Professional Documents
Culture Documents
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF DOMINGO P. BALOY,
represented by RICARDO BALOY, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-46145 November 26, 1986
FACTS:
The Respondents, heirs of Domingo Baloy, represented by Ricardo P.
Baloy, applied for registration of their land in Zambales. Their claim
was anchored on their possessory information title coupled with their
continuous, adverse and public possession over the land in question
The description and the area of the land stated therein substantially
coincides with the land applied for and that said possessory
information title had been regularly issued having been acquired by
applicants' predecessor, Domingo Baloy, under the provisions of the
Spanish Mortgage Law. Applicants presented their tax declaration on
said lands on April 8, 1965.
Director of Lands opposed the registration alleging that this land had
become public land thru the operation of Act 627 of the Philippine
Commission.
o On November 26, 1902 pursuant to the executive order of the
President of the U.S., the area was declared within the U.S. Naval
Reservation. Under Act 627 as amended by Act 1138, a period
was fixed within which persons affected thereby could file their
application, (that is within 6 months from July 8, 1905) otherwise
"the said lands or interest therein will be conclusively adjudged
to be public lands and all claims on the part of private individuals
for such lands or interests therein not to presented will be
forever barred."
o Petitioner argues that since Domingo Baloy failed to file his claim
within the prescribed period, the land had become irrevocably
public and could not be the subject of a valid registration for
private ownership.
RTCS DECISION
Court of First Instance of Zambales denied respondents' application for
registration, concurring with the argument of the Director of Lands.
CAS DECISION
CA reversed the decision appealed from and thus approving the
application for registration on the the following grounds:
o Reason for the failure of Baloy to file his application was that
warning was from the Clerk of the Court of Land Registration and
there has not been presented a formal order or decision of the
said Court of Land Registration so declaring the land public
because of that failure
o It would be most difficult to sustain position of Director of Lands
that it was land of no private owner; open to public disposition,
and over which he has control; and since immediately after U.S.
Navy had abandoned the area, applicant came in and asserted
title once again
ISSUE:
WON private respondents' rights by virtue of their possessory
information title was lost by prescription.
HELD:
No
Sec. 3, Act 627 reveals that private land could be deemed to have
become public land only by virtue of a judicial declaration after due
notice and hearing.
o Without a judgment or order declaring the land to be public, its
private character and the possessory information title over it
must be respected. Since no such order has been rendered by
the Land Registration Court it necessarily follows that it never
became public land thru the operation of Act 627.
o To assume otherwise is to deprive private respondents of their
property without due process of law.
The finding of CA that during the interim of 57 years from November
26, 1902 to December 17, 1959 (when the U.S. Navy possessed the
area) the possessory rights of Baloy or heirs were merely suspended
and not lost by prescription, is supported by Exhibit "U," a
communication or letter No. 1108-63, dated June 24, 1963, which
contains an official statement of the position of the Republic of the
Philippines with regard to the status of the land in question.
o Said letter recognizes the fact that Domingo Baloy and/or his
heirs have been in continuous possession of said land since 1894
as attested by an "Informacion Possessoria" Title, which was
granted by the Spanish Government.
o Hence, the disputed property is private land and this possession
was interrupted only by the occupation of the land by the U.S.
Navy in 1945 for recreational purposes.
Clearly, the occupancy of the U.S. Navy was not in the concept of
owner.
o It partakes of the character of a commodatum.
o It cannot therefore militate against the title of Domingo Baloy
and his successors-in-interest.
o One's ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason
of another's possession if such possession be under claim of
ownership, not where the possession is only intended to be
transient, as in the case of the U.S. Navy's occupation of the
land concerned, in which case the owner is not divested of his
title, although it cannot be exercised in the meantime.
November 3, 1939
FACTS:
Quintos and Beck entered into a contract of lease, whereby the latter
occupied the formers house.
On Jan 14, 1936, the contract of lease was novated, wherein the
Quintos gratuitously granted to Beck the use of the furniture, subject
to the condition that Beck should return the furnitures to Quintos upon
demand.
Quintos sold the property to Maria and Rosario Lopez.
Beck was notified of the conveyance and given him 60 days to vacate
the premises.
In addition, Quintos required Beck to return all the furniture. Beck
refused to return 3 gas heaters and 4 electric lamps since he would use
them until the lease was due to expire.
Quintos refused to get the furniture since Beck had declined to return
all of them.
Beck deposited all the furniture belonging to QUintos to the sheriff.
RTCS DECISION
Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered that the defendant
return to her the three has heaters and the four electric lamps found in
the possession of the Sheriff of said city, that she call for the other
furniture from the said sheriff of Manila at her own expense, and that
the fees which the Sheriff may charge for the deposit of the furniture
be paid pro rata by both parties, without pronouncement as to the
costs.
ISSUE:
WON the defendant complied with his obligation to return the furniture upon
the plaintiff's demand
HELD:
FACTS:
In the year 1943, Jose Grijaldo obtained five loans from the Bank of
Taiwan, LTD., in Bacolod City, in the total sum of 1281.97, with interest
at 6% per annum, compounded quarterly.
The said loans were evidenced by promissory notes executed by
Grijaldo in favor of Bank of Taiwan. To secure payment of the loans,
Grijaldo executed a chattel mortgage on the standing crops on his
land, known as Haciend Campugas in Hinigiran, Negros Occidental.
By virtue of Vesting Order P-4, and under the authority providing for in
the Trading with the Enemy Act, the assets in the Phils., of Bank of
Taiwan were vested in the Government of the United States.
Pursuant to the Phil. Property Act of 1946 of the United States, these
assets, including the loans in question were subsequently transferred
to the Republic of the Phils.
The Republic of the Phils,filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace to
collect the unpaid account in question.
The Justice of the Peace, after hearing, dismissed the case on the ground
that the action had prescribed.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance, ordered Grijaldo to pay the Republic
the total amount of the loans plus interests.
ISSUE: and RULING
1. WON appellee has no privity of contract with the appellant
NO.
It is true that the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. was the original creditor and the
transaction between the appellant and the Bank of Taiwan was a
private contract of loan.
2. WON the obligation of Grijaldo to pay the loan was extinguished upon
the destruction of the mortgaged crops.
No.
The terms of the promissory notes and the chattel mortgage that the
appellant executed in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. do not support
the claim of appellant.
o The obligation of the appellant under the five promissory notes
was not to deliver a determinate thing namely, the crops to be
harvested from his land, or the value of the crops that would be
harvested from his land.
FACTS:
On the 1st of September, 1906, Felix de los Santos brought suit against
Agustina Jarra, the administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno Jimenea,
alleging that
o in the latter part of 1901 Jimenea borrowed and obtained from
the plaintiff ten first-class carabaos, to be used at the animalpower mill of his hacienda during the season of 1901-2, without
recompense or remuneration whatever for the use thereof, under
the sole condition that they should be returned to the owner as
soon as the work at the mill was terminated;
o that Magdaleno Jimenea, however, did not return the carabaos,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff claimed their return
after the work at the mill was finished;
o that Magdaleno Jimenea died on the 28th of October, 1904, and
o the defendant herein was appointed by the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros administratrix of his estate and
she took over the administration of the same and is still
performing her duties as such administratrix;
o that the plaintiff presented his claim to the commissioners of the
estate of Jimenea, within the legal term, for the return of the said
ten carabaos,
but the said commissioners rejected his claim as appears
in their report;
o therefore, the plaintiff prayed that judgment be entered against
the defendant as administratrix of the estate of the deceased,
ordering her to return the ten first-class carabaos loaned to the
late Jimenea, or their present value, and to pay the costs.
RTCS DECISION
On the 10th of January, 1907, the court below entered judgment
sentencing Agustina Jarra, as administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno
Jimenea, to return to the plaintiff, Felix de los Santos, the remaining six
second and third class carabaos, or the value thereof at the rate of P120
each, or a total of P720 with the costs.
ISSUE:
WON the carabaos are merely loaned to the estate of Magdaleno
Jimenea
HELD:
Yes.
therefore, as the said six carabaos were not the property of the
deceased nor of any of his descendants, it is the duty of the
administratrix of the estate to return them or indemnify the owner for
their value.
The Civil Code, in dealing with loans in general, from which generic
denomination the specific one of commodatum is derived, establishes
prescriptions in relation to the last-mentioned contract by the following
articles:
o ART. 1740. By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to
the other, either anything not perishable, in order that the latter
may use it during a certain period and return it to the former, in
which case it is called commodatum, or money or any other
perishable thing, under the condition to return an equal amount
of the same kind and quality, in which case it is merely called a
loan.
ART. 1742. The obligations and rights which arise from the
commodatum pass to the heirs of both contracting parties, unless the
loan has been in consideration for the person of the bailee, in which
case his heirs shall not have the right to continue using the thing
loaned.
Issue:
WON the defendants hold a lawful possession of the lot in question
Held:
No.
Although both litigating parties may have agreed in their idea of the
commodatum, on account of its not being, as indeed it is not, a
question of fact but of law, yet that denomination given by them to
the use of the lot granted by Francisco Fontanilla to his brother,
Andres Fontanilla, is not acceptable.
o Contracts are not to be interpreted in conformity with the
name that the parties thereto agree to give them, but must be
construed, duly considering their constitutive elements, as
they are defined and denominated by law.
o By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to the
other, either anything not perishable, in order that the latter
may use it during the certain period and return it to the
former, in which case it is called commodatum . . . (art. 1740,
Civil Code).
It is, therefore, an essential feature of the commodatum that the
use of the thing belonging to another shall for a certain period.
Francisco Fontanilla did not fix any definite period or time during
which Andres Fontanilla could have the use of the lot whereon the
latter was to erect a stone warehouse of considerable value, and so
it is that for the past thirty years of the lot has been used by both
Andres and his successors in interest.
o The present contention of the plaintiffs that Cu Joco, now in
possession of the lot, should pay rent for it at the rate of P5 a
month, would destroy the theory of the commodatum
sustained by them, since, according to the second paragraph
of the aforecited article 1740, "commodatum is essentially
gratuitous," and, if what the plaintiffs themselves aver on
page 7 of their brief is to be believed, it never entered
Francisco's mind to limit the period during which his brother
Andres was to have the use of the lot, because he expected
that the warehouse would eventually fall into the hands of his
son, Fructuoso Fontanilla, called the adopted son of Andres,
which did not come to pass for the reason that Fructuoso died
before his uncle Andres.
With that expectation in view, it appears more likely
that Francisco intended to allow his brother Andres a
surface right; but this right supposes the payment of an
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the sale of the lot in question is
held to be null and void and of no force or effect. No special finding is made
as to the costs of both instances.
FACTS:
FACTS:
Lopez paid the insurance to May 18, 1920, but not to subsequent
payments
Mrs. Del Rosario submitted the insurance with the arbitrators and
seems to have satisfied all of the persons who had copra stored in her
warehouse, including the stockholders in the Compaia Coprera de
Tayabas (whose stock she took over), with the exception of Froilan
Lopez
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff should recover interest at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum.
HELD:
Yes.
The defendant has not sought to elude her moral and legal obligations.
o The controversy is merely one which unfortunately all too often
arises between litigious persons.
o Plaintiff has exactly the rights of any litigant, equally situated,
and no more.
It has been the constant practice of the court to make article 1108 of
the Civil Code the basis for the calculation of interest.
o Damages in the form of interest at the rate of 12 per cent, as
claimed by the plaintiff, are too remote and speculative to be
allowed.
o The deprivation of an opportunity for making money which might
have proved beneficial or might have been ruinous is of too
uncertain character to be weighed in the even balances of the
law. (Civil Code, art. 1108)
FACTS:
Minors Jacobo Zobel, Alfonso Zobel, and Mercedes Zobel, under the
guardianship of Fernando Zobel, to recover of the City of Manila the
amount of the first two installments of the purchase price of a tract of
land located in the Province of Rizal near the corporate limits of the
City of Manila, which has been conveyed by the guardian of the minorplaintiffs by deed dated 21st of February, 1922, said installments
amounting respectively to P41,666.66 and with interest upon the first
installment from May 21, 1922, and upon the second from the date of
the making of the contract.
The City of Manila have appreciated the necessity for the
establishment of a cemetery near the city and on the south side of the
Pasig River. Admittedly the only tract of land available for this purpose
consists of a part of the Hacienda San Pedro Macati, belonging to the
plaintiffs, who are minors.
o This estate lies in the Province of Rizal, beyond the corporate
limits of the city, but one of its corners juts into the southern, or
southeastern suburbs of the city, in such manner as to bring the
desired tract close to populous centres.
o The hacienda, it may be stated, has never been built upon
improved for city purposes and forms a solid block, practically
untraversed by public streets or roads.
o Owing to the character of the subsoil the land has little value for
agricultural purposes, which is the only use to which it has
heretofore been put; and it is taxed in the Province of Rizal on
the low basis of agricultural land.
In February, 1920, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed an
ordinance (No. 726) appropriating the sum of P703,750 to be used for
"the establishment of a cemetery in the south district of Manila and the
acquisition of the land necessary therefor."
Honorable Ramon J. Fernandez, at that time the Mayor of the City,
entered into negotiations with the guardian of the appellees, the result
of which was a letter, written July 1, 1920, in which the appellees
offered to sell to the city upon the terms therein set forth twenty-five
hectares of the San Pedro Macati Estate for cemetery purposes (Exhibit
A)
By the final deed of sale, dated February 21, 1922, the city undertook
to pay the total purchase price of P250,000 in six installments. The first
was in the amount of P41,666.70 payable on May 21, 1922. The other
five were in the amount of P41,666.66 each, successively falling due
on May 21, 1923, and on the same date in each succeeding year until
all should be paid.
RTC Ruling
Upon hearing the cause the trial judge gave judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs to recover both the principal sums claimed, amounting to
P83,333.32, with interest upon only one installment at the rate of five
per centum per annum.
ISSUE:
WON the rules on the computation of interest is proper
HELD:
No.
As to the first installment, which was to fall due at three months, it was
stipulated that it should bear no interest.
o The trial judge appears to have considered that this stipulation
deprived the plaintiffs of the right to interest after default, and no
interest whatever was allowed by him upon this installment. This
was error.
As already stated, the first installment fell due on May 21, 1922, and
extrajudicial demand for payment appears to have been made in a
letter dated June 7, 1922, from the guardian of the plaintiffs addressed
to the Mayor.
o Under the first paragraph of article 1100 of the Civil Code and
under article 1108 of the same Code, interest should be allowed
upon this installment at the rate of six per centum per annum.
o Under section 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the interest
thus accruing must be consolidated with the principal as of the
date of the judgment of the lower court; after which interest
upon the whole shall be computed at the same rate.
o The circumstance that the rate here stipulated was less than the
lawful rate does not alter the case.
In connection with liability for interest it may be well to point out that
section 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable only to debts
and claims with respect to which no stipulation for interest has been
made, and article 1109 of the Civil Code, providing for interest upon
interest, is applicable only to obligations containing a stipulation for
interest.
o Furthermore, it will be noted that, though section 510 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that interest shall be added
"until the date of the final judgment," this is not to be understood
as inhibiting the collection of interest thereafter accruing until
the judgment is paid.
o A demand established by judgment must be understood as
bearing interest whether expressly so stated or not.
o Finally, it hardly needs be said, a municipal corporation does not
enjoy immunity from liability for interest, when assessed as
damages for the nonpayment of a debt, to the same extent as
the general government.
The plaintiffs shall recover of the defendant, upon the first cause of action,
the sum of P45,652.84, as of the date of January 11, 1924, with interest
thereafter at the rate of six per centum per annum until the judgment shall
be paid; and upon the second cause of action the sum of P44,283.04, as of
the date of May 24, 1923, with interest thereafter at the rate of five per
centum per annum until the judgment shall be paid. The plaintiffs will also
recover costs of both instances. As thus modified, the judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
A fire occurred burning the boat FB Pacita III and fishing gear of the
Reforminas. Consequently, they filed an action for recovery of
damages for injury to persons and loss of property.
Judge Tomol, Jr awarded the Reforminas damages with legal interest
from the filing of the complaint until paid.
He further rendered that by legal interest meant 6% as provided for by
Art 2209 CC. Reforminas contend that it should be 12% by virtue of
Central Bank Circular No. 416
ISSUE:
WON the appropriate legal interest is 6%
HELD:
C.B. Circular 416 which took effect July 29, 1974 pursuant to PD 116
which amended Act 2655 (Usury Law) which raised the legal interest
from 6% to 12% applies only to forbearances of money, goods or credit
and court judgments.
Such court judgment refers only to judgments in litigations involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credit.
Any other kind of monetary judgment does not fall under the coverage
of said law for it is not within the ambit of authority granted to the
central Bank.
Only the legislature can change the laws.
In this case, the decision of the judge is one rendered in an action for
damages arising from injury to persons and loss of property and does
not involve a loan much less forbearance of any money, goods or
credit.
The law applicable is thus ART 2209 CC which states that:
o If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money and
the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages there
being no stipulation to the contrary shall be the payment of
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest which is 6% per annum.
Plana Concurring and Dissenting: Under Sec 1a of Act 2655 as
amended by PD 116, the authority of CB is to fix a maximum rate of
interest on loans and not to prescribe a fixed interest rate. Such
authority given to CB is absolute and unqualified and therefore the
delegation of power to itis void.
RTC Ruling:
On June 26, 1961, the Trial Court rendered decision ordering defendants to
pay plaintiff "the amount of P10,000.00 plus the further sum of P6,000.00 by
way of liquidated damages . . . with legal rate of interest on both amounts
from April 30, 1960." It is from this judgment that defendants have appealed.
ISSUE:
WON the P6,000.00 constituted usurious interest
HELD:
No.