TORTS for FINALS NOTES by Engking: (case digests are sourced online)

Vestil v. IAC G.R. No. 74431

G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the
house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was
rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine
days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15,
1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the
charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and
that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog
left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the
acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must
be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages
should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs
thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it
was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that
she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14
and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with
Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the
death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also
noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita
said she knew them only casually. 16
ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness
there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.
RULING:
On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing
to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in
an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the
dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established
by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death
but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us
that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of
death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is

not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should
"escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the
petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals
for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the
medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint.
While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their
pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
Dingcong v Kanaan
72 Phil 14 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of proprietors
Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain Francisco Echevarria rented a room in
the upper floor of the hotel. The room he rented was immediately above the store occupied by the Kanaan
brothers who are also tenants of the hotel. One night, Echevarria carelessly left his faucet open thereby
flooding his room and it caused water to drip from his room to the store below. Because of this, the articles
being sold by Kanaan were damaged. Apparently also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from
Echevarrias room was defective hence the flooding and the dripping.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dingcong is liable to pay for the damages caused by Echevarria.
HELD: Yes. Dingcong as proprietor is liable for the negligent act of the guest of his hotel (Echevarria). It
was not shown that Dingcong exercised the diligence of a good father in preventing the damage caused.
The pipe should have been repaired prior and Echevarria should have been provided with a container to
catch the drip. Therefore, Dingcong is liable to pay for damages by reason of his negligence.
Quezon City Government vs. Dacara
G R No. 150304 June 15, 2005
Facts: Dacara Jr.s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at
Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result,
Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage. Thus his
father Fulgencio Dacara Senior (Fulgencio) filed a calim for damages against the Local Government. The
LGU contended that the fault is with the driver, since the LGU have out up warning signs. The trial court
ruled that the LGU is liable.
Issue: Whether or not the Quezon City Government is liable for moral and exemplary damges due to the
injuries suffered by Dacara Jr.
Held: To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury
-- whether physical mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated
in Article 2219. In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondents son Fulgencio Jr. sustained
physical injuries. The son testified that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after
hitting a pile of earth that had been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever. It is apparent
from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a
medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on
Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim
of respondent that his moral sufferings were due to the negligence of petitioners. The Decision of the trial
court, which summarizes the testimony of respondents four witnesses, makes no mention of any
statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
social humiliation and the like. well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in
a civilor a criminal case, in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. The
award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually
experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated
by clear and convincing proof.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Gross negligence means such utter want of care
as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable

consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to
the danger of injury to the person or property of others. The negligence must amount to a reckless
disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. A finding
of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both the CA and the trial court. We quote from
the RTC Decision: Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities have failed to show
the modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected of them (sic) by the constituents of this City. It is
even more deplorable that it was a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the accident in
the so-called premier city. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be
a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts
of an offender. It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees should be responsible
not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must
secure construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.
DBP v CA
MVRS vs Islamic DaWah Council of the Phils. (2003)
Bellosillo,
J.
FACTS:
a. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy(70) Muslim
religious organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman,da Silva, Junio) filed in the RTC a
complaint for damages in their own behalf and as aclass suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide
against MVRS Publications, Inc.,arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a
daily tabloid. The article reads:"
ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit nasila pa ay
magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyosat sinasamba pa nila ito
sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw natinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
b. Islamic DaWah: the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; not only published
out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and
Islam,; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but
the entire Muslim world
c. MVRS Publications, Inc.,: the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and
therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion
and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage
d. RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified
e. CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. The suit for
damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status
as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all
Muslims.
ISSUES:
1. WON Islamic DaWah has a cause of action for libel.
NO.
2. WON in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional tort and notlibel.
NO.
3. WON this is a valid class suit.
NO.
HELD:1. NO, there is no cause of action for libel.DOCTRINES:

Defamation - which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person'scharacter, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements.
It is that which tends toinjure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the
plaintiff orto excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
6
It is the publication of anythingwhich is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to
bring him intodisrepute.
7

Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion whichothers in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.

Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and merewords of general
abuse however ill-natured, whether written or spoken, do not constitute abasis for an action for defamation
in the absence of an allegation for special damages.
Thefact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
10

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to anidentified or
identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to aparticular member of a
class, no member of such class has a right of action without at allimpairing the equally demanding right of
free speech and expression, as well as of the press.
APPLICATION:
there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the
Bulgar
article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondentshave no
individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.An individual Muslim
has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community.A Muslim may find the article
dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as anopportunity to strengthen their faith and educate
the non-believers and the "infidels." There isno injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who
constitute this community that cangive rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in
character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give
them a commonor general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
DOCTRINE:
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is consideredto have no application to
anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Asthe size of these groups increases, the
chances for members of such groups to recoverdamages on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is
said to embrace two (2) important public policies:
first
, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader wouldtake the
statements as so literally applying to each individual member.
second
, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech andexpression, as well as of
the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflictingfundamental interests involved in libel
cases.
G.R. No. 119107 March 18, 2005
JOSE V. LAGON,
petitioner,vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO V. LAPUZ,
respondents.
FACTS:
On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat
from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a
complaint for torts and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
Private respondent claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over three
parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. It was agreed upon that private
respondent will put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to
be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina
Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but was allegedly renewed. When Bai
Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her
estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings
he constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had
been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of
inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over
it. Petitioner denied the allegation, thus contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the
obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfering with private respondent's leasehold rights as there
was no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and
inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots. On July 29, 1986, the RTC decided in favor
of the private respondent. Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed existence of
private respondent's lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for
which petitioner should be held liable for damages.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the petition and sets aside the decision of the appellate court. Before the
appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any lease contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepiand
private respondent. On the other hand, private respondent insisted that it was impossible for petitioner not
to know about the contract since the latter was aware that he was collecting rentals from the tenants of
the building. While the appellate court disbelieved the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held
that, for petitioner to become liable for damages, he must have known of the lease contract and must
have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject parcels of land.
February 19, 2016 Class (digest sourced online)
P v Muyco
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning
capacity. In People v. Verde, the non-presentation of evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity did not prevent the Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the victims
wife as to earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was then 48 years old and was
earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an award.
In that case, Erwin Gesmundo was only 15 years old at the time of his death and was earning a
daily wage of P100.00 as a construction worker. As in People v. Verde, this Court is inclined to grant
the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence. To be
able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence,
there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the minimum wage
under the current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victims line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.
VICTORY LINER V GAMMAD
G.R. No. 159636. NOVEMBER 25, 2004
Facts:Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad was on board an air-conditioned Victory Liner bus bound for
Tuguegarao, Cagayan from Manila. At about 3:00 a.m., the bus while running at a high speed fell on a
ravine which resulted in the death of Marie Grace and physical injuries to other passengers. On May 14,
1996, respondent heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for damages arising from culpa contractual
against petitioner. in its answer, the petitioner claimed that the incident was purely accidental and that it
has always exercised extraordinary diligence in its 50 years of operation.
Issue:Whether petitioner should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage.

Ruling:Petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of contract of carriage. A common carrier is bound to
carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed
that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the
presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
exercised extraordinary diligence.
in the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proximate cause of
Marie Graces death was the negligence of petitioner. Hence, the courts below correctly ruled that
petitioner was guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
----Phil Hawk Corp v. Vivian Tan Lee, GR 166869, Feb 16, 2010
F: Respondent filed a case for Damages based on QD arising from vehicular accident between motorcycle
and bus of Phil Hawk. Husband died, respondent sustained injuries. Before answer, filed amended
complaint, adding additional damages and reliefs. RTC ruled ifo respondent; CA added relief granted. Phil
Hawk filed R45 Petition before SC, saying that respondent did not appeal to the ruling of the RTC and it was
error on part of CA to grant damages
H: no error in awarding additional reliefs
-as to ruling on assignment of errors:
GR: only those assigned should be considered under R45
X:
If errors affect jurisdiciton of the court as to subject matter
Error affect validity of judgment

So long as closely related to those assigned, properly argued in the brief

Rule 46 Original Cases
Rule 65 supplements Rule 46 Original cases: original petition for certiorari against rulings of Lower court or QJ bodies
Republic v. Carmel Dev 377 SCRA 459
F: Carmel dev't filed petition against DepEd w/ regard concession of certain parcels of land on which a
school was located. MTD denied by RTC. MR denied. Deped brought before CA under R65 but was
dismissed - not attached certified true copies of judgment and order of lower court. So question is WON
R46 (certified true copies or duplicate originals) or R65 (certified true copies only) would be followed
H: Both should be read in conjunction with each other. R46 governs procedure for R65.
-Under Section 2 of R56, R46,....are applicable to SC unless expressly provided.
Original duplicate: a copy of a decision, judgment, etc. Intended to be furnished to the parties in the case;
duly signed or initialed by the clerk of court or office of the issuing entity. Also allowable if there's a dry
seal; same as the one received by parties from the court
-what is usually done is that you go to the court to have certified true copies - that is the way the court
personnel have money
-in R65, can file either duplicate original or the certified true copy - substantial compliance
---People v Asilan
As to actual damages, Adovass widow, Irene Adovas, presented the receipts showing that she paid
25,224.00 to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Inc., as hospital expenses,[57] 35,000.00 to Marulas
Memorial Homes,[58] and 20,000.00 to Funeraria Saranay as funeral expenses,[59] or a total of
80,224.00.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, Asilan is
also liable for the loss of the earning capacity of Adovas, and such indemnity should be paid to his
heirs[60]:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;

Irene Adovas testified[61] on the amount her husband received as police officer and presented
documentary evidence to show that Adovas, who was only 29 years old when he died, [62] earned
8,605.00 a month[63] at the time of his death.
The following are the factors in computing the amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased:
1) The number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed. This is based on the
formula (2/3 x 80 age of the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy), which is adopted from
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality; and
2) The rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed.[64]
Net income is arrived at by deducting the amount of the victims living expenses from the amount of his
gross income.[65] The loss of earning capacity of Asilan is thus computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income living expenses][66]
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income 50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-29] x [103,260.00 51,630.00]
= 34 x 51,630.00
= 1,755,420.00
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02686
is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it found accused-appellant Joseph Asilan y Tabornal guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
MODIFICATION as to the damages. Asilan is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Randy Adovas y Pecaat the following: (a) 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) 50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) 30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (d) 80,224.00 as actual damages; (e) 1,755,420.00 as loss of earning capacity; and
(f) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
-----Quirante v IAC
FACTS:
Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor named Norman Guerrero
Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (Philamgen) acted as bondsman for Guerrero. In view of
Guerrero's failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his
counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both Guerrero and Philamgen
Philamgen filed a cross-claim against Guerrero for indemnification
RTC: in favor of Dr. Indalecio Casasola by rescinding the contract ordering Guerrero and Philamgen to pay
actual damages of P129,430, moral damages of P50,000, exemplary damages of P40,000 and attorney's
fees of P30,000 ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300/day from December 15, 1978
to July 16, 1979 and ordering Philamgen to pay Dr. Casasola the amount of the surety bond equivalent to
P120,000.
Petition to quash the writ of execution and to compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal was
dismissed
In the mean time, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as survivors
Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees
According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola that in case of
recovery of the surety bond - P30K and in case of damages excess of the surety bond, divided equally bet.
the heirs, Atty. Quirante and Atty. Cruz.
RTC: granted the motion for confirmation
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Quirante can claim attorney's fees
HELD: NO. present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED
attorney's fees may be asserted either in:
the very action in which the services in question have been rendered -as in this case
the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for
the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of
the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered
rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the
nature and extent of the lawyer's services
The rule against multiplicity of suits will in effect be served
a separate action
2 Kinds of Attorney's fees
1. item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code wherein the award is made in favor of
the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce
the judgment for attorney's fees by execution
2. claims are based on the contract for professional services, with the attorney as the creditors and the
clients as the debtors
It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides
that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies
We are of the considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise
determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in
determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners
herein. The court below will be in a better position, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds
that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto,
since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same
objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters
that may be presented for consideration by the trial court.
---PNB V CA
FACTS:
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. (IEI) entered into a coal operating contract with the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED) with Cabarrus and then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco as signatories. IEI found
3 newly-discovered coal blocks and applied it for conversion. But instead it was awarded to Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC).
Consequently, IEI made written demands to MMIC, pursuant to the MOA, for the reimbursement of all costs
and expenses it had incurred on the project which, as of July 31, 1983, had amounted to P31.66 million as
audited by the Sycip, Gorres and Velayo Company

IEI filed a complaint alleging that MMIC acted in gross and evident bad faith in entering into the MOA when
it had no intention at all to operate the 2 coal blocks and of complying with any of its obligations under the
said agreement
July 13, 1981: MMIC entered into a Mortgage Trust Agreement in favor of PNB and DBP. MMIC defaulted in
the payment of its loan obligation.
August 15, 1984: IEI advised PNB and DBP that it had assigned to MMIC per the MOA were still unpaid but
still foreclosure sale proceeded.
IEI filed a rescission of the assignment of the Giporlos Coal Project to MMIC before the RTC impleading PNB
and DBP
RTC: granted. PNB is equally guilty of bad faith because it was advised beforehand that the heavy
equipment and movable property which are part of the Giporlos Coal Project were still unpaid. MMIC and
PNB jointly and solidarily liable to pay moral damages P300,000,exemplary damages P200,000 and
P200,000 attorney's fees
CA: reversed. IEI's claim against PNB for actual, consequential and moral damages including attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit, has neither legal nor factual bases.
ISSUE: W/N PNB should be liable for damages.
HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it renders petitioner solidarily liable with Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation for damages and AFFIRMED insofar as it nullifies the foreclosure sale of
August 31, 1984
In view of the noninvolvement of petitioner in the alleged conspiracy to strip private respondent of the its
rights over the Giporlos Project, petitioner cannot be made solidarily liable with the MMIC for damages.
However, although petitioner's rights to foreclose the mortgage and to subject the equipment of private
respondent to the foreclosure sale are unassailable, we find that the foreclosure proceedings fell short of
the requirements of the law.
-----Padillo v CA, nothing found online except for Padilla and im in a hurry so no time to bother
----Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v CA (Credit Transactions)
G.R. No. 97412 July 12, 1994
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and broker-forwarder for
damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee who paid the
consignee the value of such losses/damages.
the losses/damages were sustained while in the respective and/or successive custody and possession of
defendants carrier (Eastern), arrastre operator (Metro Port) and broker (Allied Brokerage).
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee P19,032.95 under
the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of said
consignee against defendants.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * trial court: ordered payment of damages, jointly and severally * CA:
affirmed trial court.
ISSUES AND RULING:
(a) whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and
several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre operator and the customs broker;
YES, it is solidary. Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care of the goods that are in its
custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the
CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the
goods in good condition to the consignee.
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time
the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier
for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance by, the

person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646;
Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863). When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in
damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and
there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable.
(b) whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be computed from the time
the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered; and
FOLLOW THESE VERY IMPORTANT RULES (GUIDANCE BY THE SUPREME COURT)
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts
is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages"
of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the
rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
(c) whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent (12%) or six percent (6%).
SIX PERCENT (6%) on the amount due computed from the decision, dated 03 February 1988, of the court a
quo (Court of Appeals) AND A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be
imposed on such amount upon finality of the Supreme Court decision until the payment thereof.
RATIO: when the judgment awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the monetary award
shall earn interest at 12% per annum from the date of such finality until its satisfaction, regardless of
whether the case involves a loan or forbearance of money. The reason is that this interim period is deemed
to be by then equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
NOTES: the Central Bank Circular imposing the 12% interest per annum applies only to loans or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits, and that the 6% interest under the Civil Code governs when the transaction
involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the
performance of obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these cases, a common time frame in the
computation of the 6% interest per annum has been applied, i.e., from the time the complaint is filed until
the adjudged amount is fully paid
--ESTORES V SUPANGAN (rate of interest)
-----CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Marikina Auto Line transport Corp. vs. People
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]
FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road,
Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger
bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along
Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus
suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon
located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the
damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon
refused.
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto.
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. Suelto
maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. Both the trial court and the CA ruled
in against herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.
HELD:
No.
xxx
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted on an emergency,
that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA
that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was
enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or
highway:
SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different course of action is required in the interest of
the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in
compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway
shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when
overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one
highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the
highway.
Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same
at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for
the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person
shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of
any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured
clear distance ahead.
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property
of private respondent.
However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos defense, in light of his contradictory
testimony vis--vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial
apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems
highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to
conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid
the passenger jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs.
Ison, 173 SCRA 118, where the Court stated that "physical evidence is of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately
after the incident. The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused
not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the

jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the
incident, the damages would have been less severe.
In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony
in court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was because he wanted to
avoid the passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his testimony in court, he
said that it was to avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his
lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the witness doubtful and
shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the variance between testimony and prior statements renders the
witness unreliable. Such inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony
as to his prudence and diligence.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the
accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be.
What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of
the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.
Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the
driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.
Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and
his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile
---------RCJ BUS LINES VS. STANDARD INCURANCE CO. G.R. No. 193629, Aug. 17, 2011, Carpio, J.:p, 2
nd
Division FACTS:
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (STANDARD) filed a complaint against the petitioners Flor Bola Mangoba and
RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. The complaint was predicated upon an accident which involves the Mitsubishi Lancer
and the RCJ Bus Lines. Upon seeing a pile of gravel and sand on the road, the Toyota Corolla, which is
ahead of the Mitsubishi Lancer, stopped on its tracks. The Mitsubishi Lancer followed suit and also halted.
At this point, the bus hit and bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Lancer causing it to move forward
and hit the Toyota Corolla in front of it. As a result of the incident, the Mitsubishi Lancer sustained damages
amounting to P162,151.22, representing the costs of its repairs. Under the comprehensive insurance policy
secured by Rodelene Valentino, owner of the Mitsubishi Lancer, STANDARD reimbursed to the former the
amount she expended for the repairs of her vehicle. Rodelene then executed a Release of Claim and
Subrogation Receipt, subrogating STANDARD to all rights, claims and actions she may have against RCJ Bus
Lines, Inc. and its driver, Flor Bola Mangoba. In its answer, RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. maintained, among others,
that the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the
Mitsubishi Lancer when, for no reason at all, it made a sudden stop along the National Highway, as if to
initiate and/or create an accident. The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Standard. The RTC affirmed
with modification the
MeTCs
Decision deleting the award for exemplary damages.The appellate court found that the RTC committed no
reversible error in affirming RCJs liability as regist
ered owner of the bus and employer of Mangoba.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals erroneously disregarded the point that petitioner
RCJs defense of extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver
was made as an alternative defense;
HELD:
The petition has no merit. RCJ, by presenting witnesses to testify on its exercise of diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus drivers, admitted that Mangoba is its
employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2176, makes the employer vicariously liable
for the acts of its employees. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises the
juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and
supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being
the relationship of
pater familias
or on the employers own
negligence.Mangoba, per testimony of his conductor, was ten meters away from the Mitsubishi Lancer
before the collision and was driving 60 to 75 kilometers per hour when the speed limit was 50 kilometers
per hour. The presumption under Article 2185 of the Civil Code was thus proven true: Mangoba, as driver of
the bus which collided with the Mitsubishi Lancer, was negligent since he violated a traffic regulation at the

time of the mishap. We see no reason to depart from the findings of the MeTC, RTC and appellate court
that Mangoba was negligent