Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED
SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:
LESSONS, CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
A Case Study
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................IV
Introduction........................................................................................................................ 1
Reference List..................................................................................................................27
III
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared under the World Bank Institute (WBI) project entitled Lessons on Gender Inclusion in
Fragile and Conflict Affected States Womens Access to Rights, Resources and Voice. It is part of a library of
case studies that aim to document key issues relating to womens access to rights, resources, and voice in fragile
and conflict-affected states. This paper focuses on rights, targeting the ambitious project designed to improve
the legal response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Liberia: the establishment of a specialized
sexual offenses court known as Criminal Court E. It describes and explains the experience with this court and
draws lessons from the Liberian context that may be instructive for other fragile and conflict-affected situations.
The report was prepared by Finlay Young (Consultant) under the supervision of A. Waafas Ofosu-Amaah (Task
Team Leader). The task team consisted of Rea Abada Chiongson, Camilla Gandini, Lwanzo Amani, and Sanam
Naraghi Anderlini (Consultants).
The team expresses its thanks to the representatives of the government, civil society, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), as well as the international development partners and individuals in Liberia who provided
valuable information for this case study: Ministry of Gender and Development (Deddeh Kwekwe, GBV Unit
Coordinator); Specialized Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit (Cllr. Felicia Coleman, Lead Prosecutor); the judiciary
(Judge Evelina QuaQua, former judge, Criminal Court E; Judge Eva Mappy Morgan, judge, Commercial
Court; and John Sackor, Financial Comptroller); National Council of Chiefs and Elders (Ma Musu E. Coleman,
Vice Chair of Internal Affairs, Peace and Reconciliation); African Network for the Prevention and Protection
against Child Abuse and Neglect - Liberia (ANPPCAN) (Alvin Winford, Program Manager); Servants of All
Prayers Assembly (SOAP) (Rev. Stephen D. Tour); UN Government SGBV Joint Program (Madhumita Sarkar,
Program Advisor); U.S. Department of State Justice Sector Support Program (Damare Theriot, SGBV Advisor);
United Nations Mission in Liberia (Catherine Barley, Senior Policy Advisor to the D/SRSG Rule of Law; Sophie
Frediani, Human Rights Advisor); UN Women (Martine Villeneuve, Program Officer); Carter Center (Amanda
Rawls, Program Advisor; Timothy Meyer, Legal Associate; and Alfred Hill, Monitoring and Reporting Officer);
the Liberian Government SGBV Taskforce membership (for permitting the authors participation and assisting with contacts and information), and members of Monrovias Jallah Town Community (various individuals
who together served as an informal focus group).
The team also acknowledges the following World Bank Group colleagues for their technical guidance and
collaboration: Bernard Harborne, Lead Social Development Specialist; Jared Matthew Schott, Justice and
Conflict Advisor; Jeni Klugman, Director, Gender and Development; Heike Gramckow, Lead Counsel; and LouisAlexandre Berg, Justice and Conflict Advisor. Peter Forster Chapman, Program Officer for Legal Empowerment
(Open Society Justice Initiative), also provided valuable insights. Finally, the team is very appreciative of the
inputs, critiques, and suggestions from the members of the Gender Issues in Fragile Situations Community
of Practice (GFCoP) (https://collaboration.worldbank.org/groups/gender-issues-in-fragile-situations). Special
thanks go to GFCoP members, Crystal Corman, Peace Medie, Wren Chadwick, Lillian Dang, and Janine Moussa.
The report was made possible by the generous support of the Government of the Netherlands, under the World
Bank-Netherlands Partnerships Program (BNPP) Trust Fund.
IV
Introduction
Among the many complex development challenges presented by the country of Liberia, perhaps none is as
emotive as its enduring problem of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Following the cessation of a
brutal and prolonged civil conflict infamous for its disproportionate victimization of women, the election of Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf as President in 2005 presented new and exciting opportunities for gender-sensitive reform.
With strong support from international donors, the new administration made addressing the problem of SGBV
a key priority.
As eight years have passed since the commencement of these reform efforts, Liberias experience represents
a potentially valuable case study on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at addressing the issue of SGBV
in fragile and conflict situations (FCS). The high prevalence of SGBV and the general impunity enjoyed by
the perpetrators remain significant issues in many such contexts, and while the implementation of effective
responses is well established globally as a priority area of concern, information about the effectiveness of justice
system interventions designed to strengthen the legal response in FCS remains limited. This case study situates
itself within this developing global discourse.
The study focuses on perhaps the most ambitious project designed to improve the legal response to SGBV in
Liberia: the opening of specialized sexual offenses court known as Criminal Court E. It is necessarily limited in
scope, intended as a concise and accessible stand-alone case study to inform and stimulate discussion among
development practitioners and policy makers interested in examining, analyzing, and identifying possible
solutions to the problem of SGBV in the context of fragility. It also seeks to outline the experience, provide a
number of recommendations for reform, and derive lessons from the Liberian context that may be instructive
for other FCS.
The case study is based on a review of the relevant literature and data, as well as interviews with key government,
civil society, nongovernmental organization (NGO), and United Nations (UN) actors conducted by the author in
Liberia between October 2012 and March 2013. Due to the sensitive nature of some interviewee observations,
their specific identities have been withheld where requested.
The views expressed in this report are those of the author.
1
2
This refers to a 2004 World Health Organization study, cited in Liberia and UN Joint Programme (2011, 31).
Liberian women reported being raped with objects including bananas, pieces of wood, metal, guns, hot water, mud, dried batteries, and
hot peppers. See Omanyondo (2005, 26).
These studies include those from the NGOs Human Rights Watch in 2011 and Save the Children in 2009. See also Liberia and UN Joint
Programme (2011).
For these and similar figures, see the Annual Reports of Liberias Ministry of Gender and Development for 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012,
which are available at http://mogd.gov.lr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=67&Itemid=125.
1500
1000
500
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: Ministry of Gender and Development Annual Reports, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.
Detailed figures can be found in two document produced by UNMILs Legal and Judicial Systems Support Division. See UNMIL
(2010 and 2011).
6
7
For the most complete analysis of access to justice in rural areas, see Isser, Lubkemann, and NTow (2009).
According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, Judges were susceptible to bribes for awarding damages in civil cases.
Judges sometimes requested bribes to try cases, release detainees from prison, or find defendants not guilty in criminal cases. See U.S.
Department of State (2011, 12).
The most recent detailed analysis was conducted in June 2011 by the Human Rights Center of the University of California, Berkeley. In particular, it noted that Most agreed with the claim that going to court is too expensive (75 %), and just a minority agreed that judgments
are the same for everyone (23%), or that judges treat everyone equally (28%). The results suggest an overall lack of trust in judges, and
more broadly in the justice system. See Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer (2011).
INFORMAL
FORMAL
Reconciliatory
Punitive
High
Low
Social Stigma
Lower
High
Likelihood of Remedy
Higher
Low
Financial Cost
Low
Higher
Time Cost
Low
High
Guiding Logic
Accessibility of Remedy
While there is an increasing awareness among traditional leaders that the government wants rape
cases to go through the formal system, there is a corresponding dissatisfaction with how the courts deal
with these cases. This is likely linked to a large extent
with the overall ineffectiveness of courts, which leads
to impunity and disharmony at the community level.
However, importantly, there is also a widespread
feeling that the formal adjudication of rape fails to
reflect Liberias social and cultural values. In essence,
the informal processes are viewed as acting in harmony with prevailing social norms, whereas formal
processes and courts are viewed as acting contrary
to them.
iv) The costs of formal justice for rape victims
From a survivors perspective, accessing the formal
system in response to SGBV is a high cost endeavor in three main respects. First, financially, the
process of going to court is, relative to the wealth of
most Liberian citizens, hugely expensive. In the first
instance, it will often involve paying for the police
Fashioning an effective legal response to the problem of SGBV against this complex socio-legal
and cultural landscape, in a context still in disarray
from recent war, was the stark challenge facing the
government, UN, and NGO policy makers. To be
successful, their response had to address these high
costs associated with access to justice for women,
creating a process that was victim friendly and more
efficient and that would combat the prevalent culture
of impunity for crimes of SGBV.
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 represented the first time the Security Council addressed the impact of armed conflict on women
and girls and the importance of womens participation at all decision-making levels in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace
processes. It was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on October 31, 2000.
10
Liberia has a number of long-established specialized courts. The Judiciary Law of 1972 specifies the existence of labour, debt, monthly
and probate, juvenile, tax, traffic, and civil courts. Subsequent to the opening of Criminal Court E, in September 2008, the countrys first
commercial court was opened, on which three judges handle the backlog of cases on financial and commercial disputes.
11
12
Peter N. Toby, Liberia: Lawyers Denounce Rape Laws As Unjust, AllAfrica, August 31, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201008310721.html.
13
Liberian Leader Dedicates Criminal Court E, Press release (Monrovia: Executive Mansion, December 3, 2008),
http://www.emansion.gov.lr/2press.php?news_id=972&related=7&pg=sp.
STAGE 1:
LNP Women
and Children
Protection Services
STAGE 2:
Specialized
SGBV Crimes
Prosecution Unit
STAGE 3:
Specialized Sexual
Offenses Criminal
Court E
other counties are dealt with by conventional, nonspecialized circuit courts, and are not prioritized over
other forms of cases. One circuit court exists in each
of these other 14 counties.
FIGURE 3. POLITICAL MAP OF LIBERIA
14
United Nations, Gender Based Violence Unit of the Ministry of Gender and Development, Liberia (2008), UN Secretary-Generals Database
on Violence against Women,
http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/searchDetail.action?measureId=33910&baseHREF=country&baseHREFId=766.
Background
South Africas first specialized sexual offenses court was established in March 1993 at
the Wynberg Magistrates Court.
By the end of 2005, 74 specialized courts had been established nationwide.
The courts were intended to address very high rape figures, and in particular, mitigate
the problem of secondary victimization.
Key Aspects
of the Process
Unlike in Criminal Court E, the Wynberg Court had in-camera rooms where children
could give evidence with a social worker acting as intermediary. This option had to be
requested and justified by the prosecutor.
Successes
Conviction rates were generally higher than in non-specialized courts, and there was a
decrease in case timelines from report to finalization.
Challenges
Courts were underfunded, carried high caseloads, and suffered from high staff turnover,
particularly for prosecutors.
Secondary victimization remained an issue due to the adversarial nature of trial,
particularly in cross examination.
Courts did not have a specific establishing framework, and had poor visibility in remote
areas and a lack of well-trained, experienced court personnel.
There was no monitoring and evaluation mechanism developed to continually assess the
courts.
The program was subsequently discontinued, and there are now only nine sexual
offenses courts remaining South Africa.
The Future
In 2013, with sexual violence a continuing issue, the South African government
announced that it would be reintroducing the sexual offenses courts; 22 will be in use by
the end of 201314.
10
By contrast, the specialized commercial court, which opened in 2011, has three judges assigned to it.
Criminal Court E, located in the judiciary headquarters (the Temple of Justice) in Monrovia, was based
largely on the template of South Africas specialized
sexual offenses courts. Along with its original and
exclusive jurisdiction, it is distinguished from other
courts through its emphasis on victim-friendly processes. In particular, as noted above, witness testimony is given in camera, which means the victim
gives evidence into a microphone from within a
witness room closed to observers, with television
screens in court showing only the back of the victims
head. This feature is designed to make court a less
harrowing experience for the survivor, as she need
not confront the accused face to face in the court,
nor face an intimidating gallery of onlookers while
recounting events and delivering testimony. This
aspect is compulsory; the law does not allow for a
waiver of the in-camera element by the survivor, nor
at the judges discretion. Further, only the lawyers
and a limited number of family members generally
witness proceedings in Criminal Court E.
Via Medical
Service
Provider
Via Liberia
National
Police
Report to
and
Investigation
by WACPS
Via NGO or
INGO
Via MoGD
GBV unit
Via SGBV
Crimes
Prosecution
Unit
11
There were three main interrelated motivating factors that drove the institution of Criminal Court E and
the other specialized SGBV-focused justice sector
structures, the WACPS and SGBV Crimes Unit. These
motivations emanated primarily from a clear understanding of prevailing deficiencies in the wider conventional justice system. First and foremost, the creation of the new court and special investigative units
was intended to make the process more victim centered, assuaging as much as possible the different
costsfinancial, social, and psychologicalwhich
frequently dissuaded the victim from pursuing the
case through the formal justice system. Second, it
was intended to be a more efficient process, eliminating the delays pervasive in the conventional courts so
that a larger number of survivors would have timely
access to justice, with a corresponding dent in the
prevailing culture of impunity. Third, it was hoped
that the court would increase the visibility of the
issue, and serve as a deterrent to potential offenders.
In addition to consideration of the courts success in
pursuit of these goals, this section will also consider
two other wider factors: the sustainability of Criminal
Court E in the long run, and its continued legitimacy.
These five key concepts (victim centeredness, efficiency, visibility, sustainability, and legitimacy) provide a viable, logical structure in which to assess the
successes and challenges of Criminal Court E. The
special requirement for a particularly victim-centered
approach for sexual offenses is coupled with the fundamental rule of law principles of a timely trial (efficiency), where justice is seen to be done (visibility),
by a court whose authority is clear and respected
(legitimacy). However, it should be noted that these
elements are, in reality, largely intertwined and mutually reinforcing. For instance, from a victims perspective, if the process is not efficient, it cannot be truly
victim centered, as these delays will result in accrued
costsfinancial, social, or psychological. Similarly,
a process that is not visible and efficient will not
be viewed as legitimate from a wider societal perspective. As such, quantitative questions (does the
court hear enough cases?) and qualitative indicators
(how victim friendly are the courts procedures and
outcomes?) cannot be considered divorced from
each other.
Visible
Efficient
Victim-Centered
process
Legitimate
Successful
Specialized
Sexual Offenses
Court
12
Sustainable
A. VICTIM-CENTERED PROCESS
17
Case of Musa Soloman Fallah v. Republic of Liberia, July 2011, available on www.liberlii.org.
13
14
law enforcement, and prosecution personnel. A victims safety and security must also be ensured. Few
of those interviewed were confident that this was
the case, however, due to disparities in capacity and
approach, the lack of effective coordination, and the
non-uniformand frequently ad hocreferral pathways. Second, financial cost is a key factor in whether
many Liberians can pursue justice, including in cases
of SGBV. Currently, as for other court cases, bringing
a case to Criminal Court E remains an expensive process, due to factors such as work time lost and even
travel costs to attend court. The formal justice system
institutions have tried to address this financial reality
by means of two separate endowment funds, one
operated by the Ministry of Gender and the other
associated with the SGBV Crimes Unit. However, as
was highlighted at an SGBV taskforce meeting, these
resources are generally acknowledged as insufficient
and inconsistently administered.19
iii) Utilizing informal processes
There is a deeper, difficult question that must be
asked about the requirements of a victim-centered
process as it intersects with the best interests of
the victim and the concept of victim autonomy. As
alluded to above, the formal systems focus on combating impunity is oftentimes at odds with the goal
of reconciliation that underpins indigenous Liberian
dispute-resolution processes. This seems to create a
tension between the goal of creating a victim-centered process and the fact that this process within
the formal system is not one that most victims are
familiar with or would ordinarily choose to enter.
As one UN representative put it: The Ministry of
Gender and those who support them are obsessed
with fighting impunity, which leads to a focus on the
flawed formal judicial process which often doesnt
respect the true will or best interests of the victim.
The idea that entering the formal justice process to
pursue justice could be against the best interests
of the victim seems counterintuitive and contradicts the conventional wisdom that dominates the
SGBV discourse in Liberia. Yet, as it has been noted,
from a victims perspective, the financial, social, and
18
It is important to note that even by Liberias low standards, representation of women in the judiciary remains chronically low at 8 percent,
according to the Ministry of Gender.
19
This was the consensus view of members when the issue was raised at a meeting of the Governments SGBV taskforce.
20
15
B. EFFICIENCY
i) Numbers
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
16
The author is grateful to UNMIL for releasing to him a summary document 2012 Criminal Court E Data in advance of the formal publishing
of this data.
4%
2%
1%
Completed Trial - 5 cases
5%
88%
ii) Prerequisites
17
No
Arrest
CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY
1
Crime
Reported
2
Investigation
3
Arrest
No
Cause
Not
Guilty
4
Grand
Jury
5
Trial
PRISON
KEY
Stage in
Exit
Criminal Criminal
Justice Justice
Process Process
22
18
By way of example, in its August 2010 end-of-term analysis report on the circuit courts, LJSSD noted that seven trials were conducted by
Criminal Court A during the August term alone, six of which were non-jury trials in which defendants had waived the right to a jury trial. By
contrast, in the February and May 2010 terms, in which jury trial was not waived in any case, only one case was tried at Criminal Court A
during the respective terms.
v) General inefficiency
Finally, Criminal Court E is dogged by various continuing issues such as poor court administration,
logistical problems, personnel tardiness and nonappearance, poor preparation by lawyers, unnecessary adjournments, and delaying tactics by defense
lawyers who know that the longer the case runs, the
smaller the chance that a conviction can be secured.
An UNMIL observer noted that lawyers will frequently
ask for time to read the transcripts before they cross
examine. As one civil society actor said: By the time
case gets to court it is losing weight all the time. The
slow pace of justice is the main issue. For victims of
SGBV, the slower the pace, the smaller the chance of
the perpetrator being convicted and the more costly
the process financially, psychologically, and socially
(as outlined above).
It is important to note that these issues are not
specific to Criminal Court E, but rather reflect the
GRAND JURY, to
ADJUDICATION
Criminal Court E
PROSECUTION
SGBV
Crimes Unit
INVESTIGATION
This figure includes cases carried over from previous court terms.
24
Trials completed include all those ending in conviction, acquittal, or hung jury. Cases otherwise disposed of include guilty pleas and plea
agreements; nolle prosequoi pursuant to Section 18.1 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL); and failure to proceed pursuant to Section 18.2 CPL,
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal S.20.10 CPL.
25
19
26
20
27
Information derived from UNMIL Correction Advisory Units (CAU) nationwide prison records for September 2012.
28
29
Amnesty International, Appalling Prison Conditions in Liberia Must Be Improved, (London, Amnesty International, September 21, 2011),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/appalling-prison-conditions-liberia-must-be-improved-2011-09-21.
30
Monrovia Central Prison is designed to hold a maximum of 374 detainees. In September 2012, records showed it contained 947 detainees.
31
According to the U.S. State Departments report: Inadequate provisions for food, sanitation, ventilation, temperature, lighting, basic and
emergency medical care, and potable water contributed to harsh and life-threatening conditions in the countrys 15 prisons and detention
centers. See U.S. Department of State (2011, 3). See also Amnesty International (2011).
32
33
UNMIL LJSSD found that only 44 trials were completed in 2011 in the 12 circuit courts surveyed. Trials completed account for around half
of all cases disposed of at the circuit court level. See UNMIL (2011).
21
D. VISIBILITY
ii) Deterrence
High profile initiatives such as Criminal Court E, which
seek to address an issue that finds its roots, to a large
extent, in a lack of awareness and troublesome cultural norms, have a potentially valuable role to play
in raising the visibility of the issue among the general
population. Further, where impunity has been prevalent, could the visibility of the court provide a
deterrent effect in relation to potential perpetrators?
i) Increased awareness
Among interviewees, most cited visibility for the
issue and increased awareness as the one clear
success of Criminal Court E. The court, in common
with other specialist gender projects such as the
Ministry of Gender, the SGBV Crimes Unit, and the
WACPS, coupled with the issues inclusion in government rhetoric, has served to raise awareness of the
issue of SGBV and the rights of women generally.
Community-level interviews in Monrovia showed a
general understanding of the fact that there was a
womans court at the Temple of Justice. Many perceived it as linked with the Ministry of Gender and
Development. Younger respondents seemed better
informed, though male interviewees frequently
expressed negative emotions about initiatives perceived as specifically for women. From the admittedly small sample group, it seems that young urban
males perceive many reforms, particularly those
seen as stemming from the Ministry of Gender and
Development, as excluding them. It is likely this level
of negative awareness about the court is limited to
Monrovia and parts of Montserrado, since the reach
of the Criminal Court E and other gender initiatives
is geographically limited.
22
23
24
Consider a change to the grand jury and jury systems. There are ongoing discussions in Liberia about
modifying the jury and grand jury systems. This
report advocates for an exploration of the potential
for and ramifications of modifying or even abolishing
the grand jury system for the indictment of sexual
offenses. In its place, a simple preliminary examination of probable cause could be undertaken by the
court.
Increase the number of sitting judges to two, as
specified in the statute. One simple step to aid
Criminal Court Es disposition of cases would be
increasing the number of sitting judges from one
to two. This could increase the amount of time the
court spends in session.
25
26
Encourage the setting of benchmark case timelines and effective monitoring of the court in
adhering to a statutory time period for cases.
Where there is insufficient evidence to proceed, such
cases must be dropped. Where the accused has been
detained longer than the statutorily allowed period,
he or she should be released. Prosecutors must know
they have limited time to bring people to trial, and
Criminal Court E should play a more effective role in
monitoring this. If a case is not ready, it should be
dropped. While these are bitter pills to swallow, it is
only through adherence to the law that the accountability needed for improved performance can be
encouraged, from the police through the prosecution to within the court. Initiatives to monitor SGBV
projects through the UN Joint Programme are welcome. Further, the taskforce on SGBV is a valuable
body for the coordination of initiatives. However, the
weakness of civil society in these processes remains
hugely problematic. The justice system generally
needs to be held accountable by civil society for its
poor performance sectorwide, including Criminal
Court E. Currently there is very little incentive to dispose of cases quickly, and very few, if any, sanctions
where poor performance causes the delays. Accountability needs to involve the setting of benchmarks for
prosecution and the courts.
Reference List
Altbeker, Antony. 2003. Court Specialisation in Theory. Chap. 3 in Justice Through Specialisation? The Case
of the Specialised Commercial Crime Court. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
Amnesty International. 2011. Good Intentions Are Not Enough: the Struggle to Reform Liberias Prisons.
London, Amnesty International.
Cossins, Anne. 2009. Prosecuting Child Sexual Assault Cases: To Specialise or Not, That is the Question.
Judicial Commission of New South Wales,
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/sexual_assault/cossins-to_specalise_or_not.html.
Dziewanski, Dariusz. 2011. Assessment of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Data in Liberia. Norwegian
Refugee Council, Oslo.
Ebo, Adedeji. 2005. The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia.
Occasional Paper 9. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
Gongloe, Tiawon. 2010. Jury Law Reform. Conference presentation. Unpublished.
Isser, Deborah H., Stephen C. Lubkemann, and Saah NTow. 2009. Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences
with and Perceptions of Local Justice Options. USIP Peaceworks, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.
Liberia, Government of. 2008. Poverty Reduction Strategy. Monrovia,
available at http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Final%20PRS.pdf.
. Ministry of Justice. 2009. Sexual Assault and Abuse Prosecution Handbook. For County Attorneys
and Prosecutors of the SGBV Crimes Unit. Ministry of Justice, Monrovia.
. Ministry of Gender And Development. 2011. Annual Report. Ministry of Gender and Development,
Monrovia.
Liberia, Government of, and UN Joint Programme on Sexual and Gender Based Violence. 2011.
In-depth Study on Reasons for High Incidence of Sexual and Gender Based Violence in Liberia
Recommendations of Prevention and Response. Government of Liberia, Monrovia.
Nagelhus Schia, Niels, and Benjamin de Carvalho. 2009. Nobody Gets Justice Here! Addressing Sexual and
Gender-Based Violence and the Rule of Law in Liberia. Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs.
Omanyondo, Marie-Claire O. 2005. Sexual Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment.
World Health Organization, Geneva.
Saffa Abdulai, Emmanuel. 2010. Evaluation: Strengthening of Prosecution of SGBV Offences through Support
to the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit (SGBV CU). Government of Liberia and the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Monrovia.
27
TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia). 2009. Consolidated Final Report. Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Monrovia.
UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia). 2008. Research on Prevalence and Attitudes to Rape in Liberia,
MayJuly 2008. UNMIL, Monrovia.
. 2010. LJSSD Report on Circuit Courts. Legal and Judicial Systems Support Division, UNMIL,
Monrovia.
. 2011. Monitoring Unit Consolidated Analysis of Circuit Courts. Legal and Judicial Support Services
Division, UNMIL, Monrovia.
. 2012. Nationwide Prison Records for September 2012. Corrections Advisory Unit, UNMIL,
Monrovia.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2011. Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems
in Africa. Survey Report. United Nations, New York.
U.S. Department of State. 2011. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Liberia.
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
Vinck, Patrick, Phuong Pham, and Tino Kreutzer. 2011. Talking Peace A Population-Based Survey on
Attitudes About Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia. Human
Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, CA.
World Bank, Gender Issues in Fragile Situations Community of Practice (GFCoP). Collaboration for
Development, World Bank,
https://collaboration.worldbank.org/groups/gender-issues-in-fragile-situations.
Wright, Valerie. 2010. Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment.
The Sentencing Project, Washington, DC.
28