Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 151334

February 13, 2013

CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA,
JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M.
FIGURACION,
LEANDRO
M.
FIGURACION,
II,
and
ALLAN
M.
FIGURACION, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated December 11, 2001
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290, which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated June 26, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49. The RTC decision (1) dismissed respondent Emilia FiguracionGerillas (Emilia) complaint for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages, and (2) annulled
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudicationexecuted by petitioner Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina).
The Facts
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the surviving
spouse. The other petitioners Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin
Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez and respondent Emilia were Carolina and Leandros children. 4
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were acquired by Leandro during his
lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of 7,547 square meters originally covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P;5 and (2) Lot No. 705 measuring 2,900 square meters and covered by TCT No. 4220-P. Both lands were
registered in the name of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above
real properties in favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not delineated with particularity
because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of 3,164 square
meters originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued in his name on
August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived.
When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina). 6
On November 28, 1961, Agripina 7 executed a Deed of Quitclaim8 over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein
respondent Emilia.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication9adjudicating unto herself the
entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina. 10 On the same date, Carolina also
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the
cancellation of OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names. 12
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and relying on
the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.13

The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in
retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705. The matter was initially brought
before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. 14 On May 23, 1994, respondent
Emilia instituted the herein Complaint15 for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self-

Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and
damages.
In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the respondents cause of action had long
prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing the suit; (2) TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and
Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and (3) an action for partition is
no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the
same amount to a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.16
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into: (1) whether or not Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are the exclusive properties of
Leandro; and (2) whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of Lot No. 707.17
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages is hereby ordered
dismissed whereas the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 are hereby
declared null and void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.18
The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their ownership is yet to be transmitted from
Leandro to his heirs whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in estate settlement proceedings. Anent Lot No. 707,
the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half () share to Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the other
half pertaining to Agripina was void. While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No.
42244, it refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lots eastern half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the
estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.19
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11, 2001, ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to
partition Lot No. 707. The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under judicial administration since Carolina
had long sold her pro indiviso share to Felipa and Hilaria. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962
as her own, the sale affected only her share and not that belonging to her co-owner, Agripina. The proper action in such case is not
the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for a
division or partition of the entire lot. Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to
the buyer.
The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is indeed premature considering that there is a
pending legal controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the income from Lot No. 2299 and of the expenses for
the last illness and burial of Leandro and Carolina, for which the lots appear to have been intended.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision appealed from in Civil Case No. U5826 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 707 covered by TCT No. 42244 to
be owned by appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein respondent], pro indiviso share, appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein
petitioner], pro indiviso share, and appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share, who are hereby directed to
partition the same and if they could not agree on a partition, they may petition the trial court for the appointment of a commissioner
to prepare a project of partition, in accordance with the procedure as provided in Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.20

Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 154322. In a Decision
promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the appeal, concurring with the CAs ruling that a partition of Lot
Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that: (1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in dispute; and
(2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the estate of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole error committed by the CA:
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL DICTA LAID DOWN BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.21
In view of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 154322, the ensuing discussion shall concern only Lot No. 707.
The Arguments of the Parties
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership because the Deed of
Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation that contained no acceptance and thus,
void. The petitioners attached a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim and stressed on the following portions, viz:
I, AGRIPINA ESTIOKO ADVIENTO, of le[ga]l age, Filipino citizen, single and a resident [of] San Vicenter (sic),
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO ([P]1.00), Philippine Currency and the
services rendered by my niece EMILIA FIGURACION, 20 years old, single, Filipino citizen and a resident of San
Vicente, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, do hereby by these presentsw (sic) RENOUNCE, RELEASE and forever
QUITCLAIM in favor of EMILIA FIGURACION, her heirs, and assigns the ONE[-]HALF (1/2) eastern portion of the
following parcel of land more particularly described and bounded as follows to wit[.]22
They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim is riddled with defects that evoke questions of law, because: (a) it has
not been registered with the Register of Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as 1961; (b) a certification dated
June 3, 2003 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, shows that it
does not have a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c) the Office of the National Archives which is the depository of old
and new notarized documents has no record of the Deed of Quitclaim as evidenced by a certification dated May 19,
2003;23 and (d) Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar, who supposedly notarized the Deed of Quitclaim was not commissioned to
notarize in 1961 per the certification dated June 9, 2003 from the OCC of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.24
Respondent Emilia, on the other hand, contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an onerous
donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by the formalities for a
simple donation.25
The Courts Ruling
Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time in a petition filed under Rule 45
Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the petitioners before the RTC and the CA.
In the Pre-Trial Order26 of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties agreed to limit the issue with regard to Lot No. 707
as follows: whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No. 707. The petitioners
supporting theory for this issue was that "the Deed of Quitclaim dated November 28, 1961 was rendered ineffective

by the issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name of Felipa and Hilaria."27 On appeal to the CA, however, the
petitioners raised a new theory by questioning the execution and enforceability of the Deed ofQuitclaim. They claimed
that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in the manner required by law.28
The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his
theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the
court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court
below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised
for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that
theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so
would be unfair to the adverse party.29 The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations
of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present
further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing
before the trial court.30
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any
further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory,31 this
exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.
Contrary to the petitioners assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual nature of
the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the evidence already
adduced by the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners themselves have acknowledged
when they attached in the petition several certifications32 in support of their new argument. It is settled that questions
of fact are beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts.33
Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by the petitioners involving the nature and
execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For their failure to advance these questions during trial, the petitioners are now
barred by estoppel34 from imploring an examination of the same.
The respondent can compel the
partition of Lot No. 707
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of
Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to
effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.35
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaimexecuted
by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. It is well to recall that
the petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the Deed of Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has
been rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilariathis contention is, of course, flawed.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title.36 Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean

that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership.37 In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent Emilia was
able to successfully establish, as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed fact. As such heirs, they
became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was predeceased by
Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share, however, passed on to her
daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina
did not prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an entire
property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui
non habet.38
Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina. As co-owners, each of them had full
ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to alienate the
lot but only in so far as the extent of her portion was affected.39
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria and Felipa without the consent of
her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolinas pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and
Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to Carolinas share. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence,
a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only
the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.40
Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa was a valid conveyance but only
insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolinas successors-in-interest to the
property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any superior right in the property than what Carolina is entitled to or
could transfer or alienate after partition.
In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as
the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.41 Hilaria and
Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which has already been effectively bequeathed to
respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest
of Agripinas share in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia took the formers place in the co-ownership and as such coowner, has the right to compel partition at any time.42
The respondents right to demand
for partition is not barred by
acquisitive prescription or laches
The petitioners posit that the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Hilaria and Felipa over Lot No. 707 on
December 11, 1962 was an express repudiation of the co-ownership with respondent Emilia. Considering the period
of time that has already lapsed since then, acquisitive prescription has already set in and the respondent is now
barred by laches from seeking a partition of the subject lot.
The contention is specious.
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent
a clear repudiation of the co ownership.43 The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to
certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.44

The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of Hilaria and Felipa in effecting the registration of the
entire Lot No. 707 in their names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively repudiate the co-ownership. The
respondent built her house on the eastern portion of the lot in 1981 without any opposition from the petitioners. Hilaria
also paid realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the respondent, for the years 1983-1987.45 These events indubitably
show that Hilaria and Felipa failed to assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia. Their acts clearly
manifest that they recognized the subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent Emilia despite the issuance of
TCT No. 42244 in 1962. Their acts constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn negates the
presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the respondent. To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly
appear that one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners
were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged
prescriptive period began to run.46
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was
created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondents undivided share.47 As
trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. In Ringor v. Ringor,48 the Court
had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate the
trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not vest ownership of the land
upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and
vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal in
the performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does not
have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners
cannot rely on the registration of the lands in Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the
wrong result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his coheirs. The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The
intended trust must be sustained.49 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
1wphi1

Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of occupation and possession exercised by
Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only evidence of possession extant
in the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their names for taxation
purposes.50 Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in this case, possession, do not
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot
take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague or uncertain.51
Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be
clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when upon
trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of
the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie.52 The petitioners failed to muster adequate evidence
of possession essential for the reckoning of the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription.
The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on December 11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244 was issued
but in 1994 when Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilias house thus explicitly excluding her from the co-ownership. It
was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa made known their denial of the co-ownership. On the same year, the
respondent instituted the present complaint for partition; hence, the period required by law for acquisitive period to set
in was not met.
Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the period when the co-ownership
was expressly repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.53 More so, laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be

used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name
of another.54
Partition of Lot No. 707
Under the Old Civil Code55 which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas marriage, Lot No. 707 was
their conjugal property.56 When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the surviving
spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership.57 Marcelas rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted to her
legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio.58 Under Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled
only to the usufruct of the lot while the naked ownership belonged to Agripina. When he remarried, Eulalios one half
portion of the lot representing his share in the conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other half were
brought into his second marriage with Faustina.59
When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her share in the conjugal
partnership.60 The remaining were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalios children, Carolina and
Agripina.61 However, Faustina is only entitled to the usufruct of the third available for betterment.62
The usufructuary of Eulalio over the portion inherited by Agripina earlier was merged with her naked
ownership.63 Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which represents her share in the conjugal
partnership and her inheritance from Eulalio were in turn inherited by Carolina64 including Faustinas usufructuary
rights which were merged with Carolinas naked ownership.65
Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8 pertains to Carolina. Thus,
when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8 portion of the subject lot. Since
theDeed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of Agripinas
entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by Agripinas nearest collateral relative,66who,
records show, is her sister Carolina.
In sum, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is entitled to have Lot No. 707
partitioned. The CA judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the above-discussed apportionment of the lot
among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290 dated
December 11, 2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: (1) 3/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain in
equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and Felipa Figuracion-Manuel; (2) portion of Lot. No. 707 shall pertain to Emilia
Figuracion-Gerilla; and (3) 1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate of Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De
Figuracion. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, who is directed
to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject property, as
well as the improvements that lie therein, in the foregoing manner. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more
than three (3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the
property and the proper share appertaining to each co-owner, including the improvements, in accordance with Rule
69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quomay order it assigned to one of
the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the
just share of each co-owner. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

CELESTINO BALUS,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168970

Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

- versus -

SATURNINO
BALUS andLEONARDA
VDA. DE CALUNOD,
Respondents.

BALUS

Promulgated:
January 15, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CAG.R. CV No. 58041 which set aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 3263.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July
6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security
for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The
said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P439(788) and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of
3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang,
Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE.,

along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan
River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by
Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x [2]

Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and
was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for
that purpose.On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale [3] was executed by the
sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period
allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the
sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale [4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new
title was issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of
the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial
Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of
the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they
intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of
Registered
Land[6] was
executed
by
the
Bank
in
favor
of
respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.)
[7]
was issued in the name of respondents.Meanwhile, petitioner continued
possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint [8] for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner
of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the
petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. Respondents
claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of the
case, but to no avail.
On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to
execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of
the property in question, presently possessed by him, and described in
the deed of partition, as follows:

A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of Title No. P788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B.
Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan
City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of
Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by
Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting
of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of
Court is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of
the one-third portion of the land in question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his
share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the
respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the
CA.
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing
and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately
surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that
when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of
a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER
AND
THE
RESPONDENTS
OVER
THE
PROPERTY
PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE

TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE

PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF
BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE
PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY
REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S)
JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.[11]

The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and

respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by
the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually
bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title
over the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still
proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the
intention of purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of
continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a
contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby the
parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by redeeming
or repurchasing the same from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is
the law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a result,
petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the
Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim
his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing
respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the
estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact
that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents'
father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the
parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996.
[12]
Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale [13] was issued in favor of the Bank
on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any
dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6,

1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of
the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.
[14]
In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.[15] In the
present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime,
it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently,
petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became
co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of
petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in
the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and
respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete
determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's
argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which gives
him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by
respondents.
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are
perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to
continue with their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement

would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his
sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what
they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation
of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial
consideration.[16] It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic
construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is
negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.[17] Such intention is
determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[18] Absurd and illogical interpretations
should also be avoided.[19]
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between
him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their ownership of the
subject property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching
the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no
property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their
deceased father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing
with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions in the
present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject
property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank
acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored such
offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to purchase
the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's
offer to re-sell the subject property to him?
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the
time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the subject
property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of
knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents that the mortgage was already
foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the Bank does not
give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners
of the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to
depend on the belief and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence
adduced and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue

their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of
the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention
of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the
petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in
common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting
in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to
enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.[20] In other
words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, [21] an objective
which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by

his wife CEFERINA DE PALMAFELICIANO, ANGELINA DE LEON,
representing the heirs of ESTEBAN
FELICIANO, TRINIDAD VALIENTE,
AND BASILIA TRINIDAD, represented
by her son DOMINADOR T.
FELICIANO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 161746

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus PEDRO
CANOZA,
DELIA Promulgated:
FELICIANO,ROSAURO FELICIANO,
ELSA FELICIANO AND PONCIANO September 1, 2010
FELICIANO,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision[1] dated June 26, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated January 15, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61888. The CA had reversed the
Decision[3] dated August 3, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 819-M-93 and dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground of prescription.
The facts are as follows:
When Antonio Feliciano passed away on May 20, 1930, he left behind his
only property, a parcel of land located at Bunga [4] Mayor, Bustos, Bulacan. The
land had an area of 1,125 square meters and was evidenced by Tax Declaration No.
1402[5] in his name. On March 28, 1972, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina, all
surnamed Feliciano, declared themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Antonio
Feliciano, with the exception of Salina. They executed an extrajudicial settlement

of Antonio Felicianos estate[6]and appropriated among themselves the said parcel of

land, to the exclusion of the heirs of Esteban Feliciano and Doroteo Feliciano,
deceased children of Antonio Feliciano.On even date, Leona, Maria, Pedro
and Salina executed a deed of absolute sale or Kasulatan sa Ganap Na
Bilihan over the property in favor of the late Jacinto Feliciano (Pedros portion),
Felisa Feliciano (Salinas portion) and Pedro Canoza (Leona and Marias portions).[7]
During his lifetime, Jacinto Feliciano applied for a free patent over the
portion of land he bought, declaring that the same was a public land, first occupied
and cultivated by Pedro Feliciano.[8] Jacinto was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4)
012293 on November 28, 1977[9] and the same was forwarded to the Register of
Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan, but unfortunately, it was burned on March 7,
1987. Pedro Canoza, for his part, also applied for a free patent over the portion of
land which he bought, claiming that the same was public land, first occupied and
cultivated by Leona and Maria Feliciano.[10] He was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4)
012292, now covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-364,
[11]
on February 23, 1979.
On October 18, 1993, Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina Feliciano-de Leon,
surviving heirs of the late Esteban Feliciano, and Trinidad Feliciano-Valiente and
Basilia Feliciano-Trinidad, surviving children of the late Doroteo Feliciano, filed a
complaint[12] against Salina Feliciano, Felisa Feliciano, Pedro Canoza and the heirs
of the late Jacinto Feliciano, namely Delia, Rosauro, Elsa, Nardo and Ponciano, all
surnamed Feliciano, for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title,
Recovery of Real Property and Damages. They alleged that the settlement of the
estate and sale were done without their participation and consent as heirs of
Esteban and Doroteo. Likewise, they averred that the ancestral home of the
Felicianos is erected on the subject property and that they have occupied the same
since birth. Canoza and Jacinto falsely declared that the property was not occupied,
so their titles to the property should be declared null and void on the ground that
they have made false statements in their respective applications for free patent.
On November 4, 1993, before an Answer could be filed, the petitioners
amended their complaint to include the allegation that they sought to recover the
shares of their fathers, Esteban and Doroteo, which they could have acquired as
heirs of Antonio Feliciano.[13]
In their Answer,[14] respondent Pedro Canoza and his spouse, respondent
Delia Feliciano, alleged that they were buyers in good faith and for value. They

likewise contended that assuming that there was preterition of legal heirs, they
never took part in it. As affirmative defenses, they alleged that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action; the lower court had no jurisdiction as the subject of the
case were free patents and therefore prior exhaustion of administrative remedies
was required; the case was prematurely filed; no effort was exerted towards a
settlement; plaintiffs right has prescribed; Eugenio Feliciano was a mere squatter
who should be ordered to vacate; the deed of sale was validly, genuinely and duly
executed; Eugenio and Angelina were guilty of misleading the court because there
were other heirs who were indispensable parties but who were not included; and
Presidential Decree No. 1508 or the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law was
not resorted to by plaintiffs.
Respondents Rosauro Feliciano, Elsa Feliciano and Ponciano Feliciano
likewise filed an Answer[15] containing the same allegations and defenses as
respondents Pedro Canoza and Delia Feliciano. The other defendants, Salina
Feliciano, Felisa Feliciano and Nardo Feliciano were declared in default.
On August 3, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Declaring the extra-judicial settlement of estate of Antonio Feliciano
null and void;
2. Declaring the sale of the property in question to Pedro Canoza,
Felisa Feliciano and Jacinto Feliciano null and void;
3. Declaring the original certificate of Title No. 364 in the name of
Pedro Canoza and the certificates of titles in the name of defendants
over Lot 1874-Cad-344, Bustos Cadastre (Tax Declaration No. 1402)
as null and void;
4. Ordering defendants to reconvey ownership and possession of said
property to plaintiffs subject to a just and equitable partition thereof
by and between all interested parties.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[16]

The trial court explained that by operation of law, the plaintiffs (herein
petitioners) have as much right as Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina Feliciano to
inherit the property in question, and they cannot be deprived of their right unless
by disinheritance for causes set forth in the law. When Leona Feliciano, Pedro
Feliciano, Maria Feliciano and Salina Feliciano appropriated the disputed lot solely
to themselves through the extrajudicial settlement of estate, they committed a
fraudulent act. To the extent that Doroteo and Esteban were deprived of their
rightful share, the said out-of-court settlement was annullable, said the trial
court. The trial court also declared that Pedro Canoza was not a buyer in good faith
of Leona and Marias shares. Records show that Pedro Canozas live-in partner,
Delia Feliciano, was a relative of the petitioners and the other defendants; thus, he
could be reasonably charged with the knowledge of petitioners status vis--vis the
subject property. The acquisition by Canoza and Jacinto Feliciano of free patent
titles over portions of the contested lot also did not legitimize their ownership
thereof, as they acquired no greater rights over the property than their
predecessors-in-interest, having merely stepped into their shoes.[17]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA with the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF ANTONIO FELICIANO (EXHIBIT B)
[;]
II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF ANTONIO FELICIANO
(EXHIBIT B)[;]
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF
SALE (EXHIBIT C) IN FAVOR OF JACINTO FELICIANO, FELISA
FELICIANO AND PEDRO CANOZA[;]
IV. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DECLARING O.C.T. NO. 364 IN THE NAME OF PEDRO
CANOZA AND CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF DEFENDANTS AS
NULL AND VOID[; AND]
V. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO RECONVEY
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO

PLAINTIFFS SUBJECT TO A JUST AND EQUITABLE PARTITION

THEREOF BY AND BETWEEN ALL INTERESTED PARTIES.[18]

On June 26, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
reversing the trial courts decision. The CA held,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 3, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 (XI), Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case
No. 819-M-93 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and plaintiffsappellees complaint is ordered DISMISSED for being time-barred.
SO ORDERED.[19]

The CA ruled that prescription had set in, citing the case of Pedrosa v. Court of
Appeals,[20] which held that the applicable prescriptive period to annul a deed of
extrajudicial settlement is four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. It
reasoned that when petitioners filed the instant complaint for the annulment of the
extrajudicial settlement of Antonio Felicianos estate, more than four (4) years had
elapsed from the issuance of the free patents. As regards the portion claimed by the
late Jacinto Feliciano, sixteen (16) years had elapsed from the time the free patent
was issued to him before petitioners filed the complaint, while in the case of
Canoza, fourteen (14) years had elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in
Canozas favor. Hence, according to the CA, the action for the annulment of the
documents had prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it
was denied by the CA in the Resolution dated January 15, 2004 for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN GRANTING THE APPEAL BY ORDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION HAS NOT BEEN RAISED
ON APPEAL AS AN ISSUE, NOR ASSIGNED AS AN ERROR, NOR
DEFINED IN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS AMONG THE ISSUES
TO BE RESOLVED;

B. ASSUMING THAT PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION MAY BE

TAKEN AS A GROUND FOR DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
EVEN IF NOT RAISED ON APPEAL, NOR ASSIGNED AS AMONG
THE ERRORS COMMITTED, THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACTION PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS, OR IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE ACTION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE;
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT.[21]

Essentially, the issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in reversing
the trial courts decision.
Petitioners allege that the CA gravely erred in granting the appeal and in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription of action because that issue
was never raised on appeal, nor defined as one (1) of the issues outlined and
limited in the pre-trial order.
We do not agree.
While respondents have not assigned the defense of prescription in their appeal
before the CA, they raised such defense in their December 1, 1993 Answer as one
(1) of their affirmative defenses.[22] In their brief before the CA, respondents
specifically prayed for the reliefs mentioned in their respective answers before the
trial court. Thus, by reference, they are deemed to have adopted the defense of
prescription, and could not properly be said to have waived the defense of
prescription.
Moreover, Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure , as amended,
provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the action is already barred by the statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss
the claim. Thus, in Gicano v. Gegato,[23] we held:
We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss
an action on the ground of prescription when the parties pleadings or
other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred x x x; and it may
do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up
such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged
after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even

if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof
is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in
default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating
the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record: either in the averments of the
plaintiffs
complaint,
or
otherwise
established
by
the
evidence. (Underscoring supplied.)

But did the CA nonetheless commit error when it held that the applicable
prescriptive period is four (4) years?
Petitioners argue that the CA erroneously treated the action they filed at the trial
court as one (1) for annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and applied the four
(4)-year prescriptive period in dismissing the same. They contend that the action
they filed was one (1) for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles, Recovery
of Real Property and Damages, and as such, their action was imprescriptible
pursuant to Article 1410[24] of the Civil Code.
Respondents, for their part, maintain that the CA did not err in holding that the
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of the partition and did not consent thereto, is merely fraudulent
and not void. They stress that the action to rescind the partition based on fraud
prescribes in four (4) years counted from the date of registration, which is
constructive notice to the whole world.
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and
Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the
other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the said deed was
fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of
their shares in the estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious.[25] Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud
could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however,
must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
In Gerona v. De Guzman,[26] respondents therein executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement declaring themselves to be the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman. They secured new transfer certificates of title in their own names, thereby
excluding the petitioners therein from the estate of the deceased. The petitioners

brought an action for the annulment of the said deed upon the ground that the same
is tainted with fraud. The Court held,
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of
extra-judicial settlement upon the ground of fraud in the execution
thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24,
1959). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on
June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds
and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement
constitute constructive notice to the whole world. [27] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the
deed of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of
fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.[28] However, the records show
that petitioners complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen
(16) years after Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293
on November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the time Pedro
Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 onNovember 28, 1979. As petitioners are
deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon the registration of
the Free Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil action within the
allowable period. The same result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one
(1) essentially for reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since
petitioners cause of action accrued. The CA committed no error in dismissing their
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated June 26, 2003 and Resolution dated January 15, 2004, of the Court
of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No. 61888 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183852

October 20, 2010

CARMELA BROBIO MANGAHAS, Petitioner,

vs.
EUFROCINA A. BROBIO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated February 21, 2008,
which dismissed petitioners action to enforce payment of a promissory note issued by respondent, and
Resolution2 dated July 9, 2008, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The case arose from the following facts:
On January 10, 2002, Pacifico S. Brobio (Pacifico) died intestate, leaving three parcels of land. He was survived by
his wife, respondent Eufrocina A. Brobio, and four legitimate and three illegitimate children; petitioner Carmela Brobio
Mangahas is one of the illegitimate children.
On May 12, 2002, the heirs of the deceased executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late
Pacifico Brobio with Waiver. In the Deed, petitioner and Pacificos other children, in consideration of their love and
affection for respondent and the sum of P150,000.00, waived and ceded their respective shares over the three
parcels of land in favor of respondent. According to petitioner, respondent promised to give her an additional amount
for her share in her fathers estate. Thus, after the signing of the Deed, petitioner demanded from respondent the
promised additional amount, but respondent refused to pay, claiming that she had no more money.3
A year later, while processing her tax obligations with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent was required
to submit an original copy of the Deed. Left with no more original copy of the Deed, respondent summoned petitioner
to her office on May 31, 2003 and asked her to countersign a copy of the Deed. Petitioner refused to countersign the
document, demanding that respondent first give her the additional amount that she promised. Considering the value
of the three parcels of land (which she claimed to be worth P20M), petitioner asked for P1M, but respondent begged
her to lower the amount. Petitioner agreed to lower it to P600,000.00. Because respondent did not have the money at
that time and petitioner refused to countersign the Deed without any assurance that the amount would be paid,
respondent executed a promissory note. Petitioner agreed to sign the Deed when respondent signed the promissory
note which read
31 May 2003
This is to promise that I will give a Financial Assistance to CARMELA B. MANGAHAS the amount of P600,000.00 Six
Hundred Thousand only on June 15, 2003.
(SGD)
EUFROCINA A. BROBIO4
When the promissory note fell due, respondent failed and refused to pay despite demand. Petitioner made several
more demands upon respondent but the latter kept on insisting that she had no money.
On January 28, 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages5 against respondent,
alleging in part
2. That plaintiff and defendant are legal heirs of the deceased, Pacifico S. Brobio[,] who died intestate and
leaving without a will, on January 10, 2002, but leaving several real and personal properties (bank deposits),

and some of which were the subject of the extra-judicial settlement among them, compulsory heirs of the
deceased, Pacifico Brobio. x x x.
3. That in consideration of the said waiver of the plaintiff over the listed properties in the extra-judicial
settlement, plaintiff received the sum of P150,000.00, and the defendant executed a "Promissory Note" on
June 15, 2003, further committing herself to give plaintiff a financial assistance in the amount
ofP600,000.00. x x x.
4. That on its due date, June 15, 2003, defendant failed to make good of her promise of delivering to the
plaintiff the sum of P600,000.00 pursuant to her "Promissory Note" dated May 31, 2003, and despite
repeated demands, defendant had maliciously and capriciously refused to deliver to the plaintiff the amount
[of] P600,000.00, and the last of which demands was on October 29, 2003. x x x.6
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,7 respondent admitted that she signed the promissory note but claimed
that she was forced to do so. She also claimed that the undertaking was not supported by any consideration. More
specifically, she contended that
10. Defendant was practically held "hostage" by the demand of the plaintiff. At that time, defendant was so
much pressured and was in [a] hurry to submit the documents to the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of
the deadline set and for fear of possible penalty if not complied with. Defendant pleaded understanding but
plaintiff was adamant. Her hand could only move in exchange for 1 million pesos.
11. Defendant, out of pressure and confused disposition, was constrained to make a promissory note in a
reduced amount in favor of the plaintiff. The circumstances in the execution of the promissory note were
obviously attended by involuntariness and the same was issued without consideration at all or for illegal
consideration.8
On May 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The RTC found that the
alleged "pressure and confused disposition" experienced by respondent and the circumstances that led to the
execution of the promissory note do not constitute undue influence as would vitiate respondents consent thereto. On
the contrary, the RTC observed that
It is clear from all the foregoing that it is the defendant who took improper advantage of the plaintiffs trust and
confidence in her by resorting to a worthless written promise, which she was intent on reneging. On the other hand,
plaintiff did not perform an unlawful conduct when she insisted on a written commitment from the defendant, as
embodied in the promissory note in question, before affixing her signature that was asked of her by the defendant
because, as already mentioned, that was the only opportunity available to her or which suddenly and unexpectedly
presented itself to her in order to press her demand upon the defendant to satisfy the correct amount of consideration
due to her. In other words, as the defendant had repeatedly rebuffed her plea for additional consideration by claiming
lack of money, it is only natural for the plaintiff to seize the unexpected opportunity that suddenly presented itself in
order to compel the defendant to give to her [what is] due [her]. And by executing the promissory note which the
defendant had no intention of honoring, as testified to by her, the defendant clearly acted in bad faith and took
advantage of the trust and confidence that plaintiff had reposed in her.9
The RTC also brushed aside respondents claim that the promissory note was not supported by valuable
consideration. The court maintained that the promissory note was an additional consideration for the waiver of
petitioners share in the three properties in favor of respondent. Its conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the
promissory note was executed after negotiation and haggling between the parties. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) which
she committed to pay to plaintiff under the promissory note in question, plus interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum computed from the date of the filing of the complaint;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 21, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint.11 The CA found that there
was a complete absence of consideration in the execution of the promissory note, which made it inexistent and
without any legal force and effect. The court noted that "financial assistance" was not the real reason why respondent
executed the promissory note, but only to secure petitioners signature. The CA held that the waiver of petitioners
share in the three properties, as expressed in the deed of extrajudicial settlement, may not be considered as the
consideration of the promissory note, considering that petitioner signed the Deed way back in 2002 and she had
already received the consideration of P150,000.00 for signing the same. The CA went on to hold that if petitioner
disagreed with the amount she received, then she should have filed an action for partition.
Further, the CA found that intimidation attended the signing of the promissory note. Respondent needed the Deed
countersigned by petitioner in order to comply with a BIR requirement; and, with petitioners refusal to sign the said
document, respondent was forced to sign the promissory note to assure petitioner that the money promised to her
would be paid.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision. In a Resolution dated July 9, 2008, the CA denied
petitioners motion.12
In this petition for review, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in the appreciation of the facts of this case when it found that
intimidation attended the execution of the promissory note subject of this case.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it found that the promissory note was without consideration.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it stated that petitioner should have filed [an action] for
partition instead of a case for specific performance.13
The petition is meritorious.
Contracts are voidable where consent thereto is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud. In determining whether consent is vitiated by any of these circumstances, courts are given a wide latitude in
weighing the facts or circumstances in a given case and in deciding in favor of what they believe actually occurred,
considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship, and conduct of the parties at the time of the
execution of the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private
writing.14
Nowhere is it alleged that mistake, violence, fraud, or intimidation attended the execution of the promissory note. Still,
respondent insists that she was "forced" into signing the promissory note because petitioner would not sign the
document required by the BIR. In one case, the Court in characterizing a similar argument by respondents therein
held that such allegation is tantamount to saying that the other party exerted undue influence upon them. However,
the Court said that the fact that respondents were "forced" to sign the documents does not amount to vitiated
consent.15

There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the
latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.16 For undue influence to be present, the influence exerted must have so
overpowered or subjugated the mind of a contracting party as to destroy his free agency, making him express the will
of another rather than his own.17
Respondent may have desperately needed petitioners signature on the Deed, but there is no showing that she was
deprived of free agency when she signed the promissory note. Being forced into a situation does not amount to
vitiated consent where it is not shown that the party is deprived of free will and choice. Respondent still had a choice:
she could have refused to execute the promissory note and resorted to judicial means to obtain petitioners signature.
Instead, respondent chose to execute the promissory note to obtain petitioners signature, thereby agreeing to pay
the amount demanded by petitioner.
The fact that respondent may have felt compelled, under the circumstances, to execute the promissory note will not
negate the voluntariness of the act. As rightly observed by the trial court, the execution of the promissory note in the
amount of P600,000.00 was, in fact, the product of a negotiation between the parties. Respondent herself testified
that she bargained with petitioner to lower the amount:
ATTY. VILLEGAS:
Q And is it not that there was even a bargaining from P1-M to P600,000.00 before you prepare[d] and
[sign[ed] that promissory note marked as Exhibit "C"?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact, you were the one [who] personally wrote the amount of P600,000.00 only as indicated in the
said promissory note?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q So, just to clarify. Carmela was asking an additional amount of P1-M for her to sign this document but you
negotiated with her and asked that it be lowered to P600,000.00 to which she agreed, is that correct?
A Yes, Your Honor. Napilitan na po ako.
Q But you negotiated and asked for its reduction from P1-M to P600,000.00?
A Yes, Your Honor.18
Contrary to the CAs findings, the situation did not amount to intimidation that vitiated consent. There is intimidation
when one of the contracting parties is compelled to give his consent by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants, or
ascendants.19 Certainly, the payment of penalties for delayed payment of taxes would not qualify as a "reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil."
1awphil

We join the RTC in holding that courts will not set aside contracts merely because solicitation, importunity, argument,
persuasion, or appeal to affection was used to obtain the consent of the other party. Influence obtained by persuasion
or argument or by appeal to affection is not prohibited either in law or morals and is not obnoxious even in courts of
equity.20

On the issue that the promissory note is void for not being supported by a consideration, we likewise disagree with
the CA.
A contract is presumed to be supported by cause or consideration.21 The presumption that a contract has sufficient
consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. To overcome the presumption,
the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence.22 The burden to prove lack of
consideration rests upon whoever alleges it, which, in the present case, is respondent.
Respondent failed to prove that the promissory note was not supported by any consideration. From her testimony and
her assertions in the pleadings, it is clear that the promissory note was issued for a cause or consideration, which, at
the very least, was petitioners signature on the document.
1avvphi1

It may very well be argued that if such was the consideration, it was inadequate. Nonetheless, even if the
consideration is inadequate, the contract would not be invalidated, unless there has been fraud, mistake, or undue
influence.23 As previously stated, none of these grounds had been proven present in this case.
The foregoing discussion renders the final issue insignificant. Be that as it may, we would like to state that the remedy
suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the circumstances. An action for partition implies that the property is
still owned in common.24 Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and
waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is
nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA Decision dated February 21, 2008 and its Resolution dated July 9, 2008
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC decision dated May 15, 2006 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014
CARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner, v. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. AND MARILOU P. EMBOY
DELANTAR, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and
Marilou EmboyDelantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No.
CEB33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding
the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.
Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907A2 (subject lot) of the
subdivision plan Psd165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T
174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907A,8 which was
partitioned in the following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion): 9

Lot No.
1907A1
1907A2

TCT No.
T54359
T54360

1907A3
1907A4
1907A5

T54361
T54362
T54363

Heirs
Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla
Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente),
namely: (1) Azucena Padilla, married
to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla
(Remedios), married to Oscar Dimay;
(3) Veronica Padilla (Veronica);10 and
(4) Moreno Padilla (Moreno), married
to Teresita Curso (Teresita)
Cresencio Padilla
Fructousa Baricuatro
Claudia PadillaEmboy (Claudia)

A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother,
Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907A. They had
thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents,
Carlos and Asuncion.11

In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to
transfer to Lot No. 1907A5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply insisting that Claudias inheritance
pertained to Lot No. 1907A2.12
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencitas counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated
February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita had already purchased on
February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the formers relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they
examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the
execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a
complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs respective portions of Lot No. 1907
A.14
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin
of the instant petition. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, 15 the registered
owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successorin
interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the
same.16
The MTCC upheld Carmencitas claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The respondents were ordered to vacate
the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable
to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorneys fees.17
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling. 18
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review19 filed before the CA.
The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades. Carmencita,
on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on
the subject lots title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents
institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20the respondents emphasized
that even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical
or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment.21 The respondents also
invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action anchored on the issue of ownership
justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar
where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of ownership would
necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer,
bore telltale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Parejas demand letter sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of sale
dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a
signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among the
vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a codefendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered the following
year after its supposed execution.
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically
occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencitas claim that the respondents possession of the subject lot was
by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in an old wooden chest in their
ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an Agreement,23dated February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his
spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the
Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907A as a collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have
been executed in order to be fair to Vicentes siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership
rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
The respondents also averred that Carmencitas complaint lacked a cause of action. The certification to file an action was issued by
the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencitas brother, who had no real rights or interests over the
subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no
demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally
defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the oneyear period within which the suit can be filed.
In support of the respondents prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their loss would be irreparable.
Moreover, the resolution of the respondents petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907A, in which Carmencita was
likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the event that the latters complaint for unlawful detainer would be
granted and the formers ancestral house demolished.
The Ruling of the CA
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing
Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived
of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to

hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained inSarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible
entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers
on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant
is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of
the last demand.
A close perusal of [Carmencitas] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but
essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the
respondents] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents] entered the
land and constructed a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the respondents] possession became legal before
[Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot
[the respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded [for the
respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the
land for several decades already. There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencitas] predecessors tolerated [the
respondents] possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied, between [the
respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the respondents] possession of
the land as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that
[the respondents] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencitas] predecessorsininterest did not
yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. Take note that [Carmencitas] predecessorsininterest merely
stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also coheirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one
constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession
which he later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accionpubliciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:
For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for
more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. Although admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim
ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual
possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party
in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if
he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
In Carmencitas Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the case ofSarmiento cited by the respondents is
not applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the subject of an accion
reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at
bar. InRivera, the contending parties were each others relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior
physical possession by the complainant is not necessary.27 Instead, what is required is a better right of possession. Further, the
MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencitas Motion for Reconsideration.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
I
Whether or not Carmencitas complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful
detainer.
II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907A and for the issuance of new
certificates of title can abate Carmencitas ejectment suit.
Carmencitas Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the

registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty.
Pareja, in Carmencitas behalf, demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents refusal to comply with the demand
turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose
recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack 28 and the issue of ownership cannot be
resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of ownership of a piece of real property will not
abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs. 29
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA30 that the registered owner of a property is
entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation of a property not by its registered owner
but by others depends on the formers tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand,
failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper.32
The Respondents Arguments
In their Comment to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer was
fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the
respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents possessed the property by mere
tolerance with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand
by the owners.34 In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.
33

In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership are inseparably linked in the case at
bar. Carmencitas complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is already the subject of the respondents
petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907A.
Our Disquisition
The instant petition lacks merit.
Carmencita had not amply alleged
and proven that all the requisites for
unlawful detainer are present in the
case at bar.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper
judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.37
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property,
viz:
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(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico)
[sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in
unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial
court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from
the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court
when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession
of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the
forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand,accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. 39 (Citations omitted)
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:

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(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or

by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and

deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 40
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and
when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about
the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. 42
Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents initial occupation
of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully
withholding the subject lots possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to
vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the
respondents claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short,
the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44
As an exception to the general rule, the respondents petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907A can
abate Carmencitas suit for unlawful detainer.
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:

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As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of
ejectment proceedings. The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to
delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses
in the ejectment action and there resolved.
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de
Legaspi v. Avendao, wherein the Court declared:
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x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the
plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less
productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court
in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary
injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in
the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter
of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the
fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any
attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
xxxx
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit;
thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda.
de Legaspi, the respondents suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of
petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and
expenses mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by
physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming
ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by
proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably
irreparable.
We should stress that respondents claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but
allegedly on mere tolerance. Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under
the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case. 45 (Citations omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G.
Tuquero in CAG.R. No. 43611SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:
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ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory that petitioners possession of
the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners
categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are owners of the premises we are
occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite. In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership
as well that is involved in this case.[]

TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who
is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.[]
THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal of the petitioners house
[from] the lot in question.[]
To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners house prior to the determination of the
question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands.46 (Citation omitted)
We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for reasons discussed hereunder.
Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the
subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot
and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907A, in
which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencitas complaint be granted, the
respondents house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing
circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer. As discussed
above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven.
Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her ownership
claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their
house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907A, where ownership over
the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued
on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 03489 areAFFIRMED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. P-12-3069

January 20, 2014

ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA, Complainant,

vs.
ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct and Making Untruthful Statements filed by Atty. Virgilio
P. Alconera against Alfredo Pallanan, Sheriff IV, assigned at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 in General
Santos City.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant was the counsel for Morito Rafols, the defendant in Civil Case No. 5967-2, an unlawful detainer case
entitled Cua Beng a.k.a. Manuel Sy and Ka Kieng v. Morita Rafols, et al., filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 in General Santos City, South Cotabato. After trial, the MTCC ruled against Rafols and his
co-defendants in a Judgment dated March 12, 2009, disposing as follows:
1

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant MORITO RAFOLS,
his privies, assigns, heirs, transferee, sublessee. co-Jessee or agents if any to vacate from the subject lots and
deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs and for defendant to pay back rentals of P5,000.00 per month from June
2008 and every succeeding months thereafter until he vacate the premises and to jointly and severally, together with
all other defendants, pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 with the other defendants and costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, Rafols, through complainant Alconera, appealed the case to the RTC, Branch 36, docketed as Civil Case
No. 675. Pending appeal, the court issued an Order dated February 18, 2011 granting Cua Bengs motion for
execution she filed in Civil Case No. 5967-2, the unlawful detainer case. Alconera sought reconsideration but the
motion was denied through another Order dated March 14, 2011.
2

On March 17, 2011, a troubled Evelyn Rafols, Rafols daughter-in-law, called up Alconera, who at that time was in
Manila, to report that the sheriff, respondent Pallanan, was about to implement the adverted writ of execution. Evelyn
Rafols informed Alconera that respondent sheriff arrived along with the lawyer of the opposing party and 30 other
men to enforce the writ. Respondent sheriff then allegedly demanded payment of PhP 720,000 to settle Rafols
obligation to which the latter protested on the ground that the amount is too exorbitant when they have been
religiously depositing monthly rentals in court to satisfy the judgment.

After explaining the matter to Alconera, Evelyn Rafols passed her phone to respondent sheriff. Over the phone, a
verbal disagreement between the two ensued. Alconera claims that he has a pending motion for reconsideration on
the issuance of the writ of execution, but the respondent said that the motion has already been denied. And since no
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) has been issued enjoining the implementation, respondent claimed that he is
legally mandated to perform his ministerial duty of enforcing the writ. Complainant countered that he has not yet
received a copy of the denial of the motion, rendering the execution premature and, at the same time, preventing him
from securing a TRO from the higher courts. Nevertheless, respondent still pushed through with the execution of the
judgment.
On March 18, 2011, complainant returned to General Santos City and, at his law office, found a copy of the Order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration, which was only served that very same day. The RTC ruled that there was no
pending Motion to Approve Supersedeas Bond filed with it. Instead, what was filed not with the RTC but with the
MTCC was a "NOTICE OF APPEAL and MOTION TO APPROVE PROPERTY SUPERSEDEAS BOND," which
was not granted.
That afternoon, Alconera went to RTC Br. 36 with his daughter to confront respondent sheriff. The face-off escalated
into a heated argument caught on video. It was complainants daughter, Shyla Mae Zapanta, who is coincidentally his
office clerk, who filmed the incident and transcribed the dialogue during the altercation. As hereunder translated in
English, the exchanges went:
ATTY. ALCONERA: Pag hatod nimo didto sa demolition order, kabalo ka na wala pa ko kadawat ug denial? (When
you served the demolition order, you know that I did not yet receive a copy of the denial order?)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Denial sa unsa, motion? (Denial of what, motion?)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Oo. (Yes.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Attorney, ang motion inyoha nang kuan diri sa korte, and akoa sa writ ko. As long as the sheriff
did not receive a TRO or any order from the court restraining him to implement the writ, I have to go. So in case, just
in case, na may resolution si judge na ireconsider and iyang order after they declare, ideliver na sa area kung asa giexecute so the sheriff will move out. (Attorney, the motion, that is your what do you call this, here in court. Mine is
the writ. As long as the sheriff did not receive a TRO or any order from the court restraining him to implement the writ,
I have to go. So in case, just in case, the judge reconsiders his order, they will declare, deliver it to the area where the
writ if executed so the sheriff will move out.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Mo execute diay ka? Dili diay ka mangutana kung duna pa bay motion for recon ani? (So you will
execute? You will not inquire whether a motion for reconsideration has been filed?)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Bisag may motion for recon na, Attorney, I have to go gyud. (Even if there is a motion for
reconsideration, I really have to go.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Uy, di man na ingon ana, uy! Ana imong natun-an as sheriff?
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo mao na sya. Mao na sya sa akoa ha, mao na sya. (Yes, that is it. That is it to me ha,
that is it.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Kita ra ta sa Supreme Court ani. (Let us see each other in the Supreme Court.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: (unintelligible) Ang imoha anaimong motion ana and imong motion ana, delaying tactic.
(Your motion is a delaying tactic.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Ah, sige lang, atubang lang ta sa Supreme Court. (Ok, lets just see each other in the Supreme
Court.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, atubangon nako ko na siya, pero mag-review pud ka.
ATTY. ALCONERA: Unsay mag-review? (What review?)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Motion nang imoha, Dong. (Yours is motion, Dong.) ("Dong" is equivalent to the Filipino term
"Totoy"; if used by one to address someone older than him, it is an insult.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Naunsa man ka, Dong. (What happened to you, Dong?)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Motion na imoha Dapat diri ka mag file, dili ka didto mag-file. Ayaw ko awaya. (Yours is
motion. You should file it here, you do not file it there. Dont quarrel with me.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Lahi imong tono sa akoa sa telepono Dong ba. (You were rude in the telephone, Dong.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, kay lain man pud ka mag sulti. Ang imong venue kay diri, dili sa area. (Yes, because you
also talked bad, your venue is here in court, not in the area.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Ingon nako sa imo nakadawat ka ba.. nakadawat ba ug (I was just asking you whether you
received)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Dili nako na concern. (That is not my concern.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: O, ngano nag ingon man ka nga "Ayaw ko diktahe, Attorney?" (Why did you say, "Dont dictate on
me, Attorney?")
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Yes, do not dictate me. Kay abogado ka, sheriff ko. Lahi tag venue. Trabaho akoa,
magtrabaho pud ka. (Yes, do not dictate me. Because you are a lawyer, and I am a sheriff. I do my job, you do yours.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Bastos kaayo ka manulti ba. (You are very rude!)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Ikaw ang bastos! (You are the one who is rude!)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Magkita ta sa Supreme Court. (I will see you in the Supreme Court.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Magkita ta, eh! Ikaw lang akong hadlukan nga wala man ka sa area. (As you wish, I am not
afraid of you, you were not in the area.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Unsa nang inyong style diri, Kempeta? (What is your style here, Kempetai?)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Dili man! Na may order. Why cant you accept? (No! There is an order. Why cant you accept?)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Naay proseso, Dong. Mao ning proseso: ang MR, proseso ang MR. (There is a process, Dong.
This is the process: MR.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, proseso pud na ang akong pagimplement. Naay writ. (Yes, my implementing the writ is
also a process. There is a writ.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Nabuang, ka Dong? (What is going on with you, Dong?)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Ka dugay na nimo nga abogado, wala ka kabalo! (You have been a lawyer for a long time
now, yet you do not know!)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Dugay na bitaw. Ikaw bago ka lang na sheriff. (Yes, I have been a lawyer for a long time now,
you, you are new in your job as sheriff).
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Pero kabalo ko. (But I know.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Susmaryosep!
SHERIFF PALLANAN: O, di ba? Wala sa padugayay. Naa sa kahibalo. (Isnt that true? It is not the length of time one
has spent on his job. It is the knowledge that one possesses.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Tanawa imong pagka sheriff, Dong. (Know you job as a sheriff, Dong.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Tanawa pud imong pagka abogado kung sakto. Pilde! Sige mo pangulekta didto ibayad sa
imo! (Know your job also as a lawyer, see if you are correct. Loser! You [and the Rafols] are always collecting [from
the other defendants] so your fees can be paid!)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Ngano wala man lagi nimo kuhaa ang mga butang didto, Dong? (Why did you not bring with you
the things that you had gathered, Dong.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, kay hulaton ta ka pag demotion. (Yes, because I will wait for you on demotion day.)
ATTY. ALCONERA: Nahadlok ka, Dong. (You were afraid, Dong.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Wala ko nahadlok, Doy. Sa demotion adto didto, Attorney. Sulayi ko! Sulayan nato imong
pagkaabogado! (Im not afraid of you, Doy. On demotion day, you go there, Attorney. You try me! Let us see how good
a lawyer you are.) ("Doy" is the same as "Dong.")
ATTY. ALCONERA: March 22 pa ang hearing sa imong abogado, Dong. (The hearing of the motion of your lawyer, is
on March 22 yet, Dong.)
SHERIFF PALLANAN: Asus, Pinobre na imong style, Attorney. Bulok! (Your style is that of an impoverished lawyer,
Attorney. Dullard!)
It is against the foregoing backdrop of events that Alconera filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent sheriff
for grave misconduct before this Court on April 6, 2011. The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) and was docketed as AM No. 11-3634-P. As directed by the OCA, respondent filed his comment. In it, he
averred that the duty of a court sheriff in enforcing a writ of execution is ministerial, and without a TRO enjoining it, a
sheriff is duty bound to implement it.
3

On July 14, 2011, respondent filed his own Affidavit of Complaint against herein complainant for Grave Misconduct
and for violating the Code of Ethics. Respondent alleged that during the enforcement of the writ, a second phone
conversation took place. Complainant allegedly called up Evelyn Rafols who put him on loudspeaker for the
respondent to hear his words. Alconera then allegedly made a threat that there will be bloodshed if respondents party
pushes through with the implementation of the writ. Respondent likewise claimed that complainant berated him at his
office on March 18, 2011 and that the incident was orchestrated by the complainant. His (respondent sheriffs)
complaint affidavit avers:
5

6. GRAVE MISCONDUCT OF ATTY. VIRGILIO ALCONERA The planned attack happened in our office on March
18, 2011 in the afternoon, after lunch, in the presence of his lady companion (believed to [be] his daughter), who is so
delighted in taking videos. He is so angry and at rage as if he is the boss in our office, yelling and nagging at me with
NO RESPECT as a nomad. THE ONLY PERSON AROUND WAS ME, THE GIRL HE BROUGHT THERE (who is
taking videos), AND THE NAGGING ATTY. VIRGILIO ALCONERA (JUST THREE OF US), while pointing his finger
into his MOTION for Reconsideration that he is holding [sic] almost an inch to my face. Saying "KITA NIMO NI, KITA
NIMO NI?" NA INSULTO KO NIMO NGANO WALA KA NI PATOO NAKO PAYLAN TAKA UG KASO HULATA SA
SUPREME COURT! (DO YOU SEE THIS? DO YOU SEE THIS? YOU INSULTED ME WHY DID YOU NOT FOLLOW
MY ORDER I WILL FILE CHARGES AGAINST YOU WAIT FOR IT IN THE SUPREME COURT!) HE wants me to
shiver in scare and expect me to beg. No, GO I said. I ALWAYS REPEATED THE WORDS "WHERE IS YOUR T.R.O.
Just present it." Because he is too loud, Mrs. Nenita Paredes, our stenographer, ARRIVED and middle on us our
arguments. On the mid part of the arguments, he recorded the events; he and his companion, cohort in designing the
plan of the attack, orchestrated it. ITS AN ASSAULT TO THE OFFICER OF THE LAW. He told me SHERIFF KA
LANG WALA KAY NABAL AN. NGANON NADAWAT MAN KA DIRI BOGO KA. (YOU ARE JUST A SHERIFF. WHAT
DO YOU KNOW? WHY ARE YOU ADMITTED HERE YOU DUMB, WHO TAUGHT YOU THAT?) Ana mo diri
IPINATAY! KINSA NAG TUDLO SA IMOHA ANA. While he almost struck his motion papers into my face, I was caught
unaware.
In view of respondents counter-charge, Alconera supplemented his affidavit-complaint to include a charge against
the former for False Testimony. Complainant belied the claims of respondent sheriff, and showed that the
respondents allegations can nowhere be seen in the transcript of the altercation.
6

On March 2, 2012, this Court, upon the OCAs recommendation, resolved to re-docket Alconeras complaint as a
regular administrative case with docket No. A.M. No. P-12-3069 and referred the same to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, South Cotabato, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
After due proceedings, the investigating judge submitted a report, styled as Order dated August 6, 2013, with the
following recommendation:
7

Based on the findings and evaluation, the herein Executive Judge hereby recommends the respondent Sheriff be
ADMONISHED. The respondent must be reminded that as a Court Employee, he must exercise utmost patience and
humility in the performance of his duties amidst all the pressures and personal attacks against his person because he
carried with him the image of the entire judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
The Executive Judge adopted the transcript of the altercation as appearing in the affidavit of Shyla Mae Zapanta and
based his recommendation mainly thereon.
The Issues
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent can be held administratively liable for grave misconduct and
false testimony. In fine, the controversy stems from the propriety of the implementation of the writ of execution, and
the altercation between complainant and respondent. While the investigating judge made a recommendation based
on how respondent conducted himself as an officer of the court in the afternoon of March 18, 2013, there was no
discussion regarding the propriety of the implementation of the writ, which is the main issue in the case for grave
misconduct. It then behooves this Court to sift through the arguments and records to rule on this point.
The Courts Ruling
Grave Misconduct

Misconduct has been defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be
established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. In this case,
complainant imputes grave misconduct on the respondent for the following acts:
8

1. For enforcing the writ despite the fact that complainant has yet to receive the copy of the order denying
his motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of execution;
2. For allegedly leaking to the opposing counsel the issuance of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration;
3. For allegedly demanding P720,000 from Rafols for a P165,000.00 obligation; and
4. For allegedly being arrogant and disrespectful.
Complainant admits that there is no TRO enjoining the enforcement of the writ, nor allegation in his pleadings that a
motion to quash the writ of execution was ever filed. However, complainant asserts that respondent committed grave
misconduct when the latter implemented the writ prior to serving the complainant a copy of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration. According to complainant, said motion stayed the execution, and the writ could not have
been validly executed without first informing the parties concerned of the motions denial.
We rule against complainant on this point.
It must be borne in mind that the case at bar traces its roots to an unlawful detainer case wherein the MTCC ruled
against Rafols, complainants client. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can
only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time
under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made immediately
executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case may have such judgment
stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental
or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. The failure
of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant has perfected the
appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected.
Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
9

10

In the case at bar, complainant lost his clients case and appealed to the RTC. His client has also been periodically
depositing rental with the court for the use of the property pending appeal. However, as ruled by the RTC, the bond
filed did not meet the legal requirements because first and foremost, the bond posted was a property bond, not cash

nor surety. Furthermore, Rafols did not own the property he posted as bond and besides, it was also not issued in
favour of the plaintiff in the ejectment case. Because of the non-compliance with the requirements under the abovequoted rule, the execution of the judgment was not effectively stayed. The only exceptions to non-compliance are the
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from posting the
supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which brought about a
material change in the situation of the parties and which would make the execution inequitable. But whether or not
these obtain in the case at bar is an issue best left to the court that issued the writ of execution.
11

Given the above circumstances, there was no legal impediment preventing respondent sheriff from performing his
responsibility of enforcing the writ of execution. Since Rafols failed to comply with the requirements under the Rules,
Cua Beng who prevailed in the unlawful detainer case is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the
courts judgment both as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals or compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises.
12

Well-settled is that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the
court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his
hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is
executed without undue delay. This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires immediate
execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, respondent
sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ.
13

Immediacy of the execution, however, does not mean instant execution. The sheriff must comply with the Rules of
Court in executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court is a misconduct and
warrants disciplinary action. In this case, Sec. 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules prescribes the procedure in the
implementation of the writ. It provides:
Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
xxxx
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. The officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment for
the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate
the property within three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee, otherwise, the
officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and
employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee in
possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the
same manner as a judgment for money.
Based on this provision, enforcement in ejectment cases requires the sheriff to give notice of such writ and to
demand from defendant to vacate the property within three days. Only after such period can the sheriff enforce the
writ by the bodily removal of the defendant in the ejectment case and his personal belongings. Even in cases
wherein decisions are immediately executory, the required three-day notice cannot be dispensed with. A sheriff who
enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry of the three-day period is running afoul with the
Rules.
14

15

In the present controversy, the Order denying the motion for reconsideration was allegedly served, according to the
respondent, on the same day the writ was executed on March 17, 2011. Complainant, however, avers that his office
was only able to receive the denial the day after the execution or on March 18, 2011. At first blush, one might hastily
conclude that the three-day notice rule was apparently not observed. This Court, however, is not prepared to make
such a finding. We are mindful of the possibility that a demand to vacate has already been given when complainant
and Rafols were first served the Order granting the issuance of a writ of execution, before the motion for
reconsideration was filed. More importantly, complainant failed to allege con-compliance with Sec. 10(c) of Rule 39.

Thus far, no deviation from the Rules has been properly ascribed to respondent. As an officer of the court, he is
accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. The burden was on complainant to adduce
evidence that would prove the respondents culpability, if any. Without evidence of any departure from well
established rules, any unlawful behaviour, or any gross negligence on his part, the presumption remains applicable
and respondent cannot be held administratively liable for the offense of grave misconduct.
1wphi1

Discourtesy in the Performance of Official Duties

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court adopts in part the recommendation of the investigating judge that
respondent should nonetheless be penalized for discourtesy in the performance of his official duties.
As a public officer and a trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of respondent to demonstrate
courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public. In Court Personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court San Carlos City v. Llamas, this Court has held that:
16

17

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully
adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
xxxx
At all times, employees of the judiciary are expected to accord respect to the person and the rights of another, even a
co-employee. Their every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity.
Government service is people-oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has no place therein.
Rude and hostile behavior often translates a personal conflict into a potent pollutant of an otherwise peaceful work
environment; ultimately, it affects the quality of service that the office renders to the public. Letting personal hatred
affect public performance is a violation of the principle enshrined in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, a principle that demands that public interest be upheld over personal ones.
Improper behavior especially during office hours exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace, but
also great disrespect for the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public
official and employee. Thus, the Court looks "with great disfavor upon any display of animosity by any court
employee" and exhorts every court personnel to act with strict propriety and proper decorum to earn public trust for
the judiciary. Colleagues in the judiciary, including those occupying the lowliest position, are entitled to basic courtesy
and respect.
In discharging its constitutional duty of supervising lower courts and their personnel, this Court cannot ignore the fact
that the judiciary is composed essentially of human beings who have differing personalities, outlooks and attitudes;
and who are naturally vulnerable to human weaknesses. Nevertheless, the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that
court personnel must not only be, but also be perceived to be, free from any impropriety -- with respect not only to
their duties in the judicial branch, but also to their behavior anywhere else.
Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that respondent has indeed been remiss in this duty of
observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have exercised restraint in dealing with the complainant instead
of allowing the quarrel to escalate into a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should have been
sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainant's criticisms in the performance of his duties. On
the contrary, respondent's demeanour tarnished the image not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a whole,
exposing him to disciplinary measure.

Making Untruthful Statements

Lastly, the charge of making untruthful statements must also fail. While the statements mentioned in respondent's
complaint-affidavit were not reflected in the transcript submitted by the complainant, this actuality is not conclusive
evidence that such event did not take place. As claimed by respondent, complainant's clerk was only able to record a
part of the argument. We cannot then discount the probability that there is more to the argument than what was
caught on video and there remains the possibility that what respondent narrated and what complainant recorded both
actually transpired.
WHEREFORE, respondent Alfredo T. Pallanan is ADMONISHED and WARNED to be always courteous in dealing
with the public in the performance of official duties. A repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189248, February 05, 2014
TEODORO S. TEODORO (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS/SONS NELSON TEODORO AND ROLANDO
TEODORO, Petitioners, v. DANILO ESPINO, ROSARIO SANTIAGO, JULIANA CASTILLO, PAULINA LITAO, RAQUEL
RODRIGUEZ, RUFINA DELA CRUZ, AND LEONILA CRUZ,Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We here have what appears to be a cut and dried case for ejectment which has, nonetheless, resulted in three conflicting and
varying decisions of the lower courts. We exercise judicial restraint: we simply delineate the possessory rights of the warring parties
and refrain from ruling on these squabbling heirs respective claims of ownership.

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP
No. 99805 which reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 81, Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case
No. 634M06 which, in turn, vacated and set aside the Decision 3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Bulacan, Bulacan in Civil Case
No. 1240. The case is for Forcible Entry filed by the predecessorininterest of petitioners Nelson and Rolando Teodoro, heirs of
Teodoro S. Teodoro (Teodoro Teodoro), against respondents Danilo Espino, Rosario Santiago, Juliana Castillo, Paulina Litao, Raquel
Rodriguez, Rufina dela Cruz and Leonila Cruz, a squabble for physical possession of a portion of a real property, the ownership of
which is traceable to Genaro Teodoro (Genaro).
The subject property is a portion within Cadastral Lot No. 2476 with a total area of 248 square meters, covered by Tax Declaration
No. 99050030246, registered in the name of Genaro, long deceased ascendant of all the parties. The subject property pertains to
the vacant lot where the old ancestral house of Genaro stood until its demolition in June 2004, at the instance of Teodoro Teodoro.
Genaro had five children: Santiago; Maria, from whom respondents descended and trace their claim of ownership and right of
possession; Petra, Mariano, Teodoro Teodoros father; and Ana. Genaro and his children are all deceased.
Respondents respective parents are first cousins of Teodoro Teodoro. All parties are collateral relatives of Petra Teodoro: Teodoro
Teodoro is her nephew while respondents are her grandnephews and grandnieces, descendants of Petras sister, Maria Teodoro.
Of all Genaros children, only Petra occupied the subject property, living at the ancestral house. Genaros other children, specifically
Santiago, Maria and Mariano were bequeathed, and stayed at, a different property within the same locality, still from the estate of
their father.
After Petras death, her purported will, a holographic will, was probated in Special Proceedings No. 1615M before RTC, Branch 8,
Malolos, Bulacan, which Decision on the wills extrinsic validity has become final and executory.4 In the will, Petra, asserting
ownership, devised the subject property to Teodoro Teodoro.
Teodoro Teodoro effected the demolition of the ancestral house, intending to use the subject property for other purposes.
Soon thereafter, respondents, who resided at portions of Lot No. 2476 that surround the subject property on which the ancestral
house previously stood, erected a fence on the surrounding portion, barricaded its frontage, and put up a sign thereat, effectively
dispossessing Teodoro Teodoro of the property bequeathed to him by Petra.
After Teodoro Teodoros demand for respondents to vacate the subject property went unheeded, he filed the complaint for forcible
entry against respondents, alleging the following in pertinent part:
3. [Teodoro Teodoro] is a nephew of the deceased Petra Teodoro vda. De Salonga x x x who executed a holographic will designating
him therein as administrator of her estate and likewise devised in his favor a parcel of land located in Purok 2, Bambang, Bulacan,
Bulacan and the ancestral house built therein. Other properties of Petra Teodoro were bequeathed in favor of other named heirs. x x
x.
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4. Aforementioned parcel of land with the ancestral house was in turn inherited by the decedent Petra Teodoro from her father
Genaro Teodoro who also gave separate properties to his four other children, who are all dead, namely, Santiago who has eight (8)
children, Maria who has six (6) children, Ana who has no child and Mariano who has eight (8) children including herein [Teodoro
Teodoro] as the eldest;
5. It is of common knowledge in the locality that the subject property where the ancestral house stood was given by Genaro
Teodoro to [his] daughter Petra Teodoro to the exclusion of all others. Petra Teodoro lived in that property all her life. x x x.
xxx
7. This subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of [Teodoro Teodoros] grandfather, Genaro Teodoro as shown
by the hereto attached photocopy of Tax Declaration of Real Property No. 99050030246 for the year 2000 which is marked
as Annex F;
xxx
10. [Subject property] having been given to [Teodoro Teodoro] as a devisee in the approved will of Petra Teodoro, it became his
absolute property to the exclusion of all others;
11. Sometime in July 2004, [Teodoro Teodoro] as the absolute owner and possessor thereof, decided to demolish the already
dilapidated ancestral house in the subject property to clear the same for other available uses/purposes. x x x.
12. By means of force and intimidation, [Teodoro Teodoro] was ousted likewise prevented by [respondents] from entering the
subject property. [Respondents] have also converted/appropriated for themselves the exclusive use of the subject property into
their own parking lot and other personal use, to the exclusion and damage of [Teodoro Teodoro]; 5 (Emphasis supplied).
In their Answer, respondents asserted their own ownership and possession of the subject property, countering that:
5. It is worth to mention that [respondents] Danilo Espino and Rosario Santiago are residing thereat for more than fifty (50) years,
while [respondents] Paulina Litao and Rufina dela Cruz are resident of the subject place for more than sixty (60) years, most of
them residing thereat since birth, at the time that their grandmother Maria Teodoro is still living and residing thereat.
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6. Thus, when siblings Maria Teodoro (grandmother of [respondents]), Petra (to whom the subject property was inherited) and
Mariano (father of [Teodoro Teodoro]) died, the heirs, who include [respondents] and [Teodoro Teodoro] extrajudicially, among
themselves, partitioned the property left by their ascendants, which are still in the name of the siblings father Genaro Teodoro.
[Respondents], since they are already residing in the subject property and had built their respective houses therein, had with them
the said subject [property]. x x x.

7. [Respondents], through their authorized representative, [respondent] Rosario Santiago, in the exercise of their act of ownership
of the subject lot paid for its real property taxes. x x x.
8. x x x [Teodoro Teodoro] deliberately failed to consider and mention in his complaint that there was already a decision rendered
by court, declaring the subject property as part of the property left by Petra Teodoro to her legitimate heirs, which include among
others [respondents].
9. That however, due to [respondents] failure as substituted heirs to execute the order, dated May 18, 1994, a Motion for the
Revival of Judgment was filed and heard before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Honorable Court x x x
resolved x x x the extent of the allowance and admission to probate the holographic will of the late Petra Teodoro, where a
Certificate of Allowance dated February 14, 1990 was subsequently issued, as its Decision dated June 29, 1989 became final and
executory, affect the revival of judgment.
xxx
13. While it is true that the dilapidated ancestral house in the subject property was demolished; however, the said act, as suggested
by [Teodoro Teodoro] was allowed by [respondents] (who had their respective houses built in the same lot where the same is
constructed) in order to have the same be partitioned among themselves. As [Teodoro Teodoro] was constantly complaining that
the property left to him and his siblings is less than the subject property given to the [respondents] in area, they agreed verbally
that if the ancestral house will be demolished, a surveyor would be at ease in surveying the same and determine if indeed the area
is more than that allotted to [Teodoro Teodoro], which in that case, as per agreement, the excess, if any will suffice the lack in area
of [Teodoro Teodoro]. It was however found out that the area of the subject property was less than the area that should be
allocated and apportioned as shares of [respondents], hence they [intimated] the same to [Teodoro Teodoro], who got mad and
threaten[ed] to get the subject property from them.
14. The putting of signs No Trespassing posted at the frontage of the subject property is an allowable act by owners, residing
thereat to protect their property against intruders, hence there is nothing wrong for [respondents] to put the same. x x x.
15. There is no truth, as what [Teodoro Teodoro] claimed in paragraph 12 of his complaint that he was ousted and prevented from
entering the subject property by [respondents], because in the first place he could not be ousted thereat, as he is not in possession
of the said property.6 (Emphasis theirs).
After trial, the MTC dismissed the complaint, ruling on the issue of ownership and ultimately resolving the issue of who between
Teodoro Teodoro and respondents had a better right to possess the subject property:
x x x [Teodoro Teodoros] claim of ownership over the subject lot stemmed from the approved and duly probated Holographic Will of
Petra Teodoro. Although it its undisputed that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the subject lot prior to her demise and that
she left a Holographic Will wherein the subject lot was bequeathed to [Teodoro Teodoro], the probate of her last will has not finally
settled the question of ownership over the subject lot. Clearly, the subject lot still forms part of the estate of the late Genaro
Teodoro. In the absence of an actual and approved partition plan among his heirs, the subject lot remains part of the Genaro
Teodoros estate. Since his children Santiago, Maria, Petra, Maraino and Ana are all deceased, their children or grandchildren by
right of representation have the right to inherit from their ancestor.
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xxx
A person who claims that he has a better right to real property must prove his ownership of the same x x x. Clearly, [Teodoro
Teodoro] has failed to prove his ownership over the property or that of his devisee Petra Teodoro. Thus, the court is convinced that
the possession of [respondents] over the subject lot should not be disturbed, until and unless the question of ownership over the
same shall have been finally resolved before the appropriate court.
xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim interposed in relation thereto, without
pronouncement as to costs.7
The RTC, in its appellate jurisdiction over forcible entry cases, acting on Teodoro Teodoros appeal, adopted the factual findings of
the MTC, but reversed the ruling, ruled in favor of Teodoro Teodoro and ordered the ejectment of respondents from the subject
property. It pithily ruled, thus:
But the bottom line for resolution in this case is who has the prior physical possession of the subject parcel. x x x.
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The late Petra Teodoros share to the inheritance of his father Genaro is admittedly the old ancestral house and the lot over which it
stands. x x x.
[Teodoro Teodoro] claims right to possession only over said portion (now the vacant space x x x not the entire lot 2476 until he was
displaced therefrom by the [respondents] through force). [Teodoro Teodoro] does not contest the perimeter area of Lot
2476 where [respondents] are residing. He has acknowledged in clear terms that the rest of the area of Lot 2476 is occupied
by [respondents]. The assailed decision recognized that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the lot prior to her death. It is
[Teodoro Teodoros] argument that Petra Teodoro, tacked [from by Teodoro Teodoro], has had prior physical possession of the
controverted portion of lot 2476. He went on arguing that regardless of whether or not the duly probated will completely settled the
issue of partition of the remaining estate of Genaro Teodoro, he has the prior actual and physical possession of the vacant space
where the old ancestral house formerly stands, passed on to him by the late Petra Teodoro, a fact [respondents] deny.
[Respondents] even belied that they have ousted and restrained [Teodoro Teodoro] from entering the subject property.
Said pretension is however negated by evidence showing the barricaded vacant space or disputed area consisting of 120 square
meters, more or less (approximate width of lot is 7.55 meters, approximate length is 17.9 meters with indented portion measuring
1.5 meters deep x x x), where the cemented portion of the flooring of the bakery near the national road lease by [respondents] is
still existing x x x and over which he exercised control and constructive possession. x x x.
xxx

[Teodoro Teodoro] anchors on the other hand his claim on the Holographic Will of Petra Teodoro dated May 1, 1973 x x x duly
probated and approved in a Decision x x x dated June 19, 1989 of Branch 8 of this Court in SP Proceeding No. 1615M, which
Decision has become final and executory as of February 14, 1990 x x x bequeathing the disputed portion of Lot 2476 and the old
ancestral house thereon to him, the letters of administration issued to him by Branch 8 of this Court x x x, the Project of Partition
submitted to the said court x x x plus his possession of the vacant area or disputed portion of [L]ot 2476. [Respondents] has
stressed that he is not contesting the rest of [L]ot 2476 occupied by the houses of [respondents].
Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel is a part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro
and in the absence of an approved partition among the heirs, remains a community property over which the legal heirs of Genaro
Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to exercise the right of dominion including the right of possession.
This Court disagrees with the said ruling applying the plethora of cases decisive of the issue and consistent with the established
jurisprudence that the lower court cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownershipsuch issue being inutile in an ejectment suit
except to throw light on the question of possession.
Given the foregoing, [Teodoro Teodoro] has established a valid claim to institute the eviction suit against [respondents] over the
disputed area or vacant portion of Lot 2476 and for him to be restored therein.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding reversible error on the appealed judgment, the same is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered as follows:
1. Ordering that [Teodoro Teodoro] be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area of Lot 2476 and for the eviction
therefore of [respondents] on said portion; and
2. [Respondents] to pay the costs of the suit. 8
With the reversal of the MTCs ruling, respondents then appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
reversed the RTC, likewise dismissed the complaint as the MTC had done, but did not reach the same result as that of the inferior
court. It specifically ruled that Teodoro Teodoro:
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(1) never had physical possession of the subject property, not having lived there at anytime, whether while Petra was alive nor after
her death;
(2) did not adduce evidence before the lower courts on proof of payment of any real property tax on the disputed vacant lot,
portion of Lot No. 2476, or to the whole of Lot No. 2476;
(3) did not solely or unilaterally cause the demolition of the ancestral house such a fact equating to his exclusive ownership of the
subject property and complete control and dominion over it; and
(4) cannot tack his alleged possession of the subject property to that of Petra Teodoro simply by virtue of the latters holographic
will, leading to the issue of ownership which is insignificant in forcible entry cases.
In all, the appellate court found that Teodoro Teodoro (substituted by his heirs Nelson and Rolando Teodoro at that juncture) failed
to discharge the burden of proof that he had prior actual physical possession of the subject [property] before it was barricaded by
[respondents] to warrant the institution of the forcible entry suit. The appellate court disposed of the case, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision [dated] 28 February 2007 and Resolution dated 26 June 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 81 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the instant case isDISMISSED for
lack of merit.9
Hence, this appeal by certiorari filed by the heirs of Teodoro Teodoro raising the following errors in the appellate courts dismissal of
the complaint:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to take notice of relevant facts such as petitioner Teodoros exercise of possessory rights
over the subject property, among others, which if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.
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2. The Honorable Court of Appeals misappreciated undisputed facts such as the respondents fencing of the vacant area cleared by
petitioner Teodoro and their barricading of the frontage thereof, among others, that deprived petitioner Teodoro his possessory
rights over the vacant area.
3. The findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures.
4. There is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in the assailed Decision. 10
The assigned errors define the issue for our resolution which is whether or not the act of respondents in barricading the frontage of
the portion of Lot No. 2476 on which stood the ancestral house occupied by Petra amounted to Teodoro Teodoros unlawful
dispossession thereof through the forcible entry of respondents.
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The ground rules in forcible entry cases: 11

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(1) One employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of real property.
(2) Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by
the defendant (herein respondents). This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful
from the beginning.
(3) The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a
claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can, at the outset, preclude the

court from taking cognizance of the case.

(4) Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de
facto and undue deprivation thereof.
In this case, both parties assert prior and exclusive physical possession in the concept of owner 12acquired through succession13 from
the same decedent, their aunt and grand aunt, respectively, Petra. In turn, Petra inherited the property from her father Genaro, in
whose name the subject property is still registered.
Teodoro Teodoros assertion of physical possession comprises mainly of his claimed ownership of the subject property acquired
through testate succession, or via the holographic will of Petra. 14 Teodoro Teodoro then points, as an exercise of his ownership and
incident of his physical possession of the subject property, to his act of demolition of the ancestral house.
On the other hand, respondents assert possession likewise by virtue of ownership manifested in their residence at Lot No. 2476
spanning more than five (5) decades, reckoned even from the time Maria, respondents grandmother and sister of Petra, was alive
and resided thereat.15 Respondents trace their possession from the extrajudicial partition of the commingled properties of the
siblings Maria, respondents direct ascendant, Petra and Mariano, father of Teodoro Teodoro, progeny and heirs of
Genaro.16 According to respondents, from the partition, the heirs of all three Genaro children possessed and occupied their
respective shares: respondents received Lot No. 2476 which encompasses herein subject property, while Teodoro Teodoro and his
siblings received a different property, a 667 residential lot at Bambang, Bulacan, Bulacan.
Also, respondents aver that, through respondent Rosario Santiago, they paid for Lot No. 2476s realty taxes. Respondents counter
that the subject property was not solely bequeathed to Teodoro Teodoro as it is part of Petras estate for disposition to her
legitimate heirs, including herein respondents. Lastly, on Teodoro Teodoros claim that he had solely effected the demolition of the
ancestral house, respondents contend that they had allowed the demolition upon the understanding that the parties would then
completely partition the subject property, as that portion is centrally located in Lot No. 2476 where the respondents actually reside.
Given both parties respective claims of ownership over the subject property via succession from their ascendants Maria, Petra and
Mariano Teodoro, who are all compulsory heirs of Genaro in whose name the subject property is still registered, the MTC ruled that
respondents cannot be disturbed in their possession of the subject property until and unless the question of ownership over the
same [is] finally resolved before the appropriate court.
In contrast, the RTC, without categorically resolving the issue of ownership of Lot No. 2476, ruled that on the portion of Lot No.
2476 where the ancestral house used to stand, Teodoro did establish his prior physical possession over the subject property
resulting in his right to institute the ejectment suit against respondents. Significantly, the RTC confirmed respondents physical
possession of, and residency at, Lot No. 2476.
There would yet be another turn of events. The appellate court, albeit refusing to touch and rule on the issue of ownership, declared
that there lacked conclusive evidence of Teodoro Teodoros prior actual physical possession over the subject property. Thus, the
appellate court dismissed Teodoro Teodoros complaint for lack of merit.
We are now asked for a final ruling.
We grant the petition. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the RTC on the appeal reversing
the MTC.
We affirm the finding of fact by the RTC which is decisive of the issue that has remained unresolved inspite of a summary procedure
and two appellate reviews of the forcible entry case filed by Teodoro Teodoro. The RTC said:
Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel is a part of the estate of the late Genaro
Teodoro and in the absence of an approved partition among the heirs, remains a community property over which the
legal heirs of Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to exercise the right of dominion
including the right of possession.17 (Emphasis supplied).
The RTCs comment that it disagrees with the said ruling only meant that the lower court cannot dispose with finality the issue of
ownership since such ownership issue is inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession.18 And so
the RTC ruled that Teodoro Teodoro should be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area of Lot No. 2476 in light of the
finding of the MTC that the subject lot still forms part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro. It is from this same fact that the
MTC reached the contrary conclusion that Teodoro Teodoros complaint should be dismissed because he has failed to prove his
ownership.19
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In the sense that Teodoro Teodoro has not proven exclusive ownership, the MTC was right. But exclusive ownership of Lot No. 2476
or a portion thereof is not in this case required of Teodoro Teodoro for him to be entitled to possession. Coownership, the finding of
both the MTC at first instance and by the RTC on appeal, is sufficient. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 484. There is coownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
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Art. 1078. When there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.
Certainly, and as found by the trial courts, the whole of Lot No. 2476 including the portion now litigated is, owing to the fact that it
has remained registered in the name of Genaro who is the common ancestor of both parties herein, coowned property. All, or both
Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession as coowners. Neither party can exclude the other
from possession. Although the property remains unpartitioned, the respondents in fact possess specific areas. Teodoro Teodoro can
likewise point to a specific area, which is that which was possessed by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area,
not only by virtue of Petras bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own right of possession that comes from his co
ownership of the property. As the RTC concluded, petitioners, as heirs substituting Teodoro Teodoro in this suit, should be restored
in the lawful possession of the disputed area.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 99805 is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 634M06 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
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SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580
October 6, 2010
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ]
LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering
an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.
The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394-CV of the
MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial, Civil Case
No. 176394-CV was decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent Judge,1 who disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the latter as follows:
(a) to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and
surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;
(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in rentals from February 2003 to July
2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus the further sum of Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for the
continued use and occupation of the premises starting August 2003 until the same is finally vacated and
possession thereof is turn-over to plaintiff;
(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorneys fees; and
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be
issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court as basis for its motion.2
In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution,3stating:
A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for the defendant, let the records of
the above-captioned case be, as it is hereby ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate
proceedings and disposition.
In view thereof, no more action shall be taken on the Motion for Execution dated July 8, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru
counsel.
SO ORDERED.
According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about the matter. Allegedly, respondent
Judge told their counsel that "if you think the court is wrong, file a motion for reconsideration." With that, the plaintiff
filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent Judge nonetheless denied in his order dated July 28,
2004,4 thuswise:
Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the defendant which was perfected within
the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004 filed by
the plaintiff thru counsel.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the records of this case to the Regional Trial
Court, Manila.

SO ORDERED.
The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial of their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and had
unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the premises. They further averred that respondent Judges refusal
to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiffs
damage and prejudice.
The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the administrative complaint against him.
In his comment dated September 16, 2004,5 respondent Judge denied the charges. He explained that he had
honestly thought that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court (which provides that "in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had
given due course to the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed that he had issued the orders in good faith and with
no malice after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts, applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had
thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing so should be considered as error of judgment on
his part.
He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the parties in Civil Case No. 176394-CV, and had absolutely no
reason to give undue favor or advantage to the defendant; that the complainants did not submit evidence to show
that the orders had been issued for a consideration, material or otherwise, or that his issuance of the orders had been
motivated by ill-will or bad faith.
In their reply dated September 22, 2004,6 the complainants contended that respondent Judge exhibited his ignorance
of the law and procedure in relying on Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred to appeals from the
Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40, which contained provisions on appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts, and which provided in its Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such
perfection should be governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by notice of appeal in
general; and that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that appeal in forcible entry and
detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a
notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. They asserted that respondent
Judges invocation of good faith and error of judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he had grossly
neglected his duties mandated by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion for immediate execution and
motion for reconsideration and by giving due course to the appeal despite no supersedeas bond having been filed
and approved by the trial court.
In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,7 then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now Associate
Justice of the Court, recommended that the administrative complaint against respondent Judge be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter; and that respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, based on an evaluation of the charges, as
follows:
EVALUATION: We agree with the complainants that respondent erred when he did not act on complainants motion
for immediate execution.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
"SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unlessan
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal

Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. XXXX XXXX XXXX."
It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the
judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the
plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise
deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal.Otherwise,
execution becomes ministerial and imperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401 as
cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 626).
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July 2004 on 13 July 2004; he however
failed to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal, more specifically on 12 July 2004,
complainants have already filed their Motion for Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion for
Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his
Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court
however failed to forward the records to the RTC. This fact is clear from Judge Rabacas Order dated 28 July 2004
wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court
immediately.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the immediate execution of Judge Rabacas
decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the Motion
for Execution. The relevant question that we should resolve however is whether such error is an error of judgment or
an error amounting to incompetence that calls for administrative discipline.
Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the complainants Motion for execution because he honestly thought
that when he gave due course to the defendants appeal which was seasonably filed, and ordered the elevation of the
records to the appellate court, his court already lost jurisdiction over the case.. In making his ruling, respondent
asserts he relied on the provisions of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. This provision reads as follows:
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in
due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
He likewise allegedly relied on the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ: Susana
Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina, MeTJ wherein the Court said thatRespondent Judge is correct in saying that she had lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion for execution after the
perfection of the appeal and after she issued an order to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court for
review.
The facts of the case against Judge Bunyi-Medina are however different from those prevailing in the instant case. In
the Medina case, the fifteen (15) day period within which to perfect the appeal had already lapsed before the
complainant therein moved for the execution of the execution judgment. Clearly therefore, appeal had already been
perfected. In the instant case, although the defendant had filed his appeal, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed
since the plaintiff still had his own period to appeal from the judgment and such period had not yet lapsed. The
provision relied upon by judge Rabaca, more specifically, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that,
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon perfection of the appeals filed on due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties." Moreover and more importantly, the herein
complainants filed their Motion for Execution even before the defendant had filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion
was therefore still well within the jurisdiction of the lower court.

It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and
mandatory. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of cases involving the same issue posed
before the respondent judge. Respondent Judge is expected to know this and his justification of erroneous
application of the law, although mitigating, could not exculpate him from liability.
We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court Administrator.
Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution considering that the
defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiffs motion for
immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond.
Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time
under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
xxx
Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendants appeal, was
unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal
by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. The execution of
the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond
and the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the
appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his omission to act according to the
provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and
explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be implemented without evasion or hesitation.
To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is
an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein. And, thirdly,
given that his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV,
had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the
issue of immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.
1avvphil

We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore, that respondent Judges omission to apply Section 19 was
inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the plaintiffs
motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his authority to grant the motion for immediate
execution, as he would have us believe, he could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the
Rules of Court, which he well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action. Neither
was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly favor the defendant by his
omission. His mere failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively
accountable.
This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate under
Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond.
The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the mandate for an

immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession, should
always be borne in mind.
The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely is also correct. The Court Administrator rationalized the recommendation of the penalty thuswise:
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure is classified as serious offense for which the
imposable penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we find respondents acts not ingrained with malice or
bad faith. It is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the acts of a judge
in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo vs.
Judge Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five thousand pesos
was deemed sufficient where it was held that respondents lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative
liability but not for gross ignorance of the law.
We concur with the rationalization of the Court Administrator. Verily, even if respondent Judges omission would have
easily amounted to gross
ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense under Section 8,8 Rule 140, of the Rules of Court, as
amended, the fact that the complainants did not establish that malice or bad faith impelled his omission to act, or that
fraud, dishonesty, or a corrupt motive attended his omission to act demands a downgrading of the liability. In the
absence of any showing that he had been held guilty of any other administrative offense,9 and without our attention
being called to other circumstances that might demonstrate respondent Judges dark motives for his inaction, we
should find and consider the recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely to be commensurate to the offense.10
WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of Branch 25, Metropolitan Trial
Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure, and, accordingly, impose upon him a fine ofP5,000.00
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
CGR CORPORATION herein
represented by its President
ALBERTO
RAMOS,
III,
HERMAN M. BENEDICTO
and
ALBERTO
R.
BENEDICTO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 170916

- versus -

Promulgated:
April 27, 2007

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR.,

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284, to
wit: Order[1] dated August 26, 2005 which dismissed petitioners complaint for
damages on the ground of prematurity, and Order[2] dated January 2, 2006 which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In issue is one of law whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file
an independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had
occurred.
CGR
Corporation,
Herman
M. Benedicto and
Alberto
R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public

land in Barangay Bulanon, SagayCity, Negros Occidental even before the

notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement Nos. 5674,[3] 5694[4] and 5695[5] in
their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of
Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until December 31, 2024.
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly
forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded
the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to
petitioners fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and
fingerlings owned by petitioners.
On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial
Court
(MTC)
in Sagay City separate
complaints
for
Forcible
Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And
Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1331,[6] 1332[7] and 1333,[8] against Ernesto
M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.
In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC
a complaint for damages against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No, 04-12284,
alleging,inter alia,
xxxx
V
That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor
of the plaintiffs, they had already been in open and continuous
possession of the same parcel of land;

VI
As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond,
plaintiffs have continuously occupied, cultivated and developed the said
fishpond and since then, had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps,
mud crabs and other produce of the fishponds;
VII

That the yearly income of the fishpond of the plaintiff corporation

is at least P300,000.00 more or less, while the yearly income of the
fishpond of plaintiff Herman Benedicto, Sr. is at least P100,000.00 more
or less, and the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff
Alberto Benedicto is at least P100,000.00 more or less;
VIII
That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant
Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men and with the help of the blue
guards from the Negros Veterans Security Agency forcibly and
unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs and once inside
barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up barb wire fence along
the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and
carted away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;
IX
That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their forage
on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the
remaining full grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine
products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by
plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the
materials taken away by defendants men.Religious icons were also
stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of
some of these icons;
xxxx
XIII
That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of
defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and
possessed by the plaintiffs is without any authority of law and in
violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code which states:
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected
in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he
shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the

means established by the laws and rules of the Court.

[9]
(Underscoring supplied)

and praying for the following reliefs:

1)

Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum

of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and
Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by way
ofactual damages and such other amounts as proved during the trial;

2)

Ordering the defendant to pay the

of P100,000.00 each as moral damages;

plaintiffs

the

sum

3)

Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs

of P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages;

the

sum

4)

Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum

of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs with
all such sums paid to their counsel by way of appearance fees. [10]
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] petitioners complaint for damages

on three grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.
By the assailed Order[12] of August 26, 2005, Branch 43 of the Bacolod RTC
dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a
complaint for damages may only be maintained after a final determination on the
forcible entry cases has been made.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The only issue is whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints
for forcible entry, petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for
damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession
by respondent of the premises.
Petitioners meet the issue in the affirmative. Respondents assert otherwise.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations
of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent
or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are
not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If
a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum
found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice
requires. (Emphasis supplied)

The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to
rents or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises or
fair rental value of the property and attorneys fees and costs.[13]
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas[14] reiterates the long-established rule that
the only form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is
the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the property:
Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis
for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of
the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue
raised inejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could
be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a
mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation
of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered
but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession. x x x[15] (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied;
citations omitted)

Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.[16]

In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case
of Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. [17] In this case,
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor, repossessed
the leased premises from the lessee allegedly pursuant to their contract of lease
whereby it was authorized to do so if the lessee failed to pay monthly rentals. The
lessee filed a case for forcible entry with damages against Progressive before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ofQuezon City. During the pendency of the case,
the lessee filed an action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a
motion to dismiss based on litis pendentia.The RTC denied the motion.
On appeal by Progressive, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC order
denying the motion to dismiss.
Progressive brought the case to this Court. Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, this Court reversed the lower courts ruling, it holding that all cases
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial
Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also
all claims for damages and costs therefrom. In other words, this Court held that no
claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed
separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.
[18]
(Underscoring supplied)
In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the
therein two complaints, thus:
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private
respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that
not only are the elements of res adjudicatapresent, at least insofar as the
claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also
that the claim for damagesmoral and exemplary in addition to actual and
compensatoryconstitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this
runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the
second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent
allegations
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a
contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property
designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter

Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA

corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon
City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to
30 April 1998.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual
physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff
established and now operates thereon the now famous
Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been
in actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of
the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject
Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and
enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all
others, including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to
forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from
plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use of
force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of
superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking of
the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out
plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from
defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof
through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation
should be condemned and declared illegal for being
contrary to public order and policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined
from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to
vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof,
together with its contents to plaintiff.
xxxx

4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly

grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff
is illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged
liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which
plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private
respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues as
bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC
entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or
from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property
designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter
referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of
EDSA
corner McArthur
Street, Araneta Center, Cubao,Quezon City. A copy of the
lease contract is attached hereto as Annex A.
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual
physical possession of Subject Premises, and established
thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant.
xxxx
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m.,
defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of
possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of
approximately forty (40) armed security guards and
policemen under the supervision of defendant Tejam,
forcibly entered the subject premises through force,
intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force
and in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will,
unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the
subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its
actual, physical and natural possession of the subject
premises. The illegal high-handed manner of gestapo like
take-over by defendants of subject premises is more
particularly described as follows: x x x x

8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess

and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multimillion improvements, fixtures and equipment therein
owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute
an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property
against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants
are threatening to sell at public auction and without the
consent, of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multimillion fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices
way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby
attaches as Annex B the letter from defendants
dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the
latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August
19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in
defendants possession.
xxxx
12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises
constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of
the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the
lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed
the present suit for the recovery of damages under Art.
1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x[19] (Emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)

Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed:

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one
cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the
leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs(denominated by private
respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by
the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to
the lessee, (b) the claim foractual damages due to the losses suffered by
private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs
stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises
causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorneys fees and
costs of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a

monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and
exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of
P20,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing
unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorneys fees and
costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased
premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were
already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is
obvious that this cannot berelitigated in the damage suit before the RTC
by reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also
succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being
heard before the MeTC. x x x[20] (Italics in the original; Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in

the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages
have no directrelation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with
respondents alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other
marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by
petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the
heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia that the identity between the
pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is
such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration is not
present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages.
[21]

Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no
jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the
premises and attorneys fees.[22]

Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for

damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final
judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.[23]
Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those
sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use
and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a
cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2,
2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case
No. 04-12284 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, is directed to
REINSTATE Civil Case No. 04-12284 to its docket and to conduct proceedings
thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN G.R. No. 189239
ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO AND ERWIN
COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO AND Present:
FELITA ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND
ROGER LAS PIAS, LINDA LAYDA,
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J.,
RESTITUTO
MARIANO,
SPS.
BRION,
ARNOLD
AND
MIRIAM
BERSAMIN
MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND
VILLARAMA, JR., and
WENCESLAO A. RAPACON, SPS.
SERENO, JJ.
ROMEO AND EMILYN HULLEZA,
LUZ MIPANTAO, SPS. HELEN AND
ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE
TUAZON, SPS. ZALDO AND MIA
SALES, SPS. JOSEFINA AND JOEL
YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND JESSIE
CABATUAN, SPS. WILMA AND
MARIO
ANDRADA,
SPS.
RAYMUNDO
AND
ARSENIA
LELIS, FREDY AND SUSANA
PILONEO,
Petitioners,
- versus -

FIL-HOMES
REALTY
and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Promulgated:

and
MAGDIWANG
REALTY
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
November 24, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty
Corporation (respondents), co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City
and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21712 and 21713, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners
before the Paraaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject
lots since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.
Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30
years; and that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development
Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the question of
ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may be resolved.
During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed
expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for
distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A writ of possession was
consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.
Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment
in the unlawful detainer case against petitioners, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants Leticia and Ervin Abad et. als.
ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them

to VACATE and SURRENDER possession of the premises (Lots

covered by TCT NOS. (71065) 21712 and (71066) 21713 otherwise
known as Purok I Silverio Compound, Barangay San Isidro, Paraaque
City to plaintiff and to PAY the said plaintiff as follows:
1. The reasonable compensation in the amount of P20,000.00 a
month commencing November 20, 2002 and every month
thereafter until the defendants shall have finally vacated the
premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to the
plaintiff;
2. P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, and finally
3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[1] (emphasis in the original)

The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they
still maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better
right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries
have yet to be named.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4, 2008,
[2]
reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:
x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents
herein) is unlawful detainer as shown by the allegations of the
Complaint. The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate.It is not the
allegations of the Complaint that finally determine whether a case is
unlawful detainer, rather it is the evidence in the case.

Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of tolerance.

Tolerance of the occupation of the property must be present right from
the start of the defendants possession. The phrase from the start of

defendants possession is significant. When there is no tolerance right

from the start of the possession sought to be recovered, the case
of unlawful detainer will not prosper.[3] (emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)

The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
City bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the
judgment had already been rendered in the expropriation proceedings which
effectively turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to
disregard the . . . final judgment and writ of possession due to non-payment of just
compensation:
The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties
subject of this case had already been given to the City of Paraaque since
January 19, 2006 after they were expropriated. It is serious error for
the court a quo to rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang
Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development
Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which
were already expropriated in favor of the City of Paraaque.
There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo
that the case for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court would not bar,
suspend or abate the ejectment proceedings. The court a quo had failed
to consider the fact that the case for expropriation was already decided
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 way back in the year 2006 or 2
years before the court a quo rendered its judgment in the unlawful
detainer case in the year 2008. In fact, there was already a Writ of
Possession way back in the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation
case by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196. The court a quo has no
valid reason to disregard the said final judgment and the writ of
possession already issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the
City of Paraaque and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and
Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation and make another
judgment concerning possession of the subject properties contrary
to the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196.
[4]
(emphasis in the original)

Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review,
they maintained that respondents act of allowing several years to pass without

requiring [them] to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts to
acquiescence or tolerance of their possession.[5]
By Decision of May 27, 2009,[6] the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not
present evidence to rebut respondents allegation of possession by tolerance, and
considering petitioners admission that they commenced occupation of the property
without the permission of the previous owner Pilipinas Development
Corporation as indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor-in-interest,
ruled in favor of respondents. Held the appellate court:
Where the defendants entry upon the land was with plaintiffs
tolerance from the date and fact of entry, unlawful detainer proceedings
may be instituted within one year from the demand on him to vacate
upon demand. The status of such defendant is analogous to that of a
tenant or lessee, the term of whose lease, has expired but whose
occupancy is continued by the tolerance of the lessor. The same rule
applies where the defendant purchased the house of the former lessee,
who was already in arrears in the payment of rentals, and thereafter
occupied the premises without a new lease contract with the landowner.[7]
Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings,
the appellate court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,[8] held the same does not signify
the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court a quo is REVOKED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March
3, 2008 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION [by] deleting
the award for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26,
2009, hence, the filing of the present petition for review.
The petition fails.
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates
private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized
housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the
constitutional provisions on social justice.[9]

As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not
suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil
action regarding ownership.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538[10] enlightens, however:
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through
purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or
chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants
occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time
as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary
negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period
of suspension shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants
shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due
or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has
been instituted. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the
benefits of the suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the
subject of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better
right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of
expropriation proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they
are entitled to continue staying there.
Petitioners position does not lie.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by
Section 19 of the Local Government Code (LGC):
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through
its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property

upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a

deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid
for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value of the property.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation[11] clearly outlines the stages of
expropriation, viz:
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners x x x .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is
said to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment
of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession
in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To
effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay
the property owners thefinal just compensation.[12] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation
proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such
issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that
judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys
possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.
Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the
lots, the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does
not state so.[13] Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of
the ordinance.

Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for
petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries
thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they can
be considered to be beneficiaries.
In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their
possession is by mere tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan
v. Pascual:[14]
In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to
vacate the premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs
have acquiesced to defendants possession and use of the
premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land
of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the
date of the demand to vacate. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in

1983. They stepped into the shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with
petitioners. Even if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action
against petitioners to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained
the status quo allowed petitioners possession by tolerance.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 129521 September 7, 1999

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONERS FE ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. CASIGURAN, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P. MANALAYSAY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals 1 setting aside the order of the

Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) 2 declaring respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying a temporary restraining order issued to
respondents to desist from holding a stockholders meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation.
The facts are as follows:
On June 28, 1996, SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation,
directed respondent Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite time and place for the
validation of proxies and nominations for directors of the firm.
On the same date, June 28, 1996, the SEC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport
Resources Corporation from holding the July 9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders.
Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the meeting on July 9, 1996, presided over by
respondent Manalaysay.
On July 10, 1996, the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of Interport Resources Corporation held on July 9,
1996, null and void and directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15, 1996, at 3:00 p.m., to show cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them or why they should not be cited in contempt.
At the hearing on July 15, 1996, respondent Manalaysay questioned the validity of the TRO as well as the contempt
proceedings in light of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the SEC from enforcing its TRO. 3
After the hearing, on July 15, 1996, the SEC issued an order stating:
xxx xxx xxx

VIEWED in this light Atty. Cesar Manalaysay, Manuel D. Recto and Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde are
hereby DECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT and are correspondingly ORDERED to pay a fine of
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos each upon finality of this Order for willfully disobeying and
disregarding the July 8, 1996 Order of this Commission. Atty. Cesar Manalaysay is likewise
BARRED from practicing his law profession before this commission for a period of sixty (60) days
from date hereof and Mr. Recto and Atty. Ricalde are, by this ORDER, prohibited and barred from
acting as President/Chairman and Secretary respectively of Interport Resources, Inc. within the
same period. This Order shall be immediately executory unless otherwise restrained by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
(s/t) PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR.
Chairman
(s/t) FE ELOISA C. GLORIA
Associate Commissioner
(s/t) EDIJER A. MARTINEZ
Associate Commissioner 4
In due time, respondents appealed from the aforesaid order to the Court of Appeals.
After due proceedings, on April 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside
the SEC order declaring respondents guilty of contempt. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' Order dated July 15, 1996, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The cash bond of P50,000.00 may be withdrawn by petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
(s/t) ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO
Associate Justice
(s/t) ARTEMON D. LUNA
Associate Justice
(s/t) HECTOR L. HOFILEA
Associate Justice 5

On May 2, 1997, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on June 11, 1997, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this appeal.
On September 10, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
notice. 6 On October 7, 1997, respondents filed their comment. 7 In the main, respondents submit that

contempt is criminal in character and their exoneration from a charge of contempt amounts to an acquittal
from which an appeal would not lie. 8
At issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred, as a matter of law, in setting aside the order of
the SEC finding respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying its temporary restraining order to desist from holding
the annual stockholders meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation scheduled on July 9, 1996.
We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. 9 The

exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a
court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity
of the court. 10
Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents was civil in nature, as the temporary restraining order
the SEC issued was for the benefit of a party to a case. The contention is untenable.
"Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings
for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required." 11 "In

general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or
someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected." 12 If the contempt is initiated by the
court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the
proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases.
The State is the real prosecutor. 13
"The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant
purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when
the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial." 14
"But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal, for instance, is a bar to
a second prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining the character of punishment to be
administered." 15
In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the dignity and power of the
Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an
exoneration from, a charge of contempt." 16
At any rate, the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt was highly
improper. The Court of Appeals issued on July 8, 1996, a temporary restraining order against the order of the SEC of
June 28, 1996 directing the Interport Resources Corporation to desist from holding the stockholders' meeting on July
9, 1996. Contrary to the view of petitioners, the effect of the temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals
directing the SEC to desist from enforcing its own TRO was to allow such meeting to proceed as scheduled. More,
the Court of Appeals in its final decision nullified the SEC's order. 17 Hence, there was no willful disobedience to

a lawful order of the SEC. Respondents were not guilty of contempt.

While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, 18 the salutary rule is that the power to punish for

contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, 19 and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. 20 The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must
exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. 21
In this case, the SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte. There was no charge filed by a private party
aggrieved by the acts of respondents. Strictly speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's temporary
restraining order. The Court of Appeals enjoined that order. Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the
scheduled stock-holders' meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful disobedience to an order of the
SEC. 22 The disobedience which the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at

bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience.

23

The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. The chairman and commissioners of the
SEC must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint. 24
Finally, the penalty imposed exceeded those authorized in the powers of the SEC 25 in relation to the 1964

Revised Rules of Court as amended. 26 If the contempt was committed against a superior court or judge,
the accused may be fined not exceeding thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) or imprisoned not more than
six (6) months, or both. The SEC suspended respondent Manalaysay from the practice of law in the SEC,
a power vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals in GA-G.R. SP No. 41400, promulgated on April 14, 1997.
1wphi1.nt

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771. May 27, 2004]

SALVADOR SISON, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR.,

Presiding Judge, and TEODORO S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch 253, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer, filed a
verified Complaint dated October 12, 1999, charging Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
Jr. and Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City,
Branch 253, with grave abuse of authority.
[1]

In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order dated September 15,

1999 in Criminal Case No. 99-002 which the respondent judge issued,
requiring the complainant to appear before him to explain a traffic incident
involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads, thus:
[2]

[3]

Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on
September 8, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized
driver, while on board the official car of the undersigned on an official errand was
flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue while he was
positioning the car he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right turn;

that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that swerving to the right lane was
prohibited when it appeared that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily
visible to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as the authorized
driver of the undersigned, his son in fact, and showed to the accused the calling card
of the undersigned with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof introducing the
bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and accordingly
begged that he be allowed to proceed on his way considering that there was no danger
to limb, life and property occasioned by his alleged traffic violation; that
notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the drivers
license of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to
somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before.
The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his
arrogance and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation
accorded to a court of law and/or its representative but is one constitutive of indirect
contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
specially considering that the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court
was then on official errand.
WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four (24) hours from receipt
hereof, the accused is ordered to show cause why he should not be cited as in
contempt of court and dealt with accordingly. The Branch Sheriff of this Court is
authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order upon the accused immediately
and to make a return of his proceedings thereon. After receipt of this Order, the
accused is ordered to personally file his comment in Court, within the period allowed
him herein.
SO ORDERED.

[4]

Because of the complainants failure to appear before the respondent

judge as directed, the latter, after verifying that the said order was duly served
on the complainant, issued another Order dated September 22, 1999 for the
complainants arrest and commitment, and for the latter to appear for hearing
before his sala on September 29, 1999. The respondent sheriff then served
the order on the complainant. On the scheduled hearing, the complainant
appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to the court that he made a
[5]

[6]

mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding. The respondent judge,

thereafter, lifted the September 22, 1999 Order.
[7]

In his complaint, the complainant alleged inter alia the following:

6. That on September 28, 1999, at around 6:00 P.M., the undersigned complainant was
greatly surprised when respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came and arrested him
without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the respondent Judge, and he was
ordered to board a motor vehicle and was brought to the respondent Judge in Las Pias
City who ordered him detained in the Las Pias City Jail. When he was arrested, he
was not able to call his family to inform them where he was because he failed to
return home in the evening;
7. That the next day, September 29, 1999, respondent Teodoro Alvarez informed him
that there will be a hearing of his indirect contempt charge before the sala of the
respondent Judge in Las Pias City. During the hearing, the complainant was made to
admit by the respondent Judge that he made a mistake in apprehending his driverson[,] conscious that he committed the gravest abuse of his authority, and perhaps in
anticipation of the legal action the undersigned complainant may take against him
after he is discharged from detention. Thus, after the complainant admitted his
mistakes under duress, and upon appeal by his counsel assuring the respondent Judge
that the same incident may not be repeated, the complainant was ordered discharged
from detention at around 3:30 P.M. on September 29, 1999;
8. That the undersigned complainant did not know of any offense he had committed,
except for his issuing a traffic violation receipt to the driver-son of the respondent
Judge which he is tasked by law to do so for those found violating traffic rules and
regulations;
9. That if the act of issuing a traffic violation receipt for a traffic violation within the
city limits of Mandaluyong City by the complainant is considered by the respondents
as an offense, then complainant should be tried for the said offense in Mandaluyong
City, and not in Las Pias City where the respondent judge has no jurisdiction;
10. That to the ordinary and lowly understanding of the undersigned complainant, the
acts of respondents in arresting him without any warrant of arrest before a charge of

indirect contempt is heard constitute the gravest ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ever

committed by the respondents; and
11. That the manner the respondents are administering justice in Las Pias City is
despotic and barbaric in the sense that they take the law into their own hands without
due regard for the rights of the others.
[8]

The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily

dismissed from the service.
In his comment, the respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations
against him, contending that he was merely preserving the dignity and honor
due to the courts of law. The respondent narrated that on September 8, 1999,
he ordered his son, Jose R. Caoibes III, to go to the Pasig City Regional Trial
Court to secure certain records. While on his way there, he was flagged down
by the complainant for an alleged traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to the
complainant that he was on an errand for his father, the respondent judge, to
which the complainant reportedly uttered, Walang Judge, Judge Caoibes sa
akin; kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko.
The respondent judge also alleged that he initiated the complaint for
contempt pursuant to the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:
a) Section 3(d) and Section 4 of Rule 71; b) Section 5(c) of Rule 135; and, c)
the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 71.
According to the respondent judge, the complainants allegation that he
failed to contact any relative is belied by the fact that during the hearing
of September 29, 1999, the complainant was assisted by Atty. Eduardo P.
Flores of the MMDA, as evidenced by the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the proceedings. The respondent prayed that the instant
complaint be dismissed for lack of legal or factual basis.
[9]

For his part, the respondent sheriff admitted that he personally served
copies of the respondent judges orders on the complainant, but averred that
he was merely performing his duties as deputy sheriff of the court. As such, he
did not commit grave abuse of authority in the performance of his functions.
[10]

Thereafter, the complainant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng

Pagbawi ng Reklamo dated November 26, 2002, where he indicated that he
was no longer interested in pursuing the administrative complaint against the
respondent judge. The complainant recanted his earlier claim, averring that
the respondent judges son did not in fact enter a one-way street and that he
was standing by the September 29, 1999 Affidavit he executed during the
hearing. He then requested that his complaint be duly withdrawn.
[11]

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Court, in

a Resolution dated April 2, 2003, resolved to (a) dismiss the instant
administrative complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez for lack of merit; and
(b) refer the matter against respondent Judge Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle among the Associate Justices of the
Court, and for investigation, report and recommendation. The case was raffled
to Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin. The Investigating Justice, thereafter,
submitted his Sealed Report dated February 26, 2004.
[12]

[13]

According to the Investigating Justice, although the complainant never

appeared to prove the charges against the respondent judge, the facts
averred in the complaint appear to be substantially correct and true. Thus, the
respondent judge abused his authority to charge and punish any person for
indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Investigating Justice recommended that the respondent be admonished and
warned, pursuant to Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
Section 11(c) of the same rule.
[14]

The respondent judge anchors the justification of his acts against the
complainant on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel,
a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in
his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a

court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any
real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters
or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending
such proceedings.
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing
with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be
used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from
callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to
comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed
by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect
or interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the
public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which
are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of
society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves. And, as in all
[15]

[16]

other powers of the court, the contempt power, however plenary it may seem,
must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow
himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.
[17]

[18]

At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in
holding the complainant for contempt, due to the latters refusal to comply with
the judges Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this
Court that the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before
the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the
traffic violation incident involving the respondent judges son. Furthermore, the
record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as
required by the respondent judge, the same was refused by some staff
member in the latters sala.
[19]

In Cortes v. Bangalan, we held that a judge may not hold a party in

contempt of court for expressing concern on the judges impartiality through a
motion for voluntary inhibition, even if the latter may have felt insulted
therein. The Court also declared, thus:
[20]

[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve

order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, judges,
however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for
correction and preservation not for retaliation and vindication.
[21]

We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the

respondent judge should have refrained from ordering the arrest and
detention of the complainant, since the incident involved his own son, and the
matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent judge insisted
that the complainant personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts
as to the motive behind it; as the Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement
of personal filing was deliberately inserted so that the respondent could
confront and harass the complainant.
[22]

We also agree with the following ruminations of Justice Bersamin:

[T]he respondent judge obviously resented the refusal of Sison to let off Caoibes III
from the traffic violation apprehension. The refusal of Sison was apparently
aggravated by the sons reporting to the father that Sison had supposedly made the
remarks of Walang judge, judge Caoibes sa akin; Kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli
ko.
...
The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of Sison as
thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect,
courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its representative. First of all,
the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part
of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet know at the time)
because he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of
enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way
street from the wrong direction,regardless of the office or position of the violators
father. Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the circumspection expected
of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes IIIs
attempt to bluff his way out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC
judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for contempt
of court. And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the
issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not
agree with the basis of the apprehension and also administratively charged Sison for
any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on the contrary,
both ultimately accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval
of the drivers license after September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to
the traffic violation, then it follows that the respondent Judge had the consciousness
that his son was at fault, instead of Sison.
[T]he respondent Judge claimed at the hearing that his son was at that time working
with (sic) me as my personal driver; and that his errand was to secure some papers
from the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City involved in a personal case which the
respondent Judge had filed against a bank for specific performance and damages, and
since I just suffered a mild stroke at that time, specifically on June 10, 1999, and the
incident took place (sic) September, I could not at that time personally go to Pasig to
secure the documents I needed for the next hearing of the case so I had to send my
son.

The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by
which to consider Sisons apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. As indicated
earlier, the act complained against mustbe any of those specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which
requires that the person obstructed should be performing a duty connected with
judicial functions. As such, the respondent Judge acted oppressively and vindictively.
Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would even propose herein that
Caoibes III, already 25 years at the time of the apprehension, was serving his father as
the latters personal driver, albeit not officially employed in the Judiciary. Most likely,
therefore, Caoibes III might not be doing anything for his father at the time of his
apprehension but was in the place for his own purposes.
[23]

The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner

which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of
Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge
should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. The very delicate function of administering justice
demands that a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which
would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the
visible representation of the law. The irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid
all impropriety and the appearance thereof.
[24]

[25]

[26]

We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be merely

reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to the improper
use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine,
amounts to grave abuse of authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in
such cases ranges from a fine of P2,500; one months salary; suspension
from the service without pay for a period of three months; and even the
ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service.
[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the respondent judge was

previously sanctioned by the Court for violating Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, where he was meted a fine of P20,000. He was found
guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering fistic blows on
a complainant judge. To our mind, the instant case falls under similar conduct,
[31]

which the Court avowed would be dealt with more severely if repeated, and of
which the respondent was duly warned. The respondent was, likewise, found
guilty of gross ignorance of procedural law and unreasonable delay in the
issuance of an order of execution, where he was meted a fine of P30,000;
and delay in resolving a motion to dismiss in a civil case pending before his
sala where he was, likewise, fined P40,000.
[32]

[33]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.,

Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious
impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
This decision is immediately executory. The respondent is ORDERED to
cease and desist from discharging the functions of his Office. Let a copy of
this Decision be entered in the respondents personnel records.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
JUDGE
DOLORES
L. G.R. No. 150949
*
ESPAOL, Presiding
Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Present:
Dasmarias,Cavite,
Petitioner,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO Promulgated:
and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and
MARLY SEE,Respondents.
June 21, 2007
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the

Decision[1] dated September 12, 2001 and Resolution dated November 15, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.

The facts are:

On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from
Evanswinda Morales a piece of land consisting of 33,130 square meters in
Paliparan, Dasmarias,Cavite. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece
Martires City.
Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latters
workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the
caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that
spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title
and found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses
Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.
On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
90, Dasmarias, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No.
2035-00.Impleaded as defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and
the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents
relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Espaol,
petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and
treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso,
respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it
(Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently,
petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their
confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.

Petitioners Order is partly reproduced as follows:

From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so
holds that the instant case is a callous and blatant imposition of lies,
falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations, through the
extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its
former counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C.
Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who connived with this private
group on one hand, and some officials and employees of the
government agencies responsible for the processing and issuance of
spurious or falsified titles, on the other. Unless these fraudulent
operations are put to a complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the
mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of
falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25
SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges be filed
against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C.
Morales. Thus, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice for their
appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of
this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidants Office, Supreme
Court. Manila.
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons
Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso,
counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in
contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious
documents in the pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the
instant case filed before this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants of
Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents who should serve ten
(10) days of detention at the Dasmarias Municipal Jail, Cavite.
Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under
TCT No. T-511462 allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, being
spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from another
spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda
C. Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property
No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of
this Order be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its implementation
with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the Assessors

Office of the Municipality of Dasmarias, Cavite, to stave off the

proliferation of these spurious instruments.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas, the private defendants
counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are likewise
dismissed. However, the said private defendants are not precluded from
pursuing their rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for
quieting of title, she stumbled upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title
and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge
Lucenito N. Tagle.[2] Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judges Decision
declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that
respondents are responsible therefor.

On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They
were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite. That same day,
respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. But they
were denied outright by petitioner.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition.
On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant
petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. Respondent
judges July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein petitioners in
direct contempt and ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well
as the Warrant of Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of
Commitment, dated July 13, 2001, which the respondent judge issued
against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Espaol erred in taking cognizance of the
Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not
offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as
the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted
a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as
charged.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in its Resolution of November 15, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents
are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons
filed its complaint for quieting of title.
The early case of In re Jones[3] defined contempt of court as some act or conduct
which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some
lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which
in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court
and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same. It has also been described as a
defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with
or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation.[4] Simply put, it is
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court.[5]
The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in
the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch,
and to scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign. [6] This concept was
adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications. In this
jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the
very stability of the judicial institution. [7] Such stability is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very administration of
justice.[8]
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of

misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn
or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in
contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if
it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or
by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

In Narcida v. Bowen,[9] this Court characterized direct contempt as one done

in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of
justice. It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished summarily
without hearing.[10] In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct
contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act
of contumely.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under
Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as
such without authority;
(f)

Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the

custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court
held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the
court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from
holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting

of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference
with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any
improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.[11]
We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a
contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct
contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper conduct which
degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch VI,[12] we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where
the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect
contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the
proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be
punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been
given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel. [13] Moreover, settled is the

rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a
criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction.[14] Thus, the
modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are
assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.
[15]
Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are
guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have
conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took judicial
notice of the Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92, assigned to another RTC branch,
presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government,
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In Gener v. De Leon,[16] we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been
tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we reiterate that petitioner took judicial
notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof,
concluded that respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax
declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of
Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of
court.
Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of
Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has become
moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting the required bail as
ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a
person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail
is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.[17]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205956

February 12, 2014

P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a petition filed on
December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng
La'O (La O) is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is her
counsel therein.
1

G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265
(RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident which
transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent LaO), Francis Xavier Manzano, and
Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center, which
incident was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).
In G.R. No. 199462, LaO, together with the other petitioners, prayed, among others, that the resolution of the Office
of the Ombudsman downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set aside; that the
corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the

death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative
publicity for him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, LaO and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and
one Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press
conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling
G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding
Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN news program. Marantan quotes a
portion of the interview, as follows:
2

Atty. Diokno
So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police
officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero
ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Ernesto Manzano
Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang
ginawa nila, sila mismo na ang nagbigay ng hatol.
Monique Cu-Unjieng Lao
Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x
he is already so arrogant because they protected him all these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so
confident of what he did, I mean confident of murdering so many innocent individuals.
Atty. Diokno
Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and company have never been disciplined, suspended
or jailed for their participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by their superiors and some like
Marantan were even promoted to our consternation and disgust. Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we filed a
Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc.
hangang ngayon wala pa pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag charge ng homicide
lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
Atty. Diokno
Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the policemen who killed them led by Supt. Hansel
Marantan the same man who is involved in the Atimonan killings still roam free and remain unpunished. Mr.
President, while we are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that police rub-out will not stop until you personally
intervene.
Ernesto Manzano
Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
Monique Cu-Unjieng Lao

Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with us, I mean everything shows that they were
murdered.
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt under
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending
directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements
and malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed, but
also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his co-accused are
guilty of murder. It is Marantas position that the press conference was organized by the respondents for the sole
purpose of influencing the decision of the Court in the petition filed before it and the outcome of the criminal cases
before the RTC by drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the Atimonan incident.
The respondents, in their Comment, argue that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were
legitimate expressions of their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the
utterances were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that
this petition is intended to stifle legitimate speech.
3

The petition must fail.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may
render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
4

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in
criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.
5

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with
and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the
court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should
be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.
7

1wphi1

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by
publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper
constitutional boundary between these two rights.
10

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and
present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired
through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make
a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely,
threat.
11

The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly the
guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their
loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which
precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of
the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend
to, influence the Court.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it
had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had
passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity
of the Court either.
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press
merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in such a case, it
must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice." By no stretch of the imagination could
the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No criminal intent to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents.
12

Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases. The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be
resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. In the present case, such necessity is wanting.
13

14

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182738

February 24, 2014

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL O. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 13, 2008
Decision and April 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100911, which affirmed the
September 3, 2007 Resolution of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226.
1

The relevant facts are as follows:

On July 1, 2002, respondent Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country
Club, Inc. (Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and

the special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002. Petitioners, along with their co-defendants, filed an Answer with
Counterclaims and, thereafter, a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants Affirmative Defenses, which was
denied on August 9, 2002 by Hon. Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 93, now a member of the Court of Appeals.
4

On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which the court granted
in an Order dated September 10, 2002 directing, thus:
On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and pursuant to Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, in relation to Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
defendants are ordered to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following
documents:
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants;
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub of
the stock certificate; and
4. The tape recording of the stockholders meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.
The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in the office premises of defendant corporation
within reasonable business hours of a business day before the pre-trial with costs to be shouldered by the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) of the August 9, 2002 Order, which denied their motion for
preliminary hearing. Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to Defendants Motion for Reconsideration, attaching
therewith an alleged certification issued by the National Printing Office to support their contention of lack of cause of
action on the grounds, among others, that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Memorandum Circular
No. 5, Series of 1996, as amended, has not been duly published in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Pending
resolution of the MR, petitioners filed on January 21, 2003 a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the
September 10, 2002 Order.
9

10

11

For his part, respondent, on October 7, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion to immediately allow him to inspect and
photocopy the documents and to compel petitioners to deposit with the court the documents subject of the September
10, 2002 Order.
On December 9, 2002, then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Order denying petitioners MR of the Order dated
August 9, 2002 and considered respondents omnibus motion as a reiteration of his earlier motion for inspection and
production of documents; thus, the immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order was simultaneously
ordered.
12

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated August 9, 2002 and
December 9, 2002. However, the CA denied the same in its Decision dated June 29, 2004. Petitioners MR was
likewise denied on November 3, 2004. A petition for review was filed before this Court, but We denied it per
Resolution dated January 10, 2005.
In the meantime, respondent sought to enforce the September 10, 2002 Order. The supposed inspection on
September 30, 2002 was not held per the trial courts Order dated September 27, 2002. The January 22, 2003
inspection also did not push through after petitioners and their co-defendants again moved for its deferment. When
13

14

the court eventually denied their motion on June 16, 2003, respondent set the inspection to August 1, 2003. On said
date, however, Atty. Matias V. Defensor, then Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged to be out of town
and petitioner Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman) purported to have shown no willingness to comply with the
directive. The matter was reported to the trial court, which merely noted respondents Report and Manifestation. On
November 3, 2003, respondent moved for the issuance of an order for immediate implementation of the September
10, 2002 Order, as reiterated in the Order dated June 16, 2003, but the court denied the same in its May 24, 2004
Order. Respondents motion for issuance of writ of execution suffered the same fate when the trial court denied it on
February 10, 2005.
15

16

17

18

19

When this Court settled petitioners challenge to the Orders dated August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002, respondent
filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion for Clarification and to Resolve Plaintiffs Pending Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Execution and to Set the Case for Pre-Trial Conference. Acting thereon, Judge Ramon Paul L.
Hernando, likewise now a member of the Court of Appeals, who took over Branch 93 after the appointment of Judge
Bruselas to the CA, issued the July 10, 2006 Order, which directed the immediate execution of the September 10,
2002 Order, and set the case for pre-trial.
20

21

On February 9, 2007, Judge Hernando issued an Order inhibiting himself from handling the case in view of his
"close friendship relation" with petitioners counsel and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office
of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another sala. The case was subsequently re-raffled to RTC Branch 90 presided by
Judge Reynaldo B. Daway, who likewise voluntarily recused himself from the case per Order dated July 13, 2007.
Finally, on July 30, 2007, the case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 226 presided by Judge Leah S. Domingo Regala.
22

23

24

On November 28, 2006, the parties agreed to defer the pre-trial conference until the actual conduct of the inspection
of records/documents on December 12, 2006. Before said date, however, petitioners and their co-defendants moved
to hold the inspection to January 11, 2007, which the court granted.
25

26

During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced by the Acting Corporate Secretary, Atty. Antonio
V. Meriz, and one of the staff, Malou Santos, was the Stock and Transfer Book of the Corporation. They alleged that
they could not find from the corporate records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the
tape recordings taken during the stockholders meetings, and that they needed more time to locate and find the list of
stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the Corporation. This prompted respondent to file a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that an order be issued in accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to
(d) of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court (Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
27

On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Resolution, the concluding portion of which ordered:
In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the order dated September 10, 2002,
this Court reiterates the said order:
"On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and pursuant to Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies[,] in relation to Rule 27 of the 1997 Rule[s] of Civil Procedure,
the defendants are ordered to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the
following documents:
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants;
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub of
the stock certificate; and

4. The tape recording of the stockholders meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.
The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in the office premises of defendant corporation
within reasonable business hours of a business day before the pre-trial with costs to be shouldered by the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED."
This Court orders the defendants to strictly comply with this order. Failure of the defendants to comply with all the
requirements of the order dated September 10, 2002 will result in this court citing all the defendants in contempt of
court. This Court shall order defendants solidarily to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay to comply with
the order of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall have fully and completely complied with the said order.
Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court find that defendants have been in bad faith in
complying with the order of September 10, 2002 despite the order of this Court.
Both plaintiff and counsel, as well as defendants and counsel, are therefore ordered to meet on November 13, 2007
at the corporate offices of defendant firm between 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. so that faithful compliance with the order of
September 10, 2002 may be done, otherwise, this Court shall allow the plaintiff to present evidence to prove their
prayer in their Manifestation with Omnibus Motion filed on January 31, 2007 and issue a resolution based on the
same accordingly.
SO ORDERED.

28

Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for Certiorari (With Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction). In resolving the petition, the CA ruled that there is no indication that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. According to the appellate
court, the September 3, 2007 Resolution was issued pursuant to Section 3, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, with the
suppletory application of Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules. It noted that, except for the sanctions contained therein,
the assailed Resolution merely reiterated the September 10, 2002 Order of Judge Bruselas, which petitioners did not
dispute in accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules or via petition for certiorari. The CA further held
that petitioners were not denied due process as they were able to move for a reconsideration of the September 10,
2002 Order, but not opted to file the same with respect to the September 3, 2007 Resolution.
29

30

31

32

Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for contempt of court and the possible payment of
a hefty fine, the CA opined that the case of Dee v. Securities and Exchange Commission cited by petitioners is
inapplicable, since the September 3, 2007 Resolution merely warned petitioners that they would be cited for contempt
and be fined if they fail to comply with the courts directive. Moreover, it said that the penalty contained in the
September 3, 2007 Resolution is in accord with Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, in relation to Section 3, Rule
29 of the Rules.
33

34

Petitioners moved to reconsider the CA Decision, but it was denied.

35

36

Before Us, petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize them sua sponte or
without regard to the guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge Sardido is not proper and calls for
the exercise of Our power of supervision over the lower courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay, among
others, they claim that the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness
or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.
37

38

We deny.
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for
39

40

indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of
a party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply
with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing
agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or
photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options
given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."
Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, We said:
41

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes
serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part
thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or
agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel
discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;
refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts
thereof; staying further proceedings.
42

If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both. In this case, the threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily
pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the
allowable range of penalty.
43

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen is instructive:
44

x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the
court; or (2) by a verified petition.
In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. (Calimlim)
clarified the procedure prescribed for indirect contempt proceedings. We held in that case:
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the
opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the
charge and consider respondents answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.
(Citations omitted.)
As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that is, through a verified petition, the rule is
already settled in Regalado v. Go:
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has
complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second
paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.
The Rules itself is explicit on this point:
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to
a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have the duty to ensure that all
the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It behooves them too to docket the petition,
and to hear and decide it separately from the main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the
contempt proceedings and the main action.
But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do
not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified
petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her
right to due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to
explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to explain their failure to bring the accused before the
RTC for his scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was not yet sufficient to initiate the
contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount to a show-cause order directing the petitioners to explain why
they should not be cited in contempt. The formal charge has to be specific enough to inform the person, against
whom contempt proceedings are being conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise, he or she will
be cited in contempt. The Order must express this in clear and unambiguous language.
xxxx
Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear
and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much less to exercise the discretion to order the
consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from any party to be docketed, heard and decided separately from the
main case precisely because it is the show-cause order that initiated the proceedings.
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is
the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to due process of the party
being cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer
to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must
consider the respondents answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished accordingly.
xxxx
In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to defend himself or herself and have a day in court
a basic requirement of due process. This is especially so in indirect contempt proceedings, as the court cannot
decide them summarily pursuant to the Rules of Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt
proceedings, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him or her, and there
must be a hearing, and the court must investigate the charge and consider the respondents answer.
45

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Courts mind, the September 3,
2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or
final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein
only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue
order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of
another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect
contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
1wphi1

Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt," this would still not work to petitioners advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the
proper remedy from a judgment in indirect contempt proceedings. It states:

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall
not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from
which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the
judgment or final order.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged in indirect
contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its
suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007
Resolution final and executory.
46

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The March 13, 2008 Decision and April 28,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100911, which affirmed the September 3, 2007
Resolution of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINEISLANDS,

G.R. No. 180699

Petitioner,
- versus -

Present:

VELASCO, JR., J.,*

NACHURA,**
Acting Chairman,
LABOR ARBITER RODERICK
JOSEPH CALANZA, SHERIFF
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,***
ENRICO Y. PAREDES, AMELIA
ENRIQUEZ, and REMO L. SIA, BRION,**** and
Respondents.

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 13, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by petitioner Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) against respondents Labor Arbiter
Roderick Joseph Calanza (LA Calanza), Sheriff Enrico Y. Paredes
(Sheriff Paredes), Amelia Enriquez (Enriquez), and Remo L. Sia
(Sia).

The case stemmed from the following facts:

Enriquez and Sia were the branch manager and the assistant
branch manager, respectively, of Bacolod-Singcang Branch of
petitioner. On September 3, 2003, they were dismissed from
employment on grounds of breach of trust and confidence and
dishonesty. The following day, they filed separate complaints for

illegal dismissal against petitioner before the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No.
VI, Bacolod City.[1]

After the submission of their respective position papers,

Executive LA Danilo C. Acosta rendered a decision on March 29,
2004, finding that Enriquez and Sia had been illegally dismissed
from employment. The dispositve portion of LA Acostas decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises
hereby rendered as follows:

considered,

judgment

is

1.
DECLARING that complainants were illegally
dismissed by respondents;

2.
ORDERING
respondents
to
reinstate
complainants to their former position without loss of
seniority rights and to pay them their corresponding full
back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits as
computed, in the sum of Pesos: ONE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED
SEVENTY-THREE
THOUSAND,
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR AND
50/100ONLY (P1,173,434.50).[2]

Pursuant to the aforesaid decision, Enriquez and Sia were

reinstated in petitioners payroll.[3]

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that

petitioner had just cause to terminate Enriquez and Sia. Hence, it

reversed and set aside the LA decision and, although it dismissed

the complaint, it ordered petitioner to give the dismissed
employees financial assistance equivalent to one-half months pay
for every year of service. [4] In view of this decision, petitioner
stopped the payroll reinstatement.[5]

Enriquez and Sia elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals

(CA), but failed to obtain a favorable decision. On November 30,
2005, the appellate court affirmed in totothe NLRC decision. The
case eventually reached this Court and was docketed as G.R. No.
172812.

During the pendency of the petition before this Court,

Enriquez and Sia filed a Motion for Partial Execution [6] of the LA
decision dated March 29, 2004. Citing Roquero v. Philippine
Airlines,[7] they claimed that the reinstatement aspect of the LA
decision was immediately executory during the entire period that
the case was on appeal.

In an Order[8] dated October 13, 2007, LA Calanza granted

Enriquez and Sias motion despite the opposition of petitioner. He
opined that so long as there is no finality yet of the decision
reversing a ruling of the lower tribunal (in this case, the LA)
awarding reinstatement, the same should be enforced.
Considering that the case was then pending before this Court, he
sustained Enriquez and Sias claim, applying the cases
of Roquero and Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora.[9] The
corresponding writ of execution was subsequently issued. [10] Upon
service of the writ, Sheriff Paredes served on petitioner a notice of
sale of a parcel of land owned by petitioner to satisfy its
obligation.[11]

Aggrieved, petitioner immediately filed an Urgent Petition for

Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the NLRC,

Fourth Division, Cebu City. On November 26, 2007, the NLRC
issued a TRO.[12]

Disappointed with the conduct of LA Calanza, Sheriff

Paredes, Enriquez, and Sia, and in view of the pendency of G.R.
No. 172812, entitled Enriquez v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,
[13]
before this Court, petitioner instituted the present petition for
indirect contempt. Petitioner avers that LA Calanzas Order
granting Enriquez and Sias motion for partial writ of execution
preempts the decision of this Court and eventually results in the
payment of Enriquez and Sia's claims which may be contrary to
this Courts conclusion. Petitioner adds that respondents
obstinately persist in applying jurisprudence which is clearly
inapplicable. Finally, petitioner argues that the execution
proceedings were done with undue haste that petitioner was not
given an opportunity to submit evidence in its defense to stop the
execution. These, according to petitioner, clearly indicate utter
disrespect to the Court and are grounds to cite respondents in
indirect contempt.

Meanwhile, on February 12, 2008, this Court rendered a

Decision in G.R. No. 172812, denying the petition filed by
Enriquez and Sia, thereby sustaining the NLRC and the CAs
conclusion that Enriquez and Sia were validly dismissed from
employment by petitioner.

In a decision[14] dated June 30, 2008, the NLRC, Fourth

Division, Cebu City, granted BPIs petition for injunction, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted below:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated 12 October

2007 issued by public respondent Labor Arbiter granting

the Writ of Execution is declared NULL and VOID. The Writ
of Execution issued in pursuance to said Order is likewise
declared NULL and VOID. Public respondent Labor Arbiter
Roderick Joseph B. Calanza, and any person acting for and
in his behalf, is DIRECTED to take no further action in
pursuance of the aforementioned Order and Writ of
Execution.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by this

Commission dated 12 December 2007 is hereby MADE
PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.[15]

On
October
27,
2008,
LA
Calanza
issued
an
[16]
Order
considering the case closed and terminated based on
Enriquez and Sias manifestation and motion to dismiss in view of
the satisfaction and full payment of their claims.

Hence, the only issue that is left unsettled is whether or not

respondents are guilty of indirect contempt.

Indirect contempt of court is governed by Section 3, Rule 71

of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing.-After a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court

and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of

any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance
of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any
real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or
in any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person
adjudged
to
be
entitled
thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of a court held by him. x x x.

Do the acts of respondents Enriquez and Sia in filing a

motion for partial execution; of LA Calanza in granting the writ of
execution and applying or not applying established jurisprudence;
and of Sheriff Paredes in serving the notice of sale of the real
property owned by petitioner fall under the above enumeration?

We answer in the negative.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court

by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts
order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the
court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice. [17] It is a
defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their
witnesses during litigation.[18]

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts

and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice. [19] However, such power should be
exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive, principle.
Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in
order to retain that respect, without which the administration of
justice will falter or fail. [20] Only in cases of clear and
contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised.

Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should

not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. [21]

It is true that, at the time of the filing by Enriquez and Sia of

the motion for the partial execution of the LA decision which
directed their reinstatement, the decision had already been
reversed by the NLRC, and such reversal was affirmed by the
CA. The case was then on appeal to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We find
that their motion for partial execution was a bona fide attempt to
implement what they might have genuinely believed they were
entitled to in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.
[22]
This is especially true in the instant case where the means of
livelihood of the dismissed employees was at stake. Any man in
such an uncertain and economically threatened condition would
be expected to take whatever measures are available to ensure a
means of sustenance for himself and his family. [23] Clearly,
Enriquez and Sia were merely pursuing a claim which they
honestly believed was due them. Their act is far from being
contumacious.

On the other hand, LA Calanza, on motion of Enriquez and

Sia, issued the writ of execution considering that at the time of
the application of the writ, this Court had yet to decide G.R. No.
172812. LA Calanza opined that so long as there is no finality yet
of the decision reversing a ruling of the LA awarding
reinstatement, the same should be enforced. This was how he
interpreted
this
Courts
pronouncements
[24]
[25]
in Roquero
and Zamora;
that
even
if
the
order
of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal
until reversal by the higher court.

But as we clearly discussed in Bago v. National Labor

Relations Commission,[26] while it is true that the reinstatement

aspect of the LA decision is immediately executory, the reversal

thereof by the NLRC becomes final and executory after ten (10)
days from receipt thereof by the parties. That the CA may take
cognizance of and resolve a petition for the nullification of the
NLRC decision on jurisdictional and due process considerations
does not affect the statutory finality of the NLRC decision. It then
logically follows that, at the time of the application for the
writ since the Court eventually sustained the NLRC and the CA
decisions in G.R. No. 172812 no issue of payroll reinstatement
may be considered at all after the reversal of the LA decision by
the NLRC.

Still, the erroneous issuance of the writ of execution by LA

Calanza can only be deemed grave abuse of discretion which is
more properly the subject of a petition forcertiorari and not a
petition for indirect contempt. [27] No one who is called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. [28]

Finally, Sheriff Paredes, in serving the notice of sale, was

only performing his duty pursuant to the writ of execution. No
matter how erroneous the writ was, it was issued by LA Calanza
and was addressed to him as the sheriff, commanding him to
collect from petitioner the amount due Enriquez and Sia. In the
event he failed to collect the amount, he was authorized to cause
the satisfaction of the same on the movable and immovable
properties of petitioner not exempt from execution. [29] Thus, any
act performed by Sheriff Paredes pursuant to the aforesaid writ
cannot be considered contemptuous. At the time of the service of
the notice of sale, there was no order from any court or tribunal
restraining him from enforcing the writ. It was ministerial duty for
him to implement it.

To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly

contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A
person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless

the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and

exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or
required.[30]

WHEREFORE,
premises
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

considered,

the

petition

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 208828-29

August 13, 2014

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES,
INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to reverse
and set aside the Decision dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173
and 122024 are concerned, and Resolution dated July 4, 2013 denying petitioner's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. The CA nullified the preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
("intestate court"), Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed said court's Order dated August 18, 2011
declaring the sales and derivative titles over two properties subject of intestate proceedings as null and void.
1

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: The late Beatriz S.
Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia
S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO.
M-2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging several orders ofthe
intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court. To better understand the myriad of factual and
procedural antecedents leading to the instant consolidated case, this court will resolve the petitions in seriatim.
The Petitions

CA-G.R. SP No. 121172

The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO S.
SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order ofthe intestate court dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO
SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a Joint
Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as
administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed
as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator
ensued between SILVERIO SR. and SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of administrator is summarized
below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was removed as administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO, JR.
was designated as the new administrator. A motion for reconsideration was separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and
Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May 2005, the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming
among others, the Order of 3 January 2005. Inthe same Order, the intestate court also granted the motion of
SILVERIO JR. to take his oath as administrator effective upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report
filed by SILVERIO SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the motion filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled the Order granting
letters of administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated SILVERIO SR. as administrator. Then again, the intestate
court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR.
issued an Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006 upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR.
and removed SILVERIO SR., ad administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81
of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above Order whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the other hand, filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. On 28 August 2008, the Court
of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of
the Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private
Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619
challenging the 28 Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11 February 2009, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution denying the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error inthe assailed judgment to warrant
the exercise by the Court of discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO JR.s motion for reconsideration,
the Supreme Court on 11 February 2011, denied the motion with finality. An entry of judgment was made on 29 March
2011.
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as administrator of
the estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued the now challenged Order dated 16 June 2011, the
pertinent portion of the Order reads:

xxxx
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN MILLION PESOS, the same to be approved by this Court,
Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as the Administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio
and to immediately take his oath as such, and exercise his duties and functions as are incumbent under the law upon
the said position. xxx."
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian moved for the
disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the following grounds: (1) Absence of the written
consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. to continue hearing the case considering that he
appeared once as counsel in the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in
favor of SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the
rules against forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYAs Petition for Support and Release of Funds for Medical Support has
not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be presided and decided by
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition.
The movants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the
instant petition.
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties
belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is pertinent to the present petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to grant the following:
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City,
covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes
Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City; and (3) No.
19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to partially settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing the
Administrator to undertake the proper procedure or transferring the titles involved to the name of the estate;
and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3 above to the payment of taxes, interests,
penalties and other charges, if any, and todistribute the residue among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.,

Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II,
Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. SilverioDee in accordance with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of
CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06 September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for
the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 0062011000050 was issued toMonica P. Ocampo. The latter subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc.
(ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with prayer for injunctive relief. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February 2007. On 4 July 2007, the Court issueda Writ of Preliminary
Injunction conditioned upon the posting of the bond in the amount of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIODEE posted the required bond on February 5, 2007 but in an order dated 3 January 2008, the Court ruled that the
bond posted by SILVERIO-DEE failed to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court, however, did not reverse the
ruling granting the injunction but instead ordered SILVERIO-DEE to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court also
increased the bond from two million to ten million. On 29 February 2008, the Court issued a Resolution approving the
ten million bond and issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the Court of Appeals
(Seventh Division) issued a decision reinstating SILVERIO SR. as administrator and declaring the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction permanent in regard to the appointment of administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena
Duces Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect the
titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c)
To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate
Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
SILVERIO JR., their agent or anybody acting in their behalf from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering,
annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents involving
voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving,
alienating, or disposing in favor of any individual or any entity of the subject properties. Subpoena ad
testificandumand duces tecumwas also issued by the intestate court requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO
and ALEXANDRA GARCIA of CITRINE to testify and bring with them any books and documents under their control to
shed light on the circumstances surrounding the transaction involving the properties in question.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2011. On 18
August 2011, the intestate court rendered the now assailed Order the decretal portion of the Order is quoted
hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as VOID:

2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050 in the name of defendant MONICA OCAMPO or any
of her successors-in-interestincluding all derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-2011000190 in the name of ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC. or
any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000190 and all of its derivative titles; and 5. Reinstating the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. AND THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS TO THE INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds ofMakati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 0062010000063, in the name of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and all of its derivative titles; and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223612 in the name of RICARDO C.
SILVERIO, SR. and the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
xxxx

The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before the CA
questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 Order dated June 16, 2011
reinstating Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 (1) Order dated March 23,2011 granting Silverio,
Sr.s application for preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from committing any
act that would affect the titles to the subject properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever deeds,
instruments or any other documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March 23, 2011
which denied Silverio, Jr.s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June
14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary
injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT
and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsiaproperties as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloof which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court hereby disposes and orders the following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172is DENIEDfor lack of merit. Accordingly, the 16 June 2011 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 reinstating MR. RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. as
Administrator is AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly DENIEDfor lack of merit insofar as it questions the 23
March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JRs Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge
Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition is partly GRANTEDin that the Preliminary Injunction issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is herebydeclared NULL and VOID for being issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011 Order declaring
the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia
Property null and void is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration "insofar as its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
122024" praying that the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court be affirmed. By Resolution dated July 4, 2013,
the CA denied his motion for partial reconsideration.
5

Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and
Cambridgeproperties upon the ground that the intestate court cannotannul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction
only and which does not includeresolving issues of ownership. It is asserted that the CA should nothave stopped
there and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate court annulling the sales of the Cambridge and Intsia
properties. In the alternative, should the said sales be upheld, petitioner prays that this Court (1) declare the sales to
be valid only to the extent of 50% net remainder share of the late Beatriz less the corresponding shares therefrom of
petitioner and the other legal compulsory heirs, and (2) order respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of
sales for distribution of the residue among the legal/compulsory heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that the intestate court
should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties to third parties after it itself had authorized
their disposal in partial settlementof the estate, especially so when separate actions assailing the new titles issued to
said third parties were already instituted by petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent of petitioner to the aforesaid sales as the surviving spouses with a 50%
conjugal share in the subject properties, respondents point out that such is belied by the October 31, 2006 Order of
the intestate court, which clearly showed that counsels of all the heirs were present at the hearing of June 16, 2006
and no objection was made by them to the sale of the properties and the partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S.
Silverio, together with the transfer of titles of these properties in the name of the Estate as prayed for in petitioners
Manifestation and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner had not challenged or appealed the said order authorizing
the sale of the subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the day for petitioner to raise this factual issue before this
Court, not to mention that it cannot be ventilated in the present appeal by certiorari as thisCourt is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment contending that the intestate court improperly nullified
the titles despite the fact that the present registered owners, who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
Indeed, a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked and may be cancelled only in a direct proceeding brought for
the purpose. Respondent points out that petitioner himself recognized thata direct action is required to annul a
Torrens title ashe initially instituted two civil complaints before the RTC of Makati City seeking to annul, among others,
the TCTs issued to respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge property. After failing to secure restraining orders in these
two civil cases, petitioner filed in the intestate court his Urgent OmnibusMotion dated February 14, 2011 to annul the
said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case, respondent maintains that it is a buyer of good faith and for value, of
which the intestate court never made a determination nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement
to the Omnibus Motion dated March 4, 2011 contain allegations indicating that respondent ZEE2 was not a buyer in
good faith and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioners act of filing a separate complaint with application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in another court (Civil Case Nos. 11-084 of
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping asthe former also prayedsimilar
primary reliefs and setting up the alleged nullity of the subject deeds of absolute sale as those raised in the Urgent
Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the
prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85 :
6

Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate. In the early case of Godoy vs.
Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled
that: x x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed
of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. Asearly as 1921 in the case of Godoy
vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is
not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under
administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it
is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To
uphold petitioners contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless
the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is therefore
clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication
requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by
the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate courts order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is
anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case
making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator
and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
The CAs ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the properties in question
granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably
conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still good and valid. The fallo of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued is made permanent in regard to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private
Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the saleof the three properties
in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and void.It is axiomatic that it is the
dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those
rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.

From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court when it
ordered the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID citing as justification the decision
of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No. 97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was made
permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus
Order that upheld the grant of letters of administrationby SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as
administrator and nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court in its Order dated 23 March 2011 and challenged by
SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion as it was directed
against acts which were already [fait]accompli. The preliminary injunction sought to: 1) restrain SILVERIO JR., their
agents, or anybody acting in their behalf or any person from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
subject properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining the Register of Deeds
of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any giving due course to whatever
deeds, instruments or any other documents involving voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have the effect of
transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating or disposing in favor of any individual or any entity
the above-enumerated properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the records
show that when the preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed properties were
already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC. (Emphasis supplied.)
7

We affirm the CA.

It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court acting upon pending
motions filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son, respectively, who are the central figures in the
now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in
appointing as administrator of the estate petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming
more evident to the intestate court as the proceedings suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed by
Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject properties and partially settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity came
when the heirs represented by their respective counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), weagree with the CA that the permanent
injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October
31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by
respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same
Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on
February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.s motion for reconsideration of the
February 11, 2009 Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).
1wphi1

The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court annulling the sale of the
subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine
and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having
relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order
dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July 4, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are

respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion
to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal10 of
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in
1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested
rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the
facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled
to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting
the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent
and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the

Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate
children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of
the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee,
"shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

35

Rodolfo later filed a

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be

retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as
contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible
that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of

the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in
the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should
be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change
the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie,
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified
the law already established through judicial precedent.
1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is

considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the coowner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse
of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or
Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 177099

- versus SEBASTIAN AGTARAP,

JOSEPHAGTARAP, TERESA
AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
ABELARDO DAGORO,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 177192

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH

Promulgated:
AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP,
WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
June 8, 2011
DAGORO,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners

Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)[1] and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo),[2] assailing
the Decision dated November 21, 2006[3] and the Resolution dated March 27,
2007[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.
The antecedent facts and proceedings
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate
of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 94-4055.
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964
in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin
contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), [5] and second with
Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had
three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three
children, namely, Gloria,[6] Joseph, and Teresa[7]). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926. They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
(survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels
of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had
been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for
himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as
special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their
civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he
prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory
heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning
and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance
with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into
possession those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.

On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for
initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting
the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as
special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that
the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and
that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the
subject properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house
were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant)
was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They
opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds:
(1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is
minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best
interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular
administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as
regular administrator of Joaquins estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of
administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention,
alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him
as her husband. He also averred that there is a need to appoint a special
administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is not the person best
qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their
respective proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an
Order of Partition,[8] with the following disposition
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed
projects of partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate
as early as 1965, and there being no claim in Court against the estate of
the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently
ripe for distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad
Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.

Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired

during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No.
(38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent
was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict
by evidence other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the
estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory
heirs thereunder.
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just
accounting of his administration from his date of assumption up to the
year ending December 31, 1996 per Financial and Accounting Report
dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by the Court. The accounting
report included the income earned and received for the period and the
expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the
widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which
was duly approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998
the deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the
following:
I LAND:
Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030
Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
38254 and 38255 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL VALUE AMOUNT

38254 745-B-1 1,335 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,675,000.00

38255 745-B-2 1,331 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,655,000.00
TOTAL------------------------------------------------------------P13,330,000.00
II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ------------------------------ P350,000.00
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) ----------------------------- 320,000.00
Building Improvements -------------------------------------- 97,500.00
Restaurant ------------------------------------------------------ 80,000.00
TOTAL --------------------------------------------------------- P847,500.00

TOTAL
NET
----------------------------------------- P14,177,500.00

WORTH

WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN

AGTARAP with a total value of P14,177,500.00, together with whatever
interest from bank deposits and all other incomes or increments thereof
accruing after the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after
deducting therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other
expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as
follows:
TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00
CARIDAD AGTARAP of the estate as her conjugal
share P7,088,750.00, the other half of P7,088,750.00 to be divided
among the compulsory heirs as follows:
1) JOSE (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
4) SEBASTIAN - P1,181,548.30
5) EDUARDO - P1,181,548.30
6) CARIDAD - P1,181,548.30
The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount
of P1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and
Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and
Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.
TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66
JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66
WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P236,291.66
EDUARDO AGTARAP - P236,291.66
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:
COMPULSORY HEIRS:
1) GLORIA (deceased) represented by Walter de Santos
- P295,364.57
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P295,364.57
3) TERESA AGTARAP - P295,364.57

4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - P295,364.57

Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57.
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the
first marriage stand to receive the total amount of:
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
2) TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
3) WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
P7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share
P1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
Total of P8,270,208.30
b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros

d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the

surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
P1,181,458.38
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:
SEBASTIAN P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
EDUARDO P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
SO ORDERED.[9]

Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective
motions for reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution [10] denying the motions for
reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and
Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October
23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both
appealed to the CA.
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals
are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August
27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the subject properties

(Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No.
38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned
as follows:
The two (2) properties, together with their improvements,
embraced by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first
to be distributed among the following:
Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But since she is deceased, her
share shall be inherited by Joaquin,
Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal
shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of the other half of the
property which pertains to Lucia
Mendiettas share.
Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he is already
deceased (and died without issue), his
inheritance shall, in turn, be acquired
by Joaquin Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since she died
in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her
inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de
Santos and her daughter Samantha),
Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in
representation of Milagros brother Jose
Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited
by Mercedes (represented by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo,
all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he died in
1967, his inheritance shall be acquired
by his wife Priscilla, and children
Gloria (represented by her husband
Walter de Santos and her daughter

Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa

in equal shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the
subject properties and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her
share shall be inherited by her children
namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented
by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian
Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996
without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance
shall
be
inherited
by
Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de
Santos and her daughter Samantha),
Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in
representation of Milagros brother Jose
Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited
by Mercedes (represented by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile), Sebastian and
Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his
inheritance shall be acquired by his
wife Priscilla, and children Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de
Santos and her daughter Samantha),
Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in
equal shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984,
her inheritance shall be acquired by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile in equal shares.

Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.

Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.[11]

Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for

reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence,
these petitions ascribing to the appellate court the following errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
aforementioned important facts[12] which alter its Decision;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of
hearing the issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
3. The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and
in not applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res
judicata.[13]
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID
NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF
MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER
INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION)
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR
LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER

COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY

TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF
DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA
GARCIA
MENDIETTA
NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR
REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP,CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO
DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE
RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A
TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED WITH
INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE
MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.[14]

As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that
Joseph and Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they are the
legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He
draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating
that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their
mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and
Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of Joses marriage with Priscilla,
inasmuch as they were not authenticated and formally offered in evidence.
Sebastian also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and
Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply
to their opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of Abelardo
Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them as heirs had the
effect of admitting the allegations therein. He points out that his motion was denied
by the RTC without a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the
certificates of title of real estate properties subject of the controversy are in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as such are conclusive
proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject to collateral attack,
but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise
argues that estoppel applies against the children of the first marriage, since none of
them registered any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad
and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have already been settled in light of

the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa,
resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros name and of TCT No. 8026
in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as
the court order directing the deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with
the name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo
alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of
Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in
contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in one proceeding. He
particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for
the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that
she would receive from Joaquins estate. He states that this violated the rule on
precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely
erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad
Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited
jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of
ownership, which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.

The Courts Ruling

As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the ownership of the subject real
properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve
the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will
and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. [15] The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.[16] As held in several cases,[17] a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in
the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency
and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of
a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a
separate action.[18] Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
[19]
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.[20]
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering
that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be
impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the

determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the
probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for
judicial settlement of Joaquins estate, he alleged that the subject properties were
owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his
petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first
marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were
able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived
from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name
of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con
Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR
BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the
second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta). [21] When TCT No. 5239 was divided
between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of
land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case
No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square
meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184) [22] issued on April 23,
1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924,
and subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to
note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads
Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal
como aparece, tanchando las palabras con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a y
poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras en
segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia, en complimiento de un orden de
fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23,
G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada
con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo TNo. 32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.[23]

Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia

Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad
Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be
gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridads name in TCT No.
32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal
share in TCT No. 32184. Lucias share in theproperty covered by the said TCT was
carried over to the properties covered by the certificates of title derivative of TCT
No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and
the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and
Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are
conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of
the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for
the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the settlement
proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucias spouse.[24] Accordingly, the CA correctly
distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos.
38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and
the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255
conclusively show that the owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin
and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado
con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said
to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate
of title is not necessarily conclusive of a holders true ownership of property.[25] A
certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be
used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. [26] Thus, the fact that the
properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses
coverture.[27] The phrase married to Caridad Garcia in the TCTs is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not
necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal properties.[28]
Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have already been settled
in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the

inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As provided
in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue
made. -- When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the
court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and
the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.

Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of
the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to
the widow, and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show that these
were complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa,
suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate
children of Jose.The RTC found that Sebastian did not present clear and
convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to exclude them as
heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact
of Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian
and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in
the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995 hearing. [29] Furthermore, the CA
affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision.[30]
Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not
heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of

Partition, the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and
was later substituted in the proceedings below by her husband Walter de
Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de
Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro
filed a motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving
spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his
answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby admitting his
answer on October 18, 1995.[31] The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the
motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose
any objection when the intervention was submitted to the RTC for resolution.[32]
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling
reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos,
and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was
incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his and
Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful
heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and
Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de
Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in
representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes,
respectively.[33]
This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration that the CA erred in
settling, together with Joaquins estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision would
readily show that the disposition of the properties related only to the settlement of
the estate of Joaquin.Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited
above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the
lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the payment of the
obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was
merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate, they being his
legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred in distributing
Joaquins estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was
able to show that a separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will
allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.[34] While
there has been no showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her
share from Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and

approved, prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros share
in Joaquins estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his
Certificate of Death.[35] He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita)
and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap
Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and
the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications
such that the share of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the final
determination of the probate of her purported will, and that Sebastian shall be
represented by his compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit,
while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the
Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of
the
Court
of
Appeals
are AFFIRMED with
the
following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros
Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of her
will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15,
2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin
Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
114, Pasay City, for further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin
Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDOSUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
Petitioner,

- versus -

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 183053

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
Promulgated:
June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between Spain and
Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the
riches of the New World by issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with the
difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family imbroglio over the estate of a
decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,
[4]
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.[5]
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son,

Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At
the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II,
all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock,
Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion
Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was
a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II,
lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father
and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for
visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio
II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the
petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to
thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita.[7]
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left
an estate of real and personal properties, with a probable gross value

of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving

heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old,
surviving spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay,
36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3)
Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and
a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old,
legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far as
[respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at the time of
her death.[8]

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel,

Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering
her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as
part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be
accorded legal preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and
her family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than
thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely:
Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,]
he was already the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the
probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly
overstated (sic); and that Isabels allegation that some of the properties
are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings

amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his
adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in
the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of
administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his
Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his
grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was
better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the
decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: [he]
is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the decedent to

work in his early age by involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo
Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father;
the significant work experiences outside the family group are included in his
curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation
in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural
Bank; x x x.[10]
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on
their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on
November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of
decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED
and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed
administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay,
who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond
in the amount of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1)
To make and return within three (3) months, a true and
complete inventory;
(2)
To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3)
To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and
at any other time when required by the court, and
(4)

To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of

Administration be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to
Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
decedent, Cristina, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated

November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M.
Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate
estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be
issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals
by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES;
and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN
PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER
SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING
APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]

In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial
and documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the
estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor,
Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed administrator of the estate in the
above-entitled special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondents
immediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The

root cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right
time and the proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time
is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of such
unfortunate and bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go
against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy
in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go
against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio
III] for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is
accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78,
Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed
the appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his
grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and
justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly
ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to
give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from
the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s]
intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants,
creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is
prepared, academically and by experience, for the demands and
responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing
physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it comes to
management of real estate and the processing and payment of debts,
[Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a
manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better
handle the preservation of the estate.[14]

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate

child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the
estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA
pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by Federico, and which
nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as administrator of the decedents
estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for the
following reasons:[15]
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e.,
Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse

of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his appointment as

administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate
offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the
next of kin referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to
share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 [16] of the Civil Code
bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from
inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio
III to administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified in Section 1,[17] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and
respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in
the administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses
over several undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give
preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and
effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual
relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the
other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the
subsistence of their marriage;

5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with
that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit
terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not
simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio
III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son,
Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the
interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that under the
law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in
the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained
legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and
rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case
at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be

granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant
facts and circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the
selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. [20] In the
main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a
joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers,
Cristinas, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the appointment by the trial
court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the decedents brother,
who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein, we declared
in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de
Damian[22] that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The
order of preference does not rule out the appointment of coadministrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative
heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of
respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting
claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina
and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move
in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of
the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate
relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably
demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was
actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from
infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by
decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of
administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in

the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code,
beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943
of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child
to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child
from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we
shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue
enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992
must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate children.[23]

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased
Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads
sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants,
and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to
those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would
have done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone
called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or
affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be
given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the
welfare of humanity.[24]

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not
distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of
this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain
from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares
of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question
on who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be
settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue remains good
law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,
although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the
deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the
proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate
which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination
and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004]

JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President

and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippines Internationl
Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE
GROUP, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA,
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY
SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA
ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other
persons/
public
officers
acting
for
and
in
their
behalf, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division,
dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R. 59736, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao (in their
capacities as president and secretary, respectively, of Philippine International
Life Insurance Company) and Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
[1]

The antecedent facts follow.

Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys
incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed
capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado
Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five
illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina

Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all
surnamed Ortaez).
[2]

On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez,
docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains pending at
Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an
opposition to the petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent
urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of
Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez joint special administrators of
their fathers estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular
administrator (up to now no regular administrator has been appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose
Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included,
among other properties, 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the
companys outstanding capital stock.
[3]

On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming that she
owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate,
sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino
Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner
Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the
stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG
in its name.
[4]

On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his

personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining
1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold
said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year,
[5]

petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife

shares of stock when Jose Ortaez failed to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of
the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
85), Juliana Ortaez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and
Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982
for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez,
partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among
themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by
Juliana Ortaez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on
October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes
and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.)
filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of
stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private
respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent
motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated March
4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of
the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate. These motions were
opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion
to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which
move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the
approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the
release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any
shares of stock for her to administer.

On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the
reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of the
estate without an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. Since the sales in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortaez and Jose
S. Ortaez in their personal capacity without prior approval of the Court, the same is
not binding upon the Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife
shares of stock and release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as Special Administratrix is
hereby denied.
[6]

On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the
motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4,
1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court
reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, 1997 DENYING the
approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stocks and release of Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes as Special Administratrix, the Urgent Motion to Declare Void Ab
Initio Memorandum of Agreement dated December 19, 1995. . . is hereby impliedly
partially resolved insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares
of stock are concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of the
Memorandum of Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum of Agreement dated
March 4, 1982 executed by Juliana S. Ortaez, Rafael S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez as
partially void ab initio insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife
shares of stocks are concerned.
[7]

Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortaez

filed, on December 22, 1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal
justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose
Ortaez, his brother Rafael Ortaez and mother Juliana Ortaez during the

pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, without the requisite
approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to
the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made
by Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock
they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate
court, was void.
[8]

Special Administrator Jose Ortaez filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. He elevated the case to the
Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court
dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13, 1999. On February 23,
1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the petition of Special
Administrator Jose Ortaez became final and was subsequently recorded in the
book of entries of judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the rest
of the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital
stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest of
the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, in the insurance company. This became
the subject of a separate action at the Securities and Exchange Commission
filed by private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes against petitioner
Jose Lee and other members of the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife on
November 7, 1994. Thereafter, various cases were filed by Jose Lee as
president of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortaez and her sons against private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil courts.
Somehow, all these cases were connected to the core dispute on the
legality of the sale of decedent Dr. Ortaezs Philinterlife shares of stock to
petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose Lee who
later became the president of Philinterlife after the controversial sale.
[9]

[10]

On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes and

her siblings filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court
dated August 11 and August 29, 1997 because the orders of the intestate
court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court) had long became final. Respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes
served a copy of the motion to petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as

president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife, but petitioners ignored

the same.
[11]

On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares in the name of
the Estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to
reinstate in the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife
shares of stock in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the
owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for violation of pre-emptive
rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock
certificates of Philinterlife for 2,029 shares in the name of the Estate of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for
violations of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife
shares and,
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes, has
the power to exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said shares, including
the right to vote and to receive dividends.
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it
or otherwise, to acknowledge and allow the said Special Administratrix to
exercise all the aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain from
resorting to any action which may tend directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or
any other person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby
directed to comply with this order within three (3) days from receipt hereof
under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to
implement the writ of execution with dispatch to forestall any and/or further
damage to the Estate.

SO ORDERED.

[12]

In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the office of petitioners to
execute the writ of execution, he was barred by the security guard upon
petitioners instructions. Thus, private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao
(president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) in contempt.
[13]

Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of

Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion in (1)
declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock was
null and void; (2) ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity and
(3) depriving the petitioners of their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright:
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in the light of the following considerations:
1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent judge had long
become final and executory;
2. The certification on non-forum shopping is signed by only one (1) of the three (3)
petitioners in violation of the Rules; and
3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of execution, deed of sale with right to
repurchase, deed of sale of shares of stocks and omnibus motion, the
petition is not accompanied by such pleadings, documents and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations therein in
violation of the second paragraph, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

[14]

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao of the
above decision was denied by the Court of Appeals on October 30, 2000:

This resolves the urgent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of our
resolution of July 26, 2000 dismissing outrightly the above-entitled petition for the
reason, among others, that the assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent
Judge had long become final and executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

[15]

On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court

through a petition for review under Rule 45 but on December 13, 2000, we
denied the petition because there was no showing that the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any reversible error to warrant the exercise
by the Supreme Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
[16]

However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and

Aggabao, the Supreme Court granted the motion and reinstated their petition
on September 5, 2001. The parties were then required to submit their
respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes, on July 19,
2000, filed a motion to direct the branch clerk of court in lieu of herein
petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate the name of Dr. Ortaez in the stock
and transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the corresponding stock certificate
pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides that the
court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by
some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall
have the effect as if done by the party. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao opposed
the motion on the ground that the intestate court should refrain from acting on
the motion because the issues raised therein were directly related to the
issues raised by them in their petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, the intestate court
granted the motion, ruling that there was no prohibition for the intestate court

to execute its orders inasmuch as the appellate court did not issue any TRO
or writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62461,
questioning this time the October 30, 2000 order of the intestate court
directing the branch clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They also
questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of the intestate court nullifying
the sale made in their favor by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez. On November
20, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied their petition and upheld the power of
the intestate court to execute its order. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao then filed
motion for reconsideration which at present is still pending resolution by the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following errors for our
consideration:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR:
A. IN FAILING TO RECONSIDER ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTION
DENYING THE PETITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
APPELLATE COURTS MISTAKE IN APPREHENDING THE
FACTS HAD BECOME PATENT AND EVIDENT FROM THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE COMMENT OF
RESPONDENT ENDERES WHICH HAD ADMITTED THE
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS IN THE PETITION
AS WELL AS IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
MOREOVER, THE RESOLUTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS
CONTAINED IN ONLY ONE PAGE WITHOUT EVEN TOUCHING
ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE EXHAUSTIVE
DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND SUPPORTING LAW IN THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
RULE ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS;

B. IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE VOID ORDERS OF THE

INTESTATE COURT ON THE ERRONEOUS GROUND THAT THE
ORDERS WERE FINAL AND EXECUTORY WITH REGARD TO
PETITIONERS EVEN AS THE LATTER WERE NEVER NOTIFIED
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER CANCELING ITS
OWNERSHIP;
C. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INTESTATE COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION (1) WHEN IT ISSUED THE OMNIBUS ORDER
NULLIFYING THE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER FLAG OVER
SHARES OF STOCK WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO BE PART OF
THE ESTATE AND (2) WHEN IT ISSUED A VOID WRIT OF
EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONER FLAG AS PRESENT
OWNER TO IMPLEMENT MERELY PROVISIONAL ORDERS,
THEREBY VIOLATING FLAGS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS;
D. IN FAILING TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE ORDERS OF
THE INTESTATE COURT WHICH NULLIFIED THE SALE OF
SHARES OF STOCK BETWEEN THE LEGITIMATE HEIR JOSE S.
ORTAEZ AND PETITIONER FLAG BECAUSE OF SETTLED LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE, I.E., THAT AN HEIR HAS THE RIGHT
TO DISPOSE OF THE DECEDENTS PROPERTY EVEN IF THE
SAME IS UNDER ADMINISTRATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL
CODE PROVISION THAT POSSESSION OF HEREDITARY
PROPERTY IS TRANSMITTED TO THE HEIR THE MOMENT OF
DEATH OF THE DECEDENT (ACEDEBO VS. ABESAMIS, 217
SCRA 194);
E. IN DISREGARDING THE FINAL DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN G.R. NO. 128525 DATED DECEMBER 17, 1999
INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME PARTIES, TO WIT,
PETITIONERS JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO WERE
RESPONDENTS IN THAT CASE WHILE RESPONDENT MA.
DIVINA ENDERES WAS THE PETITIONER THEREIN. THAT

DECISION, WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED LAW OF THE CASE,

RULED THAT PETITIONERS CANNOT BE ENJOINED BY
RESPONDENT ENDERES FROM EXERCISING THEIR POWER
AS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF PHILINTERLIFE AND THAT
THE INTESTATE COURT IN CHARGE OF THE INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ADJUDICATE TITLE TO PROPERTIES
CLAIMED TO BE PART OF THE ESTATE AND WHICH ARE
EQUALLY CLAIMED BY PETITIONER FLAG.
[17]

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and
FLAG, assail before us not only the validity of the writ of execution issued by
the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August 11,
1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife
shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez, in their personal
capacities and without court approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor because this was already settled a
long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our
resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition
for review on a technicality and thereafter denying the motion for
reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground that there was no
compelling reason to reconsider said denial. Our decision became final on
February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of
judgments. For all intents and purposes therefore, the nullity of the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez in favor
of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said issue would set a
bad precedent, opening the door wide open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate
unfavorable decisions no end. This is completely inimical to the orderly and
efficient administration of justice.
[18]

The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342

affirming the nullity of the sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana
Ortaez of the Philinterlife shares of stock read:

Petitioners asseverations relative to said [memorandum] agreement were scuttled

during the hearing before this Court thus:
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Counsel for petitioner, when the Memorandum of Agreement was executed,
did the children of Juliana Salgado know already that there was a claim for share
in the inheritance of the children of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it is already known to them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for extrajudicial settlement of a property
subject of intestate proceedings when there is an adverse claim of another set of
heirs, alleged heirs? What would be the legal justification for extra-judicially settling
a property under administration without the approval of the intestate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-judicial settlement there is an approval
of the honorable court as to the propertys partition x x x. There were as mentioned
by the respondents counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No
JUSTICE AQUINO:
The point is, there can be no adjudication of a property under intestate
proceedings without the approval of the court. That is basic unless you can
present justification on that. In fact, there are two steps: first, you ask leave and
then execute the document and then ask for approval of the document executed.
Now, is there any legal justification to exclude this particular transaction from those
steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
None, Your Honor.
ATTY BUYCO:

With that admission that there is no legal justification, Your Honor, we rest
the case for the private respondent. How can the lower court be accused of
abusing its discretion? (pages 33-35, TSN of January 29, 1998).

Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private respondent:

What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without
securing court approval have appropriated as their own personal property the
properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other
claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without court approval, have distributed
the asset of the estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third
parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate Court. As admitted
by petitioners counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification for this action by the
heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that
public respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of
the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortaez in favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March
4, 1982 (see Annex 7 of the Comment). . . are not the only heirs claiming an interest in
the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez. The records of this case. . . clearly show that
as early as March 3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of
Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortaez with Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim by the acknowledged natural children of
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez is admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum of
Agreement before they executed the same. This much was admitted by petitioners
counsel during the oral argument. xxx
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, public respondent can
never be faulted for not approving. . . the subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose
Ortaez] and his mother [Juliana Ortaez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the
Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez. (pages 3-4 of Private Respondents Memorandum;
pages 243-244 of the Rollo)
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
want of jurisdiction committed by respondent judge.
[19]

From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three
sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered into a

memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate

among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or
claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana
Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the
subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without
court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession
of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only
alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of
the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after
all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been
given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or
undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present
case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate
(1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG.
This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by
the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other
claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
[20]

[21]

Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate,
without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for
the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate. In the early case
of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of
the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void
and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that:
[22]

[23]

[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties (fishpond) were included in the
inventory of properties of the estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon
Herrera on November 14, 1974. Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of
the estate on March 3, 1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978,
the questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed between petitioner and
private respondent without notice and approval of the probate court. Even after the

sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three fishponds as among the
real properties of the estate in her inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as
stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the fishponds in
question, knew that the same were part of the estate under administration.
xxxxxxxxx
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate court which
according to our settled jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition
regarding properties under administration. . . More emphatic is the declaration We
made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 767) where We stated that when the
estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding,
the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval
of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 174), We held
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a
special proceedings, needs court approval. . . This pronouncement finds support in the
previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We
emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. x x
x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate
court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the
estate and is null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil
347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the
deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does
not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the
disposition of the property under administration, made by private respondent, the
same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the probate court
that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89),
hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioners contention that

the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the
power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication
requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order
nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to
execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts power to
annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of
estate property before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale
was affirmed by the appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
46342 dated June 23, 1998 and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the decision of the
Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of judgments on February 23,
1999. Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the
sale, as affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct for private respondentSpecial Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of execution and
for the intestate court to grant it.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however, contend that the
probate court could not issue a writ of execution with regard to its order
nullifying the sale because said order was merely provisional:
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to determine provisionally
whether said shares are included or excluded in the inventory In ordering the
execution of the orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and

grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a
probate or intestate court of whether a property is included or excluded in the
inventory of the estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of execution.
(emphasis ours)
[24]

Petitioners argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on the

facts of this case, that the Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate
of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez from the very start as in fact these shares were
included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael
Ortaez after he and his brother, Jose Ortaez, were appointed special
administrators by the intestate court.
[25]

The controversy here actually started when, during the pendency of the
settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, his wife Juliana Ortaez sold the 1,014
Philinterlife shares of stock in favor petitioner FLAG without the approval of
the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortaez later sold the remaining 1,011
Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the approval of the intestate
court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of
properties in the inventory of the estate because there is no question that,
from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were owned by the
decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here with the
effect of the sale made by the decedents heirs, Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez, without the required approval of the intestate court. This being
so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of the intestate court
was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate
proceeding is incorrect.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that the writ of
execution should not be executed against them because they were not
notified, nor they were aware, of the proceedings nullifying the sale of the
shares of stock.
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein petitioner
FLAG can be struck down by the intestate court after a clear showing of the
nullity of the alienation. This is the logical consequence of our ruling

in Godoy and in several subsequent cases. The sale of any property of the
estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the
probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon. Melencio Geneto, G.R. No.
56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court to cancel the transfer
certificate of title issued to the vendees at the instance of the administrator
after finding that the sale of real property under probate proceedings was
made without the prior approval of the court. The dispositive portion of our
decision read:
[26]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed Order dated

February 18, 1981 of the respondent Judge approving the questioned Amicable
Settlement is declared NULL and VOID and hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
sale in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and by the latter to William Go is likewise
declared NULL and VOID. The Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the latter is
hereby ordered cancelled.
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital
stock, approved on the vote of petitioners non-existent shareholdings and
obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr. Ortaezs estate to reassume its
controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due process.
We do not think so.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to them, did not
appeal the decision of the intestate court nullifying the sale of shares of stock
in their favor. Only the vendor, Jose Ortaez, appealed the case. A careful
review of the records shows that petitioners had actual knowledge of the
estate settlement proceedings and that they knew private respondent Enderes
was questioning therein the sale to them of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
It must be noted that private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes
filed before the intestate court (RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85) a Motion to
Declare Void Ab Initio Deeds of Sale of Philinterlife Shares of Stock on March
22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners already knew of the pending

settlement proceedings and that the shares they bought were under the
administration by the intestate court because private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortaez-Enderes and her mother Ligaya Novicio had filed a case against them
at the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 1994, docketed
as SEC No. 11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer of shares of stock,
annulment of sale of corporate properties, annulment of subscriptions on
increased capital stocks, accounting, inspection of corporate books and
records and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. In said case, Enderes and her mother
questioned the sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to petitioners. The SEC
hearing officer in fact, in his resolution dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of
stock sold to petitioners by Jose Ortaez and Juliana Ortaez:
[27]

Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez who
died, in 1980, are part of his estate which is presently the subject matter of an intestate
proceeding of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85. Although, private respondents
[Jose Lee et al.] presented the documents of partition whereby the foregoing share of
stocks were allegedly partitioned and conveyed to Jose S. Ortaez who allegedly
assigned the same to the other private respondents, approval of the Court was not
presented. Thus, the assignments to the private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] of the
subject shares of stocks are void.
xxxxxxxxx
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stock owned by the
late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, we rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of
the regular court where the intestate proceedings are currently pending.
[28]

With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as early as March 24,
1995 recognizing the jurisdiction of the intestate court to determine the validity
of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Dr. Ortaez and the subsequent
sale by the heirs of the decedent of the Philinterlife shares of stock to
petitioners, how can petitioners claim that they were not aware of the intestate
proceedings?

Futhermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing officer reached the
Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R. 128525), herein petitioners who
were respondents therein filed their answer which contained statements
showing that they knew of the pending intestate proceedings:
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the SEC but with
the Regional Trial Court; Ligaya Novicio and children represented themselves to be
the common law wife and illegitimate children of the late Ortaez; that on March 4,
1982, the surviving spouse Juliana Ortaez, on her behalf and for her minor son
Antonio, executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and Jose,
both surnamed Ortaez, dividing the estate of the deceased composed of his one-half
(1/2) share in the conjugal properties; that in the said Memorandum of Agreement,
Jose S. Ortaez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329 shares of stock in
Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective
shares of stock in Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the contentions of petitioners,
private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became
stockholders of Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortaez, the principal
stockholder at that time, executed a deed of sale of his shares of stock to private
respondents; and that the right of petitioners to question the Memorandum of
Agreement and the acquisition of shares of stock of private respondent is barred by
prescription.
[29]

Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes offered additional

proof of actual knowledge of the settlement proceedings by petitioners which
petitioners never denied: (1) that petitioners were represented by Atty. Ricardo
Calimag previously hired by the mother of private respondent Enderes to
initiate cases against petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggaboa for the
nullification of the sale of the shares of stock but said counsel made a
conflicting turn-around and appeared instead as counsel of petitioners, and (2)
that the deeds of sale executed between petitioners and the heirs of the
decedent (vendors Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez) were acknowledged
before Atty. Ramon Carpio who, during the pendency of the settlement
proceedings, filed a motion for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares
of stock to the Knights of Columbus Fraternal Association, Inc. (which motion
was, however, later abandoned). All this sufficiently proves that petitioners,
through their counsels, knew of the pending settlement proceedings.
[30]

Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as libel (Criminal Case
No. 97-7179-81), grave coercion (Criminal Case No. 84624) and robbery
(Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919) against private respondents mother Ligaya
Novicio who was a director of Philinterlife, all of which criminal cases were
related to the questionable sale to petitioners of the Philinterlife shares of
stock.
[31]

Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept petitioners claim of

denial of due process. The essence of due process is the reasonable
opportunity to be heard. Where the opportunity to be heard has been
accorded, there is no denial of due process. In this case, petitioners knew of
the pending instestate proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Juvencio Ortaezs
estate but for reasons they alone knew, they never intervened. When the court
declared the nullity of the sale, they did not bother to appeal. And when they
were notified of the motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court,
they ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners alone should bear the blame.
[32]

Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling in G.R. No.
128525 entitled Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes vs. Court of Appeals, dated
December 17, 1999, where we allegedly ruled that the intestate court may not
pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining
whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate
action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties.
We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No. 128525. The issue therein
was whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the resolution of the SEC
that Enderes et al. were not entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the
resolution of the SEC denying the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
because injunction is not designed to protect contingent rights. Said case
did not rule on the issue of the validity of the sale of shares of stock belonging
to the decedents estate without court approval nor of the validity of the writ of
execution issued by the intestate court. G.R. No. 128525 clearly involved a
different issue and it does not therefore apply to the present case.

Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby warned
not to further delay the execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated
August 11 and August 29, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing
petitioners petition for certiorari and affirming the July 6, 2000 order of the trial
court which ordered the execution of its (trial courts) August 11 and 29, 1997
orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]

THE

ESTATE
OF
HILARIO
M.
RUIZ,
EDMOND
RUIZ,
Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE
RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, respondents.
DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5,
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his
heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate.
1

On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash
component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedents will. For unbeknown
reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate
of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will
and
for
the
issuance
of
letters
testamentary
to
Edmond
Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will
was executed under undue influence.
3

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate - the house and
lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed
to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - was leased out by
Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
4

On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with
the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling
P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In
compliance,
on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned
over
the
amount
of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting
P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.
5

In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the
real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court
approved the release of P7,722.00
6

On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to
probate
and
ordered
the
issuance
of
letters
testamentary
to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor,
filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the
rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes
opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to
Certain Heirs and Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate
Will. Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the
testators properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue
Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioners motion for
release of funds but granted respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners
lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the
decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titleds to

and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and

respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his
opposition to respondent Montes motion for release of rent payments which
opposition the court failed to consider.Petitioner likewise reiterated his
previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he
was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the
lease contract over Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year.
7

Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on December 22,

1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only such amount as
may be necessary to cover the espenses of administration and allowanceas
for support of the testators three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in
abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three
granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of firast publication
of the notice to creditors. The Court stated thus:
8

xxx xxx xxx

After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties, the court
resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental
payments deposited with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such
amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances
for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which
are subject to collation and deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs
and insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and
the above-named heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until
the lapse of six (6) months from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an
accounting of the expenses necessary for administration including provisions for the

support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli
Ruiz before the amount required can be withdrawn and cause the publication of
the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.
9

Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition
and sustained the probate courts order in a decision dated November 10, 1994 and a
resolution dated January 5, 1995.
10

11

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED
DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL
THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT
SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE,
TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY
PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC
VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.
12

The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the
will to probate but before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has
the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the
support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to
certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:

Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for
support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the
testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they
are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and
gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states children of the
deceased which excludes the latters grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should
not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article
188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the
time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their
age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from
the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to
support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.
13

14

15

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from

the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to
widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance to
the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.
16

Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles
of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date
of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties
of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is allowed
only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a pending
controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may,

in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such
part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed
among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90
of these Rules.
17

And Rule 90 provides that:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each
is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations abovementioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs.
18

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties

can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2)
before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives
a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations.
19

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of
the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors, not
payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he

died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably,
at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
20

It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of
the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is
conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the
question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the
intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
21

22

23

The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was controverted by

petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes Opposition to his
motion for release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August
26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive
shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his fathers will included the
estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of
his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the
lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the
probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
cases.
24

25

26

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order
deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, Section 3 of
Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
27

Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to

administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall have the right to the

possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration.
28

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the
clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain
amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate,
and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for
the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It
was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of
the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money
in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited
with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde
property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the
lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
29

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties
of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled
and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The
funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties
and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and the fruits thereof
without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the
expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of
which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety
and justness.
30

31

32

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed
with the modification that those portions of the order granting an allowance to
the testators grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private
respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.

Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings

below.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND

SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the
dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount
of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of
the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations
of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May
31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,[4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay
the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural AllPurpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor
Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory
note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement [5] for the loan dated
December 13, 1980.

Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.

Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On
April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. [7] During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three
(3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to
FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
[6]

On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of

Liabilities[9] was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned
all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed
the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund
and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended
for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was
no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
[12]
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S.
Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer[13] and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was
not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and
her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a

decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed
with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint
Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July
22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the
said agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the
probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has
been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove
that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the
contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities
of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly
refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by
the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of
action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to
the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
(EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.[16]

The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased
had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and

Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A

estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability
under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in
their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before
the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was
not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased;
and the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S.
Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to relitigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the
money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the probate
court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held
that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as
provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held
that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid
partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the
CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject
properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as
all other properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence
S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the
CA:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO

VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ
UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RELITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.

RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY

LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON
THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT
EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.

THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00
AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00
CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS
BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE
DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted
to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no
need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations
related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any
position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic
will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of
the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active
participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary
civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to

have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of
the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value
of the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said
heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola
and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing
the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and his
heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory
Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late
Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence,
made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The
petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the
named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable
thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim
before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving
heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the
deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains
that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement
there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner
knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay
payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the
said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the
agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should
still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the
estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights,
as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be

filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that
she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as
evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of
her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the
heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether
the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the
same properties embraced in the will. [23] In the present case, the deceased,
Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the
provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later
after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an allencompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and
other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3)
subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among
the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement [25] executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so
since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for
the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
[26]
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. [27] Thus, in
executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extrajudicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no showing
that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent.
When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the
court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were.
Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the
other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the
estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of
the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing
the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed

to divide between themselves and take possession and use the abovedescribed chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of
First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of liability was conditioned
upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The
partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive
any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given
any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have
thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions.
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for
the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must
be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent,
instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is
rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the
true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before
the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:[31]

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of
the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. [32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late
father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only
by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to
file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and
continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as
against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. [33] The
petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit
Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines [34] However, the documentary
evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can
the petitioners participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no
documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove
or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now
the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to

take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be promptly resolved in the negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA
504).[36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial
court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing
the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005,
and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia
Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth)
and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her
Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico
(Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at
the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of
decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be
posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise
was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992.
For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS
NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY
INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that
he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates
can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not
binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo
spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners
submission that the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to
Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source

of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights,
such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or
not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito
was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by
the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a
competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said
marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of
any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the
Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of
letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

ERLINDA
PILAPIL
and
HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ
BRIONES, namely: ESTELA,
ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO
SANTOS,
ANA
SANTOS
CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS
INOCENTES,
ERNESTO
MENDOZA,
RIZALINA
SANTOS,
ADOLFO
MENDOZA
and
PACITA
MENDOZA,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 150175

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*

- versus-

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R.
BRIONES,
namely:
SILVERIO
S.
BRIONES,
PETRA
BRIONES,
BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR.,
ANITA
TRASMONTE,
CIRILITA
FORTUNA,
CRESENCIA
BRIONES,
FUGURACION
MEDALLE
and MERCEDES LAGBAS,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

February 5, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision [1] in

the
above-entitled
case,
ruling
in
favor
of
the
[2]
petitioners. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31
August 2001, affirming the Decision of the CebuCity RTC in
Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by

the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby

DISMISSED.

On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration [3] of the foregoing

Decision was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law
Office
on
behalf
of
the
respondents,
heirs
ofMaximino R. Briones. On 19
May
2006,
petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and
the
other
co-heirs
of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an
Opposition to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, [4] to which
the respondents filed a Rejoinder [5] on 23 May 2006. Thereafter,
Atty. Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office
entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for the
respondents.[6] Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June
2006, respectively, a Reply[7] and Supplemental Reply[8] to the
petitioners
Opposition
to
respondents
Motion
for
[9]
Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder to the
respondents Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006.

The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision, [10] are as

follows

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata OrtizBriones (Donata),

consisting
of
her
surviving
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erl
inda Pilapil(Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces
of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who
had also passed away. Respondents, on the other hand, are
the
heirs
of
the
late Maximino Briones (Maximino),
composed of his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews
and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings
of Maximino.

xxxx

Maximino was married to Donata but their union did

not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1 May
1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance
(CFI),
14th Judicial
District,
designated
as
Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued
Letters
of
Administration
appointing Donata as
the administratrix of Maximinos estate. She submitted an
Inventory of Maximinos properties, which included, among
other things, the following parcels of land x x x.

xxxx

The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2

October 1952, awarding ownership of the aforementioned
real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata had the
said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs,
covering the said properties, now in her name.

Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one

of Donatas nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and
her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as
administrators
of Donatas intestate
estate. Controversy
arose among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive
ownership of three parcels of land, covered by TCTs No.
21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation,
both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly executed in her

favor
by
her
aunt Donata. The
other
heirs
of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This Court, however, was
no longer informed of the subsequent development in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as far as
this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata,
including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.

On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a

nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters
of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino,
which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued
an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to
collect
rentals
from Maximinos properties. But
then,
Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order,
dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties
were already under his and his wifes administration as part
of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was
subsequently set aside by the RTC.

On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a

Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later
filed an Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They
alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate
ofMaximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach
of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.

xxxx

After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision,

dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.

xxxx

x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were

entitled to of the real properties covered by TCTs No. 21542,
21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It also
orderedErlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said
properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof.

The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision,

dated 8 April 1986, to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31 August 2001,
affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.

xxxx

Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court

of Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition,
x x x.

In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the

Petition meritorious and, reversing the Decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession
of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794. This Court summed up its findings,[11] thus

In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed,
through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the
absence of fraud, no implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the
real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake,
but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by
the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order,
presumed
to
be
fairly
and
regularly
issued,
declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of
the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties,
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint
of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
same should have been dismissed.

Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision

of this Court raising still the arguments that Donata committed
fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2
October 1952, which declared her as the sole heir of her
deceased
husband Maximino and
authorized
her
to
have Maximinos properties registered exclusively in her name;
that respondents right to succession to the disputed properties
was
transmitted
or
vested
from
the
moment
of Maximinos death and which they could no longer be
deprived of; that Donata merely possessed and held the
properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue
of this Courts ruling in Quion v. Claridad[12] and Sevilla, et al. v.
De Los Angeles,[13] respondents action to recover title to and
possession of their shares in Maximinos estate, held in trust for
their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the
latters successors-in-interest, is imprescriptible. Respondents
also advance a fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2
October 1952, being based on the fraudulent misrepresentation

of Donata that she was Maximinos sole heir, was a void order,
which produced no legal effect. Lastly, respondents asseverate
that, by relying on certain procedural presumptions in its
Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court has sacrificed their
substantive right to succession, thus, making justice
subservient to the dictates of mere procedural fiats. [14]
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some
points in its previous Decision in this case, it does not find any
new evidence or argument that would adequately justify a change
in its previous position.

On the finding of fraud

As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust

relations between petitioners and respondents shall be examined
in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that, [i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. Hence, the foremost question to be answered is still
whether an implied trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code
had been sufficiently established in the present case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was
insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed fraud. It
should be remembered that Donata was able to secure
certificates of title to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI
Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she
instituted to settle Maximinos intestate estate), which declared
her as Maximinos sole heir. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, the Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the
presumptions of regularity and validity. Reproduced below are the
relevant portions[15] of the Decision

At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able

to secure the TCTs covering the real properties belonging to
the estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2
October 1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was
issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
instituted by Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate
ofMaximino. The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable to
present a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising
considering that it was issued 35 years prior to the filing by
the heirs of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI
Order, nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was recorded in the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds on 27 June
1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on
the TCTs covering
the
real
properties
as
having
declaredDonata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order
was not fatal to the cause of the heirs of Donata considering
that its authenticity and contents were never questioned.
The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not
pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or procedure by
which it was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the nonpresentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by
the RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of
evidence that would give rise to the presumption that it
would be adverse to the heirs of Donata if produced. x x x.

xxxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled the intestate
estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The
issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct

of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the

presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n)
of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.

By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must

presume, in the absence of any clear and convincing proof
to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and
to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and it
could not give credence to the following statements made
by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.

xxxx

There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing

pronouncements. First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for
Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R
before the CFI was not even referred to nor presented
during the course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794
before the RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a
finding that Donata willfully excluded from the said Petition
the names, ages, and residences of the other heirs
of Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing
that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that it did
not require presentation of proof of service of such
notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his

duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included

sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of
proof of service of such notices; and, the heirs
of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk
such presumption. They only made a general denial of
knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until
1985. There was no testimony or document presented in
which the heirs of Maximinocategorically denied receipt of
notice from the CFI of the pendency of Special Proceedings
No. 928-R. The only evidence on record in reference to the
absence of notice of such proceedings was the testimony of
Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino,
x x x.
xxxx
Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit considering that
she was not testifying on matters within her personal
knowledge. The phrase I dont think is a clear indication that
she is merely voicing out her opinion on how she believed
her uncles and aunts would have acted had they received
notice of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.

It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the

Court was proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence on
record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI Order in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only submitted a
certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006, annexed to their
Supplemental Reply to petitioners opposition to their motion for
reconsideration of this Courts Decision. Respondents did not offer
any explanation as to why they belatedly produced a copy of the
said Order, but merely claimed to have been fortunate enough to
obtain a copy thereof from the Register of Deeds of Cebu.[16]

Respondents should be taken to task for springing new

evidence so late into the proceedings of this case. Parties
should present all their available evidence at the courts below
so as to give the opposing party the opportunity to scrutinize
and challenge such evidence during the course of the
trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in
fact, admitted by the petitioners; that the copy submitted is a
certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order
may provide new information vital to a just resolution of the
present case, this Court is compelled to consider the same as
part of the evidence on record.
The CFI Order[17] in question reads in full as

ORDER

This is with reference to the Motion of

the Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960, that she be
declared
the
sole
heir
of
her
deceased
husband, Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having died
without any legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor
any legitimate brother or sister, nephews or nieces.

At the hearing of this incident today, nobody

appeared to resist the motion, and based on
the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she
was
the
nearest
surviving
relative
of
the
deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the time of the
latters death, and pursuant to the pertinent provisions of
the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby
declares the aforesaidDonata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute
and
exclusive
heir
of
the
estate
of
the
deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby

entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after

paying all the obligations thereof, which properties are
those contained in the Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.

Cebu City, January 15, 1960.

From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is

able to deduce that the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January
1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated in the Decision. It
was
the
inventory
of
properties,
submitted
by Donata as administratrix of Maximinos intestate estate, which
was dated 2 October 1952.[18] Other than such observation, this
Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which could change its
original position in the Decision under consideration.

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed

that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not
able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the
intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem,[19] and that the publication in the newspapers
of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing
of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The
publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely
for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of
the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings,
most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in
the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily
or involuntarily made.

This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the
result of the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the

trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the
manner by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys
the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such
presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the
intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any
allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the
publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate
proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance
therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation
as to whyMaximinos siblings could have missed the published
notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.

In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of

official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in
rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, this
Court is not, as counsel for respondents allege, sacrificing the
substantive right of respondents to their share in the inheritance
in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the
establishment of rules of procedure, as amply explained by this
Court in De Dios v. Court of Appeals[20]

Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and

expeditious administration of justice by providing for a
practical system by which the parties to a litigation may be
accorded a full and fair opportunity to present their
respective positions and refute each other's submissions
under the prescribed requirements, conditions and
limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of
substantive law. In fact, there is a symbiotic relationship
between them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of
Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss,
analyze and understand substantive rights and duties and
consequently to more effectively protect and enforce them.
The other alternative is judicial anarchy.

Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule,

and abandonment thereof should only be done in the most
exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this
Court in the instant case are disputable presumptions, which are
satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by evidence. This
Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents failed to
overcome the given presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that
she was her husbands sole heir, it was not established that she
did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this
Court to conclude that she indeed committed fraud. This Court
again brings to the fore the delay by which respondents filed
the present case, when the principal actors involved,
particularly, Donata and Maximinos siblings,
have
already
passed away and their lips forever sealed as to what truly
transpired between them. On the other hand, Special
Proceedings No. 928-R took place when all these principal
actors were still alive and each would have been capable to act
to protect his or her own right to Maximinosestate. Letters of
Administration of Maximinos estate were issued in favor
of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question
was issued only on 15 January 1960.The intestate proceedings
for the settlement of Maximinos estate were thus pending for
almost eight years, and it is the burden of the respondents to
establish
that
their
parents
or
grandparents, Maximinos surviving siblings, had absolutely no
knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As
established in Ramos v. Ramos,[21] the degree of proofto
establish fraud in a case where the principal actors to the
transaction have already passed away is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all
human evidence; and as it thus removes from the
parties all the immediate means to verify the nature
of the original transactions, it operates by way of

presumption, in favor of innocence, and against

imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a
great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory
explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which
it may be encumbered. The most that can fairly be
expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the
frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material
facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if
the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and
in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive
at probable conjectures, and to substitute general
presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or
breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to
the living; for, the legal presumption is the other
way; as to the dead, who are not here to answer for
themselves, it would be the height of injustice and
cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the
sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be
clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6
Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).

Moreover,
even
if Donatas allegation
that
she
was Maximinos sole heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient
to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January
1960,[ 2 2 ] considering the nature of intestate proceedings as
being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular
performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction
by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January
1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on implied
trust
Assuming,
for
the
sake
of
argument,
that Donatas misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would
impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the

Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain respondents contention

that their right to recover their shares in Maximinos estate
is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an
implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to
prescription and laches.

The case of Ramos v. Ramos[23] already

elucidating discourse on the matter, to wit

provides

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts

are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties.
Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art.
1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an
immovable or any interest therein may be proven by oral
evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence"
(Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an

express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96
Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21
SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created
by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some
writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J. S.
122).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being

expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction
as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89

an

C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and

constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is

raised or created by the act or construction of law, but in its
more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of
law and presumed always to have been contemplated by
the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the
nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or
instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of
resulting trusts are found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil
Code. See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569,September
28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust

"raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of
law." In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not
created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing
a direct intention to create a trust, but by the construction
of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does
not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of
law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains legal title to
property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will
impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor
of the defrauded party." A constructive trust is not a trust in
the technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49
Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).

There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by

prescription the ownership of property entrusted to him
(Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to
compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name

in trust for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not
prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs.
Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription
cannot be set up in an action to recover property held by a
person in trust for the benefit of another (Sevilla vs.
De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust
can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse
of
time
(Marabilles vs.
Quito,
100
Phil.
64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. Zuiga,
62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957,
May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).

That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis

of the rule is that the possession of a trustee is not adverse.
Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the
property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides
that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a
continuing
and
subsisting
trust"
(Diaz
vs. Gorrichoand Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna
vs. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil.
138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA
199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).

The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover

property held in trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts
as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust (Heirs
of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez
vs. Grao, 42 Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G.
11033, 16 SCRA 849).

The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to

constructive
trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava
and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs.

Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs.

De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).

Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the

beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the
recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui
trust and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive
(Laguna vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil.
729. Compare with the rule regarding co-owners found in
the
last
paragraph
of
Article
494,
Civil
Code; Casaas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De
Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).

With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is

different.
The prescriptibility of
an
action
for reconveyance based on constructive trust is now
settled (Alzona vs.Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962,
4
SCRA
450; Gerona
vs.
De
Guzman,
supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs.
Jimenez,
L-19073,
January
30,
1965,
13
SCRA
80; Boaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co.,
vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA
84). Prescription may supervene in an implied
trust (Buenovs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto
vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).

And whether the trust is resulting or

constructive, its enforcement may be barred
by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz

vs. Gorricho and Aguado,

supra;
Compare
with Mejia
vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277). [Emphases supplied.]

A present reading of the Quion[24] and Sevilla[25] cases,

invoked by respondents, must be made in conjunction with and
guided accordingly by the principles established in the aforequoted case. Thus, while respondents right to inheritance was
transferred or vested upon them at the time of Maximinos death,
their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be
barred by the prescription of the action.

Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed

properties based on implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of
the New Civil Code, which reads

ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought

within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically,

in this case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then
respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action
for reconveyance of their shares in Maximinos properties. The
next question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period
be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action

for reconveyance of real property based on implied trust

prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance of the title
to the property,[26] not only because registration under the Torrens
system is a constructive notice of title, [27] but also because by
registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name,
Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to
the same.

By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special

Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata was able to register and secure
certificates of title over the disputed properties in her name on 27
June 1960. The respondents filed with the RTC their Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed
real properties, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794, only on 3
March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said
properties in the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents action
for recovery of possession of the disputed properties had clearly
prescribed.

Moreover, even though respondents Complaint before the

RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the
disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce their
right to the said properties imprescriptible. While as a general
rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe
so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized,
as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to
emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as coowners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly. [28] Her assertion
before the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she
was Maximinos sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of some
other co-owner or co-heir to the inherited properties;
Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition
of property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.

On laches as bar to recovery

Other than prescription of action, respondents right to

recover possession of the disputed properties, based on implied
trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a
question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced, applies
independently of prescription, which is a question of
time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.[29]

Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is
based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. [30]

This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision

the basis for barring respondents action for recovery of the
disputed properties because of laches. This Court pointed out
therein[31] that
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs
of Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as
some of the siblings ofMaximino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the
CFI Order, dated [15 January 1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and
the issuance in her name of new TCTs covering the real properties which
belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court, however, appreciates such
information differently. It actually works against the heirs
of Maximino.Since they only lived nearby, Maximinos siblings had ample
opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their
deceased brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate
of Maximino, were also located within the same area as their residences
in Cebu City, and Maximinos siblings could have regularly observed the
actions and behavior of Donata with regard to the said real properties. It is
uncontested that from the time of Maximinos death on 1 May
1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She managed the real
properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until her own

death on 1 November 1977. After Donatas death,Erlinda took possession of

the real properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the rental
fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously
exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all
others, which must have already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they
truly believed that they still had rights thereto.

The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May

1952. They even attended his wake. They did not offer any
explanation as to why they had waited 33 years
fromMaximinos death before one of them, Silverio, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate
of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning that the
intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years,
before instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery
of the real property belonging to the estate of Maximino.
xxx

Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted

paragraphs, as well as respondents conduct before this Court,
particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument
of new issues, respondents are consistently displaying a
penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or
justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are
vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law
requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches,
indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a
party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must
show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings. [32]

On void judgment or order

Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental

Reply to the petitioners Opposition to their Motion for
Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is void and, thus,
it cannot have any legal effect. Consequently, the registration of
the disputed properties in the name of Donata pursuant to such
Order was likewise void.

This Court is unconvinced.

In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents, [33] an

order or judgment is considered void when rendered by the court
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a
mandatory duty, circumstances which are not present in the case
at bar.

Distinction must be made between a void judgment and

a voidable one, thus
"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a
mere nullity, is liable to be made void when a person who
has a right to proceed in the matter takes the proper steps
to have its invalidity declared. It always contains some
defect which may become fatal. It carries within it the
means of its own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly
annulled, it is attended with all the ordinary consequences
of a legal judgment. The party against whom it is given may
escape its effect as a bar or an obligation, but only by a
proper application to have it vacated or reversed. Until that
is done, it will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or a
source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken against it, it

will continue throughout its life to all intents a valid

sentence. If emanating from a court of general jurisdiction,
it will be sustained by the ordinary presumptions of
regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any
collateral action. * * *"

But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void

judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless
in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its
authority finds himself without title and without redress."
(Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell
vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush,
295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3
Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549;
Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2
Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin,
9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also
Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and Another vs. Wells,
3
Ind.,
399;
Meyer vs. Mintonye,
106
Ill.,
414;
Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M.
Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)

It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation

between a void judgment and a voidable one, but all
authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
essential to the validity of a judgment and that want of such
jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of
the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55;
Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga.,
247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central

Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs.

Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining
Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill.,
32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6
Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)[34]

The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the

CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely,
the
intestate
estate
of Maximino. Donatas fraud
and
misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said
Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set
aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its enforcement. [35] It
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack as is being done in this
case. Note that respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of the disputed properties. The annulment
sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, but of the certificates of title over the properties
issued in Donatas name. So until and unless respondents bring a
direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment
therein, the assailed Order remains valid and binding.

Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to

annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be brought
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. [36]If it is
conceded
that
the
respondents
came
to
know
of Donatas fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the
RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement
ofMaximinos estate, then their right to file an action to annul the
CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928R
(earlier
instituted
by Donata for
the
settlement
of Maximinos estate), has likewise prescribed by present time.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration

is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
A.M. No. P-01-1448
June 25, 2013
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P)
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant,
vs.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn letter-complaint1 dated May 29, 1999 filed before this Court
by Rodolfo C. Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and abuse of authority.
The Facts
Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot 11
(Lot 1280-D-4-11 of consolidation-subdivision plan [LRC] Pcs-483) originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges
and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City.2 The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11
of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the
subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City,
Branch 4 ("Rosita R. Natividad in her capacity as Administratrix of C.N. Hodges Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila Saplagio,
defendant"). On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to immediately vacate
the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorneys fees, expenses and costs.3 At the
time, respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. In a letter
dated January 7, 1986, the Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondents offer in view of an application to
purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to
the actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While the check for initial down payment tendered by
respondent was returned to him, he was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if
he could put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate Court
so that the property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them."4
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234
square meters for the amount of P35,100. Under the Order dated November 18, 1986 issued by the probate court
(Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles
Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"), respondents Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the
courts observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they
are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x
offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January 21, 1987, the probate court issued another Order
granting respondents motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over Lot 11 was
eventually issued on June 27, 1989.5
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed between respondent and the
Hodges Estate represented by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R. Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to respondent
on installment for the total purchase price of P50,000.

Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued on December 5, 1994. Lot 11 was later
subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which the corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468),
also in the name of respondent, were issued on February 28, 1997.6
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the Hodges Estate, a writ of demolition was issued on March 3,
1998 by the probate court in favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11.7
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court employee respondent cannot
buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression and
grave abuse of authority. Complainant specifically alleged the following:
3. Complainant and his siblings, are possessors and occupants of a parcel of land situated at Brgy. San
Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City, then identified as Lot No. 1280-D-4-11, later consolidated and subdivided and
became known as Lot 11, then registered and titled in the name of Charles Newton Hodges. The Sabidong
family started occupying this lot in 1948 and paid their monthly rentals until sometime in 1979 when the
Estate of Hodges stopped accepting rentals. x x x
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987 that the property over which their house is standing, was being offered
for sale by the Estate, the mother of complainant, TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG (now deceased), took
interest in buying said property, Lot 11;
5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then an ordinary housekeeper and a laundrywoman, who never
received any formal education, and did not even know how to read and write. When Trinidad Claverio
Sabidong, together with her children and the complainant in this case, tried to negotiate with the Estate for
the sale of the subject property, they were informed that all papers for transaction must pass through the
respondent in this case, Nicolasito Solas. This is unusual, so they made inquiries and they learned that,
Nicolasito Solas was then the Clerk of Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City and
presently, the City Sheriff of Iloilo City;
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of Court III, MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge, by reason of
his position that in 1983 Hodges Estate was ejecting occupants of its land. x x x Taking advantage of this
inside information that the land subject of an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City,
whom respondent is a Clerk of Court III, the respondent surreptitiously offered to buy the said lot in litigation.
xxx
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did not know that as early as 1984, the respondent had offered
to purchase the subject lot from the estate x x x. After receiving the notice of denial of his offer to purchase,
dated January 7, 1986, respondent made a second offer to purchase the subject property the following day,
January 8, 1986, knowing fully well that the subject property was being occupied. x x x
8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the family of the complainant and negotiated for the sale of
the property and transfer of the title in favor of the latter. Respondent made the complainant and his family
believed that he is the representative of the estate and that he needed a downpayment right away. All the
while, the Sabidong family (who were carpenters, laundrywomen, a janitor, persons who belong to the
underprivileged) relied on the representations of the respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale,
with more reason that respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff;
9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the complainant who was fortunate to have worked abroad, sent the
amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos to complainants mother, to be given to respondent Nicolasito
Solas. x x x After receiving the money, respondent assured the Sabidong family that they will not be ejected

from the lot, he being the City Sheriff will take care of everything, and taking advantage of the illiteracy of
Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, he did not issue any receipt;
10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it took the respondent some time to see them again and
demanded additional payment. In the meanwhile, the complainant waited for the papers of the supposed
sale and transfer of title, which respondent had promised after receiving the downpayment of P10,000.00;
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again received from the mother of complainant the amount of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for the expenses of the documentation of sale and transfer of
title, and again respondent promised that the Sabidong family will not be ejected;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant and his family, respondent was able to secure an order
for the approval of his offer to purchase x x x in Special Proceedings No. 1672 x x x;
13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession in his favor, which the probate court
acted favorably x x x. A writ of possession was issued on June 27, 1989 x x x;
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and confidence which the Sabidong family has shown,
considering that respondent was an officer of the court and a City Sheriff at that. The complainant and his
family thought that respondent, being a City Sheriff, could help them in the transfer of the title in their favor.
Never had they ever imagined that while respondent had been receiving from them hard-earned monies
purportedly for the sale of the subject property, respondent was also exercising acts of ownership adverse to
the interest of the complainant and his family;
15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be an embodiment of fairness and justice, respondent
acted with malice, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit when he represented that he can facilitate the
sale and titling of the subject property in favor of the complainant and his family;
16. That when several thousands of pesos were given to the respondent as payment for the same and
incidental expenses relative thereto, he was able to cause the transfer of the title in his favor. x x x;
17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x x x the respondent received from the complainant the
amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos x x x When a receipt was demanded, respondent refused to
issue one, and instead promised and assured the complainant that they will not be ejected;
xxxx
19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law, Socorro Sabidong, delivered and gave to the
respondent the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos as expenses for the subdivision of the
subject lot. The respondent facilitated the subdivision and after the same was approved, the complainant did
not know that two (2) titles were issued in the name of the respondent. x x x;
20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to Sell, for the complainant and his neighbor Norberto
Saplagio to affix their signatures, pursuant to their previous agreement for the buyers to avail of a housing
loan with the Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG). Complainant attended the seminar of the HDMF
for seven (7) times, in his desire to consummate the sale. However, when the complainant affixed his
signature in the contract, he was surprised that the owner of the subject property was the respondent. When
complainant raised a question about this, respondent assured complainant that everything was alright and
that sooner complainant will be the owner of the property. Complainant and his family, all these years, had
believed and continued to believe that the owner was the estate of Hodges and that respondent was only
the representative of the estate;

21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been notarized on June 3, 1996, however, no copy thereof was
given to the complainant by the respondent. Respondent then, took the papers and documents required by
the HDMF to be completed, from the complainant allegedly for the purpose of personally filing the same with
the HDMF. Complainant freely and voluntarily delivered all pertinent documents to the respondent, thinking
that respondent was helping in the fast and easy release of the loan. While the said documents were in the
possession of the respondent, he never made any transaction with the HDMF, worse, when complainant
tried to secure a copy of the Contract to Sell, the copy given was not signed by the Notary Public, x x x;
22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that respondent had canceled the sale and that respondent
refused to return the documents required by the HDMF. Respondent claimed that as Sheriff, he can cause
the demolition of the house of the complainant and of his family. Respondent threatened the complainant
and he is capable of pursuing a demolition order and serve the same with the assistance of the military. x x
x;
23. After learning of the demolition order, complainant attempted to settle the matter with the respondent,
however, the same proved futile as respondent boasted that the property would now cost at Four Thousand
Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos;
24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly, complainant and his family were duped by the respondent
and are helpless victims of an officer of the court who took advantage of their good faith and trust.
Complainant later was informed that the subject property was awarded to the respondent as his Sheriffs
Fees, considering that respondent executed the decisions in ejectment cases filed by the Hodges estate
against the adverse occupants of its vast properties;
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the respondent over the subject property is pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 37 and a criminal complaint for Estafa is also pending preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, known as I.S. No. 1559-99, both filed [by]
the complainant against the respondent.8
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a 1st Indorsement9 dated July 8, 1999,
requiring respondent to file his comment on the Complaint dated May 29, 1999. On October 21, 1999, respondent
submitted his Comment.10
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor Constantino C. Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa charge against
respondent for insufficiency of evidence.
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation and Recommendation12 finding
respondent guilty of violating Article 149113 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain court officers
of property and rights in litigation within their jurisdiction. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended that:
1. this administrative complaint be treated as an administrative matter;
2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, OCC, MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED for six (6)
months, with warning that a repetition of the same offense in the future will be dealt with more severely;
3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the delivery of substantial amounts which complainant
alleged and which defendant denied, this issue should be investigated and the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City should be designated to hear the evidence and to make a report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt.14

In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted the recommendation of the Court Administrator to treat
the present administrative action as a regular administrative matter and to designate the Executive Judge of the RTC
of Iloilo City to hear the evidence of the parties.
The Court, however, noted without action the Court Administrators recommendation to suspend respondent for six
months.
On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao forwarded the records of this case to Executive
Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated July 18, 2001, the Court referred this case to the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice. By
Order18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive Judge Gustilo set the case for reception of evidence.
On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed the case for annulment of title, damages and injunction
against respondent for lack of merit.19
In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to reassign the instant administrative case to Executive
Judge Rene S. Hortillo for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice. In a Letter 21dated
September 15, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo informed the Court that per the records, the parties have presented
their testimonial and documentary evidence before retired Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo.
On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required the parties to file their respective memoranda within 60
days from notice, upon submission of which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.22
In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his purchase of the subject land is not covered by the prohibition in
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A a decade after the MTCC of Iloilo,
Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He insisted that
public trust was observed when complainant was accorded his right of first refusal in the purchase of Lot 11-A, albeit
the latter failed to avail said right. Asserting that he is a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent cited the
dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and damages which complainant filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, requesting for the release of his retirement benefits pending resolution of
the administrative cases against him.24 In a Memorandum25 dated September 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Elepao made the following recommendations:
a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk of Court, MTCC, Iloilo City for partial release of his
retirement benefits be GRANTED; and
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator be
DIRECTED to (1) WITHHOLD the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) from the
retirement benefits of Nicolasito S. Solas to answer for any administrative liability that the Court may find
against him in A.M. No. P-01-1448 (Formerly Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA IPI No. 99659-P; OCA IPI No. 99-670-P; and OCA IPI No. 99-753-P; and (2) RELEASE the balance of his retirement
benefits.26
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the new Executive Judge of the Iloilo City RTC for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and Recommendation27 finding respondent liable for grave
misconduct and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Based on the
evidence presented, Judge Patricio concluded that respondent misappropriated the money which he received for the
filing of complainants loan application. Such money could not have been used for the partition of Lot No. 1280-D-4-

11 since the same was already subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B when respondent presented the Contract to Sell to
complainant. And despite respondents promise to keep complainant and his family in peaceful possession of the
subject property, respondent caused the issuance of a writ of demolition against them. Thus, Judge Patricio
recommended the forfeiture of respondents salary for six months to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
In a Resolution28 dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted Judge Patricios Investigation Report and referred the
same to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for
serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty and recommended the forfeiture of respondents salary for six months,
which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of extinguishing the contract to sell and forfeiting the amounts
he received from complainant and Saplagio without due notice, respondent failed to act with justice and equity. He
found respondents denial to be anchored merely on the fact that he had not issued receipts which was belied by his
admission that he had asked money for the expenses of partitioning Lot 11 from complainant and Saplagio. Since
their PAG-IBIG loan applications did not materialize, complainant should have returned the amounts given to him by
complainant and Saplagio.
On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution30 requiring the parties to manifest whether they are willing to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings and records already filed with the Court. However, the copy
of the Resolution dated February 11, 2009 which was sent to complainant was returned unserved with the postal
carriers notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in a Compliance31 dated August 24, 2009, respondent expressed his
willingness to submit the case for decision and prayed for an early resolution of the case.
Our Ruling
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property
involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these
persons.32 "In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud,
which is what can and must be done."33

For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property.34 Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.35
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No.
14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that the
property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment
that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.36 A property forming part of the estate under judicial
settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings
closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch
27, had already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification
to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC
where he was Clerk of Court.
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as
well as gross negligence by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the
public officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office.39
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness."40
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led to believe that he is the legal representative of
the Hodges Estate, or at least possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying occupants of the estates
properties like complainant. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainants family
completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the premises. Upon learning that the lot
they were occupying was for sale and that they had to negotiate for it through respondent, complainants family
readily gave the amounts he demanded and, along with Saplagio, complied with the requirements for a loan
application with PAG-IBIG. All the while and unknown to complainants family, respondent was actually working to
acquire Lot 11 for himself.
Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges Estate for the sale of the property to him, he collected as
down payment P5,000 from complainants family in July 1986. Four months later, on November 18, 1986, the probate
court approved respondents offer to purchase Lot 11. The latter received further down payment from complainant in
the amount of P10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or before the Deed of Sale with Mortgage41dated November 21,
1994 could be executed in respondents favor.

Thereafter, respondent demanded P3,000 from complainant supposedly for the subdivision of Lot 11 between the
latter and the Saplagios. Yet, it was not until respondent obtained title over said lot that the same was subdivided into
Lots 11-A and 11-B. The records42 of the case show that the Subdivision Plan dated April 25, 1996, duly approved by
the Land Management Services (DENR) subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and 11-B, was inscribed on February 28,
1997 two years after TCT No. T-107519 covering Lot 11 was issued in respondents name on December 5, 1994.
Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of P2,000 to defray the expenses for documentation and transfer of
title in complainants name. In the latter instance, while it may be argued that respondent already had the capacity to
sell the subject property, the sum of all the circumstances belie an honest intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to
complainant. We note the inscription in TCT No. T-1183643 in the name of C.N. Hodges that respondent executed a
Request dated February 19, 1997 "for the issuance of separate titles in the name of the registered owner."44 Soon
after, TCT No. T-11646745 covering Lot 11-A and TCT No. T-11646846 covering Lot 11-B were issued in the name of
respondent on February 28, 1997 only eight months after he executed the Contract to Sell47 in favor of complainant
on June 3, 1996.
Respondents bare denials were correctly disregarded by the Court Administrator in the light of his own admission
that he indeed asked money from both complainant and Saplagio. The evidence on record clearly established that by
misrepresenting himself as the estates representative and as a court officer having the power to protect
complainants family from eviction, respondent was able to collect sums totaling P20,000 from complainants family.
Even after the latter realized they were duped since respondent was already the owner of Lot 11, they still offered to
buy the property from him. Respondent, however, changed his mind and no longer wanted to sell the property after
nothing happened to the loan applications of complainant and Saplagio. This subsequent unilateral cancellation by
respondent of the contract to sell with complainant may have been an afterthought, and plainly unjustified, based
merely on his own assumption that complainant could not make full payment. But it did not negate the deception and
fraudulent acts perpetrated against complainants family who were forced into submission by the constant threat of
eviction. Such acts constitute grave misconduct for which respondent should be held answerable.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and
Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,48 the Court stressed that to
preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and
adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, we said that court employees are expected to be paragons of
uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official conduct but also in their personal dealings, including
business and commercial transactions to avoid becoming the courts albatross of infamy.49
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times.
They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
1wphi1

Under Section 52,51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and grave
misconduct are classified as grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Section
58(a) states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service.
Section 53 further provides that mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense should be
considered in the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the erring government employee. However, no such
mitigating circumstance had been shown. On the contrary, respondent had been previously held administratively
liable for irregularities in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. In A.M. No. P-01-1484,52 this Court imposed
on respondent a fine of P5,000 for acting imprudently in notarizing documents and administering oath on matters
alien to his official duties. And in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-670-P) and P-08-2568 (formerly OCA
IPI No. 99-753-P),53 respondent was found liable for simple misconduct and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his
three (3) months salary to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on September 10, 2007, for this additional administrative
case he should be fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for six months which shall likewise be deducted from
his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, retired Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Iloilo City, LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY. Respondent is FINED in an amount
equivalent to his salary for six (6) months to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003]

PILAR
Y.
GOYENA, petitioner,
GUSTILO, respondent.

vs. AMPARO

LEDESMA-

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

From the Court of Appeals June 19, 2000 Decision which affirmed that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 149 in Special Proceeding
No. N-4375 appointing herein respondent Amparo Ledesma Gustilo as
guardian over the person and property of her sister Julieta Ledesma, Pilar Y.
Goyena, Julietas close friend and companion of more than 60 years, comes to
this Court on petition for review on certiorari.
On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP over the person and properties of her sister
Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which read:
[1]

2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a
patient in the Makati Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age,
general debility, and a mini-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early
1995;
3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without
outside assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair;
4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and
in Western Visayas, with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million
Pesos[;]
5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the
assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural
enterprises;
6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely,
petitioner Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the
Religious of the Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given

their consent to the filing of this petition as shown by their signatures at the bottom of
this petition[;]
7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business management of commercial,
agricultural and corporate enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where
Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and
supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma whether
in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship. She
later filed an Amended Opposition on August 15, 1996 reading in part:
2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent
and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her
person/property. She is very able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly
evident from her letters to the petitioner. Copies of her recent letters are herewith
attached as Annexes A to E.
xxx
2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their
interests are antagonistic (Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46. 49 L.R.A. 800, as cited in vol.
V-B Francisco Revised Rules of Court, Rule 93, Section 4, p. 414).
xxx
3.01 The above captioned petition should be dismissed for utter lack of legal and/or
factual basis.
3.02 In the remote event that this Honorable Court should find that Julieta Ledesma is
incompetent and resolve that there is need to appoint a guardian over her
person and property, this Honorable Court should appoint as such guardian:
1. Oppositor Goyena;
2. Bart Lacson;
3. Fely Montelibano;

4. Jose T. Revilla; or
5. a qualified and reputable person as may be determined fit by this
Honorable Court.
By Decision of October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta incompetent
and incapable of taking care of herself and her property and appointed
respondent as guardian of her person and properties, ratiocinating as follows:
[2]

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age, the
youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90 years of age has
been the close friend and companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with
Oppositor when she suffered her first stroke in Makati in 1991 which was the reason
why Julieta had to give up the management of their hacienda in Bacolod. It is also not
disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the U.S. In
short, the special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor cannot
be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to manage her personal life and business
concerns due to senility and vascular dementia, the oppositor wants to be appointed
her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.
It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the
appointment of Amparo as guardian because she thinks that the latter dislikes her.
She further added that there were a number of letters allegedly written by Julieta to
Amparo which showed Julietas sentiments regarding certain matters. Nevertheless,
not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta opposed the petition. As a matter of fact, her
sisters signified their conformity thereto. Thus, Ms. Goyenas mere conjecture that
Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition should be denied. Neither
does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. On the
contrary, it is Ms. Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse interest to
that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julietas holdings at the Makati Medical Center
has been transferred to her as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A.
By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and
properties of Julieta has been duly established. As a sister, she can best take care of
Julietas concerns and well being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her
family should be given the opportunity to show their love and affection for her
without however denying Pilar Goyena access to her considering the special bond of

friendship between the two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of age could not
be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Amparo Gustilo, is hereby appointed guardian over the
person and property of Julieta Ledesma, an incompetent with all the powers and duties
specified under the law.
Accordingly, let letters of guardianship issue to petitioner upon her filing of a bond in
the amount of P200,000.00 to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed
for general guardians.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts decision was, by
Order of November 4, 1996 , denied in this wise:
[3]

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Oppositor thru counsel, and
finding no merits on the ground stated therein, considering that petitioner appears to
be most qualified and suitable to act as Julieta Ledesmas guardian after taking into
consideration the qualifications of the oppositor and her other recomendees [sic],
aside from the fact that petitioners appointment as such was not objected to by any of
her nearest kin, in contrast to the hostile interest of oppositor, the same is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision on the following ratiocination:
[4]

Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has not shown the authenticity and due execution
of the letters which purport to show the existence of a rift between Julieta and her
family and dissatisfaction as to how the businesses were managed. At any rate, while
it is correct to say that no person should be appointed guardian if his interest conflict
with those of the ward (Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil. 212), there are really no
antagonistic interests to speak of between petitioner [Amparo] and Julieta, they being
co-owners of certain properties. There is also no showing that petitioners business
decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta.

While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no sufficient
showing that petitioner is hostile to the best interests of the latter. On the contrary, it
was the petitioner who, realizing the need for the appointment of a person to guard her
sisters interests, initiated the petition for guardianship. We see no indication that
petitioner is animated by a desire to prejudice Julietas health as well as financial
interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who had initially concealed
the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta from the court. Oppositors advanced age
of 90 years also militate against her assuming the guardianship of the
incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not interested to be appointed
legal guardian (p.21[,] Appellants Brief, Rollo, p. 59). But the persons that she
points to as being better choices as Julietas guardian over the appellee have not acted,
nor even indicated, their desire to act as such. In any case, We see no cogent reason
why We should reverse the well-reasoned disquisition of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision
having been denied, she filed the present petition which proffers that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION DATED OCTOBER 4, 1996 AND IN ISSUING THE
RESOLUTIONS DATED JUNE 29, 2000 AND FEBRUARY 9, 2001.
The petition fails.
It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects
of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of
appeal is confined to questions of law. The test of whether the question is
one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
[5]

raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a

question of law; otherwise, it is question of fact.
[6]

In the case at bar, the only issue before this Court is whether or not the
appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not
unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of
Julieta. In support of an affirmative answer, petitioner posits as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests
between [her] and [respondent] is contrary to the evidence on record,[7]
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no showing that [respondent] is
hostile to the best interest of Julieta,[8] and
3. Julieta Ledesmas appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as
her guardian.[9]

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioners position

require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the
petition at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs
presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if
the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior
credit.
[10]

That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by petitioner in her
Reply dated August 30, 2001:
[11]

Although the general rule is that this Honorable Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing and revising only errors of law, it is
nonetheless subject to the following exceptions which have been laid down in a
number of decisions of this Honorable Court:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) When there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellants and appellee; (7)
When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Emphasis supplied); (Rollo,
350-351)
Petitioner claims that there is no doubt that the instant petition falls within
the above-stated exceptions because the findings of the Court of Appeals are
clearly belied by the evidence on record.
[12]

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge

who deals directly with the parties. As this Court said:
[13]

As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting
the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action
which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless
it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
[14]

In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts
committed any error.
Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo with respect to the
existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta. In that
case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of the minorwards properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the interest of the wards
as mortgagors, hence, Gabriels appointment as guardian was erroneous. For
while he sought to foreclose the wards properties as creditor and mortgagee
on one hand, he had to, on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the
wards as their guardian. Added to that was Gabriels appointment as guardian
without him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the
properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that the
first mortgagee was the Santa Clara Monastery when it was him. None of the
said circumstances obtain in the present case.
[15]

Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim
that there existed a rift between the two which amounts to antagonistic
interests. The first letter sent by Julieta to respondent which reads:
[16]

[17]

x x x So if you (appellee) do not agree with me (Julieta) my decision is right to let us

divide as soon as possible, so we will have capital each of us to work, and keep the
Hda, for [sic] generation to generation.
xxx
For the last time I will repeat even if I have to kneel before you and Carlos I have no
interest anymore in any future investment due to my age and being single and alone in
life. I would like to be able to enjoy whatever monies that correspond to me. I would
like to have enough money as a reserve for any future need that I might have like
hospitalization, travel, buying whatever I like, etc. etc. (Letter to appellee; Exhibit 2)
merely shows Julietas lack of interest in future investments, not
necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not per se amounting to
antagonistic interests between her and respondent to render the latter
unsuitable for appointment as guardian.
The second letter which reads:
[18]

My mind is still clear to tell you about Fortuna when I had my stroke I was confined
in MMC for one month. If I am not mistaken you did not visit me. One day Carlos
came to visit me and asked me this question. Do you think you will be able to
continue managing the Hda? I answered him I dont know it all depends on my
sickness. Carlos said who do you want to take your place? I said I want Cheling
Zabaljauregui. Then Carlos said O.K. He asked Pilar can you contact Cheling? Tell
him to call me or see me. The nephew of Cheling was a resident in MMC through him
Pilar was able to contact Cheling and gave him Carlos message. So I thought all the
time it was agreeable. I left for USA for treatment. To my surprise when I came
back from USA it was not Cheling, but you (appellee) took over the management
as you requested. Carlos did not tell me but decided in your favor. x x x (Letter to
appellee; Exhibit 3; emphasis supplied)
shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at
the Makati Medical Center on account of her stroke, 2) there was

disagreement as to who should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring a

certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over management of
the hacienda with their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No inference
as to the existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta
can thus be made.
The third letter which reads:
[19]

x x x Carlos went to the house before I left and asked from me twenty thousand
(20,000) shares of San Carlos Milling which you gave because I wanted to sell all.xxx
If he does not sell or cannot sell, just arrange to send them back to me. Amparing
since I came here to America and Vancouver my requests have been
ignored. Everyone is suspecting that Pilar is the one ordering or commanding me that
is not true. What I asked from Julio is just to report to me or send me reports so I can
follow up from here. But up to now he has ignored my requests x x x. (Letter to
appellee Exhibit 4)
has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in
finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian. The
letter in fact discloses, that it was Julietas nephew Julio Ledesma, and not
respondent, who ignored the request.
As for the fourth letter which reads:
[20]

I want all of you to know that whatever decision now and in the future I want to do
nobody can stop me especially regarding my properties, money, etc. I will be the only
one to dispose of it because it is mine. You said to Raul you are going to court, you are
most welcome x x x. (Letter to Connie, Exhibit 5)
it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not
even addressed to respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-law of
Julieta).
Petitioners assertion that respondents intent in instituting the guardianship
proceedings is to take control of Julietas properties and use them for her own
benefit is purely speculative and finds no support form the records.
[21]

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also
lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the Makati Medical Center
where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show
her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in
the present petition, that Julieta was still placed under the care of
doctors after she checked out and was returned to the hospital when she
suffered another stroke.
[22]

Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1)
Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian
before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked
by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for
appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state
of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good
faith.
[23]

[24]

Discussion of the third argument is unnecessary, the suitability of Amparo

for appointment as guardian not having been successfully contested.
ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997]

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian,

AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife,
LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen
Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of
Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared
incompetent by judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and
estate.
[1]

[2]

[3]

Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City.
On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit
in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject
the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint
was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through
her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
[4]

The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the
absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that
out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free;
[5]

that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian,
Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but
they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully
depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were)
enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they
** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent
** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also
alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of
first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had
been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their
faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the
latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which
she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's favor,
the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Caiza P5,000.00
by way of attorney's fees.
[6]

But on appeal, the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96. By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, the RTC
held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be
resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation **
demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."
[7]

[8]

[9]

Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October
21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision promulgated on June 2,
1993, the Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a)
the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not
an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in
the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have
been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by
what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will,
[10]

[11]

unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the
basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire
on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to
continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's
supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the
right or authority to drive the defendants out."
[12]

Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the
Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in
(a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not
an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an
alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case."
[13]

In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, the

Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful
detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been
obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises
could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never
became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against
them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been
occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen
Caiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They
conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal
guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
[14]

Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs -- the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her
niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for
her.
[15]

[16]

Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action

is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in
dispute; (b) assumingdesahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as
Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming an

affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue

to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
I

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as

which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. An inquiry into the averments of the amended
complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order.
[17]

[18]

The amended Complaint alleges:

[19]

"6. That the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house and lot
at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the subject of this
complaint;
** ** **
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were allowed to
live temporarily in the house of plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, for free, out of her kindness;
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the defendants, for
them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the
defendants refused to vacate the same. **
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, made
another demand on the defendants for them to vacate the premises, before Barangay
Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2)
conferences, the result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of
the Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990; issued by said Barangay Captain is
attached, marked Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to vacate the
house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and they are up to this time
residing in the said place;

13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by
her legal guardian -- Amparo Evangelista;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the
house in question, they are enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent plaintiff, because, while they are saving money by not paying any rent
for the house, the plaintiff is losing much money as her house could not be rented by
others;
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that funds
could be raised to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout Tobias,
Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court
for justice, and she has to spendP10,000.00 as attorney's fees."
Its prayer is quoted below:
[20]

"WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen Caiza,
represented by her legal guardian. Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this
Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants
as follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and other
persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and premises at No. 61 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the plaintiff, Carmen
Caiza: and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit."
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance -- having been
"allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness;"

2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health ** (was) failing and she
** (needed) funds ** to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas several times,
orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to Caiza, to
her continuing prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out.
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that
the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
[21]

[22]

The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the
institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend
that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by
virtue of any contract, express or implied" -- they having been, to repeat,
"allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness" -in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of ** (their) right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an
action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had
"deprived (Caiza) of the possession of ** (her property) by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth."
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to
occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right
of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary
sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less

certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning

the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court
adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The
situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but
who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is
deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the
date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is merely
tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court
of Appeals, where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant
upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill
its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand
and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession ** became illegal and the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant's owner) was its proper
remedy."
[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had
been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the
complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last
demand, the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises. Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that the
same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand
dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law
because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February
27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually
filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last)
written demand to vacate.
[27]

[28]

The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express
permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as
was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her
judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so.

Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will

bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not
give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the
theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership
being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and
until the will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas
had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or
sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by
sufferance, that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of
possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners
is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had
allegedly been bequeathed to them -- an event which still has to take place; in
other words; prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by
them would be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e.,
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the
proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary
action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to
possession de jure.
II

The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it
may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
[29]

[30]

tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her
Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA
with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the management of her properties ** " By that appointment, it
became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her
physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of
her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right
and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property,
both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right
to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right
to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof
and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions
as may be needful for this purpose.
[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]

Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely

discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of
ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and
apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable
and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such
income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber
the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the
proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance."

Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the

ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve. "the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue
of possession."
[37]

III

As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of

this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing
that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal
personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as
niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
[38]

[39]

[40]

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear
within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of
a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an

executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's
demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death;
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal
at bar.
[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 -- affirming the Regional Trial Court's
judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari -- is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194366

October 10, 2012

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,

DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon),
Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri
(Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the
April 27, 2010 Decision2 and October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del

Norte and instead, entered a new one dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of sale, damages and
attorneys feesagainst herein respondents heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo
Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique),
namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in
Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285, (P-14608) P51536 and P-20551 (P-8348)7issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural
guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the
said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
(spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include
Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as childrenof
Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victorias exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the
defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that
Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed possession of
the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the
annulment of the sale considering spouses Uys possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia and
Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994
when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their
co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to
Enrique and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they
consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have
ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set in
because of their inaction for a long period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:

I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and
second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal
shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction
as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique acquired their respective
inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate, as follows:
Enrique

9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)

Eutropia

1/16

Victoria

1/16

Napoleon

1/16

Alicia

1/16

Visminda

1/16

Rosa

1/16

Douglas

1/16

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses
Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring added)

The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because
it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof."
As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that
their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect to
their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the
properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death11and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their
undivided share in the estate.12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their
natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to
dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale,
provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be
considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of
Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos
or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the
property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of
the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required
by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law
only to a judicial guardian of the wards property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance
with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles
1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter or unless he has by
law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf
it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or
defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly
made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the
party so making the ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly received
benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was constituted, 17 as it has a
retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In
Napoleon and Rosas Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and conformed to by us
and our other two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy
on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale
was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any intention to file a case
against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus,
purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosas 1/16 share in the
estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence
showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have
effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the
buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of
the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were deemed to be holding
the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied constructive trust for the latters benefit,
conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their shares equivalent
to P 5,000.0021 each or a total of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so far as it
seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2
years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action
accrues,22 which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in
1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of
10 years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda
D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL
OWNERSof the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title
Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda
D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount of P 15,000.00, with
legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per
annum thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION

NILO OROPESA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 184528

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

CIRILO OROPESA,

Promulgated:

Respondent.
April 25, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision [1] dated February 29,
2008, as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449,
entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA. The Court of Appeals
issuances affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and the
Order[4] dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 040016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo
Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the
(respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 040016 and raffled off to Branch 260.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent)

has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such
has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke,
the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and
judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly;
that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside
aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma.
Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a
quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to
conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker

conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his
witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report
but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and
talk to the social worker.

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of

his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
(respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated

May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written
formal offer of evidence.

Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and
the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally
offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the
Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to
Evidence.

In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the
(respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed
his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. [5] (Citations omitted.)

The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an

Order dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide

sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case
is DISMISSED.[6]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by

the trial court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that

petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and
testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27
September 2006.

Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for

lack of merit.[7]

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of

Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed
Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is

DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated September
27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this

was denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed
Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition
was filed.

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by

this Court:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS

DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO
SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we

find the petition to be without merit.

Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed

rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly
committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the
erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly
disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him
showing respondents incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature
and purpose of guardianship in the following wise:

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in

which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward
whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A
guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of
the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as
to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has
been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one
in loco parentisas well.[11]

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a

qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor
or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us

that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of
taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid
are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed
under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the

word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a finding that a person is

incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite

evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged

and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent

and, therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises
in his Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:

a.

Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for
over ten (10) years already;

b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical
Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues
who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his
hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of
money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;

c.

Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care
and management;

d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and
therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the
necessary taxes;

e.

Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the
reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car
had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to
account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;

f.

Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name
and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;

g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to
stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;

h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of

groceries and furniture, despite protests from his children.[14]

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and

cited petitioners lack of material evidence to support his
claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any
relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to
the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent
largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical
document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed
competent to run his personal affairs and administer his
properties. Portions of the said document, entitled Report of
Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted by respondent in
his Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact favored
respondents claim of competence, to wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he

enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be
quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in
a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.

xxxx

General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the

domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental
calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to
copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render
and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.

xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to
suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x x x. [17]

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his

documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence
consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister
(who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal
properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not
include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to
convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead
lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.

Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in

failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof
were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties
registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners,
tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate
taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way
relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for
himself. The only medical document on record is the
aforementioned Report of Neuropsychological Screening which
was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never
identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event,
the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for
although the report had negative findings regarding memory

lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that

supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed
competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of

mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to
rule that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is
not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental
sanity will suffice.[18]

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14,

2006 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the
trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court
highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own documentary
evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court
made known its own observation of respondents physical and
mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical

expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the
mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On
the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the
average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable
of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem
situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory,
reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able. [19] (Citation omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law

may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the

Court is not a trier of facts. [20] We only take cognizance of

questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;
[21]
however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is
also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this
Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to
great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on
this Court when supported by the evidence on record. [22] We
therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the
Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents demurrer
to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has

completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of

the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. [23] We have also held
that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits
of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on
his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence
shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. [24]

There was no error on the part of the trial court when it

dismissed the petition for guardianship without first requiring

respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect

of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause
of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting
his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008
as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 191993

December 5, 2012

EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner,

vs.
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set
aside the Decision 1 dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April 19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No; 90145.
The facts show that on March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for guardianship over the
person and properties of Maura B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dagupan City, Branch 42,
which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2007-0050-D. In support thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence at
No. 14 B St. Paul Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and that he is Mauras nephew. He averred that Maura,
who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in
dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her advanced age, Maura is already
sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of
deceit and exploitation.3
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to the same and scheduled it for
hearing. When the petition was called for hearing on April 27, 2007, nobody entered an opposition and Abad was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. After Abad formally offered his evidence and the case was submitted for
decision, Atty. Gabriel Magno filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an Oppositionin- Intervention.
Subsequently, on June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition
and attached therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties
of Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the
pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latters guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of
Abad as Mauras guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while
Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Mauras guardian
since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties.4
On September 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 denying Abads petition and appointing Biason as Mauras
guardian. The RTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. Petitioner Eduardo T. Abad is found to be disqualified to act as guardian
of incompetent Maura B. Abad. Oppositor Leonardo A. Biason is established by this Court to be in a better position to
be the guardian of said incompetent Maura B. Abad.

The Court hereby fixes the guardianship bond at [P]500,000.00 and the letters of guardianship shall be issued only
upon the submission of the bond, conditioned on the following provisions of the Rule 94[,] Section 1, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
a. To make and return to the Court within three (3) months true and complete inventory of all the estate, real
and personal, of his ward which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession or
knowledge of any other person for him;
b. To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the estate according to these rules
for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper care, custody x x x of the ward;
c. To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest
derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated by these
rules and such other times as the court directs, and at the expiration of his trust to settle his accounts with
the court and deliver and pay over all the estate, effects, and moneys remaining in his hands, or due from
him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;
d. To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.
SO ORDERED.6
Unyielding, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but the RTC denied the same in an
Order dated December 11, 2007.
Abad filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that the RTC erred in disqualifying him from being appointed as Mauras
guardian despite the fact that he has all the qualifications stated under the Rules. That he was not a resident of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground for his disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the
affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura
to be her guardian.7
Abad further averred that no hearing was conducted to determine the qualifications of Biason prior to his appointment
as guardian. He claimed that the RTC also overlooked Mauras express objection to Biasons appointment.8
On August 28, 2009, the CA issued a Decision,9 affirming the decision of the RTC, the pertinent portions of which
read:
The petitioner-appellant may have been correct in arguing that there is no legal requirement that the guardian must
be residing in the same dwelling place or municipality as that of the ward or incompetent, and that the Vancil vs.
Belmes case cited by the court a quo which held that "courts should not appoint as guardians persons who are not
within the jurisdiction of our courts" pertains to persons who are not residents of the country.
However, we do not find that the court a quo, by deciding to appoint the oppositor-appellee as guardian, has fallen
into grievous error.
For one, the oppositor-appellee, like petitioner-appellant, is also a relative, a nephew of the incompetent. There are
no vices of character which have been established as to disqualify him from being appointed as a guardian.
xxxx
Anent the claim of the petitioner-appellant that he has been expressly chosen by her aunt to be her guardian as
evidenced by her testimony, although it could be given weight, the same could not be heavily relied upon, especially
considering the alleged mental state of the incompetent due to her advanced age.

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 42 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[10
Dissatisfied, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in a Resolution11 dated April 19,
2010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.12
On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. Subsequently, Maura filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene,13 together with a Petition-in-Intervention.14
The instant petition raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONERS
APPEAL AND AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DESPITE VERY CLEAR VIOLATIONS OF
DUE PROCESS, DISREGARD OF THE RULES, AND IRREGULARITIES IN THE APPOINTMENT OF
RESPONDENT BIASON AS GUARDIAN;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONERS
APPEAL AND ERRONEOUSLY UPHELD RESPONDENT BIASONS APPOINTMENT AS GUARDIAN
BASED ON SOLE GROUND OF RESIDENCE, AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE REQUIREMENTS AND
QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
GUARDIAN.15
Abad contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision despite the fact that it did not hold any hearing to
determine whether Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as provided by law. Further, he was not
given the opportunity to submit evidence to controvert Biasons appointment.16
Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his residence. He emphasizes that it is not a
requirement for a guardian to be a resident of the same locality as the ward, or to be living with the latter under the
same roof in order to qualify for the appointment. The more significant considerations are that the person to be
appointed must be of good moral character and must have the capability and sound judgment in order that he may be
able to take care of the ward and prudently manage his assets.17
Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. On May 11, 2012, Maura filed a
Manifestation and Motion,18 informing this Court that Biason passed away on April 3, 2012 at SDS Medical Center,
Marikina City due to multiple organ failure, septic shock, community acquired pneumonia high risk, prostate CA with
metastasis, and attached a copy of his Death Certificate.19 Maura averred that Biasons death rendered moot and
academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be
terminated.

On June 20, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution,20 requiring Abad to comment on the manifestation filed by Maura.
Pursuant to the Resolution, Abad filed his Comment21 on August 9, 2012 and expressed his acquiescence to Mauras
motion to dismiss the petition. He asseverated that the issues raised in the petition pertain to the irregularity in the
appointment of Biason as guardian which he believed had been rendered moot and academic by the latters death.
He also supported Mauras prayer for the termination of the guardianship by asseverating that her act of filing of a
petition-in-intervention is indicative of the fact that she is of sound mind and that she can competently manage her
business affairs.
We find Mauras motion meritorious.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial
relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.22
In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April
19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion
for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was challenging Biasons qualifications and the procedure by which the
RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biasons demise, it has become impractical and futile to
proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward
is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward.23The supervening event of death rendered it
pointless to delve into the propriety of Biasons appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has
already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter,
any substantial relief.
1wphi1

Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Mauras belief that the petition has lost its purpose and even consented to
Mauras prayer for the dismissal of the petition.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.