Administrative Law Case Digests Arellano University School of Law

aiza ebina/2015
US vs DORR2 Phil 332
Administration as an Organization Distinguished from Government
FACTS:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the
oense of writing,publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the InsularGovernment of the Philippine
Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of c t !o. "#" of the$ommission,
which is as follows%&'ver( person who shall utter seditious words or speeches,
write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libelsagainst the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or whichtend to disturb
or obstruct an( lawful o)cer in e*ecuting his o)ce, or which tend to instigate others
tocabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, orwhich tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or to disturb the peace of the communit(,the safet( and order of the
Government, or who shall +nowingl( conceal such evil practices, shall bepunished
b( a ne not e*ceeding two thousand dollars or b( imprisonment not e*ceeding two
(ears, orboth, in the discretion of the court.& The alleged libel was published as an
editorial in the issue of the &-anila reedom& of p ril /, 0#1", underthe caption
of& few hard facts.&
ISSUE:
2hether or not the article be regarded as embraced within the description of
&scurrilous libelsagainst the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands&
RULI!:
!o.

The important 3uestion is to determine what is meant in section 8 of c t !o. "#" b(

thee*pression &the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.& 4oes it mean in a
general and abstractsense the e*isting laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it
mean the aggregate of the individuals b(whom the Government of the Islands is, for
the time being, administered5 'ither sense would doubtless beadmissible. 2e
understand, in modern political science, b( the term &government&, that institution
or aggregate of institutions b( which an independent societ( ma+es and carries out
those rules of action which arenecessar( to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming thatsociet( b( those who possess the
power or authorit( of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities
which rule a societ(. 6( &administration& again, we understand in modern times,
and especiall(in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in

whose hands the reins of government arefor the time being 7the chief ministers or
heads of departments.& 76ouvier, 9aw 4ictionar(, 8#l. 6ut thewriter adds that
the terms &government and ::administration& are not alwa(s used in their
strictness, andthat &government& is often used for ::administration.:: The article in
3uestion contains no attac+ upon the governmental s(stem of the United States,
and it is3uite apparent that, though grossl( abusive as respects both the
$ommission as a bod( and some of itsindividual members, it contains no attac+
upon the governmental s(stem b( which the authorit( of theUnited States is
enforced in these Islands. The form of government b( a $ivil $ommission and a
$ivilGovernor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with
the administration of thegovernment that the writer is see+ing to bring into
disrepute b( impugning the purit( of their motives,their public integrit(, and their
private morals, and the wisdom of their polic(. The publication of the
article,therefore, no seditious tendenc( being apparent, constitutes no oense
under c t !o. "#", section 8.
RATIO:

Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "administration"

again, weunderstand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries,
the aggregate of those personsin whose hands the reins of government are for the
time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments). The terms "government
and administration" are not always used in their strictness, andthat "government"
is often used for administration.

MECANO vs.COA
G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992

FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of

which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which
he is claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of
duty. When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby
to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may
direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on
full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion
also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,

subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some
act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding
petitioners illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination
of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioners
claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to
Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to
the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73,
S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He
commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred
after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro
to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court if he so desires.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section
699 of the RAC

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioners claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent
law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the

particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific
law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of
whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the
new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing
clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an
example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of
the earlier one.
2.

If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended
as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear
is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on
the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and

repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA

G.R. No. L-66614
January 25, 1988

FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:
Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and. Leveriza
over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between
Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to
3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff
Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25
years.
There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three contracts
of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is the same
parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is
4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has been reduced to
3,000 square meters.
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it
appears that defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for
durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil,
and the latter, as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit:
(1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of time that also overlapped.
Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased.
This is the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of
brevity, these defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the
ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already
been cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the
defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land,
subject to the present litigation is concerned.
Defendants Leverizas claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has
never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C
between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.

CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by
Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the
violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of
Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not
having been approved by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not
valid.
After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:
1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has
therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;
2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28,
1966 because of the cancellation of Contract A;
3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is
still valid and subsisting;
CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was
properly registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the
President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute
the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the
Airport General Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered
into between the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil
was void for not having been approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. Said motion was however denied.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this
petition for Review on certiorari.
ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid
contract. The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after
its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with
Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of another
contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of
Contract A
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
YES
Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee
specifically for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the
latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased
premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in
such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In

any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of
this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms
and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and
conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract
by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease
(Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of
the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA
addressed to Rosario Leveriza.
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation,
claiming that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the
cancellation. They maintain that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, acting for the President, or by delegation of power, the (2)Director
of CCA who could validly cancel the contract. Petitioners argue that cancelling or
setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of
the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation
or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in
Contract A which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is
evident that in the implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said
Department Head is no longer necessary if not redundant

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and
theAssociation of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration
caseto resolve the following issue:Issue: WON the company has violated the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provisionand the Memorandum of Agreement
dated April 1994, on promotion.Held: It is to be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred
by law on a voluntary arbitrator ora panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of thelabor arbiter and the appellate
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC) for that matter. The
state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitrationprovides that "(t)he award
or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final andexecutory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decisionby the parties,"
while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are finaland executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there isan
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715
issilent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs.

CORPORATION

CA and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER

G.R. No. 102976

October 25, 1995
FACTS: Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D. No. 272 in order,
generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. The
list of powers and functions of the ISA included the following: xx
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and
functions: xx
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities for
subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies involved if it is shown that such
use of the States power is necessary to implement the construction of capacity
which is needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority; xx
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National
Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things,
the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion
program of the NSC, Proc. No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines
withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public located in Iligan City, and
reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were
occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned
by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No.
1277, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and
on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy
rights on the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private
respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from
the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent
domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of
occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as
well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly ISA
commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City,
praying that it be placed in possession of the property involved upon depositing in
court representing ten percent (10%) of the declared market values of that property.
A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed
NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by MCFCs fertilizer plant
installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, thestatutory
existence of petitioner ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased
to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this motion.

The trial court granted MCFCs motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The
dismissal was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that only
natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
case.
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial
court. At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature
for the trial court to have ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public
purpose, considering that the parties had not yet rested their respective cases.
Hence this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of
ISAs term.
HELD: The Decision of the CA to the extent that it affirmed the trial courts order
dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the
RPfor petitioner ISA
YES
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil action:
Sec. 1. Who May Be Parties. Only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that ISA falls under
category (b) above. P.D. No. 272, as already noted, contains express authorization
to ISA to commence expropriation proceedings like those here involved. It should
also be noted that the enabling statute of ISA expressly authorized it to enter into
certain kinds of contracts for and in behalf of the Government in the following
terms: xx
(i) to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the
government, for the bulk purchase of materials, supplies or services for any sectors
in the industry, and to maintain inventories of such materials in order to insure a
continuous and adequate supply thereof and thereby reduce operating costs of such
sector; xxx
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated
with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing
ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate
and distinct from that of the Government.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The
Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply
of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as legal personality.
The relevant definitions are found in the Administrative Code of 1987:

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the
context as a whole, or a particular statute, require a different meaning:
(1) Government of the RPrefers to the corporate governmental entity through which
the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or
other forms of local government.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
xxx xxx xxx
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revertback to, and
are re-assumed by, the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying
some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such
powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry
must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality
of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into GRP and hence assumed once again by the Republic,
no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession
thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not the NSC, even
though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the
condemnation suit be eventually successful.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the RP is entitled to be substituted in
the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of
ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did
not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

In E.B. Marcha, the Court also stressed that to require the Republic to commence all
over again another proceeding, as the trial court and CA had required, was to
generate unwarranted delay and create needless repetition of proceedings:

BALICAS vs. FFIB, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G. R. No. 145972
March 23, 2004
FACTS: In the development of the Cherry Hills Subdivision (CHS), Philjas applied for
the issuance of ECC from the DENR-Region IV
Respondent
BALICAS,
PENRO
senior
environmental
management
specialist,monitored the implementation of the CHS Project Development to check
compliance with the terms and conditions in the ECC. She conducted another
monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both instances, she noted that
the project was still in the construction stage hence, compliance with the stipulated
conditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a follow-up monitoring is
proper. It appeared from the records that this August 23, 1995 monitoring
inspection was the last one conducted by the DENR.
Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3, 1999, a fact-finding investigation
was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly filed an administrative complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against several officials of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and the local government of Antipolo.
The charge against petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part to monitor
and inspect the development of CHS, which was assumed to be her duty as DENR
senior environmental management specialist assigned in the province of Rizal.
For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not conducted,
claiming that she monitored the development of CHS as evidenced by 3 monitoring
reports .She further claimed good faith and exercise of due diligence, insisting that
the tragedy was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse did not occur in
Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent mountain eastern side of the subdivision.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision imposing upon petitioner the
supreme penalty of dismissal from office for gross neglect of duty.
Petitioner seasonably filed a petition for review of the Ombudsmans decision with
the CA. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed
the appealed decision. It found that the landslide was a preventable occurrence and
that petitioner was guilty of gross negligence in failing to closely monitor Philjas
compliance with the conditions of the ECC given the known inherent instability of
the ground where the subdivision was developed. The appellate court likewise
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

This petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE: WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty
HELD: the petition is hereby GRANTED, The CA decision affirming the Ombudsmans
dismissal of petitioner IGNACIA BALICAS from office is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and petitioners REINSTATEMENT to her position with back pay and without loss of
seniority rights is hereby ordered.
NO
In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look at the
lawfully prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations are silent
on the specific duties of a senior environmental management specialist. Internal
regulations merely speak of the functions of the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.
Tthe monitoring duties of the PENRO mainly deal with broad environmental
concerns, particularly pollution abatement. This general monitoring duty is
applicable to all types of physical developments that may adversely impact on the
environment, whether housing projects, industrial sites, recreational facilities, or
scientific undertakings.
However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed on the HLURB as the sole
regulatory body for housing and land development.
P.D. No. 1586 prescribes the following duties on the HLURB (then Ministry of Human
Settlements) in connection with environmentally critical projects requiring an ECC:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects.
The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation
of the National Environment Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain
projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No
person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the
President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies,
institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements [now HLURB]
shall:
(a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or
area(s);
(b) establish ambient environmental quality standards;
(c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or protective
measures against calamitous factors such as earthquake, floods, water
erosion and others; and

(d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to
time.
The legal duty to monitor housing projects, like the CHP, against calamities such as
landslides due to continuous rain, is clearly placed on the HLURB, not on the
petitioner as PENRO senior environmental management specialist. In fact,
the law imposes no clear and direct duty on petitioner to perform such narrowly
defined monitoring function.

Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995

03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26
and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2,
1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3
o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction
and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not
allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against
the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to
their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting
of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They
also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such
order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government
infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the

provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as

follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies
or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the
monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of
the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of

the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the
ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third,
heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or
transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M
had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the

prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project

Preclaro vs Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

(Public Officers, Non-Career Service)

Facts: Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division,

Industrial Technology Development Institute, Department of Science and
Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute which is an agency
of the DOST.

He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD building, while the Jaime Sta.
Maria Construction undertook the construction. The structure is jointly funded by
the Philippine and Japanese Governments.

While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either directly
requested and/or demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00, claimed as part of
the expected profit of the contractor.

Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
committing said offense in relation to the performance of his official duties.

Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer because he
was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely a private individual
hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified
period. Hence the Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the case.

Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to include elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government

Issue: WON a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government is a

public officer.

Held: Yes. The word includes used in defining a public officer indicates that the
definition is not restrictive. The terms classified, unclassified or exemption service
were the old categories of position in the civil service which have been reclassified
into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807 providing for the organization
of the Civil Service Commission by the Administrative Code of 1987.

A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a

government undertaking falls under the non-career service category of the Civil
Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019.

Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative Code of
1987, non-career service in particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than
those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and 2)
tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with
that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.

Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include
Contractual personnel or those employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or
technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
OPLE VS torres

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National

Computerized Identification Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos
on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order
for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on
two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and
(2) that it intrudes the citizens right to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?

Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a

Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the
issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative
power. Oples concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking
domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the
power of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will
disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
Eugenio vs CSC
In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was
then recommended to be appointed as a Civil Service Officer Rank IV. But her
appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same year, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board (CESB). CESB is
the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the
selection, classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive
Service.

Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the
CSC does not have the power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law
(P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to do so pursuant to
the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the
CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career
Executive Service Board.

HELD: No. The CESB is created by law. It can only be abolished by the legislature.
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function, except
for Constitutional offices. The power to restructure granted to the CSC is limited to
offices under it. The law that created the CESB intended said office to be an
autonomous entity although it is administratively attached to the CSC.