SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 175507, October 08, 2014

RAMON CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, v. JOSEPH
CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE1 AND LUCINA SANTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the
plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 2 and resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86818, which upheld the (1) order 4 dated November 22, 2002
dismissing Civil Case No. 02-103319 without prejudice, and (2) the omnibus order 5 dated July
30, 2004, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Both orders were issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6.6
The issues before this court are procedural. However, the factual antecedents in this case,
which stemmed from a complicated family feud, must be stated to give context to its
procedural development.
It is alleged that Antonio Ching owned several businesses and properties, among which was Po
Wing Properties, Incorporated (Po Wing Properties).7 His total assets are alleged to have been
worth more than P380 million.8 It is also alleged that while he was unmarried, he had children
from two women.9
Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio Ching with his common-law wife,
Lucina Santos.10 She, however, disputed this. She maintains that even if Ramon Ching's birth
certificate indicates that he was Antonio Ching's illegitimate child, she and Antonio Ching
merely adopted him and treated him like their own.11
Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand, claim to be Antonio Ching's illegitimate
children with his housemaid, Mercedes Igne.12 While Ramon Ching disputed this,13 both
Mercedes and Lucina have not.14

Lucina Santos alleged that when Antonio Ching fell ill sometime in 1996, he entrusted her
with the distribution of his estate to his heirs if something were to happen to him. She alleged
that she handed all the property titles and business documents to-Ramon Ching for
safekeeping.15 Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from illness and allegedly demanded that
Ramon Ching return all the titles to the properties and business documents.16
On July 18, .1996, Antonio Ching was murdered.17 Ramon Ching allegedly induced Mercedes
igne and her children, Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, to sign an agreement and waiver 18 to
Antonio Ching's estate in consideration of P22.5 million. Mercedes Igne's children alleged that
Ramon Ching never paid them.19 On October 29, 1996, Ramon Ching allegedly executed an
affidavit of settlement of estate,20 naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon
himself the entirety of Antonio Ching's estate.21
Ramon Ching denied these allegations and insisted that when Antonio Ching died, the Ching
family association, headed by Vicente Cheng, unduly influenced him to give Mercedes Igne
and her children financial aid considering that they served Antonio Ching for years. It was for
this reason that an agreement and waiver in consideration of P22.5 million was made. He also
alleged that he was summoned by the family association to execute an affidavit of settlement
of estate declaring him to be Antonio Ching's sole heir.22
After a year of investigating Antonio Ching's death, the police found Ramon Ching to be its
primary suspect.23 Information24 was filed against him, and a warrant of arrest 25cralawred
was issued.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91046 (the first case).26
On March 22, 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave of court, to implead additional
defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon Ching was a primary stockholder.
The amended complaint was for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement
of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction."27 Sometime after, Lucina
Santos filed a motion for intervention and was allowed to intervene.28
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter.29
On November 13, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, granted the motion to

dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.30 Upon motion of the
Chengs' counsel, however, the Chengs and Lucina Santos were given fifteen (15) days to file
the appropriate pleading. They did not do so.31
On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of
Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by
Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. 32 This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103319 (the second case) and raffled to Branch 20 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.33
When Branch 20 was made aware of the first case, it issued an order transferring the case to
Branch 6, considering that the case before it involved substantially the same parties and causes
of action.34
On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their
complaint in the second case, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice.35
On November 22, 2002, Branch 6 issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the basis
that the summons had not yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they
had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The dismissal of the second case was made without
prejudice.36
On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dated November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal should
have been with prejudice under the "two-dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.37
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit
of Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with
Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 (the third case) and was
eventually raffled to Branch 6.38
On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed their comment/opposition
to the application for temporary restraining order in the third case. They also filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of res jiidicata, litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. A series of responsive pleadings were filed by both

parties.39
On July 30, 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus order 40 resolving both the motion for
reconsideration in the second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. The trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration and the motion to dismiss, holding that the dismissal of
the second case was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the filing of the third case.41
On October 8, 2004, while their motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending,
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a petition for certiorari (the first certiorari case)
with the Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated November 22, 2002 and the portion of the
omnibus order dated July 30,.2004, which upheld the dismissal of the second case.42
On December 28, 2004, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration
in the third case. The denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to file a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with application for a writ of preliminary injunction or the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (the second certiorari case) with the Court of
Appeals.43
On March 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision 44 in the first certiorari case
dismissing the petition. The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties'
reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was misplaced since the rule involves two motions for
dismissals filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the dismissal of the first case
was upon the motion of the defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was at the
instance of the plaintiffs.45
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, 46 Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties
filed this present petition for review47 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties argue that the dismissal of the second case was with
prejudice since the non-filing of an amended complaint in the first case operated as a dismissal
on the merits.48 They also argue that the second case should be dismissed on the ground of res
judicatasince there was a previous final judgment of the first case involving the same parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.49
Lucina Santos was able to file a comment50 on the petition within the period required.51 The
Chengs, however, did not comply.52 Upon the issuance by this court of a show cause order on
September 24, 2007,53 they eventually filed a comment with substantially the same allegations
and arguments as that of Lucina Santos'.54

In their comment, respondents allege that when the trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
Ramon Ching's counsel was notified in open court that the dismissal was without prejudice.
They argue that the trial court's order became final and executory when he failed to file his
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.55
Respondents argue that the petition for review should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping and litis pendencia. since Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties are seeking relief
simultaneously in two forums by filing the two petitions for certiorari, which involved the
same omnibus order by the trial court. 56 They also argue that the "two-dismissal rule" and res
judicata did not apply since (1) the failure to amend a complaint is not a dismissal, and (2)
they only moved for dismissal once in the second case.57
In their reply,58 petitioners argue that they did not commit forum shopping since the actions
they commenced against respondents stemmed from the complaints filed against them in the
trial courts.59 They reiterate that their petition for review is only about the second case; it just
so happened that the assailed omnibus order resolved both the second and third cases.60

SEC. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for
summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the
dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that
a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.
SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. Except as provided in the preceding section, a
complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded
by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for dismissal, the
dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.

Upon the filing of the parties' respective memoranda,61 the case was submitted for decision.62
For this court's resolution are the following issues:
I.

Whether the trial court's dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a
third case, as per the "two-dismissal rule"; and

II.

Whether respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the third case while
the motion for reconsideration of the second case was still pending.

The petition is denied.

The "two-dismissal rule" vis-a-vis
the Rules of Civil Procedure
Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
pertinent provisions state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RULE 17
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of
the case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done through
notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless
otherwise declared by the court.
The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been pleaded
by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. It requires
leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by
the court.
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to
prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu
propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.

In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the
defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16,
which covers motions to dismiss.63
64

In Insular Veneer, Inc. v. Hon. Plan, Consolidated Logging and Lumber Mills filed a
complaint against Insular Veneer to recover some logs the former had delivered to the latter. It
also filed ex parte a motion for issuance of a restraining order. The complaint and motion
were filed in a trial court in Isabela.65
The trial court granted the motion and treated the restraining order as a writ of preliminary
injunction. When Consolidated Logging recovered the logs, it filed a notice of dismissal under
Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure.66
While the action on its notice for dismissal was pending, Consolidated Logging filed the same
complaint against Insular Veneer, this time in a trial court in Manila. It did not mention any
previous action pending in the Isabela court.67
The Manila court eventually dismissed the complaint due to the non-appearance of
Consolidated Logging's counsel during pre-trial. Consolidated Logging subsequently returned
to the Isabela court to revive the same complaint. The Isabela court apparently treated the
filing of the amended complaint as a withdrawal of its notice of dismissal.68
Insular Veneer also filed in the Isabela court a motion to dismiss, arguing that the dismissal by
the Manila court constituted res judicata over the case. The Isabela court, presided over by
Judge Plan, denied the motion to dismiss. The dismissal was the subject of the petition for
certiorari and mandamus with this court.69
This court stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In resolving that issue, we are confronted with the unarguable fact that Consolidated Logging
on its volition dismissed its action for damages and injunction in the Isabela court and refiled
substantially the same action in the Manila court. Then, when the Manila court dismissed its
action for failure to prosecute, it went hack [sic] to the Isabela court and revived its old action
by means of an amended complaint.
Consolidated Logging would like to forget the Manila case, consign it to oblivion as if it were
a bad dream, and prosecute its amended complaint in the Isabela court as if nothing had
transpired in the Manila court. We hold that it cannot elude the effects of its conduct in junking

the Isabela case and in giving that case a reincarnation in the Manila court. Consolidated
Logging' [sic] filed a new case in Manila at its own risk. Its lawyer at his peril failed to appear
at the pre-trial.70chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This court ruled that the filing of the amended complaint in the Isabela court was barred by the
prior dismissal of the Manila court, stating that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The provision in section 1(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that an action may be dismissed
because "there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause"
presupposes that two similar actions are simultaneously pending in two different Courts of
First Instance. Lis pendens as a ground for a motion to dismiss has the same requisites as the
plea of res judicata.
On the other hand, when a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned.
The original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on
the amended pleading only. So, when Consolidated Logging filed its amended complaint dated
March 16, 1970 in Civil Case No. 2158, the prior dismissal order dated January 5, 1970 in the
Manila case could he [sic] interposed in the Isabela court to support the defense of res
judicata.71chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it
is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate
as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the
following requisites must be present:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the
ground
that
the
latter
paid
and
satisfied
all
the
claims
of
the
72
former. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." 73 When a complaint
is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
The dismissal of the second case
was without prejudice in view of the
"two-dismissal rule"

Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not
only new defendants but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special
proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
The trial court granted that motion to dismiss, stating that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A careful perusal of the allegations of the Amended Complaint dated February 10, 1999, filed
by Plaintiff Joseph Cheng, show that additional causes of action were incorporated i.e. extrajudicial settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio Ching and receivership, subject matters,
which should be threshed out in a special proceedings case. This is a clear departure from the
main cause of action in the original complaint which is for declaration of nullity of certificate
of titles with damages. And the rules of procedure which govern special proceedings case are
different and distinct from the rules of procedure applicable in an ordinary civil action.

that had no bearing on the dismissal of the case.

Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it
does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since
there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiffs default, the trial court's instruction to file the
appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate
pleading, the trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still
stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section
1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

In view of the afore-going, the court finds the Motion to Dismiss filed by Atty. Maria Lina
Nieva S. Casals to be meritorious and the Court is left with no alternative but to dismiss as it
hereby dismisses the Amended Complaint.

....

However, on motion of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias, counsel for the plaintiffs, he is given a
period of fifteen (15) days from today, within which to file an appropriate pleading, copy
furnished to all the parties concerned.

....

(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;chanrobleslaw

Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the same action or claim subject to
certain exceptions.

....
SO ORDERED.74
Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias failed to file the appropriate
pleading within fifteen (15) days, he violated the order of the court. This, they argue, made the
original dismissal an adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e.,
a dismissal through the default of the plaintiff. Hence, they argue that when respondents filed
the second case and then caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with prejudice
according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the same claim.
Unfortunately, petitioners' theory is erroneous.
The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants. When it allowed Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days to file
an appropriate pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a request made by the plaintiffs counsel

Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the same claim that
had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to
dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the
plaintiffs instance.
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the
service of any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of
right that is not subject to the trial court's discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction and
Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty and Development Corporation:76
[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff
under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs.Even if the motion
cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider
the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right,
regardless of ground77 (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For this reason, the trial court issued its order dated November 22, 2002 dismissing the
case, without prejudice. The order states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When this Motion was called for hearing, all the plaintiffs namely, Joseph Cheng, Jaime
Cheng, Mercedes Igne and Lucina Santos appeared without their counsels. That they verbally
affirmed the execution of the Motion to Dismiss, as shown by their signatures over their
respective names reflected thereat. Similarly, none of the defendants appeared, except the
counsel for defendant, Ramon Chang [sic], who manifested that they have not yet filed their
Answer as there was a defect in the address of Ramon Cheng [sic] and the latter has not yet
been served with summons.
Under the circumstances, and further considering that the defendants herein have not yet filed
their Answers nor any pleading, the plaintiffs has [sic] the right to out rightly [sic] cause the
dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
without prejudice. Thereby, and as prayed for, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.78 (Emphasis supplied)
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one
prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the
defendants. While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does
not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be
examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this case.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file
the appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered as one without
prejudice. InGomez v. Alcantara:79
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and
is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise
provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case
for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to
the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly
contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.80 (Emphasis supplied)

In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court specifically orders the dismissal to
be without prejudice. It is only when the trial court's order either is silent on the matter, or
states otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an adjudication on the merits.
However, while the dismissal of the second case was without prejudice, respondents' act of
filing the third case while petitioners' motion for reconsideration was still pending constituted
forum shopping.
The rule against forum shopping
and the "twin-dismissal rule"
In Yap v. Chua:81
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be
resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one
forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special
civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. What is critical is the
vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule
on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the
process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora
upon the same issues. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a
ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining
forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.82(Emphasis supplied)
When respondents filed the third case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
of the second case was still pending. Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final since it
could still be overturned upon reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court.
Moreover, petitioners were not prohibited from filing the motion for reconsideration. This
court has already stated in Narciso v. Garcia83 that a defendant has the right to file a motion for
reconsideration of a trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss since "[n]o rule prohibits

the filing of such a motion for reconsideration."84 The second case, therefore, was still pending
when the third case was filed.
The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to wait until the final disposition of
the second case before filing the third case. As it stands, the dismissal of the second case was
without prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure. In their haste to file the third case, however, they unfortunately transgressed certain
procedural safeguards, among which are the rules on litis pendentia and res judicata.
In Yap:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the
second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying principle of litis pendentia
is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy
that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once,
in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the
rights and status of persons.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment
in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.85 (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no question that there was an identity of parties, rights, and reliefs in the second and
third cases. While it may be true that the trial court already dismissed the second case when the
third case was filed, it failed to take into account that a motion for reconsideration was filed in
the second case and, thus, was still pending. Considering that the dismissal of the second case
was the subject of the first certiorari case and this present petition for review, it can be
reasonably concluded that the second case, to this day, remains pending.
Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged in forum shopping. Any judgment
by this court on the propriety of the dismissal of the second case will inevitably affect the
disposition of the third case.
This, in fact, is the reason why there were two different petitions for certiorari before the
appellate court. The omnibus order dated July 30, 2004 denied two pending motions by

petitioners: (1) the motion for reconsideration in the second case and (2) the motion to dismiss
in the third case. Since petitioners are barred from filing a second motion for reconsideration
of the second case, the first certiorari case was filed before the appellate court and is now the
subject of this review.
The denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration in the third case, however, could still be
the subject of a separate petition for certiorari. That petition would be based now on the third
case, and not on the second case.
This multiplicity of suits is the very evil sought to be avoided by the rule on forum shopping.
In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc.,86 the rule is that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the
petition pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court.
This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly
administration of justice.87 (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. Lopez, Jr.88 In Buan, petitioners filed a
petition for prohibition with this court while another petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction was pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila involving the same parties
and based on the same set of facts. This court, in dismissing both actions,
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions . . . have incurred not only the sanction of dismissal of
their case before this Court in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also the
punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions, that in this Court and that in the Regional
Trial Court as well. Quite recently, upon substantially identical factual premises, the Court en
banc had occasion to condemn and penalize the act of litigants of filing the same suit in
different courts, aptly described as "forum-shopping[.]"89chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by dismissing all pending actions on the same
claim filed in any court. Accordingly, the grant of this petition would inevitably result in the
summary dismissal of the third case. Any action, therefore, which originates from the third
case pending with any court would be barred by res judicata.
Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an examination must first.be made on the
purpose of the rule. Parties resort to forum shopping when they file several actions of the same
claim in different forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable result. It is prohibited by the
courts as it "trifle[s] with the orderly administration of justice."90

G.R. No. 199990, February 04, 2015

In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became final and executory upon the
failure of respondents' counsel to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the correct pleading
the second time around but eventually sought its dismissal as they "[suspected] that their
counsel is not amply protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost three (3)
years."91 The filing of the third case, therefore, was not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable result but only to get the case moving, in an attempt to protect their rights.
It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original controversy between the parties has
long been mired in numerous procedural entanglements. While it might be more judicially
expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and disallow the proceedings in the third case to
continue, it would not serve the ends of substantial justice. Courts of justice must always
endeavor to resolve cases on their merits, rather than summarily dismiss these on
technicalities:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SPOUSES ROLANDO AND HERMINIA SALVADOR, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES

ROGELIO AND ELIZABETH RABAJA AND ROSARIO GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 22, 2011
Decision1 and the January 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 90296 which affirmed with modification the March 29, 2007 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 214 (RTC-Branch 214), Mandaluyong City in Civil Case No. MC-03-2175,
for rescission of a contract (rescission case).

[C]ases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been given full opportunity
to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections.
In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A
strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules
[on Civil Procedure] shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring
the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 92 (Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be shown that (1) the original
case has been dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2) the only
pending matter is a motion for reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that
serve the goal of substantial justice for the fresh new case to proceed.

Sometime in July 1998, Spouses Rabaja learned that Spouses Salvador were looking for a
buyer of the subject property. Petitioner Herminia Salvador (Herminia) personally introduced
Gonzales to them as the administrator of the said property. Spouses Salvador even handed to
Gonzales the owners duplicate certificate of title over the subject property. On July, 3, 1998,
Spouses Rabaja made an initial payment of P48,000.00 to Gonzales in the presence of
Herminia. Gonzales then presented the Special Power of Attorney3 (SPA), executed by Rolando
Salvador (Rolando) and dated July 24, 1998. On the same day, the parties executed the
Contract to Sell4 which stipulated that for a consideration of P5,000,000.00, Spouses Salvador
sold, transferred and conveyed in favor of Spouses Rabaja the subject property. Spouses
Rabaja made several payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by Gonzales
pursuant to the SPA provided earlier as evidenced by the check vouchers signed by Gonzales
and the improvised receipts signed by Herminia.

The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since been dismissed and is now
the subject of a petition for certiorari. The third case filed apparently contains the better cause
of action for the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel they are more comfortable
with. Substantial justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim to the labyrinth
in the procedures that their travails led them. It is for this reason that we deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6 is
ordered to proceed with Civil Case No. 02-105251 with due and deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrar

This case stemmed from a dispute involving the sellers, petitioner spouses Rolando and
Herminia Salvador (Spouses Salvador); the sellers agent, Rosario Gonzales (Gonzales); and
the buyers, respondent Spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja (Spouses Rabaja), over a parcel
of land situated at No. 25, Merryland Village, 375 Jose Rizal Street, Mandaluyong City
(subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13426 and registered in
the names of Spouses Salvador. From 1994 until 2002, Spouses Rabaja were leasing an
apartment in the subject lot.

Sometime in June 1999, however, Spouses Salvador complained to Spouses Rabaja that they

did not receive any payment from Gonzales. This prompted Spouses Rabaja to suspend further
payment of the purchase price; and as a consequence, they received a notice to vacate the
subject property from Spouses Salvador for non-payment of rentals.

attend. Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial order14declaring Spouses Salvador in default
and allowing Spouses Rabaja to present their evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador and
Gonzales to present evidence in her favor.

Thereafter, Spouses Salvador instituted an action for ejectment against Spouses Rabaja. In
turn, Spouses Rabaja filed an action for rescission of contract against Spouses Salvador and
Gonzales, the subject matter of the present petition.

A motion for reconsideration,15 dated March 28, 2005, was filed by Spouses Salvador on the
said pre-trial order beseeching the liberality of the court. The rescission case was then reraffled to RTC-Br. 214 after the Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 212 inhibited herself. In the
Order,16 dated October 24, 2005, the RTC-Br. 214 denied the motion for reconsideration
because Spouses Salvador provided a flimsy excuse for their non-appearance in the pre-trial
conference.

In the action for ejectment, the complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 (MeTC), where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 17344. In its
August 14, 2002 Decision,5 the MeTC ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador finding that valid
grounds existed for the eviction of Spouses Rabaja from the subject property and ordering
them to pay back rentals. Spouses Salvador were able to garnish the amount of
P593,400.006 from Spouses Rabajas time deposit account pursuant to a writ of execution
issued by the MeTC.7 Spouses Rabaja appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212,
Mandaluyong City (RTC-Br. 212) which reversed the MeTC ruling in its March 1, 2005
decision.8 The RTC-Br. 212 found that no lease agreement existed between the parties.
Thereafter, Spouses Salvador filed an appeal with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 89259. On March 31, 2006, the CA ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador and reinstated the
MeTC ruling ejecting Spouses Rabaja.9 Not having been appealed, the CA decision in CAG.R. SP No. 89259 became final and executory on May 12, 2006.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, the rescission case filed by Spouses Rabaja against Spouses Salvador and
Gonzales and docketed as Civil Case No. MC No. 03-2175 was also raffled to RTC-Br. 212. In
their complaint,11dated July 7, 2003, Spouses Rabaja demanded the rescission of the contract to
sell praying that the amount of P950,000.00 they previously paid to Spouses Salvador be
returned to them. They likewise prayed that damages be awarded due to the contractual breach
committed by Spouses Salvador.
Spouses Salvador filed their answer with counterclaim and cross-claim 12 contending that there
was no meeting of the minds between the parties and that the SPA in favor of Gonzales was
falsified. In fact, they filed a case for falsification against Gonzales, but it was dismissed
because the original of the alleged falsified SPA could not be produced. They further averred
that they did not receive any payment from Spouses Rabaja through Gonzales. In her defense,
Gonzales filed her answer13 stating that the SPA was not falsified and that the payments of
Spouses Rabaja amounting to P950,000.00 were all handed over to Spouses Salvador.
The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle the case were unsuccessful. It
was formally reset to February 4, 2005, but Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to

Thereafter, trial proceeded and Spouses Rabaja and Gonzales presented their respective
testimonial and documentary evidence.
RTC Ruling
On March 29, 2007, the RTC-Br. 214 rendered a decision17 in favor of Spouses Rabaja. It held
that the signature of Spouses Salvador affixed in the contract to sell appeared to be authentic. It
also held that the contract, although denominated as contract to sell, was actually a contract
of sale because Spouses Salvador, as vendors, did not reserve their title to the property until the
vendees had fully paid the purchase price. Since the contract entered into was a reciprocal
contract, it could be validly rescinded by Spouses Rabaja, and in the process, they could
recover the amount of P950,000.00 jointly and severally from Spouses Salvador and Gonzales.
The RTC stated that Gonzales was undoubtedly the attorney-in-fact of Spouses Salvador
absent any taint of irregularity. Spouses Rabaja could not be faulted in dealing with Gonzales
who was duly equipped with the SPA from Spouses Salvador.
The RTC-Br. 214 then ruled that the amount of P593,400.00 garnished from the time deposit
account of Spouses Rabaja, representing the award of rental arrearages in the separate
ejectment suit, should be returned by Spouses Salvador.18 The court viewed that such amount
was part of the purchase price of the subject property which must be returned. It also awarded
moral and exemplary damages in favor of Spouses Rabaja and attorneys fees in favor of
Gonzales. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Ordering the Contract to Sell entered into by the plaintiff and defendant spouses
Rolando and Herminia Salvador on July 24, 1998 as RESCINDED;chanrobleslaw
b. Ordering defendant spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador and defendant Rosario S.

Gonzales jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiffs:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. the amount of NINE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P950,000.00),
representing the payments made by the latter for the purchase of subject
property;chanrobleslaw
2. the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), as moral
damages;chanrobleslaw
3. the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), as exemplary
damages;chanrobleslaw
4. the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), as
attorneys fees;chanrobleslaw
5. the cost of suit.

c. Ordering defendant Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador to pay plaintiffs the
amount of FIVE HUNDRED NINETY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P593,000.00)
(sic), representing the amount garnished from the Metrobank deposit of plaintiffs as
payment for their alleged back rentals;chanrobleslaw
d. Ordering the defendant Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador to pay defendant
Rosario Gonzales on her cross-claim in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00);chanrobleslaw
e. Dismissing the counterclaims of the defendants against the plaintiff.

examination of CA-G.R. SP No. 89260 showed that Spouses Rabaja were not involved in that
case. CA-G.R. SP No. 59260 was an action between Spouses Salvador and Gonzales only and
involved a completely different residential apartment located at 302-C Jupiter Street,
Dreamland Subdivision, Mandaluyong City.
The CA, however, ruled that Gonzales was not solidarily liable with Spouses Salvador. The
agent must expressly bind himself or exceed the limit of his authority in order to be solidarily
liable. It was not shown that Gonzales as agent of Spouses Salvador exceeded her authority or
expressly bound herself to be solidarily liable. The decretal portion of the CA decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 29,
2007 and the Order dated September 12, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214,
Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. MC-03-2175, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that Rosario Gonzalez is not jointly and severally liable to pay Spouses Rabaja the amounts
enumerated in paragraph (b) of the Decision dated March 29, 2007.
SO ORDERED.21
Spouses Salvador filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its January
5, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I

19

SO ORDERED.
Gonzales filed a motion for partial reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC-Br. 114 in its
Order,20 dated September 12, 2007. Undaunted, Spouses Salvador and Gonzales filed an appeal
before the CA.
CA Ruling
On March 29, 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC-Br. 114 with modifications. It
ruled that the contract to sell was indeed a contract of sale and that Gonzales was armed with
an SPA and was, in fact, introduced to Spouses Rabaja by Spouses Salvador as the
administrator of the property. Spouses Rabaja could not be blamed if they had transacted with
Gonzales.
The CA then held that Spouses Salvador should return the amount of P593,400.00 pursuant to
a separate ejectment case, reasoning that Spouses Salvador misled the court because an

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DECLARING PETITIONERS IN
DEFAULT AND IN DEPRIVING THEM OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSSEXAMINE RESPONDENTS SPS. RABAJA AS WELL AS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
FOR AND IN THEIR BEHALF, GIVEN THE MERITORIOUS DEFENSES RAISED IN
THEIR ANSWER THAT CATEGORICALLY AND DIRECTLY DISPUTE
RESPONDENTS SPS. RABAJAS CAUSE OF ACTION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
RESPONDENT GONZALES THAT PAYMENTS WERE INDEED REMITTED TO
AND RECEIVED BY PETITIONER HERMINIA SALVADOR EVEN AS THE

IMPROVISED RECEIPTS WERE EVIDENTLY MADE UP AND FALSIFIED BY

RESPONDENT GONZALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN RESCINDING THE CONTRACT TO SELL WHEN THERE IS
NOTHING TO RESCIND AS NO VALID CONTRACT TO SELL WAS ENTERED
INTO, AND IN DIRECTING THE REFUND OF THE AMOUNT OF P950,000.00
WHEN THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWS THAT SAID AMOUNT WAS PAID TO
AND
RECEIVED
BY
RESPONDENT
GONZALES
ALONE
WHO
MISAPPROPRIATED THE SAME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS
DECISION FOR PETITIONERS TO RETURN THE AMOUNT OF P543,400.00
REPRESENTING RENTALS IN ARREARS GARNISHED OR WITHDRAWN BY
VIRTUE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHICH
WAS TRIED AND DECIDED BY ANOTHER COURT.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS SPS. RABAJA,
THERE BEING NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR SUCH AWARD.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING P100,000.00 TO RESPONDENT GONZALES AS
ATTORNEYS FEES WHEN RESPONDENT GONZALES, IN FACT, COMMITTED
FORGERY AND FALSIFICATION IN DEALING WITH THE PROPERTY OF
PETITIONERS AND MISAPPROPRIATED THE MONIES PAID TO HER BY
RESPONDENTS SPS. RABAJA, THUS GIVING PREMIUM TO HER FRAUDULENT
ACTS.22
The foregoing can be synthesized into three main issues. First, Spouses Salvador contend that
the order of default must be lifted because reasonable grounds exist to justify their failure to
attend the pre-trial conference on February 4, 2005. Second, Spouses Salvador raise in issue
the veracity of the receipts given by Gonzales, the SPA and the validity of the contract to sell.

They claim that the improvised receipts should not be given credence because these were
crude and suspicious, measuring only by 2 x 2 inches which showed that Gonzales
misappropriated the payments of Spouses Rabaja for herself and did not remit the amount of
P950,000.00 to them. As there was no consideration, then no valid contract to sell
existed. Third, Spouses Salvador argue that the ejectment case, from which the amount of
P593,400.00 was garnished, already became final and executory and could not anymore be
disturbed. Lastly, the award of damages in favor of Spouses Rabaja and Gonzales was
improper absent any legal and factual bases.
On January 21, 2013, Spouses Salvador filed their supplemental petition23 informing the Court
that RTC-Br. 213 had rendered a decision in Civil Case No. MC00-1082, an action for
rescission of the SPA. The said decision held that Spouses Salvador properly revoked the SPA
in favor of Gonzales due to loss of trust and confidence. On September 11, 2013, Gonzales
filed her comment to the supplemental petition,24 contending that the RTC-Branch 213
decision had no bearing because it had not yet attained finality. On even date, Spouses Rabaja
filed their Comment,25 asserting that the present petition is a mere rehash of the previous
arguments of Spouses Salvador before the CA. On November 15, 2013, Spouses Salvador
replied that they merely wanted to show that the findings by the RTC-Br. 213 should be given
weight as a full-blown trial was conducted therein.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Courts Ruling
As a general rule, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure
questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the review of
questions of fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsity of the allegations.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present petition presents questions of fact because it requires the Court to examine the
veracity of the evidence presented during the trial, such as the improvised receipts, the SPA
given to Gonzales and the contract to sell. Even the petitioner spouses themselves concede and
ask the Court to consider questions of fact, 28 but the Court finds no reason to disturb the
findings of fact of the lower courts absent any compelling reason to the contrary.
The failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial conference warrants the presentation of
evidence ex parte by Spouses Rabaja
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pre-trial
conference does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the
reglementary period.29On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference,
the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 4. Appearance of parties.
It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The nonappearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a
representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations
or admissions of facts and of documents.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section
shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause
to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on
the basis thereof.
[Emphasis supplied]
The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Joseph
Enario30 discussed the difference between the non-appearance of a defendant in a pre-trial
conference and the declaration of a defendant in default in the present Rules of Civil
Procedure. The decision instructs:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase "as in default" was initially
included in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as
in default.cralawred
It was, however, amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Regalado, in
his book, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, explained the rationale for the deletion of the
phrase "as in default" in the amended provision, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former Rule 20 with the change that,
instead of defendant being declared "as in default" by reason of his non-appearance, this
section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the ex parte presentation of
plaintiffs evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis thereof. While actually the
procedure remains the same, the purpose is one of semantical propriety or terminological
accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the word "default" in the former provision since
that term is identified with the failure to file a required answer, not appearance in

court.cralawred
Still, in the same book, Justice Regalado clarified that while the order of default no longer
obtained, its effects were retained, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not failure to appear
at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default, except the failure to appear at a pretrial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are followed, that
is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon
may be rendered against defendant.cralawred
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the
defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and
the court shall render judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given
the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being
that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.31 The stringent application of the rules on
pre-trial is necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial stage in the litigation process.
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was
discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and
the subsequent amendments in 1997.32 The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be
overemphasized.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial
conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their
non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his calendar.34 This
excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be
considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses
Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs,
were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as
defendants. Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to attend the pre-trial
conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment
based on the evidence presented during the trial.
Gonzales, as agent of Spouses Salvador, could validly receive the payments of Spouses Rabaja
Even on the substantial aspect, the petition does not warrant consideration. The Court agrees
with the courts below in finding that the contract entered into by the parties was essentially a
contract of sale which could be validly rescinded. Spouses Salvador insist that they did not
receive the payments made by Spouses Rabaja from Gonzales which totalled P950,000.00 and
that Gonzales was not their duly authorized agent. These contentions, however, must fail in

light
of
the
applicable
provisions
of
the
New
Civil
Code
which
state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 1900. So far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have been performed
within the scope of the agent's authority, if such act is within the terms of the power of
attorney, as written, even if the agent has in fact exceeded the limits of his authority according
to an understanding between the principal and the agent.
xxxx
Art. 1902. A third person with whom the agent wishes to contract on behalf of the principal
may require the presentation of the power of attorney, or the instructions as regards the agency.
Private or secret orders and instructions of the principal do not prejudice third persons who
have relied upon the power of attorney or instructions shown them.
xxxx
Art. 1910. The principal must comply with all the obligations which the agent may have
contracted within the scope of his authority.cralawred
Persons dealing with an agent must ascertain not only the fact of agency, but also the nature
and extent of the agents authority. A third person with whom the agent wishes to contract on
behalf of the principal may require the presentation of the power of attorney, or the instructions
as regards the agency. The basis for agency is representation and a person dealing with an
agent is put upon inquiry and must discover on his own peril the authority of the
agent.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to Article 1990 of the New Civil Code, insofar as third persons are concerned, an
act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the agent's authority, if such act is
within the terms of the power of attorney, as written. In this case, Spouses Rabaja did not
recklessly enter into a contract to sell with Gonzales. They required her presentation of the
power of attorney before they transacted with her principal. And when Gonzales presented the
SPA to Spouses Rabaja, the latter had no reason not to rely on it.
The law mandates an agent to act within the scope of his authority which what appears in the
written terms of the power of attorney granted upon him. 36 The Court holds that, indeed,
Gonzales acted within the scope of her authority. The SPA precisely stated that she could
administer the property, negotiate the sale and collect any document and all payments related
to the subject property.37 As the agent acted within the scope of his authority, the principal
must comply with all the obligations.38As correctly held by the CA, considering that it was not
shown that Gonzales exceeded her authority or that she expressly bound herself to be liable,

then she could not be considered personally and solidarily liable with the principal, Spouses
Salvador.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Perhaps the most significant point which defeats the petition would be the fact that it was
Herminia herself who personally introduced Gonzalez to Spouses Rabaja as the administrator
of the subject property. By their own ostensible acts, Spouses Salvador made third persons
believe that Gonzales was duly authorized to administer, negotiate and sell the subject
property. This fact was even affirmed by Spouses Salvador themselves in their petition where
they stated that they had authorized Gonzales to look for a buyer of their property. 40 It is
already too late in the day for Spouses Salvador to retract the representation to unjustifiably
escape their principal obligation.
As correctly held by the CA and the RTC, considering that there was a valid SPA, then
Spouses Rabaja properly made payments to Gonzales, as agent of Spouses Salvador; and it
was as if they paid to Spouses Salvador. It is of no moment, insofar as Spouses Rabaja are
concerned, whether or not the payments were actually remitted to Spouses Salvador. Any
internal matter, arrangement, grievance or strife between the principal and the agent is theirs
alone and should not affect third persons. If Spouses Salvador did not receive the payments or
they wish to specifically revoke the SPA, then their recourse is to institute a separate action
against Gonzales. Such action, however, is not any more covered by the present proceeding.
The amount of P593,400.00 should not be returned by Spouses Salvador
Nevertheless, the assailed decision of the CA must be modified with respect to the amount of
P593,400.00 garnished by Spouses Salvador and ordered returned to Spouses Rabaja. The RTC
ordered the return of the amount garnished holding that it constituted a part of the purchase
price. The CA ruled that Spouses Salvador misled the Court when they improperly cited CAG.R. SP No. 89260 to prove their entitlement to the said amount. Both courts erred in their
ruling.
First, the garnishment of the amount of P593,400.00 against Spouses Rabaja was pursuant to
the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259, an entirely different case involving an action for
ejectment, and it does not concern the rescission case which is on appeal before this Court.
Moreover, the decision on the ejectment case is final and executory and an entry of judgment
has already been made.41 Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court which rendered it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is

founded on consideration of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
errors,
judgments
must
become
final
at
some
definite
point
in
time.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The March 31, 2006 CA decision43in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259 has long been final and
executory and cannot any more be disturbed by the Court. Public policy dictates that once a
judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be
denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified
delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the courts to
resolve justiciable controversies with finality.44chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, in ruling that the garnishment was improper and thus ordering the return of the
garnished amount, the CA referred to its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89260. Spouses
Salvador, however, clarified in its motion for reconsideration45 before the CA and in the
present petition46 that the garnishment was pursuant to CA-G.R. SP No. 89259, and not CAG.R. SP No. 89260, another ejectment case involving another property. A perusal of the
records reveals that indeed the garnishment was pursuant to the ejectment case in the MeTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 17344,47where Spouses Rabaja were the defendants. The MeTC
decision was then reinstated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259, not CA-G.R. SP No. 89260.
There, a writ of execution48 and notice of pay49 were issued against Spouses Rabaja in the
amount of P591,900.00.
Second, Spouses Rabajas appeal with the RTC never sought relief in returning the garnished
amount.50 Such issue simply emerged in the RTC decision. This is highly improper because the
courts grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the complaint or related
thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the partys cause of
action.51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
If Spouses Rabaja would have any objection on the manner and propriety of the execution,
then they must institute their opposition to the execution proceeding a separate case. Spouses
Rabaja can invoke the Civil Code provisions on legal compensation or set-off under Articles
1278, 1279 and 1270.52 The two obligations appear to have respectively offset each other,
compensation having taken effect by operation of law pursuant to the said provisions of the
Civil Code, since all the requisites provided in Art. 1279 of the said Code for automatic
compensation are duly present.
No award of actual, moral and exemplary damages
The award of damages to Spouses Rabaja cannot be sustained by this Court. The filing alone

of a civil action should not be a ground for an award of moral damages in the same way that a
clearly unfounded civil action is not among the grounds for moral damages. 53 Article 2220 of
the New Civil Code provides that to award moral damages in a breach of contract, the
defendant must act fraudulently or in bad faith. In this case, Spouses Rabaja failed to
sufficiently show that Spouses Salvador acted in a fraudulent manner or with bad faith when it
breached the contract of sale. Thus, the award of moral damages cannot be warranted.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the New Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 54 The claimant must
first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In this case,
considering that Spouses Rabaja failed to prove moral or compensatory damages, then there
could be no award of exemplary damages.
With regard to attorneys fees, neither Spouses Rabaja nor Gonzales is entitled to the award.
The settled rule is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and that not every
winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorneys fees. 55 The RTC reasoned that
Gonzales was forced to litigate due to the acts of Spouses Salvador. The Court does not agree.
Gonzales, as agent of Spouses Salvador, should have expected that she would be called to
litigation in connection with her fiduciary duties to the principal.
In view of all the foregoing, the CA decision should be affirmed with the following
modifications:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The order requiring defendant Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador to pay
plaintiffs the amount of Five Hundred Ninety Three Thousand (P593,000.00) Pesos,
representing the amount garnished from the Metrobank deposit of plaintiffs as for their
back rentals should be deleted;chanrobleslaw
2. The award of moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos;
exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, and
attorneys fees in the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in favor
of Spouses Rabaja should be deleted; and
3. The award of attorneys fees in amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos
in favor of Gonzales should be deleted.
The other amounts awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum, to be
reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 29, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. MC-03-2175,
is MODIFIED to read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Ordering the Contract to Sell entered into by Spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja
and Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador on July 24, 1998 as
RESCINDED;chanrobleslaw
b. Ordering Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador to pay Spouses Rogelio and
Elizabeth Rabaja:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00) Pesos,
representing the payments made by the latter for the purchase of the subject
property; and
2. The cost of suit;chanrobleslaw
c. Dismissing the counterclaims of Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador and Rosario
Gonzales against Spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja
The amounts awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum to be reckoned
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
As aforestated, this is without prejudice to the invocation by either party of the Civil Code
provisions on legal compensation or set-off under Articles 1278, 1279 and 1270.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157583, September 10, 2014

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, v. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAUBAN, QUEZON, BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER (PHILIPPINES) LIMITED,
CO., PROVINCE OF QUEZON,AND DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Respondents.
RE S O LUTI ON
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari1assailing the Orders

dated December 2, 20022 and March 13, 20033 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Mauban,
Quezon, Branch 64 (RTC) which dismissed Civil Case No. 0587-M on jurisdictional grounds
and, concomitantly, petitioner Frumencio E. Pulgars (Pulgar) motion for intervention therein.
The Facts

before the Secretary of Finance, which resulted in a Resolution15 dated August 30, 2002 where
the basic issues between the principal parties were passed upon.
The RTC Ruling

Sometime in 1999, the Municipal Assessor of Mauban, Quezon issued 34 tax declarations on
the buildings and machinery comprising the Mauban Plant a coal-fired electric generation
facility owned and operated by respondent Quezon Power (Philippines) Limited, Co. (QPL)
and thereby assessed it with a total market value of P29,626,578,291.00 and, hence, P500
Million, more or less, in realty taxes per annum. The Municipal Assessor maintained that the
Mauban Plant was completed and already operational in October 1999. Subsequently, or on
May 18, 2000, QPL filed with the Municipal Assessor a sworn statement declaring that the
said properties had a value of only P15,055,951,378.00.5cralawred

In an Order16 dated December 2, 2002, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack of
jurisdiction in the absence of a payment of the tax assessed under protest, which requirement
QPL attempted to skirt by alleging in its complaint that it is the very authority of the Municipal
Assessor to impose the assessment and the treasurer to collect the tax that it was questioning.
Declaring that QPLs complaint essentially challenged the amount of the taxes assessed, the
RTC ruled that it is the Local Board of Assessment Appeals that had jurisdiction over the
complaint. Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgars motion for intervention since with the
dismissal of the main case, the same had no leg to stand on.17cralawred

On March 16 and 23, 2001, QPL tendered to the Municipal Assessor the amount of
P60,223,805.51 as first quarter installment of the realty taxes on the plant, which the latter
rejected.6 Hence, QPL filed a Complaint for Consignation and Damages 7 before the RTC
against the Province of Quezon, the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Mauban,
Quezon, and the Provincial Assessor and Provincial Treasurer of Quezon (defendants),
docketed as Civil Case No. 0587-M, depositing to the RTC the above-stated amount in
payment of the first quarter realty tax for 2001.8 Albeit classified as a consignation and
damages case, QPL essentially protested the Municipal Assessors assessment for, among
others, its lack of legal authority to make such assessment and its supposed non-compliance
with the prescribed valuation process.9cralawred

Aggrieved, Pulgar filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied in an
Order18 dated March 13, 2003, hence, this petition.

For their part,10 defendants averred, among others, that QPL was estopped from denying the
authority of the Municipal Assessor since it previously paid realty taxes for its properties for
the year 2001 based on the assessment of the latter.

The Courts Ruling

On January 28, 2002, Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention 11 and
Answer-in-Intervention12 (motion for intervention), alleging, among others, that as a resident
and taxpayer of Quezon Province, he has an interest in the aggressive collection of realty taxes
against QPL. By way of counterclaim, he prayed for the award of moral damages and
attorneys fees, anchoring the same on the mindless disturbance of the forest and marine
environment whereon the power plant of [QPL] stands. 13Pulgars motion was initially granted
and his Answer-in-Intervention was admitted.14cralawred

Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main

action.19 Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction.20cralawred

Sometime in June 2002, QPL and the Province of Quezon agreed to submit their dispute

The Issue Before The Court

The issue advanced before the Court is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgars
motion for intervention as a consequence of the dismissal of the main case. While
acknowledging the RTCs lack of jurisdiction, Pulgar nonetheless prays that the Court pass
upon the correctness of the Municipal Assessors assessment of QPLs realty taxes, among
others.

The petition lacks merit.

In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTCs dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack of
jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the
correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be
improper since the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the
dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal litigation on

jurisdictional grounds at that means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to
intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[I]ntervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing
litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor x xx unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the
machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or
interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or
protect such right or interests.
Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original
party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for;
hence, the right of intervention ceases.21cralawred
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015

TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner, v. FE. T. ADOLFO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside: 1) the October 6, 2009 Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783 reversing the October 2, 2006 Order 3 of
the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Mandaue City (RTC Mandaue), Branch 55 in
Civil Case No. MAN-4821; as well as 2) the CAs March 2, 2012 Resolution 4 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration5 and Supplement6 thereto.
Civil Case No. MAN-4821
On April 14, 2004, petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition 7 for
judicial separation of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo, nee Tudtud.

Docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-4821 and assigned to Branch 55, the petition alleged that
the parties were married on November 26, 1966; that the union bore one child; that during the
marriage, they acquired through conjugal funds Lot 1087-A-2-E, a 3,652-square meter
property in Brgy. Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Cebu (the subject property) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 18368; that later on, the parties separated due to irreconcilable
differences; that since reunion was no longer feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of the
conjugal property, but respondent adamantly refused; that respondent denied petitioners coownership of the subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal property; that several
earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them proved unavailing; and that a
judicial separation of property is proper under the circumstances and pursuant to Article 135(6)
of the Family Code.8 Petitioner thus prayed that judgment be rendered decreeing a separation
of the conjugal property and the subdivision or sale thereof, to the end of dividing the same or
the proceeds thereof; and ordering respondent to pay petitioner P50,000.00 as attorneys fees,
appearance fees (P2,000.00 per hearing), and P20,000.00 litigation costs.
In her Answer9 with counterclaim, respondent contended that while she remained married to
petitioner, she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal
property which she inherited from her mother; that petitioner is a lazy bum, gambler, drunkard,
wife abuser, and neglectful father; that respondent found all means to support the family even
as petitioner neglected it; that respondent bought on installment a tricycle for the petitioners
use in business, but he kept the proceeds thereof to himself and used the same in his gambling
and drinking sprees; that respondent alone took the initiative to support the family and found
ways to take care of the daily needs of her child; that she caused to be built on a portion of her
mothers land a house even while petitioner was bumming around; that one day, petitioner
destroyed the roof of the house that was then being built; that petitioner subsequently
abandoned her and their child in 1968, and transferred to Davao City where he took a mistress
and begot four children by her; that in 1986, petitioner returned to Cebu City seeking
reconciliation with respondent; that respondent took petitioner back, but in 1987 they once
more separated; that thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from petitioner.
Respondent claimed in her Answer that the subject property was a portion of a bigger lot
(mother lot) owned by her mother Petronila Tudtud which was covered by TCT T-15941. On
October 11, 1967, her mother executed a quitclaim deed transferring a portion of the mother
lot the subject property to respondent. The mother title TCT T-15941 was then cancelled
and a new one, TCT (17216)-5415, was issued in respondents name. Respondent then sold
the subject property to her brother on January 19, 1968, and a new TCT (17833)-5515 was
issued in her brothers name. Her brother then mortgaged the property to Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP), which foreclosed on the same. TCT 18231 was issued in DBPs
name. DBP then sold the property to the spouses Antonio and Lucy Garcia (the Garcias), and

TCT 18266 was in turn issued in their name. Finally, on May 25, 1983, the Garcias sold back
the subject property to respondent, and a new title TCT 1836810 was then issued in the
name of respondent FE M. TUDTUD, x x x married to Teofilo Adolfo.
Respondent argued that she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her
paraphernal property which she alone redeemed from the Garcias; that the inclusion of
petitioners name in TCT 18368 does not make him a co-owner of the property, but was
merely necessary to describe respondents civil status; and that under Article 135 11 of the Civil
Code, all property brought by the wife to the marriage as well as all property she acquires
during the marriage in accordance with Article 14812 of the same Code constitutes paraphernal
property.
Respondent thus prayed that the petition be dismissed. By way of counterclaim, she sought
the payment of moral, exemplary, and nominal damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses.
Civil Case No. MAN-2683
In 1996, respondents sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon (the
Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with damages against respondent. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and raffled to Branch 55 of the RTC Mandaue. The
Complaint13 therein alleged that in 1988, respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the
Gingoyons over a 300-square meter portion of the subject property, but that respondent refused
to partition/subdivide the same even after the Gingoyons paid the taxes, fees and expenses of
the sale. For her defense, respondent claimed in her Answer14 that when the sale to the
Gingoyons was made, the subject property constituted conjugal property of her marriage with
petitioner; that as early as 1983, or when the Garcias executed the deed of sale in her favor, the
subject property became a conjugal asset; since petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor
of the Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was
null and void.

Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings in Civil Case No. MAN-4821
Meanwhile, during the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, petitioner submitted
as part of his evidence and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons Complaint in
Civil Case No. MAN-2683, respondents Answer thereto, and the trial courts May 15, 2002
Decision in said case.
On August 1, 2005, petitioner filed a Request for Admission 17 of 1) the genuineness of the duly
marked certified true copies of the Complaint, Answer, and Decision in Civil Case No. MAN2683 (Exhibits F, G and H, respectively); 2) respondents declaration in said Answer
that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial courts
pronouncement in said case that the subject property forms part of the conjugal estate.
Respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission.
On September 5, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings,18 stating that since respondent failed to answer his request for admission, the
matters contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure19 (1997 Rules); that as a consequence of the application of the
rule, respondent is in effect considered to have admitted that the subject property is a conjugal
asset of their subsisting marriage which may thus be the subject of his petition for judicial
separation of property; and that on account of said admission, a hearing on the merits becomes
unnecessary and, instead, Rule 3420 of the 1997 Rules on judgments on the pleadings should
apply. Petitioner thus prayed that the trial court render judgment in his favor based on the
pleadings.
Respondent filed an Opposition.21 In her Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum, 22 respondent
argued among others that the request for admission was premature considering that the
decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 was the subject of an appeal, and thus not yet final.

On May 15, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision 15 in Civil Case No. MAN-2683,
declaring that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. It thus
nullified the 1988 deed of sale executed by respondent in favor of the Gingoyons for lack of
consent on the part of petitioner, citing Article 124 of the Family Code. 16 The trial court
likewise awarded moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in
favor of the respondent in the total amount of P107,000.00.

In an October 11, 2005 Order,23 the trial court directed the transfer of Civil Case No. MAN4821 to Branch 55 of the RTC Mandaue, since it is said court which decided the closely related
Civil Case No. MAN-2683.

The Gingoyons filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971.

This court has painstakingly exerted effort in going over the record and took serious note of all

On October 2, 2006, Branch 55 issued an Order 24 granting petitioners motion for judgment on
the pleadings. It held as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

the pleadings, documents and others on file. After serious consideration, the court believes
and so holds that there is basis in rendering judgment. The Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings though denominated as such but [sic] shall be treated as a move to seek summary
judgment. x x x

that Lot 1087-A-2-E was no longer paraphernal property but rather a conjugal property of
Spouses Teofilo and Fe Adolfo and; c) that RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue City, sustained and/or
held the view of defendant (Fe Tudtud) that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property of Spouses
Teofilo and Fe Adolfo, thus, dismissed Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and awarded damages to the
defendant.

xxxx
The court in arriving at this resolution was guided by the following pronouncements by the
Supreme Court in the case of Diman vs. Alumbres, G.R. No. 131466, November 27, 1998, 299
SCRA 459 x x x:
xxxx
In the same case, it was held
It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares that
although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact e.g., there are denials of, or
a conflict in, factual allegations if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits, that
those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall render a summary
judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be. (Italics and underscoring
supplied)
On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment[,] issues apparently exist i.e.. facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but
the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by
[affidavits], depositions or admissions. In other words, as a noted authority remarks, a
judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is
a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions. (Italics
and underscoring supplied)
x x x xcralawlawlibrary
Defendant25 did not file any verified answer or a pleading denying under oath the genuineness
and authenticity of the documents attached to the Request for Admission and of the other
matters therein set forth. This failure has far reaching implications in that the following are
deemed admitted: a) the genuineness of Exhibits F, G and H, all attached to the Request for
Admission; b) that she admitted in paragraph 10 in her Answer to Civil Case No. MAN-2683

Judicial admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in the course of
the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding, as in the pre-trial of the case. Admissions obtained through depositions,
written interrogatories or requests for admission are also considered judicial admissions. Page
686, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 9thRev. Ed., Regalado
With the admission that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property, it follows as its necessary and
logical consequence, that plaintiff26 is entitled to the relief demanded.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
A DECISION in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 had already been rendered by RTC, Branch 55, on
the 15th day of May 2002 with the court finding that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property x
xx
xxxx
For reason[s] of expediency and convenience, the court may even take judicial notice of its
earlier decision finding Lot 1087-A-2-E as a conjugal property.27cralawred
xxxx
Under the circumstances, judicial separation of property is proper. Aware that the separation
has the effect of a dissolution of the conjugal partnership property regime, the presumptive
legitime of Nilo Adolfo (the only common child of the spouses) has to be delivered in
accordance with Article 51 in relation to paragraph (8) Article 127 and Article 137 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the partition of
Lot 1087-A-2-E between the plaintiff and the defendant in equal share of what remains after
allocating to Nilo Adolfo a portion of Nine hundred thirteen (913) square meters representing
his presumptive legitime.

The plaintiff is directed to submit to this court the proposed subdivision plan for its
consideration before submitting the same for approval to the Bureau of Lands.

Let the partition of Lot No. 1087-A-2-E consisting of 300 square meters bought by plaintiffsappellants from defendant-appellee be done in accordance to [sic] the sketch plan executed for
that purpose.

In case of disagreement as to their respective location, the same shall be done through raffle to
be conducted by the sheriff who shall see to it that judgment in this case shall be fully
implemented.

SO ORDERED.32cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

SO ORDERED.28cralawlawlibrary

On June 23, 2007, the above CA decision became final and executory.33cralawred

Respondent instituted an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 01783.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783

Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971

In CA-G.R. CV No. 01783, respondent filed her Appellants Brief, 34 where she argued that the
trial court erred in issuing its October 2, 2006 Order directing the partition or sale of the
subject property; that it was error for the trial court to take judicial notice of its own judgment
in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and thus declare that the subject property is conjugal, since the
issue of whether it constitutes conjugal or paraphernal property was still pending in the appeal
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971; that since the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 have not
been terminated and the issue regarding the character of the subject property has not been
resolved with finality, then petitioners resort to a request for admission and motion for
judgment on the pleadings was premature; and that with the May 30, 2007 Decision in CAG.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner and the trial court should submit to the finding therein that the
subject property is her paraphernal property.

Meanwhile, on May 30, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision 29 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It
reversed the May 15, 2002 Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. MAN-2683. It
declared, among others, that the subject property was respondents paraphernal property.
Thus, it held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Proceeding from the foregoing consideration, the finding that Lot No. 1087-A-2-E is a
conjugal property does not have any basis, hence, does not have any merit at all. On the
contrary, plaintiffs-appellants30 sufficiently proved that the aforesaid lot was defendantappellees31 paraphernal property as the latter even admitted that she inherited the same from
her mother although she claimed it as a conjugal property based on the TCTs attached to her
answer. Another strong indication that Lot No. 1087-A-2-E is solely owned by defendantappellee is the fact that in another case (Civil Case No. MAN-2008) involving the same
property and the same parties but for a different issue (road right of way), defendant-appellee
alone signed the compromise agreement ceding a portion of the subject lot as a right of way
perpetually open and unobstructed for the benefit of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee,
their respective heirs, assigns and transferees and guests. The same compromise agreement
which became the decision of the case attained finality without defendant-appellee questioning
the absence of her husbands signature.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing premises, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55, dated 15 May 2002, in
Civil Case No. MAN-2683 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

In his Appellees Brief,35 petitioner insisted that the trial court did not err in treating his motion
for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment; that respondents Answer in Civil
Case No. MAN-2683 constituted a judicial admission that the subject property was a conjugal
asset, which required no further proof; that respondents failure to reply to his written request
for admission also resulted in the acknowledgment that the subject property is a conjugal asset;
that the trial court correctly took judicial notice of the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN2683, as they were relevant and material to the resolution of Civil Case No. MAN-4821; that
since it was not respondent who appealed the May 15, 2002 decision in Civil Case No. MAN2683, then the finding therein that the subject property is conjugal should bind her; and that the
CAs eventual finding in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 that the subject lot was respondents
paraphernal property cannot bind him because he was not a party to Civil Case No. MAN2683.
On October 6, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal
portion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, based from the foregoing premises, the Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 55, Mandaue City, in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the records of this case are remanded to RTC (Branch 55), Mandaue City, for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.36cralawlawlibrary
In arriving at the above conclusion, the CA held that the trial court cannot treat petitioners
motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment. It stated that in a proper
case for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at all on account of the
defending partys failure to raise an issue in his answer, while in a proper case for summary
judgment, such issues exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by
affidavits, depositions or admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a
judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as
summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. 37 It added that respondents
Answer appeared on its face to tender an issue; it disputed petitioners claim that the subject
property is their conjugal property. The next thing to be determined is whether this issue is
fictitious or sham as to justify a summary judgment.
The CA added that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted by her
failure to reply to petitioners request for admission, her claims and documentary exhibits
clearly contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request; that the trial court
disregarded the fact that the issue of whether the subject property is conjugal was still
unresolved as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 was still pending; and that finally, the trial court should
have been guided by the principles that trial courts have but limited authority to render
summary judgments and that summary judgments should not be rendered hastily.38cralawred
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in a March 2, 2012 Resolution, he was rebuffed. Hence,
the present Petition was filed on April 30, 2012.
In a March 20, 2013 Resolution,39 the Court resolved to give due course to the instant
Petition.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issue
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of
substance not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable
jurisprudence.40cralawred

Petitioners Arguments
In his Petition seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and thus reinstate
the October 2, 2006 Order of the trial court, petitioner insists that respondents failure to reply
to his written request for admission resulted in her admitting that the subject property is a
conjugal asset, applying Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules; that the CA grossly erred in
disregarding the rule; that with the resulting admission, there remains no genuine issue to be
resolved in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, such that judgment based on the pleadings is proper.
Finally, petitioner adds that respondents trifling with the law and rules of procedure by
conveniently claiming in one case that the subject property is conjugal, and then in another that
it is paraphernal should not be countenanced; she should be held to her original declaration
that the subject property is conjugal.
Respondents Arguments
In her Comment,41 respondent counters that, as correctly ruled by the CA, petitioner elected the
wrong remedy in filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings when he should have moved
for summary judgment; that in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the movant is deemed
to admit the truth of all of the opposing partys material and relevant allegations, and rest his
motion on those allegations taken together with that of his own as are admitted in the
pleadings;42 that the effect of this is that petitioner is deemed to have admitted that the subject
property is paraphernal, as claimed in her Answer; that with the final and executory May 30,
2007 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, the subject property should now be
considered as her paraphernal property, and petitioners case for partition on the claim that the
subject property is conjugal should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. 43 Summary judgment, on the
other hand, will be granted if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions
on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.44cralawred
We have elaborated on the basic distinction between summary judgment and judgment on the
pleadings, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their
sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary
judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the
pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys
answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues
apparently exist ? i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no
admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth
set out in the answer?but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not
genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.45cralawlawlibrary
An answer would fail to tender an issue if it does not deny the material allegations in the
complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by confessing
the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact
specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses
(allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint
expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a
judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.46cralawred
On the other hand, whether x x x the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux
of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary
judgment. In a case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at
all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings.47 A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence
as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the
facts, and summary judgment is called for.48cralawred
In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondents failure to reply to
petitioners request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its
May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial
notice of the proceedings in said case. While there is nothing irregular with this as courts
may take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the
same court if (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other
party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so49 the trial court however
disregarded the fact that its decision was then the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 78971. It should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it
would be premature to render judgment on petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings;
that it would be presumptuous to assume that its own decision would be affirmed on appeal.
One of the issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether the subject property is conjugal, or a

paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of resolving petitioners motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It
should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in the hasty resolution of his case.
In the first place, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 was transferred to it from Branch 56 precisely for
the reason that it was the court which tried the closely related Civil Case No. MAN-2683.
Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioners request for
admission by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court should have considered the pending
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It cannot take judicial notice solely of the proceedings in
Civil Case No. MAN-2683, and ignore the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. After all, CAG.R. CV No. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. MAN-2683; an appeal is
deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the lower court.50cralawred
On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear that under Rules 34
and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment as a result of the consequent admission by respondent that the subject property is
conjugal, this is not actually the case. Quite the contrary, by invoking the proceedings and
decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment while
the appeal in said case is pending, because the result thereof determines whether the subject
property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal. He may not preempt the appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 78971.
While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the
action,51 petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to
secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief, be
allowed to repudiate or question the CAs ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. The principle of
estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate court, which
became final and executory, that the subject property is respondents paraphernal property. In
estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular
manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that
thereby causes loss or injury to another. It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact
which has, in the contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial
or legislative officers or by the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by
representations, express or implied or in pais.52cralawred
Finally, the Court notes that the appellate court overlooked the May 30, 2007 Decision in CAG.R. CV No. 78971, which became final and executory on June 23, 2007. The respondent
included this development in her appellees brief, but the CA did not take it into account. As

an unfortunate consequence, the case was not appreciated and resolved completely.
Thus, with the development in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 brought upon by the final and
executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioners case is left with no leg to stand on.
There being no conjugal property to be divided between the parties, Civil Case No. MAN4821 must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2009 Decision and March 2, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION in that Civil Case No. MAN-4821 is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.