Petitioners: JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C.

IMBONG, for themselves and in

behalf of their minor children, et al.
Respondents: HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, et al.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
FACTS:
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the ground that the RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives.
For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their
beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. It is also argued that
the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion
and the right to free speech.
Issue:
Whether or not the RH Law violates Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
Held:
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the
use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to
one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is
an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against
his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with
their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck
down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)
(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding
programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

Complainant: OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT

ADMINISTRATOR
Respondent: JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna,
Surigao del Norte,
Poente: BRION, J.
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed the present administrative case against
Judge Ignacio B. Macarine (respondent) for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign travels of judges and court personnel, regardless of
the number of days, must be with prior permission from the Court. Judges and personnel who
shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the OCA shall be subject to disciplinary
action.
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate
Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family for the
period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent
stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not
submit the corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete
requirements, his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. The respondent
proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA.
On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the OCA that his leave of absence
for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered
unauthorized by the Court.
In an Evaluation Report dated September 6, 2010, the OCA found the respondent guilty
of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003 for traveling out of the country without filing the
necessary application for leave and without first securing a travel authority from the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OCA Circular No. 49-2003 restricts freedom of movement
HELD:
True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution.1wphi1 However, the exercise
of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on
ones right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public

safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be
construed as limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be
complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To
"restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or
direct according to rule.
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of
justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit,
together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his
Executive Judge.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte, is hereby given the ADMONITION that he acted irresponsibly
when he opted not to immediately secure a travel authority and is saved only from the full force
that his violation carries by the attendant mitigating circumstances. He is also WARNED that the
commission of a similar violation in the future will merit a more severe penalty. The
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administration that his absences, which were
unauthorized, shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary is hereby
APPROVED.

MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [247 SCRA 127; G.R. NO. 115132-34; 9 AUG 1995]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel
abroad for medical treatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she
filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by
practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening
medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she
again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis
and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her
doctor Roberto Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of
several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all
of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to
travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or

orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel
Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party
asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there
was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the
latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent
court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her
physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in
resolving her request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if
respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in
deciding a case against them.
In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad.
It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in
several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was
on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek
medical treatment in foreign countries.
On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states
that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise
and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments
of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for
leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an

event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical
specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-691 September 10, 1993
SULU ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF MASJID LAMBAYONG, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE NABDAR J. MALIK, Municipal Trial Court, Jolo, Sulu, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
On June 5, 1992, Imam Hashim Abdulla, Imam Hadji Tambing, Hatib Illih Musa, an officers and
members of the Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong, filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Nabdar J. Malik, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Jolo,
Sulu, charging him with violation of R.A. 2260 (An Act to Amend and Revise the Laws Relative
to Philippine Civil Service) and serious misconduct committed as follows:
1. Nepotism by recommending the appointment of Omar Kalim, his nephew, and Hanina
Kalim, his niece-in-law, as process server and clerk, respectively;
2. Graft and Corruption by using Omar Kalim to extort money from court litigants, e.g.:
a. P13,000.00 in exchange for the freedom of Datu Tating Erwin, who had been charged an
accessory in a robbery case;
b. demanding P10,000.00 thru a certain P/Sgt. Duran Abam Tating, Erwin's brother-in-law; and
c. blackmailing litigants;
3. Immorality engaging in an adulterous relationship with another woman with whom he has
three children.
In his letter/comment dated October 19, 1992, Judge Malik alleged that the complainants are
fictitious persons and that the charges against him are false and fabricated. He asked that the
complaint be dismissed.

The Supreme Court referred the case to Judge Harun Ismael of the Regional Trial Court of Jolo,
Sulu, for investigation report and recommendation.
On April 7, 1993, Judge Malik addressed a letter to Judge Ismael, enclosing affidavits of four
witnesses, namely : (1) Imam Hashim Abdulla; (2) Mrs. Jamura Tambing; (3) Mr. Mirad
Tambing; and (4) Marina Balais Malik.
He alleged that Datu Tating Erwin is the nephew of Kaya B. Sarabi who had previously filed
"many fabricated charges" (p. 235, Rollo) against him which had been dismissed by the Supreme
Court. He implied that Erwin was being used by Sarabi, and that the affidavit was false.
Imam Hashim Abdulla, one of the "complainants," denied any knowledge of, or participation in,
the filing of the complaint against Judge Malik. He disowned his supposed signature in the
complaint as a forgery. He alleged that Judge Malik is his neighbor and he knows him to be
"honest and righteous" (p. 238, Rollo).
Illih Musad, another "complainant," died on February 24, 1991 yet. His widow, Jamura Musad,
executed an affidavit certifying that she knows Judge Malik personally because he has been her
neighbor for many years. It was physically impossible for her late husband to have signed the
complaint dated June 5, 1992 against Judge Malik because her husband died more than a year
before the signing of the complaint.
The signature of another complainant, Imam Hadji Tambing Arong, was impugned by his son,
Mirad Tambing. He said his father could not have signed the complaint because he had been sick
and bedridden for five years before his death. In fact, he died on August 15, 1992.
Marina Balais Malik, wife of respondent Judge N. Malik, disowned her supposed affidavit which
she supposedly signed before Notary Public Attorney Rodrigo Martinez in Zamboanga City, in
February 1991 (p. 250, Rollo).
She, however, denied having appeared before the Notary Public to subscribe said affidavit which
attacks the "honor and integrity of her beloved husband" (p. 251, Rollo).
After conducting an investigation of the charges, Judge Ismael on May 25, 1993, submitted a
Report to the court. Of the three (3) charges against Judge Malik, only the charge or nepotism
holds.
On the charge or graft and corruption, Judge Ismael observed that:
. . . practically all of those who testified denied any knowledge of any particular instance that
Judge Malik extorted or received bribe money from litigants having pending cases before his

sala. Mrs. Beatriz Abbas, Clerk of Court II of Municipal Trial Court of Jolo, Sulu presided by
Judge Malik, testified that the people praised highly Judge Malik because of his honesty. She
attests to this because she was, at one time told by Judge Malik to return to litigants something
which litigants wanted to give to Judge Malik. However, one of those who testified confided, but
refused to be quoted in his testimony for fear of reprisal, suggested that in order for the Court to
be spared of any ill suspicion, Omar Kalim should be transferred to another Municipal Circuit
Trial Court branch where Judge Malik has no supervision. Accordingly, it's just not nice and
good looking to have Omar Kalim where he is now. This information is worth considering. The
only obstacle is Judge Malik is Acting Judge in all Municipal Circuit Trial Court branches except
Siasi, Sulu. However, no hard evidence was adduced linking Judge Malik to graft and
corruption as alleged in the complaint. (p. 51, Rollo.)
With regard to the charge of adultery or immorality, the investigating Judge observed that under
Muslim Law the marriage of a Tausug (the tribal group to which Judge Malik belongs) to as
many as four (4) wives in sanctioned provided the man can support them and does not neglect
any or them. Judge Ismael's report states:
As regards the claim that Judge Malik has two (2) wives, all those who testified at the
investigations confirmed the same. Mrs. Marina Balais-Malik, the first wife, admitted that Judge
Malik has a second wife (Lourdes) but she does not mind them since she and her children are
financially taken cared of all their eight children are going to school and three (3) have
reached college level. Moreover, under the Muslim Shari'a (Law) marrying more than one wife is
allowed provided the man can afford financially and can give equity and justice to the wives.
Mrs. Marina Balais Malik claims that Judge Malik is financially capable.
The Holy Qur'an (the Muslim Holy Scripture) provides in Surah 4:3 (Chapter 4, verse 3) thus:
3. And if ye fear that ye shall not.
Be able to deal justly
With the orphans,
Marry women of your choice
Two, or three, or four;
But if, ye fear that ye shall not
Be able to deal justly (with them)
The only one, or

That which your right hand possess

That will be more suitable,
To prevent you
From doing injustice.
Strictly, Islam enjoins only monogamous marriage. While Islam allows marrying more than one
wife, it however sets limitation, i.e., not more than four at a time and the man be financially
capable in order for him to provide equity and justice to the wives. Theme revelations came to
the Prophet Muhammad after the Battle of Uhud whereby many Mujahideens died thus leaving
more widows and orphans. This particular revelation serve, as it was then, as a remedy to the
impending situation of the widows and orphans left unattended. By allowing the mujahideens to
take them in marriage helped prevent them from engaging in illicit marital relations like
fornication. Marrying more than one wife does not per se create any stint (sic) of social
immorality, since this marriage, like any other ordinary marriages, is made public and are (sic)
accepted by the people in the community. Any issue out of this marriage is legitimate before the
eyes of the Almighty Lord and the people.
True, Islam sanctions such marriage but very few Muslim males practice it. Worst yet today,
however, this permissible marriage is used as a means of building social standing in the
community. As a judge, there is no doubt that Judge Malik has acquired higher respect and social
standing in the community, and is deemed financially capable. Hence, he can marry more than
one wife in accordance with the Muslim Shari'a. (pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
Mrs. Marina Malik consented to her husband's wish to contract, a second marriage because he
does not neglect to support her children. Three of them are in college. She has no ill-feelings
against Malik's second wife, who married her husband under Muslim law. Since Art. 180 of P.D.
No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal laws of the Philippines, provides
that the penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy "shall not apply to a person married . . . under
Muslim Law," it is not "immoral" by Muslim standards for Judge Malik to marry a second time
while his first marriage exists.
The charge of nepotism, however, is a different matter.
Judge Nabdar Malik was appointed and confirmed as Judge of Municipal Court of Jolo on May
29, 1972. He assumed office on May 29, 1972. 1 On June 16, 1978, he recommended the
appointment of his nephew, Omar Kalim, the son of his older sister, Nuridjan Ambutong, to the

position of Janitor of his court. He falsely certified that Kalim was not related to him by affinity
or consanguinity within the third degree:
This is to certify that Mr. Omar Kalim, a proposed appointee for the position of Janitor in the
Municipal Court of Jolo, Branch 1, is not related to the undersigned within the third
degree either by affinity or consanguinity.
xxx xxx xxx
NABDAR J. MALIK
Municipal Judge
(Certification dated June 16, 1978, 201 File.)
The truth is that, being his sister's son, Kalim is related to Judge Malik by consanguinity within
the third degree.
Later, Omar Kalim was promoted an MTC Aide and still later, in 1985, he became a Process
Server. 2 In support of Kalim's promotion, Judge Malik again issued a false certification that
Kalim in not related to him by affinity or consanguinity.
This is to certify that MR. OMAR N. KALIM, a proposed appointee for the position of MTC
PROCESS SERVER in the Office of the Municipal Trial Court of Jolo, is not related to the
undersigned appointed official either by affinity or consanguinity. (Certification dated January 2,
1985, 201 File.)
Similarly, Kalim falsely denied his relationship to Judge Malik in answer to question No. 23 in
his Personal Data Sheet.
Are you related within the third degree of consanguinity or of affinity to the appointing or
recommending authority, or to the chief of bureau or office, or to the person who has immediate
supervision over you in the Office, Bureau or Ministry you are to be appointed?
His answer was "No".
The prohibition against nepotism in the government service is found in Section 59, Chapter 7,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over
him, are hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.
The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a member of
any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts
marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention
therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous appointments which
are in contravention hereof shall be corrected by transfer, and pending such transfer, no
promotion or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who were
appointed in violation of these provisions.
In the case of Layno vs. People (213 SCRA 686, 696-697), the incumbent Mayor, of Lianga,
Surigao, appointed his legitimate son as Meat Inspector, but certified that the appointee was not a
relative by consanguinity or affinity. He was prosecuted criminally and punished for falsification
of public document (Art. 171, par. 4 or the RPC).
One of the legal issues raised was whether the appointing authority is obliged to disclose his true
relationship to the appointee., That question was answered by this Court in the affirmative:
The law on nepotism, as provided in Section 49(a) or PD No. 807, prohibits the appointing or
recommending authority from making any appointment in the national, provincial, city or
municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, in favor of his (appointing or recommending authority's) relative
within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity. Thus, in order to guarantee that the law is
duly observed, it is required, among others, that the appointment paper should be accompanied
by a certification of the appointing or recommending authority stating therein that he is not
related to the appointee within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity. Although Section
49(a) or PD No. 807 does not explicitly provide that the appointing or, recommending authority
shall, disclose his true relationship with the appointee in the form or a certification, nonetheless,
in the light of the rulings in the aforecited cases, the legal obligation or the appointing or

recommending authority to state the true facts required to be stated in the certification is inherent
in the law on prohibition against nepotism and the nature and purpose of such certification.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum
The general purpose of P.D. No. 807 is to "insure and promote the constitutional mandate that
appointments in the Civil Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to provide
within the public service a progressive system of personnel administration, and to adopt
measures to promote moral and the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency,
and professionalism in the Civil Service." (Section 2, PD No. 807.)
The civil service laws are designed to eradicate the system of appointment to public office base
on political considerations and to eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship and
personal favoritism in making appointments. These laws intend to establish a merit system of
fitness and efficiency as the basis of the appointment; to secure more competent employees, and
thereby promote better government. (Meran vs. Edralin, 154 SCRA 238 [1987])..
Indeed, there are many cases wherein local elective officials, upon assumption to office, wield
their new-found power by appointing their own protegees, and even relatives, in violation of civil
service laws and regulations. Victory, at the polls should not be taken as authority for the
commission of such illegal acts. (Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 78053, June 4, 1990, citing
Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, 26 SCRA 1 [1968]).
By making untruthful statements and certifications regarding their relationship to each other,
Judge Malik and his nephew, Omar Kalim, committed the crime of falsification under Article
171, subparagraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Nepotism is a ground for disciplinary action under Section 46, subpar. 30, Chapter 5, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be suspended or dismissed except for cause an provided by law and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
(30) Nepotism as defined in Section 59 of this Title.
Section 67 (Penal Provision) of the Administrative Code provides the following penalty therefor:

Sec. 67. Penal Provision. Whoever makes any appointment or employs any person in
violation of any provision of this Title or the rules made thereunder or whoever commits
fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service
matters, or whoever violates, refuses or neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules,
shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion
of the court. (Executive Order 292, Emphasis ours.)
Disclosure of one's relatives in the Government is required of every public official or employee:
Sec. 8. . . .
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. It shall be the duty of every public official or
employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in
the Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil service Commission.
(Sec. 8 (B), Rep. Act 6713 [Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees].)
Judge Malik did not merely fail to disclose his relationship to Omar Kalim, but he falsely
certified that he was not related to the latter.
Kalim, likewise, falsely denied his relationship to Judge Malik. Their acts violated the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and are punishable under
Section 11 of the Code, with removal from office.
Sec. 11. Penalties. (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds
office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity,
committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent
of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the
gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the
violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the
latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or both,
and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause
for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, classifies nepotism as a grave offense punishable with
dismissal from the service, even as a first offense.
Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less
grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said acts on the government
service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties:
xxx xxx xxx
(m) Nepotism [1st Offense, Dismissal]
Moreover, by committing nepotism and covering up his malfeasance by falsely disavowing any
relationship to the appointee, Judge Malik is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
falsification and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that "a judge shall not
allow family, social, or other relationship to influence his judicial conduct or judgment" (Canon
2, Rule 2.03) and enjoins a judge to "be faithful to the law" (Canon 3, Rule 3.01). Violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious offenses punishable by any of the following sanctions
under Section 10-A, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended:
1. Dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits (except accrued leaves) and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a governmentowned or controlled corporation;
2. Suspension for three (3) to six (6) months without salary and benefits; or
3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00.
With respect to Judge Malik's niece-in-law, Hanina M. Hailidani Kalim, her appointment did not
violate the law against nepotism.
Hanina began her service in the judiciary on August 6, 1973. She was then known as "Mrs.
Hanina M. Hailidani-Ainin," for she was married to Hadji Abubakar Ainin, clerk of the
Municipal Court, Branch 1. Omar Kalim entered the service in 1978 or five years after Hanina.
She was already a widow when she and Kalim met and married in a ceremony performed by
Judge N. Malik on July 24, 1982. Evidently, when Hanina was appointed as a member of Judge
Malik's staff in 1973, she was not yet related to him by affinity or consanguinity. Her marriage to
Omar Kalim after both had entered the government service is expressly excluded from the
prohibition against nepotism. Section 59 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that:

Sec. 59. . . .
(2) . . . "The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a
member of a family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau,
contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or
retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Nabdar J. Malik GUILTY of nepotism, falsification and
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His Process Server and nephew, Omar Kalim, is
likewise found GUILTY of falsification and deceit. The Court hereby orders their DISMISSAL
from the service, with prejudice to re-employment in the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges (if
any), except the money value of their earned leave credits. Respondent Judge is ORDERED to
cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or decision, or continuing any
proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective immediately upon receipt of a copy of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J. and Feliciano, J., are on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Certification of the Commission on Appointments dated April 13, 1972; Service Record in the
Judiciary. Telegram sent by Judge Malik to the Secretary of Justice, Personal Files.
2 Service Record dated July 13, 1987, Certified correct by Nabdar Malik.

Lad lad vs comelec

facts
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme
Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.

Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the
conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to
Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on
the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.