Introduction

On the 20th of April 2004 at around 3:30 pm, the Nicoll Highway collapsed
when a tunnel constructed for use by MRT trains collapsed. The temporary
lateral support system of the tunnel failed, resulting in the formation of a
100 ft. deep cave, which spread across six lanes of the Nicoll Highway. The
collapse killed four people and injured three. The incident resulted in
disruption of the gas, water and electric lines, which affected nearly 15000
people in the area. Two spans of a nearby bridge had to be demolished
and reconstructed due to the damage in soil conditions the collapse had
done in the nearby areas.

http://failures.wikispaces.com/Nicoll+Highway+-+Subway+Tunnel+Collapse

http://www.meehaesong.com/project/416/

Background of the Tunnel near the Nicoll Highway

There are three basic types of tunnel construction in common use:
1. Cut-and-cover tunnel, constructed in a shallow trench and then
covered over.
2. Bored tunnel, constructed in situ, without removing the ground
above. They are usually of circular or horseshoe cross-section.
3. Immersed tube tunnel, sunk into a body of water and layed on or
buried just under its bed.
The tunnel near the Nicoll Highway belongs to the cut and cover type. To
be specific, bottom up method was used to construct that tunnel.

http://www.railsystem.net/cut-and-cover/

http://www.railsystem.net/cut-and-cover/

Generally, to construct a cut and cover tunnel using bottom-up method,

we first install temporary excavation support walls, such as soldier pile
and lagging, slurry walls or sheet piling, followed by dewatering within the
trench if required. We then excavate and install temporary wall support
elements such as struts or tie backs. Next we start constructing the floor
of the tunnel, walls and then the roof. Waterproofing is applied as required.
Lastly, backfilling is done and we restore the ground surface.
The tunnel structure is a bit more complicated than the schematic
description shown before. It has more struts and piles to support the
tunnel.

http://failures.wikispaces.com/Nicoll+Highway+-+Subway+Tunnel+Collapse

As shown in the picture is the typical cross section of the failed tunnel
section. The diaphragm walls were 0.8~1 m thick and were about 40~45
m deep. Walls extended about 1~3 m into the stiffer strata (the old
alluvium layer). Width of the tunnel is about 17~20 m and width of each
diaphragm wall panel was 6 m. There were two layers of interlocking jet
grout piles (JGP). The upper layer of the JGP was 1.5 m thick and was
temporary and the lower layer of the JGP was 2.5 m thick and formed the
base of the tunnel. JGP layers were built to minimize the deflection of the
walls while tunnels was being excavated. Bored piles were constructed to
support the rail boxes. Excavation was supported by a system of steel king
post and 10 levels of struts placed at 4m center to center. As the
excavation progressed the struts were constructed and before the
construction of the 10th level of strut the temporary layer of the jet gout
pile was removed.

Reasons for Collapse

1. The main reason for the collapse is the erroneous soil analysis
which leads to under design of the diaphragm walls. The use of
Method A or Effective Stress Method of Plaxis (a geotechnical
software tool based on finite element method) resulted in
overestimation of the soil undrained shear strength and hence,
underestimating the diaphragm wall bending moment and wall
deflections. The method is actually more suitable forestimations of
shallower soil behaviour, but given how much deeper the
excavation actually was, the method was still a poor choice for
analysis. Besides, the soil conditions were also considered wrongly.
Rapid excavations in slightly overconsolidated soft marine clays
does not give sufficient time for the excess pore water pressure in
the clays to dissipate. Therefore the geotechnical analysis should be
performed based on undrained conditions and for such soil
conditions, Total Stress Method should be applied for the analysis.
2. Another chief reason for the failure was the under design of the
strut-waler connection. Part of the system designed included
horizontal steel struts and waling beams connected into a bracing
system meant to provide mechanical support for the diaphragm
walls. The connections between the struts and the waling beams
were meant to bear some of the load exerted by the marine clay
surrounding the walls of the tunnel, and were already
underdesigned due to the inappropriate soil analysis mentioned
earlier. This problem, however, was exacerbated by the omission of
critical components on some struts called load spreading splays.

http://failures.wikispaces.com/Nicoll+Highway+-+Subway+Tunnel+Collapse

http://www.hssmge.gr/HIGHT_The%20Nicoll%20Highway%20Collapse.pdf

Without these splays, the load exerted on the waling beam from the
wall was much larger than intended. Instead, they substituted Cchannel steel sections with C-channel stiffeners to reinforce the
strut-waler connections which later buckled from the strain. A risk
analysis which dictated the need for reassessing this aspect of the
design in light of buckling observed at the stiffeners, was ignored to
keep costs down. The collapse eventually occurred when the load
exerted on the ninth of the ten levels of the entire bracing system
exceeded the capacity of the strut-waler connections there, causing
a phenomenon called forced sway failure a violent, rapid
deformation of the connections which hastened the collapse. The
remaining levels of bracing could not withstand the increased load,
and subsequently failed as well.
3. Besides, lack of toe in depth of the diaphragm wall into competent
strata was also found to be a factor that caused the collapse. In the
investigations following the collapse it was found that certain parts
of the tunnel went through a buried valley of old alluvium under the
layers of marine clays. Investigation revealed that the upper portion
of the old alluvium valley consisted of sands, silts and clay with
organic material with very low SPT (Standard Penetration Test) Nvalues (about N=30). This fact was unknown at the time of design
as there were very few test boreholes in the area. So in certain
sections the toe of the diaphragm wall was not embedded
sufficiently into stiffer strata.
Lessons Learned
The Nicoll Highway collapse was described as quote a wake-up call for the
construction industry. Since then, new rules have been introduced to
tighten processes. Buildings and expressways built have to meet stricter
construction rules implemented after the Nicoll Highway incident. In 2007,
Parliament passed amendments to the building control bill. Among the
changes, major underground building works which involve temporary
earth retaining structure will need to be designed by a Professional
Engineer and reviewed by an Accredited Checker. Works going deeper
than 6m must also be designed and checked by a Professional Engineer
and an Accredited Checker who are specialists in Geotechnical
Engineering. Geotechnical specialists are also required for tunnels greater
than 2m in diameter, underground structures greater 6m and complex
foundations of buildings more than 30 storey high. There have been
changes too with the industry level. When it comes to building for
example, its the developers responsibility to hire a subcontractor to
measure ground movement or the tilting of buildings.
As Singapore continues to build underground, especially in a densely built
environment, it is very important to ensure the excavation works are
carried safely. Precaution must be taken while using new or unfamiliar
technologies and the limitations of such technologies should be properly
understood.