Facts: Bartulata was part of the AFP since 1924 and then joined thr 108th Infant

ry, a guerilla organization in Mindanao. This guerilla outfit was recognized by

the US Armed Forces, taking effect on September 16, 1924. He then proceeded to r
ise as second lieutenant in April 1, 1943 and continued to serve in the Phil. Ar
my, receiving salaries and allowances as such officer. On Sept. 1, 1956, petitio
ner retired as Staff Sergeant.
Petitioner requests re-adjustment of his retirement from Staff Sergeant to secon
d lieutenant but denied by the AFP and DND, due to his name lacking in the roste
r of recognized guerilla officers.
Issue: Whether Bartulata is entitled to all rights and privileges as a recognize
d guerilla officer and should be retired as second lieutenant.
Ruling: Yes. The PH Gov recognizes the petitioner's records of services, salarie
s, and retirement as second lieutenant, rendering to 23 years and 15 days of ser
vice, this which the respondents admit as well. Regardless of his exclusion from
the roster of guerillas, his records of service and membership of the 108th inf
antry supports his petition.
Thus it is only fair that he be granted his petition of re-adjustment and the pr
ivileges of retiring as second lieutenant.
WENCESLAO
Facts: In April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry advertised a bidding for a public f
orest land in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares within the 7,252 h
ectares of timberland of a former US Naval Reservation which was turned over to
the PH gov. Wenceslao Tan applied along with 9 others in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner and Secretary Gozon of ANR issued a memor
andum authorizing Dir. of Forestry to grant OTL. Subsequently, acting ANR Secret
ary Feliciano revoked said authorization of Dir. of Forestry yet on the same dat
e, an OTL was signed and released by Acting Dir. of Forestry sans approval of th
e Secretary of ANR. Ravago Commercial Company prayed for Sec. of ANR to revoke T
an's OTL, inducing clarification from the Secretary to announce that the OTL is
indeed null and void. Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration but was t
hen denied. Due to this, petitioner filed the instant case before tile court a q
uo.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available
.
Ruling: No. Tan did not appeal the Secretary of the ANR's order to the President
of the Philippines, who issued withdrawal of the area from private expolitation
and establishing it as a Watershed Reserve. Petitioner failed to exhaust his ad
ministrative remedies by filing before a court even though the President has the
power to review orders and acts of respondents-appellees.
HARVEY
Facts: After close observation by the CID, petitioners were among the apprehende
d 22 suspected alien pedophiles in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 opted for self deportat
ion, 1 released for lack of evidence, 1 was charged due to working without a val
id working visa, leaving 3 to face the deportation proceedings. Photos and poste
rs of suspected child prostitution was gathered during the apprehension. A warra
nt of arrest was issued by the respondent against the petitioners for violation
of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Sec. 69 of the Revised Administ
rative Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Phil. Immigration Act granted authority to the Commisi

oner to arrest and detain petitioners with pending probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.
Ruling: Yes. Although the constitution grants freedom from unreasonable searches
to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not, one constitu
tional requirement of a valid search warrant is basis upon probable cause. This
was determined after close surveillance of their activities and was affirmed thr
ough the photographs and posters. The deportation charges by respondent Commissi
oner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1
940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The requireme
nt of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportatio
n proceedings. Petitioners were, in order, also denied of bail since the right to
bail was a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner in deportation
proceedings which do not partake the nature of criminal actions. The power to de
port lies on the sovereign power of the State upon any grounds it may deem prope
r; it is a measure against aliens deemed harmful to public welfare. Respondent a
cted in the interests of the state.
ROMULO
F: Petitioner files a petition declaring PET's unconstitutionality on the ground
that the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it viol
ates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General affirms that th
e construction of PET lies on the SC's power to be the sole judge of all electio
n contests for the President or VP under par 7, section 5, Art VII of the Consti
tution. SC then dismisses Macalintal's petition yet petitioner files for a motio
n for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
ruling: Yes. The Constitution grants this power to the SC in Section 1, Art 7 an
d is consistent to its power to settle "disputes and controversies involving rig
hts duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable and to de
termine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to l
ack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of th
e Government." The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolutio
n of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
CEREZO
F: Petitioner filed a complaint for libel against respondents. Finding probable
cause, the Prosecutor filed the corresponding Information against them, but reve
rsed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the information. Rely
ing on the recommendation of the prosecutor, the RTC ordered the criminal case d
ismissed on the ground that it is a settled rule that the determination of the p
ersons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public Prosecutor who is vested
with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. Being vested
with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that there is
reasonable ground to do so.
However, upon petitioner s motion for reconsideration, the RTC granted the same an
d reinstated the case after the DOJ Secretary reversed the resolution of the pro
secutor.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC judge necessarily has to make an independent evalu
ation or assessment of the merits of the case.
Ruling: Yes. There is a rule that once a case is filed with the court, its dispo
sition rests on the discretion of the court. The trial court should not rely sol
ely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice in reso

lving a motion to dismiss a case or withdraw information. The court exclusively

assess the merits of the motion and in which content should be in the form of a
written order. Thus, the RTC judge failed to make his own determination by blind
ly relying on the judgment of the prosecutor when he should have been more judic
ious especially when the prosecution seemed to be uncertain and irresolute on wh
ether to indict respondents.
BAYAN TELECOM
F: NTC granted Bayantel the authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone sys
tem (CMTS) on its own initiative, in accordance to Rule 15 Sec 3 of its 1987 Rul
es of Practice and Procedures. Respondent argues that the NTC should have applie
d the Revised Rules wherein the phrase "on its own initiative" has been since de
leted.
I: WON NTC has the power to provide such authority and to issue Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity
R: Yes. In the regulatory telecommunications industry, the NTC has the sole auth
ority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the i
nstallation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities and service
s, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems. Specifically,
Section 16 of the Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC, upon notice and he
aring, to issue Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation of public s
ervices within the Philippines "whenever the Commission finds that the operation
of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promot
e the public interests in a proper and suitable manner"
GONZALES
F: Gonzales was a public school teacher from 1965 until her forced resignation i
n 1994 when Purita Avila filed before the DECS, in 1993, an administrative compl
aint for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and estafa against petitioner who was the
n Assnt. Principal of Caloocan Elementary School. Respondent Nagpacan, administr
ative officer iii of city schools in caloocan city, issued a report of investiga
tion recommending the dismissal Gonzales from service, following further support
from Schools Division Superintendent Abracia, rendering DECS-NCR Director respo
ndent Nilo Rosas dismissing petitioner from
Petitioner and Padilla were also charged with estafa before the RTC of Caloocan
City, with the same facts in the complaint filed before DECS, leading to the con
viction of the petitioner. Two years after, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondents in their violation of Sec. 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School T
eachers. Graft Investigation Officer Plaridel Oscar Bohol supported said petitio
ner's complaint and recommended an adjudication against respondents.Administrati
ve Adjudication Bureau Director Evelyn Baliton dismissed the complaint against r
espondents, noting that the it was filed five (5) years after the occurrence of
the act complained of, leadinng to its outright dismissal of the complaint under
Sec. 4(a), Rule III of the Rules of Procedureof the Office of the Ombudsman. Bal
iton maintained that petitioner should have sought judicial relief and for decla
ration of nullity of the proceedings, and petitioner allegedly failed to produce
enough evidence against respondents resulting in the denial of petitioner's rig
ht to due process.
I: WON motion for reconsideration is no longer available as the administrative d
ecision had become final and unappealable
WON that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed pe
titioner s administrative complaint against respondents.
R: Yes. Rule 43 states that appeals from decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, s

uch as the Office of the Ombudsman, in administrative disciplinary cases, should

be taken to the Court of Appeals. This was formulated precisely to uniform rule
of appellate procedure for these agencies. Thus,certiorariunder Rule 65 will not
lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to appeal within fifteen (15) days from notic
e of the assailed decision. Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal, especially if such error was due to petitioner's negl
ect in the choice of remedies.
No. Ombudsman dismissed the petitioner's complaint on the ground that it was fil
ed out of time. This statement is further supported by the petitioner's admittan
ce of neglect. Hence, the Ombudsman was plainly following the mandate of law.
ODCHIGUE-BONDOC
Petitioner denies allegations by respondent's complaint for estafa against Fil-E
state officials, herein respondent. DOJ Secretary dismissed the petition upon fi
nding there was not any reversible error. The CA claims that the DOJ Secretary c
ommitted grave abuse of discretion since it did not disclose the petitions groun
ds for dismissal in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner asserts that no violation was committed since that applies only to de
cisions of courts of justice , and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of ex
ecutive departments such as the DOJ. Respondent counters that the constitutional
requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and admini
strative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tri
bunals.
Issue:
Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.
Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.
Ruling:
[A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.Prelimina
ry investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discove
ring the persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [p
rosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the cas
e on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime ha
s been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof.While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be
said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor].
the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor s order or resolu
tion via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial pro
ceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body."22Section 14, Article VIII o
f the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secreta
ry.