Legal ethics- CASES

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered
by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with

Legal ethics- CASES

rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is
yes.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

... ( Emphasis supplied)

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging
in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

Legal ethics- CASES

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what
[is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has
been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not
[be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine
can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that
a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems inhouse.

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in

Legal ethics- CASES

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with subnational governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some
cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990,
p. 4).

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one
who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for
the corporate counsel's total learning.

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think

Legal ethics- CASES

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

Legal ethics- CASES

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from
the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 2631, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist
or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External
Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis issine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law
in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men
learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo
J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from
the constitutional intent.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the

Legal ethics- CASES

definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This
is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

No blood shall flow from his veins.

No blade shall touch his skin;

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger,
and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator
calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator
was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,
Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents. ULANDU

We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.

RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August
13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989
giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private
respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order
specifically provided for private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario.
However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
is in the negative.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not
detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a
free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990
prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the latter
accepted cases and continued practicing law.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a
motion seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable
Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to
Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of
Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and
detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Legal ethics- CASES

escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be
issued?"[2] Mis spped

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are
ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and
shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written
permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the
trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial
jail.

Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police
Office, San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,
Antique.
SO ORDERED.

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent
motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the
motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA,

Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against
him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold
and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the
regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the
personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the
custodian under the same undertaking.

RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for
Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.[1] While respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated
September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondents authority to appear
as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of the
Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.[3]

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the
trial courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be
recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is
not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention
prisoner. The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to
roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred
not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private
respondent would appear in court to defend himself. Spped

In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin
who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the
other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even
with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not
prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his
position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by
the presiding judge.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense.[3] He must be detained in jail during the pendency of
the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance.[4] Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file
formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from the
Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint
against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which provides:

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than
ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is
ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid
further delay.

Legal ethics- CASES

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his
cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of
Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.

xxx

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as
such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover,
his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to
represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a
member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as
counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government
service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the

administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who
belong to a powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From
childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him
while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms.
Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885
for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the
said criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins discord
with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home
to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga
begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification
charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he
felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough
funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years
of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with
the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this
particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a
close relative by giving a free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose. He never took
advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He
stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his
approved leave applications attached to his comment.

RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin
without first securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it
coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of
the bar or give professional advise to clients.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge
Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.

However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice
prohibited by the said section, to wit:

Legal ethics- CASES

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as
counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby

REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely.
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by
his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar,
who is a relative.[8]

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as
a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that
"the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private
practice of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice
of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which
is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided,further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do
not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way
influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.[9]

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous

occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out
by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of
the Department contemplated by law.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx

10

Legal ethics- CASES

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of
the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May
8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice,
who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in
the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid
down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September
28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high
tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the
constitutional bases for impeachment."

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution
of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that
he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by
the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that
is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal,
based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was
June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub
silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26,
1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and
for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following
words:

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed
from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a
behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that
the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,

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which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition.
To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R.
No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's
September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and
that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted
with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness
to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court
resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof,
his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in
person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and
candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time
to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the
unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness
towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is
to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to
be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how
can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou
wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court
has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But
in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
and his Constitutional right of free speech.

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to
be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

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What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the
observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in
effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively,
1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would
not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that
would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons
not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a
particular time makes review undesirable.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf
in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our
beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED,
not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we
held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered "dismissed".

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the
reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to
tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have
been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical
scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions
forcertiorari.

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that
the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject,
we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The
proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has

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(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open
to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for
this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This
danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire
Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or
ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he
did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did
not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction &
Co., supra:

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into
the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected
to serve.

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections
4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing
Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil.
866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has
only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of
a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying
this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear
that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In
the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all
to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly
stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have
the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge
or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he
loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.

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be
entertained. ... .

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and
it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26,
1967)

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with
the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no
other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State
Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit
Court, 72 N.W. 196)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject
the attorney to disciplinary action.

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism
of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona
fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are
not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when
the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They
say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as
a lawyer, had a right to do.

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the
court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the

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judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to
keep that money." Said the court:

appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer
was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two
years. The Court said:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of
the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless
insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v.
Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac.
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against
whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen.
The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination,
are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is
always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of
the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end
that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to
an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel
suit against the judge and others. The letter began:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising
the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting
on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the
right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to
remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of
his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him,
or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of
their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are
criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from
the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of
the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of
the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners,
it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced
by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not

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The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to
duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if
any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for
the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon
the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself
with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging
the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to
the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any
case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity.
Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert.
No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by
a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does
not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from
his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself,
as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance
under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a
judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn
to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the
less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward
the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence
the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution not the court.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights
of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to
be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646.
And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity
of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for
like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.
This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The
letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

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sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case,
as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions
which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official
acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law
in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against
the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was
disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of
the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the
bar.

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided.
"An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The
same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court
of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned
in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be
long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to
bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts
of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable
nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless
illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which
referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been
one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19
L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v.
Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl.
134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him
to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it
our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to
others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months
for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister
influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

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... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
client ... .

according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused
to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local
newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders
and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to
go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as
"a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice
of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding
him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of
the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes
into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis
of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all
these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from
the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members
and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted
yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to
account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel,

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which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was
later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of
the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of
the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may
still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental
power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts
and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority,
and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public
confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind
of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is
no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be
influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would
lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar,
to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere
inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question
are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice."
And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he
caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to
startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures,
virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution
of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it
concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority
and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole
objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar. Thus

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far

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transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it
cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the
court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon
Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from
mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of
the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize
that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from
the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and
effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this
choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself
how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.30 So
that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court
itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.

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Legal ethics- CASES

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements
on the matter, with which request they complied.

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him
by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause
within ten (10) days from noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise
resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.).
The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 31, rec.).

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for recorrection and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%,
65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that
the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.).
This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there
are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects
also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results. Note that
this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates
concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is
no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It
would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair
and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2,
Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.).
while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on
August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May
18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who
re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law
and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo
Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the
correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to
meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon.
Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in
Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by
the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another reevaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed
and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed
that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar
candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971
bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

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Legal ethics- CASES

change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the

Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one
Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L.
Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries
in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same
university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21,
32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon
verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the
same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with
original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to
5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of
this fact which he is required under the rules to do.

xxx xxx xxx

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on
October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda.
Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on
November 14, 1973.

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to
make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard;
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the
identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the
identities of the examiners in other subjects;

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as
their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The
same became the basis for their cross-examination.

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized
to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty.
Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to
the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in
the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the
circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in
question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting

the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was
isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar
Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in
bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects
and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather
low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and
change of grade;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection,
and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;

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Legal ethics- CASES

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner,
and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as
much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of
two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my
record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a
Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had
with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he
requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the
said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I
recall correctly, in remedial law.

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my
residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me
that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding
in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two
companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as
it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had
submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the
same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not
been identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The
Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number
661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted
the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant
knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was
humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had
used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved
an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not
been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and
the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized
grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook
code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final
grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the
other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was
that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said
subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier
sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the
motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code
numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only
upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do
not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my
residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had
repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so
assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity

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Legal ethics- CASES

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law
and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee
had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal
Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the
examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good
faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember
correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the
mark in the general list.

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been
apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position
of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of
the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the
examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did
I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria
laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed,
herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to
be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo,
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously
graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him
in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he
thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to
the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his
answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo
however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and
submitted was entirely within my discretion.

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17,
1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations
were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile
Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of
this particular Bar candidate;.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a
request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that
in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in
other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade
increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613)
showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar
candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of
his sworn statement, adding the following:

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Legal ethics- CASES

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that
the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the
trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or
not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter
concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below
50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of
raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner
concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he
remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the
examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and
in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar
Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned
should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation
that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges
as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting
on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook.
This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation
on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the
examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in
all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was
circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not reevaluation was in order,

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language
and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or rechecking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation.
Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission
to the Honorable Court.

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back
to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always
made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first
number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the
first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards
the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance
on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied
because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would
contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all
the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

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Legal ethics- CASES

do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or
"227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo
and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List
as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the
1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-aLanuevo).

to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International
Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a)
On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on
December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed
by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I
regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the
possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the
army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then
we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some
19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left
and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter
the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject
or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only
Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to
the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story
is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he
stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at
the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks
bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the
writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all
good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and
Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back
to the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and
never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain
papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two
cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the
Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases;
after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a
situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met
only once in the ordinary course of official business?

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50%
(47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified
and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-aLanuevo); and

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable
doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5,
1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations
which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man
intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo
in his behalf.

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade
below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left
in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law
under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution,
which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent,

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Legal ethics- CASES

these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the
Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards
the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter
of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se
of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's
behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the
members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are
deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said
narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's
grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the
examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including
Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain
the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to
review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was
short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he
thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account
or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance
of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondentsexaminers to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the
corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and
ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of
papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further
believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in
the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his
signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter
was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects
of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one
subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the
notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 5556; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondentexaminer Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in
said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average.
Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination

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Legal ethics- CASES

papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who
owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself
from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is
the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent
Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the reevaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent
Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the
charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was
informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile
Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who
were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness toreevaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%.
Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially
brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to
make the re-evaluation of the said paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise
added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal
records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report,
referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back
to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the
latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International
Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject
Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of
respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one
causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to
75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list
and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office
Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 &
3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was
around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according
to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent
Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of
the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has
number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo
when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo
declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in
one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's
notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the
Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent
Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the
revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the
last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination
Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,
alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

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Legal ethics- CASES

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing
grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang
to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing
average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject.
Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority
from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang or of other examinees.

was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were
made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general
average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact,
before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for reevaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang
before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang
failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent
Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51,
Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination
Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned;
and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not reevaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the
examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the reevaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.

We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian
whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and
hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent
likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus
deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers ofonly respondent Galang in five subjects
that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five
(5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of
the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this
in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's wellstudied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or

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Legal ethics- CASES

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who
Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of
more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the reevaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average.
That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on
the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc.
The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is
not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for
re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court,
which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself
to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW
TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE
IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto
Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz
and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed
that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners
concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo
further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a
record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol.
VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the
dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,
according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went
on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however,
that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol.
VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly
invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for reevaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages
ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which
could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners
for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang,
there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar
examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of
respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact
of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the
same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook
in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file
and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is
1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears,
however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50%
as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated
with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in
evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code
Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo
(Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did
not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the reevaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation
with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only

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In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an
examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one
and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject
in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is
certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not
aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Criminal Law 78% 78% = "

Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return
it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee
with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he
accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to
Galang.

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing
grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that
was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee
(Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was
referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto
Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred
back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Labor Laws 3%

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

Taxation 69%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

Mercantile Law 68%

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971,
which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members
of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others,
the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook
(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. AMontecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in
Political Law are as follows:

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized reevaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and
Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as
subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "

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Legal ethics- CASES

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar
examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to
the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and
the corresponding investigation conducted.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with
the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant
for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar
applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good
moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before
the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of
laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme
Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he
has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment
and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records
before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it
could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took
the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for
use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral
turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang
took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use
of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral
turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal
case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of
Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to
take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of
his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3)
a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed
of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as
examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of
liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual
members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with
the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court.
With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation
indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent
Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo
without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity.
The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of
such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a

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All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in
1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed
perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was
allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to
take his oath.

Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his
pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and
then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American
cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the
Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the
striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the
board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon
the court (cases cited).

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present
case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past
nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the
grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the
requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme
Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962;
In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101
Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re:
Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54
Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of
Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents.

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the
judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W
709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to
the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys
(p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate
Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of
matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state
from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding
at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such
explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted
by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about
thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of
the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or recorrection of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant
Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks;
and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records
clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondentsexaminers made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring
him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to
the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised

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greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request
of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the
respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to
have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing
to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they
could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No.
2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72,
rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under
oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades;
and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's
answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that
they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You
brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if
he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I
did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3
and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark
to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is
this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was
not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct
the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized
to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed,
herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the
increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain
extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo.
Thus in their own words:

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant
that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Montecillo

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce
the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim
that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their
conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such
information?

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after
the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

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Legal ethics- CASES

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners,
which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to
remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the
Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the
proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the
performance of their duties relative thereto.

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his
salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

V
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house
and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed
of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date,
however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house
and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage
P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20,
1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972,
date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as
down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%,
more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in
dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue
assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to
be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar
Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show,
did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late
Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute
Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make
this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing
of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the
latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part
of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the
motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are
not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities
which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of
only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount
of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971
statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of
P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the
transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian
for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee.
Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was reevaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec).
Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of
the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who
should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in
Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the
alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was
not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one.
In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister
in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is
no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or
has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of

VI

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Legal ethics- CASES

respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the
foregoing circumstances.

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot
to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of
instrument;August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage
in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo
and thereafter cancelled onMarch 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the
mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot.
According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement
(filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS
real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer
once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).It should be stressed,
however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were
not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of
the records of this Court.

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued
atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972
could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets
and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of
November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00. The proximity in point of time
between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the abovementioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination
committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or
to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar. During the early stage of
this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in
fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter,
as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is
indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program
of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law
studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to
1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which
is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No.
1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was
approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also
the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his
father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when
he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was
employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).
[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator
Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter
dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the
approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to
January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He
initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF
Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

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Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV,
rec.).

meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember
having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51,
rec.).On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed
at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when
their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn
statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46,
rec.).German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member
thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached
and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at
Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of
recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has
submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any
purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses
herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No.
1164 as above delineated.

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the
location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to
submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the
GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and
disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as
veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him
(Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating
at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49,
rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.He used to be a member of the Philippine
Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49,
rec.).He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.He attended

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.

LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON
E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

38