VIII.

Art 915-959 [disinheritance]

Seangio vs. Reyes

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D.

SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO,
petitioners, vs.HON.AMORA.REYES,in
her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region,Branch21,Manila, ALFREDOD.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
ELISA D. SEANGIOSANTOS, VICTOR
D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIOLIM, BETTY D.
SEANGIOOBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO,respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA,J :
p

This is a petition for certiorari 1 with application for the

issuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunctionand/ortemporary
restrainingorderseekingthenullificationoftheorders,dated
August10,1999andOctober14,1999,oftheRegionalTrial
CourtofManila,Branch21(theRTC),dismissingthepetition
forprobateonthegroundofpreterition,intheconsolidated
cases,docketedasSP.Proc.No.9890870andSP.Proc.No.
9993396,andentitled,"IntheMatteroftheIntestateEstateof
SegundoC.Seangiov.AlfredoD.Seangio,etal."and"Inthe
MatteroftheProbateoftheWillofSegundoC.Seangiov.Dy

YiengSeangio,BarbaraD.SeangioandVirginiaSeangio."
Thefactsofthecasesareasfollows:
OnSeptember21,1988,privaterespondentsfiledapetitionfor
the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio,docketedasSp.Proc.No.9890870oftheRTC,and
praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
SeangioSantosasspecialadministratorandguardianadlitem
ofpetitionerDyYiengSeangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed
Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy
Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties;2)thedeceasedSegundoexecutedageneralpowerof
attorneyinfavorofVirginiagivingherthepowertomanage
andexercisecontrolandsupervisionoverhisbusinessinthe
Philippines;3)Virginiaisthemostcompetentandqualifiedto
serveastheadministratoroftheestateofSegundobecauseshe
is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographicwill,datedSeptember20,1995,disinheritingone
oftheprivaterespondents,AlfredoSeangio,forcause.Inview
ofthepurportedholographicwill,petitionersaverredthatin
theeventthedecedentisfoundtohaveleftawill,theintestate
proceedingsaretobeautomaticallysuspendedandreplacedby
theproceedingsfortheprobateofthewill.
OnApril7,1999,apetitionfortheprobateoftheholographic
will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was
filedbypetitionersbeforetheRTC.Theylikewisereiterated
thattheprobateproceedingsshouldtakeprecedenceoverSP.
Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take
precedenceandenjoypriorityoverintestateproceedings.2

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's

holographicwillisquoted,asfollows:
Kasulatansapagaalisngmana
Tantuninngsinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
naninirahansa465AFloresSt.,Ermita,Manilaat
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pagiisip at
disposisyonaytahasanathayaganginaalisanko
nglahatatanumangmanaangpaganaykonganak
na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging
lapastangansaakinatisanbesessiyangsasalita
ngmasamaharapankoatmgakapatidniyanasi
VirginiaSeangiolabiskongkinasamangloobko
at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa
ibabawgayongunitdaratinangarawnaakonasa
ilalimsiyaatsiyanasaibabaw.
IaEScC

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni

Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los
ReyessaChinaBangkingCorporationnamillon
pesosathindingbabayadathindingbabayadito
aynagdulotsaakingngmalakingkahihiyasamga
mayariatstockholdersngChinaBanking.
AtikinagalitkoparinangpagkuhaniAlfredoat
ngkanyangasawanamgacustome[r]ngTravel
CenterofthePhilippinesnapinagasiwaankoat
nganakkosiVirginia.
Ditoakonagalitdinkayagayonayokonabilanin
siAlfredonganakkoathayanankonginaalisan
ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si

Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi

siyamakohamana.
Nila[g]daankongayonika20ngSetyembre1995
salongsodngManilasaharapngtatlongsaksi.3
(signed)
Segundo
Seangio
Nilagdaansaharapnamin
(signed)
DyYiengSeangio(signed)
UnangSaksiikalawangsaksi
(signed)
ikatlongsaksi

OnMay29,1999,uponpetitioners'motion,SP.Proc.No.98
90870andSP.Proc.No.9993396wereconsolidated.4
OnJuly1,1999,privaterespondentsmovedforthedismissal
oftheprobateproceedings 5 primarilyonthegroundthatthe
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
doesnotcontainanydispositionoftheestateofthedeceased
andthusdoesnotmeetthedefinitionofawillunderArticle
783oftheCivilCode.Accordingtoprivaterespondents,the
will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedentofhiseldestson,Alfredo,andnothingelse;thatall
othercompulsoryheirswerenotnamednorinstitutedasheir,
devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintainedthatwhileprocedurallythecourtiscalleduponto

ruleonlyontheextrinsicvalidityofthewill,itisnotbarred
from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
orderingthedismissalofthepetitionforprobatewhenonthe
face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary
dispositionofthepropertyofthedecedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contendingthat:1)generally,theauthorityoftheprobatecourt
islimitedonlytoadeterminationoftheextrinsicvalidityof
thewill;2)privaterespondentsquestiontheintrinsicandnot
theextrinsicvalidityofthewill;3)disinheritanceconstitutesa
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundo's will does not
constituteauniversalheirorheirstotheexclusionofoneor
morecompulsoryheirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order,
dismissingthepetitionforprobateproceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,
clearlyshowsthatthereispreterition,astheonly
heirsmentionedthereatareAlfredoandVirginia.
[T]heotherheirsbeingomitted,Article854ofthe
NewCivilCodethusapplies.However,insofaras
the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned,
Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsoryheirinthedirectline.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this
petition,fortodootherwisewouldamounttoan
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the
case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court
[155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position

clear:"for...respondentstohavetoleratedthe
probate of the will and allowed the case to
progresswhen,onitsface,thewillappearstobe
intrinsicallyvoid...wouldhavebeenanexercise
infutility.Itwouldhavemeantawasteoftime,
effort,expense,plusaddedfutility.Thetrialcourt
could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was resolved (underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theMotion
to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lackofmerit.SpecialProceedingsNo.9993396
isherebyDISMISSEDwithoutpronouncementas
tocosts.
aDHCEA

SOORDERED.7

Petitioners'motionforreconsiderationwasdeniedbytheRTC
initsorderdatedOctober14,1999.
Petitionerscontendthat:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN
EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTIONANDDECIDEDAQUESTION
OFLAWNOTINACCORDWITHLAWAND
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONEDORDERS,DATED10AUGUST
1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)

CONSIDERINGTHAT:
I
THERESPONDENTJUDGE,WITHOUTEVEN
COMPLYINGWITHSECTIONS3AND4OF
RULE76OFTHERULESOFCOURTONTHE
PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT

OF

THE
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE
TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
GROUNDTHATTHETESTATOR'SWILLIS
VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH
GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THEWILL,DESPITETHEFACTTHATITIS
ASETTLEDRULETHATTHEAUTHORITY
OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY
TOADETERMINATIONOFTHEEXTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR'S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIESPRESCRIBEDBYLAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE
INTRINSICVALIDITYOFTHEWILLOFTHE
TESTATOR,ITISINDUBITABLEFROMTHE
FACEOFTHETESTATOR'SWILLTHATNO
PRETERITONEXISTSANDTHATTHEWILL

IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY
EXTRINSICALLYVALID;AND,

AND

III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND
TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT
IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
INTESTATEPROCEEDINGS.

Petitionersargue,asfollows:
First,respondentjudgedidnotcomplywithSections3and4
ofRule76oftheRulesofCourtwhichrespectivelymandate
thecourtto:a)fixthetimeandplaceforprovingthewillwhen
allconcernedmayappeartocontesttheallowancethereof,and
cause notice of such time and place to be published three
weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a
newspaperofgeneralcirculation;and,b)causethemailingof
saidnoticetotheheirs,legateesanddeviseesofthetestator
Segundo;
Second,theholographicwilldoesnotcontainanyinstitutionof
anheir,butrather,asitstitleclearlystates,KasulatanngPag
Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsoryheir.Thus,thereisnopreteritioninthedecedent's
will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically
void;

Third,thetestatorintendedallhiscompulsoryheirs,petitioners
and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of

Alfredo,toinherithisestate.Noneofthecompulsoryheirsin
thedirectlineofSegundowerepreteritedintheholographic
willsincetherewasnoinstitutionofanheir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the
holographicwillthatitisbothintrinsicallyandextrinsically
valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the
hearingofthetestatecase;and,
Lastly,thecontinuationoftheproceedingsintheintestatecase
willworkinjusticetopetitioners,andwillrendernugatorythe
disinheritanceofAlfredo.
CDAHaE

ThepurportedholographicwillofSegundothatwaspresented
bypetitionerswasdated,signedandwrittenbyhiminhisown
handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private
respondentsdidnotraiseanyissueasregardstheauthenticity
ofthedocument.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng PagAalis ng Mana,
unmistakably showed Segundo's intention of excluding his
eldestson,Alfredo,asanheirtohisestateforthereasonsthat
he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
Fordisinheritancetobevalid,Article916oftheCivilCode
requiresthatthesamemustbeeffectedthroughawillwherein
thelegalcausethereforshallbespecified.Withregardtothe
reasonsforthedisinheritancethatwerestatedbySegundoin
hisdocument,theCourtbelievesthattheincidents,takenasa
whole,canbeconsideredaformofmaltreatmentofSegundo
byhisson,Alfredo,andthatthematterpresentsasufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under
Article919oftheCivilCode:

Article 919.The following shall be sufficient

causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants,legitimateaswellasillegitimate:
(1)Whena child or descendant has been found
guiltyofanattemptagainstthelifeofthe
testator,hisorherspouse,descendants,or
ascendants;
(2)Whenachildordescendanthasaccusedthe
testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3)When a child or descendant has been
convictedofadulteryorconcubinagewith
thespouseofthetestator;
(4)When a child or descendant by fraud,
violence,intimidation,orundueinfluence
causes the testator to make a will or to
changeonealreadymade;
(5)Arefusalwithoutjustifiablecausetosupport
the parents or ascendant who disinherit
suchchildordescendant;
(6)Maltreatmentofthetestatorbywordordeed,
bythechildordescendant;8
(7)When a child or descendant leads a
dishonorableordisgracefullife;
(8)Convictionofacrimewhichcarrieswithitthe
penaltyofcivilinterdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the

document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographicwill.
Aholographicwill,asprovidedunderArticle810oftheCivil
Code,mustbeentirelywritten,dated,andsignedbythehand
ofthetestatorhimself.Itissubjecttonootherform,andmay
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundo'sdocument,althoughitmayinitiallycomeacrossasa
meredisinheritanceinstrument,conformstotheformalitiesof
aholographicwillprescribedbylaw.Itiswritten,datedand
signedbythehandofSegundohimself.Anintenttodispose
mortiscausa 9 canbeclearlydeducedfromthetermsofthe
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo,nonetheless,isanactofdispositioninitself.Inother
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the
propertyofthetestatorSegundoinfavorofthosewhowould
succeedintheabsenceofAlfredo.10
Moreover,itisafundamentalprinciplethattheintentorthe
willofthetestator,expressedintheformandwithinthelimits
prescribedbylaw,mustberecognizedasthesupremelawin
succession.Allrulesofconstructionaredesignedtoascertain
andgiveeffecttothatintention.Itisonlywhentheintentionof
thetestatoriscontrarytolaw,morals,orpublicpolicythatit
cannotbegiveneffect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one
whoisnotlearnedinthelaw,asillustratedinthepresentcase,
shouldbeconstruedmoreliberallythantheonesdrawnbyan

expert,takingintoaccountthecircumstancessurroundingthe
executionoftheinstrumentandtheintentionofthetestator. 12
Inthisregard,theCourtisconvincedthatthedocument,even
ifcaptionedasKasulatanngPagAalisngMana,wasintended
bySegundotobehislasttestamentaryactandwasexecutedby
himinaccordancewithlawintheformofaholographicwill.
Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance cannot be
giveneffect.14
Withregardtotheissueonpreterition, 15 theCourtbelieves
thatthecompulsoryheirsinthedirectlinewerenotpreterited
in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last
expressiontobequeathhisestatetoallhiscompulsoryheirs,
with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
instituteanheir 16 totheexclusionofhisothercompulsory
heirs.Themerementionofthenameofoneofthepetitioners,
Virginia,inthedocumentdidnotoperatetoinstituteherasthe
universalheir.Hernamewasincludedplainlyasawitnessto
thealtercationbetweenSegundoandhisson,Alfredo.
HSEIAT

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's

holographicwill,andthatthelawfavorstestacyoverintestacy,
theprobateofthewillcannotbedispensedwith.Article838of
theCivilCodeprovidesthatnowillshallpasseitherrealor
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordancewiththeRulesofCourt.Thus,unlessthewillis
probated,therightofapersontodisposeofhispropertymay
berenderednugatory.17
Inviewoftheforegoing,thetrialcourt,therefore,shouldhave
allowedtheholographicwilltobeprobated.Itissettledthat
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the

samepurpose.18
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheOrdersofthe
RegionalTrialCourtofManila,Branch21,datedAugust10,
1999andOctober14,1999,aresetaside.Respondentjudgeis
directedtoreinstateandhearSPProc.No.9993396forthe
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
intestatecaseorSP.Proc.No.9890870isherebysuspended
untiltheterminationoftheaforesaidtestateproceedings.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
(DyYiengSeangiov.Reyes,G.R.Nos.14037172,November
27,2006)
|||

Art. 960-977
Rosales vs Rosales

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V.

ROSALES. IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA
ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,
respondents.
JoseB.Echavesforpetitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.CIVILLAW;WILLSANDSUCCESSION;INTESTATE

SUCCESSION; INTESTATE OR LEGAL HEIRS;

CLASSIFICATION.Intestateorlegalheirsareclassified
intotwo(2)groups,namely,thosewhoinheritbytheirown
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation.
Restated,anintestateheircanonlyinheriteitherbyhisown
right,asintheorderofintestatesuccessionprovidedforinthe
CivilCode,orbytherightofrepresentationprovidedforin
Article981ofthesamelaw.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DAUGHTERINLAW, NOT AN
INTESTATEHEIROFHERSPOUSE'SPARENT.There
isnoprovisionintheCivilCodewhichstatesthatawidow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her motherinlaw.
TheentireCodeisdevoidofanyprovisionwhichentitlesher
toinheritfromhermotherinlaweitherbyherownrightorby
therightofrepresentation.TheprovisionsoftheCodewhich
relatetotheorderofintestatesuccession(Articles978to1014)
enumeratewithmeticulousexactitudetheintestateheirsofa
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuousabsenceofaprovisionwhichmakesadaughter
inlawanintestateheirofthedeceasedallthemoreconfirms
Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the
survivingspouseanintestateheiroftheparentinlaw,itwould
havesoprovidedintheCode.
3.ID.; ID.; WIDOW OR WIDOWER MENTIONED IN
ARTICLE 887 OF THE CIVIL CODE REFERS TO
SURVIVING SPOUSE. Petitioner argues that she is a
compulsoryheirinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofarticle
887oftheCivilCode.theaforesaidprovisionoflawrefersto
theestateofthedeceasedspouseinwhichcasethesurviving
spouse(widoworwidower)isacompulsoryheir.Itdoesnot

applytotheestateofaparentinlaw.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SURVIVING SPOUSE CONSIDERED A
THIRD PARTY WITH RESPECT TO ESTATE OF
PARENTINLAW. Indeed, the surviving spouse is
consideredathirdpersonasregardstheestateoftheparentin
law.WehadoccasiontomakethisobservationinLachenalv.
Salas,towit:"Weholdthatthetitletothefishingboatshould
be determined in Civil Case No., 3597 (not in the intestate
proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio,thedecedent'ssoninlaw,who,althoughmarriedto
hisdaughterorcompulsoryheir,isneverthelessathirdperson
withrespecttohisestate....."(Emphasissupplied).
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; BLOOD
RELATIONSHIP; BASIS THEREOF. Article 971
explicitly declares that Macikequeroz Rosales is called to
successionbylawbecauseofhisbloodrelationship.Hedoes
not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented)whopredeceasedhisgrandmother,PetraRosales,
but the latter whom his father would have succeeded.
Petitionercannotassertthesamerightofrepresentationasshe
hasnofiliationbybloodwithhermotherinlaw.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; INCHOATE RIGHT TO ESTATE
EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH OF HEIR. Petitioner
contendsthatatthetimeofthedeathofherhusbandCorterio
Rosaleshehadaninchoateorcontingentrighttotheproperties
ofPetraRosalesascompulsoryheirs.Bethatasitmay,said
rightofherhusbandwasextinguishedbythisdeaththatiswhy
it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
PetraRosalesbyrightofrepresentation.Hedidnotsucceed
fromhisdeceasedfather,CarterioRosales.

DECISION
GANCAYCO,J :
p

InthisPetitionforReviewoftwo(2)OrdersoftheCourtof
First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the
widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
fromthelatter,hermotherinlaw.
prLL

ItappearsfromtherecordofthecasethatonFebruary26,
1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died
intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato T.
Rosalesandtheirtwo(2)childrenMagnaRosalesAcebesand
AntonioRosales.Anotherchild,CarterioRosales,predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widowIreneaC.Rosales,thehereinpetitioner.Theestateof
the deceased has an estimated gross value of about Thirty
ThousandPesos(P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the
proceedingsforthesettlementoftheestateofthedeceasedin
theCourtofFirstInstanceofCebu.Thecasewasdocketedas
Special Proceedings No. 3204R. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said
estate.
Inthecourseoftheintestateproceedings,thetrialcourtissued
an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following
individualsthelegalheirsofthedeceasedandprescribingtheir
respectiveshareoftheestate
FortunatoT.Rosales(husband)1/4;Magna

R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox

Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales (son),
1/4.

ThisdeclarationwasreiteratedbythetrialcourtinitsOrder
datedFebruary4,1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in
gettingashareoftheestateinhercapacityasthesurviving
spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claimingthatsheisacompulsoryheirofhermotherinlaw
togetherwithherson,MacikequeroxRosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the
aforementionedOrders.Thetrialcourtdeniedherplea.Hence
thispetition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our
resolution.Firstisawidow(survivingspouse)anintestate
heirofhermotherinlaw?SecondaretheOrdersofthetrial
courtwhichexcludedthewidowfromgettingashareofthe
estateinquestionfinalasagainstthesaidwidow?
Ouranswertothefirstquestionisinthenegative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups,
namely,thosewhoinheritbytheirownright,andthosewho
inheritbytherightofrepresentation. 1 Restated,anintestate
heircanonlyinheriteitherbyhisownright,asintheorderof
intestatesuccessionprovidedforintheCivilCode, 2orbythe
rightofrepresentationprovidedforinArticle981ofthesame
law.TherelevantprovisionsoftheCivilCodeare;.
"Art. 980.The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right,

dividingtheinheritanceinequalshares."
"Art. 981.Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
survive,theformershallinheritintheirownright,
andthelatterbyrightofrepresentation."
"Art. 982.The grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of
representation,andifanyoneofthemshouldhave
died,leavingseveralheirs,theportionpertaining
tohimshallbedividedamongthelatterinequal
portions."
"Art.999.Whenthewidoworwidowersurvives
withlegitimatechildrenortheirdescendantsand
illegitimatechildrenortheirdescendants,whether
legitimateorillegitimate,suchwidoworwidower
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimatechild."

ThereisnoprovisionintheCivilCodewhichstatesthata
widow(survivingspouse)isanintestateheirofhermotherin
law.TheentireCodeisdevoidofanyprovisionwhichentitles
hertoinheritfromhermotherinlaweitherbyherownrightor
by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code
whichrelatetotheorderofintestatesuccession(Articles978
to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirsofadecedent,withtheStateasthefinalintestateheir.
The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a
daughterinlawanintestateheirofthedeceasedallthemore
confirmsOurobservation.Ifthelegislatureintendedtomake
thesurvivingspouseanintestateheiroftheparentinlaw,it
wouldhavesoprovidedintheCode.
LLjur

Petitionerarguesthatsheisacompulsoryheirinaccordance
with the provisions of Article 887of the Civil Code which
providesthat:
"Art.887.Thefollowingarecompulsoryheirs:
(1)Legitimate children and descendants, with
respecttotheirlegitimateparentsandascendants;
(2)Indefaultoftheforegoing,legitimateparents
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
childrenanddescendants;
(3)Thewidoworwidower;
(4)Acknowledged natural children, and natural
childrenbylegalfiction;
(5)Otherillegitimatechildrenreferredtoinarticle
287;
CompulsoryheirsmentionedinNos.3,4and5
arenotexcludedbythoseinNos.1and2;neither
dotheyexcludeoneanother.
Inallcasesofillegitimatechildren,theirfiliation
mustbedulyproved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of
the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
theminthemannerandtotheextentestablished
bythisCode."

Theaforesaidprovisionoflaw3referstotheestateofthe
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
(widoworwidower)isacompulsoryheir.Itdoesnotapply
totheestateofaparentinlaw.

Indeed,thesurvivingspouseisconsideredathirdpersonas
regards the estate of the parentinlaw. We had occasion to
makethisobservationinLachenalv.Salas,4towit:
"Weholdthatthetitletothefishingboatshould
bedeterminedinCivilCaseNo.3597(notinthe
intestateproceeding)becauseitaffectsthelessee
thereof,LopeL.Leoncio,thedecedent's sonin
law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person
with respect to his estate. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied).

Bythesametoken,theprovisionofArticle999oftheCivil
Codeaforeciteddoesnotsupportpetitioner'sclaim.Acareful
examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplatedthereinistheestateofthedeceasedspouse.The
estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the motherinlaw of the petitioner. It is from the
estateofPetraV.RosalesthatMacikequeroxRosalesdrawsa
share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
providedbyArticle981oftheCode.
llcd

The essence and nature of the right of representation is

explainedbyArticles970and971oftheCivilCode,viz
"Art. 970.Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representativeisraisedtotheplaceandthedegree
ofthepersonrepresented,andacquirestherights
whichthelatterwouldhaveifhewerelivingorif
hecouldhaveinherited.

"Art. 971.The representative is called to the

succession by the law and not by the person
represented.Therepresentativedoesrotsucceed
the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded."
(Emphasissupplied.)

Article971explicitlydeclaresthatMacikequeroxRosalesis
calledtosuccessionbylawbecauseofhisbloodrelationship.
Hedoesnotsucceedhisfather,CarterioRosales(theperson
represented)whopredeceasedhisgrandmother,PetraRosales,
but the latter whom his father would have succeeded.
Petitionercannotassertthesamerightofrepresentationasshe
hasnofiliationbybloodwithhermotherinlaw.
Petitionerhowevercontendsthatatthetimeofthedeathofher
husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent
righttothepropertiesofPetraRosalesascompulsoryheir.Be
thatasitmay,saidrightofherhusbandwasextinguishedby
hisdeaththatiswhyitistheirsonMacikequeroxRosaleswho
succeededfromPetraRosalesbyrightofrepresentation.He
didnotsucceedfromhisdeceasedfather,CarterioRosales.
Onthebasisoftheforegoingobservationsandconclusions,
Wefinditunnecessarytopassuponthesecondquestionposed
bythepetitioner.
Accordingly,itisOur consideredopinion,andWesohold,
thatasurvivingspouseisnotanintestateheirofhisorher
parentinlaw.
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thePetitionishereby
DENIEDforlackofmerit,withcostsagainstthepetitioner.
Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings.

LLjur

SOORDERED.
(IntestateEstateofRosalesv.Rosales,G.R.No.L40789,
February27,1987)
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