Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

maladministration in office. for minor delinquency he may reprimand the

offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, and he
may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the
official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected,
the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten
days.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16887

November 17, 1920

MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, petitioner,

vs.
ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and the PROVINCIAL BOARD
OF RIZAL, composed of ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGSALIN and CATALINO
S. CRUZ, respondents.

Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges are

preferred by a provincial governor against a municipal officer, the provincial
board shall, at its next meeting, regular or special, furnish a copy of said
charges to the accused official, with a notification of the time and place of
hearing thereon; and at the time and place appointed, the board shall
proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity of said charges, giving the
accused official full opportunity to be heard. The hearing shall occur as soon
as may be practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not later
than fifteen days from the date the accused is furnished a copy of the
charges, unless the suspended official shall, on sufficient grounds, request
an extension of time to prepare his defense.

Gregorio Perfecto for petitioner.

MALCOLM, J.:

Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial

board shall adjudge that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings
shall be dismissed; if it shall adjudge that the accused has been guilty of
misconduct which would be sufficiently punished by reprimand, or further
reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver such reprimand in
pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if previously
suspended, shall be reinstated.

The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks
by these proceedings inmandamus to have the provincial governor and the provincial
board of the Province of Rizal temporarily restrained from going ahead with
investigation of the charges filed against him pending resolution of the case, and to
have an order issue directed to the provincial governor commanding him to return the
petitioner to his position as municipal president of Pasay. The members of the
provincial board have interposed a demurrer based on the ground that this court has
no right to keep them from complying with the provisions of the law. The provincial
governor has filed an answer to the petition, in which he alleges as a special defense
that numerous complaints have been received by him against the conduct of Miguel
R. Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay; that these complaints were investigated by
him; that he came to the conclusion that agreeable to the powers conferred upon
provincial governors, the municipal president should be temporarily suspended, and
that an investigation is now being conducted by the provincial board.

If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe
discipline, it shall without unnecessary delay forward to the Chief of the
Executive Bureau certified copies of the record in the case, including the
charges, the evidence, and the findings of the board, to which shall be
added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought to
be suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and in
such case the board may exercise its discretion to reinstate the official, if
already suspended, or to suspend him or continue his suspension pending
final action.

Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much eloquence, that his client has been
deprived of an office, to which he was elected by popular vote, without having an
opportunity to be heard in his own defense. The respondents reply that all that the
provincial governor and the provincial board have done in this case is to comply with
the requirements of the law which they are sworn to enforce. Obviously, therefore, we
should first have before us the applicable provisions of the Philippine law bearing on
the subject of suspension of public officers.

The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident

thereto shall be given preference over the current and routine business of
the board.
Action by Chief of Executive Bureau. Upon receiving the papers in any
such proceeding the Chief of the Executive Bureau shall review the case
without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the reinstatement,
dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts shall
warrant. Disciplinary suspension made upon order of the chief of the
Executive Bureau shall be without pay and in duration shall not exceed two

Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal officers," Article IV of Chapter
57 of the Administrative Code, provides:
The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of

months. No final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended

by the Department Head and approved by the Governor-General.

Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco [1910], 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell {1914], 27 Phil., 354;
U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31 Phil., 218 and other Philippine cases). In certain
proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear
of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process
of law. Examples of special or summary proceedings affecting the life, liberty or
property of the individual without any hearing can easily be recalled. Among these are
the arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of property in tax
cases; the granting of preliminary injunction ex parte; and the suspension of officers
or employees by the Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau pending an
investigation. (See Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12 C.J., 1224; Administrative Code,
sec. 694.)

With the foregoing legal provisions in mind, certain aspects of the case can be
disposed of without difficulty. Thus it cannot be seriously contended that the courts
should interfere with an orderly investigation which is about to be conducted by the
provincial board. Nor can there be any doubt as to the meaning of the law. A very
minute and extensive procedure is provided by the Legislature for central and
provincial supervision of municipal officers. The provincial governor, in receiving and
investigating complaints against such officers, may take three courses. For a minor
delinquency he may reprimand the offender; but if the maladministration in office is
more serious he may temporarily suspend the officer, and thereafter may file written
charges against the officer with the provincial board. The procedure followed before
the provincial board and later on appeal to the Chief of the Executive Bureau, while
interesting, does not concern us. The important fact is that the law, in permitting a
provincial governor temporarily to suspend a municipal officer, makes no mention of a
formal hearing of the charges.

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United
States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due proces of law, but is a public trust or agency. In the case of
Taylorvs. Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said that:
"Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies or trust,
and not property as such." The basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as
in the United States, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being
mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people
whom he represents.

In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the provincial governor, all that he can do
before the presentation of formal charges is either to reprimand the officer or to
suspend him temporarily from office. In the latter case the provincial governor's action
is not a finality. The law is especially careful to guard the rights of officer charged with
maladministration in office. But the point is made that, notwithstanding the provisions
of the law and notwithstanding long official practice, the temporary suspension of a
municipal officer, without an opportunity to be heared in his own defense, is in
contravention of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights concerning due process
of law.

Coming now to the more specific consideration of the issue in this case, we turn to
the article by Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, generally considered the leading authority in
the United States on the subject of Administration Law, in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law
and Procedure, and find the rules as to suspension of public officers laid down very
concisely as follows: "Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to the
person suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by Professor Goodnow to support his
conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. Attorney-General vs.Johnson ([1892], 30 Fla.,
433; 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here held by the Supreme Court of Florida that the
governor could, under section 15 of the executive article of the Constitution, suspend
an officer for neglect of duty in office without giving previous notice to the officer of the
charge made against him.

So much has been written on the subject of due process of law that is would be futile
to enter into its intricate mazes. It is self-evident, however, that, in ordinary cases, to
condemn without a hearing violates the due process of law clause of the American
Constitution and of the Philippine Bill of Rights. It is for this reason that we can well
understand the logic of those who cling to this through and to whom a contemplated
violation of the Constitution is most repugnant. It is but fair, in ordinary cases, that a
public official should not be removed or suspended without notice, charges, a trial,
and an opportunity for explanation. But not permitting our judgment to be unduly
swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight, and recalling again that the
courts have ordinarily to give effect to legislative purposes, it is further only fair to
mention certain exceptions to the due process of law rule, which would seem to
include the instant case.

A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be found in 22 Ruling Case Law,

pp. 564, 565. On the subject of suspension of public officers it is heared said:
The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his
hands for the time being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and often
necessary. . . . Notice and hearing are not prerequisite to suspension unless
required by statute and therefore suspension without such notice does not
deprive the officer of property without due process of law. Nor is a
suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal protection
of the laws because the evidence against the officer is not produced and he
is not given an opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the
witnesses.lawph!l.net

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative
proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American
writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily
judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried
on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is
as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they
rest upon different principles. (Weimer vs. bunbury [1874], 30 Mich., 201;
Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856], 18 How., 272 followed in

The case to support the first sentence in the above enunciation of the rule is
State vs. Megaarden (85 Minn., 41), which in turn is predicated on State vs. Peterson
([1892], 50 Minn., 239). In a discussion of the subject more general than specific, it
was said:

The highest court of the State has held that this statue was not a violation of
the constitution of the State; that the hearing before the Governor was
sufficient; that the office was substantially an administrative one, although
the commission was designed by a statute subsequent to that which created
it, a court of record; that the officer taking office under the statute was bound
to take it on the terms provided for therein; that he was lawfully suspended
from office; and that he was not entitled to a trial by jury upon the hearing of
this case in the trial court. As a result the court held that the defendant had
not been deprived of his property without due process of law, nor had he
been denied the equal protection of the laws.

The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively requires the
suspension, pending his trial, of a public officer, especially a custodian of
public funds, charged with malfeasance or nonfeasance in office.
Suspension does not remove the officer, but merely prevents him, for the
time being, from performing the functions of his office; and from the very
necessities of the case must precede a trial or hearing. Such temporary
suspension without previous hearing is fully in accordance with the
analogies of the law. It is a constitutional principle that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty or property except by due process of law, which
includes notice and a hearing, yet it was never claimed that in criminal
procedure a person could not be arrested and deprived of his liberty until a
trial could reasonably be had, or that in civil actions ex parte and temporary
injunctions might not be issued and retained in proper case, until a trial could
be had, and the rights of the parties determined. We have no doubt,
therefore, of the authority of the legislature to vest the governor with power
to temporarily suspend a county treasurer pending the investigation of the
charges against him, of official misconduct.

xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right
guaranteed to him by the Federal Constitution, by reason of the proceedings
before the Governor under the statute above mentioned, and resulting in his
suspension from office.
The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the
State. It was taken under a valid statute creating a state office in a
constitutional manner, as the state court has held. What kind and how much
of a hearing the officer should have before suspension by the Governor was
a matter for the state legislature to determine, having regard to the
constitution of the State. (There can also be cited as supporting authority
State ex rel. Wendling vs. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners [1915],
159 Wis., 295; Sumpter vs. State {1906], 81 Ark., 60; Gray vs. McLendon
[1901], 134 Ga., 224; State vs. Police Commissioners, 16 Mo. App., 947;
Preston vs. City of Chicago [1910], 246 III., 26; and People vs. Draper
[1910], 124 N.Y.S., 758, where it was held that the legislature has the right to
authorize an officer to remove an appointive or elective officer without notice
or hearing.)

The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as authority for their second
sentence is that of Griner vs.Thomas ([1907], 101 Texas, 36; 16 Ann. Cas., 944). The
holding of the court here was that it is within the power of the legislature to authorize
the temporary suspension of a public officer during the pendency of valid proceedings
to remove such officer and as an incident to such proceedings, notwithstanding the
fact that the constitution has given power to remove such officer only for cause and
after a hearing. Notice and hearing are not preprequisites to the suspension of a
public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing.
The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from the United States Supreme
Court. (Wilson vs. North Carolina [1897], 169 U.S, 586.) An examination of the
decision, however, shows that while it tends to substantiate the rule, the facts are not
exactly on all fours with those before us. Without, therefore, stopping to set forth the
facts, only the following from the body of the decisioned be noted, viz.:

Certain intimations have been made that under the procedure prescribed by the law
an injustice might be done municipal officers. Such suppositions are not unusual even
as to cases before the courts, but in this as in all other instances, the presumption
always is that the law will be followed and that the investigation and the hearing will
be impartial. In the language of Justice Trent in Severino vs. Governor-General
([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the presumption is just as conclusive in favor of
executive action, as to its correctness and justness, as it is in favor of judicial action."
We entertain no doubt that the provincial governor, fully conscious of the trust
reposed in him by the law, will act only in cases where strong reasons exist for
exercising the power of suspension and upon a high consideration of his duty.

In speaking of the statute and the purpose of this particular provision the
Supreme Court of the State said: "The duty of suspension was imposed
upon the Governor from the highest motives of public policy to prevent the
danger to the public interests which might arise from leaving such great
powers and responsibilities in the hands of men legally disqualified. To leave
them in full charge of their office until the next biennial session of the
legislature, or pending litigation which might be continued for year, would
destroy the very object of the law. As the Governor was, therefore, by the
very and spirit of the law, required to act and act promptly, necessarily upon
his own findings of fact, we are compelled to hold that such official action
was, under the circumstances, due process of law. Even if it were proper, the
Governor would have no power to direct an issue like a chancellor."

The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might unduly delay the hearing is also
without much force. The same might be said of any administrative officer, or in fact of
any judicial officer. The presumption, again, is that every officer will do his duty
promptly, and if he does not, certainly a remedy can be found to make him do so. Not
only this, but the law before us expedites the proceedings by fixing a short period of
ten days within which the provincial governor must lay the charges before the
provincial board, which must be heard by the latter body within fifteen days. Of more

compelling force is the suggestion from the other side that the public interest might
suffer detriment by postponing the temporary suspension until after the hearing.

Section 3 (first paragraph) of the Jones Law provides "that no law shall be enacted in
said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law."

Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the provisions of section 2188
of the Administrative Code are clear and that they do not offend the due process of
law clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the law
without fear or favor.

Section 2188 of Act No. 2711 provides:

SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal
officers. The provincial governor shall receive the investigate complaints
against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other
form of maladministration in office. For minor delinquency he may reprimand
the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he
shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the
official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected,
the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten
days.

Petition denied with costs. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

It will be noted that while section 2188 provides for a suspension, it makes no
provision for the procedure in such cases. In the absence of a procedure prescribed
by the statute, we are of the opinion that the procedure marked by the Constitution
(Jones Law) must be followed, to wit: That no person shall be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. "Due process of law" has been defined
many, many times, and simply means that before a man can be deprived of his life,
liberty or property, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

The right to hold, occupy and exercise an office is as much as species of property
within the protection of the law, as any other thing capable of possession; and, to
wrongfully deprive one of it or unjustly withhold it, is an injury which the law can
redress in as ample a manner as any other wrong. And that right is regarded as a
right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which says: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall nay
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
(Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714; Dent vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S., 114, 124;
Huling vs. Kaw, etc. Ry. Co., 130 U.S., 559; Scott vs. Neal, 154 U.S., 34; New
Orleans Waterworks vs. New Orleans, 164 U.S., 471; Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.
S., 78, 110; Haddock vs. Haddock, 201 U.S., 562, 567, Michigan Trust Co. vs. Ferry,
175 fed., 667; Bunton vs. Lyford, 37 N.H., 512 [75 Am. Dec., 144]; Foster vs. Kansas,
112 U.S., 201.)

This is an original action for the writ of mandamus to require the respondents to
reinstate the petitioner to his office as president of the municipality of Pasay, Province
of Rizal.
The facts upon which the petition is based are not in dispute. They are not only
admitted by the demurrer of the respondent Andres Gabriel buy were expressly
admitted by him in open court. They are:
(1) That the petitioner was duly elected by the people of the municipality of Pasay as
president for the period of three years from the 16th day of October, 1919;
(2) That the petitioner was suspended from said office on the 13th day of September,
1920, by the respondent Andres Gabriel, without notice, without a hearing, and
without an opportunity to present any proof whatsoever in his defense.

The power to remove an officer who has been duly elected for a specified period can
be exercised only, and for just cause, after the officer has had an opportunity for
defense.

The facts having been admitted, we have only a question of law to decide, to wit: Is
the governor of a province authorized under the law to suspend a municipal president
from his office, to which he has been legally elected for a period fixed by the law,
without notice, without a hearing and without an opportunity to present proof in his
defense?

In the absence of express power, given in express words, the presumption must be,
in view of the provisions of the Jones Law above quoted, that the legislature intended
that every officer duly elected for a fixed period should be entitled to hold his office
until the expiration of such period, unless removed therefrom for cause, after a fair
and impartial investigation in which he has been given an opportunity to defend

himself. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corporations, sec. 250; Fields vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa.,
478; Stadler vs. Detroit, 13 Mich., 346; State vs. Bryce, 7 Ohio St., 2; Bagg's Case, 11
Coke, 93; Hobokan vs. Gear, 27 H.J.L., 265; Dullan vs. Wilson, 53 Mich., 392;
People vs. Therrien, 80 Mich., 187; Robbinson vs. Miner, 68 Mich., 549.)

The constitution and laws of the Philippine Islands having created the office of
president of the different municipalities and having fixed definitely the tenure of said
office, the legislature, by virtue of the provisions of the Jones Law, is prohibited from
enacting any law which would justify any individual in the state in removing him from
office without first presenting charges against him and giving him an opportunity to be
heard. (Removal of Public Officer, 25 Am. Law Rev., 201; State vs. Commonwealth, 3
Metcalf [Ky.], 237; Page vs. Hardin [supra]; Brown vs.Grover, 6 Bush [Ky.], 1;
Commonwealth vs. Gamble, 62 Pa., 342; State vs. Draper, 50 Mo., 353;
State vs.Thoman, 10 Kansas, 191; State vs. McMeely, 24 La. Ann., 19; Cooley,
Const. Lim., 6th ed., p. 78; People vs.Draper, 15 N.Y., 532; State vs. Williams, 5 Wis.,
308; State vs. Baker, 38 Wis., 71; State vs. Hewitt, 16 L. R. A., 413.)

It seems to me that if the hero of the Filipino people, Jose Rizal, could read the
decision of the majority of this court and thereby learn that one of the citizens of the
Philippine Islands has been deprived of his property andrights, without a hearing, he
would turn over in his grave and, with a wailing cry, exclaim: "A social cancer of a new
type is again in my beloved land!"
The question presented is not a new one. It has been discussed since long before the
English people, in mass, met upon the fields of Runnymede and demanded and
obtained from an unwilling king the Magna Charta, which has constituted the chief
stone in the political edifice of all the civilized nations since that time (years 1215). In
creating the constitution for the Filipino people, the United States Government
expressly provided that no person, no Filipino, no citizen of the Philippine Islands,
shall be deprived of his life or property without "due process of law."

In the case of State vs. Hewitt (16 L. R. A., 413) the attorney-general of the State of
South Dakota admitted in open court "that it is true, as contended by the relator, that
the preponderance of authorities is against the removal of the officer for cause,
whose term of office is fixed by law, without formal charges and a hearingthereon on
timely notice."
Mr. Justice Bailey of the English Court, in the case of Williams vs. Bagot (3 Barn and
C., 785), said: "It is contrary to common sense of justice that any party could be
deprived of his rights and be concluded unheard."

The question has been presented to the courts many, many times, and without
exception the said provision of the constitution has been sustained, except where the
same constitution contains other provisions authorizing the suspension of officers
without a hearing. In the Philippine Islands there is no authority in the constitution (the
Jones Law) authorizing or justifying the statute in question. Not only is such a statute
not authorized but it isabsolutely prohibited by the provisions of the Jones Law quoted
above. The Jones Law provides that no law shall be enacted, etc.

Every officer in the Philippine Government who has been legally elected for a fixed
period has a right to be heard under the provisions of the Jones Law before he can be
deprived of his rights. He has a right to be heard and to explain.
In the absence of express constitutional authority, the Philippine Legislature is
prohibited from enacting a law by which any officer elected by the people for a definite
period may be suspended or removed from his office without first having been given
an opportunity to be heard and to present whatever defense he may have. (Jones
Law, sec. 3; Dullan vs. Wilson, 51 Mich., 128; Hallgreen vs. Campbell, 82 Mich., 255;
Jacques vs. Little, 51 Kansas, 300.)

In a discussion of the subject before us we must bear in mind the distinction between
an appointive and an elected officer. There are a few cases which hold that in case of
an appointive officer, where the appointment is at the pleasure of the appointing
power, his suspension or removal is exercisable at the mere discretion of the
appointing power. (State vs. St. Louis, 90 Mo., 19; Field vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa.
St., 478; State vs. Johnson, 18 L. R. A., 410.)

In the case of Dullan vs. Wilson (53 Mich., 392) the Supreme Court of the State of
Michigan, with whom Mr. Justice Cooley agreed, said: "We have examined carefully
the authorities cited upon the brief of the learned counsel for relator in support of the
position that no notice is required to be given, and that the action of the Executive is
final and conclusive. It is sufficient to say, without commenting specially upon them,
that the reasoning of those cases does not commend itself to our judgment. They
appear to us to be opposed, not only to the decided weight of authority, but also to
the fundamental principles of justice."

Where a person is appointed to an office and is a mere employee, whose position

does not have the dignity of an office, and, by virtue of his appointment, may be
removed or suspended at the will of the appointing power, then, of course, the rule is
different. Such persons are not officers but mere employees. (Thorpp vs. Langdon, 40
Mich., 673; People vs. McDill, 15 Mich., 182; Portman vs. State Board, etc. 50 Mich.,
258; Attorney-General vs. Cain, 84 Mich., 223.)
On the other hand the authorities are practically unanimous, where the appointment
or election is made for a definite term and the removal is to be for cause, that the
power of removal or suspension cannot be exercised without due notice and hearing.
(Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 454; Dullan vs. Wilson, 53 Mich., 392 [51 Am. Rep.,
128]; Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 99; King vs. Gaskin, 8 Term Rep., 209; Ramshay's
Case, Ad. & E. [N.S.], 190; Williams vs. Bagot, 3 B. & C., 786; Queen vs. Archbishop,
1 Ell. & El., 545; Page vs. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. [Ky.], 672; Willard's Appeal, 4 R. I., 601;
Field vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa., St., 478; State vs. Bryce, 7 Ohio, 82;
Foster vs.Kansas, 112 U. S., 201; Kenard vs. Louisiana, 92 U.S., 480.)

In the case of Hallgreen vs. Campbell (82 Mich., 255), the Supreme Court of the State
of Michigan said: "We have not found any case where an officer who is appointed for
a fixed term has been held to be removable except for cause, and, wherever cause
must be assigned for the removal of the officer, he is entitled to notice and a chance
to defend himself."

In the case of Han vs. Boston (142 Mass., 90) it was held that no power to remove or
suspend an officer could be exercised until after notice and an opportunity by the
official in question to be heard in his own defense.

provincial board after the investigation has been made, if he thinks it desirable to
impose a more severe punishment, or if, in his opinion, the charge is one affecting the
official integrity of the officer in question; and, in this case, that is, when the
suspension is effected after the investigation is held, such written charge against said
official must be presented by the governor to the provincial board within the period of
ten days. Therefore, it is clear and evident, according to the text of said section, that
during the investigation that the provincial governor may hold, in view of a charge
presented against a municipal officer, the latter cannot be suspended from his office
for the simple reason that such investigation may end in a reprimand of the officer,
which is the only punishment that the provincial governor may impose in such case
upon the municipal officer, and the law does not empower the governor to order said
suspension at that time, except only when a complaint is presented against the
municipal officer to the provincial board.

In the case of State vs. St. Louis (90 Mo., 19) the Supreme Court said: "When the
removal is not discretionary, but must be for a cause, . . . and nothing is said as to the
procedure, a specification of the charges, notice, and an opportunity to be heard are
essential."
Mr. Dillon, in his valuable work on Municipal Corporations (sec. 250) says: "Where the
right of removal or suspension is confined to specific causes, such power cannot be
exercised until there have been formulated charges against the officer, notice thereof,
and an opportunity for defense." (Biggs vs. McBride, 17 Ore., 640; State vs. Hawkins,
44 Ohio St., 98.)

If, as has been said, the investigation which the provincial governor may hold against
a municipal officer may end either in the imposition of a punishment, such as a
reprimand of the officer or in a complaint against the municipal officer which the
provincial governor may submit to the provincial board, in the latter case
suspending said municipal officer from that time, that is, from the time the complaint is
made and submitted to the board within the period of ten days, a period determined
and fixed, which the law grants for said purposes, it is evident that the municipal
officer should be notified of the complaint and therefore should be heard in said
investigation; otherwise, in holding the investigation without the presence of the
officer against whom the complaint may have been presented, and, in holding, at
most, a summary trial against him without first hearing him or giving him an
opportunity to defend himself, the reprimand imposed upon him as the result of the
investigation in the first case to which said article 2188 refers, would be a penalty
imposed upon the officer without due process of law.

In the case of State vs. Hastings (16 L. R. A., 791, 797) the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, after citing and commenting not only upon the cases cited above but also
upon other cases, said: "It seems plain to us that the doctrine of these cases is in
accord with the weight of authority and is supported by the soundest reasons."
It is true that a few cases can be found which hold that an officer may be suspended
under a statute, without notice and without a hearing. But it is believed that an
examinations of each of such cases will show that such statues are authorized by the
constitution of the particular state. (Grines vs. District Judge, 101 Tex., 36
Poe vs.State, 72 Tex., 625, State vs. Johnson, 18 L. R. A., 410.)
All that has been said above relates only to the petition for mandamus against the
respondent the provincial governor of Rizal. I am fully convinced that a great
preponderance of the jurisprudence upon the question which I have here discussed
shows clearly that the petitioner herein was suspended in a manner not authorized by
law, and that the writ of mandamus prayed for should be issued, directing the
reinstatement of the petitioner.

If this is true, it is also true that the officer subjected to investigation should be notified
of the complaint and should be heard in said investigation for, if such investigation
should end in a charge which the provincial governor may consider proper to present
against him to the provincial board, such investigation would be the basis of the
charge against the officer and the provincial board should take cognizance of such
investigation in the corresponding proceeding. If the most vulgar criminal is notified of
the complaint presented against him before a justice of the peace and is heard in the
preliminary investigation which this judicial officer must hold before the corresponding
information is filed by the fiscal in a court of first instance, and if in that investigation
he is given the opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty as well as to defend himself in
order that the justice of peace holding the investigation may consider the merits of the
complaint and the result thereof, so that he may determine whether or not reasonable
motives exist for him to believe that the accused is guilty and also to determine, as a
consequence, whether sufficient motives exist to present against the accused the
corresponding information in the Court of First Instance these being facts which
the fiscal in turn should consider before filing the corresponding information it is
unreasonable, unjust and illegal that, in a preliminary investigation such as that held
by the provincial governor in the second case referred to in section 2188 by virtue of
the complaint presented to him against a municipal officer, such municipal officer
should not be notified of the complaint or head or given the opportunity to defend
himself in order that the provincial governor may duly determine whether it is proper
to impose upon said officer a more severe punishment or whether the abuse or

With reference to the respondent provincial board, the record shows that it was not a
party to the acts complained of in the petition in the present case. The petition,
therefore, as against the provincial board should be denied.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
Section 2188 of the Administrative Code which empowers the provincial governor to
investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty, corruption or
other form of maladministration in office does not, as may be seen from the text itself
of said section, empower the provincial governor to suspend the officer against whom
the complaint may be presented pending the investigation. There is even no word
whatever in said section from which such power may be inferred.
The suspension of the officer against whom the complaint may have been presented
(when he is not a municipal treasurer) may, according to said section, be ordered by
the provincial governor when written charges are submitted by the latter to the

neglect of duty imputed to him is among those that affect the official integrity of said
officer.

For the reasons above stated, in dissenting from the respectable opinion of the
majority, I am of the opinion that the petition presented by Miguel Cornejo, municipal
president of Pasay, against Andres Gabriel, provincial governor of Rizal as well as
against the provincial board of Rizal, composed of Andres Gabriel, Pedro Magsalin,
and Catalino S. Cruz, is well taken, and the respondents should be, as they not are,
ordered to pay the costs.

When a complaint charging the commission of a delito (felony) is laid before

a magistrate, the accused is entitled as of right to a preliminary investigation
as to "probable cause" before being committed to stand trial for the crime
charged therein. (U.S. vs. M'Govern, 6 Phil., 621)
When a preliminary examination, under the provisions of General Orders,
No. 58, is conducted by a judge or by a justice of the peace in this
jurisdiction, either within or without the city of Manila, the accused has a right
to be present and to be heard by himself and by counsel and to present
witnesses in his behalf. . . . . (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.)
The object of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind,
before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions. (U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.)
The doctrine established by this court in the cases above mentioned, and in many
others that need not be cited, is applicable also to the case where an investigation is
held, according to said section 2188 of the Administrative Code, by the provincial
governor by virtue of a complaint presented against a municipal officer, because
without an investigation held in legal form, that is, by hearing the person accused of a
crime in a judicial complaint or the municipal officer accused in a complaint presented
to the provincial governor, and giving him the opportunity to defend himself, the
information against the accused in the first case, can not be filed in the Court of First
Instance and, in the second case, the complaint against the municipal officer, which
may result in his discharge, can not be presented to the provincial board; and as the
right to be present at the investigation, and be heard by himself or through an
attorney and present witnesses in his favor, which are what constitute due process of
law, is an essential right of the accused in either case, then, if in the investigation by
the provincial governor of Rizal, of the complaint received by him against Miguel
Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay, and referred to in his answer, said governor,
without previously notifying the accused municipal president of said charges, held a
preliminary investigation in his absence, without hearing him and without giving him
an opportunity to defend himself, the complaint against said municipal officer filed by
said provincial governor or Rizal with the provincial board is without foundation and is
illegal for want of due proces of law in said investigation. Therefore, the administrative
proceeding instituted against said municipal officer by virtue of that complaint is for
that reason affected with a radical vice and it is evident that the provincial governor
has not acted in accordance with the clear and conclusive provisions of the section of
the Administrative Code already cited and that he has acted in excess of his powers,
not only in ordering the suspension of the municipal president, petitioner herein, but
also in presenting to the provincial board, as a result of said investigation, the
complaint against him. Hence the proceeding instituted before said provincial board
by virtue of said complaint, is illegal and void.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the

presumption of validity. For in this action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief
"that it was a reasonable requirement for employment that a public officer make of
record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby make it
possible thereafter to determine whether, after assuming his position in the public
service, he accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, the
herein plaintiff [having] filed within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid
Administrative Order No. 334 the prescribed sworn statement of financial condition,
assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision on the "periodical
filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after an
officer or employee had once bared his financial condition, upon assumption of office,
is oppressive and unconstitutional." 6

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20387

January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Jesus P. Morfe for and his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.

As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy
of the individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon. There was also the allegation
that the above requirement amounts to "an insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity" of public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory
assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus restrained by this
periodical submission of the statements of "their financial condition, income, and
expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices
defined. . . ." 7 It was further asserted that there was no need for such a provision as
"the income tax law and the tax census law also require statements which can serve
to determine whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself out
of proportion to his reported income." 8

FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of
morality in public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the
principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto." 2 Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in
the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era.
An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to
have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. 3

Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the
then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after practically admitting the facts
alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special
affirmative defenses set forth: "1. That when a government official, like plaintiff,
accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to
give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of
office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied
that there was a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well
as unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in
question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiff's normal and
legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to
adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and
clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power." 10

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is
that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his
assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter",
as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of
the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid
for the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of
January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon
assumption of office was challenged for being violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional
right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed
together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision
appealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of
first instance. For it, such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power
and is thus offensive to the due process clause.

On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his
opinion all his material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an order
was issued giving the parties thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with
or without them, the case was deemed submitted for decision the lower court being of
the belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all
the material allegations of the complaint." 11

We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.

The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring
"unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it
required periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and
liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted
such a sworn statement upon assuming office; . . . ." 12

secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in

consideration for the help given or to be given; accepting or having any member of his
family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business
with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination; causing
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request,
without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending
before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the
Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby; having
directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interests; becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal gain, or having a
material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or
group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval,
even if he votes against the same or does not participate in such action; approving or
granting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not
qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of
a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled and
divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by
him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized release date. 18

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it

was the holding of this Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the lower
court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail." In the present case likewise there was no
factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute could be
based. Hence as noted the decision of the lower court could be reversed on that
ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made
clear in the above Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed sufficiently is
that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for
the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above
case, we expressly affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a situation
where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be readily
apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those involving the freedom
of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should not be
a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented." Also, in the same
Resolution, Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the mind is
imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property
is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual standard
may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases,
but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 15

After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain

relatives, 20 and prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this requirement
of a statement of assets and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission
being challenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act deal with dismissal due to
unexplained wealth, reference being made to the previous statute, 23 penalties for
violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance as the
competent court, 25 the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any
resignation or retirement pending investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a
prosecution, 27 suspension and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or
presents of small or insignificant value as well as recognition of legitimate practice of
one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 the separability clause, 30 and its
effectivity. 31

2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical
submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty
protected by the due process clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy, 16 and definition of
terms, 17 there is an enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. They include
persuading, inducing, or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense;
requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself, or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the government and any other party, wherein the public officer in
his official capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or receiving directly or
indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has

Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier
statute 32 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended
to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a
public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the
assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The
times demanded such a remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character,
sufficiently detailed and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were
prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so evident from even a
cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is
the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to
take advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.

then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process
which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such
not amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no
disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed
by the Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully
be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then
pertinent statutory provisions 43that procedural due process in the form of an
investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to defend
himself must be observed before a civil service officer or employee may be removed.
There was a reaffirmation of the view in even stronger language when this Court
through Justice Tuason in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even without express
provision of law, "it is established by the great weight of authority that the power of
removal or suspension for cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be
exercised without notice and hearing." Such is likewise the import of a statement from
the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in Meneses
v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from
does not bar such appropriate administrative action as the behaviour of petitioners
herein may warrant, upon compliance with the requirements of due process."

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is

permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what
the Constitution condemns, the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only
question raised, is that portion of the statute requiring periodical submission of assets
and liabilities, after an officer or employee had previously done so upon assuming
office, so infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power?
In the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its nature
and scope as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It has
been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary power in
the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society." 34

To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of
tenure provision to employees of government-owned or controlled corporations
entrusted with governmental functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v.
Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that they
would hold their office or employment during good behavior and would not be
dismissed without justifiable cause to be determined in an investigation, where an
opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded
them, would bring about such a desirable condition." Reference was there made to
promoting honesty and efficiency through an assurance of stability in their
employment relation. It was to be expected then that through Justice Labrador
in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could categorically affirm: "As the removal of
petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and
void. . . ."

Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general
welfare and public interest; 35to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as
may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of
each inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state
and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners
and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due
process, Mott 38 stated that the term police powerwas first used by Chief Justice
Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power
legislation usually has reference to regulatory measures restraining either the rights to
property or liberty of private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its
earliest definitions, valid then as well as now, given by Marshall's successor, Chief
Justice Taney does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or
property of private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a State? They
are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty
to the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law
to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to
be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises
the same power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men
and things within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were
of a similar mind. 41

It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due
process guaranty to be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Via, 48 where the opinion of
Justice Endencia for the Court contained the following unmistakable language:
"Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be pretended that the constitutional
provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has not been
complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We
are thus compelled to conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees were not
primarily confidential in nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the
confidence reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that respondents-appellees,
Leon Piero, et al., were not subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause
specified by law and within due process. . . ." 49 In a still later decision, Abaya v.
Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the

What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state
to promote morality in public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom. May a
public official claiming to be adversely affected rely on the due process clause to
annul such statute or any portion thereof? The answer must be in the affirmative. If
the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life,

10

constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning

cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service without
hearing upon a doubtful assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense
against Civil Service rules." Equally emphatic is this observation from the same case:
"A civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence
has clung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by now it would appear trite to
make citations thereof."

government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged provision, a public officer

would be free from such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a compulsion
to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however that under
the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due
process. That leads us to an inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal
infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is
the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for
justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason
drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and
political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause
requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.'
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to
form or phrases." 56

If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied
upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense is
analogous to property, could he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional
guarantee to strike down what he considers to be an infringement of his liberty? Both
on principle, reason and authority, the answer must be in the affirmative. Even a
public official has certain rights to freedom the government must respect. To the
extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due
process mandate is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception,
the question raised cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v.
Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this
case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. This Court
in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as understood in
democracies, is not license. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good, the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is
freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual."

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call
of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due
process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.
4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the
provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is
violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of
Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice
Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." 58

The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a
social organization, 52implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity from
reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It
was Linton's view that "to belong to a society is to sacrifice some measure of
individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which the society consciously
imposes." 54 The above statement from Linton however, should be understood in the
sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of general
welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be
regulated. The individual thought, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a
"domain of free activity that cannot be touched by government or law at all, whether
the command is specially against him or generally against him and others." 55

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for
his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately
refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed,

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and

liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of

11

they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are
built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly
speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience
personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality. If
his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe
that a man no longer master of himself is in any real sense free." 59

increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a

technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged
statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a
person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by
virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets
and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the
amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for
the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what
otherwise would be a private sphere.

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy,

specifically that of communication and correspondence which "shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of Court or when public safety and order"60 may otherwise
require, and implicitly in the search and seizure clause, 61 and the liberty of
abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves to be further
looked into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having
been rendered by this Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the leading
case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the
Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition is a legitimate one."

5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that insofar as the challenged

provision requires the periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial condition, it
would be violative of the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and
against self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner
Davis was convicted under an information charging him with unlawfully having in his
possession a number of gasoline ration coupons representing so many gallons of
gasoline, an offense penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He was convicted both in the
lower court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the objection that there was an
unlawful search which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and that their use at the
trial was in violation of Supreme Court decisions.69 In the District Court, there was a
finding that he consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did
not disturb that finding although expressed doubt concerning it, affirming however
under the view that such seized coupons were properly introduced in evidence, the
search and seizure being incidental to an arrest, and therefore reasonable regardless
of petitioner's consent.

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it
stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has wider implications though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.1wph1.t

In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas
emphasized that the Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers or
documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which never became the private
property of the holder but remained at all times the property of the government and
subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was not to
be understood as suggesting "that officers seeking to reclaim government property
may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the right
to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general search of his papers
for the purpose of learning whether he has any coupons subject to inspection and
seizure. The nature of the coupons is important here merely as indicating that the
officers did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining them." 71

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition

independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The
concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government,
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become

True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice
Murphy joined, critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing interpretation"

12

which in this particular case gave approval "to what was done by arresting officers"
and expressing the regret that the Court might be "in danger of forgetting what the Bill
of Rights reflects experience with police excesses."

incrimination clause. What was said in an American State decision is of relevance. In

that case, a statutory provision requiring any person operating a motor vehicle, who
knows that injury has been caused a person or property, to stop and give his name,
residence, and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer was
sustained against the contention that the information thus exacted may be used as
evidence to establish his connection with the injury and therefore compels him to
incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law which exacts this
information is invalid, because such information, although in itself no evidence of guilt,
might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all police
regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same ground. We
are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man's conduct
from judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a constitutional right
be involved, it is not necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in
this particular case, the constitutional privilege justified the refusal to give the
information exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the defense to the
pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called upon to decide in this
proceeding." 81

Even this opinion, however, concerned that the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial
compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under obligation to give
testimony. But that obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions which are
deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely because there may be the
duty to make documents available for litigation does not mean that police officers may
forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone except
under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant
to express and to safeguard." 72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory
provision offends against the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be futile
and unavailing. This is the more so in the light of the latest decision of this Court in
Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, after
stressing that the constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with, and that
it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of a violation of
certain statutes without reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited its
scope as "one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,"
safeguarding "the sanctity, of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical
submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.

6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult
to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot
thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this
Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the
province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or
salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override
legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85

Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit
acceptance, by his invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to the
Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This
constitutional provision gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the
prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him to furnish the
evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills it. He
may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent,
and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely
testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither then could the accused be
ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or
innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or
effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78

It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission

on Elections, 86 that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the
action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be.
The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective
authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be
adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts
of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain
unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity
of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid
and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.

In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against
self-incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason stated:
"What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts." 79 Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to await, in the language
of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or
administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the
validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non-

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring
unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires
periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities
of an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a
sworn statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.

13

14

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.

Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, L-24693, October 23,

1967, p. 5.

Footnotes

15

Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court (1950) p. II.

16

Section 1, Rep. Act. No. 3019.

Republic Act No. 3019, approved August 17, 196O.

17

Section 2, Rep. Act. No. 3019.

Section 1, Statement of Policy.

18

Sec. 3, Id.

Republic Act 1379, approved June 18, 1955.

19

Sec. 4, Id.

20

Sec. 5, Id.

21

Sec. 6, Id.

22

Sec. 7, Id.

23

Sec. 8, Id.

24

Sec. 9, Id.

25

Sec. 10, Id.

26

Sec. 11, Id.

Sec. 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within

thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within
the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the
expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from
office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department
Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent
office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the
Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the
Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement
of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of
his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided,
That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of
the calendar year, may file their first statements in the following months of
January.
5

Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 4.

27

Sec. 12, Id.

Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 5.

28

Sec. 13, Id.

Complaint, Record on Appeal, par. 5, p. 5.

29

Sec. 14, Id.

Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 7.

30

Sec. 15, Id.

Record on Appeal p. 10.

31

Sec. 16, Id.

Answer, pars. 4, 6 and 9, Record on Appeal, pp. 12, 14 and 15.

32

Rep. Act No. 1379.

Order of March 10, 1962, Record on Appeal, p. 18.

33

L-24693, July 31, 1967.

10

11

12

Decision of July 19, 1962, Record on Appeal, pp. 36, 37.

34

Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919).

13

L-24693, July 31, 1967.

35

U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 94 (1910).

14

36

U. S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 225 (1915).

37

U. S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 254 (1915).

38

Due Process of Law, 301.

57

Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak 343 U. S. 451, 467 (1952). In this

case the American Supreme Court rejected the claim that radio program on
buses and street cars of a private company regulated by the District
Columbia invaded the rights of privacy of passengers in violation of the due
process clause. Mr. Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter.
58

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). In this case Justice
Brandeis along with Justice Holmes dissented.

39

Gibbons v. Ogden 9 Wheat, 208 (1824) and Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.

419 (1827).

59
40

Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, 44 (1944). Also "Secrecy nevertheless

may be an important component of the core idea of privacy as a public-law
concept, and to this probably should be added the factor of 'solitude'
freedom from certain social impositions and pressures. The meaning of
privacy, as thus refined and separated from a generalized concept of
freedom, may be fairly well encompassed by the twin ideas of secrecy,
which protects the non-disclosure interest, and solitude, which protects
against coercion of belief or, derivatively, against actions designed to make
the holding of belief uncomfortable, or against any undue social instrusions
on the intimacies and dignities of life. As already noted, however, these twin
ideas are Janus-faced, because secrecy in the context of associational
privacy is an activistconcept supporting political action, whereas solitude in
the context of non-disclosure of nonconformity is apassivist, right-to-be-letalone concept." Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra, 64 Mich. Law Rev. 197,
205, (1955.)

License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583 (1847).

41

2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 1223 (1927). Burdick, The Law of

the American Constitution (1922).
42

84 Phil. 740 (1949).

43

Secs. 64, 694 Rev. Administrative Code.

44

92 Phil. 456, 471 (1953).

45

97 Phil. 857, 865 (1955).

46

98 Phil. 800, 806 (1956).

60

Art. III, See. I, par. 5, Constitution.

47

99 Phil. 253, 256 (1956).

61

Art. III, Sec. I, par. 3, Constitution.

48

101 Phil. 1149, 1154 (1957).

62

Art. III, Sec. I, par. 4, Constitution.

49

Piero v. Hechanova, L-22562, Oct. 22, 1966.

63

381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965).

50

L-25641, December 17, 1966.

64

51

39 Phil. 660 (1919).

52

West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

53

Chicago, B. & O. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 (1910).

65

54

The Individual, Culture and Society, p. 17 (1945).

66

55

Paradoxes of Legal Science, p. 98 (1928).

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Breard v. City of Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951): Public Utilities Comm. v. Pollak, 341 U.S. 451 (1952);
Frank v. Maryland 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1967); Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139 (1962).
Id. at p. 485.

Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mich. Law. Rev. 219,

229 (1965). But compare the pungent observation of a knowledgeable and
highly literate critic of the social scene: "Privacy? What's that? There is no
precise word for it in Filipino, and as far as I know any Filipino dialect and
there is none because there is no need for it. The concept and practice of
privacy are missing from conventional Filipino life. The Filipino believes that
privacy is an unnecessary imposition, an eccentricity that is barely
pardonable or, at best, an esoteric Western afterthought smacking of legal

56

Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc., et al. vs. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, L-24693,
July 31, 1967.

15

86

trickery." Guerrero-Nakpil, Consensus of One, Sunday Times Magazine,

Sept. 24, 1967, at pa. 18.
67

328 U.S. 582 (1946).

68

54 Stat. 676 as amended by the Act of May 31, 1940; 55 Stat. 236.

L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967. There is nothing in the separate opinion of Justice

Sanchez to which five other justices concurred that calls for a different
conclusion, the point of disagreement being in the earnestly held conviction
of this group that Congress exceeded its legitimate authority under the
Constitution.

69

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 and United States v. Lefkowitz 285
U.S. 452.
70

Id. at p. 588.

71

Id. at p. 591.

72

Id. at p. 596.

73

L-19550, June 19, 1967.

74

Art. III, Sec. 1, Clause 18.

75

People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).

76

U. S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 (1912): U. S. v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735
(1917); Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920); and Jimenez v. Caizares L12790, Aug. 31, 1960.
77

Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483 (1937).

78

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), but see Warden v. Hayden 18
L. ed. 2d 182 (1967).
79

People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).

80

Suarez v. Tengco, L-17113, May 23, 1961.

81

Ex parte Kneedler 147 S. W. 983, 984 (1912)

82

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

83

People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 548 (1947).

84

Quintos v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 290, 293 (1955).

85

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957).

16

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission

hereby RESOLVES to effect the following changes in its
organization, specifically in the Central Offices:

EN BANC

1. The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA

[Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and OPR [Office of
Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and
Development Office (RDO).

G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995

2. The Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) is

renamed Human Resource Development Office (HRDO).

SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA,
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, respondents.

3. The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit

performing said functions are hereby transferred to HRDO:
a. Administration of the Honor and Awards
program under OCSS;

FELICIANO, J.:

b. Registration and Accreditation of Unions under

OPR; and

In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail
the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission
("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.

c. Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on

appointments under OPIA.
4. The Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) is renamed
Management Information Office (MIO).

Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection

and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of
the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving,
Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and
Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission,
was issued on 7 June 1994. 1 Resolution No. 94-3710 needs to be quoted in full:

5. The Information technology functions of OPM and the personnel

assigned to the unit are transferred to MIO.
6. The following functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to
the unit performing said functions are hereby transferred to the
Office of the Executive Director:

RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710

WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides
that ". . . as an independent constitutional body, the Commission
may effect changes in the organization as the need arises;"

a. Financial Audit and Evaluation;

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in

the organization to streamline its operations and improve delivery of
public service;

c. Research and Statistics; and

b. Internal Management and Improvement;

d. Planning and Programming.

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it necessary to immediately

effect changes in the organization of the Central Offices in view of
the need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions
which were transferred to the Regional Offices;

7. The library service and its personnel under OCPR are

transferred to the Central Administrative Office.

17

8. The budget allocated for the various functions shall be

transferred to the Offices where the functions are transferred.
Records, fixtures and equipment that go with the functions shall be
moved to where the functions are transferred.

The principal issues raised in this Petition are the following:

(1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority
to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS
[Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel
Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office];
and

Annex A contains the manning list for all the offices, except the
OCES.
The changes in the organization and in operations shall take place
before end of July 1994.

(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners'

constitutional right to security of tenure.

Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.

I.
(Signed)
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
Chairman

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July
1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and
organization of the Commission in the following terms:

(Signed) Did not participate

Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr., Thelma P. Gaminde
Commissioner Commissioner

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission The Commission shall have

the following offices:

Attested by:
(Signed)
Carmencita Giselle B. Dayson
Board Secretary V 2

(1) The Office of the Executive Director . . .

(2) The Merit System Protection Board . . .
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs . . .

During the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission held in the
morning of 28 July 1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of
petitioners, expressed the determination of the Commission to implement Resolution
No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority.

(4) The Office of Planning and Management . . .

(5) The Central Administrative Office . . .

Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the
Court required public respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21
September 1994, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the
Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and
petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that public
respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders. The Court, in a
Resolution dated 27 September 1994, granted this Motion and issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records . . .

(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation . . .
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Placement . . .
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide
leadership and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of
personnel systems and standards relative to performance
appraisal, merit promotion and employee incentive benefits and
awards.

The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994, on the Petition
and then moved to lift the Temporary Restraining Order. The Office of the Solicitor
General filed a separate Comment dated 28 November 1994, defending the validity of
Resolution No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of the Petition. Petitioners filed separate
Replies to these Comments. The Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder (denominated
"Comment [on] the Reply").

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development . . .

18

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop

policies, standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct
of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management
programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical
and advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and
government agencies in the implementation of their personnel
programs and evaluation systems.

Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little differently,

these offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.
What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do? Examination of Resolution
No. 94-3710 shows that thereby the Commission re-arranged some of the
administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the Commission and, among other things,
merged three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the
"Research and Development Office (RDO)." The same Resolution renamed some of
the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for Human Resource Development
(OHRD) was renamed Human Resource Development Office (HRDO); the Office for
Central Personnel Records (OCPR) was renamed Management Information Office
(MIO). The Commission also re-allocated certain functions moving some functions
from one Office to another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM (Office of
Planning and Management) was transferred to the newly named Management
Information Office (MIO). This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions
carried with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the Office
where the function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and
equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such functions were moved to the
Offices to where the functions were transferred.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and

assistance in the development and implementation of policies,
standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and
employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement,
career development, merit and awards systems, position
classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee
welfare and benefits, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
(13) The Office of the Corporate Affairs . . .
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration . . .

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were
described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization
to streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These
changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the
decentralization and devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation
of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission
throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought
closer physically to the government employees that they are mandated to serve. In
the past, its functions had been centralized in the Head Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all over the country were compelled
to come to Manila for the carrying out of personnel transactions. Upon the other hand,
the dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field
Offices attached to various governmental agencies throughout the country makes
possible the implementation of new programs of the Commission at its Central Office
in Metropolitan Manila.

(15) The Regional and Field Offices. . . . (Emphases in the

original)
Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the Commission and their
respective functions, the 1987 Revised Administrative Code goes on to provide as
follows:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the
Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one (1)
Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary
to carry out their respective functions. As an independent
constitutional body, the Commission may effect chances in the
organization as the need arises.

The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC Regional
Office No. 3 was precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application
for retirement, thus generating a need to find a replacement for him. Petitioner de
Lima was being assigned to that Regional Office while the incumbent Regional
Director was still there to facilitate her take over of the duties and functions of the
incumbent Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior experience as a labor lawyer was also a
factor in her assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public sector unions have
been very active. Petitioner Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No.
5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated by the fact that the then incumbent
Director in Region V was under investigation and needed to be transferred
immediately to the Central Office. Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely
designee for Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering that the functions
previously assigned to him had been substantially devolved to the Regional Offices
such that his reassignment to a Regional Office would result in the least disruption of
the operations of the Central Office. 4

xxx xxx xxx 3

(Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and
OPR, and as well each of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above, consist of
aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections.
Each Section, Division and Office comprises a group of positions within the agency
called the Civil Service Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less
definable function or functions. These functions are related to one another, each of
them being embraced by a common or general subject matter. Clearly, each Office is
an internal department or organizational unit within the Commission and that
accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the other Offices within the

19

It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite legitimate
considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and
implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador C.
Fernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and
petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in Region III in San
Fernando, Pampanga. It is also clear to
the Court that the changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 943710 re-naming of existing Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions
and Sections composing particular Offices; re-allocation of existing functions (and
related personnel; budget, etc.) among the re-arranged Offices are precisely the
kind of internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code), quoted above, as "chances in
the organization" of the Commission.

II.
We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was
breached by the respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering
petitioners' assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V.
Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or
employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from
their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710
and that they cannot, without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of
the Commission.
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not
appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular
positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or
Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of
Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners
were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any
particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding
the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices,
something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had
created those public offices in the first place.
The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The
term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of
the public. 5 We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public
office as that term is used in the law of public officers. 6It is essential to note that none
of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it
or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment
between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very
difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned
fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze
those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the
commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization
regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary,
the legislative authority hadexpressly authorized the Commission to carry out
"changes in the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." 7Assuming, for
purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the
kinds off changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court
is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly
delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards
to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out
not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of
Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commission

Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code
recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the Commission
and, for that matter, in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil
service:
Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress
of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action.
Such action shall include appointment through certification,
promotion, transfer, re-instatement, re-employment, detail,
reassignment, demotion, and separation.All personnel actions shall
be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as
may be promulgated by the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency, Provided, That
such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and
salary. (Emphasis supplied)

as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a

career service, adopt measures to promote efficiency
[and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel
functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding
authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such
functions can be effectively performed. (Emphasis supplied)

It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their
previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development
Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their
subsequent assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in

20

Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory authority and did not
constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows that such re-assignment
did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of
tenure considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue
to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations which they
had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners
had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head
Office.

but also against unconsented

transfer which, as repeatedly
enunciatEd, are tantamount to
removals which are within the
ambit of the fundamental
guarantee.However, the
availability of that security of
tenure necessarily depends, in
the first instance, upon the
nature of the
appointment (Hojilla vs.
Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].)
Such that the rule which
proscribes transfers without
consent as anathema to the
security of tenure is predicated
upon the theory that the officer
involved is appointed not
merely assigned to a
particular station (Miclat v.
Ganaden, et al., 108 Phil. 439
[1960]; Jaro v. Hon. Valencia,
et al., 118 Phil. 728 [1963]).
[Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138 (1969)]

Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory provisions
relevant in the instant case, but also by a long line of cases decided by this Court in
respect of different agencies or offices of government.
In one of the more recent of these cases, Department of Education Culture and
Sports, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 8 this Court held that a person who had
been appointed as "Secondary School Principal II" in the Division of City Schools,
District II, Quezon City, National Capital Region, and who had been stationed as High
School Principal in the Carlos Albert High School in Quezon for a number of years,
could lawfully be reassigned or transferred to the Manuel Roxas High School, also in
Quezon City, without demotion in rank or diminution of salry. This Court held:
The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly
Section 6 thereof which provides that except for cause and in the
exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without his
consent from one station to another, finds no application in the case
at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that the teacher
concerned is appointed not merely assigned to a particular
station. Thus:

The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any

particular station or school. As such, she could be assigned to any
station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific
school. (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was
assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could not have been
with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently.
Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated.
Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in
Quezon City as the exigencies of public service require even
without consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138,
143

The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as

the appointed indicates a
specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally
ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In
appointments of this nature, this Court has
consistently rejected the officer's demand to
remain even as public service dictates that a
transfer be made in a particular station.
Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is
expressed in the following statement in Ibaez,
et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R.
No.
L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 1002 [1967]);

Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too

loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her
refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution is not
impenetrable. She proceeds upon the
assumption that she occupies her station in
Sinalang Elementary School by appointment. But
her first appointment as Principal merely reads
thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal
(Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public
Schools, Department of Education", without
mentioning her station. She cannot therefore

That security of tenure is an

essential and constitutionally
guaranteed feature of our Civil
Service System, is not open to
debate. The mantle of its
protection extends not only
against removals without cause

21

claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang

Elementary School or any particular station. She
may be assigned to any station as exigency of
public service requires, even without her
consent. She thus has no right of
choice. 9 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

assignment. The Court further held that assignment to a particular station after
issuance of the appointment was not necessary to complete such appointment:
. . . . We cannot subscribe to the theory that an assignment to a
particular station, in the light of the terms of the appointments in
question, was necessary to complete the said appointments. The
approval thereof by the Commissioner of Civil Service gave those
appointments the stamp of finality.With the view that the
respondent Commission then took of its power in the premises and
the demand of the mission it set out to accomplish with the
appointments it extended, said appointments were definitely meant
to be complete as then issued. The subsequent assignment of the
appointees thereunder that the said respondent Commission held
in reserve to be exercised as the needs of each locality justified did
not in any way detract from the perfection attained by the
appointments beforehand. And the respective appointees were
entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers
concerned actually conferred not in that of any place to which
they may have been subsequently assigned. . . . As things stand, in
default of any particular station stated in their respective
appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the
petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given
to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line
we have repeatedly drawn
between appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in
the law of public officers. 16 (Emphases supplied)

In the very recent case of Fernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, etc., et
a1., 10 the Court addressed appointments of petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the
National Capital Region" in dismissing a challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the
CSC and orders of the Secretary of Labor. The Court said:
Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the National
Capital Region. They were not, however, appointed to a specific
station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the National
Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be
reassigned from one organizational unit to another of the same
agency where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their
services may be used more effectively. As such they can neither
claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor
to security of tenure thereat. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, petitioners' reassignment is not a transfer for they were
not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They were not
given new appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows,
therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4 ordering their
reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in
order. 11 (Emphases supplied)

The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden, 17 had been appointed as a "Welfare Office

Incharge, Division of Urban, Rural and Community Administration, Social Welfare
Administration." She was assigned as Social Welfare Incharge of the Mountain
Province, by an office order of the Administrator, Social Welfare Administration. After a
little more than a year; petitioner was assigned elsewhere and respondent Ganaden
transferred to petitioner's first station in Baguio City. The Court ruled that petitioner
was not entitled to remain in her first station, In Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et
al., 18 petitioner Dr. Jaro had been appointed "Physician in the Municipal Maternity
and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first assigned to the Municipal
Maternity and Charity Clinics in Batulati, Davao, and later to the corresponding clinic
in Saug, Davao and then to Catil, Davao. He was later assigned to the Municipality of
Padada, also of Davao Province. He resisted his last assignment and
brought mandamus against the Secretary of Health to compel the latter to return him
to his station in Catil, Davao as Municipal Health Officer thereof. The Court,
applying Miclat v. Ganaden dismissed this Petition holding that his appointment not
being to any specific station but as a physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity
Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals, he could be transferred or assigned to any station
where, in the opinion of the Secretary of Health, his services may be utilized more
effectively. 19

In Quisumbing v. Gumban, 12 the Court, dealing with an appointment in the

Bureau of Public Schools of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, ruled as follows:
After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored
that the appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a
District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not
indicate a specific station (Rollo, p. 13). A such, she could be
assigned to any station and she is no entitled to stay permanently
at any specific station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974];
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals
[G.R. 81032, March 22, 1990] citingBrillantes v. Guevarra [27
SCRA 138 [1969]). 13
Again, in Ibaez v. Commission on Elections, 14 the Court had before it petitioners'
appointments as "Election Registrars in the Commission of Elections," without any
intimation to what city, municipality or municipal district they had been appointed as
such. 15 The Court held that since petitioners "were not appointed to, and
consequently not entitled to any security of tenure or permanence in, any specific
station," "on general principles, they [could] be transferred as the exigencies of the
service required," and that they had no right to complain against any change in

Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez 20 which involved the appointment of petitioner
Sta. Maria as "Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta.
Maria was transferred by the President of the University of the Philippines to the
Office of the President, U.P., without demotion in rank or salary, thereby acceding to

22

the demands of student activists who were boycotting their classes in the U.P.
College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria assailed his transfer as an illegal and
unconstitutional removal from office. In upholding Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, laid down the applicable doctrine in the
following terms:

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is

hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

4. Concededly, transfers there are which do not amount to

removal. Some such transfer can be effected without the need for
charges being preferred, without trial or hering, and even without
the consent of the employee.

Footnotes

The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the

appointment." Where the appointment does not indicate a specific
station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided
the transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary.
Thus one who is appointed "principal in the Bureau of Public
Schools" and is designated to head a pilot school may be
transferred to the post of principal of another school.

1 Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde did not participate in the

adoption of this Resolution.

And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to

security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed not
merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not
prescribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that
empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel
management to harness the abilities of employees to promote
optimum public service cannot-be objected to. . . .

4 Please see Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by

public respondents, Rollo, pp. 75-77.

2 Rollo, pp. 27-29.

3 Book V, Tittle I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, 1987 Revised
Administrative Code.

5 Appari vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984); Oliveros v.

Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 (1974); Fernandez vs. Ledesma, 117 Phil.
630 (1963); Alba vs. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957).
6 The dual reference of the term "office" or "public office" is brought
out in the definition of the term found in Section 2(9), Introductory
Provisions of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987:

5. The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order

77 would stand the test of validityvis-a-vis the principles just
enunciated.

Office refers, within the framework of

governmental organization, to any major
functional unit of a department or bureau
including regional offices. It may also refer to any
position held or occupied by individual persons,
whose functions are defined by law or regulation.
(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of
Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College of Education, University of the
Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university." His
appointment is to a specific position; and, more importantly, to a
specific station. 21 (Citations omitted; emphases supplied)

7 The Civil Service Commission is not the only agency of

government that has been expressly vested with this authority to
effect changes in internal organization. Comparable authority has
been lodged in, e.g., the Commission on Elections and the Office of
the President. In respect of Comelec, Section 13, Chapter 3,
Subtitle C, Title I, Book V, 1987 Revised Administrative Code reads
as follows:

For all the foregoing we conclude that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and
de Lima from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research
Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices
in Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a violation
of their constitutional right to security of tenure.

The Commission may make changes in the composition,

distribution, and assignment of field offices, as well its personnel,

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED.

23

whenever the exigencies of the service and the interest of free,

orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election so
require: Provided, That such changes shall be effective and
enforceable only for the duration of the election period concerned
and shall not constitute a demotion, either in rank or salary, nor
result in a change of status; and Provided further that there shall be
no changes in the composition, distribution, or assignment within
thirty days before the election, except for cause, and after due
notice and hearing, and that in no case shall a regional or assistant
regional director be assigned to a region, provincial election
supervisor to a province, or municipality, where he and/or his
spouse are related to any candidate within the fourth civil degree or
consanguinity or affinity as the case may be. (Section 13, Chapter
3, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V, Revised Administrative Code of 1987;
Emphasis supplied)

13 193 SCRA at 523. See also Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA

138 (1969), where petitioner Brillantes had an appointment as (a)
Principal, Elementary School, in the Bureau of Public Schools
Department of Education and where the Court reached the same
conclusion.

With respect to the Office of the President, Section 31, Chapter 10,
Title III, Book III, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, vested the
President with the following authority:

17 108 Phil. 439 (1960).

The President subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in

order to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:

19 See also Bongbong v. Parade et al., 57 SCRA 623 (1974) which

involved petitioner's appointment as "rural health physician in the
Bureau of Rural Health Units Projects."

14 19 SCRA 1002 (1967).

15 For other cases involving election registrars and applying the
same rule, see Braganza v. Commission on Elections, 20 SCRA
1023 (1967); Real, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, et al., 21 SCRA
331 (1967).
16 19 SCRA at 1012-1013.

18 118 Phil. 728 (1963).

20 31 SCRA 637 (1970).

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the

President Proper, including the immediate offices, the Presidential
Special Assistant Adviser System and the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof, or
transferring functions from one unit to another;

21 31 SCRA at 652-654.

xxx xxx xxx

(Section 31, Chapter 10, Title 3, Book III Revised
Administrative Code of 1987; Emphasis supplied)
8 183 SCRA 555 (1990).
9 183 SCRA at 561-562.
10 234 SCRA 546 (1994).
11 234 SCRA at 553.
12 193 SCRA 520 (1991).

24

Proceeding by way of elimination so as to resolve the case into its simplest factors, it
will first be noted that the petitioner abandons the untenable position, assumed by
him in one portion of his complaint, to the effect that section 1 of Act No. 3107 is
unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of the petitioner to an office. It is
a fundamental principle that a public office cannot be regarded as the property of the
incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

It will next be noted that, while the respondent as appellant assigns three errors in this
court, the first two relating to preliminary matters are ultimately renounced by him in
order that there may be an authoritative decision on the main issue. The third error
specified and argued with ability by the provincial fiscal of Cebu, is that the trial judge
erred in declaring that the limitation regarding the age of justices of the peace
provided by section 1 of Act No. 3107 is not applicable to justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace appointed and acting before said law went into effect.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23226

March 4, 1925

Coming now to the law, we find on investigation the original provision pertinent to the
appointment and term of office of justices of the peace, in section 67 of Act No. 136,
wherein it was provided that justices of the peace shall hold office during the pleasure
of the Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente Segovia was originally
appointed justice of the peace, amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making
the term of office of justices and auxiliary justices of the peace two years from the first
Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after Segovia's
appointment, however, the law was again amended by Act No. 1627 by providing that
"all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold office during
good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later amended by Acts
Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206 of the
Administrative Code.

VICENTE SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Diaz for appellant.
Del Rosario and Del Rosario for appellee.
Vicente Zacarias as amicus curiae.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be decided on this appeal is whether that portion of Act No. 3107
which provides, that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty- five years, should be
given retroactive or prospective effect.

Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice of the peace and
one auxiliary justice of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General for the
City of Manila, the City of Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and municipal
district in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests shall so require, for any
other minor political division or unorganized territory in said Islands." It was this
section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof the
following proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." But section
206 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the
peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior
unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other
justice," was left unchanged by Act No. 3107.

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January
21, 1907. He continuously occupied this position until having passed sixty-five milestones, he was ordered by the Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the
office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as
justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of opposing physical
resistance to the occupancy of the office of justice of the peace by the auxiliary justice
of the peace, instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice
of the peace, to oust the latter therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of
the peace of Dumanjug. To this complaint, Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the
ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because
Act No. 3107 was constitutional and because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old
had automatically ceased to be justice of the peace. On the issue thus framed and on
stipulated facts, judgment was rendered by Honorable Adolph Wislizenus, Judge of
First Instance, overruling the demurrer, and in favor of petitioner and against
respondent.

A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only

and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest
either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the
lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute
ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used
are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them,
or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will
hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code
has it in article 3, "Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise

25

provided." (Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer vs. City of
Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers
Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306; Montilla vs. Agustinian Corporation [1913], 24 Phil.,
220; In re will of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil., 23.)
The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known
New York decision held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may
not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office.
If that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the
purpose is stated." (People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another
case, a new constitutional provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the
incumbents of certain judicial offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did
not apply to persons in office at the time of its taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59
Barb., 198; II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Chap. XVII, particularly pages
1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 389.)
The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil.,
329). In that case, the question was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347.
The law under consideration not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall
serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further provided "that
the present judges of Courts of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking
effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of First
Instance ... ." There the intention of the Legislature to vacate the office was clearly
expressed. Here, it is not expressed at all.
The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code,
gives no indication of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating
upon existing rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 of the
Administrative Code, while leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which permits
justices of the peace to hold office during good behavior. In the absence of provisions
expressly making the law applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the
absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would
not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful public
servants out of office.
Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that the proviso
added to section 203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107,
providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve
until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect
only, and so is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force. Consequently, it results that the
decision of the trial court is correct in its findings of fact and law and in its disposition
of the case.
Judgment affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

26

Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative

staff support by a Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed
personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission
for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat
shall be headed by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by
the President.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn

from the Department of Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an
amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved by the
President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the
budget of the Office of the President.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145368

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation

(Expocorp) was created.4Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators,
who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief
Executive Officer.

April 12, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.

On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in

the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the
Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.

KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223
"constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration
in 1998." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the
Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress."1

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35,
creating an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its
component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the
Committee.

Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128,

"reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial
Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial
Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were
named Honorary Chairpersons.2

On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the
Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the
Committees recommendations was "the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr.
Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public
bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to
Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid
contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the
scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the
implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law." 5

Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall terminate upon
the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its
predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to "take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of
the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress."

Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It
recommended "the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in
proper cases of," among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,
and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the
responsibility to "prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the
Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of" the Executive
Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:

27

The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were
apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report,
recommending:

A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH
UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH
VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.

1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted

before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of
the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H.
Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President
Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;

B.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.

2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the
nominal complainant.6

C.

In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counteraffidavit and those of his witnesses.

PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT

A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT.7

On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to
Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office.

In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs.

Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was
limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade
27 and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or
higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no
jurisdiction over him.

In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to
dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order
but the motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.

This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that "it
is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding
information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a
resolution finding "probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and
TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution also
directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and
Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel
but dismissed the charge against Pea.

In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:

The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the
State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of
Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers
of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for
the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" And this is
further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special Prosecutors
authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the
original.]

In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order, commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the
Sandiganbayan or any court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral
argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a
public officer because:

28

The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by
the Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement
in its Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this
reversal:

or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.

Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and
control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to
prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the

Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of
any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by
regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of
any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a
public officer or employee.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is

one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770,
the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to
make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. A review of the development of our
Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which
petitioner relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC,
was not a public officer.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4)
granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as "protectors of the
people," who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations."
Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution11 upon
the Office of the Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient."

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction
as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases."
The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its
jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees by other courts.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of
his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public
officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted
by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.

The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law
respectively provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people shall act promptly on complaints file in any form or manner
against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service
by the Government to the people.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be

equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11
of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of
the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited tocriminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law
to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government
and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
x x x.

29

The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to
Section 13, supra:

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."17 The
executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth
by law.

SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by
any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure
of office.

The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts,
Culture, and Sports) thereof:

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.12

Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State
shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nations historical and cultural
heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.

Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who
public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence13 is that
provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:

In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee
for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in
1998, and the centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering
nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law,
by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.14

Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and

thereby strengthen Filipino values;

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of

sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an
office.15

Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only

through long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special
expertise and capability, particularly in communication and information
dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and continuous
developmental programming;

Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of
NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he
purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the
NCC being temporary.

Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake
the primary task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the
business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective instruments
from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project;

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a
position is a public office or not.

x x x.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an

employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office
involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some
portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or
judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
officer.16

E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations
in 1998, cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more
coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider
participation from the government and non-government or private organizations." It
also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries."
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to
carry them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government?
Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as
legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?

30

(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation

and implementation of programs and projects on the utilization of culture,
arts, literature and media as vehicles for history, economic endeavors, and
reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of accomplishment in
every Filipino in the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this regard, it
shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila, the
original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;

the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area

because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I
wanted to touch on by lack of material time I could not but that is a
very important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the
Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President
Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering,
suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to
catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by putting this Expo in
Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may
also mention we wanted to generate employment aside from
attracting business investments and employment. And the Estrada
administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand
people who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our target
was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated,
accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they
are going back to that because they had the airport and there are
plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the original
plan.

(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness
and celebration of the Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of
all information about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of
the programs and projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures
nationwide. In this regard, the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g.
lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-transfer, and similar
arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance of the historical
sites and structures;

There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full
employment is a fundamental state policy.20

(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation,

and to invite private individuals and organizations to assist it in the
performance of its tasks; and,

Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla21 that the holding by a
municipality of a townfiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function.
Petitioner argues that the "holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the
nations 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the
exercise of the national governments proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held:

(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects,
activities as well as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.18
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,19 created the
NCC by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance
Power), Section 2 describes the nature of executive orders:

[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative

Code] simply gives authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta
but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if
the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is
in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for
the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the
state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit
or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of
income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like
which are for public service.

SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a

general or permanent character inimplementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
[Underscoring ours.]
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development,
especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral
arguments before this Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of
determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality;
the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and
will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
undertaking may be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the

And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos,

dont you agree that the task of the centennial commission was also
to focus on the long term over all socio economic development of

31

function becomes private or propriety in character. Easily, no governmental

or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a

musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of
cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage
to the general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can
hardly be questioned. x x x"

Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the
Court cautioned that "there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining
the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding
circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive." Thus, in
footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the
"surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds" could
produce a conclusion different from that in Torio:

Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The
Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after
centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation
of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of
independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an
occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it,
it was a "vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an
opportunity to "showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values."
The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who
remarked during the hearing:

We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding

circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have
a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven,
et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during
a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander
alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The defendants
demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in
the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no
pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no
statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior
Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to
allege that the celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This
was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut held inter alia:

Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we
wanted to rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all
goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our
history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and
petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the
nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a
naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public
good.23 Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an
honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which
salary, compensation or fees are attached.24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent

performance of purely public governmental duties, unless made liable by
statute.
A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or
of statute, conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, including a display
of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the air, but which
failed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was
engaged in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "adhoc body" make said commission less of a public office.

This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and
certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be
considered an office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a
continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and
not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform,
who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract
defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an
office of the person who performs the duties from an officer."

At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:
"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public
holiday, called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the
other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States statute
making a similar provision, the different departments of the government
recognize, and have recognized since the government was established, July
4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized and
celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct
the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and
love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting of

At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be

considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are present "it can

32

make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act or a
series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one
act is done, or is to be held for years or during good behavior."25

It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and
functions of the commission were various, delicate, and important; that they
could be successfully performed only by men of large experience and
knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and
provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in
their character. We think that persons performing such duties and exercising
such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to
be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they
are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are
offices. It appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers
by Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares, section
7, that "no compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners or
other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of the United States."
The only other officers provided for were the "alternates" appointed to serve
as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.

Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.26 There
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the
United States Centennial Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify its holder
as elector of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the
United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the
United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission
holds an office of trust under the United States, and that he is therefore
disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-President of the
United States.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is,
therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether
Expocorp is a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a
private corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp
arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as
CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC
Chair.27

The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved
March 3, 1871. That statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of
American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, "under the auspices
of the government of the United States," and for the constitution of a
commission, to consist of more than one delegate from each State and from
each Territory of the United States, "whose functions shall continue until
close of the exhibition," and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and
superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition." Under the
statute the commissioners are appointed by the President of the United
States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and Territories
respectively. Various duties were imposed upon the commission, and under
the statute provision was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the
exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation, the date and
place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved
June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further
increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called "The
Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with the commission and to raise
and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the
commission. The seventh section of the act provides "that the grounds for
exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in
accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United States
Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation,
governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the
rights, privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed
and established by the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant
conferring rights or privileges of any description connected with said grounds
or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made
without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and said
commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such grants,
and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums." The
tenth section of the act provides that "it shall be the duty of the United States
Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of said
corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of
the United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition."

Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any
compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as
defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is,
therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law,
which reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:

33

SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term

Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?

xxx

Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term
"compensation," which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.

(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]

Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has been held to include

allowance for personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an
honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services,
restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages.30

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a "public officer" is expressly
limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes
of determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.

How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to
be interpreted?

Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of
law, matters that are best resolved at trial.

Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner
did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee,
honorarium, or some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of
Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and compensation.31 Would such fact bear
any significance?

To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition
is not restrictive.28 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws
that define "public officers." Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example,
provides that a public officer is:

Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we
preempt the trial court from resolving them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the
Courts Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.

x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or

appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government
or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part due to close relation to a party.

29

Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, on

the other hand, states:
Officer as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person
whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise
of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When
used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or
perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, "officer"
includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the
act or exercise that function.

Footnotes
1

A.O. 223, Section 1. The same section provided for the Committees
composition as follows:
x x x. The Committee shall be composed of six (6) representatives
from the Presidential Commission for Culture and the Arts (PCCA),
and five (5) representatives from the Philippine Centennial
Foundation, Inc. (PCFI). They shall be appointed by the President
upon their nomination by their respective groups.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be
considered a "public official" whether or not one receives compensation, thus:
"Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service
including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.

The Committee members shall elect among themselves the

Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and such other officers as they may
deem necessary.

34

The Committee was also granted the following duties and powers:

study and Master Plan for said Exposition prepared by

DOUGLAS/GALLAGHER, INC. and approved by the President of
the Philippines;

1. To undertake the overall study, formulation and implementation of

programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, and media
as vehicles for value education in the context of the Centennial
Celebration;

2. To exercise oversight functions and overall jurisdiction over the

operations of EXPO 98 as well as manage and oversee all plans,
programs, and activities related to the implementation and
operation of said Exposition;

2. To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to

awareness and celebration of the centennial;

3. To regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of

utilities, services, and infrastructure works in all the site
components of EXPO 98 and its support facilities;

3. To constitute sub-committees and working groups which shall

undertake the implementation of the program and projects; and

4. To oversee the preparations for the implementation of the

participation of countries, groups, organizations, and entities at
EXPO 98;

4. To call upon the assistance of any government agency or

instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private individuals and
organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks. (Id., at
Section 2.)

5. To establish linkages with participating countries and coordinate

their programs and activities relevant to the theme of EXPO 98;

Other members of the Commission were the Secretaries of Education,

Culture and Sports, National Defense, Interior and Local Government,
Tourism, Trade and Industry, Public Works and Highways, Transportation
and Communications, and Budget and Management, the Press Secretary,
two (2) representatives each from the Senate and the House of
Representatives, two (2) representatives from the Judiciary, the Executive
Director of the National Historical Institute, three (3) representatives from the
National Commission for Culture and Arts, three (3) representatives from the
Philippine Centennial Foundation, Inc., and other members from the
government and the private sectors, "as may be designated later." (E.O. No.
128, Section 1.)
3

6. To provide and prescribe the guidelines for the design and

fabrication of the pavilions of participating countries that played a
significant role in Philippine historical development and of other
participating groups, organizations, and entities which would be
reflective of the following objectives of EXPO 98 -a) showcase the national vision of the Philippines,
highlighted by a rich history and culture, and its traditional
heritage and diverse cultural influences;

Id., at Section 5.

b) express eloquently the Filipinism sentiment of the

Philippine Centennial;

The purposes of the corporation were set forth in Article 2 of the Articles of
Incorporation, thus:

c) strengthen cultural and historical linkages between

Philippines and participating countries;

PRIMARY PURPOSE
d) create an image of the Philippines as a country with rich
trade and tourism potentials; and

To set up and establish the Philippine Centennial International

Exposition 1998 (EXPO 98), a project of the National Centennial
Commission envisioned and mandated under Executive Order No.
128, series of 1993, in the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ)
within the Provinces of Pampanga and Tarlac, Philippines as
created, defined and delineated under Proclamation No. 163, series
1993, of the President of the Philippines and furtherance of said
purpose;

e) project the Filipino character and strengthen the sense

of national pride and patriotism among the Filipino people.
7. To conceive and devise varied promotional strategies towards
creating awareness and appreciation of EXPO 98 as the
centerpiece of the national celebrations in 1998 of the centennial of
the declaration of Philippine Independence and beyond that as a
permanent site for the Filipino people to honor their rich heritage;

1. To operate, administer, manage, implement, and develop EXPO

98 conformably to and in accordance with the Detailed Feasibility

35

8. To encourage and invite the active and meaningful participation

of the private sector in managing and overseeing EXPO 98; and

(6) To acquire or obtain from any government or authority, national,

provincial, municipal or otherwise, or a corporation, company or
partnership or person, such charter, contracts, franchise, privileges,
exemption, licenses and concessions as may be conducive to any
of the objects of the corporation;

9. To forge strategic partnerships and joint ventures with local and

international investors and developers in the development,
maintenance, operation, and management of EXPO 98 on a turnkey basis.

(7) To establish and operate one or more branch offices of agencies

and to carry on any or all of its operations and business without any
restrictions as to place or amount including the right to hold,
purchase or otherwise acquire, lease, mortgage, pledge and
convey or otherwise deal in with real and personal property
anywhere within the Philippines;

SECONDARY PURPOSES
(1) To purchase, acquire, own, lease, sell and convey real
properties such as lands, buildings, factories and warehouses and
machineries, equipment and other personal properties as may be
necessary or incidental to the conduct of the corporate business,
and to pay in cash, shares of its capital stock, debentures and other
evidences of indebtedness, or other securities, as may be deemed
expedient, for any business or property acquired by the corporation.

(8) To conduct and transact any and all lawful business, and to do
or cause to be done any one or more of the acts and things herein
set forth as its purposes, within or without the Philippines, and in
any and all foreign countries, and to do everything necessary,
desirable or incidental to the accomplishment of the purposes or
the exercise of any one or more of the powers herein enumerated,
or which shall at any time appear conducive to or expedient for the
protection or benefit of this corporation.

(2) To borrow or raise money necessary to meet the financial

requirements of its business by the issuance of bonds, promissory
notes and other evidences of indebtedness, and to secure the
repayment thereof by mortgage, pledge, deed of trust or lien upon
the properties of the corporation or to issue pursuant to law shares
of its capital stock, debentures and other evidences of
indebtedness in payment for properties acquired by the corporation
or for money borrowed in the prosecution of its lawful business;
(3) To invest and deal with the money and properties of the
corporation in such manner as may from time to time be considered
wise or expedient for the advancement of its interests and to sell,
dispose of or transfer the business, properties and goodwill of the
corporation or any part thereof for such consideration and under
such terms as it shall see fit to accept;
(4) To aid in any manner any corporation, association, or trust
estate, domestic or foreign, or any firm or individual, any shares of
stock in which or any bonds, debentures, notes, securities,
evidences of indebtedness, contracts, or obligations of which are
held by or for this corporation, directly or indirectly or through other
corporations or otherwise;

Rollo, p. 10.

Id., at 134-135.

Id., at 15.

Id., at 296-297.

312 SCRA 77 (1999).

10

Art. XI, Sec. 12.

11

Art. XI, Sec. 13 (1).

12

Section 22 extends these investigatory powers, under certain conditions,

to private persons:
SEC. 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office
allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

(5) To enter into any lawful arrangement for sharing profits, union of
interest, unitization or farmout agreement, reciprocal concession, or
cooperation, with any corporation, association, partnership,
syndicate, entity, person or governmental, municipal or public
authority, domestic or foreign, in the carrying on of any business or
transaction deemed necessary, convenient or incidental to carrying
out any of the purposes of this corporation;

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the

government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his

36

Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person as

the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private
person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same
penalties and liabilities.

26

23 Am Rep. 538 (1876).

27

See Yasay vs. Desierto, 300 SCRA 494 (1998).

28

Preclaro vs. Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454 (1995).

29

Executive Order No. 292.

30

15 C.J.S. Compensation, p. 654.

31

Rollo, p. 470.

13

E.g., Fernandez vs. Ledesma, 7 SCRA 620 (1963); Aparri vs. Court of
Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984).
14

F.R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND

OFFICERS, 1.
15

Id., at 4-10. See also 63C Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees
1.
16

Id., at 4.

17

Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998).

18

Id., at Sec. 2.

19

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 1.

20

Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. x x x.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment
based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform,
through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets. x x x.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all
regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to
develop. x x x.

21

85 SCRA 599 (1978).

22

Rollo, p. 466.

23

Id, at 7, 15. See also Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees,
192 SCRA 326 (1990)
24

Id., at 13.

25

Id., at 8. Emphasis supplied.

37

government of Quezon City. Civil Service Units were created pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 51 which was allegedly signed into law on November 15
or 16, 1972.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

On February 23, 1990, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 33, stating
that Presidential Decree No. 51 was never published in the Official Gazette.
Therefore, conformably with our ruling in Tanada vs.Tuvera 3 the presidential
decree is deemed never "in force or effect and therefore cannot at present, be a
basis for establishment of the CSUs . . . ." 4

EN BANC

On June 4, 1990, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular

No. 30, directing all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and
disapprove within one year from issuance of the said Memorandum, all
appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the
ground that the same never became law. Among those affected by the
revocation of appointments are private respondents in these three petitions.

G.R. No. 124374 December 15, 1999

ISMAEL A. MATHAY JR., in his capacity as MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EDUARDO A. TAN,
LOURDES M. DE GUZMAN, MANUEL CHUA, ANSELMO MATEO, CHRISTOPHER
SANTOS, BUENAVENTURA PUNAY, ENRICO BANDILLA, FELINO CAMACHO,
DANTE E. DEOQUINO, JAIME P. URCIA, JESUS B. REGONDOLA, ROMUALDO
LIBERATO, CESAR FRANCISCO, WILLIAM PANTI, JR., MICHAEL A. JACINTO
and CESAR DACIO, respondents.

For Quezon City CSU employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily
cushioned by the enactment of City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990,
which established the Department of Public Order and Safety ("DPOS").
At the heart of these petitions is Section 3 of the Ordinance which provides:

G.R. No. 126354 December 15, 1999

Sec. 3. The present personnel of the Civil Security Unit, Traffic

Management Unit, Anti-Squatting and Surveillance and
Enforcement Team, and Disaster Coordinating Council are
hereby absorbed into the department of public order and
safety established under Section one hereof to be given
appropriate position titles without reduction in salary, seniority
rights and other benefits. Funds provided for in the 1990
Budget for the absorbed offices shall be used as the initial
budgetary allocation of the Department. (Emphasis ours).

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 126366 December 15, 1999
ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., in his capacity as MAYOR OF QUEZON
CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and SANDY C. MARQUEZ,
respondents.

Despite the provision on absorption, the regular and permanent positions in the
DPOS were not filled due to lack of funds for the new DPOS and the
insufficiency of regular and permanent positions created.
Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the situation by offering private respondents
contractual appointments for the period of June 5, 1991 to December 31, 1991.
The appointments were renewed by Mayor Simon for the period of January 1,
1992 to June 30, 1992.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before this Court are three, consolidated petitions 1 filed under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

On May 11, 1992, petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon
City. On July 1, 1992, Mayor Mathay again renewed the contractual
appointments of all private respondents effective July 1 to July 31, 1992. Upon
their expiry, these appointments, however, were no longer renewed.

The facts behind the consolidated petitions are undisputed.

During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed
private respondents 2 to positions in the Civil Service Unit ("CSU") of the local

38

The non-renewal by Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of private

respondents' appointments became the seed of discontent from which these
three consolidated petitions grew.

The provisions of B.P. 337 are clear. As stated above, the power to appoint is
vested in the local chief executive. 9 The power of the city council
or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited
to creating, consolidatingand reorganizing city officers and positions
supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. This is
clear from Section 177 of B.P. 337 which lists the powers of the sanggunian.
The power to appoint is not one of them. Expressio inius est exclusio
alterius. 10 Had Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city
council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no uncertain
terms.

We discuss the merits of the petitions of Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. jointly.
G.R. No. 124374 and G.R. No. 126366
After the non-renewal of their appointments, private respondents in these two
petitions appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The CSC issued separate
resolutions holding that the reappointment of private respondents to the DPOS
was automatic, pursuant to the provision on absorption in Quezon City
Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, 5 and ordering their reinstatement to
their former positions in the DPOS.6 Petitioner brought petitions for certiorari to
this Court, 7 to annul the resolutions but, in accordance with Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the petition were referred to the Court of
Appeals. As stated, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for certiorari.

By ordering petitioner to "reinstate" private respondents pursuant to

Section 3 of the Ordinance, the Civil Service Commission substituted its own
judgment for that of the appointing power. This cannot be done. In a long line of
cases, 11 we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commission's power
is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not have the
authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made. Once
the Civil Service Commission attests whether the person chosen to fill a vacant
position is eligible, its role in the appointment process necessarily ends. The
Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the
appointing authority.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
erred when it ruled that respondent Civil Service Commission has the authority
to direct him to "reinstate" private respondents in the DPOS.

The Civil Service Commission argues that it is not substituting its judgment for
that of the appointing power and that it is merely implementing Section 3 of
Ordinance NC-140.

We agree with petitioner.

The law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old Local Government Code and not the
Local Government Code of 1992 which became effective only on January 1,
1992, when the material events in this case transpired.

The Ordinance refers to the "personnel of the CSU", the identities of which
could not be mistaken. The resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
likewise call for the reinstatement of named individuals. There being no issue
as to who are to sit in the newly created DPOS, there is therefore no room left
for the exercise of discretion. In Farinas vs. Barba, 12 we held that the
appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended by
the sanggunian concerned, since the power of appointment is a discretionary
power.

Applying the said law, we find that the Civil Service Commission erred when it
applied the directives of Ordinance NC-140 and in so doing ordered petitioner
to "reinstate" private respondents to positions in the DPOS. Section 3 of the
said Ordinance is invalid for being inconsistent with B.P. 337. We note that
Section 3 of the questioned Ordinance directs the absorption of
the personnel of the defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The Ordinance refers to
personnel and not to positions. Hence, the city council orsanggunian, through
the Ordinance, is in effect dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS
positions. However, a review of the provisions of B.P. 337 shows that the power
to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be
usurped by the city council or sanggunianthrough the simple expedient of
enacting ordinances that provide for the "absorption" of specific persons to
certain positions.

When the Civil Service Commission ordered the reinstatement of private

respondents, it technically issued a new appointment. 13 This task, i.e. of
appointment, is essentially discretionary and cannot be controlled even by the
courts as long as it is properly and not arbitrarily exercised by the appointing
authority.
In Apurillo vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that "appointment is
essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested." 14

In upholding the provisions of the Ordinance on the automatic absorption of

the personnel of the CSU into the DPOS without allowance for the exercise of
discretion on the part of the City Mayor, the Court of Appeals makes the
sweeping statement that "the doctrine of separation of powers is not applicable
to local governments." 8 We are unable to agree. The powers of the city council
and the city mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated by B.P.
337.

The above premises considered, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has
no power to order petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr., to reinstate private
respondents.

39

Petitioner similarly assails as error the Court of Appeals' ruling that private
respondents should be automatically absorbed in the DPOS pursuant to
Section 3 of the Ordinance.

not come into existence as the Presidential Decree creating it never became
law.
At the most, private respondents held temporary and contractual appointments.
The non-renewal of these appointments cannot therefore be taken against
petitioner. In Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission 20 we treated
temporary appointments as follows:

In its decision of March 21, 1996 the Court of Appeals held:

It is clear however, that Ordinance No. NC-140, absorbing the
"present personnel of the Civil Security Agent Unit" in the
DPOS was earlier enacted, particularly on March 27, 1990,
thus,private respondents were still holders of de jure
appointments as permanent regular employees at the time,
and therefore, by operation of said Ordinance private
respondentswere automatically absorbed in the DPOS
effectively as of March 27, 1990. 15 (Emphasis ours.)

The acceptance by the petitioner of a temporary appointment

resulted in the termination of official relationship with his
former permanent position. When the temporary appointment
was not renewed, the petitioner had no cause to demand
reinstatement thereto. (Emphasis ours.)
Another argument against the concept of automatic absorption is the physical
and legal impossibility given the number of available positions in the DPOS and
the number of personnel to be absorbed. 21 We note that Section 1 of Ordinance
NC-140 provides:

The decision is based on the wrong premise.

Even assuming the validity of Section 3 of the Ordinance, the absorption
contemplated therein is not possible. Since the CSU never legally came into
existence, the private respondents never held permanent positions.
Accordingly, as petitioner correctly points out, 16 the private respondents'
appointments in the defunct CSU

There is hereby established in the Quezon City Government

the Department of Public Order and Safety whose
organization, structure, duties, functions and responsibilities
are as provided or defined in the attached supporting
documents consisting of eighteen (18) pages which are made
integral parts of this Ordinance.

were invalid ab initio. Their seniority and permanent status did

not arise since they have no valid appointment. For then to
enter the Civil Service after the revocation and cancellation of
their invalid appointment, they have to be extended an original
appointment, subject again to the attesting power of the Civil
Service Commission.

A review of the supporting documents shows that Ordinance No. NC-140

allowed only two slots for the position of Security Officer II with a monthly
salary of P4,418.00 and four slots for the position of Security Agent with a
monthly salary of P3,102.00. The limited number of slots provided in the
Ordinance renders automatic absorption unattainable, considering that in the
defunct CSU there are twenty Security Officers with a monthly salary of
P4,418.00 and six Security Agents with a monthly salary of P3,102.00. Clearly,
the positions created in the DPOS are not sufficient to accommodate the
personnel of the defunct CSU, making automatic absorption impossible.

Being then not members of the Civil Service as of June 4,

1991, they cannot be automatically
absorbed/reappointed/appointed/reinstated into the newly
created DPOS. (Emphasis ours).
It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right
exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring
it. 17 Since Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU never became law, it could
not be a source of rights. Neither could it impose duties. It could not afford any
protection. It did not create an office. It is as inoperative as though it was never
passed.

Considering that private respondents did not legally hold valid positions in the
CSU, for lack of a law creating it, or the DPOS, for lack of a permanent
appointment to the said agency, it becomes unnecessary to discuss whether
their acceptance of the contractual appointments constitutes an
"abandonment" or "waiver" of such positions. It escapes us how one can
"relinquish" or "renounce" a right one never possessed. A person waiving must
actually have the right which he is renouncing.

In Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission 18 we held that "a void appointment
cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the
appointment."

G.R. 126354
In this case, petitioner, Civil Service Commission seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals of July 5, 1996, which overturned CSC
Resolution Nos. 955040 and 932732 and held that the Civil Service Commission

While the Court of Appeals was correct when it stated that "the abolition of an
office does not mean the invalidity of appointments thereto," 19 this cannot
apply to the case at bar. In this case, the CSU was not abolished. It simply did

40

has no authority to compel the mayor of Quezon City to "reinstate" Jovito C.

Labajo to the DPOS.
The standing of petitioner Civil Service Commission to bring this present
appeal is questionable.

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously

departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated
functions is to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review
decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," 29 not to litigate.

We note that the person adversely affected by the Court of Appeals decision,
Jovito C. Labajo has optednot to appeal.

Therefore, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has no legal standing to
prosecute G.R. No. 126354.

Basic is the rule that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest." 22 A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.

WHEREFORE, the petitions of Ismael A. Mathay in G.R. No. 124374 and G.R. No.
126366 are GRANTED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals dated March
21, 1996 and January 15, 1996 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petition of the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 126354 is DISMISSED
for lack of legal standing to sue. The assailed decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated July 5, 1996 is AFFIRMED.

In Ralla vs. Ralla we defined interest as "material interest, an interest in issue

and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or mere incidental interest." 23 As a general rule, one having
no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a
party-plaintiff in an action.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, it is evident that Jovito C. Labajo, not the Civil Service
Commission, is the real party in interest. It is Jovito C. Labajo who will be
benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement.

Davide, Jr., C. J., Bellosillo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.

We are aware of our pronouncements in the recent case of Civil Service

Commission v. Pedro Dacoycoy24 which overturned our rulings in Paredes
vs. Civil Service Commission 25 Mendez vs. Civil Service
Commission26 and Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission. 27 In Dacoycoy, we
affirmed the right of the Civil Service Commission to bring an appeal as the
aggrieved party affected by a ruling which may seriously prejudice the civil
service system.

Melo and Vitug, JJ., in the result.

Footnotes
1 In G.R. No. 124374, petitioner Mayor Mathay questions the decision of
the Court of Appeals which upheld Resolution No. 95-3003 dated April
25, 1995 of the Civil Service Commission and ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions at the
Department of Public Order and Safety ("DPOS") under permanent
status or to comparable positions in the said agency.

The aforementioned case, however, is different from the case at

bar. Dacoycoy was an administrative case involving nepotism whose
deleterious effect on government cannot be over emphasized. The subject of
the present case, on the other hand, is "reinstatement."

In G.R. No, 126354, petitioner Civil Service Commission assails

the decision of the Court of Appeals which annulled and set
aside its Resolution Nos. 955040 and 93-2732.

We fail to see how the present petition, involving as it does the reinstatement or
non-reinstatement of one obviously reluctant to litigate, can impair the
effectiveness of government. Accordingly, the ruling inDacoycoy does not
apply.

In G.R. No, 126366, the assailed decision of the 15th Division

of the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part of public
respondent Civil Service Commission when it issued
Resolution Nos. 92-1974 and 94-0902 ordering petitioner
Ismael A. Mathay to reinstate private respondent Sandy
Marquez to a position in the DPOS without dimunition in salary
or position.

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought
before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as
a nominal party. As a quasi-judical body, the Civil Service Commission can be
likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is
appealed to a higher court for review." 28

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2 In G.R. No. 124374 Private respondents are Eduardo A. Tan, Lourdes

M. de Guzman, Manuel Chua, Anselmo Mateo, Christopher Santos,
Buenaventura Punay, Enrico Bandilla, Felino Camacho, Dante E.
Deoquino, Jaime P. Urcia, Jesus B. Regondola, Romualdo Liberato,
Cesar Franciso, William Panti Jr., Michael A. Jacinto and Cesar Dacio.
In G.R. No. 126366 private respondent is Sandy Marquez. In G.R. No.
126354 there is no private respondent (Jovito C. Labajo did not appeal
from the order of the Court of Appeals).

16 Rollo (G.R. 12633), p. 32.

3 148 SCRA 446 (1986).

20 197 SCRA 168 (1991).

4 Opinion No. 33 of the Secretary of Justice, February 1991.

21 The defunct CSU consisted of 64 positions, to wit:

5 CSC Resolution No. 92-1974 (G.R. No. 126366).

Number of Positions Title of Position Monthly Salary

17 Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 234 (1984).

18 263 SCRA 184 (1996).
19 Rollo (G.R. 126366), p. 21.

6 CSC Resolution No. 95-3003 (G.R. Jo. 124374).

1 Office Head P12,650.00

7 G.R. Nos. 114320 and 120442.

1 Assistant Dept. Head III P11,385.00

8 Page 8 of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals Decision

dated January 15, 1996 citingSinco. Political Law, 1949 ed. pp. 154155 citing State vs. City of Maulcato, 136 N.W. 164, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 111;
People vs. Provinces 35 Cal. 520.

2 Security Officer IV P8,250.00

20 Security Officer II P4,418.00
2 Security Agent II P3,102.00

9 Sec. 1719 of B.P. 337 provides that, "the city mayor shall . . . appoint
in accordance with Civil Service law, rules and regulations all officers
and employees of the city, whose appointments are not otherwise
provided in this Code."

9 Security Agent I P2,752.00

24 Security Guard II P2,355.00

10 The express mention of one thing in a law will, as a general rue,

mean the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule as a
guide to probable legislative intent is based upon rules of logic and the
natural workings of the human mind (Tavora vs. Gavina, 79 Phil. 421).

1 Clerk III P2,473.00

2 Clerk II P2,250.00

11 Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, 189 SCRA 459 (1990);

Villanueva vs. Balallo, 9 SCRA 407 (1963); Santos vs. Chito, 25 SCRA
343 (1968); Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee, 46 SCRA 728 (1972); Luego
vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 (1986); Central Bank vs.
Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 741 (1989).

1 Driver P2,250.00
1 Utility Worker P2,000.00

12 256 SCRA 396 (1996).

64 Positions
13 Gloria vs. Judge de Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, October 6, 1995.
While the Intelligence and Security Division of the DPOS created to
replace the defunct CSU (p. 1 of Ordinance NC-130) is composed of the
following positions:

14 227 SCRA 320 (1994).

15 Rollo (G.R. 124374), p. 47.

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Number of Position Title of Position Monthly Salary

26 204 SCRA 965 (1991).

1 Chief, Intelligence &

27 215 SCRA 389 (1992).

Security Officer P10,135.00

28 Judge Calderon vs. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 (1992).

1 Asst. Chief Intelligence

29 Chapter 3, Section 12 (11). The Revised Administrative Code of 1987

on the Civil Service Commission.

& Security Officer P8,250.00

1 Security Officer III P5,670.00
1 Special Police Area
Supervisor P5,670.00
1 Security Officer II P4,418.00
1 Asst. Spl. Police Area Sv P4,418.00
4 Security Agent II P3,102.00
60 Security Agent I P2,752.00
1 Clerk III P2,473.00
10 Special Police Corporal P2,473.00
1 Clerk II P2,250.00
200 Special Policemen P2,250.00

282 Positions
22 Rule 3, Section 2, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
23 199 SCRA 497 (1991).
24 G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999.
25 192 SCRA 84 (1990).

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