Complex Learning & Cognition

Psychology, Year 2
University of Seville

Defending Mind: On Theory of Mind

. Melndez
Abstract
The following work is a quick incision into two possibilities that might support the construct of theory
of mind as a scientifically relevant one in nowadays research. These two proposals are research studies
in children with developmental problems within the autistic spectrum, and the possible psychobiology
that lies beneath such procedures, i. e. mirror neurons. It is defended that through these two ideas an
appropriate Theory of Mind can be built and developed, despite its recurrent failure to explain nonhuman primates behaviour.
Keywords: Theory of Mind, Autism, Mirror Neurons

Introduction: Of Apes and Children

It was back in 1978 that Premack and Woodruff
elaborated a thesis on the possibility that
chimpanzees had a Theory of Mind (ToM), and
ever since now the elaboration of this construct
has permeated the scientific field, particularly in
the study of apes and children with cognitive
developmental disorders. It is precisely in the
latter studies where we can find an elaboration of
childrens understanding of mind where sources
derived from the Philosophy of Mind and the
Philosophy of Science set the conceptual
framework for the construct, specifically of its
origins, online control and epistemic status
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Gopnik, 1993). On
the contrary, studies with apes have proven less
fruitful in the research of apes having any
capacity to present any kind of mental states. In
almost twenty years of research on this construct
applied to the animal realm, there is still no solid
evidence that would defend a ToM in non-human
primates (Heyes, 1998). Its main critiques point
out that the actual experimental outcomes in
trying to test ToM in primates can be explained
by non-mental processes such as associative
learning or inferences made based on non-mental
categories.
Autistic Syndromes: Defending a Theory of
Mind
Where there are actual improvements in research
in these regards, standing the necessity of the
ToM as a valid construct, is in the study of
developmental disorders, particularly in children

who exhibit the syndrome characteristics of the

autistic spectrum. These disorders share the
characteristics
of
imaginative
abilities,
difficulties in social interactions, restrictive and
repetitive patterns of behaviour, and delayed and
abnormal language development (Bailey et al.,
1998; Baron-cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). It is
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) the one that explains
that children with autism exhibit idiosyncratic
impairments in understanding the mental states
of their peers (i. e. other humans), specially
intentions and beliefs, and suggests that they lack
the elaboration of a Theory of Mind, condition of
possibility of the former cognitive mechanisms.
Mirror Neurons: Psychobiology of Mind
On the interesting approaches developed coming
from the neurosciences we have the recent
discovery of
the Mirror Neuron System
(Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 2014). These neural circuit
seems to embrace the ability of a supramodal
representation of action serving as a bridge
between motor cortex and highly visual
processing areas; though
the system has
basically been researched in relation to hand
movement, it is hypothesised that there is a
relation to facial expressions and speech, eye
movement and high level abstractions (Perrett et
al., 1989). Being a recent discovery as it is, it has
not been outlined the direction mirror neurons
research should take, but certain approaches have
been suggested. Concerning our particular
subject, it has been proposed that mirror neuron
activation would permit the creation of an
executive plan to perform actions being watched,

Complex Learning & Cognition

Psychology, Year 2
University of Seville

getting the observer in the current mental state,

or neuronal state, of the observed, proving the
necessity of the ability of an inhibition system
that would prevent the observer from involuntary
mimic
of
indiscriminately
observed
performances (Gallese, 2005). The importance of
imitation in such processes would constitute the
basics of a theory of mind, as it has been proven
the difficulties of autistic children with basic
tasks of imitation which are further explained by
the underdevelopment, precisely, of empathy and
eventually an appropriate ToM, that would
enable them to display normal social conduct. It
is this impairment in the self/others
representation system and its relation to imitation
the root of all autistic disorders (Rogers &
Pennington, 1991). It is through this window that
we believe that ToM can be considered a fruitful
construct in the context of its psychobiological
explanation coming from the mirror neuron
system and its basic relations to the conduct of
imitation.
Conclusions
For all concerns, one of the most scientifically
parsimonious approaches to theory of mind, if as
it is the case, we focus primarily on human
cognitions, comes along with its acceptance as a
valid construct, adequately supported by all
exposed research, but definitely with a long way
to be fully set. The psychobiology of mirror
neurons is just one approach of the wide
spectrum to be considered, yet a very powerful
one. I believe it is, therefore, more than justified
and beneficial to accept the construct of ToM at
least in the description of individuals that
possess mental constructs such as want,
believe, know or see, and use them to
explain others behaviours (Heyes, 1998).
Further research on mirror neurons might display
insight in social cognitions such as deceptive
abilities which require elaborated language and
developed ToM. Therefore we conclude that it is
still a valid construct, that beliefs, intentions and
mental representations are concepts to be taken
seriously into account, and not discarded due to
its almost proven inadequacy to explain nonhuman primates cognitions. It could be argued
that a ToM would require more intelligence of
primates; and, after all, chimps are proven not to
be like children (Heyes, 1998). It is a safe way to

acknowledge limitations of current research and

look into the future with the hope that Premack
and Woodruffs original proposal is still vivid
because its still relevant.
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Complex Learning & Cognition

Psychology, Year 2
University of Seville

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