He usually takes advantage of the
situation by asking for a short time date with such
employee. An employee who rejects to his
proposal is bad. He is always hot at her and if she
finds a mistake, he said he is going to dismiss
employees,
lawyers,
professionals,
businessmen
and
government officials; Atty. Delizo is an ex-Governor of Quirino
and a well-known and respectable lawyer; the Taganas case
was decided 10 years ago and respondents Judge Aggabao
and Atty. Betguen did not go to a nearby restaurant for lunch
with
Atty. Baltazar. The case of People vs. Blas was not decided by
Judge Aggabao but by Judge Gregorio Buenavista.
3. While respondent Atty. Betguen and Atty. Hernando, both
Clerks of Court, notarized documents because there are no
notaries public within the vicinity, they do so "for free since
most of the documents they notarize are already prepared
documents"; respondent Manuel never acted as their collector
since it is not her assigned task to collect fees.
4. No fee is charged for the withdrawal of property bond in
criminal cases.
5. Judge Aggabao does not shout with insulting and angry
words at prosecuting fiscals or witnesses, or scold or utter
uncourteous words at stenographic reporters; he has not
taken advantage of a woman, much less a subordinate; on
the contrary, he has always been very kind and honorable to
court employees; neither has he committed nepotism in the
appointment of Joel Totto since the latter is a relative in the
fifth civil degree of affinity and was appointed to the
unclassified service.
6. Judge Aggabao and Atty. Betguen did not bring home any
typewriter. The former does not need any as he dictates his
decisions, while the latter has his own typewriter in the
house. Neither of them brought home any electric fan.
The respondents claimed that the complainant filed the complaint to
satisfy her desire for revenge. They cite the following reasons in support
of their claim:
1. Judge Aggabao, in December 1992, had threatened to file
administrative charges against the complainant for the loss of
the records of two criminal cases and reprimanded her when
he learned that she was collecting fees from lawyers or
parties without issuing receipts, and she also believed that
she was convicted in a case because he failed to prevent
Melchor Totto and Estrella Magat from testifying against her;
2. Respondent Atty. Edwin Betguen had issued to her a
memorandum directing her to show cause why she should not
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degree
either
of
PER CURIAM:
Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting
executive judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was
charged with "sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness" in a
letter-complaint 1 dated
August
15,
1997,
filed
by
Floride
Dawa, 2 Femenina Lazaro-Barreto 3 and Noraliz L. Jorgensen. 4 In view of
the allegations in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated
December 10, 1997, placed respondent judge under preventive
suspension; and referred the case to retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, a
consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation,
report and recommendation. 5
Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, 6 who assisted the
aforementioned complainants, also filed, on September 5, 1997, an
affidavit-complaint 7 against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual
harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of lasciviousness, grave or
serious misconduct, and [for] violation [of] the high standard of moral[s]
demanded
by
judicial
8
ethics . . . ." In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998, we resolved to
consolidate her Complaint with the earlier one and to refer it likewise to
Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for inclusion in his investigation, report and
recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation the investigating officer
submitted his Report, dated March 16, 1998, which contained the
following exhaustive and detailed summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses for both the complainants and the respondent:
1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed as a
stenographic reporter in Branch 52 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC for brevity) of Caloocan City. She affirmed under
oath the sworn statement (Exhibit A, Record, pp. 2-3 of the
Record) she executed August 15, 1997. She related that on
August 8, 1997, while on her way to the ladies' toilet, she had
seen respondent, Judge Armando C. De Asa, talking with a
man at the backdoor of his chamber. Out of respect for
respondent, being the Acting Executive Judge of the MeTC,
she had nodded to him before entering the ladies comfort
room. When she emerged from the same, she saw that
respondent was still at the backdoor of his office although this
time he was alone. Upon seeing Dawa, respondent casually
asked her whether the toilet was clean. She answered that it
was dirty. Respondent called her and she approached him.
When she neared the respondent, the latter put his arm on
her shoulder and led her into his chamber. Once inside and
Cai2016 PALE FULL TEXT CASES
the matter over during the weekend and to talk to her parents
about it. Judge Santiago promised to talk to Dawa again the
next week.
After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz
Jorgensen, a casual employee detailed to the OCC had the
same experience. To verify the truth, the judge went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court and bluntly asked Noraliz
Jorgensen whether it was true that she had been kissed by
the respondent. Noraliz blushed and became red[-]eyed and
told the judge of the several instances that the respondent
had forcibly embraced and kissed her on the lips.
Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who presides
Branch 49. She related the stories of Dawa and Noraliz and
asked Judge Ortiz whether she knew of anyone from her
branch who may have undergone the same experience. Judge
Ortiz asked Jean Marie Lazaro and the latter told them that
there was one instance when she and Zenaida Reyes, another
employee of the court, were seated on a bench near the door
of their court and respondent sat between them and placed
his arms on their shoulders and kissed them both on the
cheeks. Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago that if Dawa
would complain, she too would file a complaint. Judge
Santiago advised her to seek the counsel of her parents and
her husband and to see her again the next week.
In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina LazaroBarreto, a court stenographer in Branch 53, accompanied by
her sister, Jean Marie, came to see Judge Santiago. Femenina
confessed to Judge Santiago that she, too, had been kissed
and embraced by the respondent twice. In between sobs and
with her handkerchief almost torn to shreds by her shaking
hands, she related how she had harbored her shame in
silence and her guilt at not being able to tell her husband.
That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also related her
own story to Judge Santiago how she was forcibly
embraced and kissed on the lips by the respondent.
Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell judge
Santiago about the instances that the respondent had kissed
her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz sought the assistance of Judge
Santiago to transfer to another branch to escape the
respondent. 9
The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondent's
witnesses in this wise:
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She said that during the almost five years that she had been
under the respondent, no one had charged him
administratively. She described him as friendly and helpful to
those working under him. His office was always open to his
subordinates. The same is not sound proof such that if
anything untoward happened inside or [if there was] any loud
conversation [it] would be noticed by those in the staff room.
During these past days she was stunned to learn that Judge
de Asa had been charged [with] sexual harassment by Nina,
Nora and Flor because she had not seen the respondent do
anything indecent to these three women. Everytime Nina saw
the judge, she would smilingly greet him with such remarks
as "Hi, Judge" or sometimes "Hello, I'm sexy now".
She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when she
[went] to the Office of the Clerk of Court to fetch Fe Apostol.
She [was] told by the employees thereat about the incident.
She said that she [went] up to Branch 51 [o]n the third floor
to ask her co-workers whether they had heard the news that
the respondent had kissed someone. Those who were still in
replied that they had not.
Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to Branch
51 to have papers signed by respondent and sometimes she
came to cut the hair of certain employees, including the
respondent himself. On the other hand, she had seen Dawa
only once when she came with her co-employees at Branch 52
to have their daily time records signed.
3. Mario Muncal, respondent's third witness is 47 years old
and single. He affirmed the contents of his sworn statement
(Exhibit 11; Record p. 53).
Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see the
respondent about a job in the MeTC. When he entered
respondent's office, Atty. Buencamino was with him. De Asa
introduced Muncal to Buencamino telling her about his
application for a job in the court. Atty. Buencamino told
Muncal to wait for her at her office. When Muncal saw
Buencamino, the latter told him that he would have to
undergo an observation period of one to two weeks. She
further told him that although he had been recommended by
respondent, she would be his direct superior and he was
admonished not to relate anywhere else whatever he heard or
saw in her office.
Court Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7; Record; pp. 1724), wherein she narrated all that she knew of the different
incident. . . . . 11
xxx xxx xxx
2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for
complainants to invent their stories. It is highly improbable
that the three complainants would perjure themselves only to
accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have had some real
or imagined resentment against respondent. Moreover, the
reason given by respondent for the ill will that Atty.
Buencamino felt against him is too superficial to genuinely
cause such malevolence, specially because it was Judge
Santiago who insisted on the relocation of Atty. Buencamino
so that her office could be used by the executive judge. 12
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees
of the court to perform their duties and to observe office
hours and his prohibition against loitering and idleness in the
premises of the court is not enough to motivate [the] three
women
into
exposing
themselves
to
ridicule
and
chastisement, not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating
false stories that would also be derogatory to them.
Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at
respondent's calling her attention to an anonymous letter
which mentioned her indiscretions with another employees of
the OCC who was also married. We are not convinced that
this would move her into fabricating a story as shocking as
the one she related under oath. . . . . 13
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when
he misjudged the young Floride Dawa to be fair game. Feeling
perhaps that the nod Dawa gave him, when she saw him as
she was about to enter the comfort room, was an invitation,
he took advantage of the young maiden and forced himself on
her. Perhaps because Dawa was naive and innocent, she
panicked and became near hysterical prompting Carpio to
question her. This broke the dam, so to speak. When it
became known that Floride Dawa was going to file a case
against respondent, a slew of indignant women surfaced also
wanting to file charges against respondent for his many
INTEGRITY
AND
THE
place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal
from office. 23 In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to
iterate our pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting
standards. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a
judge as a model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the
people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in
which they hold the judiciary in general.
xxx xxx xxx
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that
the complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he
exercises control and supervision, he being the executive
judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order
to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of being
in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent
was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his
superior position. 24
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby DISMISSED
from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ.,
concur.
7. A.M. No. 1906-MJ May 13, 1981
JOSEPHINE
LUCIO
vs.
Hon. CLARITO DEMAALA, respondent.
MANALO, complainant,
DE CASTRO, * J.:1wph1.t
This is an administrative case against above-named respondent with
respect to which the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum dated
8 January 1981, from which the following is quoted: 1wph1.t
BALDOMERO
S.
LUQUE, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE UNION C. KAYANAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province and
Lucena City, respondent.
Baldomero
S.
Luque
in
his
own
behalf
as
Judge Union C. Kayanan in his own behalf as respondent.
petitioner.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Upon the averment that respondent judge is without authority and is
disqualified to act, petitioner comes to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus to stop the judge, presiding over Branch IV, Court of First
Instance of Quezon, from taking cognizance of, and to require him to
return to Branch I of the same court, Civil Case 4871, 1 in which
petitioner, a member of the Bar, is one of the defendants and crossdefendants. And this, because petitioner's original petition for the same
purpose was thwarted by the Court of Appeals.
The better to understand this case, it is necessary to narrate in some
detail the events that transpired between petitioner Baldomero S. Luque
and respondent Judge Union C. Kayanan that spawned the legal
controversy now before us.
Judge Union C. Kayanan's oath of office described his position as "Judge,
CFI of Quezon Prov. and Lucena City Branch IV, with Station at
Calauag." On August 13, 1965, by Administrative Order 268, he was
authorized "in addition to his regular duties, to hold court in Lucena City,
effective September 1, 1965, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the
purpose of trying all kinds of cases and to enter judgments therein." By
virtue of this order, Judge Kayanan proceeded to hold court sessions in
Lucena City on September 21, 1965 in addition to his duty to attend to
case filed at Calauag, Quezon. On December 1, 1965, Administrative
Order 425 came out with the same authority,i.e., "to hold court in Lucena
City, effective December 1, 1965, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for
the purpose of trying all kinds of cases and to enter judgments therein."
All these administrative orders had for their source of authority Section 56
of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 2
Turning back to the case before us, on April 15, 1948, Civil Case 4871
was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Quezon by Bibiano Ilao,
Natalio A. Enriquez and Susana Enriquez against Florencio Ona,
Baldomero Luque (petitioner herein), Andrea Africano, Enriqueta Castillo,
and Romeo, Adelaida, Clarito, all surnamed Baldeo. Plaintiffs therein
sought to set aside the April 17, 1944 decision in Civil Cases 6 and 26 of
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the Court of First Instance of Quezon approving the parties' April 15, 1944
compromise agreement which allegedly was procured thru duress and
intimidation, and questioned Luque's attorneys' fees as counsel for
Sinforoso Ona in said cases. Enriqueta Castillo, in the same Civil Case
4871, filed a cross-claim against petitioner Baldomero Luque and others.
By notice of hearing dated October 7, 1965, Civil Case 4871 was set for
trial on November 5, 1965 before Branch I of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon at Lucena City, presided over by Judge Gabriel Valero. It was
on November 5, 1965 that Judge Kayanan first took cognizance of said
Civil Case 4871. According to plaintiffs' attorney in the case below, 3 on
November 5, 1965, at 8:30 in the morning, he found that Civil Case 4871
"was not included in the calendar of cases scheduled for Branch I"; that
"he looked up the calendar of the other sala," and finding his case there,
he thus appeared therein. The "other sala" is that of Judge Kayanan.
Defendant and cross-defendant Baldomero S. Luque (petitioner herein)
was absent therein. Going by petitioner's version, he was at Branch I
"where he should be"; after he was informed by Judge Gabriel Valero
hearing cases at Branch I that Civil Case 4871 was in Branch IV, he
proceeded to said branch but was informed by a clerk that respondent
Judge Kayanan had already left for Manila.
Respondent judge's order of November 5 was prefaced by the following
words: "When this case was called today for hearing, neither the counsel
for the defendants and cross-claimant as well as counsel for the crossdefendant appeared." That order reset the hearing for December 1, 1965
at 8:30 in the morning. Petitioner submits to be inaccurate that part of
the order that says that he did not appear. Because, so he says, he was
there in court, although at Branch I.
The next pertinent order by respondent judge was made on January 31,
1966, which set the case for hearing on February 28, 1966. This last
mentioned date was admittedly erroneous because the parties agreed on
January 31, 1966 to reset the hearing for March 8.
At the start of the hearing on February 28, 1966, petitioner was present,
the other parties absent. Counsel for plaintiffs came 20 minutes late; he
got wind of the hearing on that date after he left the other sala attending
to another case. He thought all along that the case was to be heard on
March 8. Another order of the same date (February 28) reset the case for
March 8, as originally scheduled.
Before the March 8 hearing, petitioner sent by registered mail on March 3
(received by the court on March 7) a motion for postponment. He did not
appear on March 8. This prompted the court to order the resetting of the
hearing to March 23; but the court also directed petitioner Baldomero S.
Luque and another attorney for defendants in "twenty-four (24) hours
upon receipt hereof, to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt."
Petitioner again decries that this order is wrong because his explanation
on in writing was already made in his motion for postponement; and that
furthermore since his motion for postponement was dated May 3, not May
7 as stated in the order, said motion was not in violation of the three-day
rule. Be that as may, the explanation in writing thereafter made by
petitioner was considered satisfactory by respondent judge.
On March 18, 1966, petitioner lodged a motion to dismiss the case upon
the ground of estoppel. Respondent judge on April 12, 1966 denied this
motion for the reason that estoppel is not one of the rounds for a motion
to dismiss under the Rules of Court.
On April 11, 1966, petitioner moved to disqualify respondent judge from
the case, alleging that:
Judge Union C. Kayanan doctored the records of this case in that he
suppressed the TRUE and GENUINE proceedings had in open Court
of February 28, 1966 (1) that the undersigned defendant moved to
dismiss this case; (2) that this case was set for hearing on March
21, 1966; and (3) that the undersigned defendant was ordered to
make his motion to dismiss in writing and to set it for hearing also
on March 21, 1966.
He also doctored the records by issuing an Order defending the
plaintiffs, and in which it is stated that it was given in open Court
although it can no longer be legally done, because after the case
was called and the parties have left, as this case was already called
and I had already left, the Court can no longer legally issue any
order in open Court.
The said doctorings of the records of this case are serious. If they
were done in the past days, then they may be done again in the
coming days, unless Judge Kayanan is disqualified to continue to
hear and to act on this case.
The Order about those TRUE and GENUINE proceedings was not
issued by Judge Kayanan. In other words, they were doctored by
suppressing them. When I was in Court on March 23, 1966, for a
hearing of this case, I looked at the records, and I found that there
was none.
But the records were again doctored, by the issuance of an UNTRUE
and an UNGENUINE Order dated February 28, 1966, copy of which I
received on March 15, 1966, in which the plaintiffs were defended
and which stated it was given in open Court, although after a case
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was already called and the parties had left, the Court can no longer
legally issue an order in open Court. In this case, on the date, this
case had already been called and I had already left after a TRUE
and GENUINE order was issued in open Court.
Why? Instead, Judge Kayanan issued the aforequoted UNTRUE and
UNGENUINE Order of February 28, 1966 in defense of the plaintiffs
and their attorney.
So it is conclusive that there are gross ERRORS in the Order of
March 8, 1966. Probably they were due either to gross
incompetence or that they were deliberately made so that there
could be a basis for requiring me to explain within 24 hours why I
should not be cited for contempt.
But considering that more anomalies followed, there is now reason
to believe that the anomalies committed are intentional.1wph1.t
The foregoing series of anomalies show the evident bias and
partiality of Judge Union C. Kayanan in favor of the plaintiffs and
against me, which will prevent him from resolving the questions in
this case with impartiality and solely on the merits.
On April 12, 1966, petitioner was again ordered by respondent judge to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt of court for "using clearly
insolent, disrespectful, and contemptuous language therein, which
insinuations or imputations are highly derogatory and served nothing but
to discredit the judge presiding this Court in an attempt to secure his
disqualification, considering that they have no basis in truth and in fact
and palpably unwarranted, in violation of the Canons of Professional
Ethics and Rule 71 of the Rules of Court." Petitioner's explanation was
filed on April 21, 1966.
On April 26, 1966, respondent judge declared the explanation to be
unsatisfactory, adjudged petitioner in direct contempt, and sentenced the
latter to pay a fine of P100 "to be remitted to the Clerk of Court not later
than May 3, 1966," the next scheduled hearing of the case, or upon
failure or refusal to pay, to five (5) days' imprisonment in the provincial
jail. A copy of this order does not appear to have been received by
petitioner before May 3, 1966.
On April 30, 1966, petitioner registered with this Court a petition for
impeachment of respondent judge. 4 On June 27, 1966, this Court
dismissed the same for lack of merit.
In the meantime, at the hearing of May 3, 1966, respondent judge asked
petitioner to withdraw his pleading moving for respondent judge's
disqualification. Petitioner refused. Thereupon, the judge asked if
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petitioner was going to pay the fine or not. Petitioner informed the court
that he had not received copy of any order sentencing him for contempt
and that he had a right to move for reconsideration after receipt of a copy
of such order. It was at this juncture that the judge verbally ordered a
guard to commit petitioner to jail (according to respondent judge, he
instructed the guard to detain petitioner merely at the Office of the
Warden). Petitioner was restrained of his liberty for two hours from 10:00
o'clock a.m. to 12:00 o'clock p.m., at which time the judge reconsidered
his verbal order of commitment and set petitioner free with the following
order: "Acting on the oral manifestation of defendant Atty. Baldomero S.
Luque to the effect that up to this date he has not received the Order of
this Court dated April 26, 1966, the Order of his Commitment to the
Provincial Jail at Lucena City is hereby held in abeyance until after said
defendant shall have received a copy thereof and given a chance to
explain why the said Order shall not be carried out."
The petition to disqualify respondent judge was denied by the latter on
the same day, May 3, 1966, as follows: "It appearing that there is neither
a legal nor moral ground to disqualify the Presiding Judge of this Court in
hearing this case, the Petition to disqualify the trial Judge by defendant
Baldomero S. Luque is hereby denied. Reset the hearing of this case on
June 7, 1966."
On July 26, 1966, following a series of pleadings, respondent judge
signed an order which in part reads:
The defendant, Atty. Baldomero Luque insists that the Presiding
Judge of this Court should not try this case for which he requests
that he be given one (1) month from today within which to file his
Petition of either Certiorari or Prohibition, so that he again requests
for postponement, which is not objected to by the other counsel, if
only to settle this issue once and for all and to afford said defendant
all conceivable remedies he may choose to take advantage of.
Unless said defendant secures a restraining order from the Supreme
Court, the trial shall proceed definitely on September 6 and 9,
1966, at 9 a.m. and the Court will not countenance any further
postponement. ... .
Petitioner next went to the Court of Appeals with a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction,5 praying, inter alia, for the
return of Civil Case 4871 to Branch I of the Quezon Court of First
Instance. On September 9, 1966, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. Petitioner's move to reconsider was thwarted by the Court of
Appeals' resolution of October 10, 1966. The Court of Appeals, through a
reasoned resolution of October 26, 1966, denied petitioner's second
motion for reconsideration.
the judge told petitioner, who was not given a chance to speak fully:
"That is enough, sit down," and strongly, banged the gavel. 11 These are
not seriously disputed.
Really, from the manner respondent judge answered the petition before
us, it would seem that he has lost his composure, has been emotionally
unstrung. He had not been sparing in his language either. The members
of this Court feel that as befits his exalted position, a District Judge is
expected to measure his words. The following from page 5 of
respondent's answer before this Court is quite revealing:
... . For the poor taste of Petitioner to deduce that we have
"doctored" the records just for a simple mistake in the date of
hearing, which is sometimes inevitable and not our own making,
is sheer deviltry and plain cussedness, 12 nay a display of little, if
not lack of, respect to the authority on the bench. ... .
Timely to be recalled here is the following from Ysasi vs. Hon. Jose F.
Fernandez, viz.: "We prefer to think that restraint still is a trait desirable
in those who dispense justice." 13
Petitioner and respondent judge are really at loggerheads with each
other; hostility runs deep. This situation is, indeed, unfortunate. But it is
in this context that we now view the position of respondent judge in this
case.
While it is true that upon the facts thus far recited, and under Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, 14respondent judge may not be legally
disqualified from hearing Civil Case 4871, still it may not be amiss to
repeat what we have said not so long ago in Pimentel vs. Salanga (1967),
21 SCRA 160, 167-168, as follows:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as
any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a
situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and
judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of
the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be
induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against
a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in
the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the
back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously
tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a
judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct
against him by a suitor or his counsel is not altogether remote. He
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vs.
Benedicto,
herein petition was lodged with this Court. Said order came about, thus:
On November 17, 1966, this Court gave due course to the present
petition, directed that cease-and-desist order issue upon a P1,000-bond.
Notice of this resolution reached petitioner only on November 22. That
same day November 22, petitioner wired respondent judge informing the
latter that the herein petition was given due course and that he would file
the necessary injunction bond the following day. That telegram reads:
"Respectfully reiterate motion hold abeyance hearing Case No. 4871,
Ilaw, et al. vs. Ona, et al. Stop Supreme Court gave due course petition
certiorari G.R. No. L-26826 Stop injunction bond filed tomorrow.
Baldomero S. Luque, Defendant." It will be recalled that respondent judge
received the telegram on November 23.
He held sessions on that day. When he received that telegram from
petitioner, caution should have suggested to respondent to first ascertain
from this Court as to whether or not the petition herein was really given
due course and injunction granted if he doubted the veracity of the
telegram. But he did not. Right away, he disbelieved petitioner.
Here is what respondent judge in part said in his order of November 23,
1966:
After hearing the views of counsel for the plaintiffs and for other
defendants as well as cross-claimant in connection with the Petition
for Certiorari filed by defendant Atty. Baldomero S. Luque before
the Supreme Court on November 14, 1966, as well as his pleading
entitled "Special Appearance to Move for Holding Hearing in
Abeyance," received on November 22, 1966, coupled with the
telegram he sent which we received only today reiterating his
motion to hold in abeyance again the hearing of this crime on the
alleged ground that the Supreme Court gave due course to the
petition without furnishing us a copy of the order, the Court is of the
considered opinion that in order to protect the interests of all
concerned who are desirous to terminate this case as soon as
practicable since it has been pending way back in April, 1948, and
to assert the dignity of the Court, we are constrained to proceed to
the trial on the merits after several postponements at the behest of
defendant Atty. Luque, evidently intended as dilatory tactics. We
share the view of all counsel that the petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court without including the Court of Appeals as corespondent is patently irregular, and we have grave doubts whether
the Supreme Court, with due respect, will give this petition due
course. At any rate, since there is no restraining order from a
higher court, as previously understood, and if only to appear
consistent to our repeated orders that we shall not countenance any
further postponement, there is no course of action left for us to take
but to proceed to trial in the exercise of our discretion. ... .
Fernando,
JJ.,
Capistrano,
concur.
ANTONIO, J.:
In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek
the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC
XIII-50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21,
1975, denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to
inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial
and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order
of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of
July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein)
from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought,
by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further
proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge
was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in
connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin
the respondent from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal
cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of
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the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General,
on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the
petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are
"persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of
respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial
were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the
circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and
counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them,
we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the
oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the
impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on
prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission of said
official "that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the
rendition of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional
evidence proferred by the accused with the right of the prosecution to
present rebuttal evidence as inay be warranted" and, therefore, they
interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal
cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the
parties shall have adduced such additional evidence as they may wish to
make, under such terms and conditions as this Honorable Court may
deem fit to impose. 2
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in
justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and
objected to the remand of this case.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to
Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor
on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant
proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any
personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear
before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position
in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the
right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a
stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present
proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of
and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private
prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its
Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor
General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be
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MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an administrative case filed by complainant-spouses Ireneo
Cabreana and Anna Rose Cabreana against Judge Celso Avelino, Presiding
Judge of Branch XI I I of the Court of First Instance of Cebu for "serious
misconduct, abuse of authority, prevarication and oppression. "
The backdrop of the case is as follows:
Complainant-spouses Ireneo Cabreana and Anna Rose Cabreana are the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-15988 before Branch XIII of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, presided by herein respondent judge, against the
defendant T & E Tumakay Enterprises, owned and operated by Teody O.
Tumakay, seeking rescission of sale, with damages against therein
defendant firm for having sold to plaintiffs therein and complainants
herein pieces of furniture which were not made in accordance with
specifications and/or defectively manufactured.
On August 4, 1977, a motion was filed by plaintiff-spouses for an ocular
inspection of the furniture sold, which was granted by respondent judge.
In the same motion, plaintiff-spouses proposed the appointment of the
Court:
It is like a scratch, not a crack. You discovered all
these scratches after two months?
Witness:
Before two months. (Tsn., August 31, 1977, pp.
3-6, Records, pp. 59-62).
It is, of course, not disputed that respondent may
make his own observations but the better
procedure for him to have followed would have
been to ask the opposing counsel who was also
present during the proceedings to make his
observations, and for respondent to reserve his
findings. But as it was, respondent directly
contradicted the witness, describing obvious
cracks as appearing in the photograph as
submitted by complainants, as simple scratches.
Concerning a certain cabinet, the following
dialogue took place.
Mrs. Cabreana:
This is straight and this one is not.
Court:
What do you mean by this is straight?
Mrs. Cabreana:
The left side is straight and the right side is not.
Court:
When we are facing it, this is the left side.
Atty. Varela, Jr.:
Facing the cabinet, the right side is straight and
the left side is not.
Court:
But the Court does not see any curve or any sign
that the left side is not straight.
Mrs. Cabreana:
This is supposed to be a sliding door. There are no
ball bearings put on the sliding doors.
Court:
Is there in the contract that there should be ball
bearings?
Mrs. Cabreana:
That was supposed to be a sliding door.
Court:
Is there in your contract between the defendant
that there should be a ball bearing?
Mrs. Cabreana:
No, it was not specified to be sliding doors
Court:
What do you call these doors now'?
Mrs. Cabreana:
Sliding doors that won't slide.
Court:
Atty. Grengia, you see if it will slide or not.
Atty. Grengia (after opening the door):
It will slide, however when we have to move the
glass it will not really slide smoothly
Court:
Let me see (after opening the doors It will slide;
the door is sliding. Maybe you want the American
Atty. Son:
We cannot agree, Your Honor.' (Tsn., Aug. 31,
1977; Record, p. 73).
Rather, during the entire ocular inspection
respondent judge participated most actively,
asking questions and Making comments and
observations. The definite impression conveyed to
the undersigned is that the behavior of
respondent judge during the proceedings is that
he was brusque and severe towards the witness,
Mrs. Cabreana. He displayed undue interference in
the conduct of the inspection or trial and showed
unwarranted intolerance and unjustified
impatience to the point of almost maliciously
distorting facts in the presence of complainants
and despite their protest. He practically charged
complainants with planting evidence in regard to
the "bokbok" all of which of course, is conduct(ed)
reprehensible of one who is supposed to be an
impartial person.
Further compounding, the situation of respondent judge is the
fact that he went to the residence of complainants when the
ocular inspection was conducted in the company of and riding
in the car of defendant Tumakay It must be said that a judge
is precisely given transportation allowance in order that he
may not compromise himself, no matter how innocently, in
hitching a ride with parties.
It is the duty of a member of the Bench to maintain at all
times the high esteem and regard to which Our courts of
justice must be entitled if the administration of justice is to
succeed. It is said that the office of a judge exists for one
solemn end - to promote justice and thus aid in securing the
contentment and happiness of the people. This primary and
principal end consequently imposes on a member of the
Bench heavy responsibilities. Certain duties are cast upon him
in respect to behavior, in relation to the State and the
citizens, the litigants, the practitioners of law, and the
witnesses, and court officials (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 1). In
fine, heavy and tremendous as are the burdens of a judicial
office, the occupant thereof must exercise extreme restraint
in such a way that his independent frame of mind would not
be compromised, and thus remaining uncompromised, evoke
respect, perhaps admiration even, from litigants. Any act
which tends to undermine the people's respect for, and
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FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated November 16, 1972, addressed to the
then Secretary of Justice, the complainant, PrimitivoSantos charged
Municipal Judge Arturo E. Cruz of the Municipal Court of Bulacan with
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge for having intervened with
and/or prevented the complainant in filing cases in the Municipal Court of
Bulacan. 1
The then Secretary of Justice referred to Municipal Judge Arturo E. Cruz
the complaint of Primitivo Santos for immediate comment. 2
In his comment dated November 22, 1972, the respondent Judge denied
the charges. 3
The complaint was referred to the Executive District Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan at Malolos for investigation, report and
recommendation. 4
In her Report dated August 23, 1973, District Judge Floreliana CastroBartolome made the following findings:
The complaint of Primitivo Santos, therefore, was the only one
that stood for hearing.
On the first paragraph of the letter-complaint, it was adduced
by the testimony of Roberto G. Garcia, a police corporal of
Bulacan, Bulacan, who brought the police blotter subpoenaed
for containing the following entry:
June 1, 1972. Sa ganap na ika-10 ng umaga ay nagsadya
sa himpilan si Gng. Leonila Rodriguez-Santos at
ipinagsumbong si Teresita Cruz sa ginawang pagmumura at
pagsasara ng daanan sa kusina ng kanilang tindahan.
Nagbigay ng kusang loob na pahayag si Leonila Santos kay.
... Walang saksi naiharap si Gng. Santos kaya pinagpayuhang
magbalik at kailangan din ang pahayag ng saksi. (two
charges: slander & closing of the "daan").
A careful review of the records of this case shows that the investigating
Judge correctly found that the complainant was not able to prove the
charges of partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.
However, the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that during the
formal investigation conducted on February 9, 1973 6 the respondent
judge, while cross-examining the witness, Alberto T. Cano, lost his temper
and said: "You can go to hell I don't care or where do you want to go Mr.
Cano". This language of the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal judge
and deserves administrative penalty.
next day he granted the motion. It should be noted that on both days the
respondent was on leave as stated in his certificate of service.
Rufino Ignacio and his co-plaintiffs questioned the legality of the
respondent's act quashing the restraining order in the Court of Appeals.
In CA-G.R. No. 09226-SP the appellate court upheld the respondent
judge; it said, among other things, the following:
The petitioners, in their memorandum filed before this Court,
maintain that the order of May 9, 1979, is null and void
because it was issued by the respondent judge at a time when
he was supposed to be on official leave of absence (Rollo, pp.
77-78). There is no showing, however, that the respondent
judge had a replacement who had taken over the performance
of his functions. Even assuming that the respondent judge
officially continued to act on the case despite his replacement,
he cannot simply be considered to be totally without proper
authority when he issued the questioned order. Thus, in an
analogous case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held
that, in even assuming the erroneous designation of a judge
to act as Justice of the Peace whereby he took cognizance of a
case, it cannot be denied that he was and have acted, at
least, as a de facto judge, and his erroneous designation did
not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the court he presided
(Bacabac vs. Delfin, 1 SCRA 1194).
We now quote the well-written report of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza of the
Court of Appeals who investigated the case:
On the basis of these facts, it is charged that the respondent
Judge manifested undue personal interest in Civil Case No.
7159-P. The evidence does not warrant a finding that the
interest shown by respondent Judge proceeded from some
corrupt motive. It is believed that at most he is guilty of
impropriety in acting on a case when he was on leave.
Indeed, the excerpt from the calendar of cases for May 1979
of Branch XXIX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, over
which the respondent Judge presides, bears opposite each
case the handwritten notations "No hearing, " "Judge on
vacation," and "No hearing, Judge on leave," except with
respect to Civil Case No. 7159-P (Rufino Ignacio v. Remedios
Tan) opposite which the notation 'hearing' appears. (Exh. 1,
Exh. 10) The excerpt was duly certified by the Branch Clerk of
Court, Basilio B. Bolante. (Transcript, pp. 39-40, Oct. 1,
1981) It thus appears that out of 71 cases calendared during
the period May 2 to May 9, 1979, only Civil Case No. 7159-P
was heard.
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PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint charging Judge Francisco A. Garrete of
the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Loreto-La Paz, Agusan del
Sur, and designated Acting Presiding Judge of the 4th MCTC, EsperanzaSan Luis-Talacogon, and of the 5th Luis-Talacogon, and of the 5th MCTC
of Bayugan-Sibagat, with grave misconduct, abuse of authority,
dishonesty and immorality.
The first three (3) complainants, namely, Glenita Legaspi, Lanie F. Pama
and Lalaine F. Pama are his Stenographic Reporters. Both Glenita and
Lanie are assigned at Loreto while Lalaine at Esperanza. The temporary
appointment of Glenita took effect on 22 July 1991 and those of the Pama
sisters Lanie and Lalaine on 15 August 1991. The fourth complainant,
Leslie Espinola, is not a court employee. She claims that she was formerly
hired by respondent judge as salesgirl in the refreshment parlor of Ms.
Elsa Pontimayor at Trento, Agusan del Sur, from 30 December 1991 to 20
July 1992. Glenita Legaspi executed her affidavit-complaint on 7 August
1992, while the Pama sisters and Leslie Espinola on 18 August 1992. 1
On 21 August 1992 respondent Judge wrote the Office of the Court
Administrator requesting that the temporary appointments of Glenita and
Lanie be immediately terminated because of inefficiency and
incompetence. 2
received their salaries even though they did not actually discharge the
functions of their office.
Such anomalous office practice was not isolated. Without prior court
approval, Lalaine who was officially assigned at Esperanza was detailed by
respondent to Loreto from May to September 1991, and at Trento in the
house of Ms. Pontimayor doing household chores from October to
November 1991.
While respondent denied this charge, his unsubstantiated disavowal
however cannot overrule the positive and detailed account of Lalaine on
her stay at Ms. Pontimayor's house. 19 Significantly, there is no evidence
to prove that Lalaine and Ms. Pontimayor knew each other before the
former's employment in the court. On the other hand, respondent himself
confirmed his close friendship with Ms. Pontimayor. Consequently, Lalaine
could not have just gone over to Trento without respondent's directive;
But more importantly, Lalaine's detail was not sanctioned by this Court.
Respondent knows without being told that his authority to detail
employees to laces other than their official station is at all times subject
to our approval.
These highly irregular and anomalous actuations of respondent plainly
contravene the mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly
Rules 3:08 and 3:09 of
Canon 3. 20 He has demonstrated that he cannot maintain professional
competence in court management, organize and supervise court
personnel for efficient dispatch of business, and observe unceasingly the
high standards of public service. Indeed, the conduct of respondent could
hardly create in his salas an atmosphere conducive to industry, dedication
and commitment to excellence. 21 We have held that a judge must be at
the forefront of all efforts to preserve and enhance the public trust
character of a public office and anyone who cannot do so should not be
allowed to stay a minute longer in any judicial seat. 22
On the charge of dishonesty, the evidence proves that respondent judge
took portions of the allowances or benefits of complaint-stenographers
Re Cost of Living Allowance (COLA)
In October 1991, the staff of the MCTC Loreto-La Pat, received their COLA
in the amount of P1,700.00 each with the exception of Glenita who claims
that at first she thought she was not entitled to the benefit as she was
relatively new in the service. Later she learned about her check from Ms.
Marilyn Cullantes, the Clerk of Court. She claims that although she
received from. respondent the supposed cash value of her check on 4
November 1991, she did not endorse her check, and that she actually
received from respondent P1,500.00.
For her part, Lalaine avers that respondent got P500.00 from her COLA on
the pretext that he would buy a cassette tape recorder for her she being
new in the Service. But respondent neither bought the adhesive recorder
for her nor returned the amount he took from her.
Respondent judge vehemently denies these charges. He asserts that
Glenita requested him to encash her COLA check because there was no
payee bank at Loreto; that she signed on 4 November 1991 an
acknowledgment receipt for her COLA; that he never had any agreement
with Lalaine to buy a cassette recorder for her; and, that subsequently,
Lalaine allowed Lanie, impliedly at least, to use the cash value of her
check for the latter's expenses in their Bohol trip.
The protestations of respondent judge, regretfully, fail to impress us. It
may be noted that all salary checks, including allowances and fringe
benefits of the MCTC personnel of Loreto-La Pat, were addressed to and
received by respondent. He distributed the checks himself. Since the
checks arrived in bunch respondent would have to distribute arrived in
bunch, respondent would have to distribute them to the personnel then
present. Yet, he offers no corroborative evidence to show that Glenita
requested his assistance for the encashment of her check.
On the other hand, Glenita's non-receipt of the COLA in October 1991 was
attested by no less than respondent's recommend, Ms. Marilyn Cullantes,
the Clerk of Court of Loreto-La Paz, who proved to be a disinterested
witness. She stated that Glenitars check arrived together with the rest but
respondent held on to it for reasons of his own; that weeks after, she
confided to respondent judge the ire of Glenita's father who intended to
report the matter to higher authorities; and that respondent later gave to
Glenita the cash value of her COLA. 23
The likelihood that respondent judge held on to Glenita's COLA longer
than necessary cannot be discounted. His proffered reason that there was
no payee bank in Loreto is weak considering that the store owned by
Henet Morente at Loreto accepts checks for encashment. In one instance,
respondent directed Concepcion and Glenita to encash the latter's check
for her fringe benefit of P2,000.00 in that store. Consequently,
respondents unexplained delay in giving the cash value of the COLA to
Glenita only intensifies the suspicion of wrongdoing. Reason dictates that
had Glenita received her check, she would have gone promptly to Rene
Morente's' store for immediate encashment rather than wait longer for
respondent's return to Loreto.
Concerning Lalaine's plaint, respondent's unsupported denial cannot stand
against the positive testimony of Milagros Patete, 24 Clerk of Court of the
MCTC of Esperanza, a witness to respondent's machinations. She testified
Respondent judge argues that the repair of the typewriter donated by the
Municipal Government to the court was urgently needed because it was
the only typewriter in the office. 25 According to him, he went twice to this
Court to request for a typewriter but none was available. Upon his
suggestion, the employees contributed P100.00 each and he shouldered
the rest of the expenses amounting to P1,200.00. 26
The allegations of respondent judge are misleading and untrue. A
certification from the Property Division, this Court, dated 9 November
1994 discloses that on 9 September 1989 a typewriter was issued to the
MCTC, Loreto-La Paz, which was received by respondent judge on the
same date. On 5 December 1991, another typewriter was sent to the
same court. In between those dates, respondent did not file any written
request for an additional typewriter with the Property Division. A written
request is required as a standard-operating procedure to serve as basis
for the Property Division to release a typewriter to the office concerned if
immediately available or as soon as the equipment would be available. No
written request appears to have been made by respondent. Instead, on
12 July 1989 respondent asked for and received on 17 July 1989 an
electric fan as evidenced by his signed receipt. Again, in March 1992 he
requested for an additional electric fan which Edgardo Cullantes received
for him on 29 January 1993. Respondent's misrepresentation certainly
placed the Court's reputation in bad light. As a lawyer and judge, his
conduct ought to be marked with candor. Hence, respondent's devious
strategy to bolster his claim at the expense of truth should be strongly
condemned.
Moreover, the reason of respondent for soliciting contributions from
Glenita and Lanie appears implausible. He knew upon receipt of the
donated typewriter that it was almost junk. 27 Instead of requesting this
Court for an additional typewriter, he resorted to soliciting contributions
purportedly to fix a typewriter that was already beyond repair. Be that as
it may, his solicitation was absolutely illegal and uncalled for, Sec, 7, par.
(d), of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees 28 implicitly prohibits public officials in the course of their
official duties from soliciting directly or indirectly anything of monetary
value from any person. Notwithstanding his alleged good intentions,
respondent's transgression cannot be countenanced. For judges must be
the first to abide with the law and weave an example for others to
follow. 29 Thus, solicitations made by judges for reasons of refurbishing
and improving the office 30 or of donating to a Judiciary Welfare
Fund 31 or to a Common Fund 32 were declared unlawful and violative not
Common Fund only of the law but also of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The erring judges were dismissed from the service with
prejudice to reinstatement in public office. Respondent's case is no
different as the law makes no distinction whether those who made the
contributions were litigants, private persons or court employees.
letter. For the same reason which prompted Glenita to yield, Lalaine could
not likewise refuse to give P500.00 to respondent through Ranulfo
Vargas.
We are not swayed by Ranulfo's claim that Lalaine was indebted to him.
For one, it lacks supportive evidence. Secondly, Ranulfo was admittedly
close to respondent, a neighbor in Bohol, who was responsible for his
appointment in the court. Such close relationship is further shown when
respondent favored Ranulfo with the privilege of being his companion in
his trips and reporting only to his official station to get his paycheck. 36
In rebuttal, Lalaine presented Clerk of Court Cullantes who was with her
and Ranulfo when the latter demanded the amount of P500.00. In a
straight-forward manner, Ms. Cullantes asserted that
Atty. Battad, counsel for respondent.
Q: You mentioned also in your affidavit, Mrs.
Witness, that Judge Garrete demanded P500.00
from Miss Lalaine Pama. Am I correct, Mrs.
Witness?
A: That is correct.
Q: And the alleged demand of P500.00 was
allegedly coursed through Ranulfo Vargas?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Am I correct to say, Mrs. Witness, that when
Judge Garrete allegedly requested or directed
Ranulfo Vargas to demand P500.00 from Lalaine
Pama you were not around if at all there was a
request?
A: I was present, sir.
Q: You mean to say that when Judge Garrete
allegedly directed Ranulfo Vargas to demand
P500.00 from Lalaine Pama, you were around?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When did Ranulfo Vargas allegedly inform you
about it that it was Judge Garrete who allegedly
MAKASIAR, J.:
These two complaints dated February 9 and 19, 1980, filed by Jose
Mangulabnan and Dolores Bolilan, respectively (pp. 1 2, AM 2112, rec.;
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pp. 1-2, AM 2123, rec.), charge Honorable Jose Tecson, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Manila, and his
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Raymundo Magno, with Non-Feasance in
violation of Section 11 (1), Article X of the Constitution in relation to
Article 27 of the New Civil Code and contrary to complainant's right as
guaranteed by Section 16, Article IV of the Constitution. The two
complainants are the complaining witnesses in Crim. Cases Nos. 22622 &
22623, both entitled "People vs. Jose Calderon & Josefa Calderon" for
estafa, which were tried and decided jointly by respondent Judge on
February 24,1978 (pp. 15-30, AM 2112 rec.).
The complainants alleged in their sworn complaints that the said criminal
cases were submitted for decision as early as August 16, 1977 (p. 1, AM
2112 rec. & p. 1, AM 2123 rec.). After that date, they had been inquiring
from respondent Clerk of Court about the decision, but they were not
answered. On January 17, 1978, they both wrote the same respondent
(p. 3, AM 2112; p. 3, AM 2123 rec.) asking whether or not a decision had
already been rendered and requesting copies of the decision, if any.
Several follow-up letters (pp. 4 & 16, AM 2123 rec.) written by
complainant Bolilan yielded no response.
It turned out that a joint decision was rendered by respondent Judge
on February 24, 1978 in the two criminal cases, but a copy thereof was
delivered to complainant Mangulabnan only on September 28, 1979, over
19 months later (pp. 30, AM 2112 rec.). The said cases were elevated to
the Court of Appeals on appeal by the accused on August 7, 1979 (p. 18,
AM 2123 rec.).
The respondent Judge gave his written explanations in his letters dated
March 5 and 14, 1979 (pp. 4-5, AM 2112 rec.; pp. 6-7, AM 2123 rec.),
pursuant to the Ist Indorsements of Deputy Court Administrator Arturo
Buena dated February 20 and March 9, 1979. In his comments,
respondent Judge confirmed that the above- mentioned criminal cases
were disposed of on February 24, 1978. However, due to the honest
mistake and excusable neglect of one of their filing clerks who had since
resigned, the records of the said cases were inadvertently included among
the finished cases kept in a separate cabinet. He overlooked the said
cases in his efforts to duplicate his past records as one of the judges with
the most number of disposed cases per year. He also vouched for the
integrity and honesty of his clerk of court.
This Court's First Division, in its resolution of July 25, 1980 (p. 8, AM
2112), referred these cases to Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. After
hearing, the said Justice submitted his report dated September 17, 1980
(pp. 73-86, AM 2112 rec.), recommending that both respondents be
exonerated from the charges but they should be admonished to be more
meticulous in seeing to it that submitted cases are decided with dispatch
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and within the period ordained by the Constitution, with a warning that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with drastically (p. 86, AM 2112 rec.).
It appears that the decision (joint) in the subject criminal cases was
rendered on February 24, 1978, or six (6) months and eight (8) days
from submission on August 16, 1977. The several letters written by the
complainants inquiring about the cases and requesting copies of the
decision were received by respondent clerk of court but not answered. It
was only their letter written in late September, 1979, which were
answered with the information that the cases had been elevated to the
Court of Appeals on August 7, 1979. A copy of the decision was furnished
complainant Mangulabnan on September 28, 1979, more than one year
and seven months after rendition of the decision. The records do not show
when the decision was actually promulgated.
During the investigation, both respondents denied malice or bad faith as a
cause for the delay. In his testimony, respondent Judge attributed such
delay to unavoidable circumstances, such as misfiling by their filing clerk,
a certain Ricardo Norberte, now resigned (t.s.n., pp. 86-87), and the
cramped space they temporarily occupied in 1978 (t.s.n., p. 89). He
explained, however, that when the letter of complainant Mangulabnan
dated January 17, 1978 was brought to his attention, he ordered his clerk
of court to locate the records, then he immediately prepared the decision
on February 24, 1978 (t.s.n., pp. 86-87). He also admitted that
complainant Bolilan visited him in his office sometime in July 1978,
inquiring about the decision; however, he inadvertently thought she was
referring to another case so he told her that it was still under
consideration (t.s.n., p. 88).
Respondent Mago justified the delay in furnishing a copy of the decision
to the complainants by stating that it is only the defense counsel, private
prosecutor and fiscal who are furnished copies of the decision. Partieslitigants are given only upon request, without discrimination (t.s.n., pp.
62-63). He denied ever ignoring the complainants. He also cited his
achievements as a branch clerk of court as well as those of respondent
Judge, being among the topnotchers for several years in number of yearly
dispositions of cases (t.s.n., pp. 60 & 67).
In spite of all the glowing achievements cited by the respondents, it is
obvious that they had been remiss in the performance of their official
duties. This should not be countenanced, as it negates the principle of
speedy dispensation of justice as ordained by the Constitution.
The respondent Judge, who is so interested in maintaining his record as
among the topnotchers in the number of yearly disposition, should
exercise more diligence and more vigilance in attending to cases
submitted for decision. It would be wen for him to institute some form of
control not only over court records but also among his personnel, and not
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