PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT:

Case: Manguila vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 125027, August 12, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Anita Manguila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under
the name and style Seafood Products while respondent Loreta Guina is the president
and general manager of Air Swift International engaged in a freight forwarding business.
Petitioner the contracted the services of the respondent for the shipment of her products
to Guam, USA. Manguila the agreed to pay cash on delivery in favor of respondent.
However, despite the stipulation, petitioner failed to pay Loreta, prompting the latter to
file a civil case for collection of sum of money. When summons is about to be served,
Manguila is nowhere to be found, apparently she was already in Guam. Hence, a writ of
preliminary attachment was filed by Loreta, alleging that petitioners departure was
done to defraud her creditors. Manguila on the other hand, claim that the court has no
jurisdiction over her persons since she has not yet been served by summons. Thus, the
writ of preliminary attachment issued is defective.
ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction over Manguilas person is necessary in order for the
writ of preliminary attachment to be enforced?
HELD: YES. Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service on
petitioner after her personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private
respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry,
still she had some other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules provide
for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be effected on a party.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever the defendants
"whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may,
by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation x x x." Thus, if petitioners whereabouts could not be ascertained after the
sheriff had served the summons at her given address, then, respondent could have
immediately asked the court for service of summons by publication on petitioner.
Moreover, as private respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of
the service of summons, this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the
country. This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, providing for service of summons by publication.
A. Three stages for the grant of preliminary attachments:
1. The court issues the order, granting the application;
2. The writ of attachment is issued pursuant to the writ;
3. The writ is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person be
obtained, However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has
no power to act in any authority against defendant. In the instant case, the writ of
preliminary attachments was issued on September 27, 1998, and implemented on

October 28, 1998. However, the alias summon was served only on January 26, 1989 or
almost three months after the implementation of the writ.
B. Actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time
when jurisdiction should be had:
"It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant - issuance of summons, order of
attachment and writ of attachment - these do not and cannot bind and affect the
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the
court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the courts authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the
defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the
order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the
summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint.
C. When personal service cannot be effected:
The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be
effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever
the defendants "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation x x x." Thus, if petitioners whereabouts could not be
ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her given address, then
respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by
publication on petitioner.
Moreover, as private respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of
the service of summons, this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the
country. This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, providing for service of summons by publication.
D. On the issue of venue:
The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue
on which an action should be brought.29 However, a mere stipulation on the venue of
an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The
parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that
show the parties intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will
allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are
followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do
not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered
merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati.
There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention
of the parties that Makati is the "only or exclusive" venue where the action could be
instituted. We therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue
where this case could be filed.

Nevertheless, we hold that Pasay is not the proper venue for this case. Under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is venue in personal actions is "where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." The exception to this rule is
when the parties agree on an exclusive venue other than the places mentioned in the
rules. But, as we have discussed, this exception is not applicable in this case. Hence,
following the general rule, the instant case may be brought in the place of residence of
the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff (private respondent herein).
In the instant case, the residence of private respondent (plaintiff in the lower court) was
not alleged in the complaint. Rather, what was alleged was the postal address of her
sole proprietorship, Air Swift International. It was only when private respondent testified
in court, after petitioner was declared in default, that she mentioned her residence to be
in Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City.

Case: Vicente B. Chuidan vs. Sandiganbayan GR No. 139941, January 19, 2011.
FACTS: In this case, after the successful peoples revolution that topples the Marcos
dictatorship, the Philippine government, filed before the Sandiganbayan against the
Marcos spouses, several government officials who served under the Marcos
administration, and a number of individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses,
including Chuidan (who is said to be an alleged dummy or nominee of the Marcoses
spouse in several companies that have been acquired illegally) for the reconveyance,
reversion, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth, allegedly acquired illegally
by the defendants. While the case is pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachments over the L/C issued in favor
of Chuidan as a result of the earlier compromise agreement entered into by the
petitioner and the Philippine Government. The Sandiganbayan granted the writ of
attachment despite the opposition of Chuidan. Four years later, petitioner filed a motion
to lift the attachment stating among others that the preliminary attachment was, in the
first place, unwarranted because he was not "guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation". In fact, the L/C was not a product of fraudulent transactions,
but was the result of a US Court-approved settlement The Sandiganbayan however
denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment maybe lifted?
HELD: NO. The rules of court have provided remedies of a defendant whose property
or assets has been attached: 1. Under Rule 57, Section 12 which is to file a
counterbond; 2. Under Rule 57, Section 13 which is to quash the attachment on the
ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued. It would appear that Chuidan
choose the latter ground as his basis for quashing the writ of preliminary attachment.
However, the grounds he has given for quashing the writ (e.g. the cancellation of his
passport, the decision of US courts for the two cases of fraud lodge against him and by
reason of estoppel on the part of the government for failure to prosecute the case for a
number of years) have nothing to do for the issuance of the writ of attachment. Much
less that they attack the writ as improper or irregular. The rule contemplates that the
defects must be the very issuance of the writ of attachments. Supervening events which
may or may not discharge the writ are not within the purview of the particular rules
stated. Moreover, for four (4) years, he keeps silent and did not exercise any remedies
available to him. It is rather too late to question the propriety of the issuance of the writ.
Petitioners motion to lift the attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in
the issuance of the writ; neither did he file a counterbond.
A. On the issue of fraud:
Petitioner may argue, albeit belatedly, that he also raised the issue that there was no
evidence of fraud on record other than the affidavit of PCGG Chairman Gunigundo. This
issue of fraud, however, touches on the very merits of the main case which accuses
petitioner of committing fraudulent acts in his dealings with the government. Moreover,

this alleged fraud was one of the grounds for the application of the writ, and the
Sandiganbayan granted said application after it found a prima facie case of fraud
committed by petitioner.
In fine, fraud was not only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary
attachment, it was at the same time the government's cause of action in the main case.
We have uniformly held that:
x x x when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same
time the applicant's cause of action; e.g., "an action for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a
corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his
employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful
violation of duty," or "an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought," the
defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of
Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's
application and affidavits on which the writ was based and consequently that the writ
based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason being that the
hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the
merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a
mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial. Thus, this Court has time and
again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has
been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment, otherwise an
applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere
motion.
B. On the issue of Res Judicata:
Petitioner also makes capital of the two foreign judgments which he claims warrant the
application of the principle of res judicata. The first judgment, in Civil Case Nos. 575867
and 577697 brought by Philguarantee before the Santa Clara Country Superior Court,
denied Philguarantee's prayer to set aside the stipulated judgment wherein
Philguarantee and Chuidian agreed on the subject attached L/C. On March 14, 1990,
the Court of Appeal of the State of California affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.
The said judgment became the subject of a petition for review by the California
Supreme Court. There is no showing, however, of any final judgment by the California
Supreme Court. The records, including petitioner's pleadings, are bereft of any evidence
to show that there is a final foreign judgment which the Philippine courts must defer to.
Hence, res judicata finds no application in this instance because it is a requisite that the
former judgment or order must be final.

Case: Luz Du vs. Stronghold Insurance GR No. 156580, June 14, 2004
FACTS: In this case, Aurora Olarte de Leon sold her property under a conditional deed
of sale to Luz Du. Then again, sold the same property in favour of the spouses
Enrique and Rosita Caliwag. Stronghold Insurance Corp. instituted a civil case against
the spouses for allegedly defrauding the company and misappropriating its fund by
simulating and falsifying purchases of documentary stamp. The action was
accompanied by a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment duly annotated on the
back of the title of the property in question. Luz Du on her part, instituted a civil case
against the spouses for the annulment of the sale made to them by Aurora. Luz Du
cause the annotation of Notice of Lis Pendens on the same title. A decision was handed
down in favour of Stronghold and the properties were sold in a public auction favour of
the latter. The properties were then transferred to Stronghold by the issuance of TCT
6444. On the other hand, Luz Du was also able to secure a favourable judgment on her
case. She commenced the present case to cancel the TCT 6444 by virtue of the Notice
of the Lis Pendens claiming superiority rights over the property.
ISSUE: Which of the parties concern has a superior right over the properties?
HELD: Stronghold has superior rights against Luz Du over the properties. The
preference given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a prior
unregistered sale is well-settled in our jurisdiction. As early as Gomez v. Levy
Hermanos, this Court has held that an attachment that is duly annotated on a certificate
of title is superior to the right of a prior but unregistered buyer. The doctrine is wellsettled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference over a prior
unregistered sale; and that even if the prior sale is subsequently registered before the
sale in execution but after the levy was duly made, the validity of the execution sale
should be maintained, because it retroacts to the date of the levy; otherwise, the
preference created by the levy would be meaningless and illusory. If either the thirdparty claim or the subsequent registration of the prior sale was insufficient to defeat the
previously registered attachment lien, as ruled by the Court in Capistrano, it follows that
a notice of lis pendens is likewise insufficient for the same purpose. Such notice does
not establish a lien or an encumbrance on the property affected. As the name suggests,
a notice of lis pendens with respect to a disputed property is intended merely to inform
third persons that any of their transactions in connection therewith, if entered into
subsequent to the notation would be subject to the result of the suit.
A. On the issue of Bad Faith:
We now tackle the next question of petitioner: whether Stronghold was a purchaser in
good faith. Suffice it to say that when Stronghold registered its notice of attachment, it
did not know that the land being attached had been sold to petitioner. It had no such
knowledge precisely because the sale, unlike the attachment, had not been registered.
It is settled that a person dealing with registered property may rely on the title and be

charged with notice of only such burdens and claims as are annotated thereon. This
principle applies with more force to this case, absent any allegation or proof that
Stronghold had actual knowledge of the sale to petitioner before the registration of its
attachment. Thus, the annotation of respondents notice of attachment was a
registration in good faith, the kind that made its prior right enforceable.
B. Doctrine:
Preference is given to a duly registered attachment over a subsequent notice of lis
pendens, even if the beneficiary of the notice acquired the subject property before the
registration of the attachment. Under the torrens system, the auction sale of an attached
realty retroacts to the date the levy was registered.

Case: Sofia Torres et. Al. vs. Nicanor Satsatin et. al GR No. 166759, November
25, 2009
FACTS: In this case, Nicanor Satsatin asked the petitioners mother Agripina Aledia if
she wanted to sell their properties. The petitioners as owners of the said lands, agreed
to sell it, executing a special power of attorney in favor of Satsatin to negotiate the sale.
Solar Resources Inc. agreed to buy the said properties for P35, 000,000.00. Petitioners
alleged that Nicanor was supposed to remit them the total amount of P28,000,000.00
and that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price agreed upon. That
respondent just remitted the amount of P9,000,000.00 leaving a balance of P19,
000,000.00. That despite repeated demands, Nicanor failed to remit them prompting the
petitioner to file a civil case for sum of money and damages against the latter.
Petitioners then applied for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
respondents properties which was granted by the trial court. Respondents then
question the validity of the writ arguing amongst others that the subject writ was
improper and irregular having been issued and enforced without the lower court
acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. They maintained that the writ
of attachment was implemented without serving upon them the summons together with
the complaint. They also argued that the bond issued in favor of the petitioners was
defective, because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that it
can transact business with the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite. On the other hand,
petitioners maintain that respondents are barred by estoppel, laches and prescription in
questioning the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment may be applied to the
respondents?
HELD: NO. In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the
provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order
granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However,
once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court
will not bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the
complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the
grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of
attachment, service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application
for attachment, the applicants affidavit and bond, and the order must be served upon
him.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the trial court validly issued the writ of
attachment on November 15, 2002, which was implemented on November 19, 2002, it
is to be noted that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served only
on November 21, 2002. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued,
it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.
A. Requisite for approval of a surety bond:
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing
that the company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty
(30) days from the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification
issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued
would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be
accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the
surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the
RTC of Dasmarias, Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company
from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be
accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of
attachment founded on the said bond.
B. Actual time when jurisdiction should be acquired:
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time
when jurisdiction should be had:
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant x x x issuance of summons,
order of attachment and writ of attachment x x x these do not and cannot bind and affect
the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the
court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the courts authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the
defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the
order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the
summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
C. Application of the Doctrine (EXCEPTION):
Moreover, although there is truth in the petitioners contention that an attachment may
not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground
which is at the same time the applicants cause of action in the main case, since an
anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated and
resolved in a mere hearing of a motion. However, the same is not applicable in the case
bar. It is clear from the respondents pleadings that the grounds on which they base the
lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities in its issuance and in the service of
the writ; not petitioners cause of action.
D. On the issue of Estoppel:

Further, petitioners contention that respondents are barred by estoppel, laches, and
prescription from questioning the orders of the RTC issuing the writ of attachment and
that the issue has become moot and academic by the renewal of the attachment bond
covering after its expiration, is devoid of merit. As correctly held by the CA:
There are two ways of discharging the attachment. First, to file a counter-bond in
accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57. Second, to quash the attachment on the ground
that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same
rule. Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the
law, the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the
issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the
attachment writ, instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier
way of discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way.
E. Effect of late summons:
Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued,
although the trial court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the
summons upon them, such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be
deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court
cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining
jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or
simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal
service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the
case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated
service.

Metro Inc. and spouses frederick and liza juan vs Laras gifts and decors
and mr and ms. Luis and lara villafuerte
GR no 171741, Nov. 27, 2009

FACTS: Laras Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged
in the business of manufacturing, producing, selling and exporting handicrafts. Luis
Villafuerte, Jr. and Lara Maria R. Villafuerte are the president and vice-president of
LGD respectively. Frederick Juan and Liza Juan are the principal officers of Metro, Inc.
Sometime in 2001, Metro Inc. and LGD agreed that LGD would endorse to
Metro Inc. purchase orders received by LGD from their buyers in the US in
exchange for a 15% commission, to be shared equally by LGD and James R.
Paddon (JRP), LGDs agent. The terms of the agreement were later
embodied in an e-mail labeled as the "2001 Agreement." 4In May 2003, LGD
filed with the RTC, Branch 197, Las Pias City (trial court) a complaint against Metro
Inc. for sum of money and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. Subsequently, respondents filed an amended
complaint5and alleged that, as of July 2002, Metro Inc. defrauded them in
the amount of $521,841.62.Respondents also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. In its 23 June 2003 Order,the trial court granted LGDs
prayer and issued the writ of attachment against the properties and
assets of petitioners. On 26 June 2003, petitioners filed a motion to
discharge the writ of attachment. Metro Inc. argued that the writ of
attachment should be discharged on the ground that respondents failed to
substantiate their allegations of fraud with specific acts or deeds showing
how petitioners defrauded them. After considering the arguments of the
parties, the trial court granted Metro incc motion and lifted the writ of
attachment. LGD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 10 September 2003
Order, the trial court denied the motion. According to the trial court, respondents
failed to sufficiently show that petitioners were guilty of fraud either in incurring the
obligation upon which the action was brought, or in the performance thereof. The
trial court found no proof that petitioners were motivated by malice in entering into
the 2001 agreement. The trial court also declared that petitioners failure to fully
comply with their obligation, absent other facts or circumstances to indicate evil
intent, does not automatically amount to fraud. LGD filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. LGD alleged that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered the discharge of the writ of attachment without requiring
petitioners to post a counter-bond. According to the Court Appeals, the trial
court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the discharge of the
writ of attachment without requiring petitioners to post a counter-bond.
The Court of Appeals said that when the writ of attachment is issued upon

a ground which is at the same time also the applicants cause of action,
courts are precluded from hearing the motion for dissolution of the writ
when such hearing would necessarily force a trial on the merits of a case
on a mere motion. The Court of Appeals pointed out that, in this case, fraud was
not only alleged as the ground for the issuance of the writ of attachment, but was
actually the core of respondents complaint. The Court of Appeals declared that the
only way that the writ of attachment can be discharged is by posting a counter-bond
in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals
granted respondents petition. Metro Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2
March 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of attachment issued by the trial court was improperly
issued such that it may be discharged without the filing of a counter-bond.
HELD: The petition is without merit. Metro inc,Frederick juan are guilty of
fraud committed both at the inception of the agreement and in the
performance of the obligation. Through machinations and schemes, Metro Inc.
successfully enticed LGD to enter into the 2001 Agreement. In order to secure LGDs
full trust in them and lure LGD to endorse more Purchase Orders and increase the
volume of the orders, Metro Inc during the early part, remitted to LGDs shares
under the Agreement. However, soon thereafter, just when the orders increased and
the amount involved likewise increased, Metro Inc. suddenly, without any
justifiable reasons and in pure bad faith and fraud, abandoned their
contractual obligations to remit to plaintiffs their shares. And worse, Metro
Inc. transacted directly with LGDs foreign buyer to the latters exclusion and
damage. Clearly, Metro Inc. planned everything from the beginning, employed ploy
and machinations to defraud plaintiffs, and consequently take from them a valuable
client. Metro Inc.are likewise guilty of fraud by violating the trust and confidence
reposed upon them by LGD. Metro Inc. received the proceeds of LGDs LCs with the
clear obligation of remitting 15% thereof to LGD. Their refusal and failure to remit
the said amount despite demand constitutes a breach of trust amounting to malice
and fraud. LGDs allegation that petitioners undertook to sell exclusively and only
through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that petitioners transacted
directly with respondents foreign buyer is sufficient allegation of fraud to support
their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Since the writ of
preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be
dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court.

PRELIMINARY INJUCTION:
Case: Teresita Idolor vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 141853, February 7, 2001
Facts: In this case, Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo
De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortagage with the right of extra-judicial foreclosure
upon failure to redeem the mortagage to secure a loan of P250,000.00 On September
21, 1996, private respondents wife Iluminada De Guzaman filed before the Office of the
Barrangay Captain a complaint against Idolor which resulted into a Kasunduang
Pagaayos which one of the terms is that Failure to settle the above account on or
before December 21, 1996, I agree to execute a deed of sale with the agreement to
repurchase without interest within one year. Petitioner Idolor failed to comply with the
undertaking prompting private respondents to file an extrajudicial foreclosure pursuant
to the said agreement. Then, the property was sold in a public auction which private
respondent was the highest bidder. Idolor filed before the RTC a complaint for
annulment of sale with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction against private respondents alleging the irregularity and lack of notice in the
extra judicial proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. The RTC issued the writ
against private respondents. On a petition before the CA, the court a quo, annulled the
writ stating that Idolor has no more proprietary right to the issuance of this provisional
remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Idolor is entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction?
HELD: NO. Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land
was not yet lost since her right to redeem the subject land for a period of one year had
neither lapsed nor run as the sheriff's certificate of sale was null and void; that petitioner
and the general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted by
respondent sheriffs; that the newspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale
was not a newspaper of general circulation. In the instant case, we agree with the
respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the
foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that
the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo
on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of
the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before
June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment
of sheriff's sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in
the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on
June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground
for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain
it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity.

The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not aground
for an injunction.
A. Nature and Requisites of Preliminary Injunction:
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and
interests.6 Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites
be present: 1) there must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of
such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of
an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to
establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially
protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has
attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence
of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for
the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent
a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims
can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.

Case: Rimio Gustillio vs. Ricardo Real Sr. AM No. MTJ 00-1250, February 28,
2001
FACTS: In this case, Rimio Gustilio was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay
Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negro Occidental. His lone opponent was Weddy Libo-on, the
incumbent punong barangay and the representative of the representative of the
Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) to the Sangguniang Bayan of Manapla and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental. Both complainant and Libo-on
garnered eight hundred nineteen (819) votes during the elections, resulting in a tie.
Despite the tie, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected punong barangay. Libo-on then
filed before the MCTC of Victorias, Manapla an election protest and sought a
preliminary prohibitory injunction and damages. Respondent judge issued a TRO in
favor of Libo-on and annulled the proclamation of the complainant therein. Rimilio filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC of Silay City Negros, which court a quo lifted the
TRO earlier issued by respondent judge and void the order of the latter nullifying
Rimilios proclamation. After hearing Libo-on motion for a permanent injunction, a
second TRO was issued by respondent judge on the ground of extreme urgency and
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise if no injunctive remedy were granted.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a TRO can be issued ex-parte?
HELD: NO. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted
immediately after raffle (Emphasis supplied). The foregoing clearly shows that whenever
an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the application only after all
parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a summary
hearing may not be dispensed with. In the instant case, respondent admits that he
issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving the applicants
evidence ex parte. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing
the first TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice.
*Paragraph 3 of AMC No. 20-95 is an exception to the preceding rules on summary
hearing of TROs. The executive judge of a multiple sala court or the presiding judge of
a single sala court is empowered to issue an ex-parte TRO but:
1. Shall be effective only for 72 hours;
2. He shall immediately comply with section 4 regarding service of summons and
accompanying documents;
3. He shall conduct a summary hearing within 72 hours to determine whether restraining
order shall be extended until application for preliminary injunction can be heard.

A. Onus Probandi of a writ of injunction:

The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which
is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing
that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.[12] In this case,
complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay.
He had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all
the rights of said office. We do not see how the complainants exercise of such rights
would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so as to
justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo.

Case: Michael Lagrosas vs. Bristol- Myers GR No. 168637, September 12, 2008.
FACTS: In this case, Michael Lagrosas was employed by the Bristol-Myers as one of
their territorial managers in its Medical Sales Force Division. On February 4, 2000, a
district meeting for territorial managers was conducted and among its attendees were
the petitioner and his former girlfriend, Ma. Dulcinea Lim, who is also a territorial
manager of Bristol-Myers. After the meeting, Lim riding the car of Cesar Mequito, notice
that Lagrosas was following them. She told Cesar not to stop the car but Lagrosas slam
the latters car thrice. A brief confrontation ensued in which petitioner hit Menquito with a
metal steering lock and when Lim intervene, he hit her head. The incident was
eventually discovered by the company prompting it to dismiss the petitioner due to
unwarranted behaviour. Lagrosas filed for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of the petitioner, awarding the latter monetary awards for his dismissal. On appeal,
the NLRC vacated its earlier (ruling in favor of Bristol Myers) and affirmed the Labors
Arbiter decision. The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution and notices of
garnishments were issued upon the Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. for the
supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and the Bank of the Philippine Islands for
the balance of the judgment award. Respondents move to quash the writ and applied
for a TRO for the enforcement of the writ of execution. The Court of Appeals gave
credence to the TRO which would later be substituted by an injunction. The court a quo
ruled in favor of Bristol-Myers. The latter then moved for the release of the TRO and
injunction cash bonds by virtue of the decision. The appellate court denied the motion
since the decision is not yet final and executor due to Lagrosass appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the release of the TRO and
Injunction cash bonds?
HELD: YES. A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things,
the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court where the action or proceeding
is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by
the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of
the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. In this case, the Court
of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the
writ of execution and notices of garnishment "pending final resolution of this case or
unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the Court.
By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by
granting Bristol-Myers petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002
of the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge
of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of
preliminary injunction were satisfied.
Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards
granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of

execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to
a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. To
reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is not a security for the
judgment award by the labor arbiter.
A. Nature and Purpose of Preliminary Injunction:
The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided
that the injunction ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the
enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly.

Case: Janosa vs. Delariarte- GR No. 172138, September 9, 2010.

FACTS: In this case, petitioners were high school students that were caught and
apprehended by the school for hazing. A meeting was convened between the parents of
the petitioners and the principal of the school which is the respondent in this case. The
meeting ended up with an agreement that instead of being charged and found guilty of
hazing, the petitioners would just have to transfer to another school. The parents signify
their conformity to the agreement and affixed their signatures to the minutes of the
meeting. The school did not anymore convened the Committee on Student Discipline
(COSD) by virtue of the agreement entered upon by the parties. The principal then
ordered the immediate transfer of the students despite the pleas of the petitioners not to
do so without convening COSD. Hence, petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for
injunction and damages, assailing the violation of their rights to due process since
COSD has not yet been convened. The court a qou issued a preliminary injunction
against the school and directed respondents to admit the students for enrolment. On
April 23, 2003, petitioner wrote to DepEd asking it to direct the school in releasing their
reports cards and other credentials. Respondent replied that it cannot release the
documents since there is a pending disciplinary case before the COSD. Thus, petitioner
filed a complaint for mandatory injunction, directing the respondent to release the same.
The Court of Appeals, granting respondents petition ordered the trial court to dismiss
the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, petitioners should
have waited for the action of DepEd or the school before resorting to judicial actions.
The issue was raised before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may avail the remedy of preliminary injunction?
HELD: NO. Petitioners parents affixed their signatures to the minutes of the 28
November 2002 meeting and signified their conformity to transfer their children to
another school. In turn, the University did not anymore convene the COSD. The
University agreed that it would no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings and instead
issue the transfer credentials of petitioner students. Then petitioners reneged on their
agreement without any justifiable reason. Since petitioners present complaint is one for
injunction, and injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners must come to court with
clean hands. Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any
justifiable reason, come to court with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant
relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in
issue.
A. Doctrine of the case:
In University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, Jr., a case involving student
misconduct, this Court ruled:
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with
equity or with clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he
who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with

clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the
principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant
may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
issue.

RECEIVERSHIP
Case: Spouses Aguilar vs. Manila Banking Corporation GR No. 157911
FACTS: In this case, petitioner spouses obtain a loan from the Manila Banking
Corporation in the amount of P600,000.00 which is secured by a real estate mortgage.
When the petitioners failed to settle the obligation, the bank extra judicially foreclosed
the properties and was sold in a public auction with respondent as the highest bidder.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for the annulment of the
foreclose properties but the case ended up in a Compromise Agreement whereby
petitioners obliged themselves to pay the purchase price of the property for P2, 548,
000.00. The RTC adopted and approved the said agreement on January 30, 1987.
When petitioners failed to pay the balance, respondent bank proceeded to file a writ of
execution to enforce the said compromise agreement entered into by the parties.
Petitioners then argued that since the bank is under a receivership, its receivership is a
supervening event that rendered execution of the Decision dated January 30, 1987
impossible, if not unjust; that since a bank under receivership is relieved of its obligation
to pay interest on the deposits of its depositors, they (petitioners) are also not obliged to
pay interest on a loan due it and interest shall commence again only after respondent's
resumption of banking operations.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are still liable to pay the interest on their obligation
despite the bank being under a receivership?
HELD: YES. On the arguments relating to the effect of respondent's receivership,
petitioners brought this matter for the first time in RTC Branch 165 in their Omnibus
Motion dated March 5, 2001, fourteen years after respondent was placed under
receivership and was ordered to close operation in 1987. The belated invocation of such
circumstance speaks strongly of the staleness of their claim. Besides, it would be
absurd to adopt petitioners' position that they are not obliged to pay interest on their
obligation when respondent was placed under receivership. When a bank is placed
under receivership, it would only not be able to do new business, that is, to grant new
loans or to accept new deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to
collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the bank. Thus,
petitioners' obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondent was placed under
receivership. The respondent's receivership is an extraneous circumstance and has no
effect on petitioners' obligation.

Case: SPS Larrobis vs. Philippine Veterans Bank GR No. 135706, October 1,
2004
FACTS: In this case, spouses Larrobis contracted a monetary loan with the respondent
bank in the amount of P135, 000.00 as evidence by a promissory note which is secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage including improvements thereon. However, respondent bank
was placed under receivership/liquidation due to bankruptcy from April 25, 1985 until
August 1992. On August 23, 1985, the bank sent a letter to the petitioners asking for
the payment of the insurance premiums advance by the bank over their mortgage
property. Then, more than fourteen (14) years from the time the obligation was
contracted, the bank filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and was sold in a
public auction. This prompts the spouses Larrobis to file a complaint before the RTC to
declare the subsequent foreclosure and sale null and void alleging that the foreclosure
made was done beyond the prescriptive period. Respondent, however, argues that the
prescriptive period for foreclosure was interrupted when it was put under a receivership
and liquidation was a fortuitous event that halted the banks operations. Hence, the
foreclosure was made within the 10 year prescriptive period when the bank resumes its
operations, citing Article 1154 of the New Civil Code. Moreover, the fact that it was put
under a receivership, defendant bank was restrained from doing its business.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period was interrupted due to the fact that the
bank was prevented from doing its business when it was put under a receivership?
HELD: NO. When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the
Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, determines whether to proceed with the
liquidation or reorganization of the financially distressed bank. A receiver, who
concurrently represents the bank, then takes control and possession of its assets for the
benefit of the banks creditors. A liquidator meanwhile assumes the role of the receiver
upon the determination by the Monetary Board that the bank can no longer resume
business. His task is to dispose of all the assets of the bank and effect partial payments
of the banks obligations in accordance with legal priority. In both receivership and
liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the
closure of its business and may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by
the receiver or liquidator. The receiver or liquidator meanwhile acts not only for the
benefit of the bank, but for its creditors as well. The receiver of the bank is in fact
obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of
the bank. The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation of the
bank under receivership, and take steps to prevent dissipation of such assets.
Accordingly, the receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due
to the bank, and in connection therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing such
debts.
A. Duties of a Receiver:

Section 29 of the Republic Act No. 265, as amended known as the Central Bank Act,
provides that when a bank is forbidden to do business in the Philippines and placed
under receivership, the person designated as receiver shall immediately take charge of
the banks assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible, collect and gather all the
assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and represent the bank
personally or through counsel as he may retain in all actions or proceedings for or
against the institution, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including,
but not limited to, bringing and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank.
This is consistent with the purpose of receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive
collectibles and preserve the assets of the bank in substitution of its former
management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets to the detriment of the creditors
of the bank.
B. On the issue of fortuitous event:
Respondents claims that because of a fortuitous event, it was not able to exercise its
right to foreclose the mortgage on petitioners property; and that since it was banned
from pursuing its business and was placed under receivership from April 25, 1985 until
August 1992, it could not foreclose the mortgage on petitioners property within such
period since foreclosure is embraced in the phrase "doing business," are without merit.
While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of "doing business," that
is:
a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements and contemplates to that
extent, the performance of acts or words or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the purpose and object of its
organization.
it should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks
are "prohibited from doing business" during receivership and liquidation proceedings.
C. Application of Provident Ruling:
General Rule - Foreclosure of properties is part of a banks business activity. Hence, it
is the duty of a receiver to foreclose properties due to the bank for the satisfaction of its
creditors.
Exception: Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals - It is true that we also
held in said case that the period during which the bank was placed under receivership
was deemed fuerza mayor which validly interrupted the prescriptive period. This is
being invoked by the respondent and was used as basis by the trial court in its decision.
Contrary to the position of the respondent and court a quo however, such ruling does
not find application in the case at bar.
A close scrutiny of the Provident case, shows that the Court arrived at said conclusion,
which is an exception to the general rule, due to the peculiar circumstances of Provident
Savings Bank at the time. In said case, we stated that:
Having arrived at the conclusion that a foreclosure is part of a banks business activity
which could not have been pursued by the receiver then because of the circumstances
discussed in the Central Bank case, we are thus convinced that the prescriptive period
was legally interrupted by fuerza mayor in 1972 on account of the prohibition imposed

by the Monetary Board against petitioner from transacting business, until the directive of
the Board was nullified in 1981.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further examination of the Central Bank case reveals that the circumstances of
Provident Savings Bank at the time were peculiar because after the Monetary Board
issued MB Resolution No. 1766 on September 15, 1972, prohibiting it from doing
business in the Philippines, the banks majority stockholders immediately went to the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which prompted the trial court to issue its judgment
dated February 20, 1974, declaring null and void the resolution and ordering the Central
Bank to desist from liquidating Provident. The decision was appealed to and affirmed by
this Court in 1981. Thus, the Superintendent of Banks, which was instructed to take
charge of the assets of the bank in the name of the Monetary Board, had no power to
act as a receiver of the bank and carry out the obligations specified in Sec. 29 of the
Central Bank Act.
In this case, it is not disputed that Philippine Veterans Bank was placed under
receivership by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank by virtue of Resolution No. 364
on April 25, 1985, pursuant to Section 29 of the Central Bank Act on insolvency of
banks.
Unlike Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein
respondent to deter its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under
the law. Thus, the ruling laid down in the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.
Moreover, in the present case, a liquidator was duly appointed for respondent bank and
there was no judgment or court order that would legally or physically hinder or prohibit it
from foreclosing petitioners property; despite the absence of such legal or physical
hindrance, respondent banks receiver or liquidator failed to foreclose petitioners
property and therefore such inaction should bind respondent bank.
D. Inaction of a receiver; consequences:
Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver.
As we held in Philippine Veterans Bank vs. NLRC, a labor case which also involved
respondent bank,
all the acts of the receiver and liquidator pertain to petitioner, both having assumed
petitioners corporate existence. Petitioner cannot disclaim liability by arguing that the
non-payment of MOLINAs just wages was committed by the liquidators during the
liquidation period.36
However, the bank may go after the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or
negligent failure to collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard its assets.

Case: Chavez vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 174356, January 20, 2010.
FACTS: In this case, private respondent Fidela Vargas, a practicing lawyer owned a
five hectares of land (mixed coconut land and rice fields) in Sorsogon. While petitioner
Chavez reside in the remote part of the land. The two then agreed to divide the gross
sales of all the products of the land between themselves, with private respondent
entrusting her shares to Chavez for safekeeping. When petitioner Chavez failed to remit
Fidelas share, the latter filed a complaint against the petitioners for the recovery of
possession, rent and damages with the prayer of an immediate appointment of a
receivership before the RTC. The court a quo dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction since the subject matter involved an agrarian dispute. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals granted the appointment of a receiver pointing out the necessity to preserve
the property in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not a receiver is necessary in the case at bar?
HELD: NO. In any event, we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the
property in dispute in this case. For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section
1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of
the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its
protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the
property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is
not receivership. Here Fidelas main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her
share of the lands produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity
would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that
the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation.
Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations,
Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of the
other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her.
A. On the issue of forum shopping:
By forum shopping, a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals, grounded
on the same cause, trusting that one or the other tribunal would favorably dispose of the
matter. The elements of forum shopping are the same as inlitis pendentia where the
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of
forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.5
Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved
different causes of action and sought different reliefs. The present civil action that she
filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the property based on Evelina and
Aidas failure to account for its fruits. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused
the two of misappropriating and converting her share in the harvests for their own

benefit. Her complaint for dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with the DARAB
sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting coconut trees without the prior
authority of Fidela or of the Philippine Coconut Authority.
The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela
sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of them. But receivership
is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help
achieve its purpose. Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership
in one case will amount to resjudicata on the merits of the other cases. The grant
or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the
particular action.

REPLEVIN
Case: Orosa vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 111080, April 5, 2000
FACTS: In this case, petitioner Jose Orosa purchased the subject motor vehicle (1983
Ford Lase 1.5) on instalments from Fiesta Motor Sales Corporation as evidenced by a
promissory note which is payable on instalments. To secure the obligation, petitioner
executed a chattel mortgaged over the car in favour of Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. The
latter assigned the promissory note and the chattel mortgage to private respondent FCP
Credit Corporation. When the petitioner failed to settle his obligation which fell due on
July 28, 1984 as well as the other instalments due for the month of August, September
and October 1984 respectively, private respondent FCP Credit Corp. filed a complaint
for replevin and damages against petitioner demanding payment of the entire balance of
his debt with interest and the surrender of the vehicle the latter was allegedly detaining.
The trial court dismissed the complaint alleging that private respondent was not entitled
to the writ of replevin since Orosa already paid the instalments for the months of July to
November 1984 which is the sole basis of the complaint. Moreover, the court a quo held
that private respondent be solidarily liable with Stonghold Insurance Co. to return to the
petitioner the car or its equivalent in kind or in cash and pay the damages up to the
extent of the value of the replevin bond in the amount of P210,000.00. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications (deleting the award for damages) the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the matter was brought before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled for the issuance of a writ of
replevin?
HELD: NO. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it
ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that
petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial court's
decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when it
instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount
equivalent to the fourteen instalments actually paid with interest.
A. On the issue of Jurisdiction:
Petitioner alleges that the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
review the present case since the First Division of the Court of Appeals already passed
upon the law and the facts of the same. Petitioner alleges that the present appeal
involves the same causes of action, same parties, same facts and same relief involved
in the decision rendered by the First Division and affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
84979.
Petitioner's argument is untenable. Jurisdiction is simply the power or authority to hear a
case. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review decisions and orders
of lower courts is conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. More importantly, petitioner
cannot now assail the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction after having actively participated in
the appeal and after praying for affirmative relief. Neither can petitioner argue that res

judicata bars the determination of the present case. The two cases involve different
subject matters, parties and seek different reliefs.
The petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 was for certiorari with injunction,
brought by Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. alleging that there was grave abuse of
discretion when the trial court adjudged it liable for damages without due process, in
violation of Rule 60, Section 10 in relation to Rule 57, Section 20, of the Rules of Court.
The surety also questioned the propriety of the writ of execution issued by the trial court
pending appeal.
B. Issues were raised first time on appeal:
Petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
considered causes of actions which were raised for the first time on appeal. True,
private respondent submitted issues to the Court of Appeals which were not raised in
the original complaint. Private respondent belatedly pointed out that:
1.1. It is pertinent to note that Defendant-Appellee has waived prior notice and demand
in order to be rendered in default, as in fact the Promissory Note expressly stipulates
that the monthly installments shall be paid on the date they fall due, without need of
prior notice or demand.
1.2. Said Promissory Note likewise expressly stipulates that a late payment charge of
2% per month shall be added on each unpaid installment from maturity thereof until fully
paid.
1.3. Of equal significance is the Acceleration Clause in the Promissory Note which
states that if default be made in the payment of any of the installments or late payment
charges thereon when the same became due and payable, the total principle sum then
remaining unpaid, together with the agreed late payment charges thereon, shall at
oncebecome due and payable.
Private respondent argued that based on the provisions of the Promissory Note itself,
petitioner incurred in default since, even though there was actual payment of the
installments which fell due on July 28, 1984, as well as the three installments on August
28 to October 28, 1984, the payments were all late and irregular. Private respondent
also argued that petitioner assigned the subject car to his daughter without the written
consent of the obligee, and hence, violated the terms of the chattel mortgage.
Meritorious as these arguments are, they come too late in the day. Basic is the rule that
matters not raised in the complaint cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
C. On the issue of moral damages:
Petitioner laments that he assigned the car to his daughter so that she could
"approximate without equaling the status of her in-laws." This being the case, petitioner
experienced anguish and unquantifiable humiliation when he had to face his daughter's
wealthy in-laws to explain the "why and the whats of the subject case." Petitioner further
insists that an award of moral damages is especially justified since he is no ordinary
man, but a businessman of high social standing, a graduate of De La Salle University
and belongs to a well known family of bankers.
We must deny the claim. The law clearly states that one may only recover moral
damages if they are the proximate result of the, other party's wrongful act or
omission. Two elements are required. First, the act or omission must be the

proximate result of the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury. Second, the act must be wrongful.
Petitioner maintains that embarrassment resulted when he had to explain the suit to his
daughter's in-laws. However, that could have been avoided had he not assigned the car
to his daughter and had he been faithful and prompt in paying the installments required.
Petitioner brought the situation upon himself and cannot now complain that private
respondent is liable for the mental anguish and humiliation he suffered.
D. Good faith as a defense against moral damages:
Furthermore, we agree with the appellate court that when private respondent brought
the complaint, it did so only to exercise a legal right, believing that it had a meritorious
cause of action clearly borne out by a mere perusal of the promissory note and chattel
mortgage. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution
was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was
initiated deliberately, knowing that the charges were false and groundless. Such was
not the case when the instant complaint was filed. The rule has always been that moral
damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another
in good faith. The law always presumes good faith such that any person who seeks to
be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter
acted in bad faith or with ill motive.

Case: Smart Communications Inc. vs. Regina Astorga GR No. 151079, January
28, 2008.
FACTS: In this case, respondent Artoga was employed by SMART as one of its District
Sales Managers. As such, she is receiving additional benefits from SMART in the
course of her position from the company. One of the benefits is a car plan in the amount
of P455, 000.00. In February 1998, SMART entered into a joint venture agreement with
NTT of Japan forming SMART-NTT Multimedia Inc. (SNMI) as part of its organizational
realignment to achieve more efficient operations. Since SNMI was formed to do sales
and marketing work, SMART abolished Astorgas division, prompting the latter to file an
illegal dismissal case against SMART. In the meantime the company asked respondent
to pay the current fair market value of the car given to her as part of her car plan benefit
or surrender the same for proper disposition. When Astorga refused to do either,
SMART instituted a replevin case over the subject car before the RTC of Makati.
Consequently, respondent question the jurisdiction of the court a quo by filing a motion
to dismiss the case since the subject matter of the complaint arises out from an
employment contract, hence, jurisdiction is vested over the labor tribunal and not in the
regular courts
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss since recovery via a replevin suit is allowed by
Rule 60 of the Rules in Civil Procedure, thus, it is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. On
appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision, dismissing the replevin case, alleging that
suit is intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal dismissal, hence, the labor tribunal
has the rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. Citing out that the car plan privilege is a
benefit arising out of employer-employee relationship. Meanwhile, the NLRC sustained
the Labor Arbiters decision for illegal dismissal but ordered the respondent to
immediately return the vehicle assigned to her to the company.
ISSUE: Whether the replevin case is within the ambit of the labor tribunal (arising out of
employee-employer relationship) or with the regular courts?
HELD: REGULAR COURTS. Contrary to the CAs ratiocination, the RTC rightfully
assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying
Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the
car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil dispute . It
involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer
relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. In
Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the
plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie
wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to
adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property.
The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property
involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained

said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a
labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters
A. Jurisdiction of regular courts over replevin cases:
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the
plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie
wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to
adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether
or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether
or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require
its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond
the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
xxxx
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The
respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. In
fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ
enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and
ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is
properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners right to picket. But the
determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the
Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the
Vessel, of that right to possess in addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining a venues of
jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.
B. Nature of Replevin:
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or
taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one
having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully
taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the
recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it,
by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during
the pendency of the action.

Case: Hao vs. Andres AM No. P-07-2384,

June 18, 2008

FACTS: On October 17, 2005, Judge Renato Fuentes issued an order of seizure
against 22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by the complainant. Hao was one of the
defendants in an earlier civil case for replevin. In his complaint affidavit, complainant
charges the defendant for gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority and violation
of RA 3019 in connection of the latters duty as sheriff in the earlier case thereon.
According to Hao, by virtue of his counter-replevin bond, defendant was ordered by the
court to return the seized motor vehicles but only to discover that eight out of nine
vehicles were missing. Police reports indicated that a certain Nonoy was able to enter
the premises were the vehicles are kept and duplicated its keys. Subsequently,
complainant Hao accused respondent Andres of conspiring with Atty. Macadangdang
(Silvers counsel, who is the earlier plaintiff in the replevin case) and the policemen (who
were tasked to guard the motor vehicles) for carnapping. An investigation was made
therein by the OCA and the results pointed out several irregularities in implementing the
writ, and that Andres lacked due diligence required for the safekeeping of the seized
motor vehicles. It was recommended that respondent be found guilty of serious
negligence in the custody of the nine motor vehicles. The OCA disagreed with the
recommendation and cites Andres to be guilty of simple negligence only. The matter
was brought then before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Andres followed the proper procedure in implementing the writ
and observed due diligence in enforcing it?
HELD: NO. Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are welldefined steps provided in the Rules of Court regarding the proper implementation of a
writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure. The Rules, likewise, is explicit on the duty of
the sheriff in its implementation. To recapitulate what should be common knowledge to
sheriffs, the pertinent provisions of Rule 60, of the Rules of Court. The rules provide that
property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.
In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in
order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of
the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing
a counter-bond. This, he failed to do. Records show that Andres took possession of two
of the subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October 18, 2005, and
another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository
receipts, on October 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the seized motor
vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19, 2005. Consequently, there is
no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles
immediately after seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles.
Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
with regard to the proper disposal of the property.
It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for
safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that the property
seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain

custody of the seized property for at least five days. Hence, the act of Andres in
delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose,
without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
A. Property seized is under custodia legis:
Likewise, Andres claim that he had no knowledge that the compound is owned by Silver
fails to convince us. Regardless of who actually owns the compound, the fact remains
that Andres delivered the vehicles to Silver prematurely. It violates the rule requiring
him to safekeep the vehicles in his custody.[28] The alleged lack of facility to store the
seized vehicles is unacceptable considering that he should have deposited the same in
a bonded warehouse. If this was not feasible, he should have sought prior authorization
from the court issuing the writ before delivering the vehicles to Silver.
It must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in replevin is executed by
taking possession of the property specified therein, such property is in custodia legis.
As legal custodian, it is Andres duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence,
when he passed his duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear
neglect of duty.
B. Duty of the sheriff:
SEC. 4. - Duty of the sheriff.Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a
copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and
bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse
party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be
concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not
delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the
property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as
herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its
delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for
taking and keeping the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 6. - Disposition of property by sheriff.If within five (5) days after the
taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency
of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and
the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the
adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found
insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be
delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the
applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied.)
C. Rationale of the 5 day Rule
In Pardo v. Velasco, this Court held that:
Respondent as an officer of the Court is charged with certain ministerial duties which
must be performed faithfully to the letter. Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court
has a specific reason or objective. In this case, the purpose of the five (5) days is to
give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or

sureties thereon or require the return of the property by filing a counterbond. (Emphasis
supplied.)
D. Due diligence required:
It must be stressed that as court custodian, it was Andres responsibility to ensure that
the motor vehicles were safely kept and that the same were readily available upon order
of the court or demand of the parties concerned. Specifically, sheriffs, being ranking
officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care
and diligence. In serving and implementing court writs, as well as processes and orders
of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper dispensation
of justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents
of the law, high standards of performance are expected of them. Hence, his failure to
return the motor vehicles at the time when its return was still feasible constitutes
another instance of neglect of duty

Case: Navarro vs. Escobido GR No. 153788, November 27, 2009.

FACTS: In this case, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC
against petitioner Roger Navarro. The second complaint is a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of replevin. Apparently, petitioner Navarro entered into a lease agreement with an
option to purchase a certain motor vehicle (make/type FUSO with mounted crane) with
Go. The agreement was then sign by Karen Gos husband Glenn Go, who is the
manager of the KARGO ENTERPRISES, a sole proprietorship registered under the
name of the respondent therein. Navarro delivered six (6) post-dated checks each in
the amount of P66,333.33 which were supposedly in payments of the agreed rentals,
that when the fifth and the six checks were delivered and deposited by Go, the same
was dishonored for the reason that deposit account in which the check were issued did
not have sufficient funds to cover the same. Hence, respondent demands the payment
of P132, 666.66, which were the balance remaining or to return the subject vehicles.
Petitioner however, failed to do the same, thus, the RTC issued writs of replevin and the
sheriff seized the vehicle and delivered it to the respondent. Petitioner then questions
the implementation of the writ of replevin. He insists that a prior demand is necessary
before the action of writ of replevin is filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not prior demand is necessary before a party may file a writ of
replevin?
HELD: NO. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an
affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules. We see nothing in these
provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the
property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a
condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. More importantly, Navarro is no
longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has already
admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him,
demanding that he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles.
Navarros position that a demand is necessary and has not been made is therefore
totally unmeritorious.
A. Requisites of Writ of Replevin:
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and
bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond:
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or
is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or

otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value
of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to
the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party
of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action.
B. On the issue of Real party- in-interest
We do not find Navarros arguments persuasive. Interestingly, although Navarro admits
that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still
insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case. According to Navarro,
while the lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises name, this was merely a trade
name without a juridical personality, so the actual parties to the lease agreements were
Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go. However, Section 2 of Rule 3
specifically provides:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly
benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros
contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that
her complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the
Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether
Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for
the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.
C. On the issue of Juridical Personality:
We faced a similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, where we said:
Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in
court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of
business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name,
and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality
upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.
Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner
of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that the
suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under
the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words "doing business as
Juasing Hardware" may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done.
D. Spouses as parties:
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the
action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a
pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:

Section 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except
as provided by law.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a
number of cases, that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a
complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action.
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately.
In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is
to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu
proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party
or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable
parties.

SUPPORT
Case: De Asis vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 127578, Feb 15, 1999.
FACTS: In this case, Vircel Andres, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor
Glen Camil Andres De Asis, brought an action before the RTC, for maintenance and
support against petitioner Manuel de Asis, alleging the latter to be the father of the
subject minor. In his answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and
theorized that cannot be liable to provide support. During the pendency of the case,
Vircel made a manifestation through her counsel withdrawing her action for support,
since according to her, defendants admission of denial renders such action useless and
futile. On the other hand, by virtue of the manifestation, petitioner agreed not to pursue
any counterclaim in the said case. The RTC then dismiss the case with prejudice.
However, on September 7, 1995, another complaint for support was lodge against the
defendant therein, this time in the name of Glen Camil De Asis, represented by her legal
guardian/mother Vircel Andres. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground of
res judicata, alleging that the earlier civil case against him was dismissed with prejudice.
Hence, the manifestation made in the prior civil case bars the action for support.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for support is barred considering the manifestation
earlier made by Vircel Andres?
HELD: NO. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a
third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to
a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. .
..
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. The manifestation
sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be
useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the
vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative
parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner
and respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support
conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise
which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of
the right to support.
A. On the issue of Res Judicata:
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil
Case Q-88-935 has the effect ofres judicata on the subsequent case for support. The
case of Advincula vs. Advincula comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela
Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment and support against her putative father,
Manuel Advincula. On motion of both parties and for the reason that the "plaintiff has
lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case against the defendant and
has no further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint", the case was

dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the defendant
moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of
the second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the
amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the
needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be
renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be compensated with
what the recipient owes the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support can
not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by
Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for
support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against the
same defendant was dismissed.
B. Rationale behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission, and/or
compromise of the right to support:
The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or
compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his
existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce;
hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
xxx xxx xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to
support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public
burden. This is contrary to public policy.

Case: People vs. Manahan GR No. 128157, September 29, 1999

FACTS: In this case, Teresita Tibigar, filed a criminal complaint against the accused
Manuel, Manahan, when the latter forced the complainant to have sexual intercourse.
The incident resulted to Teresitas pregnancy. The RTC convicted the accused of rape
and sentence him to death penalty and to indemnify the complainant for moral
damages, pay costs and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. The
matter was brought before the Supreme Court for automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manahan can be compelled to acknowledge and support his
offspring?
HELD: He cannot be compelled to acknowledge, but he is liable for support. Article 345
of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced
to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and
"in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal
impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced
by this Court in People v. Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he
cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment
under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the
accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.

Lopez vs Court of Appeals

Facts: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon a decision declaring the nullity of
marriage between Cherry Pie Lopez and Alberto Lopez a.k.a Cesar Lopez (petitioner).
The decision became final and executory based on a certification1 dated January 5,
2001. Petitioner moved to reconsider2 the support aspect of the decision but was
denied by Order of January 26, 2001. On February 8, 2001, the RTC, acting on
petitioners Notice of Appeal4 filed on February 7, 2001, gave it due course and directed
the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals "as soon as possible."
Petitioner paid before the RTC a total of Sixty (P60.00) Pesos as docket fees as shown
by Official Receipt. For petitioners failure to pay the full amount of P520.00 docket fees,
the Court of Appeals, by Resolution of March 19, 2001,6 dismissed his appeal.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration7 of the appellate courts March 19, 2001
Resolution, but it was denied by Resolution of April 26, 2001 on the grounds that the
motion did not contain an affidavit or proof of service and that it did not state on its face
the material dates determinative of its timeliness.

Issue: Whether or not the aspect of support is final and executory.

Held: The dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioner is not without remedy. For
as what he seeks to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged to provide,
he can file a motion with the trial court for its modification since a judgment
granting support never becomes final.

Case: Montefalcon vs. Vasquez GR No. 165016, June 17, 2008

FACTS: In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint4 for
acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of
Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she
prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon,
whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.5 According to petitioners, Vasquez
only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993.
Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated
demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and
that Vasquez has his own family. When the sheriff was about to serve the summons, the
respondent was nowhere to be found, hence, the personal service thereof was never
been effected. Instead, the sheriff served the summons through a substituted service on
Vazquez caretaker. The RTC declared respondent in default for failure to file an answer,
thus, the court a qou ruled in favor of Monetfalcon and ordered Vasquez to
acknowledge Lawrence as his illegitimate child and support him in the amount of
P5000.00 monthly. On appeal, Vasquez claimed that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person and he is not entitled to support Lawrence. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court holding that the service of summons was
defective as there is no explanation why personal service cannot be effected nor an
attempt to effect it personally.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vasquez is liable for support?
HELD: YES. Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of
evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child
with Dolores. He signed as father in Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public
document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of
filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by
any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any
action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were
able to prove that Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of
giving such support. Under Article 195 (4)31 of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to
support his illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof
as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of
the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction
or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly
support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.
A. On the issue of summons:

1. Status- It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual

employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait for the
signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if they
wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary
residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the manning agencies
hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where he originates. In this
case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City
when the complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a
residence in either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service was made, even though he was
temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino
resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of summons on him is governed
by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
2. Rules applicable:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who
is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be alsoeffected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied.)
The preceding section referred to states:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to,
or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6;
or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the
court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in
any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice,
within which the defendant must answer.

3. Substituted service of summons; allowed:

Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory.
Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of
by the serving officer on a defendant-seaman. Obviously, personal service of summons
was not practicable since the defendant was temporarily out of the country. To proceed
with personal service of summons on a defendant-seaman who went on overseas
contract work would not only be impractical and futile it would also be absurd.
The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the Naga Citybased sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to serve the summons
personally on Vasquez. When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the
whereabouts of Vasquez. Upon being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga

court commissioned a Taguig City-based sheriff to serve the summons. Both the Naga
and Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquez's whereabouts, signifying that they did not
immediately resort to substituted service. There was no undue haste in effecting
substituted service. The fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time to locate
Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there was indeed no precipitate haste in serving
the summons.
In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified
because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no
avail. Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in
the performance of their official duty. Also, the person who received the alias summons
was of suitable age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling.
B. Meaning of residence
"Residence" is the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the
time. A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's residence, office or regular
business place. He need not know where a resident defendant actually is at the very
moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person upon whom
service was actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or informs him about
it. The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual
notice.
C. Establishment of Illegitimate filiation:
Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under
Article 172,27 the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1)
through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission
of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.

Case: Lim vs. Lim GR No. 163209, October 30, 2009.

FACTS: In this case, respondent Cheryl S. Lim is married to Edward Lim, son of the
petitioners (Cheryls parents-in-laws) therein. Their union blessed them with three
children. Cheryl and her husband together with their children all lived with the petitioners
and Chua Giak, an in-house midwife. However, due to a violent confrontation between
the spouses Lim (Edward was caught cheating with Chua Giak), respondent abandoned
her home bringing the children with her. She subsequently filed before the RTC for
support. The court a quo granted the petition and ordered Edward and the petitioners to
jointly provide P40,000.00 (Edward shouldering P6000, and the remaining balance to
the petitioners) monthly support to the respondents. An appeal was made by the
petitioners before the Court of Appeals assailing their liability to support Cheryl and her
children. However, it affirmed the decision of the trial court, arguing that although
parents and their legitimate children are obliged to support each other, this obligation
extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren as mentioned in
Article 195 of the Family Code. Hence, the matter was brought before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents?
HELD: YES. Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation
to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also
undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a
month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and
Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines,
following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners
theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation
of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants
one degree removed are more than able to fill the void. However, petitioners partial
concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly
understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren
by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to
this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only
to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
A. Support under Parental Authority (Title IX) vs. Support (Title VIII):
Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow question of
when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title
IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their
liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
termination or suspension during the childrens minority. Because at the time
respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over

their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends
with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe
constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the
governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a
common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal
support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its
concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation to
provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,
the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the
obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative
parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or
suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only
upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
B. On the issue on alternative option under Art. 204 of the Civil Code:
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the
Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by
maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati residence. The option is unavailable to
petitioners. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are petitioners grandchildren
and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the
house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to the level
of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not
prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to
a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article
204, precluding its application.
C. Pertinent laws applicable:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents
and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this
obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly
provides that should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means
to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall
provide the necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the
relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed
first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.

INTERPLEADER:
Case: Eternal Gardens vs. IAC GR No. 73794, September 18, 1988.
FACTS: ETERNAL Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation (ETERNAL) and North
Philippine Union MISSION Corporations (MISSION) executed a Land Development
Agreement (Agreement) over the property owned by the latter into a memorial park. The
lot will be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots. In said agreement, MISSION is
entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection. Under the implementation of the
agreement, MISSION received initial payment as part of its share under the above
Agreement.
However, MAYSILO Estate (MAYSILO) asserted its claim of ownership over the
property in question. In view of the conflicting claims of ownership of the defendants
over the properties, petitioner filed a complaint for interpleader against MISSION and
MAYSILO.
MISSION then presented a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due
and unpaid from ETERNAL. The trial court denied the motion.
MISSION filed a petition for certiorari with the then IAC praying that the aforementioned
Orders of trial court be set aside and that an order be issued to deposit in court or in a
depositor trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due the private
respondent MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited
to be paid to whomever may be found later to be entitled thereto.
IAC dismissed the petition. It however later reversed its decision, and ordered
ETERNAL to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development
Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the
depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be found entitled
thereto. ETERNAL moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied
for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent CA abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in reconsidering its resolution and in requiring instead that ETERNAL deposit
whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement?
HELD: NO. Petitioner admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is
still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in
such amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside
from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is
the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule founded on

justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or
funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will
ultimately be decided as entitled thereto."

The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and
mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos
are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be
considerable, now accruing in favor of the ETERNAL. Finding that such is violative of
the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest
of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower
court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the
requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the
Court.
A. Essence of Interpleader:
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside
from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is
the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule founded
on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the
property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of
whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.
B. On the issue of Res Judicata:
The claim that this case should be barred by res judicata is even more untenable.
The requisite of res judicata are: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the
former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is
between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action Arguson v. Miclat 135 SCRA 678 [1985]; Carandang v. Venturanza,
133 SCRA 344 [1984]).
There is no argument against the rule that parties should not be permitted to litigate the
same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy
Kao v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302 [1984]).

But a careful review of the records shows that there is no judgment on the merits in
G.R. No. 73569 and in the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794; both of which deal on mere
incidents arising therefrom.
In G.R. No 73569, the issue raised is the propriety of the grant of the motion for
reconsideration without a hearing thereon and the denial of the motion for execution,
while in the case at bar, what is assailed is the propriety of the order of respondent
appellant court that petitioner Eternal Gardens should deposit whatever amounts are
due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be
designated by the Court. In fact, there is a pending trial on the merits in the trial court
which the petitioner insists is a prejudicial question which should first be resolved.
Moreover, while there may be Identity of parties and of subject matter, the Land
Development Contract, there is no Identity of issues as clearly shown by the petitions
filed.

Case: Wack Wack Golf Club vs. Lee E. Won GR No. 23851, March 26, 1976
FACTS: Wack-wack Golf and Country Corporation issued certificates of stock to its
members. A problem arose when its membership fee certificate 201 was being claimed
by two parties. Although the Corporation officially recognized one Bienvenido Tan as the
owner of the stocks in question, another person, Lee Won also claimed ownership.
Instead of compelling claimants Won and Tan to settle their dispute amongst
themselves so that the Corporation could validly recognize the rightful owner of the
stocks, Wack-Wack Corportion chose to do nothing.
And so, Mr. Won filed a civil case against the corporation for the issuance of stock
certificates wherein the Court ruled in favor of Won.
Later on, even when the decision in the above-stated case had already become final,
the Corporation still went on to file an Interpleader suit against both Won and Tan. This
suit was dismissed because defendant Won claimed res judicata.
And so, the Corporation appeals its case arguing that its interpleader suit was proper as
there were two conflicting claims against its issued stock certificate and that the
corporation itself wasnt claiming ownership of said certificate. It also argued that with
regards to res judicata, the same is not applicable to its interpleader suit because there
is no identity of the parties, subject-matter, and cause of action with the earlier case filed
by Mr. Won.

ISSUE: Should the interpleader suit be dismissed on the ground of res judicata? Was
the interpleader suit filed by Wack-wack proper as there were in fact two claimants to its
certificate?
HELD: The interpleader suit should really be dismissed but not on res judicata but
because the interpleader suit was filed out of time. Upon its knowledge that two parties
were battling for the ownership of membership Certificate of Stock 201, Wack-Wack
should have already filed an interpleader suit in order two compel the conflicting parties
to settle as to whose claim Wack-Wack should recognize. In other words, the
reasonable time to have filed the interpleader suit was after dispute had arisen without
waiting to be sued by any of the claimants, otherwise he may be barred by laches.
And so, the corporations action is deemed to late when it was filed only after judgment
against it had already been rendered by one of the claimants in an independent suit. Or,
when Mr. Won filed a case against it, it should have immediately impleaded Mr. Tan.

And because Wack-Wack has offered no explanation as to why it wasnt able to file an
interpleader suit much sooner, nor as to why it didnt implead Tan in the suit against it,
the Corporation has already become independently liable.
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful
establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is
to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of
an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the
favorable judgment. This cannot be done because having elected to take its chances of
success in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must
submit to the consequences of defeat.
A. Nature of Interpleader:
1. Under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure: The action of interpleader, under
section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has
personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is
entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against
double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.
2. Under the Rules of Court - it is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure,
except that under the former, the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the
nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader
suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates
to the performance of an obligation.
B. Reasonable diligence of a stakeholder:
A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to
court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing
a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time
after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending
claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts
with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not
barred.

C. When the remedy is not anymore available:

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after
judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,
especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit
where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained
against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
D. General Rules in Interpleader:
1. It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for
an order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that
he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants.
2. It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after
judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being
especially true when the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to
the rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants
in the suit in which the judgment was rendered.
E. Consequences of not availing the remedy on time:
The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and
hazard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with
knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the
chances for success in the actions at law, ought to submit to the consequences of
defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to
interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the
shoulders of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his own.
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an
interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse
claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

Case: Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dizon Realty GR No. 136409, March 14, 2008
FACTS: Petitioners are lesees of nine rooms in a building owned by lessor Don Luis
Dison Realty, Inc. of the San Luis Building, located at Ermita, Manila. It was clear in
their contract that all the rooms may be occupied right away except for three rooms,
which may be occupied only when the tenants vacate said premises. The lease of three
rooms however did not materialize leaving only six rooms as subjects of the lease
contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco
(Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was
replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid the monthly
rentals until May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners
continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent.
Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by
private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for
the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal
was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person
authorized to receive payment.
The MeTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint because of Ms. Bautistas
alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. It ruled however, that the
non-payment of the rental fee was unjustified. The RTC on appeal adopted the MeTCs
finding on petitioners unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for
ejectment. It, however, faulted the MeTC in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of
capacity to sue. Instead, it upheld Ms. Bautistas authority to represent respondent
notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was
implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company. The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are justified in withholding payments of rental fee on
the ground that there is confusion as to whom shall payment be made?
HELD: NO. If it were true that they were allowed to use only one of the nine rooms
subject of the contract of lease, and considering that the rooms were intended for a
business purpose, we cannot understand why they did not specifically assert their right.
If we believe petitioners contention that they had been prevented from using the rooms
for more than a year before the complaint for ejectment was filed, they should have
demanded specific performance from the lessor and commenced an action in court.
With the execution of the contract, petitioners were already in a position to exercise their
right to the use and enjoyment of the property according to the terms of the lease

contract. As borne out by the records, the fact is that respondent turned over to
petitioners the keys to the leased premises and petitioners, in fact, renovated the
rooms. Thus, they were placed in possession of the premises and they had the right to
the use and enjoyment of the same. They, likewise, had the right to resist any act of
intrusion into their peaceful possession of the property, even as against the lessor itself.
Yet, they did not lift a finger to protect their right if, indeed, there was a violation of the
contract by the lessor.

What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners non-payment of
rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made.
However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they
were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on
interpleader.
Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery of three Rooms as a justification
for non-payment of rentals. Although the two contracts embraced the lease of nine
rooms, the terms of the contracts - with their particular reference to specific rooms and
the monthly rental for each - easily raise the inference that the parties intended the
lease of each room separate from that of the others. There is nothing in the contract
which would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or more rooms was to be made
dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9) rooms. Accordingly, the use of each room
by the lessee gave rise to the corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the
same. Notably, respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the rooms actually
delivered to, and used by, petitioners.
A. Consignation under the Civil Code:
Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:
If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to
accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the
thing or sum due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases:
xxxx
(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;
x x x x.

Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial
authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of
the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation
becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him.
Petitioners claim that they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared
vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of
payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment
for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment
must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be
produced.

B. Interpleader when proper:

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in
the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on
the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from
making payments.

DECLARATORY RELIEF
Velarde vs. Social Justice Society [GR 159357, 28 April 2004]
Facts: On 28 January 2003, the Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Mariano Mike Z.
Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister
Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as corespondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and
a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders
endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members
of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted,
within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently,
Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss.
While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed
an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the
Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it
does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They
were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by
another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His
Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli
Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. The Court denied
the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde,
Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new
arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss. After
narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the
Petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions
imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law. It then
proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of
church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the
principle. Through its discourse, the trial court opined at some point that the
[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear
violation of the separation clause. After its essay on the legal issue, however, the
trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which were denied by
the lower court. Velarde filed the petition for review.

Issue [1]: Whether SJS has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief.
Held [1]: Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected
by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in
the question involved. Velarde alleged that [i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the
constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse, or require the members of the
religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal
interest in the controversy; it has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered
question would benefit or injure it. Parties bringing suits challenging the
constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show not only that the law [or
act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way. They must
demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. First, parties suing as
taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. A taxpayers action may be properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Herein, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is
being illegally disbursed. Second, there was no showing in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered
voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of Velarde, et al., if the
question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had
suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the Velarde et
al.. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of
suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking. Finally,
the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayersregistered voters is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by
our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing.
Issue [2]: Whether the constitutional issue in the SJS Petition raises an issue of
transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people, so as to allow the
cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing.
Held [2]: In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement
when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance
to the people. Herein, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS

Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people. The issue did not simply
concern a delineation of the separation between church and state, but ran smack into
the governance of our country. The issue was both transcendental in importance and
novel in nature, since it had never been decided before. The Court, thus, called for Oral
Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve the constitutional issue
despite the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated
proceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the parties -particularly for SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply
the deficiencies hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt the
case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile
because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

CASE: Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Industries GR No. 150806, Januray 28,
2008
FACTS: Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries renewed its contract of lease with
Ponciano Almeda, the father of Romel Almeda and the husband of Eufemia, who are
the petitioners in this case. The contract of lease contains the following provisions which
give rise to the instant case, to wit:
SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is
based on the present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the
assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be
imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located,
LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional rental
or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the
event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE
shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion
leased by him;
SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency
should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis of payment;
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Petitioners therein in a letter,
advised respondent Bathala that it would be assessed and collect VAT from its monthly
rentals. In response, Bathala contend that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed
on the contact of lease were supposed to include VAT, in lieu that there contract was
established when the VAT law has been effected. However, respondent received
another letter from the petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be
increased by 73% pursuant to condition no. 7 of the contact and Article 1250 of the civil
code. Bathala opposed the said increased arguing that there was no extraordinary
inflation to warrant the application of the said Article. Hence, respondent Bathala
instituted an action for declaratory relief to determine the correct interpretation of the
conditions no. 6 and 7 of the contract of lease. In turn, petitioners instituted an action for
ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent for failure to heed the demand
to vacate the premises. In addition, they moved to dismiss the action for declaratory
relief since respondent already breach the obligation and the case would not end the
litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The RTC ruled in favor of Bathala. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the matter was
raised before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief was proper considering that Bathala was in
breach of obligation when it filed the action before the trail court?

HELD: YES. Petitioners insists that respondent was already in breach of the contract
when the petition was filed. We do not agree. After petitioners demanded payment of
adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms
and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein.
Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of
the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a
breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting
before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.

A. Requisites of Declaratory Relief:

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
between persons whose interests are adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
B. On the issue on the separate actions instituted by the petitioners:
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for
rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus,
the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same
forum.
We are not convinced.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation17 we held that the
petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate
action for unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant
case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial
court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that

case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for
unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved
the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In
fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the
suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.

We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol where the
declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out
in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of
contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual
milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant
declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the
ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition
would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of
the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy

CASE: Reyes vs. Ortiz, GR No. 137794, August 11, 2010.

FACTS: The instant cases are consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari
and Prohibition. In G.R. No. 137794 (1st case), petitioners Reyes et. al seek to declare
null and void the proceedings in an ejectment case before MeTC, Caloocan and another
case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership before RTC, Caloocan. On one hand,
petitioners Sps. Embores et. al in G.R. No. 149664 (2nd case) seek to nullify of four
ejectment proceedings in different MTC/RTC branches in Caloocan. By court resolution
the 2nd case was terminated on Aug. 30, 2006.
The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the TALA
ESTATE, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and
encompassing an area of about 7,007.9515 hectares.
G.R. No. 137794
Sps. Bautista, Sps. Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes,
Sps. Matienzo and Sergio Abejero, who are occupants of separate homelots in
Camarin. The first case was initiated by Segundo Bautista, as the registered owner, he
filed a complaint against land occupants Sps. Matienzo in RTC, Caloocan (RECOVERY
CASE).
Shortly thereafter, a separate but related action for annulment of title/reversion, was
initiated by the Republic (Rep: Dir. of Lands) on Dec. 27, 1996 against Biyaya Corp and
RD of Cities Pasig, Caloocan and Quezon, the City of Manila and Admin of LRA
involving the TALA Estate before QC-RTC. The case sought to declare the transfer titles
issued by Biyaya Corp. null and void; revert the patrimonial portions of the property to
the State and the same be awarded to actual occupants (ANNULMENT/REVERSION
CASE). One of the intervenors were petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie
Matienzo, members of Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA). The
QC-RTC issued Preliminary Injunction freezing all ejectment cases in the MeTCs of QC
involving TALA Estate. Believing the said Injunction beneficial to them, Sps. Matienzo
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the Recovery Case which was denied;
likewise, the MR was denied. Trial on merits started on Dec. 2, 1998.
The second case, an ejectment case, was filed by Sps. Bernard and Florencia Perl
against Reyes before MeTC, Caloocan. Thereafter, Sps. Perl also filed an ejectment
case against Sergio Abejero. These two cases were consolidated (EJECTMENT
CASES),

Reyes, in her Answer and during Preliminary Conference, moved for

suspension/dismissal of these cases citing the Injuction case; the court ignored and
require a position paper instead. The courts Decision ordered Reyes to vacate the
contested property.
The Recovery and Ejectment cases were joined when petitioners Matienzo and Reyes
filed the instant petition as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the
denial of their respective motions for suspension.
This case is docketed as G.R. No. 137794. During the pendency of this case, certain
events supervened when the Ejectment cases ran their course and Reyes appealed the
MeTC decision to the RTC; meanwhile, Sps. Perl moved for execution pending appeal
which was granted and accordingly a writ of execution was issued by the RTC. Thus,
Reyes et. al moved for suspension of the RTC proceedings to the SC. The Court issued
TRO for the implementation of the writ.
G.R. No. 149664
This case emanated from four (4) distinct ejectment complainst filed against petitioners
Corazon Laurente, Sps. Alberto and Lourdes Embores, Sps. Roberto and Evelyn Palad,
and Dennis Henosa. Petitioners were sought to be evicted in Camarin and are members
of Alyansa ng Mga Naninirahan Sa Tala Friar Lands (ALNATFRAL). They are also
intervenors in the Reversion Case. These cases were filed prior to the issuance of
Injunction Order by the QC-RTC. Petitioners separately invoked the said injunction for
the dismissal of the current ejectment cases against them. They directly filed their
petitions with the SC.
On April 28, 2003, this Court resolved to consolidate the two cases. Since the first case
was withdrawn, only the issues in the second case remain to be resolved.
ARGUMENT/s:
As to petitioner: (1) The refusal of the Caloocals MeTC and RTC to suspend the
Ejectment cases despite the Injunction is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; if so, the Decision in the Ejectment and
Recovery cases must be annulled. (2) The petition is mainly for Declaratory Relief.
As to respondent: The petition for relief is not a proper remedy for the following
reasons: (1) the action for petition for relief will only prosper if the statute, deed or
contract has not been violated but in this case, the violation of the Injunction Order has
already been made prior to the filing of the petition; thus, to rule on the petition now
would only serve as an authoritative guidance for its implementation. (2) petitioners
recourse was merely a ploy to substitute the filing of certiorari under Rule 65 which 60-

day period already lapsed. (3) the petition was directly filed with SC in violation of
Hierarchy of Courts; it should have been filed with the CA first. (4) Caloocan RTC did
not err in not suspending the Recovery Case since QC-RTC is a co-equal court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is one for Declaratory Relief under Section 1 of Rule
63; whether or not the petition should be granted as a proper remedy for the lower
courts denial of petitioners motion for suspension of the Ejectment case while an
Injunction Order was being enforced in another court.
HELD: Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may
be brought under this Rule.
The section can be dissected in two parts. The first paragraph concerns declaratory
relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute,
ordinance, executive order or regulation to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for
declaration of rights and duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action
to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase.
In Lerum v. Cruz (1950), the Supreme Court held that the subject matter of the petition
for relief must only refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or to a
statute or ordinance. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded.
Expressio unius est exclussio alterius. The Court further ruled in succeeding
jurisprudence that a Judges query or a court decision is not a proper subject matter of a
petition for relief.
In this case, petitioners Reyes and Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule
63 of ROC, the orders denying their motions to suspend proceedings. This cannot be
countenanced since a court order is not a proper subject matter of a petition for
Declaratory Relief.

The proper remedy of Erlinda Reyes from the denial of a motion before the Caloocan
MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for
certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of ROC; Whereas, the proper remedy of
Matienzo should have been to file a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65
with CA from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan RTC. The necessity of filing the
petition to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case
of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts. Both petitions must be
filed within 60 days from receipt or notice of denial of the motion as provided under
Section 4, Rule 65. This procedural faux pas proves fatal. The case not being one of
exceptional circumstance to warrant the Supreme Court to exercise primary jurisdiction.
Matienzo obviously filed the declaratory relief as a substitute for certiorari, a remedy she
lost by inaction. To recall, Matienzo received a copy of the Order of denial for her motion
for reconsideration on June 9, 1998 but it was only on March 25, 1999 that she assailed
the said order via this petition.
The Caloocan City RTC and MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion upon
denying petitioners motion. It is clear from its Order, that the preliminary injunction was
addressed to the MTC of QC and Caloocan City; not with the Caloocan City RTC. The
order merely mentions the Caloocan City MeTCs. Nothing more. But more importantly,
the Quezon City RTC could not have validly enjoined the Caloocan City RTC without
violating the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
Hence, petitioners posture that the Ejectment cases should be suspended due to the
pendency of the Annulment/Reversion case is not meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated October 25, 2000 issued by this Court is LIFTED.

CASE: Malana vs. Tappa GR No. 181303, September 17, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan as they inherited the subject property from late Anastacio
Danao. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on and
occupy the southern portion of the subject property on agreement that the latter would
vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it. Averring that
they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same.
Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand. The petitioners referred
their land dispute with respondents to the Barangay. During the conciliation
proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented
documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership, enough to create clouds on
their title. Thus, petitioners filed before the RTC of Tugegarao City Complaint for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages.
The RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed two pleadings. A Motion for Reconsideration and another simply
designated as motion. They argued, among others, that their principal cause of action
was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to
seek complete relief from respondents. Their complaint should not have been
dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet
title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Both Motions were denied by the RTC. The RTC differentiated between the first and the
second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph
refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The
second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an
action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to
Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where
the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.
It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action under second paragraph of the
Sec.1, Rule 63 and since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration
was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: NO. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second
paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. As the provision states, a
petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be
brought before the appropriate RTC. And to determine which court has jurisdiction over
the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Where the law or
contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has
already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion
publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An
accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over
the real property as owner.
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria.
Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved.
Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the
RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint
in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction

A. Distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court (Declaratory Relief):
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may
be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to
(1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to
1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of
the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of
the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered
similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights
of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.

B. Jurisdiction of Section 1, par.2 of Rule 63:

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read
together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not
categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly
uses the word "may" that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the]
Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for
declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The
use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and
indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax
Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving
title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the MTC, not the RTC.

CERTIORARI

CASE: Tuason vs. R.D. of Caloocan City:

FACTS: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teacher. With the
funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel
Farms (Carmel), a piece of land in the latters subdivision in Caloocan City. In
connection thereto, a new title was issued in the name of Tuasons, cancelling the old
Carmels torrens title. Hence, the Tuasons took over the possession of the property.
Some 8 years later, problems soon arisen regarding the property. Petitioners woke up
one morning only to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of
the land they purchased. Their property and the other lots in the subdivision have been
declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners
Association Inc., the present bonafide occupants thereof. Apparently, Ferdinand
Marcos, during his presidency, invoking his emergency powers, issued PD No. 293
which invalidates inter alia the title of the Tuasons vendor Carmel, which had earlier
purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several
lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land bought by
Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had
bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Some of the
provisions under these statutes are the following:
2) until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the Government, and any
sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was explicitly
declared to 'be invalid as against the Government ... and ... in all respects subordinate
to its prior claim;"
3) in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and
interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) had
the duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial
authority to enforce the Government's lien on the "and by selling it in the same manner
as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale being deemed to acquire a
good and indefeasible title, and the proceeds of the sale being applied to the payment
of the costs of the court and all installments due or to become due; xxx..
The said Presidential Decree made a finding that Carmel failed to complete payment of
the price, hence the title to the said land remained in the government and the land now
occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the
property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and
purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being
therefore null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. Upon this
adjudgment, President Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those

derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang

Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots which, in
consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and sale ... pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended."
Thus, the Tuason spouses filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
assailing that PD No. 293 as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property
in favor of a selected group. However, the Solicitor General, representing the
government, argued the validity of PD 293, he questioned the propriety of the remedy of
certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents
were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess
of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner
spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal
contemplation they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the
purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the
social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the
pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left
homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they
had theretofore been residing.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD: YES. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in
relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of
the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the
petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful
exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a
determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights
of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function,
or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and
decide or determine a cause. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ
of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a
judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with
judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law, the judicial acts done by him were in
the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were
completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible
scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for
prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter.
Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without

jurisdiction exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws
and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the
parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and
efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the
appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer
but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings.

A. Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition:

The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of
certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ
of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of
the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon
analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
B. In the exercise of Judicial Functions:
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a
determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights
of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function,
or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and
decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the
original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all
installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms,
Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of
homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication
that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by
the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the
Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting
to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as
against the law and public policy.

C. Certiorari as prohibition:
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for
prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter.
Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without
jurisdiction exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws
and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the
parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and

efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the
appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer
but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings.
D. PD 293 is unconstitutional:
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e. determined the relevant facts and
applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the
opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts
material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records
of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever
the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is
undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never
confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness
and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication
was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are
entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto
himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition
exercised it unconstitutionally.

CASE: UP Board of Regents vs. Ligot- Teylan GR No. 110280, October 12, 1993
FACTS: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly a university for
people, the UP administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme
of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program
(STFAP) popularly known as Iskolar ng Bayan program. Applicants are required to
accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and the source
of the annual of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances
from which the University may evaluate their status and need on the basis which they
are categorized into brackets. Among the applicants was Ramon Nadal, a student
enrolled in the College of Law. An investigation was conducted from the resident of
Nadal, where it was found that he failed to declare not only from the fact that his brother
own a car (1977 Corolla car) but also the income of his mother who was in the US to
support his brothers. Nadal was informed by UP that the Diliman committee had
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4). Further, he was required by to pay back
the equivalent amount of full school fees with interest based on concurrent commercial
rate and failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration
privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also
warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further
investigation. Noting further discrepancy, the UP charge Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) where it rendered a decision exculpating him from
withholding information on having a car on his
STFAP application, but found him guilty of concealing the fact that his mother was
abroad to support him and his brothers. Thus, it recommended the penalty of expulsion
from the University and to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received and not doing
so could resort to a legal action by the University. The SDT decision was automatically
elevated before the Board of Regents (BOR). It affirmed the decision of the SDT. Nadal
appeal the decision, which was given due course by the University. The BOR reached a
final decision where it held Nadal guilty of all charge but mitigate his penalty to
suspension with reimbursement of all the benefits he received from the STFAP. Hence,
Nadal filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and
prayer for a temporary restraining order against petitioners herein citing that he was
denied due process in implementing the decision. The RTC granted the petition and
issued an order temporarily restraining petitioners from implementing the BOR decision.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court
assailing the order of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension
penalty it had imposed on Nadal?
HELD: YES. On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the
lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of
May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that
the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work
injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently,
in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the
situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own
making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely
disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample
justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an
institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower
court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by
Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain
right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon
legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of
academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. To revert to the instant case, inasmuch
as it has been shown sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in
withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in
blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of
petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary
sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised.

A. On the issue of Mandamus:

One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was
denied due process. To clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred only to the
March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondent's counsel: "What was
conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from the
start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on
March 28, 1993." In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case
with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University
rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose
disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body.
At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the
regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would

make an exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to reconsider
the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all
administrative charges against him. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the
lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed
by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain
right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.

QUO WARRANTO:
CASE: Mendoza vs. Allas GR No. 131977, February 4, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held
many positions in the BOC. In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was
reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with RA 6758 and
National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office. On April 22,
1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection
District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as
"Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District
Collector, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner
Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the BOC, in view of respondent
Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. Petitioner wrote the
Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without
loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent
Allas before the RTC. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office
without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was
deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same
office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the
position of Director III, and at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to
the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant
thereto. Respondent Allas appealed to the CA. On February 8, 1996, while the case
was pending, Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy
Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this
promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered
moot and academic. The CA granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly.
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its
decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the
contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent
Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition. Petitioner filed a
special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the CA questioning the order of the
trial court. On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the judgment of the RTC granting the quo warranto in favor of
Mendoza binds respondent Olores, being the successor to the position in question?

HELD: NO. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right
of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against
Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial
court's decision. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right
binds his successor in office.
This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto
does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may
trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo
warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in,
or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the
petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas.
Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and
benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the
Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can
the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of
petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warrant.
A. Nature of Quo Warranto:
Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to
show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state
which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise
except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. In other words, a petition for quo
warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not wellfounded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
B. Who may commence the action:
The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal
against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts
constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts
as a corporation without being legally incorporated. The action may also be instituted by
an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
C. How should judgment be implemented:
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the
controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession
of the office. If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that
the respondent is entitled to the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and
declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or
exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:

Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found. When the defendant is found guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be,
recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective
rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the
action as justice requires.
If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or
unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,
privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in
the discretion of the court and on the relief sought.
D. Quo warranto proceedings do not bind successors in office:
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even
though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the
nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally
authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays
claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely
against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the
qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray
Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying
execution of the trial court's decision.

CASE: Calleja vs. Panday GR No. 168696, February, 28, 2006

FACTS: Respondents, in this case, filed before the RTC of San Jose Camarines Sur,
for a quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction,
Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners.
Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court,
they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed
men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents. On May 24, 2005,
RTC-Br. 58 (San Jose Camarines Sur) issued an Order transferring the case to the
Regional Trial Court in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition
showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo
warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However, the
Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject
case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners
(respondents below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising
therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3)
wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer,
also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then required to submit
their respective memoranda. The court a quo held that the present case involves an
intra-corporate relations between and among stockholders, members or associates of
the St. John Hospital Inc., hence, jurisdiction to try and decide these cases is bestow
to the special courts created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. Thus, the court remanded
the case to the RTC Br.23 of Naga City which has been designated as the special
court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies. Moreover, it denied the Motion to
Dismiss by the petitioners on the ground that the Interim Rules of Procedure for IntraCorporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) mandates that motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading (Section 8) and which is in consonance with Administrative Order 801 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the RTC Br. 58 has jurisdiction to try the case of quo warranto in the case at
bar?
2. Whether an action for quo warranto is applicable to private corporation?

HELD:
1. Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over
respondents petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case
was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been
aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of
this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it
was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order
the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action
that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision
Homeowners Association, the Court held that the trial court, having no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could
be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.
Note, further, that respondents petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M.
No. 03-03-03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein
that such petitions shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of
the designated Special Commercial Court. Since the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City,
respondents should have filed their petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
having been in effect for four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for
almost two years by the time respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason
why respondents were not aware of the appropriate court where their petition should be
filed.

2. NO. A.M. No. 8799 provides that an actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the SEC under
PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not
change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to
quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation.
The present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp
a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the
passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules)
which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court
since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office
and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

CASE: Lokin Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
FACTS: The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized
groups registered under the party-list system, which manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2007. CIBAC, thru its president Joel Villanueva, submitted a
list of 5 nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain
the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees are: Villanueva, herein
petitioner Lokin, Jr, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, through Villanueva, filed a certificate amending
the list of its nominees whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang. The amended list includes: Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. Villanueva
even sent a letter to COMELEC transmitting signed petitions of 81% of the CIBAC
members in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of the three.
After the election, CIBAC was proclaimed entitled to two seats. CIBAC, supposedly thru
its counsel, filed with COMELEC en banc a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as
its second nominee. This was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. It appears
that COMELEC failed to act on the certificate filed by Villanueva indicating the amended
list of nominees. Thus, he filed a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment. Consequently, COMELEC en banc approved the
withdrawal of the nominees Lokin, Tugna and Galang. As a result, COMELEC
proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as
the official second nominee of CIBAC and he likewise assails Section 13 of Resolution
No. 7804 and the issued approving CIBACs withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate
recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her
assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court
has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
2. Whether or not a special civil action for quo warranto is the proper remedy?
HELD: An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is
strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It

can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the
ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter
may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive
for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be
unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated
as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be
available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization
to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a
nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee
of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie,
considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of CruzGonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for
her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC
to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in
accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the
review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit.

As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with
Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for
certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC. Petitions for certiorari and
mandamus granted. COMELEC ordered to proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a
Party-List Representative representing CIBAC in the House of Representatives.

Rule 67 (Expropriation) Cases

Case: CITY OF MANILA vs. SERRANOS, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001, J.
Mendoza.
FACTS: The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833 authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manilas First District in Tondo. One of the
properties sought to be expropriated was that supposedly owned by respondents.
Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the RTC of Manila, against the supposed owners of
the lots, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin,
Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano.
Respondents filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that their mother, the
late Demetria De Guia, had acquired Lot 1-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the
bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the
expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in their dislocation, it being the only
residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was
exempt from expropriation because dividing the said parcel of land among them
would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. Respondents,
therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Lot 1-C exempt from
expropriation and ordering the cancellation of the notice annotated on the back of TCT
No. 226048, regarding the pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282 for eminent domain
filed by petitioner.
Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998,
directing petitioner to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the
assessed value of the properties. After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial
court issued another order, dated December 15, 1998, directing the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of petitioner.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the
expropriation of Lot 1-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants thereof,
landless; that Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 provides
that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly
urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation; that respondents would only receive
around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot 1-C which consists of only

343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of
the entire residential land but only that in excess of 300 square meters.
On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that Lot 1-C
is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters
which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of R.A. No. 7279.
However, it held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream International Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in 9-10 of the
law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation. As
petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the Court of Appeals gave judgment for
respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in concluding that the Order of the RTC which authorizes
the immediate entry of the City as the expropriating agency into the property sought to
be expropriated upon the deposit thereof as tantamount to condemnation of the
property.
RULING: YES. Rule 67, 2 provides: Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take
or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the
court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer
to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and
promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.
Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of
a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made
by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this case, these requirements were satisfied
and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of
possession.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements laid down in 9-10 of R.A. No. 7279 and reiterated in the Filstream
ruling. This is error. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because an order of
condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the
judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone
beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine
whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in R.A. No.

7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner
resorted to expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated
in 10 of the law. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first,
condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for
a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

Case: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and ANTONINO POBRE, respondents, G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004, J. Carpio.
FACTS: Antonio Pobre owns 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in
Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay which he developed into a resortsubdivision, Tiwi Hot Spring Resorts Subdivision. When the Commission on
Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam, which were suitable for
domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use, were present beneath the
Property, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), began initiating two expropriation
complaints on the said Property. The first expropriation complaint was granted by the
court. During its pendency however, NPC began drilling operations and construction of
steam wells. Said procedures produced waste materials which NPC dumped beyond
the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the
topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints
and NPC continued with its dumping.
In the meantime, the second appropriation proceedings were filed by NPC to acquire an
additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. Disturbed by what NPC did with his
propery, Pobre filed a complaint for damages. Surprisingly, Napocor withdrew its
complaint for expropriation by filing a motion to dismiss, five years after filing the
second expropriation complaint, on the ground that NPC had found an alternative
site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property
due to Pobre's opposition.
The trial court granted NPCs motion dismiss but allowed Pobre to proceed with his
complaint for damages. Despite the opposition of NPC, the trial court ruled in favor of
Pobre and ordered NPC to pay P3,448,450.00 as damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the assailed decision. Hence the present appeal.
NPC argued that the complaint for damages filed by Pobre should be dismissed
because of the dismissal of the second expropriation proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the motion to dismiss filed by Napocor in order to withdraw its complaint
for expropriation has rendered the complaint for damages filed against it by Pobre,
nugatory.
HELD: NO. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right
to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered
damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss
the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions. The
exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on

the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived
of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court
must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just
compensation and there is due process of law.
If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to
judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because
private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or
abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the
court that the expropriation is not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the
court to dismiss the action. However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered
damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose
the defendant's right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a
separate action.
Thus, NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of
Pobre's claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules
of Court that provided for the dismissal of the defendant's claim for damages,
upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of
dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either in a
separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the
expropriation case. The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain
conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's right to recover damages either in
the same or in another action. The trial court in this case reserved Pobre's right to prove
his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to NPC's own fault.
We must correct NPC's claim that it filed the notice of dismissal just "shortly" after it had
filed the complaint for expropriation. While NPC had intimated several times to the
trial court its desire to dismiss the expropriation case it filed on 5 September
1979, it was only on 2 January 1985 that NPC filed its notice of dismissal. It took
NPC more than five years to actually file the notice of dismissal. Five years is
definitely not a short period of time. NPC obviously dilly-dallied in filing its notice
of dismissal while NPC meanwhile burdened Pobre's property rights.

Case: Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC (G.R. No. 169914) and DOTC vs.
C.A. and Salacnib Baternia (G.R. No. 174166), J., Chico-Nazario.
Facts: This is a consolidated case, but in view of the topic of expropriation we focus
more in the case of DOTC vs. Salacnib Baternia.
In order to better appreciate the case we must first discuss the facts and rulings in the
case of Agan and Gingoyon. In 1995 Asias Emerging Dragon (AEDC),(composed of the
6 most influential businessman in the Philippines mainly John Gokongwei, Lucio Tan,
Henry Sy, Andrew Gotianun, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco) submitted an
unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC for the development of NAIA
III under a build-operate-and transfer-arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by
RA 7718. Wherefore the proposal was indeed approved by the Government.
Biddings were held, in which in the end the Project was awarded to PIATCO. Objections
were raised by AEDC but in the end the Government justified the award to PIATCO
mainly because AEDC was not able to match the bid of PIATCO.
In 2002 the Build-operate-and transfer-arrangement (BOT) between the Govt. and
PIATCO was questioned in the case of Agan. Wherefore the court ruled among others
that, in view of anomalies in awarding PIATCO the BOT, the contract/ award (BOT) was
declared null and void. However the court ruled that it was not unmindful of the reality
that the structures comprising the NAIA III facility are almost complete and that the
funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the Government to take
over said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said
structures. The compensation must be just and accordance with law and equity for the
government can not unjustly enriched itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.
The abovementioned pronouncement of the Court in Agan gave rise to the petition in
the Gingoyan case. The facts of which are as follows, after the promulgation of the
ruling in Agan case, NAIA III was still in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed
intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. Whereby
the Govt. and PIATCO entered into several rounds of negotiation and even appeared
before arbitral proceedings before International Chamber of Commerce International
Court of Arbitration.
Then on, Dec. 21, 2004 the Govt. filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasay
RTC. The Govt. seeks the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing immediate
possession of NAIA III, it also declared that it had deposited the amount of 3 Billion in
cash with the Land Bank, representing the NAIA 3 terminal assessed value for tax
purposes. The RTC through Judge Gingoyon issued in the same day the Writ of
Possession prayed for by the Government citing the case of Manila vs. Serrano that the
RTC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon filing of a complaint
for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the

Government of the amount equivalent to assessed value of the property subject for
expropriation.
However, on Jan 4. 2005, the RTC issued another order the assailed order in this
case of Gingoyon- to supplement its earlier order dated Dec. 21, 2004. The RTC noted
that the first order was issued pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court .
However, it was observed that R.A.8974, had amended Rule 67 in many respects. That
there are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under RA
8974 and Rule 67. Under the Statute the Govt. is required to make immediate payment
to the property owner upon filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas in Rule 67, the Govt. is required only to make an initial deposit with an
authorized government depositary. Moreover Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit
be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of Tax, unlike in RA
8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value
of the property as stated in the tax declarations or the current relevant zonal valuation
of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structure
using the replacement cost method.
The Govt. in this case of Gingoyon questioned the above ruling.
The Supreme Court held the validity of the RTCs ruling. It held among others that 1. RA
8947 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by
the Govt. of at least the proffered value of the NAIA III facilities to PIATCO and provides
certain valuation standard method for the determination of just compensation. 2. That in
applying RA 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Govt. over
NAIA is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of 3 Billion pesos,
representing the proffered value of NAIA III 3. The Govt. shall pay the just
compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the
finality of said decision.
Finally we tackle the facts of the case of Republic vs. CA and Baterina. Congressman
Baterina, together with other member of the Lower House filed a petition for Prohibition
in Intervention with application for TRO. Baterina, et. al believe that the Govt. need not
file expropriation proceedings to gain possession if NAIA 3 and that PIATCO is not
entitled to just compensation, arguing that PIATCO does not own NAIA 3 because BOT
contract do not vest ownership. That the land in which NAIA 3 is situated is owned by
the Government.
Issue: In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground
that NAIA 3 is already a public property. Hence PIATCO is not entitled to just
compensation for NAIA 3.
HELD: PIATCO is entitled to just compensation and that the expropriation
proceedings commenced by the Government was proper and valid. The Government
has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the

added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and
the payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual
case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriated a building complex constructed
on land which the State already owns.
The right of eminent domain extends to personal property and real property, and the
NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered real property. The
public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that
Section 1 of Rule 67 recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be
expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be
made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3
complex stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development
Authority, another agency of the Republic. Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole
judicial recourse by which the government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while
satisfying the requisites in the order held by the SC in the Case of Agan. Eminent
Domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which
such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after
satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through
which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to
the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case.

Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Mangotara and Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corp. and PNB (consolidated cases), G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010, J. LeonardoDe Castro.
Facts: These consist of seven consolidated cases for Petitions for review and a Petition
for Certiorari arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and
reversion which involve the same parcels of land as in the Cacho case. The pertinent
case here is that which purports to the subject-matter on EXPROPRIATION, in Republic
vs. Mangotara which involve the complaint for Expropriation originally filed by the Iron
and Steel Authority (ISA), now, NSC against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation
(MCFC) and the latters mortgagee, PNB, in the sala of Judge Mangotara. ISA was
created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729 dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen,
develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was
extended until October 10, 1988.
On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of
land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted
to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of
this parcel of land. When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of
Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of
capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1 granted the Motion to Dismiss in an Order
dated November 9, 1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for the
substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, but the motion was denied
by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 106 was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this Court. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of
Appeals (ISA case), the Court remanded the case to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered
to allow the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was
made in the ISA case on August 31, 1998. In an Order dated November 16, 2001, the
RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 106.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and
overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the
RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7,
2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004
seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their
respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH.

MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental
Complaint on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same
because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic
failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive
period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an
independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the
unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in seeking the substitution
and continuation of the action for expropriation effectively barred any further
proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by laches.
In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTCBranch 1 allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the
Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTC-Branch 1
agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of the
judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been
filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected
the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest
mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of
the RTC-Branch 1.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the
Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner
of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the
institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the
same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation. Judge Mangotara justified the
dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels of land.
Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner x x x, then a
complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the owner of the land
subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v.
Government of the United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels
of land in the name of the late Doa Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is
conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only defendant
left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the
present case should be dismissed.

This Court notes that the Republic [has filed reversion proceedings] dated September
27, 2004, involving the same parcels of land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The Republic],
however, did not state such fact in its Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to its Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004. [It is
therefore] guilty of forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case,
[the Republic] asserts ownership over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed
to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation case without making a mockery of
justice.

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 12,
2005, insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge
Mangatora in a Resolution dated October 24, 2005.
On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition
for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules
of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not an expropriation proceeding is an action quasi in rem wherein the
fact that the owners of the property is made a party to the action is NOT
essentially indispensable.
(2) Whether the Republic commit forum shopping with the filing of the reversion
complaint.
Held:
(1) The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 on another
ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the expropriation proceedings, not being the
owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. The RTC-Branch 1 ratiocinated
that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private
land intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner, then a
complaint for expropriation must be directed against the owner of the land sought to be
expropriated.
The Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real party-in-interest, impleaded as a
defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation because of its possessory or occupancy
rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by reason of its ownership of the said
properties. In addition, the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action.

Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court described how expropriation proceedings
should be instituted:
Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing
of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation,
describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as
defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof
or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant
separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title
is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty
specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint.
(Emphases supplied.)
For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the
property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner
alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals:
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the
property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or
claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by eminent domain, the
owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation .
In the American jurisdiction, the term owner when employed in statutes relating to
eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the
proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those
who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a
lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having
an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award.
If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party,
he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. (Emphasis
supplied.)

At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983,

possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277 dated November
16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential
Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate
occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related
facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that:

(1)
NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the
Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the
subject lands at an amount of Thirty (P30.00) Pesos per square meter or equivalent to
the assessed value thereof (as determined by the City Assessor of Iligan), whichever is
higher. NSC shall give MCFC the option to either remove its aforesaid plant, structures,
equipment, machinery and other facilities from the lands or to sell or cede ownership
thereof to NSC at a price equivalent to the fair market value thereof as appraised by the
Asian Appraisal Inc. as may be mutually agreed upon by NSC and MCFC.
(2)
In the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the foregoing within sixty (60)
days from the date hereof, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) shall exercise its authority
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate the expropriation of the
aforementioned occupancy rights of MCFC on the subject lands as well as the plant,
structures, equipment, machinery and related facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and
thereafter cede the same to NSC. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, NSC shall take possession of the properties, subject to bonding and other
requirements of P.D. 1533. (Emphasis supplied.)

Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could
very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently
erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper
party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original Complaint
for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject
land, but not the owner/s of the said property.
Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. According to
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by
order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis supplied.)

MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this case where the
party not joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be expropriated, is an indispensable
party.

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination

can be had of an action.
Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation?
Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation
proceedings may be instituted even when title to the property sought to be condemned
appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private
individuals. The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as
defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest in the property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already
appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting
expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for
expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an
expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land
reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of
Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC
to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said
occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in
the original Complaint for Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an
indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would
still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De
Manguerra v. Risos, the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in
case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz:
[F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of
the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's
failure to comply. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged
owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any
order from the Court, the Republic upon becoming aware that the parcels of land

involved in the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and
LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel
of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 sought leave of court to file a Supplemental
Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTC-Branch 1 did not take the
Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed
outright the original Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC.
(2) NO. The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic committed forum
shopping by (1) simultaneously instituting the actions for expropriation (Civil Case No.
106) and reversion (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land; and (2) taking
inconsistent positions when it conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land in the
expropriation case but asserted ownership of the same properties in the reversion case.
There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil Case No.
6686) for the same parcels of land subject of the instant Expropriation Case (Civil Case
No. 106). The Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion dated September 27,
2004 was filed by the Republic with the RTC on October 13, 2004. The records,
however, do not show when the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation dated
September 28, 2004 was filed with the RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint
for Expropriation was filed after the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion
since the Republic mentioned in the former the fact of filing of the latter. Even then, the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Supplemental
Complaint for Expropriation did not disclose the filing of the Complaint for Cancellation
of Titles and Reversion. Notwithstanding such non-disclosure, the Court finds that the
Republic did not commit forum shopping for filing both Complaints.
In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v Hwang, the Court laid down the circumstances when
forum shopping exists:
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same
parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus, it
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Forum-shopping is an act of
malpractice because it abuses court processes. x x x.

Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 and Civil Case No. 6686.
Civil Case No. 106 was instituted against MCFC to acquire, for a public purpose,
its possessory/occupancy rights over 322,532 square meters or 32.25 hectares of land
which, at the time of the filing of the original Complaint in 1983, was not yet covered by
any certificate of title. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6686 sought the cancellation
of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), which was entered into registration on
December 4, 1998 in Doa Demetrias name, on the argument that the parcels of land
covered by said certificates exceeded the areas granted by the LRC to Doa Demetria
in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, as affirmed by this Court in the 1914 Cacho
case.
Expropriation vis--vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both
expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land.
The
expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily
exclusionary of each other.
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an
action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may
still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for
expropriation even when the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to
be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the
title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners. Rule 67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court
further provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the
property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof , the
court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid
to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to
either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation
impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission
that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the
Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private
persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still
consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject
parcels of land are part of the public domain.
In sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original Complaint and disallowing the
Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. 106. The Court reverses and sets aside the
Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil
Case 106, and reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.

Case: Spouses Abad vs. Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and
Magdiwang Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 189239, November 24, 2010, J. Carpio
Morales.
Facts: Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty
Corporation (respondents), co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City and
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21712 and 21713, filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners before the
Paraaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots
since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them. Petitioners countered
that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents
predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In
any event, they contend that the question of ownership must first be settled before the
issue of possession may be resolved.
During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed
expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for
distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A writ of possession was
consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.
Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the
unlawful detainer case against petitioners, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants Leticia and Ervin Abad et. als. ordering the latter and all persons claiming
rights under them to VACATE and SURRENDER possession of the premises (Lots
covered by TCT NOS. (71065) 21712 and (71066) 21713 otherwise known as Purok I
Silverio Compound, Barangay San Isidro, Paraaque City to plaintiff and to PAY the
said plaintiff.
The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they still
maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by
virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be
named.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4, 2008,
reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:
x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents herein) is
unlawful detainer as shown by the allegations of the Complaint. The ruling of the court a
quo is not accurate. It is not the allegations of the Complaint that finally determine
whether a case is unlawful detainer, rather it is the evidence in the case.

Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of "tolerance". Tolerance of the

occupation of the property must be present right from the start of the defendants
possession. The phrase "from the start of defendants possession" is significant. When
there is no "tolerance" right from the start of the possession sought to be
recovered, the case of unlawful detainer will not prosper. (emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City
bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had
already been rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over
the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to "disregard the . . . final judgment and
writ of possession" due to non-payment of just compensation:
The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties subject of this case
had already been given to the City of Paraaque since January 19, 2006 after they were
expropriated. It is serious error for the court a quo to rule in the unlawful detainer
case that Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development
Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which were already
expropriated in favor of the City of Paraaque.
There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo that the case for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court would not bar, suspend or abate the ejectment
proceedings. The court a quo had failed to consider the fact that the case for
expropriation was already decided by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 way back in
the year 2006 or 2 years before the court a quo rendered its judgment in the unlawful
detainer case in the year 2008. In fact, there was already a Writ of Possession way
back in the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation case by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 196. The court a quo has no valid reason to disregard the said final
judgment and the writ of possession already issued by the Regional Trial Court in
favor of the City of Paraaque and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and FilHomes Realty Development Corporation and make another judgment concerning
possession of the subject properties contrary to the final judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 196. (emphasis in the original)
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they
maintained that respondents "act of allowing several years to pass without requiring
[them] to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts to acquiescence or
tolerance of their possession."
CA granted the petition. Hence, the filing of this Petition to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not an ejectment proceeding due to its summary nature are NOT
suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action
regarding ownership.
Held: In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project

falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions
on social justice.
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not
suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action
regarding ownership.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538 enlightens, however:
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation
proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for
ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended,
for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary
negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension
shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner
the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the
action for ejectment has been instituted. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the
benefits of the suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of
expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better right of
possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation
proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to
continue staying there.
Petitioners position does not lie.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the
Local Government Code (LGC):
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of the property.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation clearly outlines the stages of expropriation, viz:
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of

condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by
the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by
the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation.
Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the
expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for
the NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation
proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance
was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit
had been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys possession of the lots,
contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.
Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the
city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so.
Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance.
Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to
claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain
requirements must be met and complied with before they can be considered to be
beneficiaries.
In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession is
by mere tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v. Pascual:
In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the premises
nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendants possession
and use of the premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the
defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired
but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand
to vacate. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They
stepped into the shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners. Even
if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action against petitioners to eject

them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed petitioners
possession by tolerance.

FORCLOSURE OF REM

Servicewide Specialists vs. CA (1999)

FACTS:
"On May 14, 1976, Leticia L. Laus of Quezon City purchased on credit a Colt Galant xxx from Fortune Motors (Phils.)
Corporation. On the same date, she executed a promissory note ). It was agreed upon, among others, that in case
of default in the payment of any installment the total principal sum, together with the interest, shall become
immediately due and payable (Exhibit A; p. 144, Orig. Records). As a security for the promissory note, a chattel
mortgage was constituted over the said motor vehicle (Exhibit B, ibid.), with a deed of assignment incorporated
therein such that the credit and mortgage rights were assigned by Fortune Motors Corp. in favor of Filinvest Credit
Corporation with the consent of the mortgagor-debtor Leticia Laus (Exhibits B-1 and B-2; p. 147, ibid.). The
vehicle was then registered in the name of Leticia L. Laus with the chattel mortgage annotated on said certificate.
(Exhibit "H"; p. 154, ibid.)
On September 25, 1978, Filinvest Credit Corporation in turn assigned the credit in favor of Servicewide Specialists,
Inc. (Servicewide, for brevity) transferring unto the latter all its rights under the promissory note and the chattel
mortgage (Exhibit B-3; p. 149, ibid.) with the corresponding notice of assignment sent to the registered car owner
(Exhibit C; p. 150, Ibid.).
On April 18, 1977, Leticia Laus failed to pay the monthly installment for that month. The installments for the
succeeding 17 months were not likewise fully paid, hence on September 25, 1978, pursuant to the provisions of the
promissory note, Servicewide demanded payment of the entire outstanding balance of P46,775.24 inclusive of
interests (Exhibits D and E; pp. 151-152, ibid.). Despite said formal demand, Leticia Laus failed to pay all the
monthly installments due until July 18, 1980.
As a result of the failure of Leticia Laus to settle her obligation, or at least to surrender possession of the motor
vehicle for the purpose of foreclosure, Servicewide instituted a complaint for replevin, impleading Hilda Tee and John
Dee in whose custody the vehicle was believed to be at the time of the filing of the suit.
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that it had superior lien over the mortgaged vehicle; that it is lawfully entitled to the
possession of the same together with all its accessories and equipments; (sic) that Hilda Tee was wrongfully
detaining the motor vehicle for the purpose of defeating its mortgage lien; and that a sufficient bond had been filed in
court. (Complaint with Annexes, pp. 1-13, ibid.). On July 30, 1984, the court approved the replevin bond (p. 20, ibid.)
On August 1, 1984, Alberto Villafranca filed a third party claim contending that he is the absolute owner of the subject
motor vehicle duly evidenced by the Bureau of Land Transportations Certificate of Registration issued in his name on
June 22, 1984; that he acquired the said mother vehicle from a certain Remedios D. Yang under a Deed of Sale
dated May 16, 1984; that he acquired the same free from all lien and emcumbrances; and that on July 30, 1984, the
said automobile was taken from his residence by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo Bernabe pursuant to the seizure order
issued by the court a quo.
Upon motion of the plaintiff below, Alberto Villafranca was substituted as defendant. Summons was served upon
him. (pp. 55-56, ibid).
On March 20, 1985, Alberto Villafranca moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there is another
action pending between the same parties before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 140, docketed as Civil
Case No. 8310, involving the seizure of subject motor vehicle and the indemnity bond posted by Servicewide (Motion
to Dismiss with Annexes; pp. 57-110, ibid.) On March 28, 1985, the court granted the aforesaid motion (p. 122, ibid.),
but subsequently the order of dismissal was reconsidered and set aside (pp. 135-136, ibid.). For failure to file his
Answer as required by the court a quo, Alberto Villafranca was declared in default and plaintiffs evidence was
received ex parte.
On December 27, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Its motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied, xxx.
CA- In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner theorized that a suit for replevin aimed at the foreclosure of a
chattel is an action quasi in rem, and does not require the inclusion of the principal obligor in the Complaint.
However, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower Court

Petitioner presented a Motion for Reconsideration but in its Resolution[4] of May 10, 1993, the Court of Appeals
denied the same, taking notice of another case pending between the same parties xxx relating to the very chattel
mortgage of the motor vehicle in litigation.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Essentially, the sole issue here is:

ISSUE: Whether or not a case for replevin may be pursued against the defendant, Alberto Villafranca, without
impleading the absconding debtor-mortgagor?

HELD:
No.
Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that an applicant for replevin must show that he is the owner of the
property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof.[5] Where the right of the plaintiff
to the possession of the specified property is so conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him
who so possesses the property. In rem action est per quam rem nostram quae ab alio possidetur petimus, et semper
adversus eum est qui rem possidet.[6]
Citing Northern Motors, Inc. vs. Herrera,[7] the Court said in the case of BA Finance (which is of similar import
with the present case):
There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is
sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes
the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the
mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them.[8]
Thus, in default of the mortgagor, the mortgagee is thereby constituted as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor, enabling
such mortgagee to act for and in behalf of the owner. That the defendant is not privy to the chattel mortgage should
be inconsequential. By the fact that the object of replevin is traced to his possession, one properly can be a
defendant in an action for replevin. It is here assumed that the plaintiffs right to possess the thing is not or cannot be
disputed.[9] (Italics supplied)
However, in case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such possession or that of
his principal, is put to great doubt (a contending party may contest the legal bases for plaintiffs cause of action or an
adverse and independent claim of ownership or right of possession may be raised by that party), it could become
essential to have other persons involved and impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the
controversy.[10] In the case under scrutiny, it is not disputed that there is an adverse and independent claim of
ownership by the respondent as evinced by the existence of a pending case before the Court of Appeals involving
subject motor vehicle between the same parties herein.[11] Its resolution is a factual matter, the province of which
properly lies in the lower Court and not in the Supreme Court, in the guise of a petition for review on certiorari. For it
is basic that under Rule 45, this Court only entertains questions of law, and rare are the exceptions and the present
case does not appear to be one of them.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. (Italics supplied) A foreclosure under a chattel
mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is default on the part of the mortgagor of his obligation
secured by the mortgage. The replevin in this case has been resorted to in order to pave the way for the foreclosure
of what is covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions essential for such foreclosure would be to show,
firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These requirements
must be shown because the validity of the plaintiffs exercise of the right of foreclosure is inevitably
dependent thereon.[12]
Since the mortgagees right of possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be
controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow
a full and conclusive determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the
eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagors default on, the
chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to replevy the property. The burden
to establish a valid justification for such action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the
mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel
mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.[13]

Leticia Laus, being an indispensable party, should have been impleaded in the complaint for replevin and
damages. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The partys interest in the subject matter of
the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence
as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the
dispute of the parties before the Court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does
complete justice to the parties in Court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely complete relief between
him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation.[14] Without the presence of
indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of a Court cannot attain real finality.[15]
That petitioner could not locate the mortgagor, Leticia Laus, is no excuse for resorting to a procedural shortcut. It could have properly availed of substituted service of summons under the Revised Rules of Court. [16]
If it deemed such a mode to be unavailing, it could have proceeded in accordance with Section 14 of the
same Rule.[17] Indeed, petitioner had other proper remedies, it could have resorted to but failed to avail of.
For instance, it could have properly impleaded the mortgagor. Such failure is fatal to petitioners cause.
With the foregoing disquisition and conclusion, the other issues raised by petitioner need not be passed upon.

CASE: Union Bank of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 133366, August 5,
1999
FACTS: A real estate mortgage was executed by Spouses Leopoldo and Jessica Dario
in favor of Unionbank, as security for a loan. For non-payment of the principal
obligation, Unionbank extrajudicially foreclosed the property mortgaged and sold the
same at public auction, with itself posting the highest bid.
One week before the one-year redemption period expired, private respondents
Reynaldo and Fermina Dario filed a complaint against Unionbank for annulment of sale
and real estate mortgage reconveyance. However, the complaint was dismissed
because of procedural error in filing the complaint. While there is a pending motion for
reconsideration and without informing the private respondents, Unionbank consolidated
its title over the foreclosed property.
Private respondents maintain that Unionbank 's consolidation of the title in its name was
in bad faith, thus void ab initio. Petitioner claimed that it was a mortgagee in good faith
and for value with a right to consolidate ownership over the foreclosed property with the
redemption period having expired and there having been no redemptioners.
ISSUE: Whether the consolidation of title in Unionbank 's name proper.
HELD: Unionbank 's consolidation of title over the property was proper, though
precipitate. In real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when due,
the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized
and sold with a view to applying the proceeds to the payment of the principal obligation.
Foreclosure may be effected either judicially or extrajudicially.
In a public bidding during extra-judicial foreclosure, the creditor mortgagee, trustee, or
other person authorized to act for the creditor may participate and purchase the
mortgaged property as any other bidder. Thereafter the mortgagor has one year within
which to redeem the property from and after registration of sale with the Register of
Deeds. In case of non-redemption, the purchaser at foreclosure sale shall file with the
Register of Deeds, either a final deed of sale executed by the person authorized by
virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed or mortgage, or his sworn
statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption; whereupon, the Register of Deeds
Shall issue a new certificate of title in favor of the purchaser after the owner's duplicate
of the certificate has been previously delivered and canceled. Thus, upon failure to
redeem foreclosed realty, consolidation of title becomes a matter of right on the part of
the auction buyer, and the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of the purchaser
becomes ministerial upon the Register of Deeds.

CASE: Ardiente vs. Provincial Sheriff GR No. 148448, August 17, 2004
FACTS: To secure the payment of the loan, the Ardientes executed in favor of the
Peninsula Development Bank a Real Estate Mortgage. When they failed to settle their
obligation, the bank extra-judicially foreclosed the property and sold in a public auction
to the bank as the highest bidder. Later, the Ardientes were notified by the bank that
they have one year to redeem the property.
Two days before the period to redeem the foreclosed mortgage expired spouses
Ardiente filed a complaint against the bank, the provincial Sheriff of Quezon, and the
Register of deeds of Quezon, for Annulment of Auction Sale with Preliminary Injunction
and Damages, claiming that the requisite of notifying the mortgagors of the intended
extra-judicial foreclosure sale was not duly complied with.
The trial court, noting the absence of documentary evidence showing strict compliance
with the statutory requirements on publication of notice of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, declared the extra-judicial foreclosure and the sale of the mortgaged
properties null and void.
However, CA reversed the decision of the trial court after finding the argument of the
defendant appellants bank, et al. that the lack of required notice and publication of the
extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage was not averred in the complaint, hence, cannot
be the basis of adverse judgment. CA held that the case of Tambunting v. Court of
Appeals, relied upon by the trial court, that the presumption of compliance with official
duty is rebutted by the failure to present proof of posting and publication of the notice of
sale, such may be applied only when these omissions are alleged and raised by the
party in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial foreclosure sale should be declared null and void for
failure of the bank to aver in its petition the Sheriffs Certification of Posting and the
newspaper where the notice was published as well as the publishers affidavits.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. With respect to petitioners allegations in their
Complaint, clearly, they were questioning the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage on the basis of lack of notice to them as mortgagors. It is settled that
personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.
The issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure of the mortgage was raised
only on appeal. Petitioner does not represent that he directly attacked in his complaint
the validity of the foreclosure because of such lack of notice.
Petitioner presented no evidence before the trial court to prove the absence of
publication of the notice despite the fact that private respondents, in their Answer,

squarely pleaded as a defense the foreclosure sale and petitioners receipt of the
"notice of the sale which was published in a newspaper of general circulation." That the
lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure was never raised in issue by petitioner
and that it is not within the issues framed by the parties in the trial court are then too
obvious.

CASE: BPI Family Savings Bank vs. Veloso GR No. 141974, August 9, 004
FACTS: Spouses Velose obtained a loan in the amount of P1.3M from Family Bank and
Trust Company secured by a deed of mortgage over three parcels of land, with
improvements, registered in their names. They likewise executed a promissory note.
However, they failed to pay the installment amounts of the loan hence their properties
were foreclosed and was sold to Family Bank and Trust Company as the highest bidder
in the auction sale for P2,782,554.66. Later, Family Bank and Trust Company assigned
its rights on the said properties in favor of BPI Family Bank, Inc.
To effect the transfer of title, the certificate of sale was registered in the Register of
Deeds of QC. Acting on the matter, respondents offered to redeem the properties for
P1,872,935. This was, however, rejected by petitioner.
Respondent thereafter filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure with consignation
and prayer for damages before RTC Branch 94 of QC where he was allowed to deposit
with said court the sum of P1,500,000 representing the redemption price.
In the meantime, BPI was able to obtain writ of possession from Branch 76 of said
court. Based on this decision, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction with the CA. The latter initially granted the prayer for injunction but
later on lifted said injunction when it finally resolved the issue of possession in favor of
BPI. Respondent went to the Supreme Court via petition for review which affirmed
BPIs right to possess the properties.
Pursuant to the said decision, on December 16, 1992, upon motion of respondents and
despite the opposition of petitioner, Branch 94 ordered the release of P1,400,000 of the
consigned amount to respondents, with the balance of P100,000 to take the place of the
injunction bond to answer for whatever damages petitioner might suffer because of the
issuance of the preliminary injunction (previously issued and later lifted) in favor of
respondents.
After 10 years, Branch 94 finally decided in favor of the validity of the foreclosure
proceedings but allowed the respondents to redeem the properties at P2.14M. From this
decision BPI appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision with
modification that the redemption price should be at P2,678,639.80. Hence this petition.
It was the contention of BPI that the decision of the CA in granting respondents right to
redeem at P2,678,639.80 was in violation of the earlier ruling by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the spouses have complied with all the requirements for redemption in
order to obtain a favorable ruling from the Court of Appeals.

HELD: NO. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender of
the entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the redemption period fixed by law
can easily be circumvented. As explained by this Court in Basbas vs. Entena:
x x x the existence of the right of redemption operates to depress the market value of
the land until the period expires, and to render that period indefinite by permitting the
tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either party unable to foresee when final
judgment will terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of two years fixed
by the statute for making the redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the
landowner to realize the value of his land. No buyer can be expected to acquire it
without any certainty as to the amount for which it may be redeemed, so that he can
recover at least his investment in case of redemption. In the meantime, the landowners
needs and obligations cannot be met. It is doubtful if any such result was intended by
the statute, absent clear wording to that effect.
And in In Bodiongan vs. Court of Appeals,the higher court clearly stated what composes
the redemption price:
In order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the
redemption price composed of the following: (1) the price which the purchaser paid for
the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the purchase price; (3) the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the property after the
purchase; and (4) interest of 1% per month on such assessments and taxes x x x.
In this case, the offer by respondents on July 24, 1986 to redeem the foreclosed
properties for P1,872,935 and the subsequent consignation in court of P1,500,000 on
August 27, 1986, while made within the period of redemption, was ineffective since the
amount offered and actually consigned not only did not include the interest but was in
fact also way below the P2,782,554.66 paid by the highest bidder/purchaser of the
properties during the auction sale.
Furthermore, Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The vendor cannot avail himself of the right to repurchase without returning to the
vendee the price of the sale x x x.
It is not difficult to understand why the redemption price should either be fully offered in
legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction
winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in good faith.
Whether or not respondents were diligent in asserting their willingness to pay is
irrelevant. Redemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a
question of payment or valid tender of the full redemption price within said period
The law granted respondents the right of redemption. But in so granting that right, the
law intended that their offer to redeem be valid and effective, accompanied by an actual
tender of the redemption price. Fixing a definite term within which the property should
be redeemed is meant to avoid prolonged economic uncertainty over the ownership of
the thing sold.

The disposition of the instant case in the trial court unnecessarily dragged for almost a
decade. Now, it is on its 18th year and still respondents have not tendered the full
redemption price. Nor have they consigned the full amount, if only to prove their
willingness and ability to pay. This would have evidenced their good faith. Their offer
was not a legal and effective exercise of the right of redemption contemplated by law,
hence, refusal of the offer by petitioner was completely justified

PARTITION
rule 69

CASE: Balus vs. Balus GR No. 168970, January 15, 2010

FACTS : Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6,
1984. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as
security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank).
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was
subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that
purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Salewas executed by the sheriff in
favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law.
More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a
Definite Deed of Sale in the Banks favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name
of the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third
portion of the subject property and also contained provisions wherein the parties
admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the
Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession
of the subject lot. Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against petitioner and RTC rendered a decision ordering the plaintiffs to
execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in
question, presently possessed by him. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to
purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by
the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed
before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank. Respondents appealed to
the CA. CA reveresed decision of RTC.

ISSUE: Whether co-ownership between petitioner and respondents persisted even after
the lot was purchased by the Bank and even after it was eventually bought by the
Respondents from the Bank.

Held: NO. It bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the
subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents father, Rufo, at
the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership
of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the
disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from
their father. There is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any
express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed coownership of the contested lot. On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioners contention that it was
his and his siblings intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue
what they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation
of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration.
There is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot
never formed part of the estate of their deceased father. Furthermore, petitioners
contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of
the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or
partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion
of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion
of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of
each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving
each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In
other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective
which negates petitioners claims in the present case.

CASE: Feliciano vs. Canosa GR No. 161746, September 1, 2010

FACTS: Antonio Feliciano passed away and left behind a parcel of land. Leona, Maria,
Pedro and Salina Feliciano declared themselves to be Antonios only surviving heirs.
They executed an extrajudicial settlement of Antonios estate to the exclusion of the
heirs of Esteban and Doroteo Feliciano, deceased children of Antonio. Further, they
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the late Jacinto Feliciano (Pedros portion),
Felisa Feliciano (Salinas portion), and Pedro Canoza (Leona and Marias portion).
On November 28, 1977, Jacinto was issued a Free Patent for the portion of land he
bought, declaring that the same was public land which was first occupied and cultivated
by Pedro Feliciano. On February 23, 1979, Pedro Canoza was issued an OCT for the
land purchased from Leona and Maria Feliciano.
On October 18, 1993, petitioners, which are the heirs of the late Esteban Feliciano
(Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina Feliciano-De Leon) and of the late Doroteo Feliciano
(Trinidad Feliciano-Valiente and Basilia Feliciano-Trinidad) filed a complaint against
Salina, Felisa, Pedro Canoza, and the heirs of the late Jacinto Feliciano for the
Declaration of Nullity of Documents and title, Recovery of Real Property and Damages
because the settlement of the estate andsale were done without their participation and
consent as heirs of Esteban and Doroteo. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal,
CA reversed RTCs decision ruling that prescription had set in and that the applicable
prescriptive period to annul is four years from the discovery of the fraud. Petitioners filed
a MR but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it held that the applicable prescriptive period is four
(4) years?

HELD: NO. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. An
action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted, however, such action
must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. In this case, the
heirs of Doroteo and Esteban was not able to participate in the extrajudicial partition
executed by the other heirs and such deed was fraudulently obtained. Moreover, the
records show that petitioners complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or 16 years
after Jacinto Feliciano was issued a Free Patent and almost 14 years after Pedro

Canoza was issued an OCT. Petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive
notice upon the registration of the Free Patent.

CASE: Manghas vs Brobio GR No. 183852, October 20, 2010

FACTS: Pacifico Brobio died intestate, leaving three parcels of land and was survived
by his wife, respondent Eufrocina Brobio, four legitimate children, and three illegitimate
children. Petitioner Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one the illegitimate children. The heirs
of Pacifico (including petitioner) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settement with waiver
wherein they waived their respective shares over the parcels of land in favor of
respondent for a consideration of P150,000. According to petitioner, the respondent
promised her an additional amount for her fathers share but when the former
demanded it, the respondent refused to pay.
A year later, respondent Brobio was required by the BIR to submit an original copy of
the deed. Respondent did not have an original copy of the deed. When she asked
petitioner Mangahas to countersign a copy of a deed, she refused to sign unless she
was given the additional amount that she asked for. Later, petitioner signed the deed
after the respondent executed a promissory note amounting to P600,000. However,
respondent failed to pay the amount despite several demands. Thus, a complaint for
specific performance was filed by the petitioner. Respondent avers that she was forced
to sign the promissory note. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. CA reversed the decision of
the RTC. It ruled that there was no valuable consideration since petitioner had already
previously signed the deed and was already given P150,000 and that there was
intimidation on the signing of the promissory note. Further, it held that if petitioner
disagreed with the amount she received, she should have filed an action for partition.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the CA erred when it found that the promissory note was without consideration
and was signed with intimidation.
(2) WON the CA erred when it stated that petitioner should have filed an action for
partition instead of a case for specific performance.

HELD:
(1) YES. There was no showing that respondent was deprived of free agency when she
signed the promissory note. She still had a choice and could have refused to execute
the promissory note and resorted to judicial means. As to the consideration, respondent

failed to prove that the promissory note was not supported by any consideration. It was
clear that the note was issued for a cause or consideration, which is the petitioners
signature on the document.
(2) YES. An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common.
Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and
waived their shares in favor or respondent, the properties are no longer under a state of
co-ownership; there is nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership had already been
merged in one person.

FORCIBLE ENTERY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER:

CASE: Modesto vs. Urbina GR No. 189859, October 18, 2010

FACTS: Carlos Urbina filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of lot
located at Taguig. He alleged that Modestos gained possession of lot through stealth,
scheme, and machinations, and despite demand, Modestos refused to vacate the
premises. Earlly on, Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the sale of the lot, however it
did not materialize. Later on, Modestos claimed possessory right over the land by virtue
of Insular Government Patent Sales application pending with the Land Management
Bureau, on the other hand Urbina claimed by virtue of Miscellaneous Sales Application
also pending with the Land Management Bureau.
The RTC ruled in favor of Urbina, on the ground that Modestos were estopped in
questioning the possessory right of Urbina by reason of the acknowledgement of the
possessory right of the later, when he entered into negotiated contract of sale which
was cancelled. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari. The Modestos mainly argued that at the time Urbina filed his MSA
and acquired tax declaration over the subject property, it was still a government
property, being part of Fort Bonifacio military reservation and since their offer to buy the
property from Urbina was based on his false assertion, the principle of estoppel cannot
apply.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Urbina has the better possessory right over the subject property by virtue of
MSA?
2. Whether Modestos was estopped from questioning the possessory rights of Urbina?

HELD: NO. The MSA (Miscellaneous Sale Application) filed by the Urbina is not
appropriate because the subject lot is still a government property, being part of Fort
Bonifacio military reservation, hence no one can claim possessory right over the said
lot.
It is only after October 16, 1987 that the questioned property has been declared
alienable and disposable by virtue of Presidential Proclamation 172. It is the only that
time when a private person can legally claim possessory right over it. Hence, the
claimed possession of Urbina as early as July 21, 1966, when he filed his MSA, is

unlawful and could not be the basis of possessory rights. On the contrary, Modestos
were the actual possessor of the property when it was declared alienable and
disposable on October 16, 1987 and continued to possess the property until the present
time. Furthermore Modestos have Insular Government Patent Sales Application over
the property pending with the Land Management Bureau, which they filed on January
2009. In contrast Urbina has a MSA filed in 1966, which the Land Management Bureau
considered invalid since it was filed when the property is still formed part of Fort
Bonifacio military reservation. With respect on the issue on estoppel, no estoppel arises
where the conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance upon an
innocent mistake.

CASE: Ferrer vs. Rabaca AM No. MTJ-05-1580, October 6, 2010

FACTS: On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for immediate execution,
praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid
Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its
motion.
In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for
immediate execution, stating:
A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for the
defendant, let the records of the above-captioned case be, as it is hereby ordered,
elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate proceedings and
disposition.
Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the defendant
which was perfected within the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.
The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial of their motions had rendered
their victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the
premises. They further averred that respondent Judges refusal to perform an act
mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant to the
plaintiffs damage and prejudice.
In his comment dated September 16, 2004, respondent Judge denied the charges. He
explained that he had honestly thought that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides
that "in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties") once he had given due course to the defendants notice of appeal.
The complainants contended that respondent Judge exhibited his ignorance of the law
and procedure in relying on Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred to
appeals from the Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40, which contained provisions on
appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and which provided
in its Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection should
be governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by notice of
appeal in general; and that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court.

The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that
appeal in forcible entry and detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a
notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a notice of appeal and a
sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to pay
the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from.
They asserted that respondent Judges invocation of good faith and error of judgment
did not absolve him of liability, because he had grossly neglected his duties mandated
by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion for immediate execution and motion
for reconsideration and by giving due course to the appeal despite no supersedeas
bond having been filed and approved by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the judge was ignorant in not considering the rule of procedure in
appeal from cases of forcible entry or unlawful detainer

HELD: Yes. In the case at bar based on sec 19 which states:

"SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to
the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal,
he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. XXXX
XXXX XXXX."
It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to
stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should
likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents,
damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise
deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate court from the time during the
pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative.
Defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July 2004 on 13 July 2004; he
however failed to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal,
more specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their Motion for
Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent
Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and
directed his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records of the case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to

the RTC. This fact is clear from Judge Rabacas Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he
directed the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of the case to the Manila
Regional Trial Court immediately. From the foregoing, it is clear that when the
complainant moved for the immediate execution of Judge Rabacas decision, the latter
still had jurisdiction over the case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on
the Motion for Execution.

SARMIENTA VS MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSO.

GR 182953 October 11, 2010

FACTS
Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) filed a case for unlawful
detainer/forcible entry. It alleged that it was the owner of the subject property and the
Petitioner AMARA, through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered the
premises and constructed a building. AMARA even filed a case for the annulment of
MAHAs title. When AMARA lost the case, MAHA ordered the former to vacate. AMARA
pleaded MAHA to give them one year period to stay. MAHA acceded. Such period was
repeatedly extended due to the benevolence of MAHA. Later on, AMARA proposed that
they become members of MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire portions of the
property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). MAHA again
agreed and tolerated AMARAS possession, giving them until December 1999 to comply
with the requirements. AMARA still failed to comply. Thus after formal demand letters to
vacate was ignored by AMARA, MAHA filed the complaint for Forcible Entry/Unlawful
Detainer. The MTCC dismissed the case. RTC reversed the decision of MTC. CA
affirmed decision of RTC. Hence this present petition.

Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in

actions for forcible entry was not alleged with particularity in the complaint, as it merely
alleged that respondent had been deprived of its possession over the property. They
also maintained that they were not withholding possession of the property upon the
expiration or termination of their right to possess because they never executed any
contract, express or implied, in favor of the respondent. Hence, there was also no
unlawful detainer.

ISSUE
Whether or not the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make up a case of
unlawful detainer.

HELD

Yes. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in
prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an
allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that
is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or
building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied.

Evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated
petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by
becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on the premises was
subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of the
CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to
demand for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already
expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave,
petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. Well settled is the
rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Thus, the RTC and the CA
correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.

As to petitioners argument that MAHAs title is void for having been secured
fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful
detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. Since the only issue involved is the physical or material possession of
the premises, that is possession de facto and not possession de jure, the
question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate action.

CALARA VS. FRANCISCO

[G.R. No. 156439 : September 29, 2010] .

Facts
Petitioner Clemencia Calara and her children own the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision in
Brgy. Anos, Los Banos. The respondents in this case are the buyers of the Calara subd.
Some of the buyers of the subject lot instituted a case for violation of P.D. 957, a law
that regulates the sale of subd lots and condominiums, before the then Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) incorporating grievances such as absence
of a drainage system, unfinished curb and gutter, undeveloped roads and abandoned
electrical facilities.
The Calaras consequently filed suits against respondents Francisco spouses and
Gaudencio Navarro with the MTC. On 26 August 1982, respondents and Gaudencio
Navarro filed a joint motion to dismiss on the ground that the Municipal Court had no
jurisdiction over the complaints filed against them by petitioner since another action over
the same cause and the same parties was pending before the HSRC. MTC denied the
same. In the meantime, the HSRC rendered a decision ruling in favor of the buyers
ordering the Calaras among others to to develop the subdivision. However trial ensued
in the unlawful detainer case. MTC ruled in favor of the Calaras discounting the
existence of a contract of sale between petitioners and respondents and upholding its
jurisdiction over the case and ordered the respondents buyers to vacate the land. On
appeal in RTC, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. However, when the case
reached the CA, it rendered decision, reversing the decisions of the MTC and RTC and
ordering the dismissal of petitioners' complaint for unlawful detainer upon the conclusion
that when a complaint for unlawful detainer arises from the failure of a buyer on
installment basis of real property to pay based on a right to stop paying monthly
amortizations under PD 957, the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Therefore, the question of the right
to collect the monthly amortization must be determined by said agency.Petitioners urge
the reversal of the assailed decision on the following grounds:

ISSUE

WHTHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO

DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS A PERFECTED CONTRACT TO SELL BETWEEN

PETITIONER CALARA AND RESPONDENTS FRANCISCO

HELD
CA correctly ruled that the cause of action embodied in the complaint of petitioners not a
simple cause of action for unlawful detainer against respondents. Petitioner's complaint
is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such action falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment
requires a consideration of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property.
Indeed private respondent claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957, to stop paying
monthly amortizations after giving due notice to the owner or developer of his decision
to do so because of petitioner's alleged failure to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time for complying
with the same. The case thus involves a determination of the rights and obligations of
parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957. The determinative question therefore
is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the question of the right of petitioner must be
determined by the agency.
Thus, petitioner's cause of action against private respondent should instead be filed as
a counterclaim in HLURB Case in accordance with Rule 6of the Rules of Court which is
of suppletory application to the HLURB Rules of Procedure. As the sole regulatory body
for housing and land development, the HLURB has jurisdiction over petitioners' cause
against respondents and is clearly the best forum for the determination of all the issues
relevant thereto.

N.B.
However, the mere relationship of the parties as a subdivision developer/owner and
subdivision lot buyer does not, concededly, vest the HLURB automatic jurisdiction over
a case. In the cases of Roxas vs. Court of Appeals and Filar Development Corporation
vs. Sps. Villar, this Court upheld the MTC's jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment
commenced by the subdivision developer on account of the buyer's failure to pay the
installments stipulated in the party's contract to sell. In said cases, however, the buyers
had no justifiable ground to stop payment of the stipulated installments and/or any of
the causes of action cognizable by the HLURB under Section 1 of P.D. 1344. In not
applying the ruling in Francel Realty Corporation vs. Sycip, moreover, the Court
likewise took appropriate note of the fact that the buyers in said cases have not
commenced an action for unsound real estate businesses practices against the

subdivision developers. Here, respondents have not only instituted a complaint for
violation of P.D. 957 against petitioner Clemencia Calara but had also already obtained
a definitive ruling on the latter's failure to fully develop the subdivision which they cited
as justification for not making further payments on Lot No. 23 of the Lophcal (Calara)
Subdivision.

Carbonilla vs abiera

Facts: dr. Dioscoro carbonilla filed a complaint for ejectment against marcelo abiera
and maricris abiera paredes with the mtcc. He alleged that he is the owner of the
land, as evidenced by torrens certificate of title. He further claimed that he is the
also the owner of the building situated thereon and the respondents occupation is
only by mere tolerance of the original owner. The respondents denied the allegation.
They alleged that they inherited the land from theis predecessors and they have
been in possession of it since 1960.

The mtcc ruled that the land is owned by carbonilla, as evidenced by the torrens
certificate of title. However with regard to the building, the mtcc ruled in favor of
the respondents, for failure of carbonilla to refute the claim of the respondents.

Carbonilla elevated the case to the rtc. Rtc affirmed the decision of the mtcc,
however with respect to the building rtc ruled that the respondents failed to prove
that the building was not included in the transfer in the name of carbonilla.

Respondents filed a petition for review with the c.a. C.a. reversed the decision of the
rtc, it found out that there was no evidence that the respondents possession was by
mere tolerance. Further, the action has already prescribed since the 1 year period
for filing forcible entry has already lapsed. Carbonilla filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the sc.

Issue: won the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make up a case of
unlawful detainer.

Held: no, w/out a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the property to recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy. In the present case, carbonilla opted to file an
ejectment case - forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceeding is: who is entitled to the physical possession
of the property. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in
favor of one who has presented proof of ownership.

Carbonilla's allegation that respondents possession was by mere tolerance make

out a case for unlawful detainer. It involves the person's withholding from another of
possession of property to which the latter is entitled after the expiration of the
former's right to hold possession.

A requirement for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that

possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned
unlawful only upon expiration of the right of possession.

Carbonilla failed to prove that respondents possession was based on his alleged
tolerance.
He did not offer any evidence that they tolerated respondents entry to and
occupation of the subject property. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. He
must, at least, show overt acts indicative of his or his predecessors permission to
occupy the subject property.

La Campana Dev. Corp. vs. Ledesma

Facts: Petitioner filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
against private respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite expiration of the contract
of lease executed between them and demands to vacate subject premises and pay
rentals therefor, the latter failed to comply with such demands. Private respondent
countered in his Answer that he had paid the rentals over subject premises and
petitioner no longer had the right to possess the property as it had been foreclosed
by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Private respondent further
pointed out that subject premises had in fact been in the possession of the DBP
since March or April of 1997, so since that time, it was with the DBP that he made
arrangements for his continued occupation of the subject premises. The MeTC then
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondent to surrender
possession of subject premises to petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private
respondent filed a supersedeas bond with the MeTC. The RTC affirmed the MeTC
judgment. Petitioner then moved for the immediate execution of the RTC Decision,
which motion was granted by the RTC. Meanwhile, private respondent elevated the
case to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. A temporary
restraining order was issued by the CA, effectively staying implementation of the
writ of execution issued by the RTC. Now the present petition for certiorari for the
annulment of the CAs resolution

Issue: 1. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to stay the immediate execution of the RTC judgment
2. Whether the CA err in considering the supersedeas bond filed with the MTC,
which answers for unpaid rentals, as sufficient bond for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
Held: No. When exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the
writ of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are
circumstances necessitating such action. Where supervening events (occurring
subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change in the situation of the
parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling
urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances,
the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.
There also exists a material change in the situation of the parties. The CA properly
took into serious consideration the fact that in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856
entitled La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Development Bank of the Philippines,

which has become final and executory, it ordered herein petitioner, formerly known
as La Campana Food Products, Inc., to surrender possession of subject properties to
the Development Bank of the Philippines. Evidently, a serious cloud of doubt has
been cast on petitioners right of possession, making it questionable whether the
RTC Decision, ordering private respondent to surrender possession of subject
premises to petitioner, should be immediately implemented. Therefore, the CA did
not gravely abuse its discretion in this case; rather, it acted prudently when it
stayed execution of the RTC Decision until such time that a final resolution of the
main case is reached.
Petitioner's contention, that it was improper for the CA to have granted private
respondent's motion to consider the supersedeas bond it posted with the
Metropolitan Trial Court as sufficient to cover the bond required for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, is likewise incorrect. Petitioner argues that, "said
supersedeas bond is posted solely and primarily to answer for a specific purpose
which is for the payment of unpaid rentals accruing up to the final judgment. This
cannot be held answerable for damages to petitioner should it later be found out
that the private respondent is not entitled to the issuance.
Since the only damages that petitioner may be entitled to in an action for unlawful
detainer are those arising from its loss of the use or occupation of subject premises,
the only damages petitioner can claim by reason of the stay of execution of the RTC
judgment is also only for the "rent" or "fair rental value" for the property in
question. Therefore, the CA did not err in considering the supersedeas bond filed
with the MTC, which answers for unpaid rentals, as sufficient bond for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Contempt rule 71
Rule 71 Cases
Yasay vs. Recto

Facts: On June 28, 1996, some stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation (IRC)
asked then SEC Chairman Perfecto Yasay to investigate and validate the proxies and
nominations for directors of the corporation.

In line with this and on the same date (June 28), the SEC issued a TRO against the
officers of the corporation to CEASE and DESIST from conducting its annual
stockholders meeting on July 9, 1996.

But because the officers of IRC where able to get from the Court of Appeals a TRO
against the Order of SEC not to go through with the July 9 stockholders conference, the
respondents (who were the officers of IRC)still conducted its meeting as planned.

On the next day, July 10, 1996, the SEC declared IRCs conference as invalid
and ordered the respondents (officers of the IRC) to show cause why they shouldnt be
cited for contempt. On the hearing, the respondent officers cited the TRO issued by the
CA as the reason why they still went through with the meeting/conference.
Nevertheless, the SEC still found the respondent officers guilty for contempt. The Order
of the SEC went even as far as barring Atty. Manalaysay, one of the respondent officers,
from engaging in the practice of law.

And so, respondent went to the CA to appeal SECs decision wherein the appellate
court reversed SECs decision. From this reversal, the petitioner SEC chairman
APPEALS to the SC via petition for review, claiming that the reversal of the appellate
court of the decision of the SEC was improper.

But the respondents argue that the CONTEMPT CHARGE against them was CRIMINAL
in nature. Thus, when the CA reversed the guilty verdict of the SEC finding respondents

guilty of contempt, said decision/reversal was tantamount to a NOT GUILTY verdict

wherein no appeal can be taken.

Issue: (1) Was the reversal of the CA of the findings of SEC that respondents were
guilty of contempt proper? (2) Was the contempt proceedings conducted by the SEC
criminal or civil in nature? As such, was the reversal of the CA appealable?

Held: (1) The ruling of the CA was proper because even though the SEC ordered the
officers of IRC not to go through with the stockholders conference on July 9, said
officers were able to get a TRO with the CA against SECs CEASE and DESIST Order
on July 8. Thus, it was only proper that the stockholders conference pushed through.

(2) We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a
criminal offense. The exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an
acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the
failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A
criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court.
Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents was civil in nature, as
the temporary restraining order the SEC issued was for the benefit of a party to a
case. The contention is untenable.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature;
that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a
remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. In general, civil contempt
proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone
who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. If the contempt is initiated by
the court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given contempt, it is criminal in
nature, and the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and
rules applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor.
The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the
relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as
criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is
primarily compensatory or remedial.

But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which
acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the
purpose only of determining the character of punishment to be administered. In this
case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the the
dignity and power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal
would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of
contempt.

Case Digest on YASAY V. RECTO

7 Sept. 1999

Contempt

Facts: SEC declared D et al. guilty of contempt for disobeying a TRO that SEC issued.
The CA set aside the order of the SEC, finding D et al. not guilty of contempt. SEC
appealed the CAs reversal.

Issue: Whether the SEC can validly appeal the CAs decision

Held: No. Whether civil or criminal, contempt is still a criminal proceeding and an
appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of
contempt. Moreover, the SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for
contempt. There was no willful disobedience of the SECs order since it was shown that
the CA previously nullified the TRO.

Sison v. Caoibes

Facts: Respondent Caoibes (Las Pinas Judge) issued an order citing Sison (MMDA
traffic enforcer) of Indirect Contempt. The order stemmed when Sison apprehended the
official driver and son of Caoibes along EDSA for traffic violation.
Because of this incident, Caoibes issued an order directed Sison to show cost within the
non extendible period of 24hours why he should not be cited as in contempt of court
and dealt with accordingly. Sison failed to appear as directed in the order. Thus, he was
arrested and detained in Jail. Sison was only discharged from detention when he
admitted under duress that he committed a mistake and upon appeal by his counsel
assuring Caoibes that the same incident may not be repeated.
Subsequently, Sison filed an administrative complaint against Caoibes. He alleged that
he did not committed any offense except that he issued a traffic violation receipt to the
driver-son of Caoibes. If indeed such act is an offense, then Las Pinas court has no
jurisdiction over it, as the incident happened in Mandaluyong City. He charged that the
acts of Caoibes in arresting him without a warrant or arrest before the charge of indirect
contempt was heard constituted the gravest abuse of authority ever committed.
Hence, he prayed that Caoibes be dismissed from the service.
Caoibes denied the accusations. He claimed that he initiated the complaint for indirect
comtempt pursuant to Sec. 3(d) of Rule 71 and its last par., and Sec. 5(3)of Rule 135.
Investigating Justice found Caoibes guilty.

Issue: Is the order citing Sison of indirect contempt proper. Was Caoibes justified in
considering the act of Sison as deliberate disregard of the respect due to court.
Held: (1) No. The person cited for contempt is not a party to case pending in court. At
first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the
complainant for contempt, due to the latters refusal to comply with the judges Order of
September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that the complainant was
not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the
contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the respondent
judges son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to
the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same was refused by some staff
member in the latters sala.

In Cortes v. Bangalan, we held that a judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for
expressing concern on the judges impartiality through a motion for voluntary inhibition,
even if the latter may have felt insulted therein. The Court also declared, thus:
[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve
order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, judges,
however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and
preservation not for retaliation and vindication.
(2) The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of Sison
as thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect,
courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its representative. First of all,
the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part
of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet know at the time) because
he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing
evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way street from the
wrong direction, regardless of the office or position of the violators father. Secondly, the
respondent Judge should have had the circumspection expected of him as a judge to
realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes IIIs attempt to bluff his way
out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC judge. Hence, the
respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for contempt of court. And,
thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the issuance of the
traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis
of the apprehension and also administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act
committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately
accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the drivers
license after September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic
violation, then it follows that the respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son
was at fault, instead of Sison.

G.R. No. 156829

June 8, 2004

RAMON D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner,

vs.
MA. TERESA L. MONTENEGRO, for herself and as the mother and natural guardian of
the minors, ANTONIO AMELO and ANA MARIA PIA ISABEL, both surnamed
"MONTENEGRO," respondents.

FACTS:
Ma. Teresa Montenegro filed, on June 1994, a complaint for support against her
husband, Ramon, for herself and as mother and guardian of her two minor children
Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel. Four years after, they entered into a
compromise agreement. It was approved by the court and since they did not appeal the
courts approval, it became final and executory.
Under the agreement, Ramon obliged himself to give his P1,000,000 entire share in the
conjugal funds in favor of his children, P500,000 of which payable immediately and the
rest 1 year after the approval of the agreement; establish a trust fund worth P3M in
favor of his children (effective 60 days after the approval of the agreement); and obtain
an educational plan for his children (effective 1 year after the approval of the
agreement.
Unfortunately, Ramon was not able to comply with said obligations. Teresa was thus
prompted to file a motion for execution of the judgment approving the compromise
agreement. It was approved and writs of execution and notice of garnishment were sent
twice to Ramon but said writs remained unsatisfied.
Teresa then filed on March 14, 2002, a motion for examination of Ramon as judgment
obligor pursuant to Sec 38 and 39 of the Rules of Court. In her motion, she alleged that
there is an urgency for the examination to be conducted at the earliest time since
petitioner was about to migrate to Canada. It was approved on March 19, 2002. The
hearing was however reset thrice due to failure of petitioner to attend because he was
already in Canada resulting in his being cited in contempt of court.
The following series of events showed how Ramon had committed indirect contempt of
courts orders:


March 22 motion for examination was set. Neither his counsel and Ramon
appeared. The hearing was rescheduled on April 10, 2002 and requiring petitioner why
he should not be held in contempt of court for disobeying the March 19, 2002 order.

March 26 - petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to re-schedule Proceedings

and explained his failure to attend based on his belief that he still have until April 14 to
file his comment as agreed upon.

April 4 - hearing for the Compliance with Motion to re-schedule Proceedings.

Counsel for petitioner manifested that his client had already left for Canada and would
not be able to attend the hearing on April 10 and that he would be available only on the
last week of July or first week of August 2002. Counsel also manifested that he would
not be available on said date due to other hearings.

June 13 court issued an order resetting the hearing for examination on July 3.
Subpoena was issued to petitioner in his address at 8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio
Village, Makati City.

June 17 court issued an order directing petitioner to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court for failure to attend the April 10 hearing. Petitioner
alleged that it was because he was already in Canada and had no intentions of
absconding from his obligations.

July 3 the hearing did not push through because petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash because according to him he may not be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3
July 2002 hearing in Bacolod City. He did not allege that he was still in Canada.

23.

Sept 2 Motion to Quash was denied but re-schedule the hearing on October

Oct 22 petitioner manifested that he would not be able to attend the hearing the
following day as he was still in Canada and would be available only on the first week of
December. He moved that the hearing be re-scheduled on 9 December.

Oct 23 he did not appear. It was only then that he was cited in contempt of
court.

Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:

WON the court erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully
disobeying the orders of the trial court requiring him to appear for purposes of
examination as a judgment obligor at in the hearings scheduled on 22 March 2002, 10
April 2002, and 23 October 2002.
HELD:
NO.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a
manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is
clothed.6 It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity."7 The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts,
because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to
the due administration of justice.8
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and
indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as
to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.9
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular
acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides
that "a party or other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend
before the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections,
and upon failure to obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a
witness or to subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other
cases." This provision relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.
Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition, complying with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings.10 In the present case, the trial court initiated
the proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders11 directing the petitioner to
show cause why he should not be punished for indirect contempt.
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature
and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect."12
On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made.13 If the purpose is to
punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.14
In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal to attend a
hearing for his examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa.
It must be pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the
judgment obligee a remedy in case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to
comply with its obligation under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined,
without justifiable reason, constituted indirect contempt which is civil in nature.
Petitioners deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial
court are clearly shown in the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court.
In his Manifestation of 19 March 2002 petitioner insisted on his right to file a reply or
comment on the Motion to Examine Defendant as Judgment Obligor until 14 April 2002
solely on the basis of the purported agreement at the conference on 6 March 2002.
Petitioner merely brushed aside the Order of the trial court requiring him to appear on

22 March 2002 for the hearing by not appearing in court. Petitioner cannot simply
assume that his manifestation would suffice for the trial court to re-schedule the 22
March 2002 hearing. That portion of the manifestation filed by petitioner on 19 March
2002, which reads:
3. In the meantime, we have no other option but to cancel the setting on March 22, 2002
until Respondent shall have submitted his Reply/Comment and the issue is finally laid to
rest by the issuance of a final Order for that purpose.
demonstrates beyond doubt arrogance, haughtiness and disrespect. While petitioner
apparently disagrees with the 19 March 2002 Order of by the trial court, he did not file a
motion for its reconsideration. Neither did he file a motion to reset the scheduled
hearing on 22 March 2002. We have ruled that a motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.15 Petitioner sought to deprive the trial court of the discretion; he took it upon
himself to cancel or to order the court to cancel the 22 March 2002 scheduled hearing.
Petitioner makes a belated claim in the present petition that his failure to attend the 22
March 2002 hearing was due to the fact that he was already on his way to Manila on 22
March 2002 in preparation for his 26 March 2002 trip to Canada. However, such
explanation was not stated in the 19 March 2002 Manifestation and 5 April 2002
Compliance and Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings. The explanation is either a
delayed afterthought or an unguarded confession of a deliberate plan to delay or even
avoid his examination as a judgment obligor.
Neither can petitioner rely on the alleged irregularity in the trial courts grant of the
motion to examine him as judgment obligor before he was able to file a reply or
comment. Section 36 of, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of right, the
plaintiff who is a judgment obligee to examine the defendant as judgment obligor, at any
time after the return of the writ of execution is made. Section 36 reads as follows:
Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied. When the
return of a writ of execution issued against property of a judgment obligor, or any one of
several obligors in the same judgment, shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in
whole or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made, shall be
entitled to an order from the court which rendered the said judgment, requiring such
judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his property and income
before such court or before a commissioner appointed by it, at a specified time and
place; and proceedings may thereupon be had for the application of the property and
income of the judgment obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no
judgment obligor shall be so required to appear before a court or commissioner outside
the province or city in which such obligor resides or is found. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling the examination of
petitioner on 22 March 2002. On the contrary, it acted with utmost judiciousness to
avoid a miscarriage of justice because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for
Canada, a fact which petitioner did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002.

It is noteworthy that while petitioner insisted that he still had until 14 April 2002 to file a
reply or comment on the motion for examination, he also manifested through counsel on
5 April 2002 that he already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will not be back until
the last week of July or the first week of August 2002. It is obvious then that petitioner
wanted to gain time to avoid being examined.
With respect to the 10 April 2002 hearing, it is established that petitioner was already in
Canada at the time of the scheduled hearing. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the
re-scheduling of the hearing to 10 April 2002 was brought about by his unjustifiable
failure to attend the 22 March 2002 hearing.
Subsequently, despite petitioners 19 March 2002 and 5 April 2002 manifestations that
he would return to the Philippines sometime during the last week of July or first week of
August 2002, petitioner did not attend the 23 October 2002 hearing. Again, instead of
filing a motion to reset the hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation the day before the
scheduled hearing, informing the court that he will be unable to attend the hearing and
suggesting the hearing to be reset to 9 December 2002. Such manifestation to reschedule the 23 October 2002 hearing was, for all intents and purposes, a motion to
postpone the hearing , but the pleading did not contain a notice of hearing.
It is of no moment that petitioner was eventually examined as judgment obligor on 17
December 2002, nine (9) months after the original setting. His subsequent appearance
at the hearing did not wipe out his contemptuous conduct.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS vs CALANZA, GR 180699, October 13, 2010

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) against respondents Labor Arbiter Roderick Joseph Calanza (LA Calanza), Sheriff
Enrico Y. Paredes (Sheriff Paredes), Amelia Enriquez (Enriquez), and Remo L. Sia
(Sia).

Facts: Enriquez and Sia were the branch manager and the assistant branch manager,
respectively, of Bacolod-Singcang Branch of petitioner. On September 3, 2003, they
were dismissed from employment on grounds of breach of trust and confidence and
dishonesty. The following day, they filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against
petitioner before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI, Bacolod City.

After the submission of their respective position papers, Executive LA Danilo C. Acosta
rendered a decision on March 29, 2004, finding that Enriquez and Sia had been illegally
dismissed from employment.

Pursuant to the aforesaid decision, Enriquez and Sia were reinstated in petitioners
payroll.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that petitioner had just cause to
terminate Enriquez and Sia. Hence, it reversed and set aside the LA decision and,
although it dismissed the complaint, it ordered petitioner to give the dismissed
employees financial assistance equivalent to one-half months pay for every year of
service. In view of this decision, petitioner stopped the payroll reinstatement.[5]

Enriquez and Sia elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), but failed to obtain a
favorable decision. On November 30, 2005, the appellate court affirmed in toto the

NLRC decision. The case eventually reached this Court and was docketed as G.R. No.
172812.

During the pendency of the petition before this Court, Enriquez and Sia filed a Motion
for Partial Execution[6] of the LA decision dated March 29, 2004. Citing Roquero v.
Philippine Airlines, they claimed that the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision was
immediately executory during the entire period that the case was on appeal.

In an Order dated October 13, 2007, LA Calanza granted Enriquez and Sias motion
despite the opposition of petitioner. He opined that so long as there is no finality yet of
the decision reversing a ruling of the lower tribunal (in this case, the LA) awarding
reinstatement, the same should be enforced. Considering that the case was then
pending before this Court, he sustained Enriquez and Sias claim, applying the cases
of Roquero and Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora. The corresponding writ of
execution was subsequently issued. Upon service of the writ, Sheriff Paredes served on
petitioner a notice of sale of a parcel of land owned by petitioner to satisfy its obligation.

Aggrieved, petitioner immediately filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City. On November 26, 2007, the
NLRC issued a TRO.

Disappointed with the conduct of LA Calanza, Sheriff Paredes, Enriquez, and Sia, and
in view of the pendency of G.R. No. 172812, entitled Enriquez v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, before this Court, petitioner instituted the present petition for indirect contempt.
Petitioner avers that LA Calanzas Order granting Enriquez and Sias motion for partial
writ of execution preempts the decision of this Court and eventually results in the
payment of Enriquez and Sia's claims which may be contrary to this Courts conclusion.
Petitioner adds that respondents obstinately persist in applying jurisprudence which is
clearly inapplicable. Finally, petitioner argues that the execution proceedings were done
with undue haste that petitioner was not given an opportunity to submit evidence in its
defense to stop the execution. These, according to petitioner, clearly indicate utter
disrespect to the Court and are grounds to cite respondents in indirect contempt.

Meanwhile, on February 12, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. No. 172812,
denying the petition filed by Enriquez and Sia, thereby sustaining the NLRC and the
CAs conclusion that Enriquez and Sia were validly dismissed from employment by
petitioner.

On June 30, 2008, the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City, granted BPIs petition for
injunction,

On October 27, 2008, LA Calanza issued an Order considering the case closed and
terminated based on Enriquez and Sias manifestation and motion to dismiss in view of
the satisfaction and full payment of their claims.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of indirect contempt. Or in the alternative,
do the acts of respondents Enriquez and Sia in filing a motion for partial execution; of
LA Calanza in granting the writ of execution and applying or not applying established
jurisprudence; and of Sheriff Paredes in serving the notice of sale of the real property
owned by petitioner fall under the Sec 3 Rule 71 Rules of Court.

Held: SC answer in the negative and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its

authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of
the courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and
the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court
which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,

orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of
justice. However, such power should be exercised on the preservative, not on the
vindictive, principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in
order to retain that respect, without which the administration of justice will falter or
fail. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be
resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

It is true that, at the time of the filing by Enriquez and Sia of the motion for the partial
execution of the LA decision which directed their reinstatement, the decision had
already been reversed by the NLRC, and such reversal was affirmed by the CA. The
case was then on appeal to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. We find that their motion for partial execution was a bona fide
attempt to implement what they might have genuinely believed they were entitled to in
accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence. This is especially true in the instant
case where the means of livelihood of the dismissed employees was at stake. Any man
in such an uncertain and economically threatened condition would be expected to take
whatever measures are available to ensure a means of sustenance for himself and his
family. Clearly, Enriquez and Sia were merely pursuing a claim which they honestly
believed was due them. Their act is far from being contumacious.

On the other hand, LA Calanza, on motion of Enriquez and Sia, issued the writ of
execution considering that at the time of the application of the writ, this Court had yet to
decide G.R. No. 172812. LA Calanza opined that so long as there is no finality yet of the
decision reversing a ruling of the LA awarding reinstatement, the same should be
enforced. This was how he interpreted this Courts pronouncements in Roquero Case
and Zamora Case that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the
higher court.

But as we clearly discussed in Bago v. National Labor Relations Commission, while it is

true that the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision is immediately executory, the
reversal thereof by the NLRC becomes final and executory after ten (10) days from
receipt thereof by the parties. That the CA may take cognizance of and resolve a
petition for the nullification of the NLRC decision on jurisdictional and due process
considerations does not affect the statutory finality of the NLRC decision. It then

logically follows that, at the time of the application for the writ since the Court eventually
sustained the NLRC and the CA decisions in G.R. No. 172812 no issue of payroll
reinstatement may be considered at all after the reversal of the LA decision by the
NLRC.

Still, the erroneous issuance of the writ of execution by LA Calanza can only be deemed
grave abuse of discretion which is more properly the subject of a petition
for certiorari and not a petition for indirect contempt. No one who is called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment.

Finally, Sheriff Paredes, in serving the notice of sale, was only performing his duty
pursuant to the writ of execution. No matter how erroneous the writ was, it was issued
by LA Calanza and was addressed to him as the sheriff, commanding him to collect
from petitioner the amount due Enriquez and Sia. In the event he failed to collect the
amount, he was authorized to cause the satisfaction of the same on the movable and
immovable properties of petitioner not exempt from execution. Thus, any act performed
by Sheriff Paredes pursuant to the aforesaid writ cannot be considered contemptuous.
At the time of the service of the notice of sale, there was no order from any court or
tribunal restraining him from enforcing the writ. It was ministerial duty for him to
implement it.

To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the

order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for
contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly
defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act
or thing is forbidden or required.