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Commentary
MarkSadoski
TexasA&M University
Allan Paivio
Universityof WesternOntario
ErnestT. Goetz
TexasA&M University
dual
critique
coding
of
schema
theory
in
reading
and
alternative
FORMORE
than a decade, reading research has been influenced by schema theory, which
hypothesizesthe existence of abstractstructuresfor the representationof knowledgein memory (schemata). This article evaluates schema theory on a variety of grounds and presents
dual coding theory as a theoreticalalternative.It is arguedthat schematheory is encumbered
by lack of a consistent definition, its roots in idealist epistemology, and mixed empirical
support. Criticalanalysis of key schema research, includingsentence integrationstudies, bizarre text studies, and perspective studies, suggests that much of the empirical basis of
schema theory may derive from proceduralsingularitiesand methodologicaldemonstrations.
Moreover,we argue that the results of many empiricalstudies used to demonstratethe existence of schemataare more parsimoniouslyand consistentlyexplainedby dual coding theory.
Dual coding theory suggests thatcognition consists of two separatebut interconnectedmental
subsystems, a verbal system and a nonverbalsystem. We review various other theories of
cognition in readingthathave adoptedprovisionsfor mentalmodelingthat renderthem tantamountto dual coding theory.Finally,we look at resultsof recentstudies of imageryandaffect
in reading and suggest that dual coding offers a better explanationof the effects than does
schema theory.
464
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incluantles recherchessur l'int6grationdes phrases, sur les textes atypiqueset sur l'effet de
perspectives suggere qu'une partie importante du support empirique de la theorie des
sch6mass'effriteen raisonde problemesde procedureset de demonstrationsartificielles. De
plus nous tenteronsde montrerque les r6sultatsde plusieurs recherchess'expliquentmieux
avec la theorie du double codage. La theorie du double codage suggere que la cognition
s'appuiesur deux systemes s6par6smais interreli6s:un systeme verbal et un systeme non
verbal. Nous examinonsd'autrestheories de la cognition en lecture qui se sont pench6es sur
le probleme de la representationdes connaissanceset qui sont 6quivalentesa la theorie du
double codage. Finalementnous examinonsles r6sultatsde recherchesr6centesen lecture sur
l'imagerie mentale et sur l'affectivit6 et nous montrons que la theorie du double codage
proposede meilleuresexplicationsde leurs effets que la theorie des sch6mas.
& GOETZ
SADOSKI,PAIVIO,
465
Reading
schema theories for nearly two decades.
* 1991
466
solar system as a model of the atom), but problems can arise when different,conflicting metaphorsare used to explainthe same phenomenon
(e.g., wave vs. particletheories of light). Schemata are also variously defined by comparison
to stereotypes, prototypes, templates, scripts,
plans, andgrammars.Hence we have prototypical or template schemata for concepts such as
birds, vehicles, weapons, or furniture;we have
scriptsor plans for events such as dining in restaurants, going to birthday parties, washing
clothes, or burglinghomes; and we have grammars for typical stories, such as mysteries or
folktales. Some schematheoristsappearto have
adopted the proposition as the basic unit of
knowledgethat comprises all schemata(Anderson & Pearson, 1984), whereas others do not
use thattermand variouslyposit templates,prototypes, features, and atomic subschemataas
basic elements (Rumelhart, 1980b; Rumelhart
& Ortony, 1977). The multitudeof terms and
metaphors suggests confusion about the basic
natureof schemata(cf. Iran-Nejad,1989).
There is also confusion regardingthe nature of the knowledge that constitutesa schema
and regarding the degree of abstraction that
must occur before a schemacan be said to exist.
Therefore, it is not clear in schema theory
whether we have an overall schema for color
that is made up of particularcolors (e.g., red,
yellow) or schemata for particularcolors that
are made up of particularexamplesof these colors (e.g., fire engine red, lemon yellow). This
problem is sometimes solved by postulating
embedded schemata, or schematawithin schemata. However,this approachinvites infiniteregress and theoreticalcircularity,problems that
troublemany cognitive theories. Such problems
led Bartlett (1932) to conclude that defining a
schema may be ultimatelyinfeasible:
XXVI/4
It is atonce
I stronglydisliketheterm"schema."
too definiteandtoo sketchy....It wouldprobably be bestto speakof "active,developingpattoo, beingnow
terns;"but the word"pattern,"
very widely and variouslyemployed,has its
owndifficulties.(pp.200-201)
SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
Reification
An epistemological issue that confronts
schema theory is the notion of reification, attributing actual existence to something that is
only a name or an abstraction.Schemataare, by
most accounts, abstractionsderived from experience thatexist in a potential,nonspecific state,
awaitinginput. The epistemological question is
how conceptualor schematicknowledgecan exist in the abstract, isolated from any of the examples that gave rise to it.
To illustrate, let us briefly consider a classic example. Kant (1787, cited in Rumelhart&
Ortony, 1977, p. 101) suggests that we have a
schema for trianglesin the abstract;no image of
a triangle could ever be adequateto cover the
concept of triangles in general. Presumably
Kantrefersto staticimages here, as imagininga
flexible triangle whose angles and side lengths
could change as long as they remained connected would account for all possible triangles.
Kantfurthersuggests that an image is a product
of reproductive,sensory imagination, whereas
a schema is a product of productive, a priori
imagination, free from empirical sense data.
However, Bossart (1986) shows how Kant in
fact makesno principleddistinctionbetweenreproductiveand productiveimagination,and employs the term schema as a bridge between the
two, so that in the last analysis one cannot exist
independentlyof the other. Klein (1984) comes
to a similarconclusion regardingthe epistemology of triangles; that is, any single triangle
symbolizes all triangles in the universe,
whether past, present, or future, needing only
imaginative transformations to complete the
set. Skemp (1987), in his analysis of the psychology of mathematics, identifies mathematical thoughtas among the most abstractforms of
thought. However, he concludes that, even in
mathematics, primaryconcepts (e.g., line, intersection, angle, triangle) are formed on the
basis of concrete sensory experienceand classified by language, whereas abstract, higher order concepts (e.g., polygon) are made possible
through further linguistic definition. Hence,
concrete experience is at the foundationof all
mathematical thought, arguably the most ab-
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SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
469
meaning of the sentences, but not an accumulation of individual sentence or word meanings,
as the integrated representation encompassed
more information than any of the original sentences contained. Inconsistent information was
consistently rejected, suggesting considerable
precision in the integrated representation.
As evidence for schema theory, this study
poses many problems. Alba and Hasher (1983)
reviewed the extensive replications of the
Bransford and Franks (1971) study as follows:
Bizarre texts
Several studies using bizarre texts have
been influential in popularizingschema theory
in reading. For example, Bransfordand Johnson (1972) demonstratedthat prior knowledge
was essential to understanding text passages
written so as to be completely obscure without
such knowledge, results that have often been
cited as evidence for the interpretationand integration processes of schemata. One such obscure passage ("Modern-Day Romeo") was
presented to subjects who saw a picture of a
is
the
set
of
schema
theories.
complex situation before listening to the paspiece
Integration
Theoretically, meaning is abstracted from the sage and to control groups who did not see the
stimuli that have been selected, and relatedab- picture or saw the picture after receiving the
stractionsarejoined into a single representation. passage. Other obscure passages ("Washing
The most impressivecontemporaryevidence in Clothes,""Makingand Flying Kites")were presupportof this notion came from Bransfordand sented with titles ratherthan pictures, using a
Franks(1971). As is now widely acknowledged, similar
experimentaldesign. Results indicated
there are many grounds on which to challenge thatthe contexts
providedby the pictureor cued
their conclusions. The most basic is the fact that
the
titles
by
produced
markedlysuperior comintegrationis not a necessary productof encodand recall.
ing relatedevents (Moeser, 1976, 1977). In fact, prehension
The qualities of the bizarre passages used
the Bransford and Franks (1971) findings are
difficult to replicate unless their methods are in this study leave considerabledoubtas to their
followed closely. Changes in presentationmo- statusas connecteddiscourse. Alba and Hasher
dality (Flagg & Reynolds, 1977; see also Katz (1983) commented,
& Gruenewald,1974), in presentationof materials (Flagg, 1976; Flagg & Reynolds, 1977;
James & Hillinger, 1977; Katz, Atkeson, &
Lee, 1974), in instructions (James, Hillinger,
& Murphy, 1977), and in testing procedures
(Anderson & Bower, 1973; Griggs & Keen,
1977; James & Hillinger, 1977) greatly reduce
or eliminate the integrationeffects found with
the original Bransford-Franks paradigm. Finally, "integration"will occur for nonsemantic
or arbitrarymaterials (e.g., letter-digits, nonsense syllables) if the original procedures are
used (Flagg, 1976; Katz & Gruenewald, 1974;
Reitman & Bower, 1973; Small, 1975). Since
integrationis assumed to be tied to similarities
in the representationof meaning, evidence of
such a process operatingon meaningless material is troublesome. (p. 216)
Bransford and his colleagues extended this
line of research in several studies also frequently cited in the schema literature. These
studies are dealt with in the next section and following sections.
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Perspective studies
A group of schema studies have assigned
perspectives to subjects to demonstrate the
schema processes of selection and retrieval.
Prominentstudies in this paradigmare those by
Pichert and Anderson (1977; Anderson &
Pichert, 1978; Anderson, Pichert, & Shirey,
1983). In these studies, the researchers assigned subjects a perspective-that is, a persona-to assume in reading passages. The
central passage in these studies involved two
boys who play hooky and visit the home of one
of the boys, whose mother is never home on
that day of the week. There they note such objects as a tall hedge and landscapingaroundthe
house, a garage with 10-speedbikes and an unlocked door, and spacious rooms containing
china, silver, a rarecoin collection, a new fireplace, a leaky roof, and so on. Subjects were
assignedto readand recall this passage from the
perspectiveof either a burglaror a prospective
homebuyer. Pichert and Anderson (1977) also
included a control condition with no assigned
perspective.The resultingratingsof importance
of informationfor a given perspective by one
group of subjectsgenerallycovariedwith recall
by anothergroup that was assigned to read the
SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
471
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SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
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Figure 1
Dual coding theory: Verbaland nonverbalrepresentationsystems
VERBALSTIMULI
NONVERBALSTIMULI
REPRESENTATIONAL
SENSORYSYSTEMS
CONNECTIONS
Imagens
Logogens
pB
REFERENTIAL
CONNECTIONS
L
1
VERBALRESPONSES
"E
NONVERBALRESPONSES
Note. From Mental representations:A dual coding approach (p. 67) by A. Paivio, 1986. New York:Oxford University Press. Copyright
1986. Reprintedby permission.
coding theory holds that linguistic representations can be interpretedin relation to other
linguistic representations (e.g., synonyms,
paraphrases,syntactic alternatives)or in relation to nonlinguisticrepresentationsof the objects, events, or feelings for which they stand
(e.g., images, affects). To continuethe analogy,
we can tradegoods and services for othergoods
and services, or for money. Similarly,dual coding also posits associativeprocessing withinthe
nonverbal system (images evoking other images) and referentialprocessing from the non-
SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
475
476
XXVI/4
SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
perspective). This explanationcould quite plausibly account for the significant additional
amount of information recalled when subjects
were askedto takethe opposite perspective.Because much of this passage is a mental tour of
the premises, such an imagery effect could be
very significant overall. As noted previously,
the additionalrecall from the opposite perspective is difficult to reconcile with the selection
and/or integrationprocesses posited by schema
theories.
The effect of imageryin perspectivestudies
has been noted by other researchers. Owens,
Dafoe, and Bower (1977) induced readersof a
water-skiingpassage to identify with either the
waterskier or the driverof the boat. The procedure resultedin differentpatternsof recognition
errors and other findings consistent with the
two perspectives. Moreover,when asked to describe the mental images they experienced
while readingthe story,their responsesrevealed
spatial perspectives that corresponded to the
different viewpoints of the characters.For example, subjects who identified with the skier
imagined the scene as though it were through
the skier's eyes and recalled the skier's actions
as if they themselves had been performing
them, but imagined the boat driver's actions
from the point of view of an outside observer.
The dual coding interpretationis that these differences were initiated by verbal instructions
and story cues, which induced patternsof prediction and association in the verbal system,
which in turninducedreferentialimagery.
A study by Black, Turner, and Bower
(1979) is particularlyimportantin this regard
because it reveals the effects of even subtle linguistic differences on imagined perspectives
and on comprehension. The study contrasted
verbs such as come and go in compoundsentences. The first clause of each compoundsentence
introduceda characterand his or her location,
and the second clause described an event from
either the same or a differentvantagepoint. For
example, Terryfinished workingin the yard was
followed by either and went into the house or
and came into the house. The formerhas a consistent perspectivefrom an observeroutside the
house, whereas the latter requires a change in
477
478
ing. A variety of researchers have shown interest, liking, and emotions to be significant
variablesin readers'responseswhen reading,as
well as in their learning from and memory for
what was read (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1981;
Hidi & Baird, 1986, 1988; Iran-Nejad, 1987a;
Sadoski & Goetz, 1985; Sadoski, Goetz, &
Kangiser, 1988; Sadoski & Quast, 1990;
Wilensky, 1983). A common finding of these
studies is that emotional responses operate
differentlythan would be predictedon the basis
of the long-term memory structures posited
by schema theory. The main processing
assumption of schema theory has been that
readers' preexisting mental structures govern
comprehensionat the time of reading through
instantiation;thatis, throughselection, abstraction, and integration.It is not clear how such
processing assumptions can explain the comprehension of surprising or novel information
not provided for by the schema (Brewer
& Lichtenstein, 1981; Iran-Nejad, 1987a;
Wilensky, 1983). For example, Iran-Nejad
(1987a) experimentally studied cognitive and
affective causes of interestand liking in stories
with surprise endings, and concluded that
schema theories of memory are not equippedto
deal with affect. He argued for a dynamic,
functional theory of comprehensionand recall
that includes affect.
The retrieval processes of schema theory
also cannot easily explain the powerful effects
of affective and imaginal variables on recall.
The retrieval processes of schema theory suggest that what is recalled will be information
that is importantto the governingschema. However, several studies have shown that interest,
emotionalresponse, and imageryare betterpredictors of text recallthanis importance(Garner,
Gillingham, & White, 1989; Hidi & Baird,
1988; Sadoski & Quast, 1990). This finding
holds even for college studentsreadingarticles
from popularmagazines on topics about which
the general public is assumed to have some
prior knowledge(Sadoski& Quast, 1990).
Finally, we speculate that the influence of
affect and imagery might explain the persistent
anomaly found in the perspectivestudies noted
earlier. That is, in the burglar/homebuyerpas-
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SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
479
for the same conclusion regarding mathematics). Similar ideas are implicit in currentuses
of mental models in explaining text comprehension (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983; Morrow,
1985).
One of the most influential models of text
comprehension has been the Kintsch and van
Dijk model (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). This model has been
worked out in considerabledetail and has been
used by many investigatorsof text processing. It
has continuallybeen extendedand elaboratedin
ways that make it increasinglycompatiblewith
dual coding theory.
The original model (Kintsch & van Dijk,
1978) assumedthat discourse is interpretedas a
set of propositionsorderedby various semantic
relations between the propositions. The resulting semantic structure is divided into microstructureand macrostructurelevels. These two
structurallevels are relatedby a set of semantic
mappingrules called macrorules,which derive
from and are applied by a general schema.
However, some research indicated that this
model was too simple, and suggested that it
should incorporate two interacting memory
systems, one for episodically "chunked"
macrostructure information and another for
processing microstructureinformation(Spilich,
Vesonder,Chiesi, & Voss, 1979).
The updatedmodel proposed by van Dijk
and Kintsch (1983) elaborates their original
view in several ways. The new model distinguishes three levels of text representation in
memory, including a surface representation,a
propositionaltext base (muchlike the one in the
original version), and a situation model. The
situationmodel is not assumedto be partof the
text representationproper,but insteadis viewed
as a model that the readerconstructsabout the
situation denoted by the text. Van Dijk and
Kintscharguethatsituationmodels are required
to accountfor such linguistic and psychological
phenomena as reference, coreference, coherence, situational parameters,and perspective.
The additionof a situationmodel to the general
theory renders it more similar to dual coding
theory, which includes holistic, situationalrepresentationsthat can be experienced as mental
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SADOSKI,PAIVIO,& GOETZ
In summary, dual coding theory can account for the results of schema studies without
reliance on reified, abstract knowledge structures, and it can explain recall results that are
difficult to explain using the mechanisms of
schema theory. Furthermore, numerous researchershave converged on theories of mental
modeling that incorporate the assumptions of
dual coding, and othertheories could be readily
modified to include dual coding assumptions.
Conclusion
481
482
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Footnote
The authors wish to thank Mary Walsh, Albert Katz,
MustaqKhan, and Jon Denton for their helpful comments
on earlierdraftsof this article.
AcceptedJuly 2, 1991