BARREDO VS.

GARCIA
FACTS: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby
killing the sixteen year old, Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against
Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually
convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi
(employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of
employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability
is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla
primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to
file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the Supreme Court
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that
Barredo is negligent for carelessly hiring his employee, Fontanilla because it was shown that he
had multiple violation of Automobile Law and speeding violations already before he hired him
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Furthermore, Barredo is
not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his
own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903 of Civil Code). Hence, Barredo must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of Art. 1903 of the Civil Code.
MENDOZA V. ARRIETA
Facts:
A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by petitioner
Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel
and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a
consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing
Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of
Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal,
in view of its findings that the collision between Salazars jeep and petitioners car was the result
of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was
petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a
civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result
of the collision involving their vehicles.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioners complaint for damages based on
quasi-delict against private respondents
HELD:
Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfully
sustained Timbols allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a
criminal case filed against him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by
petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against
Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasidelict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the
truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. Timbols submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action
of his right to file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of
Court, bars the institution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31
(in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and
different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal
Code, no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil
case filed against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal
action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with
criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action
for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,
unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. The
circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to
base his cause of action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as
evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action
until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his
right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted
in the criminal case.
Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioners car for
considering that the collision between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by
Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it
cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from
Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeepowner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil

action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c) which provides
that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right
arise did not exist

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of the schools by
assailants who were not members of the schools academic community. This prompted the parents
of the deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for damages against PSBA and its corporate
officers.
The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit dismissed on the ground of no
cause of action and not within the scope of the provision of Art 2180 since it is an academic
institution. The trial court overruled the petitioners contention and its decision was later
affirmed by the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
HELD: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article
2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence
of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco
parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form
liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For
its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the

other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its
rules and regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is
therefore held liable for his death.
Petition denied.