FOURTH LIST

the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria

Alcantara.

SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
Perez v. Garchitorena
54 Phil. 431
FACTS: The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the
plaintiff's name with the association known as La
Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated
credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is
said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also
deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano
Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for
P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of
the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to
the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an
attachment on said amount deposited withLa Urbana.
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria
Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the
execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The
defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's
universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the
injunction.
ISSUE: Whether the amount deposited is the property of
the children of the late Ana Maria Alcantara as
fideicommissary.
HELD: Fideicommissary substitution requires three
things:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the
estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve
and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the
estate.
3. A second heir.
The fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled
to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in
the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary
consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir
does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the
testator.
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question
does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff
herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred

to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the
association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is
a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the
execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is
not one of the fideicommissary heirs.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin,
G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896
[no fideicommissary substitution]
FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo leaving a will
wherein she bequeathed all of her propertied to her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges). The
will contained a disposition saying at the death of my
said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and share alike.
C.N. Hodges was appointed executor and when
he died, Joe Hodges and Fernando Mirasol replaced him,
which in turn was replaced by PCIB pursuant to an
agreement of all the heirs of Hodges.
On the other hand, the Higdons, composed of
brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane Hodges now claims
their share to her estate.
PCIB, however, contends that there was no
substitution in this case and that the testamentary
disposition in favor of the brothers and sisters are
inoperative and invalid.
ISSUES:
1. W/N there is a valid simple substitution
2. W/N there is a fideicommissary substitution
HELD:
1. NONE. There is no vulgar or simple substitution. In
order that a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid,
three alternative conditions must be present, namely, that
the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator;
or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3)
should be incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the
substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of
the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is
void.

2. NONE. There is neither a fideicommissary substitution

because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Charles
to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else.
If no obligation is imposed upon the first heir to preserve
the property and to transmit it to the second heir, then
there is no fideicomisaria.
The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Charles because, under her will, they are
not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would no or may not
inherit, but would inherit what he would not dispose of
from his inheritance.
CONDITIONS, MODES, AND TERMS
Miciano v. Brimo
50 Phil. 867 (1924)
[void condition]
FACTS: Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the
estate of deceased Joseph Brimo, filed the scheme of
partition of the said estate. The court approved the
scheme despite of the opposition of Andre Brimo, brother
of the deceased. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
In the will left by Joseph Brimo, he said that
although he is a Turkish citizen, he wished that the
distribution of his property and everything in connection
with his will be made and disposed in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippines. He also requested all his
relatives to respect said wish, otherwise he annuls and
cancels beforehand whatever disposition found in the will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with
said request.
Andre Brimo contends that the scheme of
partition puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos
will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether Andre Brimos exclusion as a legatee is
valid.
HELD: No, Andre Brimos exclusion as a legatee is not
valid.
The institution of legatees in this will is
conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his
property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and

valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings
has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
However, said condition is void, being contrary to
law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides Impossible
conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it
expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to Article 10 of the Civil Code such national law
of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then is considered unwritten, and
the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
The second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon
the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of
the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective
it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.
Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 113725, June 29, 2000
[condition, effect; mode]
FACTS: In a codicil to the last will and testament of
testatrix Aleja Bellesa, Dr. Jorde Rabadilla was instituted
as a devisee of a parcel of land subject to the obligation
of delivering to Maria Martena Coscuella y Belleza 100
piculs of sugar every year until Maria Martena dies and
should Dr. Rabadilla die, the obligation shall be passed to
his heirs. There was also an obligation to any transferee
to deliver to Maria Martena to seize the property and turn
it over to Aleja Bellezas descendants.
Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife
and four children, one of which was the petitioner Johnny
Rabadilla. Maria filed a complain to comply wit the
obligation. A compromise agreement was reached but
due to non-compliance, Maria filed another complaint but
was also dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
lower court and ordered the reconveyance from the
modal heir, Dr. Rabadillas heirs, of the property to Maria.

ISSUE: Whether there was a modal institution of heirs as

held by the Court of Appeals.
HELD: Yes. The contention of the petitioners are
untenable. It is not a simple institution. The Court of
Appeals found that the private respondents had a cause
of action against petitioners. The designation was made
as modal institution. This was precisely to stress that the
private respondents had a legally demandable right
against the petitioners pursuant to the subject codicil.
The obligations imposed by the codicil on Dr.
Rabadilla were transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death. Since the obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix not only in the instituted heir but also in his
successor-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally
apply to the instituted heir and his successor-in-interest.
The petition is dismissed and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Legitime (In General)
Raymundo v. Vda De Suarez
G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008
[compulsory succession defined]
FACTS: Spouses Marcelo and Teofista Suarez had five
children namely Danilo, Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr, Evelyn and
Reggineo. Spouses acquired several properties including
a parcel of land in Pasig, a property in Pinagbuhatan
Pasig and Lots 5,6 and 7. When Marcelo Sr. died,
Teofista, together with the other respondents, and Elpidio
Suarez executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate.
Despite the said partition, the properties remained under
the name of the spouses. Teofista continued to administer
and manage said properties.
In a case against Valente Raymundo and others,
the court ordered Teofista and Rizal Realty Coporation to
pay Raymundo P70,000.00 for damages. The subject
properties were levied to satisfy the judgment. Before the
expiration of the redemption period, herein respondents
filed a revindicatory action against Valente fof the
annulment of the auction sale. Meanwhile, RTC ordered
Teofista to vacate the premises and leave Valente in
peaceful possession thereof.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied. They then filed a patition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals which also dismissed the said
petition.

In another litigation, a writ of preliminary injuction

was issued by the RTC of Pasig enjoining petitioner
Valente from transferring to third persons the levied
properties based on its preliminary findings that the
auctioned properties are co-owned by Teofista and the
respondents.
Valente now contends that the respondents must
first be declared as heirs before they can file an action to
annul the judicial sale.
ISSUE: Whether the properties in question can be subject
of levy.
HELD: No, the properties in question cannot be subject of
levy to satisfy the judgment against Teofista Su
arez.
Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and
Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject
properties only by virtue of an execution sale to recover
Teofistas judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is
solely Teofistas, and payment therefor cannot be made
through an execution sale of properties not absolutely
owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal
properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of
Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.s
death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.s
share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by
operation of law to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of
succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778
of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of
the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or
combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of
succession. The portion that is so reserved is the
legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as
that part of the testators property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. Herein
respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding
secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over
concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the
decedents estate.
Compulsory Heir
Lapuz v. Eufemio
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
[when legal separation is pending]
FACTS: On August 1953, Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a
petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio
on the ground that she found out that her husband

abandoned her and cohabitated with a Chinese woman

Go Hiok. The spouses do not have a child.
In his amended answer, Eufemio alleged
affirmative and special defenses. He also filed a counterclaim for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with Carmen on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage with Go Hiol alias Ngo Hiok in accordance with
Chinese law and cutoms.
Before the trial can be completed, Carmen died in
a vehicular accident. Eufemio then mobbed to dismiss the
petition fro legal separation saying that the petition was
filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of
the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation.
Counsel of Carmen moved to substitute the
deceased by her father Macario Lapuz. Eufemio opposed
the motion. The lower court dismissed the case stating
that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution
had to be resolved on the question of whether the
plaintiffs cause of action has survived which was ruled in
the negative.
Petitioners then filed a review by certiorari before
the Supreme Court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final
decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action
and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD: Yes, the death of the plaintiff before the final
decree in an action for legal separation abate the action.
An action for legal separation which involves
nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing
only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in
its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered.
Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action
itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
This also applied if the action involved property
rights.
A review of the resulting changes in property
relations between spouses shows that they are solely the
effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can
not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the
decree.

The loss of right by the offending spouse to any

share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities
that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are
vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by
their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are
difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not
thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section
17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation
of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Baritua v. CA
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
[estrangement not a legal ground for disqualification]
FACTS: A tricycle driven by Bienvenido Nacario collided
with a JB Bus driven by Edgar Bitancor and owned and
operated by Jose Baritua. As a result of the accident,
Bienvenido and his passenger died.
An extra-judicial settlement was executed by
herein petitioners
and Philippine First Insurance
Company, Inc. and Alicia Nacario, Bienvenidos widow. In
consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed
a release of claim in favor of petitioners and PFICI. She
also executed an affidavit of desistance.
About a year after the accident, the parents of
Bienvenido filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners. They alleged that in accordance with the
extra-judicial settlement that they executed, the
petitioners promised to indemnify them for the death of
there son, for the funeral expenses they incurred and for
the damage of the tricycle, the purchase price of which
was loaned by them in favor of their son. However,
instead of indemnifying them, the petitioners negotiated
with the long-estranged wife of their late son.
The lower court dismissed the complaint saying
that the payment by the petitioners to the widow and her
child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-ininterest of the deceased extinguished any claims against
the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court. It said that the release
executed by Alicia did not discharge the liability of the
petitioners because the case was instituted by the
respondents in their own capacity as heirs,
representatives, successors and assigns of Alicia and that
Alicia could not have validly waived the damages prayed

for since she was not the one who suffered these
damages.
ISSUE: Whether the release executed by Alicia
discharged the liability of the petitioners.
HELD: Yes, the petitioners are discharged from the
liability by virtue of the release executed by Alicia.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes
among them being by payment. There is no denying that
the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising
from the accident. The only question now is whether or
not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the
petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
There can be no question that Alicia and her son
with the deceased are the successors in interest referred
to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment.
It is patently clear that the parents of the
deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving
spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been
established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that
they begot a child, the private respondents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not
compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted
correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the
widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their
lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged
from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal
ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an
heir of the deceased spouse.
Raymundo v. Vda De Suarez,
G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008
[primary compulsory heirs and secondary compulsory
heirs]
FACTS: Spouses Marcelo and Teofista Suarez had five
children namely Danilo, Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr, Evelyn and
Reggineo. Spouses acquired several properties including
a parcel of land in Pasig, a property in Pinagbuhatan
Pasig and Lots 5,6 and 7. When Marcelo Sr. died,
Teofista, together with the other respondents, and Elpidio
Suarez executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate.
Despite the said partition, the properties remained under
the name of the spouses. Teofista continued to administer
and manage said properties.
In a case against Valente Raymundo and others,
the court ordered Teofista and Rizal Realty Coporation to

pay Raymundo P70,000.00 for damages. The subject

properties were levied to satisfy the judgment. Before the
expiration of the redemption period, herein respondents
filed a revindicatory action against Valente fof the
annulment of the auction sale. Meanwhile, RTC ordered
Teofista to vacate the premises and leave Valente in
peaceful possession thereof.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied. They then filed a patition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals which also dismissed the said
petition.
In another litigation, a writ of preliminary injuction
was issued by the RTC of Pasig enjoining petitioner
Valente from transferring to third persons the levied
properties based on its preliminary findings that the
auctioned properties are co-owned by Teofista and the
respondents.
Valente now contends that the respondents must
first be declared as heirs before they can file an action to
annul the judicial sale.
ISSUE: What are the rights of a primary compulsory heir
and a secondary compulsory heir?
HELD: Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of
succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778
of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of
the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or
combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of
succession. The portion that is so reserved is the
legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as
that part of the testators property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. Herein
respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding
secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over
concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the
decedents estate.
Even without delving into the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.s estate in 1957, it must be
stressed that herein respondents rights to the succession
vested from the moment of their fathers death. Herein
respondents ownership of the subject properties is no
longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelos
death, although their respective shares therein remained
pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties
were sold on execution sale to answer for Teofistas
judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents
share therein was null and void.

In fine, Teofistas ownership over the subject

properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente
does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal nature of
the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion
of the subject properties, only that portion could have
been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction
by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate
declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not
necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the
subject properties.
Reyes v. CA
G.R. No. L- 39537, March 19, 1985
[natural and spurious children]
FACTS: Placida Delgado, together with the other private
respondents, filed a complaint before the CFI of Batangas
praying that Irene Delgado (alias Irene Reyes and Irene
Ramero) be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance
in favor of Placido, Domingo and Paula, all surnamed
Delgado respondents over five parcels of land in Quezon
and another deed of reconveyance in favor of Maximo
Delgado over three parcels of land in Batangas.
Herein respondents alleged that Irene was able
to register the lands under her name by lying that she
was the sole child of Francisco Delgado and thus entitled
to inherit the parcels of land.
Irene filed an answer saying that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Genoveva Ramero and deceased
Francisco Delgado. After her mother and Justino Reyes
separated, her mother cohabitated with Francisco
Delgado. Irene also filed a counter-claim averring that as
the illegitimate daughter of Francisco, she has the right to
represent her father to the inheritance left by her
grandmother, Benigna Castillo.
The CFI of Batangas dismissed the action for
reconveyance and declared Irene Delgado as the lawful
owner of the parcels of land. However, the counterclaim
of Irene was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Both
parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
lower court. It said that the self-adjudication executed by
Irene is null and void. The transfer certificates of title
issued in the name of Irene were cancelled and the titles
covering the parcels of land were reinstated in the name
of Francisco. The Court of Appeals said that although
Irene was the spurious daughter of Francisco, she cannot
inherit because she was not recognized wither voluntarily

or by court action. Furthermore, the titles of the lots

cannot be executed in favor of herein respondents
because in doing so it will be in effect a recognition by
the court that herein respondents are the only heirs of
Francisco to the prejudice of other possible heirs or
creditors of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether Irene Delgado could inherit the lot.
HELD: The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other
than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily
or by court action is well settled in our jurisprudence.
There is no reason to overturn this doctrine.
Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to
spurious children as to their recognition, this Court, in
applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural
children, to said spurious children, declared that the
considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the
time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil Code for actions
seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children
are fully applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate
and declare the paternity of illegitimate children that are
not natural.
There are two (2) general classifications of
illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born
out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by
fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit).
Natural children are defined as those born outside of
wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other
hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at
the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry
each other on account of certain impediment. Because of
this basic distinction between these children, it is not
legally possible to classify unrecognized natural children
under the class of spurious children. Besides,
commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children
other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights
under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children
who are natural child proper by birth and who have not
secured voluntary or compulsory recognition. They fag
within the scope of the definition of natural children
enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code Lastly, to
follow petitioners' contention win not be in accordance
with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an
elementary and basic principle under the old and new
Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no
rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His
rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the
child's acknowledgment by the natural parent.

Reserva Troncal
Padura v. Baldovino
G.R. No. L-11960, December 1958
FACTS: Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during
his lifetime. With his first wife Gervacia Landig, he had
one child, Manuel Padura. With the second wife, Benita
Garing, he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria
Padura. Agustin died on Apr 26, 1908, leaving a last will
and testament, duly probated, wherein he bequeathed his
properties among his three children and his surviving
spouse, Benita Garing.
Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died
unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a
will; and not having any issue, the parcels of land were
inherited exclusively by his mother Benita. Benita was
issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject
to the condition that the properties were reservable in
favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which said property came.
On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs
her four legitimate children: Cristeta, Melania, Anicia, and
Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-appellants). On Oct 6, 1940,
Manuel also died, survived by his legitimate children
Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and
Severino Padura (Petitioners-appellees) Upon the death
of Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15, 1952, the heirs took
possession of the reservable properties. CFI Laguna
declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the
rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable
properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and
Manuel, having predeceased the reservista)
The Baldovino heirs filed a petition seeking to have the
properties partitioned, such that one-half be adjudicated
to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on
the basis that they inherited by right of representation
from their respective parents, the original reservees.
Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be
deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they
claim, each should have an equal share.
(In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood
relatives of the reservista, were contending that they
should get more than their half-blood relatives, the
Padura heirs. They anchor their claim on Articles 1006
and 1008 of the Civil Code)

RTC RULING
Declared all the reservees, without distinction, coowners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the parcels of
land.
ISSUE: WON the reserved properties should, as the trial
court held, be apportioned among the heirs equally.
HELD: NO.The nephews of the whole blood should take
a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half
blood. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed
primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to
the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista). Article 891 of the Code provides:
ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once
the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the
line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further
occasion for its application. In the relations between one
reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no
call for applying Art 891 any longer; the respective share
of each in the reversionary property should be governed
by the ordinary rules of interstate succession.
Florentino v Florentino (as restated in the case): upon the
death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but
only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more
remote degree... And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews.
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic
principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule
that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to
share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.
If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to aply, the rule of double share for
immedaite collaterals of the whole blood should likewise
be operative.

In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the

group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual
right to the property should be decided by the applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art 891 does
not specify otherwise. The reserva being an exceptional
case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios,
who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right:
and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of
their right in the Registry of Property even while the
reservista is alive. This right is incompatible with the mere
expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista. It is also clear that the reservable property is
not part of the estate of the reservista, who may not
dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the
reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to
the condition that they must survive the reservista.
Gonzales v. CFI Manila
G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981
[purpose]
FACTS: Benito D. Legarda (II) predeceased his father
Benito T. Legarda (I). Benito (II) was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda (I), and their
seven children namely Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Filomena
(II), Benito (III), Alejandro and Jose.
When Benito T. Legarda (I) died, his real
properties were divided in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito (II) who were represented by Benito
F. Legarda (III).
Filomena R. Legarda (II), died intestate and
without issue. Her sole heir was her mother, Filomena
Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an
affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena Legarda (II). As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races (I) succeeded
her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda (II) as coowner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.

In 1953, Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten

identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties which she inherited from her daughter in favor
of her sixteen grandchildren, the children of her three
sons, Benito (III), Alejandro and Jose. From July 1958 to
February 1959, Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the 1/3
share in the estate of Benito T. Legarda (I) which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
D. Legarda (II).
Mrs. Legarda died in 1967 and left a holographic
will. The said will was admitted to probate. In the testate
proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of
Mrs. Legarda filed a motion to exclude from the inventory
of her mothers estate the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena (II), on the ground
that said properties are reservable properties which
should be inherited by Filomenas (II) three sisters and
three brother and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro
and Jose. The motion was opposed by the administrator
Benito F. Legarda (III).
Before the court could issue a resolution, Beatriz
Gonzales filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mothers
estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the
said properties are reservable properties.
The lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz
Gonzales. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: What is the purpose of reverva troncal?
HELD: The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "the
risk that assets possessed by a family pass for centuries
suddenly gratuitously to foreign hands by random links
and premature deaths or impeder that for a random
strange people vide a family to acquire property without
that would have been therein.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or
acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or
from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited
by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation
of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said
ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the
line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first
transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)

from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased

descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of
law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another
ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of
the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of
the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant.
In the instant case, the properties in question
were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her
death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they
survived Mrs. Legarda.

[Purpose Reserva Troncal]

FACTS: Victoriano Sablan and Marcelina Edroso were
married and had a son, Pedro Sablan. Upon the death of
his father, Pedro inherited two parcels of land in Laguna.
These parcels of land were acquired by Victoriano by
inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and
Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to
him in the partition of hereditary property between him
and his brothers. On July 1902, Pedro died unmarried
and without any child. The two parcels of land passed
through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.
Marcelina then applied for the registration and issuance
of title of the two lots.
Pablo and Basilio Sablan, the legitimate brother
of Victoriano, opposed the registration of the lots. They
claimed that wither the registration be denied or if granted
to Marcelina, the right reserved by law to them be
recorded in the registration of each parcel.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs.

Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within
the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the
exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her
three daughters and three sons.

The Court of Land Registration denied the

registration holding that the land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and
that in such a case application could only be presented
jointly in the names of Marcelina Edroso and Pablo and
Basilio Sablan. Hence this appeal.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in

her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her
daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did
not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as
long as the reservees survived the reservor.

ISSUE: Whether the two parcels of land is in the nature of

a reservable property.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable

properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives
within the third degree from the prepositus who in this
case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not
select the reservees to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the other reservees of their
share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a
testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
Edroso v. Sablan
GR No. 6878, September 13, 1913

HELD: Yes, the parcels of land are reservable properties.

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary
title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous
tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil
Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in
return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion
of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of
blood relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another descendant, or form
a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he
has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line where the
property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited
from him the two parcels of land which he had acquired
without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance
from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to

relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of

Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of
Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial courts
ruling that they partake of the nature property required by
law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the
law.
The conclusion is that the person required by
Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at
all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the
legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of
the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and
to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition.
He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who
possesses or should possess it and have title to it,
although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal
title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside
in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a
genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third
degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either
actually or constructively or formally, in their possession;
and moreover, because they have no title of ownership or
of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on
the hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they acquire
it.
Gonzales v. CFI Manila
G.R. No. L-34395, May 1981
[persons involved]
FACTS: Benito D. Legarda (II) predeceased his father
Benito T. Legarda (I). Benito (II) was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda (I), and their
seven children namely Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Filomena
(II), Benito (III), Alejandro and Jose.
When Benito T. Legarda (I) died, his real
properties were divided in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito (II) who were represented by Benito
F. Legarda (III).
Filomena R. Legarda (II), died intestate and
without issue. Her sole heir was her mother, Filomena
Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an
affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena Legarda (II). As a result of the

affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races (I) succeeded

her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda (II) as coowner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.
In 1953, Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten
identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties which she inherited from her daughter in favor
of her sixteen grandchildren, the children of her three
sons, Benito (III), Alejandro and Jose. From July 1958 to
February 1959, Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the 1/3
share in the estate of Benito T. Legarda (I) which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
D. Legarda (II).
Mrs. Legarda died in 1967 and left a holographic
will. The said will was admitted to probate. In the testate
proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of
Mrs. Legarda filed a motion to exclude from the inventory
of her mothers estate the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena (II), on the ground
that said properties are reservable properties which
should be inherited by Filomenas (II) three sisters and
three brother and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro
and Jose. The motion was opposed by the administrator
Benito F. Legarda (III).
Before the court could issue a resolution, Beatriz
Gonzales filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mothers
estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the
said properties are reservable properties.
The lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz
Gonzales. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Who are the persons involved in reserva troncal?
HELD: The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1)
the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property
was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous
title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who
received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the
other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the property
should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters.
Fourth degree relatives are not included.

10

The person from whom the degree should be

reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the
line from which the property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by descent. He is called the
prepositus.
The reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said
property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it
had temporarily and accidentally stayed during the
reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that
there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the
latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a
than interest in the reservable property.
Florentino v. Florentino
40 Phill 480
(4th civil degree excluded; cannot inherit the reserved
property)
FACTS: Apolonio Isabelo Floretino II married Antonia Faz
de Leon. They had nine children namely Jose, Juan,
Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro and
Magdalena. When Antonia died, Apolonio married
Severina Faz de Leon. They had two children namely
Mercedes and Apolonio III. When Apolonio II died, he was
survived by his second wife Severina and his ten children.
His youngest son, Apolonio III was born a month after he
died.
Apolonios children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died
single without any ascendants or descendants. Jose, one
of Apolonios children had three sons named Ramon,
Miguel and Victorino and a daughter named Rosario.
Espirita married Eugenio Singson and was blessed with
five children namely Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad and
Dolores. Pedro had two children named Jose and
Asuncion.
Before Apolonio II died, he executed a will before
the notary public instituting as his universal heirs his ten
children, his to be born son Apolinio III, and Severina. He
also said that his property should be divided among all of
his children in both marriages.
Apolonio III predeceased his mother Severina.
Severina then succeeded to all his property. When
Severina died, he left a will instituting as her universal
heir his only living daughter Mercedes. Mercedes then
took possession of all the property including the property
which Severina inherited from her son Apolonio III. The
subject property is said to be a reservable property held
by Severina in favor of her son Apolonio III.
Encarnacion Florentino, daughter of Apolinio II
from the first marriage, together with the herein

petitioners,
asked
Mercedes
to
deliver
their
corresponding part of the reservable property. However
despite several demands, Mercedes refuse to deliver the
property or pay its value to Encarnacion. Thus,
Encarnacion together with the other petitioners filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
They prayed that the subject property be declared as a
reservable property and Mercedes and her husband be
ordered to deliver to them their share of the property in
question.
Mercedes contended that she inherited the
property inherited by Severina from her son Apolonio III.
This being the case, the property did not pass into the
hands of strangers. She also contended that Article 811 of
the Civil Code is not applicable in this case because
when she, by operation of law, entered into and
succeeded to the possession of the property, said
property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost
the character of reservable property there being a
legitimate daughter of Severina with the right to succeed
her in all her rights, property and actions. Mercedes
alleged that there is no property reserved for Encarnacion
and others since there is a forced heiress entitled to the
property left by the death of Severina.
The CFI of Ilocos Sur dismissed the complaint
and ordered herein petitioners to pay the costs. The
judgment was affirmed on appeal.
ISSUE: Who has the right to inherit the property?
HELD: Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some
other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property
came.
Following the order prescribed by law in
legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property
which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be
alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of
the reservable property is not among the relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and
for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are
the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from
whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives
of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be

11

considered as reservatarios, since the law does not

recognize them as such.
There are then seven reservatarios who are
entitled to the reservable property left at the death of
Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first
marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three
children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented
by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes
Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All of the
plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos
son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four
of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve
being his nephews as they are the children of his three
half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the
third degree in their own right and the other twelve are
such by representation, all of them are indisputably
entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from
the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio
Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in
turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz
de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II.
The property inherited by Severina from her son
Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property.
Encarnacion, et al. being relatives of the deceased
Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to sixsevenths of said reservable property. Mercedes is entitled
to the remaining seventh part thereof.
Nieva v. Alcala
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
[reserva troncal applies only to legitimate family]
FACTS: Francisco Deocampo married Juliana Nieva.
They had a child named Alfeo Deocampo. Juliana is the
alleged natural mother of Segunda Maria Nieva. In 1889,
Juliana died intestate and Alfeo inherited two parcels of
land. In 1890, Alfeo Deocampo also died intestate and
without issue. The two parcels of land which Alfeo
inherited from his mother passed to his father Francisco
by intestate succession.
Francisco later married Manuela Alcala. They had
a child named Jose Deocampo. Francisco died in 1914.
Manuela and Jose Deocampo took possession of the
parcels of land in question.
A year after, Segunda Maria Nieva, claiming to be
an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, filed
an action to recover the parcels of land before the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas. The CFI held that, even

granting, that Segunda was an acknowledged daughter if

Juliana, she was not entitled to the property because an
illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal
under the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether Segunda Maria Nieva has a right over
the parcels of land.
HELD: No, Segunda does not have a right over the
parcels of land in question. Reserva troncal applies only
to legitimate family.
According to Manresa, persons in whose favor
the reservation is established is one of the most delicate
points in the interpretation of Article 811. According to the
said article, the reservation is established in favor of
parents who are within the third degree and belong to the
line from which the properties came.
Reserva troncal treats of blood, relationship. It
could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is
established between each spouse and the family of the
other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the
transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse
to that of the other, which is just what this article intends
to prevent.
Reserva troncal also treats of legitimate
relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate
ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which
proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being
true, there can be no question, because the line from
which the properties proceed must be the line of that
family and only in favor of that line is the reservation
established. Furthermore, we have already said, the
object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family,
following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not
be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the
right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from
which it must be deduced that natural parents neither
have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in
the article cited established a barrier between the two
families; properties of the legitimate family shall never
pass by operation of law to the natural family.
Sumaya v. IAC
G.R. Nos. 68843-44, September 2, 1991
[upon the death of the reservista]
FACTS: Jose Balantakbo Sr. married Consuelo Joaquin.
They were blessed with seven children namely Amadeo,
Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Jose, Jr. and Raul.

12

Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different

ascendants two sets of properties. He inherited 1/3
interest over a parcel of land in Liliw Laguna from his
father, Jose Sr. He also inherited a 1/7 interest over ten
parcels of land from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista.
Raul died intestate, single, without any issue. He
was survived by his mother Consuelo. Consuelo
adjudicated unto herself the subject properties. She then
sold the property which Raul inherited from his father to
Mariquita Sumaya. Sumaya then sold the property to Villa
Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. Villa Honorio
Development Corporation transferred and assigned its
rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
Consuelo sold the other property to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc. The latter then transferred
and assigned all its rights to the properties to Laguna
Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. Both certificate
of titles covering the subject properties do not contain any
annotation of its reservable character.
When Consuelo died, Amadeo and his brothers
together with Luisa, Jose and Dolores, children of their
deceased brother Jose Jr., filed a complaint before the
CFI of Laguna to recover the properties claiming that
such were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The CFI of Laguna ordered Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative to convey the properties
to Amadeo et al. The Court of Appeals affirmed said
decision.
ISSUE: Whether the property in question should be
returned to herein respondents.
HELD: Yes, the property should be returned to the
respondents as it is subject to reserva troncal. Moreover,
herein petitioners cannot be considered as innocent
purchasers for value.
Upon the death of the propositus, Raul
Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo caused the
registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate
of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties
were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., and from
his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. The said
affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a
recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable
character of the properties. In Spanish language, the
affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a
lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son,
who died leaving properties previously inherited from

other ascendants and which properties were inventoried

in the said affidavit.
However, the Supreme Court did not agree with
the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need
to register the reservable character of the property, if only
for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third
persons. In one of the cases decided by the Supreme
Court, it ruled that the reservable character of a property
may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally,
it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a
widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of
a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to
reserva troncal.
But herein petitioners cannot be considered as
innocent purchasers for value. This is evidenced by the
affidavit executed by Consuelo and by other proofs
showing that petitioners knew of the reservable character
of the properties.

Carillo v. De Paz
G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966
[prescriptive period]
FACTS: Spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia
owned Lot No. 221 located in Tarlac. They mortgaged the
said property for the sum of P 1,200.00 to spouses Pedro
Magat and Filomena Silva. Said mortgage was
registered. Later on, spouses Magat assigned their
mortgaged rights to Honaria Salak for P 1,632.00 with the
consent of the surviving debtor, Severino.
In 1943, Severino transferred of his interest in
the property to Honaria Salak for P 162.00. This
transaction and assignment of the mortgage credit were
not registered in the office of the Register of Deeds nor
annotated in the title.
An intestate proceedung was instituted for the
settlement of the estate of Severino Salak and Petra
Garcia. The said proceeding included Lot No. 221. Said
lot was adjudicated to Ernesto Bautista, Aurea Sahagun,
Rita Sahagun and Francisca Salak. Francisca Salak then
acquired the shares of the other heirs by virtue of which
TCT No. 970 covering Lot No. 221 was issued in her
name. Meanwhile, Honaria Salak died single living as
sole heir Agustina de Guzman.
A lease was executed by Francisca in favor of
Gabino de Leon and Asuncion Reyes covering Lot No.

13

221. A mortgage was also executed thereon by the

lessees in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation.
Agustina de Guzman then filed an action against
Francisca in the CFI of Tarlac seeking the reconveyance
to Agustina of portion of Lot No. 221. The lower court
dismissed the complaint saying that the court has no
jurisdiction to entertain any collateral attack in the present
action against the proceedings taken in the probate
proceedings covering Lot No. 221.

Pagkatipunan v. IAC
G.R. No. 70722, July 3, 1991
[manner of computation]
FACTS: Jose Velasquez, Sr. was married to Victorina
Real. They had five children. When Victorina died, no
dissolution of conjugal property was made. Jose Sr.
enjoyed full possession, use, usufruct and administration
of the whole conjugal property. Jose Sr. then married his
second wife, Canuta Pagkatipunan with whom he had 13
children.

ISSUE: Whether the action had already prescribed.

HELD: No, the action had not yet prescribed. The lower
court erred in dismissing the complaint.
While the Court admits that the sale made by
Severino Salak of his undivided interest in the property
to Honoria Salak, predecessor in interest of the plaintiff,
has not been registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds, nor annotated on the Torrens Title covering it,
such technical deficiency does not render the transaction
ineffective, nor does it convert it into a mere monetary
obligation. But it simply renders the transaction not
binding against a third person because, being a
registered land, the operative act to bind the land is the
act of registration. Said transaction however is valid and
binding between the parties and can serve as basis to
compel the register of deeds to make the necessary
registration. Such being the case, it is error to say that
plaintiff should have filed her claim in the intestate
proceedings of the late Severino Salak if she wanted to
protect her interest in the land for, the transaction being
binding between the parties, the same can be invoked
against them or their privies. This means that plaintiff can
still press her claim against the heirs of the deceased
Severino Salak who were made parties-defendants in this
case. These heirs cannot escape the legal consequence
of this transaction because they have inherited the
property subject to the liability affecting their common
ancestor. The fact that Francisca Salak bought the shares
of her co-heirs in said property is of no moment because
in so far as the portion of the land acquired by Honoria
Salak is concerned, Francisca Salak can recoup what she
has parted with from her co-heirs when the time for read
judgment comes. This matter can be threshed out when
the case is decided on the merits. For the present suffice
it to state that the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint for the reasons set forth in its order subject of
the present appeal.
Computation of Legitime

Jose Sr. died intestate and was survived by his

second wife Canuta Pagkatipunan and their 13 children
and his two children Jose Jr. and Lourdes from his first
marriage. His other three children were Amelia, Guillermo
and Lutgarda. Amelia died without ant issue. Guillermo
was survived by his five children and Lutgarda was
survived by her six children.
Herein private respondents filed a complaint
against the petitioners for accion reinvindicatoria,
annulment of deeds of sale, partition and damages.
`The trial court appointed two sets of commissions one
for the purpose of making an inventory of the estate of
Jose Velasquez, Sr., and the other, to determine which of
the parcels of land listed in such inventory submitted by
the first set of commissioners belong to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage or to the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage.
It was found out that after the death of Jose Sr.,
Canuta Pagkatipunan acquired full possession of two
parcels of land in Bagumbayan, Laguna among other
properties. The said parcels of land were sold by Canuta
to Spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena. The spouses
later resold the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan.
During the pendency of this suit, the subject property was
subdivided and assigned by Canta in favor of her 13
children. The 13 children caused the issuance of separate
free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided
lots.
Another property, which is the West Avenue
property is a residential lot purchased on installments by
spouses Jose Sr. and Canuta. When Jose Sr. died
Canuta shouldered the payment of the remaining
installment until the property was paid in full. A deed of
absolute sale conveying the house was issued in favor of
Canuta.
The lower court ruled in favor of herein
respondents. It declared the sale of the lots in Laguna in
favor of Moises and Magdalena null and void. The deeds

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of assignments executed by Canuta in favor of her

children were also declared null and void. The house and
lot in West Avenue was also ordered to be divided among
Canuta and her children and Jose Sr.s heirs from his first
marriage. The ruling was appealed before the
Intermediate Appellate Court. The IAC affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the modification that the
entire house and lot in West Avenue be divided into two
value to Canuta and the 13 children to the extent of
their respective proportional contributions and the other
half value to the second conjugal partnership of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan to be
partitioned one-fourth to the wife and the other one-fourth
appertaining to the deceased Jose Sr. to be divided
equally among his heirs.

It appears that there was no determination

whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal properties
of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is
impossible to determine the conjugal share of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. from the said property relationship.
Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during
his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it
would be extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not
such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime so that the
same may be considered subject to reduction for being
inofficious.

ISSUE: How should legitime be computed?

Donations made to strangers shall be charged to

that part of the estate of which the testator could have
disposed by his last will.

HELD: It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about

the legal share due to the heirs may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the assailed
decision, the respondent court affirmed the trial court's
ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had already disposed of
and exhausted his corresponding share in the conjugal
partnership owned by him and Victorina Real, so that his
heirs have nothing more to inherit from him, and that
accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the conjugal
property must necessarily appertain only to the private
respondents as heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of
the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall
not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be
added the value of all donations by the testator that are
subject to collation, at the time he made them.
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds
with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
It is undeniable that numerous donations inter
vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some
of his compulsory heirs.

Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be
charged to their legitime.

Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed

the disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to
the rules established by this Code.
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato
Doronio,
G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007
[manner of computation]
FACTS: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante
were the registered owners of a parcel of land in
Pangasinan. They had several children, two of which
were Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio.
In 1919, a private deed of donation propter
nuptias was executed by Simeon and Cornelia in favor of
Marcelino and his wife Veronica Pico. One of the
properties subject of said deed of donation is a residential
lot in Cabalitian. The lot was described in the deed of
donation as bound in the east by Fortunato Doronio.
However, it appears that the property described
was previously covered by OCT No. 352. According to the
OCT the adjacent lot in the east was owned by Zacarias
and Alejandro Najorda but according to the deed of
donation, the property was owned by Fortunato Doronio.
The heirs of Marcelino and the heirs of Fortunato
have been occupying the subject land for several
decades. Herein petitioners, the heirs of Marcelino,
contend that they are the owners of the entire property in
view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in
favor of Marcelino and Veronica. On the other hand,

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herein respondents, the heirs of Fortunato claim that only

half of the property was actually incorporated in the said
deed of donation because it said that Fortunato, instead
of Zacarias and Alejandro, is the owner of the adjacent
property at the eastern side.

invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of

respondents predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.

The heirs of Marcelino then filed before the RTC

of Pangasinan a petition for the Registration of a Private
Deed of Donation. No respondents were named in the
said petition. During the hearing, no one interposed an
objection. The petition was granted. The OCT was
cancelled and a TCT covering the entire property was
issued in the name of Marcelino and Veronica.

HELD: No, the legitime of Fortunato was not impaired.

The heirs of Fortunato then filed a petition for the

reconsideration of the ruling issued by the RTC ordering
the registration of the subject deed of donation. The
petition was dismissed. The heirs of Fortunato then filed
an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the heirs of Marcelino.

ISSUE: Whether the legitime of Fortunato Doronio was

impaired.

Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a

compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With
the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino

Doronio. It concluded that the parties admitted the identity
of the land which they all occupy; that a title once
registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated
by adverse, open and notorious possession or by
prescription and that the deed of donation in
consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners
is valid.
The case was brought before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the lower court. It ruled that the intention to donate half of
the disputed property to appellees predecessors can be
gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions
appearing in the title. It likewise ruled that the donation of
the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors is

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