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GAPS IN THE GRID: Pathankot has shred to pieces the cycle of terror responses in India: from processing intelligence alerts, mobilising first responders, carrying out counterterror operations
under a well-defined command-and-control system, minimising casualties and, finally, obtaining maximum intelligence to thwart possible future attacks. Picture shows soldiers on watch
at the perimeter fence of the Pathankot airbase. PHOTO: AP
ost terror attacks in India are characterised by three critical missteps: ignored intelligence inputs, inconsistent security response, and heavy
casualties.
Consider, for instance, the Pathankot
and the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks. A
few days before the boat with terrorists
actually landed in Mumbai, the Intelligence Bureau had details of the specific
location of a satellite phone used by terrorists on a boat moving towards the
Mumbai coast. In the run-up to the attacks, there were at least two more specific alerts Indian agencies had about a possible attack on Mumbai.
After 166 people were killed, hundreds
injured, and India held to ransom for days
and humiliated on the global stage by 10
terrorists, no one was held accountable.
Those who were supposed to act on the
terror alerts, those who were supposed to
guard the seas and those who were supposed to protect Mumbai, all carried on
with their professional lives.
In Pathankot the story just got worse.
The U.S. agencies had alerted their Indian
counterparts around Christmas about a
group of half-a-dozen terrorists planning
to target the city. By early morning of January 1, a senior police officer
reported his ordeal with the terrorists. Despite several hours
available to intercept the terrorists in a limited space, New Delhi, in its wisdom, decided to
waste time by flying in National
Security Guard (NSG) comJosy Joseph
mandos from the national capital, while thousands of trained
army soldiers were already stationed all over Pathankot.
As with 26/11, the criminal neglect by
those responsible for acting on the information would again be whitewashed. The
Central government would again come to
the conclusion that no one was responsible for the lapses that resulted in the humiliating attack and the mismanaged counterterror operation.
In all of its contemporary history, India
has only been going around in a loop in its
inability to tackle armed non-state actors.
Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Pakistan-based
terror group suspected to be behind the
Pathankot attack, was founded by Masood Azhar, who was one of the three terrorists freed by India in yet another embarrassing episode of terrorism on
another year-end: on December 31, 1999,
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided to release three terrorists after Indian Airlines flight IC814 was hijacked to
Kandahar, to secure the lives of the
passengers.
Reshaping Indias security posture
Though Indias wars with neighbouring countries have played the most important role in impacting its security posture, terrorism has, in fact, been the
biggest threat faced by the country on almost all major counts the number of
soldiers killed, duration of engagement
with armed movements or the spread of
the menace. However, terrorism hasnt
had a commensurate impact on reshaping
Indias security posture and tactics, as
well as political strategies.
That might explain why India has one
of the poorest track records in tackling insurgencies. Various studies have shown
that insurgencies with external support
tend to linger on longer than purely domestic movements. Broad assessments of