Professional Documents
Culture Documents
THE QUESTION OF
HERMENEUTICS
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS
edited by
TIMOTHY J. STAPLETON
Loyola College in Maryland, U.S.A.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-0-7923-2964-0
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-1160-7
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY
IN COOPERATION WITH
Editor:
William R. McKenna, Miami University
Editorial Board:
Scope
The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy
through creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in
culture genemlly, offer opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that
call for creative responses. Although the work of several generations of thinkers has
provided phenomenology with many results with which to approach these challenges, a truly
successful response to them will require building on this work with new analyses and
methodological innovations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
TIMOTHY J. STAPLETON
TABLE OF CONTENTS
viii
moMAS M. SEEBOHM /
FOREWORD
by Pierre Kerszberg
Joseph J. Kockelmans: A Biographical Note
Joseph Kockelmans was born on December I, 1923, at
Meerssen in the Netherlands. In 1951 he received his doctoral
degree in philosophy from the Institute for Medieval Philosophy,
Angelico, Rome. Earlier on, he had earned a "Baccalaureate" and
a "Licence" from the same institution. Upon his return to the
Netherlands, he engaged in a series of post-doctoral studies. His
first subject was mathematics, which he studied under H. Busard
who taught at the Institute of Technology at Venlo (1952-55). A
major turning-point then occurred when, from 1955 to 1962, his
post-doctoral research centered simultaneously around physics
under A.D. Fokker at the University of Leyden, and
phenomenology under H.L. Van Breda at the Husserl Archives of
the University of Louvain. Still in the Netherlands, his first
position as professor of philosophy was at the Agricultural
University of Wageningen from 1963 to 1964. Even though he had
been a Visiting Professor at Duquesne University in 1962, the year
1964 marked the actual beginning of his career in the United
States. He began by holding a professorship at the New School for
Social Research in New York (1964-65). Before establishing himself
permanently at the Pennsylvania State University from 1968
onward, where he became a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
in 1990, he also held a professorship at the University of Rittsburgh
from 1965 to 1968.
Kockelmans' arrival in the United States was the decisive
event that was instrumental in fostering the recognition of
Continental European philosophy in this country. Indeed, from
1965 to 1967, not only did he create (together with John Anderson
and Calvin Schrag) an internationally-acclaimed journal, Man and
World, he also published two books which turned out to be
essential tools for a generation of students of European philosophy:
these are his introductions to the works of Edmund Husserl and
Martin Heidegger. In addition, he edited a most useful anthology
of fundamental writings in phenomenology, which include both
primary and secondary sources.
ix
Pierre Kers2;berg
INTRODUCTION
by TImothy J. Stapleton
The collection of essays presented here under the title, liThe
Question of Hermeneutics," represents more than anything else an
attempt to take stock of things. Ours has been a century of
extraordinary change; and change of a sort that appears only to be
accelerating as the millennium draws to a close. To have lived
through this century is to incarnate the memory of an historical
epoch unsurpassed in terms of quantitative shifts. But many today,
when speaking of this era, would hesitate to use terms like
"progress" or development." These words which came so easily,
so confidently in times past, as part of the stock vocabulary of
"modernity," now signify precisely those concepts which are most
suspect when reflecting on lithe fate of the West" today. At the
core of these doubts are suspicions about that which, culturally, is
most our own; about those paradigmatic embodiments of Western
rationality, about science and technology and their respective
claims to truth and value. Is the truth of science no more than a
privilege granted the power of calculative, instrumental thinking?
How are we to characterize, then, our own philosophical
situation today? Such a question can easily be dismissed as simply
too general; any answers rejected as necessarily reductionistic. But
perhaps not unlike the Seinsfrage with which Heidegger began
Being and Time, the generality of this question is no proof that it
need not, that it must not, be asked. To try to provide a positive
answer might indeed prove extremely ldifficult. Let us proceed,
then, via negative. We may not be able to agree at all on what (or,
in some of the more radical cases, on whether) philosophy is or
should be. But we know what it's not, and it's not what it used to
be. Ironically from such a perspective, if philosophy has made
"progress" in the twentieth century, it is precisely insofar as it has
explicitly surrendered its traditional self-understanding; an
understanding which, among other things, legitimated the ideal,
if not the fact, of progress. The ideals of philosophy as "rigorous
science," as foundational, as that which provides a "metaphysical
groundwork," these are notions which have fallen on hard times.
In describing both major camps of contemporary philosophy,
analytic and continental, Husserl's comments from the Summer of
1935 seem appropriate, and prophetic:
II
Timothy J. Stapleton
Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically
rigorous, science - the dream is over.... Philosophy once thought of
itself as the science of the totality of what is. Thus even if
philosophy itself drew the distinction between the world, as the
totality of what exists finitely, and God, as the principle uniting the
infinity of finite things, it thought itself capable of knowing
scientifically the metaphysical principle and the world through the
principle. Whatever it later substituted in the way of worldtranscending, metaphysical [principles], however it conceived of the
unity of the absolute, it thought all too long that scientific paths
could lead to the transcendent, the absolute, the metaphysical... But
these times are over - such is the generally reigning opinion of
such people. A powerful and constantly growing current of
philosophy which renounces scientific discipline, like the current of
religious disbelief, is inundating European humanity.l
Introduction
of Hermeneutics.
Hermeneutic Rationality
In "The Future of Hermeneutic Philosophy," Otto Poggeler
looks to hermeneutics as a possible philosophy of the future,
wondering whether it is adequate to the kinds of tasks and
problems, to the sense of things that is emerging as we move
toward the twenty-first century. Poggeler argues that despite the
success of hermeneutic philosophy in establishing itself as a
dominant intellectual force, it has failed to secure an adequate
point of departure. And this failure, if left uncorrected, bodes ill
for the future of hermeneutic philosophy.
Poggeler traces the emergence of hermeneutics from a critical
consideration of Hegel'S understanding of philosophy. Do history
and time, when conceptualized and idealized from a certain
metaphysical perspective as in The Phenomenology of Spirit, lose
their distinctive natures? Man's complex relation to history and
time called for a "many-levelled hermeneutic" of the sort begun by
Dilthey, and these efforts were seemingly given a more radical
foundation derived from Husserlian phenomenology by
Heidegger's Being and Time. Heidegger offered, as a new "logic of
philosophy," a formal indicative hermeneutic in response to
Hegel's dialectic. Yet P6ggeler notes that Heidegger's project failed,
as testified to, for example, by his burning of the preparatory
studies to the third part of Being and Time. Later attempts on
Heidegger's part to overcome these difficulties still left the starting
point and the future of hermeneutic philosophy in doubt.
Timothy J. Stapleton
Introduction
Timothy J. Stapleton
Philosophy exists to represent the idea of completed knowledge, the
final telos anchored in the essence of knowledge, and to regulate all
future knowledge according to this idea. Philosophy in this old
Platonic sense is either nothing at all, or it exists as the intention to
become the most rigorous science in the most radical and most
ultimate sense. (see below, p. 111)
Introduction
Timothy J. Stapleton
Introduction
10
Timothy J. Stapleton
Introduction
11
12
Timothy J. Stapleton
Hermeneutics, Art, and Ethics
Introduction
13
TIMOTHY J. STAPLETON
14
Timothy J. Stapleton
Notes
SECTION I
HERMENEUTIC RATIONALITY?
by Otto Poggeler
(Translated by Dale Snow)
The future, according to Hegel, is a yielding element in which
a variety of things can be imagined. He who speaks of the future
of a particular philosophy can look upon previous achievements
and desire to build upon them, thereby abandoning himself to
illusory hopes. It cannot however be denied that hermeneutic
philosophy, contrary to all predictions, has even in America
triumphed over competing directions, or at least has joined
together with them in a combination [which] is difficult to
understand.
Nothing whatsoever will be argued here with respect to what
has been achieved in the conflict of the positions; it is rather the
future of hermeneutic philosophy which is in question, because
this philosophy has yet to arrive at a point of departure which
could be adequate to contemporary problems. If this philosophy is
not to fall prey to the illusions Hegel criticized, then the
insufficiency of the previous starting points in the history of the
development of hermeneutic philosophy must be demonstrated.
Therefore as a first step I would like to show how it came to
pass that discussion of the hermeneutic arose in response to
Hegel's understanding of philosophy. The second step will be to
show how Martin Heidegger countered Hegel'S dialectic with the
formal indicative [anzeigende] hermeneutic as the logic of
philosophy. The third step will be concerned with the question
whether the new and different element which is indicated by the
adjective "hermeneutical" or other words has been sufficiently
articulated. Thus we may be brought to see that the future which
we must not lose demands from us a philosophy which has yet to
be developed.
I. Hegel and the Consequences
18
Otto Poggeler
19
20
Otto Poggeler
21
22
Otto Poggeler
23
24
Otto Poggeler
25
26
Otto Poggeler
27
28
Otto Poggeler
29
30
Otto Poggeler
31
32
Otto Poggeler
33
34
Otto Poggeler
Notes
35
by Karl-Otto Apel
(Translated by Dale Snow)
I. Introduction
The question of the relation between hermeneutics and
practical philosophy is one which poses a challenge for the
contemporary philosophical situation. This way of posing the
problem provides one of the two stimuli for my attempt to
determine the logos of hermeneutics. The other resides in the fact
that in contemporary philosophy, a tendency has persisted for
quite some time to define the internal relationship between
hermeneutics and practical reason in such a way that one is no
longer able to identify [the element of] practical reason therein.
The difficulty is already apparent, for example, in view of the
following suggestion: on the one hand the hermeneutic
understanding is to be grasped from the pre-scientific connection of
communicative agreement in dialogue,! on the other hand as a
"sense-event" that is "transmitted by tradition" through "fusion of
horizons," which "plays itself out" like a cosmic event in nature in
such a way that, in the end, there will be no more point to
assuming a regulative principle of a deeper or better understanding.
Instead one must come to terms with the fact that, especially when
the interpreter can use the "temporal distance" between himself
and the interpretandum in the sense of a "historically effective
consciousness," one can always achieve only a "different
understanding.,,2 This is supposed to be the case because the
existential fore-structure of understanding is determined through a
pre-understanding of the world and hence by "prejudices" which can
never be fully taken into account by the critical consciousness of
the interpreter, For in the end, temporal being, which rules the
interpreter, is more powerful that his critical consciousness. So
argues, as is well known, Hans-Georg Gadamer in his grounding
of hermeneutics, inspired by Heidegger, in Truth and Method.
Already in view of this surrender of the regulative idea of a
possible progress in understanding -and that means also in the
judgment of related validity-claims in communicative agreement-it
is difficult to establish the simultaneously maintained internal
37
T.]. Stapleton (ed.), The Question of Hermeneutics, 37--60.
1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
38
Karl-Otto Apel
39
It is in this apparently moderate direction of the "hermeneuticpragmatic" turn that something of a liberal- conservative synthesis
seems to be emerging in the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Anglo-Saxon countries today.5 For me this synthesis would be, as
I have already indicated, no longer acceptable either as a basis for
a hermeneutic or as a basis for an ethic. The reasons for this
disapproval will be laid out later, but in the present connection, I
can already hint at them by referring to the radicalization of the
post-Heideggerian hermeneutic by the so-called "post-modernists."
What is their situation with respect to the intemal relationship
between hermeneutics and practical philosophy?
The first thing to be noted about the post-modernists who rely
upon Heidegger and Nietzsche is a subversive style which cannot
be rendered compatible with Gadamer's conservativism which ties
hermeneutics to the received tradition - and to that extent also to
Plato and Kant. This becomes clear in the latest discussion between
Gadamer and Derrida in Paris in 1981.6 Like the later Heidegger,
Derrida wants to give up ties to the received tradition of western
metaphysics and also the connection to "logos" and therewith,
consistently, even ties to the discipline of "hermeneutics." Here,
apparently, the concern is no longer with "interpretation" at all, let
alone with a "holding in validity" [in Geltung halten] (Gadamer),
but rather with "deconstruction" in an extension of that which
Heidegger - still in the name of an existential hermeneutics called "destruction" of traditional ontology?
But, even according to Heidegger's demand to "think" the
meaning of Being that, due to the ontic-ontological difference,
escapes from us in the "event" of the "clearing-concealing"
[lichtend-verbergenden] disclosure of world-meaning - finally
thinking this meaning of temporal Being in its difference from the
entity [Seienden] and from the abstract "entity-ness" [Seiendheit] even this demand of a hermeneutic of Being Derrida's deconstruction
would like to question as still being a product of the concealed will
to "logocentric metaphysics," the will to the "presence" of the
"signifie." This is supposed to be achieved with the help, so to
speak, of a post-structuralist semiotic of the infinite "play" of
"differance," which sets free the symbolic sense, but at the same
time "displaces", so that only the infinite play of the
"dissemination" of the significants remains for us - the always
fruitless attempt, as it were, to discover and root out the "trace" of
40
Karl-Otto Apel
41
a critique, not from the standpoint of the will to power, but rather
from the standpoint, so to speak, of temporal Being. And this
paradox of a radical critique of reason, in which reason functions
merely as object and no longer as subject of critique, has in the
meantime established itself as one of the fundamental characteristics of post-modem thought.
In the light of these obvious paradoxes it can be seen that even
Gadamer's apparently moderate hermeneutic has, regardless of its
conservative attitude toward the tradition of metaphysics, already
crossed the Rubicon of post-rational "thought" - whatever that
may be. For Gadamer too, along with the late Heidegger, wants
the condition for the possibility of understanding - and the
Kantian formulation suggests, the condition also for the validity of
understanding - to be seen only in the historicity of understanding;
that is, in the context-dependency of the always "other [different]
understanding." Precisely in the admission of this dependency on
history, not as a hindrance to objectivity but rather simply as a
condition of the constitution of sense, does Gadamer want to see
the overcoming of historicism, the overcoming of the difficulties in
which Dilthey remained entangled because he held fast to the
methodological ideal of objectivity.9
Gadamer does not deny the difficulties, even the paradoxical
nature of the solution to the historicity problem which he
champions. On the contrary, he explicitly discusses this in Truth
and Method, and this fact distinguishes him from the unconcerned
- or rather, from the provocatively stylistically employed irrationalism of the "deconstruceurs." Gadamer takes on Hegel at
a decisive point in his work, Hegel who, as Gadamer admits and
even emphasizes, had thoroughly recognized the historicity of our
thinking, but still wanted at the same time to "mediate" it with the
claim to the universal validity of thought. The uniqueness of
Gadamer's assessment of Hegel consists, on the one hand, in his
holding Hegel's "absolute mediation of history and truth" for the
unsurpassable position of reason to which there is no alternative, which
from the standpoint of reflection is "not to be overturned." Yet on
the other hand he is convinced that the actual truth is against it,
that in the end the demand of the young Hegelians, Kierkegaard,
Feuerbach and the young Marx, for a self-overcoming of the
philosophy which found its completion in Hegel was somehow
justified. to
42
Karl-Otto Apel
43
Being?
44
Karl-Otto Apel
45
outline, for I would like to make as clear as possible what need not
be contentious in a dispute between the defenders of IIre-transcendentalization" and the defenders of de-transcendentalization"
or deconstruction."
1. As has alreadybeen indicated, the insistence on consistently
indisputable and therefore indispensable universal claims to the
validity of argumentation does not mean that one must deny that
the content of our knowledge - and thus also for example the
hermeneutic understanding of texts - is always already predicated upon a IIpre-understanding," in which the historical
embeddedness and the "event"-character of the understanding is
manifested. Here it is rather the question about the methodologically
relevant relationship of two moments which both determine the logos
of hermeneutics: the historical conditioning on the one side and the
claim to truth as a claim of universal validity on the other.
2. The first to recognize this relationship and the necessity of
a mediation of both moments was, in my view, Hegel. Yet he
wanted to offer the concrete mediation as absolute"; that is, [as a]
definitive mediation of the transcendental form and the historically
conditioned content of understanding from the standpoint, as it
were, of the "ex-post-reflection" at the end of all history: that is as a
systematic comprehension within the framework of speculative
philosophy, and not merely as a philosophical grounding of a
possible cooperation and complementing of philosophy and the
specialized sciences of historical hermeneutics. In contrast to this,
in my view, a philosophical hermeneutic must realize - and this,
of course, with a universal claim to philosophical validity - that the
concrete hermeneutic understanding, all empirical knowledge, must
take its standpoint in the historical situation; and that means under
the presupposition of the aprioris of facticity and of historicity
(Heidegger).
3. From this arises an alternative to the Hegelian mediation of
form and content by speculative thought, namely the "hermeneutic
circle" as the basic model of all concrete, situation-dependent
understanding. With Heidegger I can accept and even emphasize
that all concrete understanding of the world cannot depend upon
"avoiding" this circle - the circle between the historically
conditioned pre-understanding of the world and the corrective recoil
function of the interpretandum - but rather depends upon
correctly "entering into" the circle.16 However, this knowledge of
II
II
lI
46
Karl-Otto Apel
47
48
Karl-Otto Apel
49
50
Karl-Otto Apel
forgetting of logos).
51
52
Karl-Otto Apel
53
54
Karl-Otto Apel
55
56
Karl-Otto Apel
false assertions has a pre-condition in the "revealing-concealing" worldsense-disclosure in language - or more precisely: in the various
languages. (With Gadamer one could further illuminate the scope
of this conditional relationship through the following suggestion:
Since every proposition could be seen as an answer to a possible
question, the issue arises for a hermeneutical reconstruction of the
evolution of culture, about which questions can be asked in this
57
culture and which cannot. About this, however, it appears that the
world-sense-disclosure is a priori decisive.) By the same token the
self-referential principle is not compatible with taking the history
of the world- sense-disclosure and the history of the knowledge of
truth which is in a certain sense dependent upon it, as an a-rational
temporal happening, that is, as exclusive of a rationally
reconstructible progress. It rather forces the conclusion that there
are long-term self-sustaining processes of learning - in all three
dimensions of the possible rational reconstruction of cultural
evolution - that playa decisive role in determining which worldsense-disclosures come into being in the history of language.34
Hence, we are led finally to the following conclusion: even if
the actual insights of the post-Heideggerian hermeneutic are taken
as seriously as possible, there is no reason to call into question the
specific presuppositions of the logos of understanding, or to
"deconstruct" them along with the technical-scientific logos of the
"framework." Even if the greatest possible realm of application is
permitted to the temporal and historically conditioned "play" of
sense-differentiation in the area of the interpretation of texts and we are
clear about the fact that we will never achieve full self-transparency
through critical hermeneutics, still there is no reason to ignore the
regulative ideas of a normatively conditioned progress. These
already preconfigure all understanding in that it must correspond
to a practical need of communicative understanding and the
judgment of claims to validity. Also, in the final analysis, through
these validity claims are grounded - as demonstrated - the
regulative principles of possible progress in understanding, and among
them that of a progress in the rational reconstruction of a moral
competence in "judgment". Therein, and not in the supposedly mere
"happening" or "event" character of understanding, lies the
internal connection between hermeneutics and practical philosophy.
58
Karl-Otto Apel
Notes
1. To this point - and that means in the rejection of the attempt at a
scientific reduction of understanding to a heuristic moment of the context of the
nomological (causal or statistical) explanation of acts as events - there is certainly
agreement between H.-G. Gadamer, J. Habermas, and myself.
2. See H.-G. Gadamer, 'Duth and Method (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1960), critical
discussion thereof in K.-o. Apel, TransforrtUltion der Philosophie (Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp, 1973), Bd. I, Introduction, note 70.
3. See G. F. Lyotard, ''Histoire universelle et differences culturelles," in
Critique 456 (1985), p. 559ff., where the paradigm of the superseded historicalphilosophical idea of progress is even traced directly to Kant. Hans Jonas, in his
Prinzip Verantwortung, also detects - in my view unjustly - in Kant's ethically
grounded regulative idea of possible progress a mere preparatory stage of the
Hegelian and Marxist conception of the intelligibly necessary (progressive) course
of history. See Jonas, Prinzip Verantwortung (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1980), p. 227ff.
4. See L Kant. "Das mag im das Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fuer die
Praxis," Akademie Edition (Berlin: de Gruyter), Bd. VITI, p. 308ff.
5. . See, for example, R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979), and Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
6. See Philippe Forget, ed., Text und Interpretation (Munich: WIlhelm Fink,
1984).
7. On Heidegger and Derrida see J. Habermas: The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), chapters VI and VII, as well as K.-o.
Apel, "Die Herausforderung der totalen Vemunftkritik und das Programm einer
philosophischen Theorie der Rationalistatstypen," in Concordia 11 (1987): pp. 2-23;
in French translation in I.e Debat (1988).
8. See Derrida's contributions in Ph. Forget, ed., Text und Interpretation (see
note 6).
9. See H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 218ff.
10. Ibid., p. 326f.
11. Ibid., p. 327.
12. Ibid., p. 3.
13. See for example K.-o. Apel: "Szientismus oder transzendentale
Hermeneutik?" in: R. Dubner et. al., eds., Hermeneutik und Diale1ctik, Festschrift fur
H.-G. Gadamer (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1970), Bd. I, pp. 105-45.
14. K.-o. Apel: Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante
bis Vico (Bonn: Bouvier, 1963, 1980).
15. See note 5.
16. See M. Heidegger: Being and Time (Halle: Niemeyer, 1941), pp. 153 and
314f.
17. See especially K.-o. Apel: Die Erlclaeren: Verstehen-Kontroverse in
transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1979); English
translation: Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental Pragamatic Perspective
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984).
59
m.:
60
Karl-Otto Apel
25. See K.-O. Apel, "Die Logosauszeichnung der menschlichen Sprache. Die
philosophische Tragweite der Sprechakttheorie," in M. -G. Bosshardt, ed., Sprache
Interdisziplirurer (Berlin/New York: W. de Gruyter, 1986).
26. See J. Habermas, ''Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der
kommunikativen Kompetenz," in J. Habermas/N. Luhmann, Theone der
Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?, op. cit., note 21, pp. 101-141; by the same
author: ''Was heisst Universalpragmatik?" in K.-O. Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und
Philosophie (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 174-272; by the same author:
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, op. cit., note 21, Bd. I, Kap. fi, as well my
work cited on note 25.
27. Concerning the necessary presupposition of contingent psychic and in
particular historical presuppositions of world-understanding there is at present
a widespread consensus among philosophers, originating with Collingwood,
Wittgenstein, Searle, Heidegger and Gadamer. That there are also non-contingent
- that is, argumentatively indisputable and to that extent universally valid presuppositions of sensible argumentation, seems to most something easy to
question - although every questioning as argumentation must obviously involve
validity claims.
28. See K.-O. Apel, "Die Herausforderung der totalen Vemunftkritik ... " See
note 7.
29. See note 26.
30. See the contributions from K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas in K. -0. Apel, ed.,
Sprachpmgmatik und Philosophie, see note 26; further K.-O. Apel, ed., "Fallibilismus,
Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit und Letztbegrundung," op. cit., note 24, as well
as W. Kuhlmann, ''Philosophie und rekonstruktive Wissenschaft" in Zeitschrift fur
philosophische Forschung, 40 (1986), pp. 224-334.
31. See K.-O. Apel, "Die transzendentalpragmatische Begriindung der
Kommunikationsethik und das Problem der hoechsten Stufe einer
Entwicklungslogik des moralischen Bewusstseins," in: K.-O. Apel, Diskurs und
Vemntwortung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 306ff.
32. See K.-O. Apel, Die Er1claeren: Verstehen - Kontruoerse in tmnszendentalpmgmatischer Sieht, see note 17.
33. See I. Lakatos, "Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und ihre rationalen
Nachkonstruktionen," in W. Diederich, ed., Theorien der Wissenschaftsgeschiehte
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 55-119.
34. See K.-O. Apel, "Die Herausforderung der totalen Vemunftkritik ...", see
note 7.
TRANSVERSAL RATIONALITY
by Calvin O. Schrag
It would surely be a gross understatement to say that the
vocabulary of rationality has become problematized in the
philosophical situation of our time. Admittedly, the question
"What does it mean to be rational?" has been asked by the learned
and the vulgar alike for some time; and it has been taken for
granted that philosophers, both by disposition and training, are
those best equipped to answer the question. Indeed, it could well
be said that in the tradition the question "What does it mean to be
rational?" has been indissolubly linked with the question "What
does it mean to be a philosopher?" To do philosophy, it has been
assumed, is to put into play, in a variety of ways, the claims of
reason; and to be a philosopher is to take on the mantle of the
guardianship of rationality.
From time to time, however, both this traditional portrait of
the philosopher as the guardian of reason and the putative claims
within reason itself have been brought under suspicion. This
would seem to be particularly the case in the current philosophical
state of affairs. In philosophical circles, both at home and abroad,
there is considerable talk about the poverty of reason, the
bankruptcy of the logos, and indeed the "end of philosophy"
itself.1
I. The Challenge of Postmodemity
It is common to ascribe anti-reason and "end of philosophy"
talk to what is broadly referred to as "postmodemism," which
itself suffers a variety of expressions both in continental and
Anglo-American enclaves. Although there is no unified voice of
postmodernism, clearly the problematization of rationality is one
of its recurring themes. The postmodem celebration of plurality,
multiplicity, heterogeneity, paralogy, and incommensurability
makes the task of finding a place for the claims of reason
particularly demanding. But it is precisely this task that we wish
to undertake in our current exercise. Formulated within its most
general context, the current exercise is an attempt at a response to
the postmodernist challenge pertaining to the resources of rationality.
61
T.]. Stapleton (ed.), The Question of Hermeneutics, 61-78.
1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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Calvin O. Schrag
Transversal Rationality
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64
Calvin O. Schrag
Transversal Rationality
65
If
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68
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Transversal Rationality
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70
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Calvin O. Schrag
72
mark out possibilities for new forms of discourse and new forms
of action, against which past and present assemblages of practices
are judged, assessed and re-evaluated. These possibilities for new
and inventive configurations provide the proper tapas of praxial
critique, the place from which discernment and valuation issue.
This is why the rationality of praxial critique requires the
supplement of rationality as engaged articulation. The articulation
of meaning as possibility rescues critique from being simply a
strategy of negation and deconstruction. As a strategy of negation
critique counters that which is not feasible, not desirable, not
coherent, not workable. But as such it does not project the
positivity of the possible, which is supplied only by the projective
transversality and anticipatory understanding of rationality as
articulation.
We have spoken of a third moment of transversal
rationality-rationality as disclosure. This moment is tied closely
to that of articulation. Indeed, Charles Taylor sees the one as
collapsing into the other, determining every event of articulation
as an event of disclosure. IS This collapsing of the two, the virtual
identification of the one with the other, may be too hurried. There
is a distinction of some consequence at stake. We recommend the
provisional use of the modem epistemological distinction between
sense and reference to point us in the direction of our distinction
between articulation and disclosure. We flag this as a "provisional"
usage because after the dust has settled we will be able to assess
the sense / reference distinction as a Wittgenstein ladder which
eventually can be set aside.
It may be helpful, nonetheless, to speak of the moment of
disclosure as a postulate of reference, a claim for reality that brings
us out of the closure" within a sphere of sense. It is disclosure
that keeps articulation from circling back upon itself, from falling
into a discursive closure in which there is nothing outside of
language, nothing beyond the text, only a free play of signifiers
perpetually feeding upon each other. Disclosure as the
achievement of reference leads us beyond language and beyond
textuality, "beyond" not in such a manner that language and
textuality are no longer at issue, but rather ''beyond'' in such a
wise that not everything is language and text. One could thus
speak of disclosure as the fulfillment of articulation as
II
Transversal Rationality
73
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Calvin O. Schrag
Transversal Rationality
75
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Calvin O. Schrag
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Notes
1. Although Heidegger clearly had much to do with the currency of "the end
of philosophy" thematic [see particularly Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy,
trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper &: Row Publishers, 1973)], in more
recent times the thematic has received variegated expressions in the academy.
One is reminded particularly of the collection of essays under the title After
Philosophy: End or Transformation?, Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas
McCarthy, eds., (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), the first printing of which was
sold out three months after its publication.
2. Trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987).
3. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
4. New York: Verso Press, 1987.
5. The Theory of CommunicatiTJe Action: R.etlson and the Rationalization of Society,
Volume One, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); The Theory
of Communicative Action: Lifrworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,
Volume two, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).
6. "But whereas Haberm.as thinks that the cultural need which 'the
philosophy of the subject' gratified was and is real, and can perhaps be fulfilled
by his own focus on a 'communication community,' I would urge that it is an
artificial problem created by taking Kant too seriously. On this view, the wrong
turn was taken when Kant's split between science, morals, and art was accepted
as a donnee, as die massgebliche Selbstauslegung der Moderne.", "Habermas and
Lyotard on Postmodernity" in Habennas and Modernity, ed. Richard Bernstein
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), p. 167.
7. "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," p. 173.
8. The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, trans.
Forrest Wllliams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: The Noonday Press, 1957),
p.39.
9. Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics, trans Rosemary Sheed (Penguin
Books, 1984), p. 22.
10. Molecular Revolution, p. 18.
11. David James Miller has provided an illuminating account of the interplay
of "critique" and "criterion" in the originative Greek notion of mno (1Cp\'IXO),
which carries the related senses of "picking out", "separating", "putting asunder",
"distinguishing", "deciding", "judging", and "assessing" as these notions play in
the actual context of life within the polis and its requirement for concrete deliberation and action. See his "Immodest Interventions" in Phenomenological Inquiry,
Volume 11, 1987.
12. Charles Taylor has paid particular attention to the articulatory function of
reason in his effort to think beyond the foundationalism of the modem
epistemological paradigm, and specifically as it was illustrated in the thought of
Husserl. "But if we purge Husserl's formulation of the prospect of a 'final
foundation' where absolute apodicticity would at last be won, if we concentrate
merely on the gain for reason in coming to understand what is illusory in the
modem epistemological project and in articulating the insights about us that flow
from this, then the claim to have taken the modem project of reason a little
farther, and to have understood our forbearers a little better than they understood
78
Calvin O. Schrag
Nietzsche even goes thus far to state, "there are indeed no matters
of fact, but only interpretations." (W, p. 323) Also, it is by
interpreting that "interpretation itself is a means to get to dominate
something.,,2 It is by means of our very interpretations that we
would dominate the world. We would not go so far as to estimate
our interpretations per se a sufficient means of power and
conquerin~ but certainly there is no conquest and domination
without goals, values and, thereby, interpretations.
In America, it was Charles S. Peirce who explicitly used semiotics for his foundation of epistemology: "We think only in signs"
and even "Omne symbolum de symbolo": "In signo veritas" - in signo
solo veritas? Only by using, understanding, i.e. correcting and
interpreting signs, are we able to "grasp something, to refer to
things, objects and events, matters of fact, to things-in sum, to the
world.,,3
If we understand by "signs" the whole network and
framework of theories, language, value orientations, etc. implied
in our views of the world the mentioned indispensability of
interpretations might be seen as to coincide or at least be easily
compatible with a current strong position in epistemology-namely
with H. Putnam's internal realism.4 This approach combines Kant's
transcendental, though not absolute, idealism with the actual cri79
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Hans Lenk
Systematic Interpretationism
81
82
Hans Lenk
Systematic Interpretationism
83
84
Hans Lenk
interpretational character.
Systematic Interpretationism
85
m.
What has been said with regard to conceiving, grasping, seeing
and noticing actions can be and has been extended to many
other concepts used in describing and explaining human
phenomena.
Most, if not all of them, are interpretative in character. This
analysis has been carried through with the concepts and phenomena of "motives" and motivations, "values", "reason", "self",
"conscience", "responsibility" etcY All of these are interpretative
constructs impregnated by our tradition and rules of interpretation
and interpretative constructs. We cannot think, conceive of
anything, even do anything without interpretation and
interpretative constructs, be they constitutive or just rule applying.
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Hans Lenk
Systematic Interpretationism
87
88
Hans Lenk
Notes
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke Bd. VIII, 1 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1980),
p. 34. Hereafter cited as W. The English translation is my own.
2. G. Abel, Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr
(Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1984), p. 138. English translation is my own.
3. G. Abel, Worlds of Interpretation (Unpublished manuscript in press).
4. Hilary Putnam, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1981).
5. G. Abel, Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr, p. 155.
6. Ibid., p. 169.
7. Ibid., p. 19.
8. See Hanks Lenk, "Handlung als Interpretationskonstrukt. Entwurf einer
konstituenten und beschreibungstheoretischen Handlungsphilosophie," in H
Lenk, ed., Handlungstheorien interdiszipliniir Bd. II, 1 (Munich: Fink, 1978), pp. 279350. Also, by the same author, "Interpretive Action Constructs," in J. Agassi &
R.S. Cohen, eds., Scientific Philosophy Today (Dordrecht Reidel, 1981), pp. 151-57.
9. G. Bebauer, ''Oberlegungen zu einer perspektivischen Handlungstheorie,"
in H Lenk, ed., Handlungstheorie interdiszipliniir Bd. II (Munich: Fink, 1978), pp.
251-371.
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1953), par. 621.
11. I. Thalberg, Perception, Emotion, and Action (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1977).
12. Lenk, "Interpretive Action Constructs," pp. 154-55.
13. Hans Lenk, Zwischen Sozialpsychologie und Sozialphilosophie (Frankfurt
Suhrkamp, 1987).
14. Joseph J. Kockelmans, The World in Philosophy and Science (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1969), p. 16 and p. 155.
15. Ibid., p. 157ff. Also, see Joseph J. Kockelmans, "On the Problem of Truth
in the Sciences," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
61, #1 (Supplement), September 1987, pp. 5-26.
16. Ibid., pp. 158-59.
17. Ibid., p. 160.
18. Ibid., p. 168.
19. Kockelmans, "On the Problem of Truth in the Sciences," p. 16.
SECTION II
HERMENEUTIC ORIGINS:
HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY
by Gerhard Funke
(translated by Royce Nickel)
Hussed's lectures on First Philosophy (Erste Philosophie, 1923-24;
1956), which. should include the individual articles from the
" Abhandlungen" and "Beitrage" of Husserliana VII, share a
common goal. They are supposed to demonstrate irrefutably that
the ground of philosophy, that which is truly "first" about it, is the
establishment of its foundation, its groundwork.
Hence the ground, the soil capable of providing the reliable
support and actual firm grounding, must be disclosed. The aims
involved in providing such a foundation must in turn have their
own ground, one which the aims themselves make plausible. Only
thus can it count as to 1tP6Yt'r! cptA.o<Jocj)tcx. And therein lies the
traditional problem of foundations, a familiar one in the history of
philosophy. It is the Aristotelian problem: is that which is "first"
according to the order of things (the universal, for example, as
1tp6tEpoV 't'Ij CPU<JEt) at the same time "last" (OOtEPOV 1tPO~ Tn. UX~)
or subsequent for us, that is, for those attempting to establish such
a foundation?
Hussed's discussion is not primarily directed at whether that
which is "first" or "more original" according to the "nature of
things" is the universal, something that only becomes accessible to
human knowledge "secondarily," i.e... as that which appears as
something still to be mediated, or whether that which is closest to
us is according to its true essence something derivative. For
Hussed the true beginning of philosophy consists instead in seeing
that what is original is the origin itself, that is, not a factum but a
faciendum. Accordingly, these Aristotelian countervailing
relationships receive in Hussed a single, characteristically
Husserlian solution. Rather than opt "decisionistically" for the
primacy of one or the other type of resolution, Husser! sets out on
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93
94
Gerhard Funke
the
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97
Psychologie (1888).
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II
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Cassirer that he had" only been able to appropriate the rich lessons
of Kant and the Kantians in the last few years" (April 3, 1925).2
As important as these interrelations and connections are from
a historical point of view, their development does not suffice by
itself to explain how Hussed could make the decisive turn, so to
speak, from "Brentano to Kant." What was needed was a
"devastating idea" which could bring about a philosophicalsystematic breakthrough.
Thus we should keep the following in mind. In his
phenomenological period, that is, during the period of his own
creative philosophical work, Hussed adopted, in modified form,
Brentano's notion of intentionality, that is, of the constitutional
interconnection of intentio and intentum. But the notion only
became truly important (and thus methodologically decisive, a
genuine lC'UQtEUrov A6')'O~) in the context of Hussed's deeper
understanding of Kant, according to the following consideration:
in the Critique of Pure Reason (A 93-95/B 197 ff.) Kant named a
highest principle for experience, that which he intended to explain;
this principle was to make experience scientifically understandable.
For Kant, the form of this principle was that the conditions of the
possibility of experience in general are likewise the conditions of
the possibility of the objects of experience. They therefore have
objective validity and are grounded in a synthetic judgment a
priori.
By adopting this principle, Hussed could systematically
supplement the concept of intentionality with the concept of
constitution. This in turn was possible to the extent that it involved
a correlational a priori that could provide the transcendentalism of
the Kantian philosophy with a more general grounding and
thereby make it more plausible. Hussed employed these
considerations in the service of his logical qua genealogical
explication of reality, an explication now based on a more
fundamental understanding of the conditions of possibility.
That Husser! was convinced by the transcendental idea as
such can be clearly seen in the total context of his writings from
1900 to 1936. In the Prolegomena he posed the "transcendental"
question explicitly (XVIII: 238) - without, however, designating
it as such. In doing so he construed the question as a quite
necessary generalization of the question concerning the 'conditions
of the possibility of experience'" in general (XVIII: 239). This
II
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103
presentive seeing" is the first basic form of reason (m: 333). with
evidence and insight. as well as with the interweaving of all the
modes of reason (ill: 341). But from the Die Idee der Phiinomenologie
on (IT: 14, 22 46, 52, 58), this "critique of reason" constitutes the
founding presupposition that makes metaphysics possible; "within
the framework of pure evidence" we must in principle follow up
"all forms of givenness and all correlations" (IT: 13), so that
"transcendental apperception" comes into view in a "nonmysterious sense" (II: 48). This means that metaphysics announces
itself as transcendental metaphysics. Husserl interprets the
"intuiting knowledge" which this involves as a form of givenness
of "reason which aims at bringing the understanding to reason"
(IT: 62). Among other things, the openings achieved by the
understanding are to be distinguished from the pure intuitions
("evidences") in which openings concerning the modes of these
openings become apparent!evident. It is in this sense that Husserl
speaks provisionally of an "intuitio sine comprehensione" (IT: 62).
Basically, however, this is transcendental philosophy "in
inception."
With respect to method, Husserl's phenomenological
investigation of origins is concerned with everything that can be
demonstrated through originally presentive intuitions in
corresponding forms of givenness according to the "principle of all
principles" (Ideen I, 24). The procedure for demonstration is and
remains completely "positive." It does not become "dialectic" or
"skeptical." It holds to the given and that is its "object." What
counts as given, however, is whatever appears in an intuition of
consciousness which intends such-and-such. In each case its sense,
its meaning, comes to light in a particular "positive" apprehension
that identifies it as such and such. And should the occasion arise,
the apprehension itself can in turn only be eliminated "positively,"
that is, by something else, by something definite.
In this way reason, as "ratio in the constant movement of selfillumination" (VI: 273), continually encounters positiva, that is,
things self-identical in such-and-such a manner, things intended in
such-and-such a way, the "logos" appearing within them in suchand-such a manner. This is what Husserl meant later in the
Cartesianische Meditationen when he observed that what was
basically at stake was the systematic unfolding of the universal a
priori, an a priori essentially innate in transcendental subjectivity.
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Gerhard Funke
What was at stake, in other words, was the "universal logos of all
thinkable being" (1: 181).
The occurrence of a possible conflict of two positiva, or even
the moment of otherness alone, is in each case exhibited in its
respective way in a new entity, characterized again anew in a
positive manner, according to the phenomenological-deictic
procedure. Here "intuitive" demonstration obviously includes, in
addition to the "sensible" presentation, the "eidetic," the
"categorial," and the "reflexive'" nor can we finally neglect the socalled "doxological" aspects any more than the "practical" or
"axiological" aspects respectively (m: 343). But in order for these
to be grasped, it is important that they in tum be expressed in
particular "doxic" ("theoretical") form.
This, then, represents the "idea" which Husserl took to be
central. In the programmatic essay "Philosophie als strenge
WlSsenschaft," however, Husserl points out how philosophy never
managed to fulfill its own claim to be a strict and ultimately
foundational science. Nowhere has philosophy been able to satisfy
"the highest theoretical requirements" (XXV: 3). It has not yet
embarked on its decisive and justified course. This lack of secured
foundations makes it impossible to follow any of the philosophies
of the past. Scientific honesty thus forbids such historical
"appropriations." In large measure this also holds for Kant. A
philosophia perennis does not yet exist. It still has to be founded and
set in motion. This is philosophy's "cause," its grounding. Without
a foundation, all the forms that have been attempted and
presented are nothing at all. Seen in this light, philosophy is called
above all the "science of true beginnings, of origins, of Q\~OOp.a'ta
7tav'tmv" (XXV: 61). It only begins to satisfy its claims to validity
when it dedicates itself to pursuing the scientific form of science,
that is, the "form" which a knowing must have if it is mediated as
knowledge and requires doxic certainty. The "matter" that is at
issue here is therefore no "matter of fact"; the "matter" is rather
this "grasping as ..." in the intuiting intentional accomplishment,
in a faciendum.
In requiring a return "to the things themselves," (XIX/I: 10),
Husserl was at the same time stressing the scientific requirement
"not to be forced by prejudice to interpret away what is seen"
(XXV: 61). The so-called "phenomenological grasping of essences"
asks nothing more than this.
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112
Gerhard Funke
Translator's Notes
1. VI: 273. All Husser! quotations are documented according to volume and
page number of the Husserliana edition of the Gesammelte Werke (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1950).
2. Letter to Ernst Cassirer quoted by Iso Kern in Husserl unci Kant: Eine
Untersuchung uber Husserls Verhiiltnis zu Kant unci zum Neokantianismus (The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), p. 39.
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Walter Biemel
*****
1. History has a prominent place in the main themes of the
Crisis. But this does not mean that Husserl had not previously
Transformation in Husserl
115
This fine, clear statement comes from a text which Fink published
in 1939 in the Revue Internationale de Philosophie in Brussels under
the title On the Origin of Geometry. That was the time when Husserl
was developing the ideas of the Crisis. Ludwig Langrebe makes a
reference to Jacques Derrida's remark (in the French translation of
the text published in Paris in 1962) that Husserl had found a new
way of gaining access to history, but that Husserl had not made
this access into a problem of its own.
When I refer to the special significance of history in Husserl's
later work, I do not mean to suggest that history had no meaning
for him in the early work. There is an anecdote that Heidegger told
me. As he was accompanying Husserl on a train on the way to his
London lecture, Husserl with great animation spoke about nature
and spirit (Geist), always returning to the opposition between the
two. Heidegger asked, "How does history fit into all this?" Husserl
was said to have replied, "I forgot about history!" History was
central for Heidegger. Landgrebe has shown how this topic was
already present, but history, no doubt, had a special significance
in the Crisis period. Here I cannot go into the ideas about teleology
which were so important to Husserl. Paul Janssen has done
thorough work on teleology in his Geschichte und Lebenswelt in
which he also treats Husserl's differences with Hegel.5 To a thinker
to whom Husserl had basically little connection, phenomenology
was a counterweight to speculative metaphysics. (Husserl had read
only the Editor's Preface to the Phenomenologie des Geistes.)
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Transformation in Husserl
117
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Walter Biemel
phenomenology provides
development of meaning.
insight
into
the
bestowal
and
........
..
Transformation in Husserl
119
years later, Husserl takes up this task again, though this time with
a new sense of importance.
There is also a reference to the world of experience as the
pretheoretical world in the Phenomenological Psychology of 1926. But
there Husserl still excludes it from the realm of rigorous truth:
All inquiries into true being presuppose this changing world of
experience: the true world denotes, then, a higher product of
knowledge that obtains its primal material from the shifting universe
of the specific givens of experience. Put another way, this first reality
of experience is the source field from which scientific research
produces the true world as its fruit.13
Finding this structure would be, in the Crisis period, the task of an
ontology of the lifeworld. Unfortunately, Husserl carried out this
task only in partial sketches.
b) In the Vienna Lecture there is, as I read it, a change that
takes place and which I can briefly explain with the key words
dom and episteme. At the beginning of the lecture, Husserl asks
about the "spiritual Gestalt of Europe." He claims that the Gestalt
of Europe was founded by the philosophizing of the ancient
Greeks. He calls this "the breakthrough and initial development of
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Walter Biemel
Transformation in Husserl
121
model for knowledge and toward the objective sciences. But this is
a fact with which the philosopher Husserl is not content. Husserl
says: " ...but perhaps what is first for us is not the knowledge that is
of itself first," (VI, 563). We can designate the specific type of
knowledge that follows the model of objective truth as first
knowledge, but it is not at all first knowledge in the sense of
knowledge of basics, of principles. It would be first if it focused on
the very foundations of objective science, if it were to ask how it
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Walter Biemel
arrives at this foundation and through what anonymous acts of
subjectivity it constructed this foundation in the first place. This new
knowledge - its respective science as philosophy - may not leap
over the lifeworld as all previous knowledge has done.25
In his Vienna Lecture, Husserl presents the matter this way:
The mathematical science of nature is a triumphant achievement of
the human spirit. But regarding the rationality of its methods and
theories, it is thoroughly relative. It makes a basic presupposition
that completely sets aside an effective rationality. Insofar as the
scientific program forgets as purely subjective the world we perceive
intuitively, it also forgets the subjectivity that is working scientifically and so the scientist never comes into focus scientifically.
(From this perspective, the rationality of the exact sciences parallels
the rationality of the Egyptian pyramids).26
Transformation in Husserl
123
........
..
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Walter Biemel
Transformation in Husser!
125
Notes
1. The original, yet to be published letters can be found in the Heidegger
Archives in Marburg.
2. Roman Ingarden, ed., Edmund Husserls Briefe on Roman Ingarden (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. XLIV.
3. See Ludwig Landgrebe, FaktizWit und Individuation (Tiibingen: Meiner
Vedag, 1982). The English translation appears as, "A Meditation on Hussed's
Statement: 'History if the Grand Fact of Absolute Being'," Southwestern Journal of
Philosophy 5 (1974): 111-125.
4. Edmund Hussed, Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentale Phiinomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phiinomenologische Philosophie,
ed., W.Biemel, Husserliana, Vol. 6 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 300.
Hereafter cited as Krisis.
5. Paul Janssen, Geschichte und Lebenswelt (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1970).
6. Kad Jaspers, Die geistige Situation der Zeit (Berlin: W. de Grugter & Co.,
1931).
7. Krisis, p. 314.
8. Edmund Hussed, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 159ff.
9. Walter Biemel, "Die entscheidenden Phasen der Entfaltung von Husseds
Philosophie," Zeitschrift for philosophische Forschung 13 (1959): p. 212.
10. Krisis, p. 275.
11. Edmund Hussed, Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfohrung in die reine
Phiinomenologie, ed., Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 61.
12. Ibid., p. 62.
13. Edmund Hussed, Phiinomenologische Psychologie, ed., Walter Biemel (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 57.
14. Ibid., p. 62.
15. Ibid., p. 63.
16. Ibid., p. 64.
17. Krisis, p. 319.
18. Ibid., p. 319.
19. Ibid., p. 328.
20. Ibid., p. 324.
21. Ibid., p. 332.
22. Ibid., p. 464.
23. Ibid., p. 465.
24. Ibid., p. 461.
25. Walter Biemel, "Doxa und Episteme in Umkreis der Krisis-Thematik," in
Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls, ed., Elizabeth
Stroker (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), p. 14.
26. Krisis, p. 343.
27. Ibid., p.127.
28. Edmund Hussed, Erfahrung und Urteil, ed., Ludwig Landgrebe (Prague:
Academia, 1939), section 10.
29. Krisis, p. 131.
30. Ibid., p. 463.
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James M. Edie
129
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James M. Edie
Husserl had gripped me. I saw everything through the perspectives
of his philosophy, which, besides, was more accessible to me
because it looked Cartesian. I was "Husserlian" and longed to
remain so. At the same time, the effort I'd made to understand-in
other words to break my personal prejudices and grasp Husserl's
ideas on the basis of his own principles rather than mine-had
exhausted me philosophically for that particular year .... It took me
four years to exhaust Husser1.10
A.
Even before writing his first published philosophical essay, The
Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre had found in Husserl's concept of
intentionality the key to refuting the "pulp" and "digestive"
phenomenologies of his own French teachers, like Leon
Brunschvicg, Andre Lalande, Emile Meyerson, and, in fact, the
whole ancient tradition, going back to Plato and Aristotle, which
presents "knowing" on the basis of the metaphor of the
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133
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James M. Edie
B.
But in The Transcendence of the Ego he is primarily concerned
with the manner in which the experiencing ego is itself given as an
object to itself. It is the "miracle" of consciousness not only to be
the objectifier of things in the world but to be able to take itself, its
own acts, states, and "qualities" or dispositions, as objects. And, as
with the experience of external objects, it experiences itself both
pre-reflexively and in acts of full reflection, of fully reflexive
awareness. There is here the possibility and the danger of making
the spurious distinction between the "I" and the "me," in which
the "I" would be the true, "innermost" ego, the source of
consciousness, an unknown x "behind" consciousness as its
producer, whereas the "me" would be the psycho-physical self, the
empirical ego in the world. This is the dichotomy Sartre will not
accept; there is neither a formal nor a material distinction between
the "I" and the "me."
The I is the ego as the unity of actions. The me is the ego as the
unity of states and qualities. The distinction that one makes between
these two aspects of one and the same reality seems to us simply
functional, not to say grammatical. 19
On the level of pre-reflexive (pre-thematic, pre-predicative,
non-positional) awareness there is neither the "I" or the "me" but
simply consciousness-of-something apprehended, or consciousnessof-something-being-done. Take, for example, the famous example
from "The Look" in Being and Nothingness.
135
organizes all the moments which precede it.... This situation reflects
to me both my facticity and my freedom....
But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking
at me! What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly affected
in my being and that essential modifications appear in my
structure-modifications which I can apprehend and fix conceptually
by means of the reflective cogito.20
In short I have moved from the pre-reflexive state of
consciousness to the fully reflexive state; I am no longer a pure,
disembodied, consciousness-experiencing-the-world, no longer the
dominant subject, the sole objectifier of the world. I am also an
"object," a "me," being seen by others. I am not just the absolute
center of the universe before whom all things and all "others"
spread themselves out before me as my objects, but I am myself
capable of experiencing "shame," "guilt," "otherness," of taking
myself as an object. I am also an "object" to other consciousnesses
who drain the world away from me, out of me.
We here come up against a rock-bottom factum of conscious
experience. While I am always the absolute subject in and for my
own experience, I am at the same time always an object" for
others and they for me. There is an inescapable truth of solipsism.
I can always experience others and they can always experience me
but I cannot experience the others' experiences nor they mine. A
co-experiencing of the world is possible; nothing could be easier;
but there is always the unbridgeable gap between my
experiencings and the experiencings of others (what Sartre calls
"the dialectic of sadism and masochism" when he talks of the
necessity of always taking the "other" as an object and of always
being taken by the other as an "object"). The fundamental law of
consciousness holds: all consciousness is consciousness of an
object. And since I am always what I am not and not what I am,
this law pertains even to my experience of myself.
Let us now return to the principal argument of The
Transcendence of the Ego, using as a basis Sartre's example of Peter's
love for Mary.
II
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James M. Edie
example, it is no longer true that the one speaks blindly and by
analogy of what the other apprehends in full. They speak of the
same thing. Doubtless they apprehend it by different procedures, but
these procedures. may be equally intuitional. And Peter's emotion is
no more certain for Peter than for Paul. For both of them it belongs
to the category of objects. . . 21 .
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James M Edie
139
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James M. Edie
III. The Transcendental Ego
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James M. Edie
But this unity does not depend on the ego; it is, rather, what
renders the ego, as an object, possible. Husserl's talk of the
transcendental ego as a "monad" leaves him open to the very
objections he raised against Descrates, says Sartre, precisely
because the ego gets substantialized, albeit as "an infinitely
contracted me.,,37
The question for us now is, then: just how telling are these
criticisms? And what motivated Husserl to speak of a
"transcendental ego" (an I) as distinct from the empirical ego (the
me)?
To give Husserl's own answer to these questions is not at all
difficult, or at least not as difficult as many writers have tried to
claim. The answer, however, does involve pointing out that on this
question there was a decisive development in Husserl's thought,
or perhaps we should say a decisive reinterpretation of Husserl by
himself between the completion of the Logical Investigations in 19001901 and the first volume of Ideas in 1913.
In fact there are two notions of the ego which are developed
throughout most all of Husserl's writings. The first is the
conception of the ego as a Welterfahrendesleben (life-experiencingthe-world), or, in the words of the Logical Investigations as an
anonym-fungierende-Intentionalitat(an anonymous operating
intentionality). This is the unreflected self-transcending activity of
consciousness, which is both protensive and retensive, going
outwards toward the world of objects, a consciousness which
constitutes objects in their meaning and value prior to thought,
which is never "punctual" or instantaneous but always ahead-ofitself, dynamic, always a "synthesis" through time. It is not fully
conscious of its own activity, except as the concomitant,
consciousness-of-self which on the basis of the pre-known, the cogiven, projects itself forward to the not-yet-known to achieve the
already-known.38 This consciousness can thematize itself only after
the fact; it is the very notion of consciousness Sartre himself
develops, on the basis of Husserl's texts, as the non-thetic, nonpositional, pre-reflexive consciousness.
Like Hume, like James (who found the ego to be a "pure
diaphaneity"), Husserl in the Logical Investigations wrote that he
had to "frankly confess... that [he was] quite unable to find an
ego, this primitive, necessary cen~er of relations" in consciousness39
though in the second edition of 1913 (the same year as Ideas 1) he
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James M. Edie
145
The world is not doubtful in the sense that there are rational
grounds which might be pitted against the tremendous force of
unanimous experiences, but in the sense that a doubt is thinkable and
this is so because the possibility of non-being is in principle never
excluded. 44
It is an essential feature of the "thing-world" that its existence
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147
Notes
1. This was first published in January, 1939, in La Nouvelle Revue Francaise,
and republished in Situations I (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), pp. 32-35, and again as
Appendix V in the 1966 critical edition of La Transcendance de L'Ego, ed., Sy1vie
Le Bon (paris: Vrin), pp. 109-113 (an English translation was done by Joseph P.
Fell, British Journal for Phenomenology, May, 1970). Though its date of publication,
1939, is later than the first publication of The Transcendence of the Ego, 1936, we
know from Sartre's correspondence with Simone de Beauvoir [Lettres au Castor,
2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1983)] that the ideas expressed in this essay, particularly
concerning "alimentary philosophy," were in his mind and had, in fact, been
largely formulated well before 1939.
2. This was first published in 1936 in Recherches Philosophiques, and has been
republished several times, unchanged, the first being in 1937, Paris, Vrin, and the
most important the critical edition by Sylvie Le Bon in 1966. The excellent English
translation by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, with helpful notes, was
published in 1957, New York, Noonday. It is this translation we will cite in this
article.
3. His most important early philosophical works are certainly: L'imagination
(paris: PUF, 1936), (English translation by Forrest Williams, Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1979), L'Imaginarie (paris: Gallimard, 1940), (English translation,
New York: Philosophical Library, 1948 as The Psychology of the Imagination), and
Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions (Paris: Hermann, 1939). The most important of
these by far, and the one that most orchestrates his theory of intentionality prior
to Being and Nothingness, in 1943, is L'Imaginaire. His later philosophical works
take quite un-Husserlian directions.
4. In her biography, Same, A Life (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), (English
translation, New York: Random House, 1987) Anne Cohen-Solal entitles two of
the crucial sections of the first chapter of her book: "A Thousand Socrates," to be
followed by the section "Just One Socrates." The titles of these divisions are taken
from the words of Sartre himself; in his War Diaries he wrote that he considered
the first years of his philosophical life, from 1921 to 1929, to be the period when he
was "a thousand Socrates," but then; all of a sudden, after discovering Husserl,
he was ''becoming just one Socrates."
5. In Sartre by Himself, tr. Richard Seaver (New York: Urizon, 1978), p. 30.
Cited by Peter Caws, Sartre (London: Routledge, 1979), p. 59.
6. See Francois H. Lapointe, Jean-Paul Sartre and His Critics: An International
Bibliography (1938-1980) (Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State
University, Ohio, 1981), ca. pp. 329ff.
7. This French translation by Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas, (Paris:
Vrin, 1953), antedated the publication of the critical German edition and the still
later English translation by quite a few years.
8. First published in Paris, Alcan, 1930, subsequently republished by Vrin,
1963, and, in English translation, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology,
tr. Andre Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1974).
9. There are two good biographies, the best by Annie Cohen-Solal, cited
above, the other by Ronald Hayman, Sartre, A Biography (New York: Simon and
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James M. Edie
Schuster, 1987), which treat of this period in Sartre's life brilliantly. There is
another biography by John Gerassi, Jean-Paul Sartre. Hated Conscience of His
Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), which hardly mentions it.
It would be interesting to study the French-German intellectual exchanges
between, let us say, 1870 and 1945; one thing is certain: they were very few in
number (or depth) and the influence of German thinkers on France was much
greater, especially in philosophy, than the inverse. Young philosophers in the
1930's in France, like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Aron and others, made conscious
efforts to come to grips with what was happening across the Rhine. But even
Sartre's attempt to live in and understand Germany during his sojourn in Berlin
was accomplished almost exclusively by association with his French-speaking
fellows of the French Institute, telling French jokes together, visiting the sights
and nightclubs together, etc. with no lasting ties having been formed with
German thinkers. When Sartre left Berlin at the end of his stay on a tour of some
famous German cities with Simone de Beauvoir before returning to Le Havre, he
made no apparent effort at all to visit Husserl in retirement in Freiburg, or any
other philosopher. This is in striking contrast to the behavior of American
philosophers, for instance, of the same period, when people like Marvin Farber,
Dorion Cairns, Charles Hartshorne, John Wild, and many others were spending
sabbaticals and periods of study in both France and Germany. Even before that,
William James had formed friendships with German philosophers like Carl
Stumpf, with French thinkers like Henri Bergson, and Englishmen like Henry
Sidgwick, and many others, while these Europeans would never have thought of
visiting or speaking to one another at that time in history.
10. The War Diaries [Les Camets de ltl drole de guerre (Paris: Gallimard, 1983)],
tr. Quenton Hoare (New York: Pantheon, 1985), p. 184. See Cohen-Solal, op, cit.,
p. 92, and Hayman, op. cit., p. 107.
11. Cohen-Solal, op. cit., p. 187.
12. Cohen-Solal, ibid., pp. 91, 95; Hayman, op. cit., p. 107.
13. Cohen-Solal, ibid., p. 92.
14. See James M. Edie, "Expression and Metaphor," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (June, 1963).
15. Cf. Hayman, op. cit., p. 100.
16. See: James M. Edie, Speaking and Meaning (BlOOmington: Indiana University
Press, 1976), pp. 181ff., on Sartre's interpretation of intentionality.
17. Hussed gave his first extended phenomenology of perception in Ideas I, in
paragraphs 40ff. Edmund Husserl, Ideas, tr. W.R Boyce Gibson (New York:
Macmillan, 1931), pp. 128ff.
18. Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1964), passim.
19. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, tr. Williams and Kirkpatrick
(New York: Noonday, 1957), p. 60.
20. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 259-260.
21. Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 95.
22. In the Transcendence of the Ego there are some obscurities not only because
of Sartre's highly metaphorical style but because the argument frequently seems
149
badly organized. For instance, he treats of "states" and "qualities" (what I call
here, in accordance with better English philosophical usage, "dispositions"),
before he speaks of "actions" (or "acts") of consciousness. His argument was
much better organized when he took up the same points later in Being and
Nothingness, op. cit., pp. 162 ff. However, he maintains and repeats the major
content of The Transcendence of the Ego in Being and Nothingness. There is only one
point which he takes back completely: whereas in The Transcendence of the Ego he
claimed that his argument was the "only possible" refutation of Husserl's
"solipsism," (p. 103), in Being and Nothingness, p. 235, he writes: "Formerly I
believed that I could escape solipsism by refuting Husserl's concept of the
transcendental "Ego".... But actually although I am still persuaded that the
hypothesis of a transcendental subject is useless and disastrous, abandoning it
does not help one bit to solve the question of the existence of Others."
23. Sartre, in both Being and Nothingness and in The Transcendence of the Ego is
utterly opposed to "the materialistic mythology" of Freud and, seemingly, to any
theory of the unconscious. But, in The Transcendence of the Ego he expresses
himself hesitantly with locutions like "even if the unconscious exists... " (p. 57),
and in the section on "Existential Psychoanalysis" in Being and Nothingness (and
in his later existential psychoanalyses of Beaudelaire, Tmtoretto, Jean Genet and
others) he argues that even though all human actions are "meaningful" as the
expressions of a "fundamental choice," a way-of-choosing-to-be-in-the-world, all
these actions and behaviors observable on the surface level of behavior have to
be "interpreted." Their meanings and connections are not immediately available
to the subject itself.
24. The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 45.
25. Though the treatment of the matter is just as metaphorical, and
considerably less focused than Sartre's, it has sometimes been remarked that
Gilbert Ryle's treatment of The Systematic Elusiveness of the "1" in his book, the
Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 195-198, makes in its
own way the same point Sartre is making in The Transcendence of the Ego. Ryle
writes, for instance: "So my commentary on my performances must always be
silent about one performance, namely itself, and this performance can be the
target only of another commentary." The "1" is an "elusive" quarry, an "ultimate
mystery." Even in concentrating on the problem of the "1" the philosopher can
never "catch more than the flying coat-tails of that which he was pursuing. His
quarry was the hunter." See also, James M. Edie, "Sartre as Phenomenologist and
as Existential Psychoanalyst," in Lee and Mandelbaum, eds., Phenomenology and
Existentialism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 149 ff.
26. See the excellent presentation and evaluation of Sartre's argument in Aron
Gurwitsch, "A Non-egological Conception of Conscioussness," Studies in
Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp.
287-300. Gurwitsch also reorganizes Sartre's presentation to make it more logical
and effective.
27. William James, Principles of Psychology, Volume I (New York: Holt, 1890),
p. 342. As we know, James' Principles of Psychology had considerable influence on
Husserl's thought during its formative period and, through Husserl, perhaps
indirectly on Sartre. See my analysis of James' phenomenology of the experience
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James M. Edie
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 41.
38. In writing these words I am still inspired and indebted, these many years
later, to the magnificent lectures on the Logical Investigations given by my former
professor, Georges Van Riet, at Louvain in 1956-57. At a recent symposium (a
memorial to Aron Gurwitsch) Bernhard Waldenfels pointed out that Husserl
maintained this view throughout his life and expressed it again in his last work,
the Krisis. See: Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, tr. David Carr (Evanston: The Northwestern
University Press, 1970), pp. 109-110, note.
39. Edmund Husserl, The Logical Investigations, tr. John Findlay (London:
Routledge, 1970), Volume II, p. 549.
40. Ibid., p. 544, note 1.
41. At the most important point of Husserl's discussion of this matter, cited
above (note 32) he recalls the position of Kant in a marginal notation. Cartesian
Meditations, op. cit., p. 25.
42. Ideas, op. cit., p. 173.
43. Ibid., p. 143. See my Introduction to Gaston Berger, The Cogito in Husserl's
Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. xxi-xxii.
44. Ideas, op. cit., p. 145.
45. Ibid.
151
46. The final fact of the matter is that Husserl's theory of consciousness is just
as non-egological as Sartre's; it is only more complete. In his later writings Sartte
himself admitted the artificiality of his argument against Husserl and needed to
admit that there was an aspect/ function/ attitude of the ego that had to survive
the reduction; he confessed that he took an anti-Husserlian stance in The
Transcendence of the Ego mainly: "because I'm argumentative by nature." Sarlre by
Himself, interviews with Astruc and Contat (New York: Urizen, 1978), p. 30. See
also: Peter Caws, Sartre, op. cit., p. 59.
SECTION III
HERMENEUTICS AND ONTOLOGY: HEIDEGGER
by Theodore Kisiel
Where exactly does Heidegger's Way clearly begin to point to
Being and Time? (Hereafter cited as BT.) There is something
abrupt and arbitrary about any beginning, and a great beginning
involves an especially violent burst of creativity. In retrospect,
there is a tendency to dispute its intrusion and heal the breach
in history by pointing to the precedents latent in the initial
situation of departure. Anticipating this tendency, the historian
wishing to recount its story must himself arbitrarily name his
beginning and justify it as a beginning within and against the
surge of precedents that then follow and, for the first time,
become identifiable as precedents.
In the case of the Early Heidegger, his philosophical departure
from the tradition is underscored by an interruption in his teaching
career during the war years coupled by a personal change in
religious confession. His abrupt philosophical beginning is clearly
identifiable in the public record, but the burgeoning precedents
leading to it less so, especially those that may finally be rooted in
the private conscience. That this religious conversion was
associated with a fundamental transformation of "my philosophical
standpoint" is testified by Heidegger's letter of January 9, 1919, to
his friend, Engelbert Krebs, a Catholic priest:
"Epistemological insights bearing upon the theory of historical
cognition have made the System of Catholicism problematic and
unacceptable to me - but not Christianity and metaphysics (these
however in a new sense)."l Thus we know that Heidegger came
home from the front philosophically transformed and, as Edmund
Hussed's assistant, from that moment launched a revolution in his
chosen arena of philosophy, in phenomenology.
The external trappings of public reputation, typically spread
by hearsay and rumor, also serve to date our starting point. The
retrospective account of Hannah Arendt is best known: 2
.. .the beginning in Heidegger's case is neither the date of his birth
(September 26, 1889, at Messkirch) nor the publication of his first
book, but the first lecture courses and seminars which he held as a
mere Privatdozent (instructor) and assistant to Husserl at the
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Theodore Kisiel
University of Freiburg in 1919. For Heidegger's "fame" predates by
about eight years the publication of Sein und Zeit [BT] in 1927;
indeed it is open to question whether the unusual success of this
book - not just the immediate impact it had inside and outside the
academic world but also its extraordinarily lasting influence, with
which few of the century's publications can compare - would have
been possible if it had not been preceded by the teacher's reputation
among the students in whose opinion, at any rate, the book's success
merely confirmed what they had known for many years.... in
Heidegger's case there is nothing tangible on which his fame could
have been based, nothing written, save for notes taken at his lecture
courses which circulated among students everywhere.... There was
hardly more than a name, but the name traveled all over Germany
like the rumor of the hidden king.
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The problems of facticity exist for me no less than in my Freiburg
beginnings, only much more radically and now in the perspectives
which even in Freiburg were guiding me. That I was constantly
concerned with Duns Scotus and the middle ages and then back to
Aristotle, is by no means a matter of chance. And the work cannot
be judged by what was simply said in the lecture hall and the
seminar exercise. I first had to go all out after (extrem losgehen auf)
the factic in order to make facticity into a problem at all. Formal
indication, critique of the customary doctrine of the apriori,
formalization and the like, all of that is still for me there [in BT]
even though I do not talk about them now. To tell the truth, I am
not really interested in my development, but when the matter comes
up, it cannot simply be put together from the sequence of lecture
courses and what is only communicated in them. This shortwinded
consideration forgets the central perspectives and impulses at w<>l'k
both backwards and forwards.
161
primal something
genuine lifeworld
B. object-type something
(motivated in a
genuine lifeworld)
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165
the single thing that can be pointed out holds the view fast. In
practice it is our duty only to look, to grasp actually all there is to
grasp, to draw out the pure self of what is offered. Over the
immediate there can be no doubt, probability and delusions. For as
immediate it has as it were nothing between itself and the
apprehension (simplex apprehensio) (FS 155).
That the differentiations of meaning stem directly from the
domains themselves (implying that they are already 'categorially'
structured [FS 196-8], that they therefore need only to be "read off"
from such "facticities," already amounts to a "hermeneutics of
facticity" ensuing from the Young Heidegger's commitment to
Aristotelian-scholastic realism: Simple apprehension espies the
analogical distribution of an identical meaning (ens commune)
differentiated "in each case" (je) in accord with lithe inherent
differentiation of meaning coming from the domains of reality
themselves," and so "determined by the nature of the domains" to
which the meaning is applied (FS 198f, 229). A few years later; the
small German distributive je, so easy to ignore (it often is by
translators), becomes the veritable mark of the facticity of Daseiri,
which is "in each case (je) mine."
This phenomenological construal of facticity constitutes a
radical reversal of classical neo-Kantianism, which coined the term.
The abstract term IIfacticity" first appears in Fichte, who uses it to
describe our encounter with the "brute" face of reality 'not
amenable to rational thought. The factic is the irrational par
excellence, the sign of the insuperable irrationality of the 'matter'
given to thought. In the Kantian tradition, Fichte was the first to
explore its various polar pairs in terms of the "hiatus irrationalis,"
the abyss between the empirical and the apriori, the individual and
the universal, quid facti and quid juris, intuition and concept, in
short, between facticity and logicity.
But what if our immediate encounter with facticity in all its
"logical nudity" involved not just an empirical intuition but also
a categorial intuition? This is the step that Lask, following Hussed,
took beyond traditional Kantianism. Lask's expansion of Kant's
transcendental logic beyond Aristotle's categories of empirical
reality dictates that such categories must themselves have
categories if they are to become objects of knowledge. But this
possibility shows that there is already a precognitive moment in
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which 'is given' or 'is there' ('es gibt'). It remains to be seen what
the precise relevance of this bare 'reflexive' category of merely
'being there' ('Es-Geben') may be (GS II, 129f).
Heidegger's HermeneutkBreakthrough
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Theodore Kisiel
175
burdened by a neo-Kantian interpretation, into a "meaningdetermining element for the category problem" (FS 350). This is
not so much faith in reality as a faith in the meaning ensconced
within it. This facticity of meaning reflects Heidegger's choice from
among the options of the transcendental philosophies of the time.
Not an ideal and theoretical realm of validity but a 'transcendental'
realm of pretheoretical meaning flowing from life itself, which
Lask called a "panarchy of the logos" (GS II, 133) in which I
already "live in truth" (Le. intelligibility, meaning)P
Lask likewise opposes Kant's "purely logical" deduction of the
categories, because they are after all "not logical through and
through... but arise from a logical material" and so fend their order
in a material logic; "we can determine their place only by way of
a detour across this matter, persistently looking at it and regarding
its stufflike nature" (GS II, 62f). Also, contrary to Hegel's
panlogism, the individual forms are not intertwined by reciprocal
logical relations. They stand before us in a reciprocal heterogeneity
and irreducible multiplicity. The pure form in which we stand at
most gives us the inner light by which to regard their matter, since
it is also being reflected from the impenetrable surface of matter's
facticity. In our encounter with this interface, we can only accept
its alogical order of being and resign ourselves to the limits of
reason.
Thus, through Lask's mediating of the neo-Kantian tradition
in the direction of Husserl and Aristotle, the two earliest
philosophical influences upon Heidegger, he has developed a sense
of intentionality and categorial intuition which allows him to move
toward a new sense of the apriori, that of the facticity of meaning,
which finds its norms in experiencability instead of knowability.
But that is not all. There is still the problem of how to express this
precognitive realm of lived meaning.
The reflexive category. It is therefore important to note that
Lask's treatment of the reflexive category appears in the
habilitation text expressly in the section on the doctrine of speech
significations. But it had already appeared unannounced in the
earlier section on the transcendental unum. While the constitutive
category plays a central role in the differentiation of the domains
of reality, their regionalization into various material logics, the role
of the reflexive category is that of their unification, and its logic
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179
KNS 1919: The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World Vzew
In order to achieve the goal of "Philosophy as a Strict Science,"
HusserI in the closing pages of his programmatic statement of the
Logos-essay (1911) calls for a radical break with any philosophy
which is even remotely oriented toward a world view. 20 On the
opening day (February 7, 1919) of his course, therefore, Heidegger
observes that the reigning neo-Kantian philosophy, even though it
regard a world view to be the personal affair of the individual,
understands itself as the critical science of values which, "based as
it is on the basic acts of consciousness and their norms, has in its
system an ultimate and necessary tendency toward a world view"
(ZBP 12). And breaking with his own earlier desire for a
metaphysical"optic" (FS 348) as well as with the entire tradition
of philosophy, he proposes with Husserl, as an opening thesis, that
philosophy and world view have absolutely nothing to do with
each other. The course thus places itself in pursuit of "a brand new
conception of philosophy. .. which would have to place it outside
of any connection with the ultimate human questions" (ZBP 11).
And if philosophy is still to be the Ur-science, this would
necessarily entail an entirely new conception of origins and ends,
the first and the last things. Philosophy itself now becomes a
problem especially in its starting point, its primary subject matter,
and consequently in its method and goal. What then is The Idea
of Philosophy?
In 1919, a sharp contrast between neo-Kantianism and
phenomenology was dictated by the very proximity of the two
schools. Both approaches in particular lay claim to the venerable
ambition of establishing philosophy as the "primal" or "original"
science (Urwissenschaft). Both seek to determine origins and
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ultimates, the first and the last things, the underived from which
all else is derived, which can only be 'shown' or 'pointed out' but
not 'proven', thereby inexorably implicating the original science in
a circle, assuming in the beginning what it wishes to find in the
end. What then is the beginning, the IIp rimalleap" (Ur-sprung: ZBP
24, 31, 60, 95 = 160, 172, 247 in the habilitation) of thinking or
knowing, the point from which it gets its start? For Heidegger,
such a starting point would have to allow for the problem of the
very "genesis of the theoretical" which he finds already operative
in Lask (ZBP 88).
As he promised in his Conclusion of 1916, the 1919 course
moves, albeit slowly and laboriously, to displace the neo-Kantian
starting point in the 'fact' of knowledge and science with the
phenomenological starting point in the 'primal fact' of life and
experience. Situating the original domain of philosophy beyond the
theoretical in a "pretheoretical something" at once overcomes the
circularity of presupposition and proof which characterizes the
neo-Kantian Idea of philosophy. The principles and structures
developed in 1916, largely with the help of Lask, playa significant
role in this movement of displacement. The following selective
summary of the course21 will first focus on the strategic use of
those principles and structures in that deconstruction and
regression toward the original domain of the environmental
experience" and the "life in and for itself."
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life. Small wonder, then, that Heidegger will shortly (WS 1919-20)
call the 'open' methodological concept that points the way and
guides the explication of phenomena without prejudice, Le.
without falling into standpoints and regional limitations, the
''formal indication" lformale Anzeige: In BT, "existence" is the formal
indication; in 1916-19, it is what hitherto has been called the
"operative concept" of intentionality; for Lask, it is perhaps
'matter-needy forms'. Each in fact schematizes the same
'tendency'!)
The pluses and minuses of formalization and its noematic
"formal-logical objective something" may now be applied to the
"primal something" to bring out is full character. Both are
indifferent in regard to all differentiations, reflecting the hollow
dilution of the medieval concept ens commune which indifferently
applied to everything. But surely there is a difference between
theoretical and pretheoretical (Le. factic) indifference. The step into
factic life is the step from the levelling 'not' of indifference to the
"not yet" of potentiality, therefore "the index for the highest
potentiality of life" (ZBP 115). In particular here, factic life has not
yet devolved into a world, it is not yet worldly; it is "preworld1y."
The KNS-Schema thus distinguishes on the pretheoreticallevel a
worldly from a preworldly something, and describes the latter as
the "basic moment of life as such." It is "life in and for itself' and
not a "genuine life," that is, life in a "genuine lifeworld" (ZBP 115f:
What does "genuine" mean here? Heidegger provides no
clarification). The distinction serves to divide the event of worlding
into its two parts, as two sides of the same coin, and gives primacy
to the suffix, to the (structuring, articulating, thus meaningful)
dynamism of life in and for itself, "the in-itself of the streaming
experiencing of life" (ZBP 116). It is this dynamic center of life that
is to be enhanced and amplified by formal considerations. How?
By investing it with the formal schematism of intentionality.
So far, this dynamic center has only been isolated (Le.
formalized) through negative terms, placed on the outskirts of
"genuine" worlds and yet - and here is the positive turn charged with the potential for worlding. The "not yet," this more
pregnant 'not' of dynamic undifferentiation, contains within itself
the power to differentiate worlds; it is a differentiating indifference
or, in more Kantian language, a determinable indetermination. The
indifference can do something. And this is the primal something.
195
How to conceptualize and define this 'deed'? For the Kantians, all
concepts have the function of determining. According to our
already established precautions, this is to be a purely formal
determination rather than the hierarchical determination of genera
and species. Heidegger finds such a formal determination in
intentionality. Within the undifferentiated dynamism of the primal
something, in its undiminished "vital impetus," there is the bare
intentional moment of "out towards" "in the direction of," "into a
(determinate) world" (ZBP 115). The student transcripts add
another formulation: the tendency to "world out" (auszuwelten) into
particular lifeworlds. Put in another way, this character of being
toward something- is "life in its motivated tendency and tending
motivation" (ZBP 117). The primal something may be undifferentiated and unformed, but is not the "amorphous irrational X"
(Rickert) of brute facticity, inasmuch as it contains within itself the
tendency toward differentiation and determination and so has an
intrinsic directional sense.
With this positive development of the undifferentiation, we get
a clearer picture of how Heidegger means to overcome the final
objection against a pretheoretical science, namely, that a
diremption between knowledge and its object always remains,
inasmuch as every intuitive comportment is inescapably a
comportive 'relation toward something'. His answer is at once
simple and genial: With the primal something, the "something" is
the relation (VerhaIten) as such, it is not an ob-ject at all but instead
the intentional moment of out towards," what Heidegger two
semesters later will structurally distinguish as the relational sense
(Bezugssinn) of intentionality. This is in actuality the non-objective
formalization read off from the intentional structures of life. It
involves a phenomenological modification of traditional formalization in order to efface its proclivity toward diremption. All
formally indicative concepts aim, strictly speaking, to express only
the pure "out towards" without any further content or ontic
fulfillment. From the relational sense of "out towards," for
example, the formal indication of "object in general" becomes the
pure "toward which" (das Worauf)28 instead of Lask's reflexive
formulation of "standing over against" (Entgegenstehendes) which
takes the object more from the side of its content sense, and so is
still too objectively formulated. In this sense, formal objectification,
even though "motivated" in the primal something, is still not near
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phenomenological back-and-forth formation of re-cepts and precepts from which all theoretical-objectifying positing as well as
transcendent positing falls out" (ZBP 117).
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Notes
1. Bernhard Casper, ''Martin Heidegger und die theologische Fakultat 19091923," Freiburger DiOzesan-Archiv 100 (1980), p. 541.
2. Hannah Arendt, ''Martin Heidegger zum achzigsten Geburtstag," Merkur
X (1969), p. 893; "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," The New York Review of Books,
October 21, 1971, p. 50. Also in Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern
Philosophy (New Haven: Yale UP, 1978), pp. 293-4.
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heideggers Wege (Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1983), p. 141.
4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ''Wdhelm Dilthey nach 150 Jahren," E.W. Orth, ed.,
Dilthey und die Philosophie der Gegenwart (Sonderband der Phiinomenologischen
Forschungen), (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1985), p. 159.
5. SZ =Sein and Zeit. The German pagination given here is to be found in
the margins of its English translation,. Being and Time, where the translators,
Macquarrie and Robinson,. call them the H-numbers. Other abbrevations: 55 =
Summer Semester and WS = Wmter Semester.
6. Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung tier Philosophie, ed., Bernd Heimbiichel,
Gesamtausgabe (GA) Volume 56/57 (Frankfurt Klostermann, 1987), pp. 114-17.
Hereafter cited as ZBP.
7. This is a citation of Oskar Becker's distillation which contains the essentials
of Franz Josef Brecht's transcript, the only extant first-hand student version of this
hour. Gerda Walther's transcript, due to the illness and death of her father, ends
in mid-course on March 14, and afterwards copies Brecht. For the German, cf. my
"Das Kriegsnotsemester 1919: Heideggers Durchbruch in die hermeneutische
Phiinomenologie," in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 99, no. 1 (1992), p. 106f.
8. Martin Heidegger, Friihe Schriften (Frankfurt Klostermann,. 1972)i p. 348.
Hereafter cited as FS.
. 9. Heidegger's letter to Karl LOwith on August 20, 1927. I wish to thank Frau
Ada LOwith for access to the .original of this letter and Klaus Stichweh for help
in deciphering it The German text of this letter is now available in its entirety in
Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Poggeler, ed., Zur philosophischen Aktualitiit
Heideggers, Vol. 2: 1m Gesprach der Zeit (Frankfurt Klostermann,. 1990), pp. 33-38,
esp. p. 36f.
10. Once again, I am following Oskar Becker's transcript, who added the
outline designations, I.A, I.B., TI.A. and n.B to Brecht's first-hand version, and so
provides convenient designations for us in follOwing this important schema. For
the German, written across the blackboard in a single row, d. my
''Kriegsnotsemester,'' op. cit (note 6). It might be observed here that the term UrEtwas is to found only in the transcripts (several times), while the published
edition speaks instead of the pretheoretical, preworldly something (ZBP 115-7).
11. Rickert's report is to be found in Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's
Lehrjahre," J.e. Sallis, G. Moneta and J. Taminiaux, eds., The Collegium
Phenomenologicum: The First Ten Years, Phenomenological Vol. 105
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1988), p. 118.
12. I have dealt with this relationship in great detail in my "Why Students of
Heidegger WIll have to Read Emil Lask," Deborah G. Chaffin, ed., Emil Lask and
the Search for Concreteness (Athens: Ohio UP, 1994).
13. Emil Lask, Gesammelte Schriften, Volume n (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1923), p. 78.
Herafter cited GS I for Volume I, GS n for Volume TI.
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Theodore Kisiel
Categorial intuition and his Lehre rom Urleil (1912) by those on Evidence and
Truth. The investigation of these even more specific interconnections made by
Heidegger might well prove fruitful for the understanding of all three parties in
this philosophical'triangle'.
18. o. the excellent index to the English translation of BT Macquarrie and
Robinson. For insight into the importance of such dimensions of undifferentiation
for Heidegger's sense of the formal indication, I am indebted to an unpublished
paper by R.J.A. van Dijk and ThCW. Oudemans, "Heideggers formal anzeigende
Philosophie."
19. Edmund Husserl, Idem zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950),
13. Hereafter cited as Idem 1. First published in 1913, there are two extant
English translations of this book.
20. Edmund Husserl's Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft was first published
in the neo-Kantian journal Logos in 1911. English translation by Quentin Lauer is
in E. Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper &
Row, 1965). Hereafter cited as Logos-essay.
21. I have summarized this course in others ways and for other purposes in
my work on Lask (ct. note 10) and the Kriegsnotsemester (ct. note 6), but first of
all, based strictly on the student transcripts, in "Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes
'Faktizitiit'im Friihwerk Heideggers," Dilthey-Jahrbuch 4 (1986-87), pp. 91-120.
22. Cf. Ibid., p. 97 n. 23, which pinpoints Paul Natorp's use of the term es gibt
in his courses at the time to describe the problem of "facticity" facing the neoKantians in their ongoing efforts to overcome 19th-century naturalism, for which
the "irrationality" of facticity is insuperable. Cf. ZBP 122.
23. Jonas Cohn, Religion und Kulturwerte, "Philosophische Vomiige" of the
Kantgesellschaft (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1914), p. 21. Heidegger refers to this
article in ZBP (145n).
24. Lask likewise writes: ~'What is at issue here is nothing less than the very
life and death of philosophy" (II, 89). But what is at issue for Lask is the
philosophical institution of the search for the categorial forms of the non-sensory
forms already operative in our experience, and for the forms of those forms of the
forms, etc. This, from Heidegger's perspective, is clearly a tum away from the
already operative categorial intuitions in experience, which are to be explicated
in themselves, toward ever escalating theoretizations of them. Ergo Heidegger's
final assessment of Lask: he was the first to see the problem of the theoretical in
avo, but this very problem is difficult to find in him since he tum wanted to solve
it theoretically (ZBP 88).
Heidegger's thought experiment of the total reification of the world clearly
bears close comparison to Husserl's experiment in Idem I (49) of worldannihilation. The detailed comparison, which must be left for another
occasion, may be especially revealing for the understanding of the different
"system of motivations" (Ibid., 47) accruing to a historically situated and
contextua1ized intentional dynamiCS as opposed to the dynamics of an
immanent and absolute consciousness. There is a great deal in 47 which
must have inspired Heidegger's descriptions of the primal something, like
the 'not yet' of experience which ''belongs to the indeterminate but
determinable horizon of my temporally particular actuality of experience...
Every actual experience refers beyond itself to possible experiences" and so
serves as a motivating source of experience.
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25. I have added this tenninology from BT (SZ 5f), not only to relate this early
discussion of the structure of a question to a later development of it, but also to
raise the question of whether, aside from its use here as an illustration, there is
really a point to a question like "Is there something?" What does it ask for
(Erfragtes)? Is the Erfragtes collapsed into the Gefragtes here? Later, in examining
formalization, Heidegger discovers that its product lacks a Vollzugssinn, i.e., it
does not follow through to some sort of fulfillment. In short, such a question does
not seem to be situationally motivated. It is the "trivial" (kummerliche: ZBP 63)
question of ens commune by a remote I and not the distressed (bekummerte)
question of ens proprium by a fully engaged I.
26. In a long letter to Heidegger on September 10,1918 (Heidegger was then
"in the field"), Husserl mentions that, after a pause of 5 years, he had begun to
read Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie (1912) once again and was concerned about
Natorp's misunderstandings of his phenomenology. And whatever Husserl thus
mentioned in this important letter to his future assistant and protege became an
explicit task for the Early Heidegger, as we shall see in other instances of these
early years of proximity to Husserl.
27. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, pp. 56, 48 (German pp. 75, 65).
Precisely in this Husserlian context in the course of SS 1925, Heidegger
underscores the phrase "intuition and expreSSion," which is a dominating
leitmotif of his courses of 1919-20. Due to the fictive license allowed by the format
of his later "Dialogue on Language" in Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959), the Old
Heidegger pretends to forget that the title of his course of SS 1920 included this
phrase. In fact, at one point, he wonders whether its title was not "Expression and
Meaning," the title of Husserl's First Logical Investigation, which played such a
crucial role in the development of Heidegger's thoughts on the fonnal indication.
Cf. his On the Way to Language, translated by Peter Hertz (New York: Harper &
Row, 1971), p. 34 (German p. 128).
28. Das Woraufis the conceptual predecessor of "das Woraufhin des primaren
Entwurfs" (SZ 324), "the toward-which of the primary project" of Dasein which
in BT is fonnally defined as its "sense" (Sinn). (It already means 'meaning' in the
transcendental context of early 1919. From this earlier context of its genesis, we
also see why the English translation of this crucial tenn in BT as the "uponwhich" is in the end erroneous.
29. Cf. my "Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes," op.cit. pp. 102, 106f.
30. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinem Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952).
Hereafter cited as Ideen II. This book is now available in an English translation by
Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1989).
31. "Angekniipft hat meine Seelenlosung an eine Sprangersche Abhandlung,
die (in der Volkeltfestschrift) unter dem TItel "Zur Theorie des Verstehens und
der geisteswissenschaftlichen Psychologie" Fragen behandelte, denen ein
Hauptteil meiner Ideen II gilt und mit denen ich wohl langer und
schmerzensvoller gerungen habe als irgendeiner der Lebenden." R I Heidegger
1O.lX.18, Husserl Archive, Louvain, Belgium (I wish to thank Samuel Ijsseling,
Director of the Archive, for permission to cite from this letter.) Also significant for
their common endeavors in this period is a remark by Husser! in a card to
Heidegger in March 28, 1918: "Mir wachst in dem stillen Hochtal ein grosses
Werk heran - Zeit und Individuation, eine Erneuerung einer rationalen
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by TImothy J. Stapleton
Heidegger's lecture course of the summer semester of 1925, the
text of which is now available as the History of the Concept of Time,l
is justifiably described as an early draft of Being and Time. As such,
the status of this work, its hermeneutical import, is somewhat
ambiguous. As the text of a lecture course not originally intended
for publication, it would seem to lack a certain critical authority.
Viewed as a "draft," it would apparently have to stand under the
shadow of its final, definitive appearance, the text of Being and
Time itself. For Heidegger specialists, of course, this text has great
significance. Questions about conceptual development and
terminology, about shifts in meaning and emphasis, the apparently
non-existential tone of the lectures, all cast light on the
understanding of Heidegger's development.
Yet the significance of these lectures is not limited to these
more esoteric concerns. For Heidegger's transformation, or perhaps
radicalization, of phenomenology in Being and Time has, for better
or worse, left in its wake an altered understanding of philosophy
itself. For all his radicality, Husserl is one in spirit with that
philosophical trajectory which spans from Plato to Hegel. Husser!
dreamt of bringing philosophy's implicit telos to actuality, to a
genuineness of beginnings. The movement of thought set in
motion by Being and Time, however, as a "critique" of metaphysics
and onto-theology, calls for a post-philosophical Denken. Hence, in
the debate between Husserl and Heidegger, in the movement from
Husserlian phenomenology to fundamental ontology and beyond,
one finds in germinal form the seeds of the shift, the turn, which
has become so pronounced in much of contemporary continental
philosophy.
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concretely? Is it that not only the formal spirit (liTo the things
themselves"), but also the "letter" of phenomenology, the detailed
thematics and self-understanding that evolved out of the Logical
Investigations, to which Heidegger is more "authentically" true?
How are we to understand Heidegger's claim that "Phenomenology has become unphenomenological"?
The Preliminary Part of HCT consists of three chapters, each
of which contributes to a clarification of liThe Sense and Task of
Phenomenological Research." The first chapter, however, is largely
historicaL Heidegger here describes the philosophical situation and
climate at the end of the nineteenth century, noting in particular
the positions of positivism, Neo-Kantianism, the emergence of the
Dilthey's critique of positivism, along with the contributions of
Brentano and the early Husserl to an understanding of philosophy
as scientific philosophy, as well as the question of its relation to
psychology.
The result of these historical reflections, however, is to show
their inappropriateness for a genuine understanding of phenomenology.
It is of the essence of phenomenological investigations that they
cannot be reviewed summarily but must in each case be rehearsed
and repeated anew. Any further synopsis which merely summarizes
the contents of this work would thus be, phenomenologically
speaking, a misunderstanding. We shall therefore try an alternate
route by providing an initial orientation concerning what is actually
accomplished here. This will also serve as an initial preparation and
elaboration of the working attitude which we shall assume
throughout this lecture course. (HCT, p. 26)
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own beginning point. How is it, then, that Heidegger is led from
the enigma of intentionality to the question of the being of that
entity which is intentionally? And to what extent does this path
continually presuppose and makes use of the legitimacy of this
initial, elemental intuitionism from which the problem first
develops?
Heidegger's initial move is to preserve the puzzle of
intentionality by turning to this phenomenon in its concretion.
It must therefore be flatly stated that what the belonging of the
intentum to the intentio implies is obscure. How the being-intended
of an entity is related to that entity remains puzzling. It is even
questionable whether one may question in this way at all. But we
cannot inquire into these puzzles as long as we cover up their
puzzling character with theories for and against intentionality. Our
understanding of intentionality is therefore not advanced by our
speculations about it. We shall advance only by following
intentionality in its concretion. An occasion for this is to be found in
our effort to clarify the second discovery of phenomenology, the
discovery of categorial intuition. (HCT, p. 47)
Heidegger's emphasis upon the provisional nature of these
questions immediately alerts us to the possibility that the source
of the puzzle may not be intentionality itself, but the horizon
within which intentionality is apprehended. Heidegger's turn to
categorial intuition, therefore, has a two-fold import. First,
categorial intuition comes to the surface as the internal
complexities of even the simplest modes of intentional
comportment are made manifest; that categorial intuition " .. .is
invested in the most everyday of perceptions and in every
experience." (HCT, p. 48) What Heidegger suggestively refers to in
these lectures as the experience of being, therefore, is not some
special mode of apprehension, nor the result of abstractions nor
formalizations. Rather it belongs to, accompanies, saturates every
mode of intentionality: the theoretical and pre-theoretical, the
practical, affective, volitional, and so forth. Second:
The discovery of categorial intuition is the demonstration... that
there is a simple apprehension of the categorial, such constituents in
entities which in traditional fashion are designated as categories and
were seen in crude form quite early [in Greek philosophy, especially
by Plato and Aristotle]. (HCT, p. 48)
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The categorial 'forms' are not constructs of acts but objects which
manifest themselves in these acts. They are not something made by
the subject and even less something added to the real objects, such
that the real entity is itself modified by this forming. Rather, they
actually present the entity more truly in its 'being-in-itself.'
Categorial acts constitute [emphasis mine] a new objectivity. This is
always to be understood intentionally and does not mean that they
let the things spring up anywhere. 'Constituting' does not mean
producing in the sense of making and fabricating; it means letting the
entity be seen in its objectivity. (HCT, pp. 70-71)
However, just as intentionality is not the final word, but rather
points to a network of new problems and difficulties which must
be examined, so too categorial intuition points to possibilities and
to problems, to the "discovery of the original sense of the a priori"
and to the field of ontological questions contained therein. "As
categorial intuition is possible only on the basis of the
phenomenon of intentionality having been seen before it, so the
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This idea, that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is
not simply invented; it is the idea which has occupied modern
philosophy ever since Descartes. The elaboration of pure
consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived
phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going
back to a traditional idea of philosophy. (ReT, p. 107)
231
This bracketing of the entity takes nothing away from the entity
itself, nor does it purport to assume that the entity is not. This
reversal of perspective has rather the sense of making the being of
the entity present. This phenomenological suspension of the
transcendent thesis has but the sole function of making the entity
present in regard to its being. The term "suspension" is thus always
misunderstood when it is thought that in suspending the thesis of
existence and by doing so, phenomenological reflection simply has
nothing to do with the entity. Quite the contrary: in an extreme and
unique way, what really is at issue now is the determination oj the being
oj the very entity. [emphasis mine](HCf, p. 99)
Yet ten pages later in the very same text, Heidegger apparently
contradicts this defense" in claiming that:
II
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Notes
1. Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. Theodore Kisiel
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). All citations of this work will be
abbreviated as HCT.
2. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 50.
3. See, for example, the imagery in Plato's Republic, Books VI and VII.
4. It is interesting, in this regard, to note Heidegger's spirited defense of a
philosophy of intuition on page 47 of HCT.
5. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenologiclll Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten (Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1982), p. 44.
6. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
7. Witness the "motivational" eidos of consciousness in Husserlian thought.
8. Though this thought reaches explicit clarity in Ideas I, it is already
emerging both in The Idea of Phenomenology and in ''Philosophy as Rigorous
Science."
9. In a letter to Roman Ingarden dated December, 1927, Husserl says,
''Heidegger has not grasped the whole meaning of the reduction." See Herbert
Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965),
p. 281. And in Husserl's marginal notes to his own copy of Sein und Zeit, he says
the following: ''Heidegger transposes or translates the constitutive,
phenomenological clarification of beings...the total region of the world, into
anthropology. For the ego, he writes Dasein, and so forth. Thus all its deeper
sense becomes unclear and loses its philosophical worth. What is said here is my
own teaching, only without its deeper foundation. This is, in my view, the way
to an intentional psychology of the personality, of the personallifeworld...." See
Alwin Diemer, Edmund Husserl (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Rain, 1965),
pp.19-20.
10. A traditional interpretation of the development of Plato's thinking involves
its movement from initial spiritual and ethical concerns, through metaphysics, to
questions of language and logic in the later works.
11. See, for example, Husserl's ''Vienna Lecture," where he talks of the infinite
goals of reason, and of "...the concept of Europe as the historical teleology of the
infinite goals of reason." The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, Appendix I, p. 299.
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Thomas M. Seebohm
their relation to the same phonetic unity Satz. The unity of the
relation proposed by Heidegger in his formula creates, therefore,
a surprise in ordinary German. It is a joke, a pun. Puns of this
kind cannot be translated. Cases in which the same phonetic unity
is used to express two different meanings are usually restricted to
one and only one language.
The first meaning of the word Satz used in the formula3 can
be translated into English as "sentence, statement." The second
meaning has to be translated as "leap", because that is the only
meaning Satz can have in the connection Satz in... . It is not
possible to discover an obvious reason for the attempt to build a
bridge of meaning between the meanings "sentence" and "leap"
with a simple analysis of the meaning of these words. Heidegger
uses a complex system of metaphorical transfers of meaning in
order to build that bridge. He moves, for this purpose, from the
German Satz through different possibilities offered by Latin and
Greek translations of this word and words close to it. The
movement is accompanied and completed by another move
beginning with Grund, ground, and ending with Sein, Being. The
following is a brief outline mentioning some of the key words used
by Heidegger.
In the technical language of German philosophy Satz can be
used also as shorthand for Grundsatz, the translation of principium.
The meaning of principium is exhibited by going back to its roots
in the Greek axioma and hypothesis leading to ratio itself. Thus it is
possible to read the principium rationis also as ratio rationis or
Grundsatz vom Grund. This is the first tune (Tonart) in which the
principium can be heard (vernommen werden).
The movement that leads to the second tune can be heard, if
the earlier metaphysical formulas of the principium are considered.
Heidegger points out that the formulas "Everything has its
ground," "Nothing is without ground" do not reveal anything
about the ground. The subjects in the first case are beings. The
formula tells us something about beings and their relation to the
ground but nothing about the ground. The second formula can be
associated with another formula in the realm of older metaphysics,
namely "Being is without ground," that is, "Being = God as
ground of beings is without ground." Not withstanding that this
consideration is not a surprise in a Heideggerian context it is
essential that already early metaphysical formulations of the
principium state that Nothing and Being are "without" ground.
Thus the ground of beings is qua Being itself groundless. It is an
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about apodicticity then he speaks about the apodicticity of selfgivenness of the subject and not about its apodictic or necessary
being. The real problem with Hussed's approach in philosophy is,
that he asked for ultimate grounding under the principium. Asking
for ultimate grounding, seen from the viewpoint of SG, simply
implies the impossibility of asking the question of being. Asking
the question of being is not asking for the ultimate ground, but a
leap into the un-ground, the Ab-Grund.
Iv. The principium and Speculative Thinking
The Satz in den Ab-grund as a Sagen des Seins in the second
tune of the principium is explored in SG only with interpretations
of poems, references to mystical experiences and the prophetic
hope for a turn in the history of Being. Following Heidegger's hint
in the preface it can be assumed that saying more will require the
"new forms of presentation" in the context outside of SG. Whether
and where such new forms can be found is a difficult question.
The difficulty is to distinguish between the style in which
Heidegger talks about the second tune in SG and the style he uses
to talk about Being in later writings. Instead of an attempt to solve
that problem some steps in another direction can be made.
Heidegger's advice is to explore the history of being in the history
of metaphysics. Such an exploration might also shed some light on
the problem of the relation between the first and the second tune
in which the Satz vom Grund can be heard.
Heidegger's metaphorical movements in SG are meaningful for
a metaphysical mind only, because they are embedded in his
interpretations of metaphysical thinking. They are meaningful for
metaphysical thinking, because they point beyond metaphysical
thinking in an explication of metaphysical thinking. Kant's
transcendental philosophy is the last development in the history of
metaphysics analyzed in greater detail in SG. But it is also clear in
other references that there is a further development of metaphysics
beyond Kant. In several places we find references to Hegel.
Heidegger's first attempt to say something about the second tune
is his interpretation of Angelus Silesius. In the beginning of this
interpretation he quoted Hegel's evaluation of Angelus Silesius, but
he also says that this evaluation is not essential for his
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belongs to the realm of form and formed essence and is, therefore,
derivative. To think the Absolute means for Schelling to think it in
its absence, and that means, to think it as Abgrund.
Schelling's destructive move can be described in terms of
speculative thinking. This might be the reason why Heidegger
characterizes Schelling'S speculations about the ground as
metaphysical. But they can serve for precisely that reason as the
most perfect expression of Heidegger's intention in the framework
of systematical metaphysical thinking.
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Notes
Satz.
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by Richard E. Palmer
I. Introduction
It is well known that Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques
Derrida are associated with "hermeneutics" and "deconstruction,"
respectively. Both of these terms they drew from Heidegger, so one
could assume that for all their differences there are similarities
between them also. That may have been what prompted Professor
Gadamer to seek in the late seventies a friendly Auseinandersetzung
with Derrida- which eventually took place April 25-27, 1981, at
the Goethe Institute in Paris.} Indeed, Manfred Frank, who was
instrumental in arranging the 1981 symposium put forward in his
paper at the same conference four areas of common ground
between "Neostrukturalismus" and hermeneutics: First both are
"after Hegel, after Heidegger, after Nietzsche," and thus neither of
them finds in absolute consciousness any escape from history and
human finitude. Second, in neither of them is a transcendental
value evoked to justify life; rather values emerge from an
"infinitely perspectival interpretation." Third, neither of them finds
the epistemological subject to be the lord of his own being; rather
"self-understanding," as Gadamer calls it, comes about in a
semiotic context of a world "into whose structure a certain
interpretation of the meaning of being has already entered. Finally,
both neostructuralism and hermeneutics are both philosophies of
language in which language guides the onward march of
'consciousness'. ,,2
Several of the areas of common ground seem to converge in
Heidegger, yet at the same time many of the differences, the areas
of divergence, also go back to Heidegger -one might say, a
"different" Heidegger. On the only occasion when I had a
conversation with Heidegger (evening of July 21,1965), Heidegger
indicated that Gadamer's continuation of his thought had traded
away its radicality by mixing in elements of Hegel (the dialectic)
and Dilthey (Horizontverschmelzung was "straight out of Dilthey!").
Gadamer had just finished the final lecture of a summer semester
Vorlesung carrying the title "Von Hegel bis Heidegger," and
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Heidegger came down for the final lecture. Gadamer found the
interaction of Entbergung and Verbergung in Heidegger's discussion
of the Lichtung des 5eins subtly reflected a dialectical relation.
Heidegger subsequently noted that he was no philosopher of
"Absolutes Wissen," and that all of Hegel'S thinking culminates in
Wissen[knowing]. After Gadamer's lecture, I fell into step with
Heidegger and asked him whether the presence of a follower like
Gadamer was not reassuring to him, to which he replied
categorically that German philosophy was going "auf den Hunden"
[lito the dogs"].
Such an attitude, such a remark, makes one wonder whether
Heidegger might perhaps have found in the iconoclastically radical
Jacques Derrida a follower more to his liking. After all, like
Heidegger, Derrida was an admirer of Nietzsche. It is not
accidental that in his paper for the symposium on "Text and
Interpretation," Derrida addressed himself to Heidegger's
interpretation of Nietzsche. Here, we find Derrida's Heidegger to
be a figure radically different from the Heidegger which Gadamer
takes as his inspiration for an ontological, linguistic, historical
hermeneutics.
How Heideggerian is Gadamer? It is not accidental that
Gadamer in Wahrheit und Methode is not satisfied to develop a
hermeneutics solely out of Heidegger but goes back to Friedrich
Schleiermarcher and Schleiermacher's famous biographer, Wilhem
Dilthey, while at the same time all but ignoring the current of
philological hermeneutics embodied in August Boeckh. Nor is it an
accident that Gadamer shows the fruitfulness of Hegel (following
Heidegger in his Hegels Begriff der Erjahrunt) in comparison with
Schleiermacher, as he tried (following Heidegger) to free himself
of the emphasis on method in Schleiermacher's allgemeine
Hermeneutik and from the scientific quest for Allgemeingu.ltigkeit in
order to "ground" the Geisteswissenschaften in hermeneutics as
found in Dilthey.
On the other hand, Derrida takes up the Heidegger that
Gadamer seemingly puts aside, the Heidegger of the Destruktion
(deconstructive reading) of the history of ontology (5Z 5), the
Heidegger who wants, like Nietzsche, to "go beyond metaphysics"
through a new analysis and understanding of time. Gadamer, as
a student of Plato trained in classical philology and philosophy
whose doctoral thesis was on Plato's dialectical ethics, winces at
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metaphysics or onto-theology whose overcoming and recovering
from was Heidegger's task of thinking. (LO 94)
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key issue is the Hegelian dialectic and how each of them responds
to it. After suggesting that Heidegger's later thinking "actually
held to his fundamental project by maintaining in a sublimated
form, the deconstructive achievement present in its beginnings,"
Gadamer offers this luminous and significant sentence:
It seems to me that, along with Heidegger's own efforts to leave
behind lithe language of metaphysics" with the help of Holderlin's
poetical language, two other paths exist and have in fact been taken
in efforts to overcome the ontological self-domestication belonging
to dialectic and move into the open. (109)
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Gadamer finds here in the opposition to, and fear of, the seductive
metaphysical power of the dialectic a way of distinguishing the
three paths taken by Heidegger, himself and Derrida and at the
same time a common ground in postmetaphysical thinking. It is
significant that Gadamer is not opposed the project of overcoming
metaphysical concepts but quibbles with the term "language of
metaphysics." Ultimately he cites his recourse to conversation in
his hermeneutics as the path he took to avoid metaphysical
thinking. In making this distinction he indirectly answers the
Derridean critique that he is still entrapped in metaphysics. He
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I thought that Hitler, after taking responsibility in 1933 for the whole
people, would venture to extricate himself from the Party and its
doctrine, and that the whole would meet on the terrain of a
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renovation and a gathering together with a view to a responsibility
for the West. This conviction was an error that I recognized from the
events of 30 June 1934,13 I, of course, had intervened in 1933 to say
yes to the national and the social (not to nationalism) and not to the
intellectual and metaphysical grounds on which the biologism of the
Party doctrine rested, because the social and the national, as I saw
them, were not essentially tied to a biologicist and racist ideology.
(165)
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naturally a matter of what constructs the dominant concept of
discipline, teaching, and the university. So one sees being organized
around the hand and speech, with a very strong coherence, all the
traits whose incessant recurrence I have elsewhere recalled under the
name logocentrism. (181)
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N. Conclusion
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Notes
1. See Text und Interpretation, ed. Philippe Forget (Munich:Fink, 1984). The
texts from this volume relating to the encounter between Gadamer and Derrida
(plus three subsequent essays by Gadamer and fifteen essays of commentary)
have been translated by Diane Michelfelder and Richard Palmer under the title
Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (Albany: SUNY Press,
1989).
2. "Die Grenzen der Beherrschbarkeit der Sprache: Das Gesprach als Ort der
Differenz von Neostrukturalismus und Hermeneutik," in TI op.cit., pp. 181-82;
trans. DD, op.cit., p.151.
3. See Martin Heidegger. Hegel's Concept of Experience, trans. Kinley Dove
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
4. See Derrida's interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, 9 September 1983, a
translation of which appeared in Derrida & Difference, ed. David Wood and Robert
Bernasconi (Conventry, England: Parousia Press, 1985 [published in the U.S. by
Northwestern University Press)), p. 115. Of Sartre he remarks in the same
paragraph that he does "share the affection, almost kinship, which many feel for
this man I never saw."
5. Edited by Philippe Forget (Munich: Fink, 1984). The very brief encounter
was at a symposium on "Text and Interpretation" at the Goethe Institute in Paris,
April 25-27, 1981. Another symposium in which both Gadamer and Derrida
presented papers took place at Heidelberg, in February, 1988, on the topic,
"Heidegger et la politique." See "Wenn es um Heidegger geht, reicht der Horsaal
nicht aus," Die Welt, Feb. 2, 1988. In addition to its appearance under the title,
"Letter to Dallmayr" in DD, this essay has appeared in German under the title
"Dekonstruktion und Hermeneutik" in a commemorative volume for Otto
Poggeler: Philosophie und Poesie: Otto Pogge1er zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by
Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (Stuttgart/Bad-Cannstatt: Friedrich
Frommann/Giinther Holzboog, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 3-15.
6. See N. Oxenhandler, ''The Man with Shoes of Wind: The Derrida-Gadamer
Encounter," DD pp. 264-68.
7. "Improbable Encounter," Art Papers, special issue on
Derrida/postmodernism, 10,1 (1986): pp. 36-39.
8. Indeed, later he says, "I cannot agree with Derrida, who would relate the
hermeneutical experience, especially live conversation and dialogue, to the
metaphysics of presence" (p. 95).
9. See his "Seeing Double: Destruktion and Deconstrucion/' in DD pp. 233-50,
esp. p. 239, and also David F. Krell, Ashes ashes we all fall ... ': Encountering
Nietzsche," in DD pp. 222-32.
10. Cf. "Envoi," Pysche: Inventions de l'autre (paris: Galilee, 1987), pp. 109-143,
esp. 117-43/trans. pp. 107-37, esp. pp. 114-37. English references will be to the
Peter and Mary Ann Caws translation, "Sending: On Representation," in
Transforming the Hermeneutical Context, ed. Gayle Ormiston and Alan Schrift
(Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1990), hereinafter abbreviated THe.
11. Also presenting papers were such eminent figures as Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Manfred Frank, Jean Greisch, Hans-Robert JauB, Fran~ois Laruelle, and
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Philippe Forget. The papers from the symposium were published in German
translation under the title Text und Interpretation (Munich: Fink, 1984). The papers
by Gadamer and Derrida, and Derrida's response to Gadamer's paper and
Gadamer's reply, along with three subsequent essays by Gadamer responding to
Derrida, plus another fifteen essays by others commenting on the "GadamerDerrida encounter" were translated and published in DD in 1989 (see footnote 1).
12. Edited by John Sallis (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1987), hereinafter
abbreviated DP and in Psyche: Inventions de ['autre (paris: Galilee), hereinafter P.
13. Date of Hitler's bloody purge of the S.A (Brown Shirts).
14. Derrida cites the German: "Der Mensch 'hat' nicht Hande, sondem die
Hand hat das Wesen des Menschen inne," which I would translate, with
explanatory insertions, as follows: "The [fully] human being does not 'have'
hands [as an appendage to an essence of anther kind], but rather [since the hand
depends on speech and "upsurges" from speech] the hand lies within the very
essence or nature of being human" (Parmenides in GA 54 [1982]; p. 118; DP p. 178.
SECTION IV
HERMENEUTICS AND THE WORLDS OF THE SCIENCES
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experience of X (by Y and possibly others) is the one and only source of
information concerning X for person Y. Can we generalize upon this
to support the unrestricted thesis (*)? Here we must think about
how this evidence was found. If this was a scientific inquiry, then
the findings were based on reports of experience by the
investigators. Moreover those investigators were required, by the
scientific community, to insert no data not derived from
observations in reproducible experimental situations. Therefore the
method followed was explicitly designed so as to throw no light
on whether (*) holds in the sub-domain formed by this scientific
inquiry itself.6 The inquiry itself may be fine and scientifically
respectable, but not as an inquiry into (*) construed with unrestricted
domain.
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belief. The attitudes that appear in these lists are to some extent
epistemic and to some extent evaluative, and perhaps some
involve or require belief for their own coherence. But they are not
equatable with beliefs. Implicitly, then, we have already been
relying on a view of philosophy which belies Principle ZERO.
So here is a radical proposal: a philosophical position can
consist in something other than a belief in what the world is like.
Taking the empiricist's attitude toward science rather than his or
her beliefs about it as the more crucial characteristic, we are then
led to the suggestion: the alternative to Principle ZERO is that a
philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach). Such a stance can of course be expressed, and
may involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot be
simply equated with having beliefs.
2.
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Yes, our cognitive science project has shown that it is, and we
now have statistical data about its reliability.
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also involve beliefs in some way and are not formulable without
them. Hence spelling out this central attitude involves also the
articulation of how science is to be conceived.
There must be some leeway: there are undoubtedly varieties
of empiricism, predicated on variations in this conception of
science. In addition there must be leeway for some variance in the
attitude toward science as conceived. Crucial will be the question:
just how much of science, which aspects, are valued so highly as
to set an ideal for practical and theoretical reason in general? How
much of actual science bears out this ideal and what is to be
ascribed to historical, cultural, and sociological accident? Most of
all: where is even this ideal to be left behind as no longer offering
adequate or relevant guidance? Empiricism is not meant to be
scientism or idolatry of science; it entails a critique of scientism in
the name of science. I will briefly address each of these points.
3.1 Attitudes not justified by beliefs
There is a certain bias toward Reason in most philosophy:
attitudes must be justified, their justification must be by something
other than attitudes, so attitudes must derive from beliefs - what
else? Isn't the alternative purely subjective preference? How
fortunate for us that this question has an exact parallel in skeptical
challenges to belief itself! That should undermine its appeal. If a
philosopher does accept that attitudes are legitimate or rational
only if justified by beliefs, he or she lands immediately in the
fact/value problem. For the belief says that things are thus or so,
while to justify an attitude it must establish that this attitude is
better than or superior to its rivals. The attempt to meet this
problem with the assertion that the relevant belief will be one
which is (based on, derivative from) genuine insight into value,
yields an immediate similar dilemma. Is the content of this insight
a factual proposition (about Values perhaps)? Or is having an
insight into value the same as valuing, having an evaluative
attitude (which is in some sense correct)? Obviously we land in a
circle either way. The only way out is to deny the initial bias:
rationality does not require our attitudes to be justified by beliefs.
3.2 Attitudes as involving belief
At the same time, attitudes and beliefs are inextricably
involved with each other. I cannot admire a person's honesty
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oneself to) a theory which goes infinitely far beyond any evidence
we could have.19 But in this, the intellect is not sacrificed, and
rational inquiry is not replaced by blind dogma, provided the step
taken is acknowledged as such. That means: to let such a step
display itself in the light of day, and not to pretend that it was
compelled (as opposed to: permitted) by reason.
This requires the possibility of a certain detachment, of
simultaneously having convictions while being capable of standing
back and assessing them critically. Is that possible at all? Perhaps
I have disarmed the second of what I called the two apparent
terrible corollaries; but what of the first? In the natural orientation,
questions as to the very possibility of cognition, or as to
presuppositions of one's current questions (and survey of possible
answers to those questions), are absent. The terminology betrays
us here, for it harks back toHusserl's dichotomy. There is in fact
a large panorama of possible orientations, in each of which some
presuppositions are investigable, but every one of which appears
blind to certain presuppositions when viewed from within another
orientation. Husserl pointed, for simplicity perhaps, to two extreme
poles, both impossible: the consciousness so immersed in things
that it cannot be troubled by pre-conditions of cognition, and the
opposite consciousness so philosophically free that its inquiry is
presuppositionless. In actuality, we are never at either extreme.
Here as elsewhere, Neurath's image applies of sailors rebuilding
their ship at sea.
There is another pressing need at this point. We need to spell
out just what an empiricist can believe about science, and I shall
address that in the next sub-section. But meanwhile, related to the
doubts and misgivings presently at issue is that science triumphant
would replace our present belief-structure/world-picture with
something truly unpalatable.20 Though Goethe put this in
Mephistopheles' mouth, who of us is not ready with "Grey, dear
friend is all theory, but ever green grows life's golden tree"? Or, to
shift the words of an English thinker from its original target to one
more threatening now:
That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the
world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller
splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it
hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of
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2.
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Notes
1. This section contains two lines of argument for a common conclusion. The
first I have previously presented in my "Carnap on Logic and Ontology"
(unpublished ms. of 1991), and the second in my "Against Naturalized
Empiricism," in P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio, eds. On Quine (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
2. For a critique of historical empiricism by a contemporary empiricist, see
Reichenbach's "Rationalism and Empiricism: An Inquiry into the Roots of
Philosophical Error," in H Reichenbach, Modern Philosophy of Science (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).
3. A fourth example is the assertion: if mathematics is not the true
description of a platonic realm of abstract entities, and also does not just consist
of logical tautolOgies, then you can't explain why it is useful for science.
4. See my "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science," in P.M. Churchland
and c.A. Hooker, eds., Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a
Reply 1Jy Bas C. van Fraassen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 245308.
5.. See my "Against Naturalized Empiricism."
6. This is not nearly enough for a good argument, and I refer to "Against
Naturalized Empiricism" for the version of this argument which I consider
adequate.
7. The word stance has been given recent currency in analytic philosophy by
Daniel Dennett's use of the term ("intentional stance," "physical stance") and I
believe that my usage here is consonant with his very suggestive exploitation of
that term. See especially D. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," Journal of Philosophy
68 (1971), pp. 87-106; and, by the same author, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1987). In the English translation of Husserl's Ideen I, the term is
"standpoint," with "orientation" reserved for spatial perspective (for example,
section 150).
8. E. Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. W.P. Alston and G.
Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). These lectures were given by
Hussed in GOttingen in 1907.
9. Ibid. p. 15.
10. Ibid. p. 15.
11. Ibid. p. 15.
12. Compare Joseph J. Kockelmans, Phencmienology and Physical Science
(pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1966), chapters nine and ten.
13. I have made a start in this in my "Belief and Will," Journal of Philosophy 81
(1984), pp. 235-56, and gone somewhat further in by "Belief and the Problem of
Ulysses and the Sirens," Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. But these are tentative,
first steps.
14. See my "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science," for a critique of the
approach to methodology which attempts to ground it in belief in the conditions
of its adequacy. I regard this as an often instantiated recipe for disaster in
epistemology.
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This is the famous reflection on two tables, the familiar and the
scientific, that Eddington proposed shortly after the formalism of
the quantum theory had been set down. 5 In this reflection,
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of a mysterious substance
constitutive of every object of physical theory, Eddington'S
argument helps us recognize that a transcendental sense of
unconditioned (absolute origin) is present down to the local
connections of the world described in every physical theory. The
development of physics from the Newtonian paradigm
highlights this presence, which is made up of four moments.8
Each of them is a variation on the theme of how to articulate the
apparent freedom contained in any present with the total history
of the universe.
(1) In the laws of Newtonian physics, as interpreted according
to Laplacian determinism, the history of a physical system, for
some interval of time, is a specification of the state of that system
at each instant of the interval, where each state consists of the
specification of position and momentum for each particle in the
system. For any given state, there exists only one extension into
the past and the future. So, at least in principle, physical laws
should make it possible to infer all past and future events of the
~9rld from the total knowledge of events contemporary with a
given event. Everything is determined from the initial condition,
with the apparently absurd consequence that no room is left for
any contingency, for any freedom. The paradox with such absolute
determinism is that the anticipatory character of the laws results
from their being an incomplete (non-pure) a priori, which could
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v
In following the progression that leads from Newtonian to
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universe turns out to be just the sum over all possible histories, so
that ultimately we are supposed to be left with a sense of being
only.
Hawking insists that his model results from the fact that we
don't know the physics of an initial singularity (BRT, 156), and
moreover we cannot give any particular reason for thinking that
the universe began one way rather than another (BRT, 143).
Considering the realm of being as overcoming these limitations
inherent to our knowing capacities, Hawking asks us to believe
that physics corrects not only the ordinary appearances in which
we live, but also those ultimate appearances that would put an end
to one's life: "only if [an astronaut] lived in imaginary time would
he encounter no singularities" (BHT, 147). Hawking's extreme
position thus reveals the real scope of Eddington'S remark that we
must at all times refrain from prejudging the ultimate identity of
the familiar and the symbolic world: there can be no illusion of
substantiality attached to my own existence as it delves into time,
since even if there was one, there can be no good reason in physics
to remove it unless we are prepared to ignore the gap between the
familiar and the symbolic. Hawking is ready to do just that:
"Which is real, 'real' or 'imaginary' time? It is simply a matter of
which is the more useful description" (BRT, 148).
In the background of these speculations that pass over
Eddington'S gap, we can discern the fundamental idea borrowed
from quantum theory, according to which, in supposedly standing
away from the four-dimensional space-time continuum, an
elementary quantum phenomenon would not really have
happened unless it enters the consciousness of an observer. What
makes world and consciousness one indivisible entity, so the
argument goes, is that consciousness itself is not localizable in
space-time; the deeper layer of reality beneath the space-time layer
would thus communicate in some way With our own mind. In the
strong versions of the argument, reality would be literally imputed
to, if not constituted by the mind. Of course, it is but a short step
from this to the conception (adopted in all brands of the so-called
"anthropic principle") that our own existence will turn out to be
a crucial factor in explaining the physical universe.
Husserl warns us that there is at least an indirect sense in
which consciousness is localizable in space-time (Crisis, 215ff). To
be sure, an individual consciousness cannot be said to be in
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Notes
1. A Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, 15th ed., trans.
R W. Lawson (London: Methuen, 1955), p. 150.
2. S.W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time (London: Bantam Books, 1988), p.
18. Quoted hereafter as BHT.
3. H Minkowski, "Space and TIme", in A Einstein et.al., The Principle of
Relativity, trans. W. Perrett and G.B. Jeffery (London: Methuen, 1923), p. 76.
4. E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,
trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 112. Quoted
hereafter as Crisis.
5. AS. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1928), xi-xix. Quoted hereafter as NPW.
6. 1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan,
1929), B xvi sq. Quoted hereafter as CPR.
7. See for instance K. Hiibner, Critique of Scientific Reason. trans. P.R Dixon
and HM. Dixon (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983), pp. 143-4.
8. The following development is based on H Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics
and Natural Science. trans. O. Helmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949),
pp.210-11.
9. The details are worked out in J. Earman, A Primer on Determinism
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986).
to. See for instance S. Goldberg, Understanding Relativity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), pp. 84-5.
11. Einstein, Relativity, p. 18.
12. See E. Harrison. Cosmology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
p.240.
13. The technical accounts of this work are presented by Hawking and Ellis
in The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1973). See also R Geroch and G. Horowitz, "Global structure of space-times", and
R Penrose, "Singularities and time-asymmetry", in S. Hawking and W. Israel, eds,
General Relativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
14. Recently, the so-called plasma cosmology has been developed, which
denies any privilege to the gravity-dominated big bang cosmology and proposes
a model without any beginning.
15. J. Earman and J. Norton, ''What price spacetime substantiva1ism: The hole
story", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1987), pp. 515-525.
16. See P. Kerszberg, The Invented Universe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
17. a the discussion in L. Sklar, "Prospects for a causal theory of spacetime",
in Philosophy and Spacetime Physics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985),
pp.285-86.
"I wish to thank Joseph Kockelmans, Bernard Dauenhauer and Babette Babich
for their help and comments on early versions of this paper.
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praxis with its own cultural goals. With Luther, it is the lack of a
sense that sola scriptura may not be able to yield a single and
divinely appointed sense without the help of profane books of
merely human composition. In both cases, tension develops with
the passage of time between the presentation of the exemplary
experience within the established practice of religion or science,
and the representation of that experience in theology or science
respectively. This moving historical dialectic between "noetic"
human expectations and "noematic" human fulfillment in the
phenomenon, modelled in a representation, whether linguistic,
mathematical, or in the form of a display, is the heart of strong
hermeneutics.
In contrast with weak (Le., textual) hermeneutics that derives
meanings from texts and other representations by reading, strong
hermeneutics (Le., hermeneutics in the context of perception and
pre-perception) has the goal of presenting to experience the
phenomena that are represented meaningfully in texts. Perception
then is like a performance, for performance, e.g., of a song as
represented, causes a phenomenon, Le., the song as performed, to
make an appearance in the world. The performance of the
perceiver makes the perceived object appear. Like every performance, perception is internally "scripted," or better,
"programmed" in anticipation of what is to be constituted by its
action in the world when the conditions are right. Such preperceptual "programming" is a program of action in the world
aimed at realizing for some local historical community the
presence of a meaningful referent, Le., one about which the home
language of the local community can speak referentially. Since
perceiving, as Heidegger says, is a "seeing-something-assomething," it is for this reason hermeneutical in a strong
sense-existentially hermeneutical.
Thus, a strongly hermeneutical philosophy is oriented towards the
perceptual world as toward its historical horizon of Being.
Whatever is or exists in this sense, makes its appearance in the
living world "dressed" for a community that is local, historical,
economic, religious, and political. It is easy to see why, for
example, Hans-Georg Gadamer would claim that hermeneutic
philosophy is the heir to the older practical philosophy of
Aristotle. 5 Hermeneutical philosophy not surprisingly presents
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Notes
1. Knorr-cetina, Karin, and Amman, Klaus, "Image Dissection in Natural
Scientific Inquiry," Science, Technology and Human Values 15 (1990), pp. 259-283.
2. Galilei, Galileo, "The Assayer" (1623), from the translation of Stillman
Drake in Drake, S. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (New York: Doubleday
Anchor, 1957), pp. 237-238.
3. At crucial times in the history of Western philosophy, e.g., with Descartes,
Hume, Carnap, Husserl, Heidegger, the rejuvenation of thinking was sought
through a return to the evidence of some basic set of givens, i.e., to a
phenomenology. Such phenomenologies seen in hindsight always turn out to be led
by some guiding universal method or metaphor, project or purpose which
converts the return to evident beginnings into a progressive method of
philosophical inquiry. With Descartes and Husserl, it was the geometric or
mathematical (in the largest sense) invariant structure of given human intentions;
with Hume and Carnap, it was the spatio-temporal atomicity of the basic givens
of experience. Every radical return to the "natural attitude," such as Arthur Fine's
"natural ontological attitude," invokes some universal progressive principle
usually in disguise; without this there would be no sense of a new beginning, no
phenomenology to ground truth claims.
4. Galilei, Galileo, Dialogues Concerning noo New Sciences, trans. by Henry
Crew (New York: Dover, 1914), pp. 178-179.
5. H-G Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981),
pp. 113-138.
6. The term "flesh" is borrowed from M. Merleau-Ponty's later works, cf. M.
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1968), p. 127.
7. H-G Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 99.
The context of discussion is the constitution of a work of art. A similar
constitution takes place in the search for a hitherto imperceptible entity such as
scientific research aims at discovering. In this latter case, data become
transformed into profiles of a new (or newly constituted) scientific phenomenon
or entity, and scientific theory undergoes a transformation by taking on the
character of being descriptive of this phenomenon. As a score is to a musical
work, so scientific theory is to the scientific phenomenon, and as performances
is to a musical work, so data are to the scientific phenomenon; see my
"Experiment as Fulfillment of Theory," in Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy, ed.
by D.P. Chattapadhyaya, L. Embree, and IN. Mohanty (New Delhi and
Washington: University Press of America and CARP, 1990), pp. 313-328.
8. Heidegger's phenomenology only applies to "ready-to-hands," i.e., to
objects actually involved in human actions, e.g., a hammer within a hammering,
because only such objects show how they participate ir\the ontological horizon
of Being. In contrast, to be merely "present-at-hand", is to have merely the status
of possibly becoming connected with ontological Being in a specific way-they
do not exhibit (ontological) Being, only the possibility of (ontic) beings. All
abstract and theoretical accounts for Heidegger fall into this second category.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXCAVATION OF
ARCHAEOLOGICAL COGNITION
OR HOW TO HUNT MAMMOTH
by Lester Embree
Introduction
Archaeology is a science, specifically a cultural science, and
subspecifically an historical science. It is devoted to the objective
description and explanation of long term continuity and change in
what are best called human worlds. Archaeologists often say they
seek to account for lifeways, but speaking of worlds will help keep
it remembered that it is not just this or that pattern of behavior but
the entirety of manners in which people in a society individually
and collectively relate in all mental and physical ways to one
another and to their animal, vegetable, and mineral surroundings
that is the theme of archaeological inquiry. Archaeology is part of
cultural anthropology.
Sometimes it may be useful to qualify the word world as social,
as cultural, as technological, as religious or ideological, etc., but
such qualifications each serve only to emphasize an aspect of
matters that concretely have all those determinations. It is
furthermore useful to speak of worlds in the plural in order to bear
in mind that our own world, which is also investigated by
archaeologists, is only one world among many in the present as
well as the past. Generically, there is concern with what is
common to any world whatsoever, e.g. technology, ideology, and
social structure, but there are the specific worlds of foragers,
simple agriculturalists, chiefdoms, feudalism, nation states, as well
as multi-nationally industrializing planets.
Archaeology is distinctive among the cultural sciences because
of its central reliance on non-verbal remains. Remains is preferable
to artifacts as a general designator for archaeological data because
much of the data of concern to contemporary archaeologists is nonartifactual, for example animals and plants that were hunted and
gathered in situations where there is no reason to believe the
environment or biota have been significantly modified by human
action. The distinction between the artifactual and the nonartifactual is sometimes useful to make among remains.
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Lester Embree
Archaeological Cognition
379
(Figure 1)
2 Inch
~-"-1-,.2---'--,i..---4..----.l;'
em.
(From George C. Frison, ed., The Casper Site, New York: Academic
Press, 1974, p. 73.) Reproduction at 75% of actual size.
Lester Embree
380
While there are stones that are so crudely shaped that there is
serious question whether they are artifacts or simply natural
products, which is a question different from whether they were
used as tools, there is no such question about these exquisite
remains. They were made by humans for some purpose or
purposes. Common-sensically, they seem too big for arrow heads
and hence were probably used as spear points in the hunting of
big game.
(Figure 2)
8UFFALO BARBECUE,.lO,OOO B. C.
Archaeological Cognition
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Lester Embree
Archaeological Cognition
383
scientific awareness-formation.
Following now Frison's Prehistoric Hunters of the High Plains
(1974),4 but skipping most of the fascinating detail and
argumentation, we can become more adequately aware of a world,
i.e. a way of life in the far past. The high plains of North America
were (and are) a harsh place, often dry if not arid, windy, very hot
in summer and very cold in winter. Mountains are almost always
in view, there are bluffs and cliffs, and arroyos cut across the
surface of the land. The flora and fauna were such that no more
than simple bands could have been supported by hunting; there
were no villages, no craft specialization, no domesticates (except
the dog), no horticulture. Bands must have moved a great deal.
They probably separated into single or small multi-family groups
during much of the year, but probably came together for larger
communal hunts in the fall, when they could accumulate dried and
later frozen meat against winter. And, although hunting was male
activity and of high prestige, women gathered the plant food and
small animals that actually made up the bulk of the diet.
The question of whether artifacts like those depicted in Figure
1 were projectile points used for killing or knife blades used for
butchering large game (or both) has actually been an issue in
Plains archaeology. It has been approached through archaeological
experiments at making similar artifacts, hafting them to shafts, and
thrusting them into live bison and freshly killed African elephants,
by attempting to skin and butcher the beasts, and examining how
the stone tools wear, are sharpened, and break.
Unbroken pieces excavated are often very sharp at the point,
which would not seem relevant for a knife, and when experimental
points hit bone, they break with "impact fractures" just like the
ones recovered from 10,000 years ago. The worked stones depicted
in Figure 1 would have been hafted at the ends opposite the
pointed ones. Frison discussed whether it would have been worth
the effort to haft a stone knife and whether a hafted point would
have been additionally useful for butchering a kill:
A properly hafted stone knife is easier to use than a handgripped one. On the other hand, flake and bone tools used in bison
butchering were not amenable to hafting. Stone has little structural
strength compared to steel and a long handle cannot be attached to
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Lester Embree
a stone knife unless a suitable means of attachment is provided. The
handle must be well supported and properly attached to withstand
the pressures of intense butchering. This sort of haft can be provided
but consider also that the stone knife is rapidly dulled in some
butchering operations so that the attrition through use and
continued sharpening and breakage is extremely rapid. The butcher
soon has a hafted tool that is no longer of any use, but one in which
he has a large investment in terms of time, effort, and materials.
Archaeological Cognition
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Lester Embree
driving bison over a jump or into a trap without horses is to locate
the proper feature and determine whether it is so situated that bison
can be brought to it. Then each hunter has to become totally familiar
with the territory. The drive lines serve as reference points to help
the hunters coordinate their movements with those of the buffalo.
These movements have to be perfectly timed. Split-second responses
to movements of the animals usually means the difference between
success and failure. (idem)
Archaeological Cognition
387
Young mammoth might have been the easiest to hunt and, given
the reproduction rates of elephants, humans might then have
played a large role in their extinction in North America.
Such a kill could have been accomplished by a band of
twenty-five persons including four to six experienced hunters.
Probably a shaman helped. The mammoth would weigh about five
tons and over 3,000 pounds of that would be meat, enough to feed
the band for nearly two months, provided it could be dried or
frozen for storage. Arrangements of mammoth bones have been
found that might well have framed meat caches.
II. Phenomenological Excavation of Archaeological Cognition
In relation to the foregoing the attempt can now be made at
least to outline the structure of archaeological cognition.
Archaeological cognition is the type of cognition specific to the
science of archaeology. Like all types of cognition, it can be
investigated phenomenologically. To investigate it in this way
signifies to reflect upon it theoretically. When thus reflected upon,
what most conspicuously appears is the difference between the
processes of cognizing and the object as cognized. This is a
noetico-noematic correlation that will become clearer as the
following reflectively produced descriptive sketch proceeds. Lest
it be thought that reflection is confined to self-observation and
hence something only practicing archaeologists might engage in,
it can be mentioned, firstly, that reflection includes among its
species reflection on others and hence non-archaeologists can
reflectively observe archaeological observation and, secondly, that
the goal is eidetic knowledge of archaeological cognition and thus
fictive as well as serious observation can be relied upon. 7
The following sketch proceeds like an excavation, which is to
say that the digging begins on the surface and proceeds
downwards and the different layers or strata and what is found
within them are recorded. It is a principle in archaeology that,
absent reasons to believe otherwise, the higher strata of a deposit
are younger than the deeper and older ones. In the following
figurative excavation the relationship between strata is not
especially temporal, but each "higher" stratum is not possible
without the one(s) beneath it. To excavate is then to practice a
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Archaeological Cognition
389
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Lester Embree
Archaeological Cognition
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Lester Embree
================================================
(Figure 3)
Archaeological Cognition
2. Archaeological knowing
Justified believing in------>
Linguistic Awareness------->
Thinking---> KnowPerceiving--> ledge
1. Justified believing in------>
Indicational awareness------>
Perceiving---> Remains
Cultural
world
back
then
and
there.
================================================
Archaeological Cognition
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Lester Embree
new remains are found and as new ideas and better laboratory and
mathematical analyses are performed on the constantly growing
accumulation of remains, different past lifeways are represented
and hence there is different knowledge. To concoct another false
but instructive "example," it might be justifiedly believed at one
time that mammoth were hunted all year around by people who
chiefly ate meat. Later, careful studies of growth stages of the
bones of calves and also of ivory might somehow show that the
vast bulk of the game was taken in the fall and early winter and
studies of tooth wear and trace elements in bones of humans might
show that the vast bulk of the diet consisted of unstorable plants
chiefly found at higher elevations than those where mammoth
grazed. On that basis, not only mammoth hunting primarily for
winter food but also a more specific type of migrational pattern
would be represented, justifiably believed in, and known. (Lest the
reader be mislead, however, let it be reiterated that this is a
concocted example even if the proposition about what it generally
exemplifies is true.)
It used to be widely assumed that knowledge that was true
once and for all and for always could be readily obtained in all
sciences. That hope found much support regarding the formal
sciences of logic and mathematics during most of the more than
two millennia in which there has been not only science but also
philosophy of science. It would be an error, however, to believe
that a contentual and factual science like archaeology can meet
such standards, which are hence inappropriate. That archaeological
knowledge changes does not imply that archaeology is not a
science. And indeed not all parts of it change. While cognition of
the role of mammoth hunting would seem to have changed in the
example just concocted, that there were people and that they
hunted mammoth did not change and, indeed, it seems not
possible, given our data, to doubt those facts. Archaeological
cognition is based on what has been observed thus far, this
depends ultimately on perceived remains, and there is considerable
openness to the future. Respect for data disciplines the entire
endeavor. Archaeology is not science fiction.
Archaeological Cognition
395
Notes
1. For additional discussion of archaeology as a science and how it might be
investigated in history-oriented phenomenological philosophy of science, cf.
Lester Embree, "Phenomenology of a Change in Archaeological Observation," in
Lester Embree, ed., Metaarchaeology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1992). This volume also contains a chronicle and a bibliography of the history of
the philosophy of archaeology.
2. From George F. Frisson, ed. The Casper Site (New York: Academic Press,
1974), p. 73.
3. From George F. Frison and Lawrence C. Todd, eds., The Horner Site
(Orlando: Academic Press, 1987), p. 5.
4. George F. Frison, Prehistoric Hunters of the High Plains (New York:
Academic Press, 1978).
5. "Dart points and bow and arrow points can usually be distinguished by
size. The long, heavy shaft and projectile point used with an atlatl and dart do
not travel as fast as the shorter, lighter shaft and projectile point used with a bow
and arrow. The evidence from bison kill sites indicates that one is about as
effective as the other since penetration of bison bones is about the same for both
dart and arrow points. Perhaps the sudden popularity of the bow and arrow was
due to a combination of many attributes. The smaller projectile points could be
manufactured from more easily obtainable quarry materials, and they were easier
to make. Arrow shafts are also easier to manufacture than dart shafts. The atlatl
dart has to be relatively long to yield accuracy and it is difficult to carry many of
these. This is believed to be the reason for the foreshaft. A large bundle of these
could be carried easily. When a projectile point was lodged in an animal, it
separated from the mainshaft, which was then retrieved to be used again with
another foreshaft. A bundle of arrow shafts, each one complete, seems a much
better solution, being more portable and more dependable. The bow has a longer
range than the atlatl and dart and proficiency with the former is quicker and
easier to attain. For the atlatl to be used effectively, the body has to be in a
position to deliver the proper thrust. The upright position is best because the
whole body can be brought into play to give added thrust. Other positions, such
as kneeling, are possible, but thrust is impaired. Underbrush constrains the action
on throwing a dart more than that of drawing a bow. A bow can be drawn
effectively by the hunter whether he is standing, kneeling, or even lying on his
back and incorporating the use of his feet. Perhaps the greatest advantage of the
bow is that it can be dxawn slowly and deliberately; involving no violent
movement on the part of the hunter. In other words, the bow was more versatile
and easier to control than the atlatl. It is easy to understand why the bow and
arrow rapidly replaced the atlatl and dart." (Prehistoric Hunters, p. 233).
6. George C. Frison and Lawrence C. Todd, The Coilly Mammoth Site
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), p. 105.
7. For background on this analysis, see Lester Embree, Reflective Theoretical
Observation, forthcoming.
by Michael Heim
The history of the twentieth century reads like a running feud
between technology and human values. Modem technology hit
human cultures with the force of an invasion: it armed the nations
with airplanes, submarines, and nuclear arsenals; revved up
communications with radio and television; and now offers options
for irreversibly altering the natural environment through genetic
engineering.
Should we say technology does these things, or does the
responsibility lie rather with us humans? After all, we create the
technology. Yet, as our century shows, we are never fully in charge
of what we create, and technology, by its very nature, produces its
effects through automation. Automation holds a mighty attraction.
It can deliver so many good things. But it also has a darker side.
Sometimes technology seems to be in charge, dictating the
conditions under which we live and forcing us to choose among
uneasy alternatives when we feel least prepared to choose.
No philosopher highlights the clash between technology and
human values so sharply as Heidegger. Not only did Heidegger
make technology central to metaphysics, he also came to see in it
the root evil of the twentieth century, including the Nazi German
catastrophe, which he described as "the confrontation of European
humanity with global technology." Both in his life and writings
Heidegger felt technology to be an overwhelming force that
challenges the reassuring maxims of traditional morality. Yet his
death in 1976 did not permit Heidegger to see the century's most
powerful technological revolution: the proliferation of the
microcomputer. He saw only the first glimmerings of
computerization, the mainframe dinosaurs of the computer age.
But Heidegger's work can become a springboard for reflecting on
current-day computer technology, so that, by carrying on the task
of thinking, we get a clearer understanding of an important aspect
of our times.
The images we have of Heidegger the thinker, both
photographic and mythic, place him in another time, another
generation. In posed photographs, we see him sitting in a hut on
the quiet mountaintop of the Todtnauberg, surrounded by shelves
of books as he bends intently over a wooden writing table. The
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sun pours in the window. Under his pen, the manuscripts bristle
with marginalia and scrawled notations of every kind, his pages
a palimpsest heaped with layers of minute revisions. Heidegger
the thinker is Heidegger the scholar, and the scholar searches
ancient texts for clues about the history of Being. He is looking for
hints about where our essence, our heart, is today and whither the
pull of the future. Like in the Sybil's cave in VIrgil's Aeneid, the
workroom shakes as the winds of history blow across the
Todtnauberg, and the scholar's pages rustle and stir like leaves,
some flying about wildly to the ground and some shuffled in
random, unexpected ways. The pages speak of archaic beginnings
in Parmenides and Heraclitus as the philosopher seeks an open
clearing for the future.
This image of Heidegger feeds on nostalgia. Even the
Heidegger of the photos, seated in his hut a half century ago,
working with pen on paper, had a keen sense of just how faded
this picture was soon to become, how quickly this image turns
antiquarian. Because he connected being with time, Heidegger
knew that reality changes and with it the task of thinking. He
sensed the pace of change in the twentieth century, and he seemed
to foresee what librarians realize today: lithe image of the
humanist scholar in the book-crammed study, thinking deep
thoughts, will continue to be less and less viable in professional
scholarship."l This observation by the director of a great college
library confirms what Heidegger in his writings of the 1940s and
50s surmised.: our rapid technological advance challenges the
legacy of human thinking. Who better than the contemporary
librarian knows the inner trend of today's scholar? Bid adieu to the
"hochgewiilbtes, engen gotischen Studierzimmer" of Goethe's Faust.
The Schreibstube is giving way to the computer workstation.
Computerized libraries already exist today without paper
books, and by the year 2000, nearly every text of human
knowledge will exist in electronic form. Heidegger sensed, with
anguish, that his works would one day come to light in a world of
scholarship that had grown alien to the meditative pathways that
nurtured his thoughts. In 1967, he saw a rising crest of information
which, he suspected, might soon swallow his own writings:
Maybe history and tradition will fit smoothly into the information
retrieval systems which will serve as resource for the inevitable
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entities within the world. We can compare and research the nature
of these entities. We can investigate the causes of their operations,
sizing up their powers and limitations, but still we treat them as
beings, as entities delimited by their respective natures. The mindversus-computer question is not ontological. Nor is it existential.
Whether or not the computer could in principle outsmart the mind
or simulate consciousness, however intriguing a question, does not
touch what is happening to us now. The chess paradigm distracts
us from the present issue, because it makes us construe our
relationship to computers as confrontational rather than
collaborative.
Very different from the Computer as Opponent is the
Computer as Component. The computer has become an ingredient
in human knowing. Instead of seeing the computer as a potential
opponent to confront, we interface with computers. Computers are
woven into the fabric of everyday life, and they have become an
important thread in the texture of Western civilization. Our daily
reliance on computers affects the way our culture proceeds, in
everything from architecture to zoology. Instead of regarding
computers as opponents, we collaborate with computers.
Increasingly rare is a computer-free stance from which to regard
the computer as a separate device. Even the research and
development at major corporations is now moving away from
artificial intelligence research, where the computer functions
separately, to research on the human/computer symbiosis,
including information environments which augment human bodily
perception.s While we may legitimately inquire into the power
wielded by computers independently of humans, the existentialontological question really cuts in a different and deeper direction
than AI. As we now live and work with computers in our writing,
building, banking, drawing, and so forth, how does our reality
change? As Heidegger might put it, What is the meaning of this
intimate connection of Being with computers? When Heidegger
pondered technology as our destiny, he seemed to have had
something in mind more intimidating than an external challenge
to our dignity as human beings. Like many others, he did worry
about the degradation of the human spirit through mechanization.
An increasingly mechanized world necessarily challenges our
ability to define ourselves by what we can do independently and
self-reliantly. The fear of being displaced or taken over by
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desktop appliance. Not long after mailing the final draft of the
translation, I installed my own personal computer for wordprocessing. Imagine my mixed feelings when I came to realize that
the two years of labor on the translation would have amounted to
no more than one year if I had used a computer to handle the text
and references. The meaning of language machine began to take
shape in my mind.
Soon after trading in my electric typewriter for a portable
computer - that was 198.3 - I came to believe that the machine
in my hands was indeed the language machine of Heidegger's
speculations. The "language machine" was Heidegger's groping
term for the incipient phenomenon of word processing. Of course,
word processing did not exist in Heidegger's lifetime, at least not
as a cultural phenomenon. It existed only in the dreams of the
inventors like Doug Engelbart and Ted Nelson. Though he did not
see the word processor, Heidegger did have a keen eye for the
philosophical implications in the shift of writing technologies. He
saw in writing technology a clue to the human relationship to
language and to our awareness as beings embodied in the world:
Human beings "act" through the hand; for the hand is, like the
word, a distinguishing characteristic of humans. Only a being, such
as the human, that "has" the word (mythos, logos) can and must
"have hands." Both prayers and murder happen through hands, as
do gestures of gratitude and salutation, oaths and summoning, but
also the "work" of the hands, "handwork" and equipment. The
handshake seals the bond of association. The hand unleashes the
"work" of ravaging devastation. The hand becomes present as hand
only where there is disclosure and concealment. The animal has no
hands, nor are hands derived from paws, claws, or talons. Even in
moments of desperation the hand is never merely a "claw" with
which the human being "crawls." The hand has only emerged from
and with the word. The human being does not "have" hands, but
the hand contains the essence of the human being because the word,
as the essential region of the hand, is the essential ground of being
human. The word as something symbolically inscribed and as thus
presented to vision is the written word, that is, script. As script,
however, the word is handwriting.
It is not by chance that modern man writes "with" the typewriter
and
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[Dichten]-"into" the machine. This "history" of the kinds of writing
is at the same time one of the major reasons for the increasing
destruction of the word. The word no longer passes through the
hand as it writes and acts authentically but through the mechanized
pressure of the hand. The typewriter snatches script from the
essential realm of the hand-and this means the hand is removed
from the essential realm of the word. The word becomes something
"typed." Nevertheless, mechanical script does have its own, limited
importance where mechanized script serves as a mere transcription
for preserving handwriting, or where typewritten script substitutes
for "print." -When typewriters first became prevalent, a personal
letter typed on a machine was regarded as a lapse of manners or as
an insult. Today, handwritten letters slow down rapid reading and
are therefore regarded as old-fashioned and undesirable.
Mechanized writing deprives the hand of dignity in the realm of the
written word and degrades the word to a mere means for the traffic
of communication. Besides, mechanized writing offers the advantage
of covering up one's handwriting and therewith one's character. In
mechanized writing all human beings look the same. 10
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senses. But this is not to recommend non-literacy, any more than the
uses made of print are a judgment against literacy. In fact,
Heidegger seems to be quite unaware of the role of electronic
technology in promoting his own non-literate bias in language and
philosophy. An enthusiasm for Heidegger's excellent linguistics
could easily stem from naive immersion in the metaphysical
organicism of our electronic milieu. If the mechanism of Descartes
looks paltry today, it may be for the same subliminal reasons that it
looked resplendent in its own time. In that sense all fashions
betoken somnambulism of some kind, and are one means of critical
orientation to the psychic effects of technology.... There is nothing
good or bad about print but the unconsciousness of the effect of any
force is a disaster, especially a force that we have made ourselves. 17
When McLuhan refers here to Heidegger's non-literate bias, he
means Heidegger's emphasis on truth as it occurs existentially,
prior to propositional statements. McLuhan suggests that
Heidegger's ideas have a greater appeal to a culture organized
electronically because such a culture has already left behind the
detached, linear, individualistic mentality of literate or print
cultures. McLuhan agrees with Heidegger in asserting that
language technology belongs to us more essentially than any tool.
When a technology touches our language, it touches us where we
live.
McLuhan's work gave me new impetus to reflect on Heidegger
and computers. The word processor is not merely a tool, not
merely another technological device we can accept or reject at will.
More than a tool or opponent, the computer is now a component
in human knowledge. This is not only true of the scientific
application of computers where the computer alters the approach
to reality as much as the telescope altered science for Galileo,
Kepler, and Copernicus. Applied to language, the computer makes
the word processor a transcendental calculator. Just as language
transcends any specific content while it structures the context
within which things appear and are stated, so too the language
machine goes beyond any specific purpose or function to which we
can apply it. Word processing reaches to all aspects of our
awareness, not only to the mathematical, scientific, and commercial
mentality. The word processor expresses our contemporary world.
It embodies the calculative mentality of the modern age with the
far-reaching cultural influence of electronics. The word processor
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literacy cut into the psychic roots of belonging and severed the
attachment to immediate interpersonal presence. The print culture
even further reinforced literacy, spreading it ever more widely,
lifting individualism to unprecedented heights. Then, in Hegelian
fashion, Ong sees the electronic media sublating the earlier
oppositions, the oral and the literate, so that electronics achieves
an encompassing synthesis. Electronic visuals, supported by voices,
re-creates human presence and re-unites the individuated members
of the community. Underneath, however, the electronic images still
depend on the reading of scripts, prepared messages, and a printinformed society. So the electronic media preserves individual
literacy while at the same time surpassing it. Because of his
hopeful Hegelian dialectic, Ong omits the critical evaluation that
can only take place in the existential moment. While McLuhan
remained publicly silent on the adverse effects of the new media,
Ong appears to have absorbed criticism in a larger picture based
on the Christian narrative of Garden->Fall->Paradise Regained.
Heidegger reminds us of the inevitable trade-offs in history.
His philosophy does in fact proceed from the Hegelian sweep of
historical epochs, but it denies the possibility of an integrative
summation from one absolute standpoint. History is a series of
ambiguous gains bringing hidden losses. The series of epochs that
makes up the history of reality (Seinsgeschichte) expands or
contracts with different hermeneutic projects but never permits a
single cumulative narrative. Each moment of historical
transformation brings a challenge of interpreting the losses and
gains, the trade-offs in historical drift. The drift of history allows
no safe haven from which to assess and collect strictly positive
values once and for all.
In our era, Heidegger's notion of the intrinsic trade-offs of
history can spark a critical analysis of computerized writing.
Existential criticism can investigate the implications of a specific
technology in all its ambiguity. Because it accepts historical drift,
existential criticism proceeds without possessing a total picture of
the whither and wherefore, without accepting the picture
promoted by either technological utopians or dystopians. There is
no need to enforce a closure of pro-or-con, wholesale positive or
negative assessments. While recognizing the computer as a
component in our knowledge process, we can attend to what
happens to us as we collaborate with technology. Because human
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Notes
1. The statement was made by Ralph Holibaugh, director of the Olin and
Chalmers libraries at Kenyon College. It appeared in The Kenyon College Annual
Report 1988-90. p. 5.
2. From the preface to Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), my
translation.
3. See Don Ihde's Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth
(BlOOmington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
4. What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence (New York:
Harper Colophon, 1972; revised edition, 1979).
5. Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of
the Computer (New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1985).
6. See "Endgame: Peep Thought Stalks the Masters" by Don Steinberg in PC
Computing (July 1990), p. 144-49.
7. The history of this chess match appears in Howard Rheingold's Tools for
Thought: The People and Ideas behind the Next Computer Revolution (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1985), pp. 161-62. Dreyfus explains what he takes to be the
point of the match in Mind over Machine, p. 112.
8. A prime instance of this shift is the interest in cyberspace. A number of
papers on various aspects of cyberspace appear in the volume Cyberspace. edited
by Michael Benedikt, (Cambridge: MIT Press, Spring 1991). The term "cyberspace"
originated with the novels of William Gibson who used science fiction to explore
the symbiotic connection of human and computer. Harry Stevens at MIT refers
to computers that support communication as "cotechnology"; he uses the term to
mean the collaborative networking of humans via computer.
9. In Hebel- der Hausfreund (pfullingen: Giinther Neske, 1957); translated as
"Hebel - Friend of the House," in Contemporary German Philosophy Volume 3
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), translation by Bruce
Foltz and Michael Heim, pp. 89-101.
10. In Parmenides (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), originally lectures
given in the winter of 1942-43, Volume 54 of the Gesamtausgabe, my translation;
the interpolations in brackets are mine. In this passage, Heidegger is commenting
on the ancient Greek notion of "action" (pragma), pp. 118-19.
11. From the preface to Wegmarken (Frankfurt Klostermann, 1967), my
translation.
12. A recent study that locates Heidegger's theory of technology within the
cultural reaction of the Weimar Republic is Michael Zimmerman's Heidegger's
Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art (BlOOmington: Indiana
University Press, 1990).
13. In a letter to Jonathan Miller (April 1970), in The Letters of Marshall
McLuhan, selected and edited by Matie Molinaro, Corinne McLuhan, and William
Toye, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 406.
14. Letter to John Culkin (September 1964), Letters, p. 309.
15. Letter to Buckminster Fuller, (September 1964), Letters. p. 398.
16. In a letter to Jonathan Miller (April 1970), McLuhan wrote: ''I take it that
you understand that I have never expressed any preferences or values since The
423
Mec1umical Bride. Value judgments create smog in our culture and distract
attention from processes. My personal bias is entirely pro-print and all of its
effects." In other places McLuhan will not be so open about his stance. In writing
to Eric Havelock (May 1970), for instance, he says: "My own studies of the effects
of technology on human psyche and society have inclined people to regard me
as the enemy of the things I describe. I feel a bit like the man who turns in a fire
alarm only to be charged with arson. I have tried to avoid making personal value
judgments about these processes since they seem far too important and too large
in scope to deserve a merely private opinion." Letters, pp. 405 and 406,
respectively.
17. From The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 66, in a section entitled "Heidegger surfboards along on the electronic wave as triumphantly as Descartes rode the
mechanical wave."
18. Jonathan Kamin, for instance, describes the outliner program ThinkTank
and writes, "Children who grow up using ThinkTank, or a program like it, may
develop the capacity to handle large amounts of information, and to structure it
at an early age. Thus, they may be able to solve problems more effectively than
their elders." In The ThinkTank Book (Berkeley: Sybex, 1984), p. 218. The book
elaborates on the powers of a program written by Living Videotext for "idea
processing" on the microcomputer. The program makes possible rapid
manipulation of hierarchically arranged data (text) so that it creates a "database
managing system" for organizing a piece of writing as it occurs in the humancomputer interface. While the statement cited refers specifically to outliner
programs, many others attribute positive changes to word processing as such. At
the 1984 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, for instance,
Professor Janice Moulton wrote: "What are the philosophical implications of these
changes? With word processing we will be able to think more carefully and
deeply."
19. Howard Rheingold gives a good account of Engelbart and Nelson in his
Tools for Thought: The People and Ideas behind the Next Computer Revolution (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).
20. Electric Language: A Philosophical Study of Word Processing (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987; paper 1989). See also the first five chapters of my more
recent book, The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993).
.
SECTION V
HERMENEUTICS, ART, AND ETHICS
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the painter simply represents a poor pair of peasant shoes, wellworn, though in fact, unusable, since the image of the shoes strictly
serves no other purpose than to be regarded.
But what, a naive reader will ask, do shoes painted on canvas
show us about the essence of a produced object that the ordinary,
real object, represented in the painting, does not? It is enough,
Heidegger replies, to look, in order to see how the painting
highlights the being of the shoes by revealing the peasant's world
in its truth. This, even though nothing in the image itself shows
anything of the universe around the shoes, not even a clod of
earth, nothing but empty space.28 When we understand how to
look, the crease in the shoe reveals the laboured, heavy step of the
peasant through the fields, his fatigue, his tenacity at work, his
path along the length of freshly plowed fields. All this and more,
Heidegger suggests, is highlighted in the painting: lithe silent call
of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain" to lithe fallow
desolation of the winter field." In the shoes we can see the sorrow
endured, the concern over the daily bread, the uncertainty of the
next day, or the peaceful joy of a good harvest. 29
Without a doubt, the work of art also teaches us the
significance of the ordinary object, the shoes, though in fulfilling
its "allegorical" function through their representation, the painting
tells us something more without explicity saying so. Speaking in
its own voice, the work of art brings to its own remarkable world,
a world where fiction is more than actuality. In a sense, the work
carries the world that it reveals within it. Rather than bring us
back to the common meaning and abstraction, as it were,
suggested by the image of the shoes, it opens onto a world which
shines forth in its own worldly light.
In this way the painter's work speaks more clearly to us of the truth
of the peasant world than an actual pair of clogs would. This is the
paradoxical conclusion we move toward when a first definition of
art and its eminent function takes shape: to be "revelatory of a
world." In meditating upon the origin of work of art, we are now
led to understand that it is not itself which constitutes the origin, but
rather its capacity to make a world appear in its worldly truth. Here
arises a difficult problem, namely, whether the truth of this peasant
world revealed by the painter's work is not just our own invention.
Couldn't it be a pure product of our imagination or a description fed
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by memories of peasant life, i.e. of a subjective account we project
onto the painting what cannot be found there at all?30
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and the invisible, with the earth and the sky, with the Sacred and
the Divine; through the dwelling place dignified by god or
goddess, it testifies to its will to influence the sojourn of man on
earth.
The temple is the presence of the Sacred: with its harmonious
architecture it speaks the "truth" of a World, incarnating it in its
erect white columns and in the enclosure that at once delimits and
opens, in the space which it arranges around itself, on this site, on
the solitary hill overlooking the sea, from which it undoubtedly
draws a part of its majesty and luminous presence. And in return
the temple highlights this site, illuminating and consecrating it by
its presence. In some way, the temple receives its depth and
majestic air from the site where it is built, where it defies the rigors
of time and the element, and in return, it renders the day more
resplendent, the sky more vast and the night more dark. The
temple dominates the sea, opposing the perpetual tidal movement
with its own stability and steadfast presence; against the incessant
noise of the waves which assail the shore, it opposes the majesty
of its silence. Thus the site contributes in rendering the work more
beautiful and more grand, while the monument, for its part, gives
value to the site by means of the play of oppositions and contrasts,
highlighting its splendour; all things become what they are in their
profound essence, and are for the first time discovered, as it were,
in their truth. 33
liThe temple in its standing there," Heidegger writes, "first
gives to things their look, and to men their outlook on
themselves."34It is the temple which, by its expressive architecture
"consecrates" the placement of men on earth and under the sky,
delimiting the space that is sacred for them. Let us not conclude
too hastily that the work of art is simply the artificial structuring
of an environment serving as a fitting decor," ingeniously though
arbitrarily installed, and meant to accentuate the work's brilliance.
On the contrary, the work of art lets these things by which it is
surrounded be; it appears in the plenitude of their being and truth,
and calls to their shared glory.
The work of art literally benefits from the protection and
kindness of the earth as it contributes to its "pro-duction," and to
its exhibition under our incredulous gaze; the celebration of the
earth is not an objective representation of the real or of Nature. The
earth, in turn, becomes more than just a geographical or planetary
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of wood, into the hardness and luster of metal, into the lighting and
darkening of color, into the clang of tone, and into the naming
power of the word.,,39
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Notes
1. "Poetry is representation and expression of life. It expresses experience and
it represents the external reality of life." See Wilhelm Dilthey, Das Erlebnis und die
Dichtung, 1905. Concerning "Erlebniskunst" (art of experience), d. H. G. Gadamer,
Truth and Method, Barden and Cumming, eds. (New York: Crossroad, 1988), pp.
63 ff.
2. M. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art" (hereafter noted as
"OWA"), in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper &
Row, 1975), p. 79. Relevant to this theme is also Gadamer's hermeneutic critique
of aesthetic consciousness in the first part of his Truth and Method. cf. also F. W.
von Herrmann, Heidegger's Philosophie der Kunst (Frankfurt on Main: Klostermann,
1980).
3. Husserl has taught us that the more things seem "selbstverstiindlich," selfevident and obvious to us, the more they demand of us a "Selbstverstiindigung,"
comprehension and self-enlightenment.
4. See Phenomenology Ilf Internal Time Consciousness, II, and Experience and
Judgment, I and XI, in which Husserl speaks explicitly of "phiinomenologische
Ursprungserhellung" (phenomenological elucidation of the origin) by means of
which the essence of logic will be uncovered step-by-step.
5. The question of origin takes, according to Husserl, the form of a
"Ruckfrage" (inquiry back) into the most original sense of the experience of logic
or geometry, or even of a "return to a foundation hidden in meaning"
(Sinnesfundament) of our experience of the world; this move should not be
confused with the investigation of the historical and empirical genesis of the
meaning of cultural formations. cf. ''The Origin of Geometry" in The Crisis of
European Sciences, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1970), p. 354. On the noetic and noematic analysis, cf. Ideas I, Part Three, chapters
ill and N trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht Kluwer Academy Publishers, 1982).
6. See Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans. E.
Casey and others (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
7. See Husserl, Ideas II, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989) and Ideas I, par. 95.
8. See OWA pp. 15-88, of which my present essay is a modest re-reading. See
also Joseph J. Kockelmans' masterful Heidegger on Art and Artworks (La Haye:
Phaenomenologica 99, 1985).
9. For the status of "objective ideality" which characterizes cultural objects,
see The Origin of Geometry, p. 354. See also Derrida's commentary dedicated to the
cultural world according to Husserl in Derrida's introduction to the French
translation of the text, L'origene de la geometrie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1962), pp. 44ff.
10. See OWA, Epilogue, pp. 79-81. See also Gadamer's analysis of the limits
of the "Erlebnis1cunst" (art of experience) in Truth and Method, pp. 63ff.
11. See Heidegger, Nietzsche: The Will to Puwer as Art. trans. D. Krell (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979).
12. See G. W. F. Hegel, "Vorlesungen liber die Aesthetik" in WWX, 1, p. 16,
cited by Heidegger in OWA p. 80.
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allow, I direct the reader to the relevant passages in Heidegger's essay, OWA p
47 ff., and also to his 1930 essay, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.
32. The example of non-representational art amply confirms it. For the
argument of art as Mimesis, see the Heideggerian analysis of Platonic theory in
Nietzsche.
33. For a complete description, see OWA p. 43.
34. See OWA p. 43.
35. Concerning the Heideggerian "mythology" of Earth (Erde), "die
Hervorkommende-Bergende" and of World (Welt), "the self-disclosing openness,"
cf. OWA pp. 46 ff. and also the essays, "The Thing" and "...Poetically Man
Dwells ... " in Poetry, Language, Thought.
36. See OWA p. 42.
37. See OWA p. 44. On the Sacred and the divine, cf. Erliiuterungen zu
HOlderlins Dichtung.
38. See OWA p. 47.
39. See OWA p. 47.
40. See OWA p. 46.
41. "Then art is a becoming and a happening of the truth: all art is a lettinghappen of the beginning of the truth of beings as such." See OWA pp. 51 ff.
Concerning the notion of "truth" as "disclosure" and Aletheia see the essay,
"Aletheia" in Vortriige und Aufsiitze.
42. "Just as a work cannot be without being created but is essentially in need
of creators, so what is created cannot itself come into being without those who
preserve it." See OWA p. 66.
43. See OWA p. 71.
44. See OWA p. 48.
45. "Art," writes Heidegger, "is history in the essential sense that it grounds
history." See OWA p. 77.
46. See OWA pp. 40 ff.
47. On Art as "Poiesis" (Dichtung), see Arion L. Kelkel, La legende de l'tre.
Langage et poesie chez Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1980). Naturally, see also Kockelmans'
Heidegger, on Art and Art Works.
by Adriaan Peperzak
Contemporary ethics
The situation of contemporary ethics is a strange mixture of
utilitarianism, Kantianism, antimoralism, relativism and a few
attempts to renew Aristotelianism. In Anglosaxon philosophy
utilitarianism seems to predominate, although some elements of
deontology also are influential.
The basic assumptions of utilitarianism fit very well into the
general pattern of contemporary culture; they clearly express it. A
critical examination of utilitarianism is, thus, not only an
intraphilosophical affair, but, at the same time, a critique of our
culture. Aside from an analysis of its internal coherence and a
meta-ethical reflection about the categories and formal structures
used in it, a diagnosis of utilitarian ethics should deal with the
following topics:
a) the true character of happiness, the qualitive differences
between its constituents and the precise definition of
different sorts of pleasure, joy, enjoyment, peace, suffering
sadness, pain etc.;
b) the relations between our search for happiness and the
human desire for an ultimate meaning of life;
c) the nature of egoism, the possibility of altruism and the
necessity of a personal interest in universal well-being.
However, such a critique should also try to discover why
some well-known defenders of utilitarianism seldom treat these
topics or dismiss them rather quickly when they come to mind. As
an initial approach one could risk the hypothesis that many
affirmations about meaning, happiness, pleasure, well-being of the
greatest number of human beings, and so on, express positions
that in our culture are considered unproblematic, although their
truth is not immediately evident. Below I will give arguments for
this interpretation.
As we all know, Kant's fundamental objection against
utilitarianism was that its appeal to the notion of happiness cannot
justify the obligatory character of morality. From our factual
tendency to happiness, which he accepts as a "naturally necessary"
desire, no obligation, no Sollen, will ever follow. Although nobody
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1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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the opinion that the right to respect due to all human beings is
based on equality in value. Can we distinguish this democratism
from an absolute relativism? If pluralism means that all practices
and convictions are equally valuable, it seems impossible to attach
any importance to the search for the authentically good or true.
Relativism has become an all-permeating mentality, although
it is not often defended explicitly as a systematic position in
philosophy. It is defenseless against the classical refutation of
skepticism, but as a general lack of faith in any specific ideology,
the relativistic mentality is stronger than the logical attacks
triumphing over it within the field of philosophy. Most relativists
appeal to the impressive multitude of factual varieties of cultural
codes and ideologies. Although this factuality does not imply the
falseness of any position or the wrongness of any code, the great
diversity of answers given to the fundamental question of life
might induce the desperate conviction that nobody can justify,
rationally, one determinate position as the only right and true one.
The greatest obstacle for all hard forms of relativism is,
however, the impossibility of practicing it; even the most
convinced relativist submits his life to guidelines which he has not
chosen, but recognizes as "naturally" imposing themselves, and
when he follows self-chosen norms, his choice ultimately has been
guided by non-chosen criteria. To pretend that all morality can be
reduced to an autonomous choice of fundamental standards is to
deny the common experience of conscience as an awareness of
given" and non-chosen obligations.
A relative relativism is, however, possible and recommendable. The multiplicity of psychological, sociological, cultural,
linguistic and other determinations is responsible for a great
variety of standpoints and approaches, but they do not prevent a
deep kind of affinity through which we can recognize all other
human beings as pertaining to a worldwide community. Even a
democratic and formalistic position for which all codes and
opinions are equally valuable, is a normative conviction which
maintains specific criteria. Our century offers the surprising
spectacle of an almost general relativism on the level of implicit
and sometimes explicit theory in combination with firm
convictions about human rights and the respectability of personal
choices for peculiar life patterns and ideologies.
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Critical remarks
To begin with the widespread formalism referred to in the last
paragraph, I would like to ask whether it is possible for
philosophy to withdraw from any social, moral, religious and
philosophical involvement. If "form" is essentially a moment of the
concrete reality - and not (any) "thing" - every hypostasis of
formal structures is impossible. All sorts of formal reflection pose,
at least laterally and implicitly, a specific relationship between the
formalities on which they concentrate, and a certain content to
which those formalities belong. All formalistic attempts to isolate
formal moments by avoiding the question of their relations to a
fitting content treat forms as if they were things or beings. In
ethics, the doctrine of equal human rights on the basis of
individual autonomy, for example, would become an empty
formalism, if it did not thematize the necessity of the individual's
involvement in concrete roles and functions of a historical society.
A logician who naively identifies the formal structures of his logic
with the fundamental structures of ontology does something
similar. Following this line one could show that all forms of metaethics are either provisional and incomplete, or masks for a
normative standpoint in morality and ethics, whereas the reduction
of ontology to a purely formal discipline abandons philosophy as
a quest for truth.
A second remark regards the spread of relativistic nihilism. If
it is no longer possible for us to agree on a meaning of individual
and social life, of history and the world, and if we do not want the
family of man to fall apart in isolated atoms, which, by their
isolation, are condemned to make war or suffer death by despair,
we cannot avoid looking for - at least some - "values" that are
obvious to all human being. Such values seem to be found in the
satisfaction of our needs. We cannot deny their value if to be alive
is better than not to be born or to be dead already. Their
universality creates a specific coherence among all humans and
procures them with a basis and some indications for our
tommerce. Notwithstanding their triviality, our needs form a firm
basis for shared ends of survival and well-being. This is why our
civilization must be characterized as an economic one: planning,
technology, bureaucracy and modem media of communication are
parts of an overall network of relations and handling motivated by
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not eat the bread I need. To prevent our needs from conflicting, a
fair distribution is needed, but what do we want to do with a wellfed, well-protected and comfortable life? Since a democratic society
cannot impose a value pattern of its own, but should follow the
lawful expressions of the will of (all?) its members, the public
distribution of goods depends on the factual situations that result
from the concrete interests and forces of a historical society. Since
it is obviously not true that all private persons in a. society are
equal in force or intelligence, as Hobbes would have it for the sake
of his argument, such a distribution is not necessarily a fair one.
The principle of needs is the principle of egoism. The only
possibility of withholding it from a compete elimination of justice
lies in a strict application of the formal demand included in the
principle of equal rights. Since the question of which needs (or
wants) are the "highest" or most urgent ones in a fully democratic
society is left to the private choice of singular individuals, the
public distribution cannot fix itself on specific goods, like
education, art, religion or philosophy; it must limit itself to a
(re)distribution of money as the most neutral means of obtaining
a possible satisfaction in a neutral and homogeneous economy.
Money, thus, has become more essential and important than
meaning. The meaning of private and communal life must be left
to private persons and free associations who are willing to give
their time and energy to search for it. But how can such seekers
find a way, if the political and cultural institutions offer no more
than numerous possibilities of an empty freedom on the single
condition that one respect the formal principles of democracy?
This question could be the starting point of a more positive
approach to the main question of human life today. Obviously, our
society does not possess a clear and all-convincing answer to it,
but philosophers cannot escape from the task of preparing one.
Perhaps, however, we may state that not only today, but as long
as there have been and shall be human beings, the question of
their meaning is more urgent than all possible answers. The first
and basic answers lies, perhaps, in the acceptance of the question
and a specific kind of existential experimentation into which it
necessarily develops. A clearcut answer in the form of a thetic
theory or system would certainly be too small to encompass the
meaning of human existence. However, if philosophy is not
465
466
Adriaan Peperzak
467
468
Adriaan Peperzak
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Kad-Otto Apel has been Professor of Philosophy at the Universities
of Kiel, Saarbrucken, and Frankfurt am Main, where he is currently
Professor Emeritus. He has had numerous visiting professorships,
including those at Purdue University, the New School for Social
Research, and the University of Ottowa. His memberships in
learned societies include those in the International Institute for
Philosophy in Paris and Academia Europa in London.
Walter Biemel, a student of Martin Heidegger, has worked at the
Hussed Archives in Leuven and Cologne. He was Professor of
Philosophy at Aachen and Diisseldorf, and has published
extensively in the areas of phenomenology and the philosophy of
art. His publications include Le concept de monde chez Heidegger,
470
Notes on Contributors
471
Hans Lenk is the author of more than sixty books and six hundred
articles. Since 1969 he has been Professor of Philosophy at
Karlsruhe University. He is currently Vice President of the
European Academy of the Sciences and the Philosophy of Law,
and President of the General Society for Philosophy in Germany.
Richard E. Palmer is the author of Hermeneutics: Interpretation
Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (1969) and
co-translator and co-editor of Dialogues and Deconstruction: The
Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (1989). He is presently working on a
book on Gadamer's poetics. He teaches philosophy and religion at
MacMurray College in Jacksonville, Dlinois.
Adriaan Peperzak is currently Arthur J. Schmitt Professor for
Continental Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago. Prior to
that, he was Professor of Systematic Philosophy and the History of
Modern Philosophy at the University of Utrecht, Professor of
Metaphysics and Epistemology at the University of Nijmegen, and
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam.
Otto Poggeler has been Professor of Philosophy at Ruhr University,
Bochum, since 1968; and also is Director of the Hegel Archives. He
has been a visiting Professor of Philosophy at Penn State
University and SUNY at Stony Brook. Since 1977 he has been a
member of the Rheinisch-WestfaIischen Academy of Sciences in
DUsseldorf. Among his publications is the influential Der Denkweg
Martin Heideggers, which has been translated into French, Dutch,
English, Italian, Spanish and Japanese.
Calvin O. Schrag is the George Ade Distinguished Professor of
Philosophy at Purdue University. He received his Ph.D. from
Harvard University and has held appointments at the University
of Dlinois, Northwestern University, Indiana University, and
Purdue University. His major publications include Existence and
Freedom (1961); Experience and Being (1969); Radical Reflection and the
Origin of the Human Sciences (1980); Communicative Praxis and the
472
Notes on Contributors
Separately-bound Publications
Dutch)
474
475
J.
476
477
J.
478
479
480
481
Hermeneutic
482
483
Contributions to Periodicals
"On the Meaning of the Notion 'Materia Intelligibilis'." Tijdschrift
484
485
486
487
488
489
INDEX
a posteriori 109, 313
a priori 4, 32, 49, 51, 52, 56, 57, 74,
84, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103,
107,109,121,164,211,214,
216,222,223,225,246,315,
319,321,347-350, 352,353,
356, 357, 434
abstraction 127, 197, 230, 339, 369,
400, 430, 433, 439
Adorno, Theodor 449
aesthetics 261,266,267,327,428,432
analytical philosophy 81, 240, 243
Apel, Karl-Otto vii, 2, 4, 6, 37, 58-60
apodictic 109, 117, 140, 246-248, 325
apophantic 26
Aristotle 24, 26, 130, 145, 160, 175,
261, 311, 338, 366, 372, 411,
412,455
art viii, 3, 8, 9, 12, 20, 27, 31, 32, 47,
55, 63, 64, 77, 257, 260,
261, 264-267, 303, 304, 321,
328,375,422,425,427~50,
463,464,466
Augustine 145
authentic 55, 158, 187, 229, 233, 234,
276,288,293,364,412,427,
437,442,446,465,467
authenticity 130, 158, 199, 214, 420
Becker, Oscar 29, 35
being-in-itself 133, 137, 222, 232
being-in-the-world 32, 51, 52, 55, 71,
138, 143, 210
Bergson, Henri 21,22,34,128,148
Biemel, Walter vii, 4, 6, 113, 125
Boehm, Rudolph 115
Brentano, Franz 5, 93, 94, 100, 213
Cairns, Dorion 114, 125, 148
categorial viii, 8, 8, 25, 104, 110, 159,
164-166, 169, 171, 173-177,
180,184,205,206,209,211,
212, 214, 217, 220-223, 227,
228,230-233
category 136, 164, 167, 168, 171, 172,
174-179, 182-184, 186, 193,
250,322,375,434,435
492
dualism 197,202,257,310
Edie, James vii, 6, 127, 148-150
ego vii, 6, 65, 67,69,77, 114, 127-131,
134,135,138-151, 177, 186,
187, 201, 236, 346
egological 5, 6, 127, 128, 137, 138,
146, 149, 151
eidetic 104, 144, 145, 150, 162, 182,
198, 225, 226, 230-233, 387,
429
eidos 12, 232, 236, 271
Einstein, Albert 21, 337, 339, 351, 361
Embree, Lester viii, 11, 375, 377, 395
empiricism viii, x, 10, 102, 183, 221,
309-312, 315, 317, 323-328,
330-335
epoche 120, 140, 201, 223, 226
equipment 381, 407
es gibt 162, 172, 176, 183, 186, 187,
192,206
essence 3, 6, 22, 25, 70, 71, 74, 91, 98,
102, 111, 116, 139, 168, 174,
180,188,189,200,210,213,
216, 234, 240, 241, 244,
249-251, 253, 278, 293, 295,
298-300, 305, 351, 369, 398,
405,407,410,419,427-429,
432-435, 438-441, 447, 448,
452,461
ethics viii, 9, 12, 38, 96, 256, 312, 327,
366,425, 451, 452, 454, 455,
461-463,465,467
evidence 25, 97, 98, 103, 117, 123, 143,
144,181,206,247,267,278,
300,317,329,331,335,345,
368,369,375,384,390,395,
433
existentialism 149, 258
facticity 8, 45, 52, 108, 130, 135, 156,
157, 159-167, 169-171, 175,
183,184, 189, 195, 197,201,
202,206
fallenness 216
Fichte, Johann 30, 95, 99, 165, 166,
253,291
Index
Habermas, Jurgen 2, 52-54,58-60,63,
64,77
Heelan, Patrick viii, 11, 363
Hegel, G.W.F. 3, 17-21,23,24,32,38,
41-43,45,63,115,209,240,
248-250, 252, 253, 255, 256,
258,268,279,283,432,448,
449,458,460
Heidegger, Martin vii-x, 1-3, 6-9, 11,
17, 22-28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37,
39-42, 44, 45, 47, 50, 52, 55,
56, 58, 60, 66, 71, 77, 86,
113, 115, 125, 130, 153,
155-164, 166, 168-170,
172-186, 188-190, 193-234,
236-241, 243-253, 255-262,
264-304, 368-370, 372, 374,
375,397-414,416,422,423,
427,428,430-435,438-444,
447-450,458,466
Heim, Michael viii, 11, 113, 397,422
hermeneutic circle 12, 45, 46, 55, 56,
449
hermeneutic phenomenology x, 5, 11,
182, 262, 368
hermeneutics vii, viii, 1-5, 7-13, 22,
27-30, 34, 37-39, 43-47, 50,
52, 57, 82, 153, 156, 157,
159,161-165,189,200,201,
255-257, 259-261, 263, 264,
269-273, 276, 277, 280, 282,
284,289,302,307,363,368,
372,392,425
historicism 4, 5, 26, 32, 41, 43, 51, 52,
109,215,229,260,262,431
historicity 27, 41-45, 114, 130,
197-199, 201, 218, 260, 278
horizons 32, 37, 132, 223, 224, 233,
373
Hume, David 107, 128, 142, 375, 418
Husserl, Edmund vii, ix, x, 2, 3, 5-9,
14, 24, 29, 65, 69, 77, 89,
91-94, 96-104, 106-110,
112-125, 127-131, 133, 136,
138-151,155,159,165,171,
175,177, 179, 184, 190, 191,
199-202, 206-216, 218, 219,
493
221-226, 228, 230, 234-236,
245-247, 258, 259, 263, 277,
278,283,318-322,328,329,
334,339,340,358,359,361,
368,369,375,428,430,431,
433,448
494
458
lifeworld 4, 6, 77, 114, 118-124, 161,
192,194,196,236,422
Locke, John 69, 107, 221
logic 3, 11, 17, 18, 22-25, 27, 28, 34,
95, 97, 99, 101, 102, 108,
117, 125, 129, 158, 163-165,
175,177,178,190,205,224,
226,234,236,240,241,243,
246,249,250,252,271,315,
319,325,334,335,393,394,
406,421,428,448,455,462
logos vii, 3, 4, 37, 39, 40, 42-45, 47,
50-54,57,61,62,74,75,99,
103,104,157,175,177,179,
199,206,271,277,407,453
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 66, 114, 129,
148,368,375,454
metaphysics x, 10, 21, 22, 31, 32,
39-41, 47, 53, 78, 103, 108,
110, 115, 155, 158, 167, 209,
236, 238-240, 243, 247-249,
252, 256,257, 261-263, 265,
268-282, 284-289, 294-297,
301, 302, 304, 309, 311,
313h317, 344, 347,397,403,
410,414,423,432,455
method 24, 29, 37, 41, 44,54,58,81,
85, 94, 103, 105, 108, 114,
123,145,161,179-181,183,
210,214,215,219,245,246,
249,252,256,260,317,324,
325,328,331,363,371,375,
388,429,448,455,467
Index
objectivity 41, 47, 106, 108, 171, 222,
231,233,342,430,452,458,
459
ontological difference 39, 162, 177,
246, 247, 290
ontology vii, 5, 7, 8, 32, 39, 81, 119,
153,159,164,209,212,227,
229,246,247,256,259,260,
269,275,301,334,369,411,
454, 455, 462
Palmer, Richard viii, 8,9,255,304
Peperzak, Adriaan viii, 12, 13, 451
perception 11, 21, 84, 86, 88, 119,
131-133, 148, 199, 202,221,
338,342,346,369,370,372,
373,390,393,404,430,431,
435,442
phenomenology 1, vii-x, 2-5, 7, 9-12,
14, 17, 19, 22, 24, 25, 28,
29, 34, 59, 65, 82, 85, 89,
99, 102, 107, 110, 114, 115,
117, 122, 124, 128, 131, 133,
135, 143, 147-150, 155, 158,
159,164,179, 182, 189-191,
193,196, 197, 199,201-203,
205-207, 209-214, 216,
218-221, 223-230, 232-234,
236, 245-247, 252, 258, 260,
262,309,318,321,334,361,
368, 369, 373-375, 395,
427-430,448,454,461
Plato 18, 19, 23, 24, 39, 130, 209, 220,
234,256,257,273,282,311,
403,411,414,415,421,428,
455,460
poetry 259, 264, 265, 278, 301, 427,
448,450,467
P6ggeler, Otto vii, 2-5, 7, 17, 34, 35,
204,304,399
poiesis 447, 450, 459
postmodernism 61, 64, 66, 75, 304
practical philosophy 4, 12, 28, 37-40,
44,57,372,455
pragmatism 58, 59, 309
495
496
Contributions to Phenomenology
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3. H. A. Durfee and D.F.T. Rodier (eds.): Phenomenology and Beyond. The Self
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4. J. J. Drummond: Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism.
Noema and Object. 1990
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