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Clayton Littlejohn
cmlittlejohn@yahoo.com
(Eastern APA 2010)
Abstract: Mentalists say that two subjects have the same evidence if these subjects are in the same
non-factive mental states. Mentalism doesn’t tell us what evidence is. Mentalism doesn’t tell us it
is to have evidence. The mentalist could say that evidence consists of facts or true propositions.
The mentalist could say that our evidence will include any proposition that we know by means of
observation. Mentalism could say either of these things, but it cannot say both of these things.
That’s why we know that the mentalist is mistaken. Or, so I argue. After showing that we have
evidence the mentalist says we cannot, I offer an argument for externalism about justified belief. I
argue that our experiential beliefs can be non-inferentially justified only if they are true.
Paper word count: 2996
Abstract word count: 129
INTRODUCTION
The mentalist says that subjects in the same non-factive mental states share the same evidence:
(M) If A and B are in the same non-factive mental states from the
cradle to the grave, p is part of S’s evidence iff p is part of B’s
evidence.1
The mentalist view is mistaken:
(1) We have non-inferential knowledge of the external world
including the proposition that p is the case (LF).2
(2) If we know p non-inferentially, p is part of our evidence (IKSE).3
(3) If ~p, p is not part of our evidence (EST).4
(4) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental
states as any one of us and believe mistakenly that p.
(C) It is possible for someone to be in just the same non-factive mental
states as any one of us and while p will not be part of their
evidence, p will be part of ours.
Mentalists will give me (1), but mentalists won’t stay mentalists unless they give up (2) or (3).5 In
this paper, I shall argue that a piece of evidence is a fact or a true proposition and if you have non-
inferential knowledge you have what you need (if not more) to possess that evidence. Thus, you
can have evidence that some possible non-factive mental duplicate of yours cannot.
II.
Scarlet: Does the prosecution have solid evidence against Mustard?
Green: People seem to think they do. Here’s the evidence they have: that
he was the last one to see the victim alive, that he lied about his
whereabouts on the night of the crime, that his fingerprints were
on the murder weapon, and that he wrote a letter containing
details the police think only the killer could have known. That
being said, I don’t know if he’s the last one who saw the victim
alive, I don’t know if he lied, I don’t know if his fingerprints were
on the murder weapon, and I don’t know if he wrote a letter
containing any details about the crime.
It seems to me that in (I), Green contradicts himself. I cannot see how Green could manage to
contradict himself if EST weren’t true. In (I), Green asserts that the negations of the propositions
that he says are included in the prosecution’s evidence. If assertions like Green’s of the form ‘S’s
evidence includes p, but ~p’ are contradictory in the way that ‘S knows p, but ~p’ is, that seems
like a good reason to think that evidence ascriptions are factive. In turn, that seems like a good
reason to think that the evidence ascribed by true ascriptions of evidence must be true.
As for (II), it seems that Green either contradicts himself or says something that seems
contradictory in the way that Moorean absurd assertions are. If Green’s remarks are contradictory,
EST is true. Someone could try to deny this and say that Green’s remarks in (II) do not contain a
contradiction. Green’s remarks, they say, only seem contradictory. Perhaps Green’s remark is an
instance of a Moorean absurd assertion. Just to be clear, the explanation I would offer cites EST.
The thing to be explained here is the appearance of contradiction. I take it that it is uncontroversial
that there is something amiss with Green’s remark, the controversy concerns the proper
explanation of that appearance.
I don’t think we can explain the appearance of the contradiction without positing a
contradiction. This is because Green’s remarks in (II) would be absurd in the way that Moorean
absurd assertions are if EST weren’t true. Consider four things Green could say:
(1) p but I do not believe p [omissive Moorean absurdity].
(2) The prosecution is justified in believing p, but ~p.
(3) p is part of the prosecution’s evidence, but ~p [commissive].
(4) p is part of the prosecution’s evidence, but I don’t believe p [omissive].
There are two things to note. First, if EST were not true, a natural view might be that someone’s
evidence consists of those things justifiably believed or rationally believed. There is nothing at all
odd about asserting (2). So, the views that deny EST seem incapable of explaining why (3) and (4)
seem contradictory since they likely take (2) and (3) to amount to the same thing. Second, on the
response we’re considering, (1)-(4) could be true, but (3) and (4) seem contradictory for the sort
of reasons that (1) does. If you want to explain why (1) seems contradictory, you could say that in
asserting the first conjunct the speaker expresses a commitment to p being true and then takes that
commitment back in asserting the second conjunct. If EST is not true and evidence ascriptions are
not factive, there is no reason to think that Green would commit himself to p being true in asserting
‘p is part of the prosecution’s evidence’ and so no clash would arise in expressing a commitment to
p being false and no clash would arise if he expressed that he was not committed to p being true.
So, you can tell a Moorean story about (4), but that story commits you to saying that (3) expresses
a contradiction.
CONCLUSION
I’ve argued here that the mentalist is mistaken. On the assumption that we have immediate
knowledge of the external world, we actually have evidence the mentalist says we cannot possibly
have.
REFERENCES
Audi, R. 2001. An Internalist Theory of Normative Grounds. Philosophical Topics 29: 31–45.
Comesaña, J. Forthcoming. Evidentialist Reliabilism. Nous.
Conee, E. and R. Feldman. 2004. Evidentialism. New York: Oxford University Press.
____. 2008. Evidence. In Q. Smith (ed.) Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University
Press: 83-104.
Goldman, A. 2009. Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence. In P. Greenough and D. Pritchard
(ed.) Williamson on Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press: 73-92.
Rizzieri, A. Forthcoming. Evidence Does Not Equal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
Silins, N. 2005. Deception and Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19: 375-404.
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press.
1
Conee and Feldman (2004) defend this view. I believe many of Williamson’s critics have
something like this view in mind. The arguments I develop in this paper apply to the view that
Goldman (2009) defends and Comesaña’s evidentialist reliabilism.
2
LF is liberal foundationalism. It breaks with classical foundationalism insofar as it recognizes the
possibility of non-inferential knowledge of the external world. There are mentalists who endorse
LF. Feldman (2004) is an example. He’s moved by Pyror’s (2000) argument for the claim that it is
possible to have non-inferential knowledge of the external world if it is at all possible to have
knowledge of the external world. Pryor is not unsympathetic to the idea that justifiers supervene
upon a subject’s non-factive mental states.
3
IKSE is the thesis that non-inferential knowledge suffices for evidence.
4
EST is the thesis that evidence is sufficient for knowledge.
5
We could quibble about (1). If you think we’re not warranted in claiming that we have non-
inferential knowledge of the external world, I could run essentially the same argument by helping
myself to the assumption that it is possible for a mental duplicate of ours to have non-inferential
knowledge of the external world. If you think we’re not warranted in claiming that it’s possible for
a mental duplicate of ours to have non-inferential knowledge of the external world, can I help
myself to the premise that we’re non-inferentially justified in beliefs in the external world? If so,
note that you cannot be justified in believing p when you know that it’s impossible for someone
with just your evidence to know that p. So, if you’ll give me something in the neighborhood of (1),
I’ll give you a refutation of mentalism. Take away my first premise I’ll give you the argument from
mentalism to skepticism.
6
If someone were to deny IKSE, they would have to explain the difference between the pieces of
evidence that you can properly treat as your evidence and the evidence you have. A difference that
isn’t a difference. Maybe someone would deny IKSE on the grounds that knowledge does not
entail justification. To that, I would say two things. First, the notion of justification I’m working
with is a normative notion. Basically, justifiably believing p involves having the belief that p and
that belief being proper, permissible, or right to hold. To accept IJSE but deny IKSE, someone
would have to say that someone could know p non-inferentially but it would be improper for the
subject to believe p for purely epistemic reasons. I would think that whatever those reasons would
be, they would explain both why the belief was not justified and why it did not constitute
knowledge, so whatever case purported to be a counterexample to IKSE would be a
counterexample to IJSE. Such cases would not be cases that show that IJSE is not a consequence of
IKSE. Second, we could drop IKSE and argue against M on the grounds that there are propositions
about the external world that are among the propositions we are non-inferentially justified in
believing. We could simply run the argument against M using IJSE. It follows from IKSE and EST
that M is false, and it follows from IJSE and EST that M is false.
7
Assuming, of course, that inference to best explanation can generate knowledge.
8
It could be that p can be evidence even if ~p, but p can only known to be included in a body of
evidence by someone who knows p is true. I see no credible explanation that could explain this. If
p need not be true to be a piece of evidence, why would the falsity of p prevent anyone from
knowing that p is part of someone’s evidence? If p is a piece of evidence that no one could know
belongs to someone’s evidence, is p really a central, important case?
9
If talk of epistemic ‘should’ or ‘ought’ worries you, the points I am about to make could just as
easily be made by focusing on claims about what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to believe.