CITY COURT OF THE CITY OF RENSSELAER

COUNTY OF RENSSELAER

NORTH GREENBUSH DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE,

Plaintiff,
DECISION
-against- AND
OIillER
JEFFREY SPAIN,

Defendant.

(City Court, City of Rensselaer)

Index No. SC-9043

(Judge Carmelo Laquidara, Presiding)

APPEARANCES: Michael J. Derevlany, Esq.

Attorney for Plaintiff

A. Joshua Ehrlich, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant

LAQUIDARA, J.:

Plaintiff North Greenbush Democratic Committee (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff or

the Committee) commenced the instant small claim action seeking to recover $4,051.71 from

defendant Jeffrey Spain, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and negligence.

Defendant submits an answer and, at the same time, moves to dismiss the claim on a variety of

grounds. Plaintiff opposes the dismissal motion.

This claim arises from allegations that defendant - the then-Chair Person of the

Committee - improperly liquidated the Committee's account following a leadership change.

Plaintiff contends that, during the relevant time period of September 2008, defendant had control

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of the Committee's financial records. No dispute exists that defendant disbursed the following

charitable contributions from the Committee's funds : (1) $1,200 to the Amanda's Journey Fund;

(2) $1,000 to the Fast Break Fund; (3) $1,000 to Patriot Flight, Inc.; (4) $337.00 to Twin Town

Little League; and (5) $338.00 to Classie Lassie. Plaintiff also contends that defendant disbursed

$176.71 for a web browser fee, which it alleges it did not use. In September 2009, plaintiff

demanded that defendant reimburse it $4,051.71, which defendant has apparently refused to do.

On December 8, 2009, plaintiff filed the instant small claim. Concurrently with answering the

claim and pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a), defendant seeks an order dismissing the claim upon a

variety of grounds. At a December 8, 2009 Court appearance regarding this claim, the Court set

a scheduling order for the instant motion practice. Pursuant to that schedule, the motion is now

finally submitted.

First, defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.

Defendant contends that plaintiff is a "constituted committee" as defined by the Election Law

and, as such, its receipts and expenditures are controlled by the Election Law. Thus, defendant

maintains that this matter is an "Election Law action, [and] it must be brought pursuant to Article

16, specifically § 16-100, § 16-102 and § 16-114, of the Election Law or Article 78 of the CPLR"

in Supreme Court (Answer at ~ 2).

This argument lacks merit. "Election Law § 16-100 (1) broadly provides that 'the

supreme court is vested with jurisdiction to summarily determine any question of law or fact

arising as to any subject set forth in this article, which shall be construed liberally'" (Matter of

Breitenstein v Turco, 254 AD2d 566, 567 [3d Dept 1998], quoting Election Law § 16-100 [I];

see also Austin v Delligatti, 137 Misc. 2d 530, 532 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1987]). "Election

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Law § 16-116 makes clear, however, that a proceeding under the Election Law is a 'special

proceeding' and, hence a party may seek relief only in the form and to the extent that Election

Law article 16 expressly permits" (Mauer of Breitenstein, 254 AD2d at 567).

Here, a review of Election Law §§ 16-100, 16-102 and 16-114, expressly relied upon by

defendant, does not indicate that any authority exists for a proceeding seeking reimbursement of

funds allegedly improperly disbursed by an officer of a committee to be commenced in Supreme

Court (see Austin, 137 Misc 2d at 532). For instance, section 16-102 allows the commencement

of a proceeding as to designations and nominations in primary elections (see Election Law § 16-

102; see also Austin, 137 Misc 2d at 532). Section 16-114 allows for a proceeding to compel the

filing of statements or corrected statements of campaign receipts or expenditures and

contributions (see Election Law § 16-1 14; see also Austin, 137 Misc 2d at 532). In the instant

claim, there are no allegations that defendant did not file the proper statement of receipts and

expenditures with the Board of Elections and evidence of such filing is attached to plaintiffs

opposition. Thus, defendant has not demonstrated that this claim should have been brought

under article 16 of the Election Law in Supreme Court. Accordingly, this branch of defendant's

motion to dismiss is denied.

Next, defendant contends that this claim should be dismissed since venue is improper.

Defendant argues that, since no parties to this claim reside in the City of Rensselaer and all of

them reside in the Town of North Greenbush, venue is improper. This argument lacks merit.

Uniform City Court Act § 207 provides that this Court "shall have jurisdiction of small

claims as defined in article 18 of this act." Under article 18,

[t]he term 'small claim' or 'small claims' as used in this act shall mean and
include any cause of action for money only not in excess of five thousand dollars

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 exclusive of interest and costs, provided that the defendant either resides, or has
an office for the transaction of business or a regular employment, within the
county [emphasis supplied] (see also Uniform City Court Act § 1801-A; Germain
v CNY Mgt. Corp., 121 Misc 2d 871, 871 -872 [Albany City Ct 1983]).

Moreover, to bring a money action in this Court, "a plaintiff or defendant must . .. be a resident

of the city or of a town contiguous to such city, provided that such town is ... within the same

county and . . .contiguous to the city by land ... " (Uniform City Court Act § 213 [a]). Here, as

defendant acknowledges, both parties are residents of the Town of North Greenbush, which is

located in Rensselaer County and contiguous to the City of Rensselaer. Accordingly, plaintiff

properly commenced this action in this Court, and, thus, this branch of defendant's motion is

denied.

As to the third branch of his motion to dismiss, defendant contends that this claim should

be dismissed since

[t]his is a political vendetta between factions of the North Greenbush Democratic

Committe[ e]. The Defendant was the Chair from October of 2007 to October
2009. This action was brought to involve and use the Court in a political dispute
[a]s well as an attempt to punish the defendant for ousting the current leadership
two years ago (Answer at ~ 8).

Defendant maintains that this Court should neither intervene nor interfere with the workings of a

party.

As cited by defendant, settled case law holds that "[Clourts should be most reluctant to

interfere with the internal affairs of a political party" (Bloom v Notaro, 67 NY2d 1048, 1049

[1986]; see Matter of Essenberg v Kresky, 265 AD2d 664, 667 [3d Dept 1999] ; Matter of

Bachmann v Coyne, 99 AD2d 742, 742 [2d Dept 1984], Iv denied 61 NY2d 207). In large part,

the determination for a Court to exercise its discretion to entertain such a matter rests on whether

a Court is interpreting rules already in place by such a political organization or whether a Court is

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being asked to help create internal guidelines (compare Matter of Keukelaar v Monroe County

Bd. of Elections, 307 AD2d 1073, 1073-1074 [4th Dept 2003], Iv denied 100 NY2d 508

[determining that respondents violated party rules regarding a chairperson's attendance at and

acknowledgment of the nomination of a candidate for office], with Bloom, 67 NY2d at 1049

[reversing Appellate Division's appointment of a supervisor with authority to rule on internal

matters before the State Committee of the Liberal Party]; Matter ofEssenberg, 265 AD2d at 667

[declining to intervene before a removal process was complete where Election Law provided

review following such a process]). Here, as developed to date, this claim seeks reimbursement of

funds allegedly improperly disbursed by defendant. Thus, the Court does not appear to be asked

to either intervene or interfere with the internal affairs of a political party. Rather, the Court is

being asked to determine whether defendant owes money to plaintiff based on his actions under

the committee structure. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the claim based on this ground.

As to the fourth branch of his motion, defendant contends that the claim should be

dismissed since it effectively seeks equitable relief in the form of an accounting that is beyond

the jurisdiction of this Court. Certainly, Rensselaer City Court is a court of limited jurisdiction

(see Trombley v Sorrelle, 6 Misc 3d 393, 397 [Watertown City Ct 2004], citing Siegel, NY Prac,

§ 581), and, as such, lacks jurisdiction to entertain an action necessitating an accounting (see

Briscoe v White, 8 Misc 3d 1,3-4 [App Term, 2d Dept 2004]; see also Bury v CIGNA Healthcare

of NY, Inc., 254 AD2d 229, 229 [1" Dept 1998] [City Court has no general equity jurisdiction

except as specifically provided for by law]). Given the record before this Court, however, an

accounting is not needed here to adjudicate this claim since there is no uncertainty as to the

amount sought to be recovered from defendant (see generally Pieper v Renke, 4 NY2d 410, 411

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[1958]; 1 NY Jur Accounts & Accounting § 34; cl770 Owners Corp. v Spitzer, 2009 NY Slip Op

51968U at • 6 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2009]). Thus, the Court denies this branch of defendant 's

motion.

Next, defendant contends that this claim should be dismissed under the equitable doctrine

of unclean hands. Defendant claims that he is accused of "doing just what they did before they

turned over control of the account" in 2008 (Answer at ~~ 14-15). "The doctrine of unclean

hands applies when the complaining party shows that the offending party is 'guilty of immoral,

unconscionable conduct and even then only when the conduct relied on is directly related to the

subject matter in litigation and the party seeking to invoke the doctrine was injured by such

conduct'" (Kopsidas v Krokos, 294 AD2d 406, 407 [2d Dept 2002], quoting National Distillers

& Chern. Corp. v Seyopp Corp., 17 NY2d 12, 15-16 [1966]; see Welch v Di Biasi, 289 AD2d

964,965 [4'h Dept 2001]). Here, defendant's conclusory allegations are insufficient to entitle

him to dismissal based on this doctrine (see Clifton County Rd. Assocs. v Vinciguerra, 195 AD2d

895, 896 [3d Dept 1993], Iv denied 82 NY2d 664 [1994]). Among other things, defendant has

failed to show how he was directly injured by any alleged conduct by plaintiff during past change

of leadership and that those actions are related to the instant claim (see Sutter v Lane, 61 AD3d

1310,1313 [3d Dept 2009]). Accordingly, this branch of defendant's motion is denied.

As to the sixth and seventh branches of defendant's motion, defendant contends that

plaintiffs treasure and the recipients of the funds sought to be recovered are necessary parties to

this action and, without their joinder, dismissal is warranted. This argument lacks merit.

"Necessary parties are 'persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded

between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a

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judgment in the action'" (Sorbello v Birchez Assocs., LLC, 61 AD3d 1225, 1226 [3d Dept 2009],

quoting CPLR 1001 [aD . As to the treasurer, his presence is not necessary for complete relief to

be accorded here. Pursuant to the record before the Court, the checks in question were signed by

defendant and not the treasurer. Further, given the informal and simplified procedures on small

claims and the available documentary evidence, the treasurer's presence may not be necessary

(see Uniform City Court Act § 1804). In any event, should testimony from the treasurer be

necessary, he does not need to be a party to testify in this action. As to the vendors who

purportedly received the improperly paid contributions, their presence is not necessary to afford

relief as between plaintiff and defendant (see CPLR IDOl). Accordingly, these branches of

defendant's motion are denied.

Defendant also contends that this action should be dismissed since he acted in accord

with the Election Law disbursing the subject funds to various charities, relying on Election Law §

14-130. While this section may allow charitable donations, the question at issue here is whether

defendant, as committee chair, had the authority to make such donations for the Committee under

the circumstances presented. Therefore, at this juncture, the Court declines to dismiss the

complaint based on this affirmative defense (see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7D.

Finally, in his supplemental submission, defendant contends that this claim should be

dismissed since plaintiff lacks standing to institute an action in small claims. The essence of this

argument is that plaintiff is an association and, as such, has no standing pursuant to the Uniform

City Court Act article 18 to initiate this claim. In response, plaintiff contends that, even if this

argument has merit, it is to no avail since it would have standing pursuant to article 18-A and the

Court has authority to transfer the claim to that part.

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 As defendant maintains, Uniform City Court Act § 1809 (1) provides, in relevant part,

that "[n]o ... association . .. shall institute an action or proceeding under this article .... "

Moreover, "a political committee is deemed to be an uncorporated association" (see D 'Angelo v

Election Comm. of Kings County Republican Comm., 154 Misc 2d 926, 928 [Sup Ct, Kings

County 1992]). Thus, here, plaintiff does not appear to have standing to bring a claim under

article 18 of the Uniform City Court Act (see Uniform City Court Act § 1809). However, as

plaintiff argues, "[t]he court shall have power to transfer any small claim or claims to any other

part of the court upon such terms as the rules may provide, and proceed to hear the same

according to the usual practice and procedure applicable to other parts of the court" (Uniform

City Court Act § 1805 [b]). Thus, here, although plaintiff lacks standing under article 18, the

Court has the power to transfer the matter to another part of the Court.

Plaintiff contends that the Court should transfer the matter under article 18-A - for

commercial claims. On the other hand, defendant contends that this matter is not "commercial"

and, thus, does not fall under the ambit of that article. Pursuant to Uniform City Court Act §

1801-A (a) and as reie"vant here, a commercial claim

shall mean and include any cause for action for money only not in excess of the
maximum amount permitted for a small claim in the small claims part of the
court, exclusive of interest and cost . . ., the claimant is a[n] ... association, which
has its principal office in the state of New York and provided that the defendant
either resides, or has an office for the transaction of business or a regular
employment, within the county in which the court is located ....

Further, under this definition, "a claim is 'commercial' not based on its subject matter, but

merely because the claimant is a corporation, partnership, or association .... The claim itself

apparently need not be 'commercial' in nature, e.g., arise via contract. As long as the claimant is

an entity, even a tort claim will presumably fit under Article 18-A" (Siegel, Practice

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Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, UCCA 1801-A). Given the

foregoing, this matter should be transferred to the commercial small claims part of this Court (see

Uniform City Court Act § 1805 [b]; article 18-A).

Otherwise, the Court has considered the parties' remaining arguments and finds them

lacking in merit. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that this claim is transferred the commercial small claims part of this Court;

and it is further

ORDERED that a hearing regarding the merits of this matter will he held as noticed by

the Clerk of the Court.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court. This Decision and Order is

being returned to the attorneys for plaintiff. The signing of this Decision and Order shall not

constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel are not relieved from the applicable

provisions of that rule relating to filing, entry, and notice of entry.

SO ORDERED!
ENTER.

Dated: Rensselaer, New York

February I 0 ,2009

City Court Judge