Objective:

Machiavelli sees conquering and keeping territory at a profit as the political objective. The defeat
of the enemy army is the strategic and tactical objective. While victory in battle is the
objective of all armies, the general should never come to a general engagement unless
forced to do so. It is more advantageous to defeat the enemy by destroying his will to
resist through the use of psychological warfare and "peace campaigns". It is always
possible to find allies within the opposing society who will act as a "fifth column". Even
so, the use of all these other methods ultimately rests on having the undoubted ability to
wage violent war in the open and to make war "short and sharp". Since war is caused by
a "thirst for domination", it is foolish to try to appease an aggressor. It is almost always
better to allow something to be taken by force than to yield it to the apprehension of
force, because to yield from fear for the purpose of avoiding war merely encourages the
enemy to try for more.
just war, notion that the resort to armed force (jus ad bellum) is justified under certain conditions; also,
the notion that the use of such force (jus in bello) should be limited in certain ways. Just war is a
Western concept and should be distinguished from the Islamic concept of jihad (Arabic: striving), or
holy war, which in Muslim legal theory is the only type of just war.
Rooted in Classical Roman and biblical Hebraic culture and containing both religious and secular
elements, just war first coalesced as a coherent body of thought and practice during the Middle Ages ...

The philosophy of war examines war beyond the typical questions of weaponry and strategy, inquiring
into such things as the meaning and etiology of war, the relationship between war and human nature,
and the ethics of war. Certain aspects of the philosophy of war may overlap with the philosophy of
history, political philosophy and the philosophy of law.

[edit] Works about the philosophy of war

Carl von Clausewitz, painting by Karl Wilhelm Wach.
Perhaps the greatest and most influential work in the philosophy of war is On War by Carl von
Clausewitz. It combines observations on strategy with questions about human nature and the purpose of
war. Clausewitz especially examines the teleology of war: whether war is a means to an end outside
itself or whether it can be an end in itself. He concludes that the latter cannot be so, and that war is
"politics by different means"; i.e. that war must not exist only for its own sake. It must serve some
purpose for the state.
Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace contains frequent philosophical digressions on the philosophy of
war (and broader metaphysical speculations derived from Christianity and from Tolstoy's observations
of the Napoleonic Wars). It was influential on later thought about war. Tolstoy's Christian-centered

philosophy of war (especially his essays "A Letter to a Hindu" and "The Kingdom of God is Within
You") was a direct influence on Gandhi's Hinduism-centered non-violent resistance philosophy.
While Sun Tzu's The Art of War, focusses mostly on weaponry and strategy instead of philosophy, his
observations are often broadened into a philosophy applied in situations extending well beyond war
itself (see the main Wikipedia article on The Art of War for a discussion of the application of Sun Tzu's
philosophy to areas other than war). Parts of Niccol Machiavelli's masterpiece The Prince (as well as
Discourses) and parts of his own work titled The Art of War discuss some philosophical points relating
to war, though neither book could be said to be a work in the philosophy of war

[edit] Traditions of thought

Since the philosophy of war is often treated as a subset of another branch of philosophy (for example,
political philosophy or the philosophy of law) it would be difficult to define any clear-cut schools of
thought in the same sense that, e.g., Existentialism or Objectivism can be described as distinct
movements. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy refers to Carl von Clausewitz is "the only (socalled) philosopher of war", implying that he is the only (major) philosophical writer who develops a
philosophical system focusing exclusively on war. However, discernible traditions of thought on war
have developed over time, so that some writers have been able to distinguish broad categories (if
somewhat loosely).

[edit] Teleological categories

Anatol Rapoport's introduction to his edition of the J. J. Graham translation of Clausewitz's On War
identifies three main teleological traditions in the philosophy of war: the cataclysmic, the
eschatological, and the political. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 13). These are not the only possible
teleological philosophies of war, but only three of the most common. As Rapoport says,
To put it metaphorically, in political philosophy war is compared to a game of strategy (like
chess); in eschatological philosophy, to a mission or the dnouement of a drama; in
cataclysmic philosophy, to a fire or an epidemic.
These do not, of course, exhaust the views of war prevailing at different times and at
different places. For example, war has at times been viewed as a pastime or an adventure,
as the only proper occupation for a nobleman, as an affair of honor (for example, the days
of chivalry), as a ceremony (e.g. among the Aztecs), as an outlet of aggressive instincts or
a manifestation of a "death wish", as nature's way of ensuring the survival of the fittest, as
an absurdity (e.g. among Eskimos), as a tenacious custom, destined to die out like slavery,
and as a crime. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 17)
The Cataclysmic school of thought, which was espoused by Leo Tolstoy in his epic novel War
and Peace, sees war as a bane on humanity whether avoidable or inevitable which serves
little purpose outside of causing destruction and suffering, and which may cause drastic change
to society, but not in any teleological sense. Tolstoy's view may be placed under the subcategory
of global cataclysmic philosophy of war. Another subcategory of the cataclysmic school of
thought is the ethnocentric cataclysmic, in which this view is focused specifically on the plight
of a specific ethnicity or nation, for example the view in Judaism of war as a punishment from
God on the Israelites in certain books of the Tenakh (Old Testament). As the Tenakh (in certain
books) sees war as an ineluctable act of God, so Tolstoy especially emphasizes war as

something that befalls man and is in no way under the influence of man's "free will", but is
instead the result of irresistible global forces. (On War, Rapoport's introduction 16)
The Eschatological school of thought sees all wars (or all major wars) as leading to some goal,
and asserts that some final conflict will someday resolve the path followed by all wars and
result in a massive upheaval of society and a subsequent new society free from war (in varying
theories the resulting society may be either a utopia or a dystopia). There are two subsets of this
view: the Messianic and the Global theory. The Marxist concept of a communist world ruled by
the proletariat after a final worldwide revolution is an example of the global theory, and the
Christian concept of an Armageddon war which will usher in the second coming of Christ and
the final defeat of Satan is an example of a theory that could fall under Global or Messianic.
(On War, Rapoport's introduction, 15) The messianic eschatological philosophy is derived from
the Jewish-Christian concept of a Messiah, and sees wars as culminating in unification of
humanity under a single faith or a single ruler. Crusades, Jihads, the Nazi concept of a Master
Race and the 19th century American concept of Manifest Destiny may also fall under this
heading. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 15) (See main articles for more information:
Christian eschatology, Jewish eschatology)
The Political school of thought, of which Clausewitz was a proponent, sees war as a tool of the
state. On page 13 Rapoport says,
Clausewitz views war as a rational instrument of national policy. The three words
"rational", "instrument" and "national" are the key concepts of his paradigm. In this view,
the decision to wage war "ought" to be rational, in the sense that it ought to be based on
estimated costs and gains of war. Next, war "ought" to be instrumental, in the sense that it
ought to be waged in order to achieve some goal, never for its own sake; and also in the
sense that strategy and tactics ought to be directed towards just one end, namely towards
victory. Finally, war "ought" to be national, in the sense that its objective should be to
advance the interests of a national state and that the entire effort of the nation ought to be
mobilized in the service of the military objective.
He later characterizes the philosophy behind the Vietnam War and other Cold War conflicts as
"Neo-Clausewitzian". Rapoport also includes Machiavelli as an early example of the political
philosophy of war (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 13). Decades after his essay, the War on
Terrorism and the Iraq War begun by the United States under President George W. Bush in 2001
and 2003 have often been justified under the doctrine of preemption, a political motivation stating
that the United States must use war to prevent further attacks such as the September 11, 2001
attacks.

[edit] Ethical categories

Another possible system for categorizing different schools of thought on war can be found in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (see external links, below), based on ethics. The SEP describes
three major divisions in the ethics of war: the Realist, the Pacifist, and the Just War Theory. In a
nutshell:
Realists will typically hold that systems of morals and ethics which guide individuals within
societies cannot realistically be applied to societies as a whole to govern the way they, as
societies, interact with other societies. Hence, a state's purposes in war is simply to preserve its
national interest. This kind of thinking is similar to Machiavelli's philosophy, and Thucydides

and Hobbes may also fall under this category.

Pacifists, however, maintain that a moral evaluation of war is possible, and that war is always
found to be immoral. Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Leo Tolstoy were all famous advocates
of pacifistic nonviolent resistance methods instead of war.
Just War Theory, along with pacifism, holds that morals do apply to war. However, unlike
pacifism, according to Just War Theory it is possible for a war to be morally justified. The
concept of a morally justified war underlies much of the concept International Law, such as the
Geneva Conventions. Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius are among the
philosophers who have espoused some form of a just war philosophy. One common Just War
Theory evaluation of war is that war is only justified if 1.) waged in a state or nation's selfdefense, or 2.) waged in order to end gross violations of human rights. Political philosopher
John Rawls advocated these criteria as justification for war.

The book contains a wealth of historical examples used to illustrate its various concepts. Frederick II of
Prussia (the Great) figures prominently for having made very efficient use of the limited forces at his
disposal, though Napoleon is perhaps the central figure.
According to Azar Gat, the "general message" of the book was that "the conduct of war could not be
reduced to universal principles.[1] Among many strands of thought, three stand out as essential to
Clausewitz's concept:
War must never be seen as having any purpose in itself, but should be seen as an instrument of
Politik--a German word that conflates the meanings of the English words policy and politics:
"War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means."[2]).
The military objectives in war that support one's political objectives fall into two broad types:
"war to achieve limited aims" and war to "disarm the enemy: to render [him] politically
helpless or militarily impotent."
All else being equal, the course of war will tend to favour the party with the stronger emotional
and political motivations, but especially the defender (a notion that surprises and confuses many
readers, who typically expect a soldierespecially a German soldierto be a proponent of
aggressive warfare).
Some of the key ideas (not necessarily original to Clausewitz or even to his mentor Gerhard von
Scharnhorst) discussed in On War include (in no particular order of importance):

the dialectical approach to military analysis

the methods of "critical analysis"
the uses and abuses of historical studies
the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
the nature of "military genius"
the "fascinating trinity" (Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) of war
philosophical distinctions between "absolute or ideal war," and "real war"
in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited war and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"

"war" belongs fundamentally to the social realm, rather than the realms of art or science
"strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art
"tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
the essential unpredictability of war
the "fog of war"
"friction"
strategic and operational "centers of gravity"
the "culminating point of the offensive"
the "culminating point of victory"

Clausewitz used a dialectical method to construct his argument, leading to frequent modern
misinterpretation because he explores variousoften opposedideas before coming to conclusions.
Modern perception of war are based on the concepts Clausewitz put forth in On War, though these have
been very diversely interpreted by various leaders (e.g., Moltke, Vladimir Lenin, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Mao Zedong, etc.), thinkers, armies, and peoples. Modern military doctrine, organization,
and norms are all based on Napoleonic premises, even to this daythough whether these premises are
necessarily also "Clausewitzian" is debatable.
The "dualism" of Clausewitz's view of war (i.e., that wars can vary a great deal between the two
"poles" he proposed, based on the political objectives of the opposing sides and the context) seems
simple enough, but few commentators have proven willing to accept this crucial variabilitythey insist
that Clausewitz "really" argued for one end of the scale or the other. On War has been seen by some
prominent critics as an argument for "total war".[a] It has been blamed for the level of destruction
involved in the First and Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually
use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable development that started with the huge,
patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic wars. These wars resulted (though war's evolution has
not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of
the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely,
Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in
modern times." (Robert Osgood, 1979)
Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticized, perhaps quite unfairly, by competing
theorists--Antoine-Henri Jomini in the 19th century, B. H. Liddell Hart in the mid-20th century, and
Martin van Creveld and John Keegan more recently. On War is a work rooted solely in the world of the
nation state, says historian Martin Van Creveld, who alleges that Clausewitz takes the state "almost for
granted" as he rarely looks at anything previous to Westphalia. He alleges that Clausewitz does not
address any form of intra/supra-state conflict, such as rebellion and revolution, because he could not
theoretically account for warfare before the existence of the state. Previous kinds of conflict were
demoted to criminal activities without legitimacy and not worthy of the label "war." Van Creveld argues
that "Clausewitzian war" requires the state to act in conjunction with the people and the army, the state
becoming a massive engine built to exert military force against an identical opponent. He supports this
statement by pointing to the conventional armies in existence throughout the 20th century. This view
ignores, among many other things, the facts that Clausewitz died in the early 19th century, that Prussia
itself was not a "nation-state," and that the Napoleonic Wars included many non-conventional conflicts
of which Clausewitz was well aware. In any case, revolutionaries like Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels,
Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong had no trouble adapting Clausewitz's concepts to their own purposes.
Nor did conservatives like the Elder Moltke and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Much of Clausewitz's thinking
was based on his experience as a Prussian war planner concerned with how to use popular forces in an
insurrectionary struggle against the much-superior French forces which occupied Prussia after 1806

how, in short, to wage a "Spanish War in Germany."

Clausewitz himself never saw the 20th-century states and armies to which Creveld refersthe states
with which he himself was familiar were quite different. In any case, the "Clausewitzian Trinity" that
Van Creveld condemns as consisting of a rigid, static hierarchy of "People, Army, and Government,"
does not in fact consist of those three concrete actors. In fact, the words people, army, and government
appear nowhere in the paragraph in which Clausewitz defines his famous Trinity. Rather, the Trinity of
forces that drive the course of real-world war in Clausewitz's view are 1) violent emotion, 2) the
interplay of chance and probability, and 3) political calculations driven by reason. It seems unlikely that
emotion, chance, and rationality will cease to play a role in war any time soon, whatever the fate of the
state.

Just war theory (or Bellum iustum) is a doctrine of military ethics of Roman philosophical and
Catholic origin,[1][2] studied by moral theologians, ethicists and international policy makers, which
holds that a violent conflict ought to meet philosophical, religious or political criteria.

[edit] Origins
The Indian epic, the Mahabharata, offers one of the first written discussions of a 'just war'. In it, one of
five ruling brothers asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified, and then a long discussion
ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality (chariots cannot attack cavalry,
only other chariots, no attacking people in distress), just means (no poisoned or barbed arrows), just
cause (no attacking out of rage), and fair treatment of captives and the wounded.[3] The war in
Mahabharata is preceded by context that develops the "just cause" for the war including last minute
efforts to reconcile differences to avoid war. At the beginning of the war, there is the discussion of "just
conduct" appropriate to the context of war.
In ancient Rome, a "just cause" for war might include the necessity of repelling an invasion, or
retaliation for pillaging or a breach of treaty.[4] War was always potentially nefas, "wrong, forbidden,"
and risked religious pollution and divine disfavor.[5] A just war (bellum iustum) thus required a
ritualized declaration by the fetial priests.[6] More broadly, conventions of war and treaty-making were
part of the ius gentium, the "law of nations," the customary moral obligations regarded as innate and
universal to human beings.[7]
The quintessential explanation of just war theory in the ancient world is found in Cicero's De Officiis,
Book 1, sections 1.11.331.13.41.

[edit] Saints Augustine and Aquinas

Christian theory of the just war begins with Augustine of Hippo[8] and Thomas Aquinas.[9]
Augustine of Hippo, generally considered one of the first and greatest Christian theologians, was one of
the first to assert that a Christian could be a soldier and serve God and country honorably. Individuals
should not resort to violence but God claims that He has given the sword to government for good
reason. Christians as part of government should not be ashamed to protect the peace and punish
wickedness.
Augustine asserted that this was a personal, philosophical stance:
"What is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition. The sacred seat of virtue

is the heart"[10]
Nonetheless, he asserted, peacefulness in the face of a grave wrong that could only be stopped by
violence would be a sin. Defense of one's self or others could be a necessity, especially when
authorized by a legitimate authority:
"The commandment forbidding killing was not broken by those who have waged wars on the
authority of God, or those who have imposed the death-penalty on criminals when representing
the authority of the state, the justest and most reasonable source of power"
While not breaking down the conditions necessary for war to be just, Augustine nonetheless originated
the very phrase, itself, in his work The City of God:
But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the
necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not
wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. [11]
[edit] Thomas Aquinas
Nine hundred years later, Thomas Aquinas an immensely influential philosopher and theologian in
the tradition of scholasticism used the authority of Augustine's arguments as he laid out the
conditions under which a war could be just:[12]
First, war must occur for a good and just purpose rather than for self-gain (for example, "in the
nation's interest" is not just) or as an exercise of power.
Second, just war must be waged by a properly instituted authority such as the state.
Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence.[13]

[edit] School of Salamanca

Growing from Aquinas arguments was the School of Salamanca, which expanded on Thomistic
understanding of natural law and just war. Given that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind,
the adherents of the School reasoned that it ought to be resorted to only when it was necessary in order
to prevent an even greater evil. A diplomatic agreement is preferable, even for the more powerful party,
before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are:
In self-defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success. If failure is a foregone
conclusion, then it is just a wasteful spilling of blood.
Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack.
War to punish a guilty enemy.
A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: it must comply with a
series of additional requirements:
It is necessary that the response be commensurate to the evil; use of more violence than is
strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war.
Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the
people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that
is waging, or is about to wage, an unjust war.
Once war has begun, there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack
innocents or kill hostages.

 It is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking
a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort.
Under this doctrine, expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans, and wars for
glory are all inherently unjust.

[edit] Formally described Just War

The first work dedicated specifically to it was De bellis justis of Stanisaw of Skarbimierz, who
justified war of the Kingdom of Poland with Teutonic Knights[citation needed]. Francisco de Vitoria
criticized the conquest of America by the Kingdom of Spain[citation needed]. With Alberico Gentili
and Hugo Grotius just war theory was replaced by international law theory, codified as a set of rules,
which today still encompass the points commonly debated, with some modifications.[14] The
importance of the theory of just war faded with revival of classical republicanism beginning with works
of Thomas Hobbes.
The Just War theory is an authoritative Catholic Church teaching confirmed by the United States
Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,
issued in 1983. More recently, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, in paragraph 2309, lists four strict
conditions for "legitimate defense by military force":
the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting,
grave, and certain;
all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
there must be serious prospects of success;
the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The
power as well as the precision of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in
evaluating this condition.
Although the criticism can be made that the application of Just War is relativistic, one of the
fundamental bases of the tradition is the Ethic of Reciprocity, particularly when it comes to in bello
considerations of deportment during battle. If one set of combatants promise to treat their enemies with
a modicum of restraint and respect, then the hope is that other sets of combatants will do similarly in
reciprocation, (a concept not unrelated to the considerations of Game Theory).
Just War theorists combine both a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war
may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just war tradition act as an aid to determining whether
resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just War theories are attempts "to distinguish between
justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use
of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of
establishing lasting peace and justice."[15]
The Just War tradition addresses the morality of the use of force in two parts: when it is right to resort
to armed force (the concern of jus ad bellum) and what is acceptable in using such force (the concern of
jus in bello).[16] In more recent years, a third category jus post bellum has been added, which
governs the justice of war termination and peace agreements, as well as the prosecution of war
criminals.
Anarcho-capitalist scholar Murray Rothbard stated, "a just war exists when a people tries to ward off
the threat of coercive domination by another people, or to overthrow an already-existing domination. A
war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to
retain an already existing coercive rule over them."[17]

Jonathan Riley-Smith writes,

The consensus among Christians on the use of violence has changed radically since the
crusades were fought. The just war theory prevailing for most of the last two centuries
that violence is an evil which can in certain situations be condoned as the lesser of evils
is relatively young. Although it has inherited some elements (the criteria of legitimate
authority, just cause, right intention) from the older war theory that first evolved around
A.D. 400, it has rejected two premises that underpinned all medieval just wars, including
crusades: first, that violence could be employed on behalf of Christ's intentions for mankind
and could even be directly authorized by him; and second, that it was a morally neutral
force which drew whatever ethical coloring it had from the intentions of the perpetrators.
[18]

[edit] Criteria of Just War theory

Just War Theory has two sets of criteria. The first establishing jus ad bellum, the right to go to war; the
second establishing jus in bello, right conduct within war.[19]

[edit] Jus ad bellum

Main article: Jus ad bellum
Just cause
The reason for going to war needs to be just and cannot therefore be solely for recapturing things
taken or punishing people who have done wrong; innocent life must be in imminent danger and
intervention must be to protect life. A contemporary view of just cause was expressed in 1993
when the US Catholic Conference said: "Force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil,
i.e., aggression or massive violation of the basic human rights of whole populations."
Comparative justice
While there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, to overcome the presumption
against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party must significantly outweigh that
suffered by the other. Some theorists such as Brian Orend omit this term, seeing it as fertile
ground for exploitation by bellicose regimes.
Competent authority
Only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. "A just war must be initiated by a
political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice. Dictatorships (e.g.
Hitler's Regime) or deceptive military actions (e.g. the 1968 US bombing of Cambodia) are
typically considered as violations of this criterion. The importance of this condition is key.
Plainly, we cannot have a genuine process of judging a just war within a system that represses the
process of genuine justice. A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political
system that allows distinctions of justice".[20]
Right intention
Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purposecorrecting a suffered
wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or maintaining economies is not.
Probability of success
Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required
to achieve success;
Last resort
Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and

exhausted or are clearly not practical. It may be clear that the other side is using negotiations as a
delaying tactic and will not make meaningful concessions.
Proportionality
The anticipated benefits of waging a war must be proportionate to its expected evils or harms.
This principle is also known as the principle of macro-proportionality, so as to distinguish it from
the jus in bello principle of proportionality.
In modern terms, just war is waged in terms of self-defense, or in defense of another (with sufficient
evidence).

[edit] Jus in bello

Once war has begun, just war theory (Jus in bello) also directs how combatants are to act or should act:
Distinction
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of distinction. The acts of war should be
directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances
they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no
military targets and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against civilians. Moreover,
combatants are not permitted to target with violence enemy combatants who have surrendered or
who have been captured or who are injured and not presenting an immediate lethal threat.
Proportionality
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. An attack cannot be
launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be
clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (principle of proportionality).
Military necessity
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of minimum force. An attack or action must
be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military
objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This principle is
meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.
Fair treatment of prisoners of war
Enemy soldiers who surrendered or who are captured no longer pose a threat. It is therefore
wrong to torture them or otherwise mistreat them.
No means malum in se
Soldiers may not use weapons or other methods of warfare which are considered evil, such as
mass rape, forcing soldiers to fight against their own side or using weapons whose effects cannot
be controlled (e.g. nuclear weapons).

[edit] Official positions

[edit] World War I
In April 1917, two weeks after President Woodrow Wilson declared war on Germany, Cardinal James

Gibbons of Baltimore, the de facto head of the U.S. Catholic church, issued a letter that all Catholics
were to support the war.[21] As an example of the position US Catholic bishops took to the war against
Germany, here is a quote from William Manning:
Our Lord Jesus Christ does not stand for peace at any price...Every true American would
rather see this land face war than see her flag lowered in dishonor...I wish to say that, not
only from the standpoint of a citizen, but from the standpoint of a minister of religion...I
believe there is nothing that would be of such great practical benefit to us as universal
military training for the men of our land.
If by Pacifism is meant the teaching that the use of force is never justifiable, then, however
well meant, it is mistaken, and it is hurtful to the life of our country. And the Pacifism
which takes the position that because war is evil, therefore all who engage in war, whether
for offense or defense, are equally blameworthy, and to be condemned, is not only
unreasonable, it is inexcusably unjust.[22]

[edit] Ending a war: Jus post bellum

In recent years, some theorists, such as Gary Bass, Louis Iasiello and Brian Orend, have proposed a
third category within Just War theory. Jus post bellum concerns justice after a war, including peace
treaties, reconstruction, war crimes trials, and war reparations. Orend, for instance, proposes the
following principles:
Just cause for termination
A state may terminate a war if there has been a reasonable vindication of the rights that were
violated in the first place, and if the aggressor is willing to negotiate the terms of surrender. These
terms of surrender include a formal apology, compensations, war crimes trials and perhaps
rehabilitation. Alternatively, a state may end a war if it becomes clear that any just goals of the
war cannot be reached at all or cannot be reached without using excessive force.
Right intention
A state must only terminate a war under the conditions agreed upon in the above criteria.
Revenge is not permitted. The victor state must also be willing to apply the same level of
objectivity and investigation into any war crimes its armed forces may have committed.
Public declaration and authority
The terms of peace must be made by a legitimate authority, and the terms must be accepted by a
legitimate authority.
Discrimination
The victor state is to differentiate between political and military leaders, and combatants and
civilians. Punitive measures are to be limited to those directly responsible for the conflict. Truth
and reconciliation may sometimes be more important than punishing war crimes.
Proportionality
Any terms of surrender must be proportional to the rights that were initially violated. Draconian
measures, absolutionist crusades and any attempt at denying the surrendered country the right to
participate in the world community are not permitted.

[edit] Alternative theories

Militarism Militarism is the belief that war is not inherently bad but can be a beneficial aspect

of society.
Realism The core proposition of realism is a skepticism as to whether moral concepts such as
justice can be applied to the conduct of international affairs. Proponents of realism believe that
moral concepts should never prescribe, nor circumscribe, a state's behaviour. Instead, a state
should place an emphasis on state security and self-interest. One form of realism descriptive
realism proposes that states cannot act morally, while another form prescriptive realism
argues that the motivating factor for a state is self-interest. Just wars that violate Just Wars
principles effectively constitute a branch of realism.
Revolution and Civil War Just War Theory states that a just war must have just authority. To
the extent that this is interpreted as a legitimate government, this leaves little room for
revolutionary war or civil war, in which an illegitimate entity may declare war for reasons that
fit the remaining criteria of Just War Theory. This is less of a problem if the "just authority" is
widely interpreted as "the will of the people" or similar. Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions side-steps this issue by stating that if one of the parties to a civil war is a High
Contracting Party (in practice, the state recognised by the international community,) both Parties
to the conflict are bound "as a minimum, the following [humanitarian] provisions." Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention also makes clear that the treatment of prisoners of war is binding
on both parties even when captured soldiers have an "allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power."
Nonviolent struggle The "just war" criterion of "last resort" requires believers to look for
alternative means of conflict. The methods of nonviolent action permit the waging of political
struggle without resort to violence. Historical evidence and political theory can be examined to
determine whether nonviolent struggle can be expected to be effective in future conflicts. If
nonviolent action is determined effective, then the requirements for "just war" are not met.[23]
Absolutism Absolutism holds that there are various ethical rules that are absolute. Breaking
such moral rules is never legitimate and therefore is always unjustifiable.
Pacifism Pacifism is the belief that war of any kind is morally unacceptable and/or
pragmatically not worth the cost. Pacifists extend humanitarian concern not just to enemy
civilians but also to combatants, especially conscripts. For example, Ben Salmon believed all
war to be unjust. He was sentenced to death during World War I (later revised to 25 years hard
labor) for desertion and spreading propaganda.[24]
Right of self-defence The theory of self-defence based on rational self-interest maintains that
the use of retaliatory force is justified against repressive nations that break the zero aggression
principle. In addition, if a free country is itself subject to foreign aggression, it is morally
imperative for that nation to defend itself and its citizens by whatever means necessary. Thus,
any means to achieve a swift and complete victory over the enemy is imperative. This view is
prominently held by Objectivists.[25]
Consequentialism The moral theory most frequently summarized in the words "the end
justifies the means," which tends to support the just war theory (unless the just war causes less
beneficial means to become necessary, which further requires worst actions for self-defense
with bad consequences).

Art of War (Italian: Dell'arte della guerra) is a treatise by the Italian Renaissance political philosopher
and historian Niccol Machiavelli.
The format of Art of War is a socratic dialogue. The purpose, declared by Lord Fabrizio Colonna
(perhaps Machiavelli's persona) at the outset, "To honor and reward virt, not to have contempt for

poverty, to esteem the modes and orders of military discipline, to constrain citizens to love one another,
to live without factions, to esteem less the private than the public good." To these ends, Machiavelli
notes in his preface, the military is like the roof of a palazzo protecting the contents.
Written between 1519 and 1520 and published the following year, it was the only historical or political
work printed during Machiavelli's lifetime, though he was appointed official historian of Florence in
1520 and entrusted with minor civil duties.

[edit] Format
Art of War is divided into a preface (proemio) and seven books (chapters), which take the form of a
series of dialogues that take place in the Orti Oricellari, the gardens built in a classical style by
Bernardo Rucellai in the 1490s for Florentine aristocrats and humanists to engage in discussion,
between Cosimo Rucellai and "Lord Fabrizio Colonna" (many feel Colonna is a veiled disguise for
Machiavelli himself, but this view has been challenged by scholars such as Mansfield [1]), with other
patrizi and captains of the recent Florentine republic: Zanobi Buondelmonti, Battista della Palla and
Luigi Alamanni. The work is dedicated to Lorenzo di Filippo Strozzi, patrizio fiorentino in a preface
which ostentatiously pronounces Machiavelli's authorship. After repeated uses of the first person single
to introduce the dialogue, Machiavelli retreats from work serving as neither narrator not interlocutor.[1]
Fabrizio is enamored with the Roman Legions of the early to mid Republic and strongly advocates
adapting them to the contemporary situation of Renaissance Florence.
Fabrizio dominates the discussions with his knowledge, wisdom and insights. The other characters, for
the most part, simply yield to his superior knowledge and merely bring up topics, ask him questions or
for clarification. These dialogues, then, often become monologues with Fabrizio detailing how an army
should be raised, trained, organized, deployed and employed.

[edit] Background
Machiavelli's Art of War echoes many themes, issues, ideas and proposals from his earlier, more widely
read works, The Prince and The Discourses. To the contemporary reader, Machiavelli's dialogue may
seem impractical and to under-rate the effectiveness of both firearms and cavalry. However, his theories
were not merely based on a thorough study and analysis of classical and contemporary military
practices. Machiavelli had served for fourteen years as secretary to the Chancery of Florence and
"personally observed and reported back to his government on the size, composition, weaponry, morale,
and logistical capabilities of the most effective militaries of his day."[2] However, the native fighting
force he assiduously oversaw was struck a catastrophic defeat in Prato in 1512 which lead to the
downfall of Republican government.

[edit] Military strategy and science

Machiavelli wrote that war must be expressly defined. He developed the philosophy of "limited
warfare" - that is, when diplomacy fails, war is an extension of politics. Art of War also emphasizes the
necessity of a state militia and promotes the concept of armed citizenry. He believed that all society,
religion, science, and art rested on the security provided by the military.[3]

[edit] Critique
However at the time he was writing, firearms, both technologically and tactically, were in their infancy

and the rushing of enemy missile armed troops, of artillery even, between salvos, by a charge of pikes
and sword and shield men would have been a viable tactic. In addition Machiavelli was not writing in a
vacuum; Art of War was written as a practical proposition to the rulers of Florence as an alternative to
the unreliable condottieri mercenaries upon which all the Italian city states were reliant. A standing
army of the prosperous and pampered citizens that would have formed the cavalry would have been
little better. Machiavelli therefore "talks up" the advantages of a militia of those arms that Florence
could realistically muster and equip from her own resources.
However, his basic notion of emulating Roman practices was slowly and pragmatically adapted by
many later rulers and commanders, most notably Maurice of Nassau.[4] and Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden[4]. They would lay the foundations for the system of Linear Tactics which would dominate the
warfare of Europe and the world until after the Napoleonic Wars.
While Machiavelli's influence as a military theorist is often given a backseat to his writings as a
political philosopher, that he considered Dell'arte della guerra to be his most important work is clear
from his discussions of the military science and soldiery in other works. For example, in The Prince he
declares that "a prince should have no other object, no any other thought, nor take anything as his art
but that of war and its orders and discipline; for that is the only art which is of concern to one who
commands."[5]
In the course of the sixteenth century twenty-one editions appeared and it was translated in to French,
English, German, and Latin. Montaigne named Machiavelli next to Caesar, Polybius, and Commynes
as an authority on military affairs. Although in the seventeenth century changing military methods
brought other writers to the fore, Machiavelli was still frequently quoted. In the eighteenth century, the
Marshal de Saxe leaned heavily on him when he composed his Reveries upon the Art of War (1757),
and Algarottithough without much basissaw in Machiavelli the master who has taught Frederick
the Great the tactics by which he astounded Europe. Like most people concerned with military matters,
Jefferson had Machiavelli's Art of War in his library, and when the War of 1812 increased American
interest in problems of war, The Art of War was brought out in a special American edition."[6]
This continued interest in Machiavelli as a military thinker was not only caused by the fame of his
name; some of the recommendations made in the Art of War-those on training , discipline, and
classification, for instance-gained increasing practical importance in early modern Europe when armies
came to be composed of professionals coming from the most different social strata. This does not mean
that the progress of military art in the sixteenth century -in drilling, in dividing an army into distinct
units, in planning and organizing campaigns-was due to the influence of Machiavelli. Instead, the
military innovators of the time were pleased to find a work in which aspects of their practice were
explained and justified. Moreover, in the sixteenth century, with its wide knowledge of ancient
literature and its deep respect for classical wisdom, it was commonly held that the Romans owed their
military triumphs to their emphasis on discipline and training. Machiavelli's attempt to present Roman
military organization as the model for the armies of his time was therefore not regarded as extravagant.
At the end of the sixteenth century, for instance, Justus Lipsius, in his influential writings on military
affairs, also treated the Roman military order as a permanently valid model.

There is only one way and one way only that Niccollo Machiavelli believes a war
should be conducted: the Roman Way! His obsession with the Roman way of life
manifests itself inside of the examples that he gives on warfare. He also gives
Roman examples on other aspects of government and statehood but with warfare
he is doubly obsessed. Nearly every example Machiavelli gives for warfare contains
some mention of the way the Romans used do it. He favors infantry over Calvary

mostly because of the fact that the Romans favored infantry. His obsession with
the Roman way of life most likely comes from the times he lived in. Many of the
best minds of his day had decided that anything from antiquity was far superior to
any of their present day ways. There was a whole revival of classical literature,
arts, and ideas during the Renaissance which occurred around????? Machiavelli's
lifetime. Machiavelli's ideas are a directly affected by this classical revival.
I don't know whether this opening paragraph begins your paper or not. If it is true
that M. cites Roman examples every time when he discusses warfare, that fact
should be substantiated thoroughly in your paper.
I will call Machiavelli Nick for ease. Nick is very obsessed with the idea that a
country or kingdom should have it's own troops and not hire Mercenaries for
battle. A militia is essentially what he believes is the best type of army. He even
says in the Discourses that it is an outright shame for a kingdom to not have it's
own troops. This statement cries out for a quote from Machiavelli.
transition???
The Romans for a time were under the decemvirs and were defeated more often
then when they were free men. Nick believes that a soldier fighting for his own
glory is a much better and faithful soldier.
Does M. argue that free soldiers fight better than those who are slaves? What do
you mean by free men? Do you mean that they were not governed by tyrants?
Your argument is very unclear and muddled here?
Now why is that? Machiavelli saw from his own experiences that hired (hired is
different from "free". A mercenary could be free) soldiers do not have that
patriotic fire in them that soldiers of today do (is that statement true?). Well at
least the stereotypical idea of a modern day soldier. Soldiers in ancient Rome were
for the most part Roman citizens and fought very well because they were more than
just hired hands. This idea of defending a place goes beyond just the soldiers. A
people themselves can also love their land and home and fight very hard to keep it.
Nick talks about how difficult it was for the Romans to conquer certain areas and
peoples. These people were fighting for the love of their land and country and that
is a great advantage in a war. Nick feels that a city must be populous in order for it
to build a great empire. Rome did this well by destroying the nearby cities of it's
enemies and allowing foreigners to take part in its government. Nick felt that Rome
had conquered it's empire through much more ability and prudence than through
sheer fortune alone. War after war was fought between the Romans and their
neighbors. Nick saw that when a power becomes as great as Rome did that it was
possible to pick and chose its wars at will. Every state or kingdom near Rome was
not strong enough to attack Rome on its own so the neighboring states would only

attack if they were driven to it out of necessity. According to Machiavelli the

Romans always fought short and conclusive wars. After Rome had defeated a land
they would build a colony on ceded land. Rome kept spreading out and using this
same tactic over and over again. Rome divided the spoils of war and kept their
empire rich and productive by doing this.
The argument in the preceding paragraph might be true, but you provide no
evidence from any of M.'s writings to justify your statements.
*He believes that guarding passes is not necessarily in an Army's best interests
because it could possibly jeopardize all of ones forces which is a cardinal rule
Machiavelli believes should not be broken.* Transition??
Machiavelli's notion that princes should lead their forces personally is rather
outdated today. In the US the President is technically the commander and chief
but he would not take direct command of the Army in a battle situation. The
circumstances of that just are not possible in this day and age.
You skip from one idea to another without developing or justifying your
arguments.
The Roman notion of not punishing commanders for mistakes on the battle field is
highly praised by Nick. Having a commander on the battlefield fearing every
decision he makes that it will be the wrong one is not a good way to boost morale
(whose moral?).
According to Nick, "War either breakes out by chance or it is provoked by the
power wishing to start the war. "("The Discourses", 308). Good quote but you
don't develop it.
The reasons why war begins: this idea deserves detailed treatment. The next
sentence treats a different topic.
Nick believes that a prince should not deceive himself by believing his forces are
stronger then what they really are. He will deceive himself if he measures his
forces in terms of wealth, their location, and their goodwill if they are not troops of
his own. Without faithful troops a great deal of money is useless. Nick says,
"Wealth not only will not defend you, it will cause you to be plundered all the
sooner. "("The Discourses", 310). Nick believes that a poorly armed country should
keep the enemy far away from it's own lands and take the fight to him. To allow
the fight to come to their own territory would be devastating to a poorly armed
country. On the other hand countries which are well armed have the luxury of
waiting for the enemy to come to him because their strength resides in their troops
and not in wealth. Well armed countries should allow the enemy onto their own

land to fight according to Machiavelli. Nick observes that modern day

commanders, i.e. commanders of his day, no longer follow the rule of putting their
troops together in three ranks to resist repeated frontal attacks.
These are interesting statements but you have to prove that M. wrote them.
The commanders of his days felt that artillery of the day made the ancient
techniques of war rather obsolete. With Machiavelli's obsession with everything
Roman he of course feels differently. Nick defends the idea that artillery would
have changed the amount of battles won by the Romans by saying that the Romans
were aggressive attackers and that artillery was used to attack defensive positions.
Since the Romans would be on the offensive, artillery would be useless against
them. Nick goes even as far to say that the Romans would have had an easier time
winning their battles if artillery was in use in ancient times. Nick thinks that a
modern Army fashioned after the ancient army's would fare much better in
modern warfare. An ancient army emphasizes the infantry instead of the Calvary
and the infantry are much better off against artillery. Machiavelli seems to believe
that the only way artillery will be useful is if the army deploying it has the bravery
of the ancient Romans. Without that bravery artillery is useless when employed
against valiant soldiers.
Nick may be alright but there are too many of them in this paragraph. Don't
switch back to Machiavelli.
The paragraph above has an iteresting argument but no proof. Remember the
purpose of this paper is to marshall evidence.
Now why is Calvary inferior to infantry according to Nick? His explanation for
this is lacking. He believes that infantry is superior to Calvary yet does not give a
reason why. He says that good troops of infantry can easily break a Calvary
charge yet Calvary has a very difficult time in breaking an infantry charge. Nick
says that there are many modern day examples of this theory, yet the princes do not
change their strategy. Nick should give a much better explanation of why he
believes this theory. Actually the best reason why Nick believes this theory is
because the Romans favored infantry over Calvary so therefor Nick would favor
infantry too. Chapter XIX of the Discourses is in a way amusing. Machiavelli
decides that when a republic takes over another land or kingdom that if it is not up
to the skill level of the Roman Empire then it will fail.
Can a kingdom or empire have a "skill level"?
Nick even says that kingdoms that do not follow the Roman example do not have
an excuse for their mistakes. They have the Roman example in front of them and
it is their own fault when they do not follow them. Nick sees many dangers that a
prince or republic can incur when they hire mercenary troops or use auxiliary

troops. Nick sees auxiliary troops as the most harmful of all because the prince or
republic that employs them has no authority over them. The auxiliary troops only
follow the orders of the prince or republic that sent them. These troops, many
times after a victory, also plunder the one who hired them to fight alongside his
own troops. Nick even says that it is better to take whatever agreement a kingdom
or republic can get from their enemy than letting auxiliary troops inside their land
to defend it.
Transition from auxiliary troops to governing the conquered is not good
Once a city has been conquered, according to Nick, it is best to put as few
restrictions on it as possible. Allow the city to govern itself so that there would not
be any animosity to the outside rulers. This way at least there would be the
perception that the conquered city could affect its own fate.
As to fortress building Nick sees building forts as relatively useless. He believes
that they are not a very good defense against outside enemies and that having them
to use against ones own subjects is harmful. Having a fortress for the expressed
purpose of holding down your own people is just a bad idea. Now republics who
build fortresses in lands they conquer is also a fallacy according to Machiavelli.
This line that Nick writes best sums up his idea on fortresses. He says, "I would
have the authority of the Romans suffice, who tore down walls instead of building
them in the lands they wished to hold by force. "("The Discourses", 336). If a
prince has a good army then fortresses may be useful in holding off an enemy for a
few days. If a prince has a weak army then fortresses are either useless or
harmful.
The section on fortresses is important for his thought but does not logically belong
here. The transition to the next topic is not elegant.
A kingdom should not try to attack a disunited kingdom or republic during times
of internal strife within that kingdom or republic. This type of action will unite the
factions and create a very powerful enemy that will be very hard to defeat. Nick
instead says that it is easier to try and encourage internal conflicts during time of
peace. This will allow for an easier time of defeating the enemy. Republics and
kingdoms that win a battle should just be satisfied with winning. If the winning
side gets in a sense, cocky, then they are putting themselves up for a big downfall
according to Nick. Arrogance leads to stupid actions.
The following paragraph belongs with fortresses and methods of warfare.
MORE ROMANS: Nick believes that taking a city the Roman way is the best way.
Besieging a city for months or even years is not very productive. The Romans
preferred to take cities by direct assault or by defeating the enemy in the field.
Using a combination of force and deceit is also a good way to besiege a city. The

Romans gave their commanders as much discretion as possible in the field. This
allowed for the speedy implementation of war. Nick believes that this is a very
good policy to have. Having military commanders that are worried about making
mistakes is not the correct way to conduct a war. Nick sees that the present day
problems in the army's of his time are caused somewhat by the fact that every act a
commander makes is analyzed and scathed over by the leaders at home.
Commanders cannot avoid a battle when his enemy decides to fight according to
Nick. Nick sees the modern idea of avoiding at battle at all costs really means to
fight on the enemy's terms. Nick says that it is much better to fight right off the
bat than to hesitate. Machiavelli puts great faith in the idea of necessity. Leaving
an escape route for the enemy and not for your own troops is a great idea according
to Nick. The enemy will fight harder if there is no escape so leaving them an
escape is a great idea. A commander should tell a city's citizen that they are only
attacking a few of their number. Nick once again says that the Romans used these
techniques in their battles. New inventions or new sounds can have a great affect on
the battle field. Discipline is essential so that these new items do not greatly affect
an army. Even such a small thing as a rumor could affect an army so discipline is
a plus. Machiavelli believes that there should not be more than one capable
commander in the field during a battle. Their should not be rule by committee.
The army should be lead by a single supreme commander. He observes that
present day army's in France and Italy use more then one commander and have
had dire consequences because of it. Nick says that nothing is more worthy in battle
than a commander who can foresee the plans of the enemy. Nick says that it is
difficult to foresee the enemy's plans so it is a blessing when a commander seems to
have that ability. Machiavelli sees two reasons why the Roman republic fell. The
disputes connected with the Agrarian Law and the prolongation of military
authority. The men who gained great power from all the warring the Romans did
could then use that power for their own glory. Caesar was a capable military
commander who used the long Roman wars as a springboard for his own political
gains. Nick sees that if the Romans had not waged so many wars they would not
have gained so great an empire so fast but they would not have lost their liberty so
fast either. Confidence is of great value according to Nick. Having a well armed
army, a well organized army, and soldiers that know each other gives an army
confidence. Their commander must also have confidence along with bravery,
alertness, and dignity. Machiavelli says that the Romans used religion to give their
men confidence. I would take that as meaning that the best way to give an army
confidence would be to use religion according to Machiavelli. He never comes
right out and says that but given his penchant for using everything Roman than my
theory would seem to make sense. Chapter XXXVI is another chapter that is really
funny. The title of the chapter is "The reasons why the French have been, and still
are, considered braver than men at the outset of a battle and less than women
afterward." Maybe that is just a bad translation but I think the average historian

probably still gets a kick out of that one. Nick says there are three kinds of armies
in this chapter. One which has both bravery and ability like the Romans, an army
which has bravery without discipline like the French, and like the army in Italy
which has neither bravery or discipline. Nick says that a good commander should
do nothing, no matter how small, that would adversely affect his army. Skirmishes
can achieve good results as well as bad ones. They are needed to test the enemy so
your army can get an idea of their strength. A drawback is that if your forces are
defeated in the skirmishes than they may be afraid to fight the enemy in a large
battle. Nick says that if a commander is forced to skirmish he should only do so
when he knows he will be certain of victory. Nick says that a man's deeds are the
best reason to follow him in warfare. Commanders should use their deeds as a
way to motivate their troops. Commanders should train their troops for several
months if the troops are inexperienced. It is better of course to have an
experienced army going into battle than an inexperienced one. Another good trait
of a commander according to Nick is that a commander should be familiar with
various terrain's. Nick says that hunting is an excellent way for a commander to
become familiar with various terrain's. Discovering all the terrain in your home
country can greatly help a commander in other countries besides his own because
Nick says that there is a certain uniformity in all countries. Machiavelli says that
employing fraud during a war is a great technique in warfare. He detests it
otherwise but in warfare it is to be commended. Nick does not mean the kind of
fraud where you break an agreement with an enemy but rather the type of fraud
you would see on a battlefield. He gives the example where Hannibal feigned
retreat at the Lake of Perugia. Machiavelli says that to save one's country by any
means is a noble cause. The country's life comes before everything else. Once
again Machiavelli's obsession with the Romans comes through when he determines
whether it is better to attack first or to wait for the enemy to attack and then
counterattack. He decides that the best method is to wait and counterattack
because of the Roman commander Fabius. That was his technique and it worked
better than his counterparts Decius's technique of attacking first.
Machiavelli's pure obsession with everything Roman makes it impossible for him to
think about warfare otherwise.
Sources so far: The Discourses Machiavelli and Us, Althusser, Louis, New York,
1999
Your prose, syntax, and spelling need more attention than you have given those
items in this draft. Remember the key point: you have to justify your statements
with references to M.'s own words. You do not have to quote them, but you must
refer to the passages upon which you have built your arguments. Pay special
attention to the logic of your arguments and to the transition from one argument to
another. You need to think through the topics that you want to cover in this
paper:

Machiavelli's ideas about how to wage war

How to raise an army
Composition of the army. etc.
You have not yet brought a coherent structure to the paper or its argument. Your
main argument so far is that M. followed Roman examples. That's a good
argument. Follow it through!

Laws of war
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

"Jus in Bello" redirects here. For the Supernatural episode, see Jus in Bello (Supernatural).
The First Geneva Convention governing sick and wounded members of armed forces, signed in 1864
The law of war is a body of law concerning acceptable justifications to engage in war (jus ad bellum)
and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (jus in bello or International humanitarian law). The law
of war is considered an aspect of public international law (the law of nations) and is distinguished from
other bodies of law, such as the domestic law of a particular belligerent to a conflict, that may also
provide legal limits to the conduct or justification of war.
Amongst other issues, modern Laws of War address declarations of war, acceptance of surrender and
the treatment of prisoners of war; military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality; and the
prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering.[1]

[edit] Early sources and history

Attempts to define and regulate the conduct of individuals, nations, and other agents in war and to
mitigate the worst effects of war have a long history. The earliest known instances are found in the
Hebrew Bible (Old Testament). For example, Deuteronomy 20:19-20 limits the amount of acceptable
collateral and environmental damage:
When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt
not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of them,
and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man's life) to employ them in
the siege: Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt
destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt build bulwarks against the city that maketh war
with thee, until it be subdued.[2]

Similarly, Deuteronomy 21:10-14 requires that female captives who were forced to marry the victors of
a war could not be sold as slaves.[3]
In the early 7th century, the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, whilst instructing his Muslim army, laid down the
following rules concerning warfare:
Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not
commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies.
Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn
them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy's flock, save
for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic
services; leave them alone.[4][5]
Furthermore, Sura Al-Baqara 2:190-193 of the Koran requires that in combat Muslims are only allowed
to strike back in self-defence against those who strike against them, but, on the other hand, once the
enemies cease to attack, Muslims are then commanded to stop attacking.
In medieval Europe, the Roman Catholic Church also began promulgating teachings on just war,
reflected to some extent in movements such as the Peace and Truce of God. The impulse to restrict the
extent of warfare, and especially protect the lives and property of non-combatants continued with Hugo
Grotius and his attempts to write laws of war.

[edit] Modern sources

See also: Sources of international law
The signing of the First Geneva Convention by some of the major European powers in 1864
The modern law of war is derived from two principal sources:[1]
Lawmaking treaties (or conventions) see the section below called "International treaties on
the laws of war".
Custom. Not all the law of war derives from or has been incorporated in such treaties, which can
refer to the continuing importance of customary law. (see Martens Clause). Such customary
international law is established by the general practice of nations together with their acceptance
that such practice is required by law.
Positive international humanitarian law consists of treaties (international agreements) which directly
affect the laws of war by binding consenting nations and achieving widespread consentsee the
section below called "International treaties on the laws of war".
The opposite of positive laws of war is customary laws of war,[1] many of which were explored at the
Nuremberg War Trials. These laws define both the permissive rights of states as well as prohibitions on
their conduct when dealing with irregular forces and non-signatories.
The Lieber Code, promulgated by the Union during the American Civil War, was critical in the
development of the laws of land warfare.[6] Historian Geoffrey Best called the period from 1856 to
1909 the law of wars epoch of highest repute.[7] The defining aspect of this period was the
establishment, by states, of a positive legal or legislative foundation (i.e., written) superseding a regime
based primarily on religion, chivalry, and customs.[8] It is during this modern era that the
international conference became the forum for debate and agreement between states and the
multilateral treaty served as the positive mechanism for codification.

In addition, the Nuremberg War Trial judgment on "The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity"[9] held, under the guidelines Nuremberg Principles, that treaties like the Hague
Convention of 1907, having been widely accepted by "all civilised nations" for about half a century,
were by then part of the customary laws of war and binding on all parties whether the party was a
signatory to the specific treaty or not.
Interpretations of international humanitarian law change over time and this also affects the laws of war.
For example Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia pointed out in 2001 that although there is no specific treaty ban on the use of
depleted uranium projectiles, there is a developing scientific debate and concern expressed regarding
the effect of the use of such projectiles and it is possible that, in future, there may be a consensus view
in international legal circles that use of such projectiles violate general principles of the law applicable
to use of weapons in armed conflict.[10] This is because in the future it may be the consensus view that
depleted uranium projectiles breaches one or more of the following treaties: The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; the Charter of the United Nations; the Genocide Convention; the United Nations
Convention Against Torture; the Geneva Conventions including Protocol I; the Convention on
Conventional Weapons of 1980; the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.[11]

[edit] Purposes of the laws

Some of the central principles underlying laws of war are:
Wars should be limited to achieving the political goals that started the war (e.g., territorial
control) and should not include unnecessary destruction.
Wars should be brought to an end as quickly as possible.
People and property that do not contribute to the war effort should be protected against
unnecessary destruction and hardship.
To this end, laws of war are intended to mitigate the hardships of war by:
Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.
Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy,
particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians.
Facilitating the restoration of peace.

[edit] Example substantive laws of war

To fulfill the purposes noted above, the laws of war place substantive limits on the lawful exercise of a
belligerents power. Generally speaking, the laws require that belligerents refrain from employing
violence that is not reasonably necessary for military purposes and that belligerents conduct hostilities
with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry.
However, because the laws of war are based on consensus, the content and interpretation of such laws
are extensive, contested, and ever-changing.[12] The following are particular examples of some of the
substance of the laws of war, as those laws are interpreted today.

[edit] Declaration of war

Main article: Declaration of war

Section III of the Hague Convention of 1907 required hostilities to be preceded by a reasoned
declaration of war or by an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.
Some treaties, notably the United Nations Charter (1945) Article 2, and other articles in the Charter,
seek to curtail the right of member states to declare war; as does the older Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928
for those nations who ratified it.

[edit] Lawful conduct of belligerent actors

Modern laws of war regarding conduct during war (jus in bello), such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
provide that it is unlawful for belligerents to engage in combat without meeting certain requirements,
among them the wearing of a distinctive uniform or other distinctive signs visible at a distance, and the
carrying of weapons openly. Impersonating soldiers of the other side by wearing the enemys uniform
is allowed, though fighting in that uniform is unlawful perfidy, as is the taking of hostages.

[edit] Red Cross, Red Crescent and the white flag

Modern laws of war, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, also include prohibitions on attacking
doctors, ambulances or hospital ships displaying a Red Cross, a Red Crescent or other emblem related
to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It is also prohibited to fire at a person or
vehicle bearing a white flag, since that indicates an intent to surrender or a desire to communicate.
In either case, persons protected by the Red Cross/Crescent or white flag are expected to maintain
neutrality, and may not engage in warlike acts; in fact, engaging in war activities under a protected
symbol is itself a violation of the laws of war known as perfidy. Failure to follow these requirements
can result in the loss of protected status and make the individual violating the requirements a lawful
military target.

[edit] Applicability to states and individuals

The law of war is binding not only upon States as such but also upon individuals and, in particular, the
members of their armed forces. Parties are bound by the laws of war to the extent that such compliance
does not interfere with achieving legitimate military goals. For example, they are obliged to make
every effort to avoid damaging people and property not involved in combat, but they are not guilty of a
war crime if a bomb mistakenly hits a residential area.
By the same token, combatants that intentionally use protected people or property as shields or
camouflage are guilty of violations of laws of war and are responsible for damage to those that should
be protected.

[edit] Remedies for violations

During conflict, punishment for violating the laws of war may consist of a specific, deliberate and
limited violation of the laws of war in reprisal.
Soldiers who break specific provisions of the laws of war lose the protections and status afforded as
prisoners of war, but only after facing a "competent tribunal" (GC III Art 5). At that point they become
an unlawful combatant but they must still be "treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be
deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial", because they are still covered by GC IV Art 5. For
example in 1976 foreign soldiers fighting for FNLA were captured by the MPLA in the civil war that
broke out when Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975. In the Luanda Trial, after "a

regularly constituted court" found them guilty of being mercenaries, three Britons and an American
were shot by a firing squad on July 10, 1976. Nine others were imprisoned for terms of 16 to 30 years.
Spies and terrorists may be subject to civilian law or military tribunal for their acts and in practice have
been subjected to torture and/or execution. The laws of war neither approve nor condemn such acts,
which fall outside their scope.[citation needed] Spies may only be punished following a trial and if
captured after rejoining their army must be treated as a prisoner of war.[13] Suspected terrorists who
are captured during an armed conflict, without having participated in the hostilities, may be detained
only in accordance with the GC IV and are entitled to a regular trial.[14] However, nations that have
signed the UN Convention Against Torture have committed themselves not to use torture on anyone for
any reason. Citizens and soldiers of nations which have not signed the Fourth Geneva Convention are
also not protected by it (Article 4: "Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not
protected by it".), whether they are spies or terrorists. Also, citizens and soldiers of nations which have
not signed and do not abide by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are not protected by them.
(Common Article 2: "[The High Contracting Parties] shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to [a Power which is not a contracting party], if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof" (emphasis added).)
If someone is (or is suspected to be) a citizen or soldier of a nation which has signed or abides by the
Fourth Geneva Convention (see Art. 2 and Art. 4 citations above), or is (or is suspected to be) a
"prisoner of war" (POW) per the definitions of such "protected persons" in the Third Geneva
Convention (see Art. 4 and Art. 5), the following applies: A POW who breaks specific provisions of the
laws of war may be penalized, but not penalized worse than the tribunal would penalize its own
soldiers for the same offense (and usually a disciplinary, not judicial, punishment if its own soldiers
normally wouldn't be brought to trial for a particular offense) and POW's may not be penalized based
on rank or gender, nor with corporal punishment, collective punishments for individual acts, lack of
daylight, or torture/cruelty (GC IV, Art. 82 through Art. 88).
After a conflict has ended, persons who have committed or ordered any breach of the laws of war,
especially atrocities, may be held individually accountable for war crimes through process of law. Also,
nations which signed the Geneva Conventions are required to search for, then try and punish, anyone
who has committed or ordered certain "grave breaches" of the laws of war. (see GC III, Art. 129 and
Art. 130)
History has shown that the laws of war are traditionally more strictly applied to those defeated, as the
victorious faction are placed in the role of policing themselves.[citation needed] While it can be argued
that the victors may be less strict on their own forces, it can also be argued that the signing of the
treaties involved in the laws of war implies a good-faith promise to adhere to them equally.[citation
needed] As with many facets of war, the aftermath and subsequent legal proceedings depend heavily on
circumstance, and are different for each conflict.
There is an emerging trend in the US to hold private corporations civilly liable for aiding and abetting
in war crimes, by knowingly providing substantial assistance in the commission of the crimes. Under
international law, the mens rea element is knowledge, not intent that the crimes be carried out. This
opens the door not only to hold private security contractors liable, but also other kinds of corporations
which employ violent mercenary or terrorist groups as private security forces. Although conflict zones
often lack functioning legal systems, and government may even have passed laws immunizing private
mercenaries from criminal liability, aiding and abetting a war crime can still be the basis for civil
liability in a foreign court with jurisdiction over the defendant corporation.

[edit] International treaties on the laws of war

see also List of international declarations
List of declarations, conventions, treaties and judgements and on the laws of war:[15][16][17]
1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law abolished privateering
1864 First Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field"
1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive projectiles
Under 400 grams Weight
1874 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels
Declaration).[18] Signed in Brussels 27 August. This agreement never entered into force, but
formed part of the basis for the codification of the laws of war at the 1899 Hague Peace
Conference.[19][20]
1880 Manual of the Laws and Customs of War at Oxford. At its session in Geneva in 1874 the
Institute of International Law appointed a committee to study the Brussels Declaration of the
same year and to submit to the Institute its opinion and supplementary proposals on the subject.
The work of the Institute led to the adoption of the Manual in 1880 and it went on to form part
of the basis for the codification of the laws of war at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.[20]
1899 Hague Conventions consisted of four main sections and three additional declarations (the
final main section is for some reason identical to the first additional declaration):
I - Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
II - Laws and Customs of War on Land
III - Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of Principles of Geneva Convention of 1864
IV - Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons
Declaration I - On the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons
Declaration II - On the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of
Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases
Declaration III - On the Use of Bullets Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the Human
Body
1907 Hague Conventions had thirteen sections, of which twelve were ratified and entered into
force, and two declarations
I - The Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
II - The Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts
III - The Opening of Hostilities
IV - The Laws and Customs of War on Land
V - The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land
VI - The Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities
VII - The Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships
VIII - The Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines
IX - Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War
X - Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention
XI - Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval
War
XII - The Creation of an International Prize Court [Not Ratified]*

XIII - The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War

Declaration I - extending Declaration II from the 1899 Conference to other types of
aircraft
Declaration II - on the obligatory arbitration
1909 London Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War largely reiterated existing law,
although it showed greater regard to the rights of neutral entities. Never went into effect.
1922 The Washington Naval Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty (6 February)
1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare[21]
1925 Geneva protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare[22]
1927-1930 Greco-German arbitration tribunal
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (also known as the Pact of Paris)
1929 Geneva Convention, Relative to the treatment of prisoners of war
1929 Geneva Convention on the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick
1930 Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament (London Naval Treaty 22
April)
1935 Roerich Pact
1936 Second London Naval Treaty (25 March)
1938 Amsterdam Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against New
Engines of War.[23]
1938 League of Nations declaration for the "Protection of Civilian Populations Against
Bombing From the Air in Case of War"[24]
1945 United Nations Charter (entered into force on October 24, 1945)
1946 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
1947 Nuremberg Principles formulated under UN General Assembly Resolution 177 21
November 1947
1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field
1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
1971 Zagreb Resolution of the Institute of International Law on Conditions of Application of
Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which the United Nations Forces May
be Engaged
1974 United Nations Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and
Armed Conflict
1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques
1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

 1978 Red Cross Fundamental Rules of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts
1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
1980 Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
1980 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices
1980 Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
1995 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons
1996 Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention), 28
November 2003, entered into force on 12 November 2006[25]
1990 Ottawa Treaty banning the use of landmines.
1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.[26]
1994 ICRC/UNGA Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the
Environment in Time of Armed Conflict[27]
1994 UN Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel[28]
1996 The International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force on 1 July 2002.
2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, entered into force on
12 February 2002.
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, entered into force on 1 August 2010.