1. Mendoza vs. Hon.

Angelito Teh
Facts:
Petitioner Adelia Mendoza for herself and as administratrix of the intestate
estate" of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the RTC
of Batangas a complaint for "reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot
in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary injunction". She
also filed an action to be the administratrix of her co-plaintiff.
On February 17, 1995, private respondents (heirs of Norberto) filed a
motion to dismiss invoking lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action,
estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of
jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case
for appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the
ordinary action for reconveyance. Adelia in her opposition to the motions,
asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix is only an incidental matter, which is not even prayed for in
the complaint.
The trial court dismissed the motion of Adelia for lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil action and a special
proceeding are different.
Issue:
W/N in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the
whole case.
Held:
NO. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth
millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the
RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions "incapable of
pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of an administratrix for
an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of
Rule 73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for
granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate
proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the
RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate.

By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix

ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents
confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular
13-95 provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the
province where the property is located, in this case, Batangas. The
mere fact that petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the
time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.
Second, the cases cited by private respondents are not at point as they
involve settlement of estate where the probate court was asked to resolve
questions of ownership of certain properties. In the present suit, no
settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily
involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of
the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not
even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for
reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with
the reconveyance suit rather than dismiss the entire case.

4. Fule vs. CA
Doctrines: Settlement of estate; Venue; Jurisdiction; Section 1, Rule 73
specifically the clause so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of the estate, is in reality a matter of
venue. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
Same; The term resides in Section 1, Rule 73 on settlement of a
decedents estate refers to his actual residence as distinguished from his
legal residence or domicile. In other words, resides, should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate nettled; in the Court, of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Facts:
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, died intestate in Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba. At the same time, she moved ex parte for
her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar
granted the motion.

A MR was filed by Preciosa Garcia on contending that the order

appointing Virginia Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has
been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no
delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Garcia, she should be
preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G.
Fule is a debtor of the estate. Preciosa prayed that she be appointed
special administratrix of the estate.
Issue: Who between Fule and Garcia has the better right to administer the
estate?
Held:
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment
of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of
such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not determine who
are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the
administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree
of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the
parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. The
preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation
Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8,
1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married
to Preciosa B. Garcia. In his certificate of candidacy for the office of
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna
filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B.
Banaticla as his spouse. Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B.
Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia.

5. EUSEBIO V. EUSEBIO
Facts:
When Andres Eusebio died, his son filed a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. The illegitimate children of Andres opposed this petition praying that
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue since
Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Rule 75, Sec. 1 provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled.If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE IN THE PROVINCE IN WHICH HE RESIDES
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. x x x
It was not disputed that Andres was domiciled in Pampanga for 70 years
prior to his death. Since his heart was in a bad condition, he was forced to
transfer residence in Quezon City. While transferring his belongings to this
house, the decedent suffered a stroke and died soon after.
Issue: W/N the decedent effectively transferred domicile prior to his death.
NO.
Held:
Where it is apparent, from the facts duly established, that the domicile of
origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided
for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well settled that a domicile once acquired is retained
until a new domicile is gained. Domicile is not commonly changed by
presence in a place merely for ones own health, even if coupled with

knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to

return home.

7. Heirs of Sandejas v. Lina

Doctrine:
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate
court approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not
on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling the
estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such
matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals
with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still
alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said
provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the right to file the
application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty
under administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before
the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
Facts:
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters
of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of
his wife, Remedios. Letters of administration were issued accordingly. An
Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was
filed by Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, he and
Eliodoro, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs,
administrators, and assigns, to sell in their entirety 4 contiguous parcels of
land in Makati which formed part of the estate of the decedent. Sometime
thereafter, the counsel for the Administrator Eliodoro informed the court
that the latter died in Canada. The court then issued an order to the
remaining heirs to appoint a new administrator. Alex Lina filed for and was
granted the letters of administration, but was subsequently substituted by
an heir, Sixto Sandejas, upon motion of the other heirs.
Lina then filed an Omnibus Motion,
(a) To approve the deed of conditional sale executed between him
and Eliodoro
(b) To compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in his favor

RTC granted intervenor Linas Motion for the Approval of the Receipt of
Earnest Money with promise to buy. On appeal, the CA overturned RTC
decision and held that the contract between Eliodoro and Lina was merely
a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. Also the conditional sale
only affected the properties owned by the seller-heir Eliodoro at that time,
i.e., his conjugal and successional shares in the property, and not those of
the other heirs. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in modifying the trial courts Decision and in
obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of the disputed properties to respondent,
even if the suspensive condition (approval of the sale by the settlement
court) had not been fulfilled
Held:
Petition is partly meritorious.
The agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent Lina is subject to a
suspensive condition -- the procurement of a court approval, not full
payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the agreement. In
accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to
deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This they could do upon the
courts approval, even before full payment. Hence, their contract was a
conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedents estate per
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however,
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their
own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other words,
they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under
administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the
validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely
implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with
the courts permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in the
present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the
disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to the pro-

indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the intestate

courts ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the transaction.
On Jurisdiction of Settlement Court
The factual differences alleged by petitioners have no bearing on the
intestate courts jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional
sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of
estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of
deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of
administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate courts
recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this
point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the
benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed
by the heirs and the beneficiaries.
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the
decedents obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls
under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file
a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to
Eliodoro Sr.s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the
settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

9. Testate of the deceased Rudocindo Adapon, Pedro Adapon vs.

Felisa Maralit, 69 Phil 383 (January 20, 1940)
Facts: Pedro Adapon presented for probate the last will and testament of
his deceased father, Rudocindo Adapon. The will was admitted to probate,
and Pedro, having been appointed administrator by the court, filed an
inventory of the properties and assets of the estate. The surviving spouse
of the testator by a second marriage, Felisa Maralit, the oppositor-appellee
here, presented a petition asking the court to include in the submitted
inventory several properties. However, (this is in Spanish) the
Administrator argued that the subject properties are owned by him
exclusively.
Issue: Will the petition of oppositor prosper?
Held: No! Under section 599 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the probate
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance relates only to matters having to
do with "the settlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased
persons, the appointment and removal of guardians and trustees, and the
powers, duties, and rights of guardians and wards, trustees, and cestuis
que trust."
As may be seen, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate
court to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceeding.
In the case of Bauermann vs. Casas (10 Phil., 392-393), the Court
observed that "the mere fact that one of the parties is an executor or
administrator of a certain estate does not give exclusive jurisdiction to the
probate court wherein the estate is being settled, of questions arising
between such executors or administrators and third persons, as to the
ownership of specific property.
In Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil., 281), the Court held that "a contested claim
of an administrator that certain rights of possession and ownership are the
property of the estate which he represents must be determined in a
separate action, and not in the course of the administration
proceedings."

10. Bernardo vs. CA

Facts:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio
died first and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
instituted in the CFI of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on
October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow and his
cousins.
Hermogena also died. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of
the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her
collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
The executor filed a project partition in the testate proceeding in
accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio
Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena
Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives aforementioned.
These relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and
submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the
properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the
theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses.
One of the collateral issues raised by the parties is the validity of donation
which the probate court declared as void. Now, petitioners question the
jurisdiction of the probate court to rule on such collateral issue.
Issue:
W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to rule on such issue.
Held:
YES. In a line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that as a
general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon in
testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays
merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in
which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However,
we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the
deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question

as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may

definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent of the parties,
matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken
cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding provided
interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to
the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter
properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has
to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to
the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented,
because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon
petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.
There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the
heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the
widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this
right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the
claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and,
consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the
parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by
respondents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners by presenting their project of partition including therein the
disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her
husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of
the properties which is well within the competence of the probate court
and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter
withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the
court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the
objection are the ones who set the court in motion. They can not be
permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges the question
against them.

11. Anita Reyes-Mesugas vs. Alejandro Aquino Reyes

Facts:
Lourdes Reyes dies intestate, leaving 3 parcels of land. Alejandro Reyes,
one of her children, filed a petition for settlement of Lourdes estate
praying for his appointment as administrator due to the alleged
irregularities and fraudulent transactions by the other heirs. Anita ReyesMesugas (also a child of Lourdes), her father Pedro and Arturo, opposed
the petition.
A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties, whereby the
estate of Lourdes was partitioned. The RTC thereafter rendered a decision
pursuant to the said agreement.
Afterwards, Anita files a motion to cancel lis pendens annotation for the
TCT in view of the finality of judgment in the settlement of the estate,
hence, the annotation had served its purpose. Alejandro opposed arguing
that side agreements had yet to be fulfilles. One such agreement was
granting Alejandro a one-meter right of way on the lot covered by the TCT.
However, Anita refused to give the said right of way and threatened to
build a concrete structure to prevent access.
RTC denied the motion to cancel lis pendens.
Issue:
Should the RTC, taking cognizance of the case as a probate court, order
for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens?
Held:
YES.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
Once submitted to the court and stamped with judicial approval, it
becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon the parties;
having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the
controversy, it has the force and effect of any judgment.
Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise
agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such
judgment.

In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took
cognizance of the case as a probate court.
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It
acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property
arising from the contract.It approves contracts entered into for and on
behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court.
It is apparent therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise
agreement, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end.
Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is
not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
The compromise agreement did not mention the grant of a right of way to
respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially approved compromise
agreement between the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the
probate court.
More importantly, the order of the probate court approving the compromise
had the effect of directing the delivery of the residue of the estate of
Lourdes to the persons entitled thereto under the compromise agreement.
As such, it brought to a close the intestate proceedings and the probate
court lost jurisdiction over the case, except only as regards to the
compliance and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations
under the compromise agreement.
Finally, when the decision and final order of the court was recorded in the
Registry of Deeds, the notice of lis pended inscribed on the TCT was
deemed cancelled by virtue of Sec 77 of PD 1529.

12. EDUARDO AGTARAP v. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP ET AL.,

GR No. 177099 | June 8, 2011
FACTS:
nd
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo (son from 2 marriage) filed with RTC
Pasay a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his
deceased father Joaquin. It alleged that he died intestate without debts or
obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin had 2 marriages, first with Lucia,
with whom he had three children and second with Caridad with whom he
also had 3 children. He left 2 parcels of land in Pasay. Joseph (grandson
st
from 1 marriage) had been leasing and improving the said parcels of land.
Eduardo prayed that an order be issued to 1. Confirm and
compulsory heris of Joaquin, 2. Apportion and allocate unto
their aliquot shares in the estate, 3. Entitle the distributees
receive and enter into possession of those parts individually
them.

declare the
these heirs
the right to
awarded to

Grandchildren of Joaquin from first marriage filed their opposition alleging

that the 2 subject lots belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and
Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death, they became pro indiviso owners of
the subject properties. They also opposed the appointment of Eduardo as
administrator on the following grounds: 1. Hes not physically and mentally
fit to do so, 2. His interest in the lots is minimal, 3. He does not possess
the desire to earn. They prayed that Joseph be appointed as special or
regular administrator.
RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator. It
also allocated the greater part of the estate in favor of the children of the
second marriage considering that the bulk of the estate property were
acquired during the existence of the second marriage.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC, as an intestate court, acquire jurisdiction over the issue on
ownership of the properties?
HELD:
Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the

probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons,

but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several
cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said
court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
Exceptions:
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination
of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question
is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the
parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be
impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but
collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for
judicial settlement of Joaquins estate, he alleged that Joaquin and
Caridad owned the subject properties since the TCTs state that the lots
were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting
marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia. Oppositors
to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present proof
before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 (2 subject properties in
this case) were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, in the name
of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first
married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta. When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes
and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land. This
same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184) also in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
Thus when the CFI or Rizal (sometime after the death and Lucia and after
the marriage between Joaquin and Caridad) crossed out the name of
Lucia Garcia Mendietta and replaced the phrase married to Caridad
Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad, it cannot
be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridads name in
TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate, onehalf (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucias share in the property
covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the
certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and
38255. And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by
her compulsory heirs Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage
is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC
had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had
to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the
decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement
proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be

consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucias

spouse. Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with
respect to the properties covered by TCTs subject of this case, to her
compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, the claim of Eduardo that
TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the
properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the
registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap married to Caridad Garcia,
deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack
on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not
necessarily conclusive of a holders true ownership of property. A
certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it
cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. Thus,
the fact that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were
acquired during the spouses coverture. The phrase married to Caridad
Garcia in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as
the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are
their conjugal properties.
These cases were remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap.

13. Nepumuceno v. CA 139 SCRA 206 (1985)

Facts:
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. In the his Will, the
testator named and appointed petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole
and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the
testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been
estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner
as husband and wife. In fact, Martin Jugo and Sofia Nepomuceno got
married on December 5, 1952 before the Justice of the Peace in Tarlac.
The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina
Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner. (See original for the provisions of the
will.)
Petitioner Nepomuceno filed a petition for the probate of and asked for the
issuance to her of letters testamentary. The legal wife of the testator
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that
the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence
on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the
testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living
in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus,
letters testamentary should not be issued to her. CFI denied probate
denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted
in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his
death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident. On appeal by petitioner, the CA declared the Will to
be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void
pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Issue: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when, after declaring
the will validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of petitioner. NO.

Held:
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing
marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that
the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital
relationship for 22 years until his death. The prohibition in Article 739 of
the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who
are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive.
The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with
whom he had been living in concubinage.
Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the
belief that she was legally married to the testator. The records do not
sustain a finding of innocence or good faith, like having admitted that she
knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, having often gone to
Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, etc.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the
Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing
the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

14. Ajero vs. CA

FACTS:
Petitioners instituted a special proceeding, for allowance of decedents
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of
sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue
influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by
will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testaments body nor the signature therein was in decedents handwriting;
it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. [Facts irrelevant to spec pro: The petition
was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in
the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He
claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.]

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on

the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he
did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his
signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code enumerates the
grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other
grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a
holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether
the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether
the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedents

holographic will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and
the petition for probate of decedents will was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in disallowing the probate of the will.
HELD:
NO. The SC said it was erroneous for the CA to say that the holographic
will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law and held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that wills shall be
disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a
will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

15. Acain vs. IAC

Facts:
Constantino Acain filed on the RTC of Cebu a petition for the probate of
the will of the late Nemesio Acain. In Nemesios will, it provided that all his
shares will go to his brother Segundo Acain and in case he pre-decease
him it will go to Segundos children (NO MENTION OF THE WIDOW OR
THE ADOPTED CHILD OF NEMESIO= PRETERITION). Segundo
predeceased Nemesio, thus the formers children are claiming to be the
heirs.
Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the
widow filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner
has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents'
petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of
the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
W/N the authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon
the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate.
Held:
The case filed by Constantino is for the probate of a will. As stated by
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation

constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In Nuguid v.

Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the motion held that the
will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without
costs. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court,
induced by practical considerations. It held that, if the case were to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary,
this litigation will be protracted.
In this case the adopted child and widow filed a motion to dismiss the
petition. It was denied by the trial court for the reason that "the grounds for
the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing
on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case. For
private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically
void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal
heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had
been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have
meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity
of the will was resolved.

16. Paz v. Madrigal October 23, 1956

Doctrine:
In a claim or suit against the estate of a decedent, the administrator or the
executor must be included as it is the administrator or the executor
representing the estate of the deceased.
*Where estate of deceased persons settled If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted and
his estate settled, in the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death [(Rule 73, sec.1) regardless of the location of his estate)
*nearest codal provision related to the case.
Facts:
Appeal from an order of the CFI of Manila, dismissing plaintiffs action to
recover the possession and ownership of 7 parcels of land situated in the
province of Camarines Sur, 1 parcel of land situated in the province of
Marinduque, and 1 lot and a house situated in the City of Manila.
Issue:
Whether the appeal should be granted even without including the executrix
of the estate of the party defendant?
Held:
Yes.
Order appealed from is set aside with costs against the appellees.
But Appellants are directed to amend the complaint so as to include the
executrix of the estate of the party defendant.