AIR

VIA:

ir I iNi-URN. IA

H NO

*ILA.

: 1/

(SPECIFY MR OR SEA POUCH)

,

115 OFNCIALS

CLASSIFICATION

ONLY

DATE.

TO

/12:

FROM

Chief of'Station, Frankfurt

5 Jun e 1952

(e /

SUBJECT: GENERAL-' , operationaV

SPECIFIC-- '

Tranmaittal of Photos

Tranewit'ved herewith for your disposition is a set

of photos of UTILITY and

ft HERDAHL.

The photos

were taken in the United States by . fL:

We have retained no copies in our files..

OECLASSIF I ED:ANO RE LEASED DY

Dist:
4--12 -

CENTRAL I NTELL 16 EN CE . AS ENC.)

SOU7CE.S METHODS EXEMPT 1 .
0N 302E
NAZ I WAR CRIMES 01 S CLOSU R E.
AC1
DATE 2005

w/att.

cos - 1
POB

Vat
3t7-(.;?..T1
:

r"MN1

MAR. 1949

51-28A

JS.,..)H CIi.

CLASSIFICATiON

C,.

eg

LL 1 L

f1VI., I /lied

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

GE, fro..E W

FORm

3768

USE P
PE.VtOUS
CMTIONS

SECRET ( Wilt,' Filled In)

EXTRACT from Mag114899 dated July 1952

C-

duentherGOLLY

Impor4eat Zipperites shomV .011126 first

ma' assessment of each.

met after the

Vero

imeluding

A. UTILITY. V-11126 knew him only by name and reputation during the
ea'.
Ito
first
mot UTILITY in the fall of 1946, after the latter w s return from
ar
his first trip to isserioa. The. introduction VM2 performed by.BAUN. At this
tire BAUN was accustomed to stay in the home of V-1112.6 in Oberzeimmering andto hold his oonforenoes there whenever house in the Munich area. ' BAUN began
bringing UTILITY to such oonforences. UTILITY took a personal liking to
V-11126 (Field. Convent' this statement ma verified indepetdently mad earlier
and V-12053), begin hilaself to visit Oberzeismering
by both C.
frequently (UnaccOmpanied by BAUN), mad often solicited the advioe of IT41126
in IS ratters. V-4091 (mentioned in para. 3 D above), who had suooeeded BAUll
as operations Chief, is the brother-in-law of UTILITY. v.-11126 told UTILITY
flatly that V-4091 was unsuited to IS work, end this blunt statement opened the
first rift between the two men. SUbsequently a clique opposed to V.11126ne the
grounds that be was a BAUN man undertook to break the friendly relationship
between htm and UTILITY, This clique consisted of SCRAM{ (who suaceeded V.4091
an chief of operations); GATTNiTZ (clover name),. a representative of'HaRN in

evaluation! and TIMMANN. The efforts of this clique, plus the fact. that the
currency reform made it easier for UTILITY to get hotel accommodations, did puts=
end to his visits to Oberzeismering.. The clique did , not succeed in changing 'the
kW

nature of the friendly relationaips.ntioh . poreisteduntil VAllte

left

Germery. EVidence that V-11126 is stiilporsona grata with titurr is the

latter's lezt-ethauto attempt to persuade him, to remain in Germany and Zipper

and Ids offer of employment should V-11126 ever return.

V-11126 provided the following evaluation of UTILITY: very intelligmato

devious but persistent,' and intensely enbitieua. Gravest Anawest a leak

up
Subjecte with the
of courage in personal mattersj evades taking unpleasant
person ono-armed, either achieves bin 'goal by indirection or delegates the

responsibility for a frontal attack to someone else. Is not deterred by

ethical stendardi in reaching his goals '. Second gravest weakneset leek of
110001,4430ot. ti volt* Chief etzbittens political in natio.. !Cashel to liar

Malacca etigraVed on Gtetaon hiatory.

DE CLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELL !BENCE ABENCY
SOURCESMETIIODS EXEMPTION3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSOREACT
DATE

2001

2005

,/e1.,";

EA&LI.MUALr

Ioh*haue von der 2irma SiINDUVE G.m.b.H. den

PKW, Opel-Kapitan
AMLliches Kennzeienen Nr. B 55 - 3563
FahreesLell Nr. 51-1N-027 605
Moor Nr. 215-1-52-09000
Baujahr 1952
zum Geseaditsgebrauch ernaiten and verpflicn .ce mion zar or dentlicnen 2Lie6e und senoneauen 13ehana1u11g desseiden.
:loh . werde den Weisangen des Ei6eattmers hinsicaidich des
-Fahizeuges Folge leistea and iceinen anderen als den verein. :p arted ciebrauca aavon mauhea.

.Im FalIe eines Besentidigung oder eines Unialies werde ica an. li erztglien deriOnten..

D ECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTR
I t! :11 IGENCE AGENC1
SOUV:ESNETHOOSEXENPTION

NAZI W IR CR INES DI SCLOSURE ACI

t;IE 2005

30 .9,,g7

/95;2.

or: cuiy

AIR

VIA:

I ino
1 16,-i

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

74.V.1

rwr,

DATE

Chief, EE

TO

FROM

: Chief of Station, FrankfurtfTh

SUBJECT: GENERAL
SPECIFIC--

----

L
CLASSIFICATION

L...:..::.",-;;;;

I ov

Operational
Progress Report - ZIPPER Transfer to The Federal Republic

1. We have had an excellent opportunity to debrief Dr. HORN

during his two day stay in Munich prior to his three week leave to
Austria. The information received from him plus what we have learned
from Drs. GRAU and GUMBEL (GLOBKE l s Administrative and Financial experts
studying ZIPPER), and recent discussions with UTILITY has given us a
rather lucid picture of ZIPPER developments and progress to legalize
themselves with the Bundesrepublic towards becoming the German Intelligence Service.
2. The team of GRAU and GUMBEL completed a three day visit on 18
July 1952. After an overall introduction by UTILITY the following subjects were discussed in detail:
a. Personnel matters.
b. Relationship and cooperation with other governmental
authorities.
C. Cover and Legalization problems.
d. Basic questions of financing and administrative
handling.
e. Accounting procedure.
f. Budget planning.
g. Examination of financial matters.
h. Insurance matters.
i. Travel costs, disposal costs, procurement of consultants and specialists.
1.

Procurement of foreign currencies.

k. Property and financial assets.

1. Vehicles and motorization.
DIS T:

1- COS

FORM HcL,
MAR. I94.

5.1/AA

Sr To
IR

.11DV

DECLASS IF IE , D AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL I NTELL I GE NCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CR IMES DISCLOSURE
DATE

2003

3a co-

2005

-) 2

ACT

SE,CRET
3, Apparently ZIPPER has prepared the background material of'
the points listed above and has now been asked to prepare the subjects and contents of this material in a format acceptable to the
government. We have asked UTILITY to provide us with copies of the
reports they will 'turn over to Bonn,

of
be

he problem
. ..toi
. 0;
.. .0.001.1404*
.:: ....
........ .
....
.
:. .- ..
.. . transfer
. 'too..
....
. 034...p0444t.
., .
.
we , ktike : . 444' : tied -.400t14:11.. -00.044* . ..01.4 .0).opP.t....!4..influenee-.
.
-to; .we a .s
to
in 010 .
tt.094'17
conoernedfeel it ...4$:.:00..involvenent
onsidex'ed ae unwantd .n: Teip'..f.
: 44 .. ..i00.0.0. 44ated
SPert.S.e..*::What.
..
. .,.....,..,:.
0.... . . ;..4.40..t.00.0...'.harm- -.-.b. -- good. .
-en a vance f
to..0
'enir'...40.0..1.***.0.4.040. or .:P.
ha ve asked UL
kitie
400a10--4
with . .1440"

r
for the pte.soia.10)W ttze, afld spOS.
:ana Peta0.0001 : The
Bon goYe n** QLcLaUy
ye4 aa4:..JO.r44400: :OA*

I;St in

tc....1741:04:-14vrc4.41).*.'

0#.,:qt...:.:tre aties

r-otr-.43Nif

0,,
e and hop* to get=
r800#01;
0640,
pic
uLer
ex

qoa no

r.

Coo.

appear aom1icated and

7: HORN advised us he was informed by McCloy,prior to the

Iatter's departure from Germany, that the United States will recognize the sovereignty of Germany as soon 46 the German Federal Republic
v#rtaa the two treaties, which is expected to take place approximately1G:getober 1252. HORN realizes this is not in accord with
, 410.040 la of the "Conventions on 'Relations Between ,14e. Three :Powers
and
'Federal
that 1! .! - .. . Republic. or Germany,
. .:. . which
. . clearly
.
, 0000
.
...:t convention 01441 enter into force: #4404.atel3t
-. ., - . . upon the
Signatory 'statas Of 40 txnnents of rati1cation of the
t by
quito ignifloantt and
Uen .,; ' '. 4 : C: 3ince : :#0
e will have. opne$:dere$0-;bearing On our
tiXrioe , 440 11.0 a Via
we as ked HORN again several dqre
3004 the statend Ba.dj.t :100: in connectionleQeragai otti* $04.00a #i::,'
08 as 8004 as

poem* t

.t.:t: stands na*.- - MIII : and 401,,'.

12.A
. s
g .tivo
ei,' friiiret04 ,
gi#4.4143 74r4$1* ,*04048 . soh:
Durin.,
g kllietoir , *000,, UELITY, MK a
na ERDAJIt, Wal . ap: -

and
ll

agn

in

ad the ctOaMen of cover Or .the compound cOov- ,:44' itO.001:

he :318, 404-00 will be the position f.
0 sit
tin, g
.....
e of a 4 ,04:003: service,
to
rvtae
4
40
:a.
4627
a
has
in
the
, :
.
as 034 10,.for.00060. .no, - ute
......:,
. ., !
change oa
cth
ne cessarytO :.:0*-: -4
.:0;,v : .
e .1
70 for the ,eerPOO.40. will be changed from viola : milita ry co ver-..
German
en Tag.ittari3Or ,s0epa sort of gorm*:.
theDe may be ,a0:iit*-7betwe**-partod 4-iat :ma-iy . * **,, some complications.,,.
thi s may i*:reSOIVed by esatutt:a ire*** , hatoon,:' the '7.iPPE4 :;,*itt .

The relationship --ef operational and staff

a on a more significant aharaOter. trTILIfl eta
as the -CO he will have a . 0
0

r4i

rt

s taff

hei

eat

SEC El
_4_
return to Palach On 8 August, which we may expect in the neXP few
days. To . o great extent the future of the FOB relationship with
the 018 will depend upon this secret agreement.

II

NAME

C.R111,

EN,

Riteinheeilt oimarti

WORMATITs!

CASE
DATE

No.
27 itaiNal

t 190tavgaz
Caw

NATIONALITY

BIRTHDATE
BIRTHPLACE

*matt

PRESENT POSITION/
.

Organization

'

Xn to 11 i g ewe

LOCATION
ON

GEN. OCCUPATION

tateilivnom Agent

ep TN%

'40.20W

RACE
SEX
yAin
. MARITACSTATUS
NAME OF SPOUSE

LAIJI
:TJP=1114

CHILDREN

eXi
W5NTWN

RELIGION
EDUCA4ION

POLITICAL AFFILIATION

tr,1:1
AlaTle!
U4Wel

LANGUAGES

i/

ATTITUDE TOWARDS: U.S.

U.S.S.R.

HONORS

IMMARV.Ss

Ci4070
Rmilvt
fle=1

A-f
Formoreneiel, Rhminherdt GMLEti, leho porved in Hit1er 4 s General Stet
as Chita Ofthe 'partment of Forei gn Armies ropertcy currently.hcade a.seporet..
t Oermany vhioh evaluatce . intellizence . fronAktegnit. ta'arOlte
Apeed in 1945,Geh1on is !mid to hart-eabined*etwird.-"fith,ekt
of tho scoref . ,eS of hAs dopartmeut. fic allegedly kOpt.in:hWeentraleue*ylof.

the top'404-iit 1 'Sts:of rivrean erosto planted in the 17-ovietljnioi : Aad : the Eistein.
naiEbborstate:s. iob. 'subsequently boahma gaviut satellites. 11c 6uPposocily h*Ohe:
key. to the_espl6nage network built by Canaria, flienler and Schtllenbarg.
cans- roport
tookjiim priemar but not for long because Lnericen intelligunct.
chiefs rpcnt1y beitana veryimpreleod by hin - ideas and hie doenmentation.which
he wan:ahle tpxtat tteir disposal. Thay ire said to hare sot him up in en office
Auld pariat
hirs ....tc pick A loan- *tar of ex-lbwehr officers' ( Gat Canarie IV:10141i'
s7,tdct .Sei
),xotit,:or itbto var. equipped uith Good anti-nut rf3 CO I'd
and
arproridino.: =Meat reports on aoviet
woakr 0
tics
:eastern tow and vaa stibsequent4 pamitted to expand ht o staff and.hts
scope OtEt. i.Vities.. As he expanded, novevocr, many Naulas SS in and SD . 7110.11 arept
into hii ni-iih1te.4on wharo they onjoyed full proteotiou.
1
'
l espionego . orTan:taat.Lon Ia s-sid to hest ag:onts in all vt;rta.,pt the
world . . The ,I,ItOritiena reporte-dly supply the feuds 1,thich amounts to 43,5Ct1ti0d:120:::a
year. Tho f Ortaer General is said to ho &tall to multiply this nom to many times:Ate
thro:01 clancer buminove deals. t in believed that he has sliteiiy
eh /ould onable htm tocart7 . CC.;. inannocOded s in piling 1.4) a aubstentla mserv9
depondoetlyshaul(1 tbe Americana eenoe to support him. Tbe material oollOctod by
Cehltnii . said to he! of Cirat oleos va1 k ,e6. 1/ The toterprebaUon of it, (14)no by his

1. 0dAY

Gehlen

DE , CLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

(00.14 HO. 60-64
HAT

19,49

CENTRAL INTELLI . BENCE AGENCY

SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001
2005

-2
,denerel)
.dinued)
.nalysta at their headquartere in Nunich has impressed not only the Americans buthte BritiSh, and thelieneh:as will. A Navy intelligenda report or Novem-

ber 1914 stateethat.Gahlen's organisation maintains 15 to 16 outer listening posts

along the borders of the RUssianoccupied zone while the organization itself is

ccefposed of between 30 and ho General Ntaff . officers and 50 to

60

other officers. IL/

. the . dunger_ofhlon s e organisation has in the future. It has already become

aniimmanse underground ,power in Osrmany and has key men in 411 German Government
i. offiCeni.:in:the:palic?, news-papery , radio stations, etc. His organisation hasArven
:iene,tritidtheAdendUer GOvernment's Office far the Protection of the Constitution
(elndihe!rc4Cretlice*office). 1/ Gohlen has been . suggested for a pasitina.with
.:thiSbff.10)%*Cerriing,to oeveral reportas.2/ W In any event for Ulu present, his
AmitiinrkAs::nli:Uning:its underground poser to expand its influence still father,
getiti*Mberin4trategic positions, and cover ex-Nazis and 8S men frusa agy % per4,0*;-

is.riaportcaly not ambitious for political power. (He is_however

.11iteit.j**Sieligier:ofibelirudaireahaft)eg His hope Supposedly is to bechme:,the
Dirpean Azuw::. The maw ox-Nazis 4th ex-offinori
;Whi.0ii764iiii;AOever,,arviiegarded .as aMbitious and rePresenting the real

SOURC:45
":
*. 111= 1.7liatrah 1952
:

cOritidtttia.

linclastrified.

viber:1914.(B-3), Se,oret.
15.11O-Ci
Cenfidtttial
114 April 1950, Seoret.

bih up

clangor.

SECRET CONTROL
US OF.ICIALS ONLY
.' 5CURITY NFORMATION

COURIER

27 August 1552

diction

Chief, Boon

Chief of Staiion ,: , ranki

. brt

bOeiltiaaal
Biogriphio . Data Report ot ex-General Reinhard GERM
14- pars.kto MOOG ,. Biolgaphie iiecitiOa l

teciesat

iitireardieg: a . bioOrsiPliie data report

2.

will

be noted the report , eitriapalytirif arid

We. :.hrrre delibertt37 !afraid:P:11m *MAIM* a tall.

:Of.. the . tan.

::..GtsC'l..A'SS IF AND RELEASED BY

-XENtRAIHNJELLIGENCE AGENCY
.40i1OCEGMETHODS EXEM.PT I ON3B1B
" :.

:NAZ

CRIMESDISCLOSUREACT
. 2U01

2.005

SECRET CONTROL

US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET CONTROL. .

US OF;ChALS ONLY .
- SECURITY INFORMATION

BiorTraphio Data Relport on ex-Oeneral Reinhard OEHLEN

DEHLEN, Reinhard (ex-Brigadier General )
%mane/ data:

Born 3 4111 1902

in Erfurt, Thuringia. Protestant.

Married; four children.

Oradnated'fros Humanistisohes Ottanasituas Breslau, 192q.

Ednotta ti n.'

'2nglish, same French:

Lanknagest

Oarmais.
(artillery),

1.920

. service
Enterod.Military

1923

Commissioned Second Liwatenopt.

Promoted to First Lieutenant.

:19.28

193341935 General Staff Academy, Ber1in

Promoted%to Captain.
19354938

GazOral Stitnyitsigierit.

castander.

19384939 Battery

Promoted to.isJore

939
., , :- .!:-,,?.,,..:::-.-::...

. S-.1939=-:1910

- Chiefs Of.',Staifr,:23.3th,leatM*.iitiliddrti!.:::..
. .... ....

.

- ..
< -

- FO'rtifiostiono Seatiao;:,..0enOtal:Staff,..
: thlirjOf.:
. .. .
.

- - .

.
.,Adjitant : to .: GaitiroI 'WM, :Chiir,: Of .penOra' , Staff:
, ...

4, . :..:: . :
: ,
-
:
-

7 - '''."

1'..1,.:?.."....,, ::

it
'

, ,,,
....:, ... -: , ,.....,;.:,.:.,2,..:::.:,11.

--

:..7, ..'",V .: i:-:.'0' ' , '7::Ft :-..

'' 46/4 :1tfinlilis! .

'

..1,:. : ;I:i...; : Ii." .,:,7'....,;

1.iotio41 .,/,*-

hii:

"f,.." .6i,Dttito.irkietelit Fronde . Heti/sei Oat,

toiBrigadier
General
,

order sof HITLER m4141119

AlMeriCanIV,,27 11*.1911.5
,

_SECRET, CONTROL
;..0..CDF1C1XLS ONLY
.
,
INFORMATION

sCURITY.

-,i-...:.,.....r.,...4,A.:::::....
'...*

,,t

SECRET CONTROL

us

a IL?

SECURITY INFORMATION

Remark
Reinhard GEHLE,'N was born the son of German Army First Lieutenant :delta
OEBLEN. His father left the military service a few years after Reinhard
was born and banana a moderately successful business an and spent the
majority of his years as Director of a Pablishing House in Breslau until
hit death in /910.
'tip until...191a Reinhard GEHLEN followed a routine career pattern similar
to other professional army officers. His promotions :can be considered
.

:. conitstant:with other officers. His highest tactioal commend ft/option-wee

that. of :a company comMander.
In441 . nf. .- 1942 CHOW, then - a Colonel, was autigned.to take o'er the

intelligence group oFre.;-,10-Hetre Oat" or "Foreign. Armies East". under. the

.-High:OcOad Of the .Aray. His mission with
unit at that- tithe was to
obtain 40eSible Intelligence material dealing with: the military, : polit : .:iCal: .:.and;aieeneeitc . eituation existing in the IISaa and the south eastern
.


Europe an
He gave an able demonstration of s himself until

PrOfaiiitis ...tO. :atand for a united Western Europe built around a Franco.
Gers Arts, for collaboration with England and the United St4411, for
"
: .
.
social s reform
1t
for
the
review
of
sisch.:*oncupation4nd

not,Socialimn,
.
.. .
.
- poet,:mar'.9,injnetices"
,
"
.
War Orindnal Trials and some aspects ' Of denami,as
.
.
,..
Zieatiou.
,
He
does
not
Prior
the" remilitarisation : Of Germany,
except as

,
part of litiiritFT:::tar6pean Defense. In the intelligenee : field he believes

that a Simaili,.(iOuntry such ..ii Germany should have a unified service.,

'' . ;

;
,

'

1,

,,,, .r.

...y.i.

-;

A- 3:-

l:- .t i4:p 43
.

;14 ai

43

tiF., 1 :

W:#i

*8

we..

wir

ttrrlinVA145.1:,44.

0 0

6OttLV

"

OFFICIAL DISPATCH
PATCH MO. aadh15816
01
NY

TO

Chid of Statics. tranktUrt

FROM

Chief, Fid

OJECT

DATE i 28 Jagoot

1952

Attne Polled

C-

>m3

ORmdFmtblitil
Gomm

Ca
1.41
GM

Inflames in the Neer lest

end the art*.

I. Prosatably you have goat the 25 Augost ism of

sot/
ele entitled, nu ow= infiCenee 8ohi.n4 the
et
inglas out Lt. 0e94
ANCISACNilie qtrjbolgtar
brief, N
as the losi-11Wso of gr
former Oore
Vda
tante by the kyptiest
do, terlsy es
tear advisees ect4
* officiator of
dovanakent whose advise otor hare gents
Occerel NAOU/IPs coup. Nreessok l e edi
olhe bodges& MA
aritieb find nothing e
ORRMIITC.,

L"
CC
C=I
ct

2, In Cris, Imam

reporte the
et *wane
not have the cr.

the
that
ise;
the meet intinent
k""Zte
whet the Omen coiled the

Wise AlW7 oat Nth.tery

eivisore
tido at hand
Gm
in Syri
er
a
Colonel 22/12211..
'department of t
is the COostomemetde
Generel Map VII.
Conway, MELD
horisano and doltish
mflttry

eoebot iatellipeee orgegisation

heettprortere. IS motel maw
role le sew* setters in
MP= ter the arrtoe jed. Seth the
be little of the Omen In kris tot the
svoraeopleiose ?rash
Ow bole% to a Mar aladded
to way oat work Asterisms onset or mold Waif net 60
3. VI bold au pertleest Irmo ea . , , . .1 . W.
hor that
do we
bare
0 404
violse artrist o .T----.--21/. . ..,
NW infornation.
eit ux
rei nere
Mtn ie .
Akinspiria.

Worm, voiserteelf
t44in reporter
4
iti
denul ah' ' ?
obi le t
well der
trot D0000Pia Attaebed are moot rd,wilte 246.1111141 1m WOW '
IS

li Tor idott be lotoroeted tallow Mattia . ankle ow tiret trosett

to oar ettootio an 0 bout tr tbilICLAW ottiee Web het resolved an

.1

[1.
mtmamt imortis witty

1111.13114$ Wriest

ATIMEini FOI F
1110-10,
MR 90

.-

"7:

as 1110

I.---

Boman

It-

LI

HI

Ce4f") WY')

EaL,..07

AIR

rcJ

STU
3 November. 1952

Chief, EE
Chief

Oellitio t

Pala&

OESIEN 10 Oatober Letter to

L.

Bieferenost EGLI...2867

(2.

in

Please pass. the original of attaahment to

1.

This

refeienee.

letter is the

direct

result of disoassions;reported

The -last and penultimate:sentendes otjarngrepn 3 estrum

-3.
Traddat.
us of Picture access to the preeint UPPERAntelli genae

Ittachmantt Subject Letter

MUM&
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
rEurR IL I NTELL IGENCE AGENC)
SOU3CES METHODSEXEMPT ION 382E
NAZI WAR CR I MES DISCLOSURE ACI
E;TE 2005

EIMPA41

with 2 copies of attach)

3;--3 - COW (1 with ittaOhment)

See car/

'

IFIMUM
Cd41020

CS2

Abli4 peL'4.

"

. .

Air

Tis44-25.i

6)

6 November 52

'Chief, 112
/

d=a4

:V 2

1ertif

/JO 6-651-1.EA/

A /

uperational ..v
taterview with UTILITY

Carr2,4

Lang . 1. 1.121LITY called me up during the . sierning of 4 November to announce

J ..- We met at my apartment for about an hoer that same
seimmeathit-:Prellanae 1:
=afternoon.
. His oonversation was restricted exelnsivel,y to the tari3urenti.
npelitiOal currents immediately effeetiag his orgautimation. His estimate
10000110 of: the tenses working. against him ray be summarised as follows:
IniCE
(a) Theitritishi who, ha feels, are dotrmiuted to see the
:::NrN
organisation Oonfined within an areas of purely military intelligence.
MCC
(b) The Soviet;. who are de te rained to see the Mud sat1031
I Mmmom
as wank as possible.

CO,

(a) Certain Yreash elements whose opposition is eaplicable

within the ifinoral frameitork of Trench ;anrie4 about a. realm/A' Germaksy.

lons.

entlino, the currents ant erase earrento.areent

eeliriieen
. rto
keit 'orderly

. , y..

prO403'

:tiiiieritp -4ew, at ..least,

be new to Other's. The
be to Proceed according to names t

an& IPTEMIST have

(a) f,dA13.Cirli : . 11S:
. is , still- a factor.
been4OnfrantOci hythe ,.:Ertrideace of , Iiis Service for foreign inte/liginiiie age.ice. Tier seem to : have 'been neither greatly moved nor
entirely convinced. Which brings us tot
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

3 .IPTILITI explains his persistent loyalty to

J served,
ion according to
with the Braanianberg Division siagaz
thuis continues to be a tb.orm in the ZIPPRN.

CENT RAL I NTELL ISE NCE AS EN C.W.C.17:k..-t,',..r1.6411t. te.i.ii*c

O:',Otid. of thi7 ;War,
SOURCESIAETHODI EXEMPTION38
NAZI WAR CRIMESCISCLO8U.REA
DATE

2001

continues to express his

conviction that

2005

Dist

'Wish .13)

risk:AL)

' ritlka';
.
.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATIOi.:

___ LI.

ill

'6

-2:CAPUT% works for the Soviet', or at least has connections to then.

UTILITY centimes, howover, to express a. high opinion of
The same cannot be said, however, with regard to-(c) -Franz Josef STRAUS, Sear,:ytaly-Rensral of the CS1/. 7 who has
frequently . hatnreported as a contender for
Je job and wham
UTILITY idesitifies,with what he:s.1.15. sYs (*tolls "Der lIrsis. ma Josef Mueller."
Al you know; UX.Pi/r1;:..hae satrap) regard.014761.12R: as one of the 12ites*$a of ..!eyiet tafItteies *n V. et eiuGerman polities.
has .sitiseePted .':''esvieveral occasions to le...UTILITT. but tho.
acting on wain/age ' from BUR, has pelitely.dikelesid. hioh brings
to

(d) Dr. Otto JOU. Not much new here, except that.. relations

botween the two awn continue to be outwardly .Cordial. They reelisu.rs

each other froa . time to tine of their deterainatiOn. to respect and
support the other's prerogatives. .UTILITY Pasitd.'enian.tuilisisfirmed.
rOort frOM an allegedly reliable source. atieording . tC-Whitih, JOIN,
in his cupe ., once confided to the source that hebad.:belotigietts.ttnthe
f3pecia3.. Service' of the 13ritiWioietta Offloe. A similar -distinction, according to UTILITY, is enjoyed by RIN1 of the -SPD..
: the. way. lams now been identified as a co-author of the article by
1st,
Salton Delmar.
.
CO- General OWIt011117. The name was 'mentioned. by. me and produeed.,..the: falleMing,story. Gerectoiff.:,reteatlifiot..in.,tOuith.;With.
urnarrr on tid:i.siiittbtat (.1) to as for hie!:jipperV:rinj144
an. -Ic positions:
the . German contin
gents ; (2) to t.11 i1a that
he had been effe*2'3.7:.lob with a
1* office and. abis
otiasit27
.
'
:;?.iia,iiii*.ilaiire***6..
.. - :t.i4:. . UTILITY xiiviiitii.!..;4iiii:1
, ..... '.- ;=;iiiieliliCii.li.t..Artie

- '. ili?..i.ifiii
Aif.;":... - *:. .::--. :. ?qUite..;pleased:With,,V,-;i%hii.,,
:::.C17.40tiknitti: itt ,'!. 1iiis 'ti.;:ortaiiii
tst2tM
, ed ?;eitt;!;.
.:;4t7aradliVhein
ss
1.:AieCtiet,.:Itere
of
ii:
the,.1.iftiii :s.. , '4
'4
4

.
.
. of
.. this
,. .
. ,.,

sound.. '..TI(**:..c.i::.....o.t.rtspoarr
4.,...n.d...: .. ? sa.jg et :Lthat.
:-'
sr
s ' ..hoitla
at.2".11<sg,rapliiiitir4ims...::
. , h rttrarr.412ie.-..-. . . *.,.7 ----'''
- .-- ' -liet
. 7 O' pinio n ,:ciii4iiii:.:- .'A:4fiti, I;t:! tli.',;,11'rtiat. r . :,iitifi.: D .4...
.7.knatt
.no%Mn af:ii.t.i..3 .:*-4iii .:ii.; :aiiiii#OtiOii.:wkihtftiteijaki t Ide',:.igioitt At
*tic ii.iiti.: iiii*ifosi .: isi4 . iftii,itiiiit.::::iiiiii**;! . '' - '.../iiii : : . iiiiiii on
*whit :GtRSDPArr .hiid :::"eneo told. hiii,:at','..ttie ::.siiiiiii.:t
.;in' Cologne. I
hairM : alWele eu34iifictAitit GRBSDORMos'iitliattit4ezeime..fiea.J0104.
-2
Pr i e

'

).4

'SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATc4nr
..S
I 9

o---)n,( /t7r,

cve

z) e

,-, ''' 441Z_.

1.4...-.A.-a..4.e.s.t.

HIII,

ES.Put-25.3
(f) GeOrget BLLTN. trruar ca11edi. atteatioa to this
the Boltn crr.spoMant of the .tgiumi1..11/ biota.
Obassortr,
L
11t4eno
reetO:Sti get ba * is...40 . 0441u I .. -#.#4.,
p
t
.csg

7
Le Ms a

or poidb

ha& t
tars axe

.,,t410;

La

tiT141#,..safeViiiik..***6:41"

itp ,o

ns

4S**
#4*
SECRET
SEctRa y NFORMAT

fac

/Te3

Noy

21

1952

SECRET

aECAP ITY 1 RFO R MATI ON

r::O 4iit.iai

1eal3RANDta1 FOR:.illei Piri4ori::o.

SUBJECr

Letter fro:- Oerieral

"* .
,

Attached- haireto:.is'A-4i.ersOnal ,lotter,froat

Ganeral Reirthar'd 00.1:en te'theilfirtOtor:.

Frs. 'hi . .opitrx DIRECTOR, PLANS

I.

2.

\.RiChirti,PIFIS

6
.

DECLASS In E0 AND R
ELEASED BY
ChITRAL IN

TELL IGINCE AGENCY

11008 EXEMPT ION3B211
NAZI WAR CR IMES 01
8CLOGURE ACi
DM 2001
2005

EE',

2O'. Nvnber 192

SOURCII MIT

addressee
/P files
I .=Et/F.I/Z.=::

- SEtRET..;

SECURITY' INFORNIA,TIOff

2. December 1952

Dear C

I thank you so much for the interesting book you

sent me. I appreciate the friendly feelings which this gift
expresses.
I take the opportunity to wish you a Merry Christmas
and a Happy New Year. On the 19th we will have our usual
Christmas party. Things are going the routine way and we
have only one major problem, which is the budget. I hope
it will' be settled in December.
Do not forget to visit us if you should come to
Germany some day again.
With many regards,
Sincerely yours,


It was a pleasure to receive your latter which Mr. Critchfisld
delivered to ma today. I took the opportunity of his visit, Which fortunately coincided with that of General Truscotto to disuse with
them many of the major prOblems related to.
current ind future
intelligence relationships between our reSpeetive services.

I as hoped. and optimistic that the near future.will bring the

establishment. of the German Intelligence Service and that the trend
which you mentioned in your letter can be (=tinned and directed totwelybenefiaiel liaison relationship
ward the estehlish ment of a mu
between our services.
deep conviction that satisfactorrliaisen
. 1 en serelpml:share
arrangements eavv.vital . :td.insuritheeninterrnpted . conduct of .matters
of mutUalr intareitAnd:Of . iiitiLietkrtehei . .tO:easspective goeernments.,: Mithihic ,in. :Mindi4lid believirOat00 ;- a9.00aratieniin in,
telligence matters can, to our itzal adventegti::be extended,I have
instructed
CritidifielatrO; iiiiiii*flath'Ii.Ou '; aar 4%11a:tad -teen's:its
In a itt=bair.. isf : Cativitiiitv in areas outside of the traimeitcr ak-of our
ptiogent:g*,0eiaticn

Bloc. In , this
th idnil'ikiti:64.4.)1:rCiiidihdalCitiii0adiiitreijita***

views on intelligenCe: war pl"ing end

gingrelaticnchipe
with a remiber of friendlycountries. have iskitrictedlfr.
Critch
_ . .
field to pees on to You my vietis on.these matter'.
Scmetime during the next few months I hope to have the opportuni
again to visit Cerium and discuss personally with you a number of
na
tters of
interest*

Oeneral Reinhard Gehl=

Germany
EIVF1GAI.g.(m413
Distribution:
se
Orig - adds-weal
- Signer
1 -.DO
1 C I
.
1 7 EE/FIO/Z

 SECRET

ECURITY INFORMATION
AIR

. fa

AI 1.?

Chief of Mission, FrankAut

Attention: Pallach/ cChief, EE
Operational
Letter to General Gehlen
R

ef-

InLA807

risme deliver attached latter from the Director

to General Gehlen.

AttaOhraintt 1 envelope

OECLASSIFI E0 AN
O REL
CEN TRAL IN
EASED G Y
TELLIGENCE
AGENCY
SO URCES MET
NM
EXEMPT ION3821

NAZI WAR CR

DATE

1001

IMESDISCLUOUREACt
2005

SECRET
.SECyRITY
fNF OUP4A1 ir

Grist 6 January 1953

Chief,

15 January 1953

MC

Chief of Mist/ion,

Operational
Interview with Utility
Reference: (0.)ESZA.-61, (b)DIR 35323, (c)SHORN 0420, (d)SPULL 4695:

7 on' 12 January. He had .dinner with us in our

1. UTILITY came
j went to the movies. UTILITY. and I
apartment,, after which F.
talked. from 2030 until after 2300, after which *I drovahirs to his hotel
...and C. .3

(the kittliard). The next . d.ay he was to see L

2. : Ai long as I hhir e known UTILITY, and as pleasant as our relations have

been;,..I . ,have never known his to be as cordial and., cemmunicativa as he was

.hours' talk. . In the course of what follows, :there

d
will be Sniiiista...frititrititing:.'gapa and some unanswered. questions. Some. of the
:entirely 'blear to lei and . wherever- I . felt ' Wit .:tiiirtit
was an avenCha.330e that such statements would be clear to my, colleague.a..ot
the (berman
Station : I lei theimo . rather than interrupt .the::flow:bfr
,..
Lion . and the ...relaxed atiosphire by possibly to persistent

.
.
.3. ithr5fOreflCetO the subject of reference ..(b) and (43)., I simply; e:sicad
heard..anything:of the sort; .;H. said. that he.-hadCrib%-;;:f,biit
tir u4r
it
that it probably emiiet,..frOM;;.tke. -. same source as the repartl . of 7renc-So'd.t
nage4ttatieaii:*fitinhail:in,*iikeraiSbe.,; .( Os . anci:'xis:'::s:itii-diAo.tiogvit plaa. K..
.stated 1 tht z 014, *-1:iik:a. po tt*44

itout as if 373a
.).11.421...t7

t...*

6,440*:!Mi5i.;:ifrili***14...4:$1044,400Oitiiiiiite i

cozp1ex. In any case, it is UTILITY's theory that certain .i..enti ia that

th5swar*2$4till
coplez who wor'zad both forth. Sovtst and this 215 during

rnab.
di;:heiird: of the -rinser tlirtraki,h'.

active an4 eiatlable 'fbr:thi..'planting of ,lust etch

TJILlTT thit

Al it*r4iisOikii,.,1

CAPO,'

or even that we.hatimin4arbialt.in ..0-ainaiy.

4. With respect to the subject raised. in SPULL 4695, UTILITY. gave no

iudicatiOnof deep 'concern. He knows that forces are at 'work
Orgini.zation to the . ICI04 : and.- b.e ;thinks that . ..the . .rrench ara behi.nd s it, POsiibly
ts iir . : the* British. Ite apliarentl y does nit knoiftUall French
Ditstriintl.oh:

ttstih . (3)
Yrazt (2)'
.,PULL . (1)
Bonn . (.1)
Mee (2)

ti MASSIrlE0 AND RELEAsEO B

Y
MORAL ItittLLI0ENCE AGENCY

StLetl;i

IO

500110W4S1H000 EXEMPT I0N3020

NAzi
cR IMI9010CLOSURE ACI
UAt
MI
2005

hi

**

-*

'

C,70+4117. are involved. Ais stye the 14= is oat takers sertoosly txsortotay.

5. he Ai deeply canae.roted, of coarse. by thoi drsaisrt Ut reerty ratifioatieam, ohiefly-boaauss tee feels tluit the position of his organisation
becomes daily sore .48nyosea. To isatiolpate attoolts fro
sition elessente,
Ws has inittatoi prerentsitire 164111tUT*4 .wit) both the it'll) and the BO' throotbt
their reepeetiste thief's. Ant before Ma trip to twitearland, bs ontifernsol
with both +1.0111 cart ::c13,-Fin'cUllf3. The latter resaily.. agreed to brief ktifs ellteef Dfl, renertin 'that .ona of

etatips on the ilti**=*.a isz4

pxobLL wiscaot that it Iss,s too veil known but that it waft :tot Uscows eel/
enones. 443gg will statilarly .hrlof the ithender Terfnascapeohultz oblate1
this proginitharing been 000ttinatatt vith

. .
reiationarhobfaen the two men eoo.tianot to fto outwera3.3r
5. As
good, end IrfIZATT even vent s* tir a-ta . to niv that he would be relootatt to
is the idoal man for tho job. 'mit because (1) his
aeo'ldo2:go,..not betonsoe -he
, probably he attributed to 2iLV21 'by the British;: odd . ()
*:;;1414tikt't, worse. Mitirrr .rei.ts,rotit his dsterstinetioa to ahintsan
or, that
haiO4*airt134, relations with tne :4**1.45.44,:: Es gat st*te.
only
is
taiktim$,..:Gaitiaiit7,;,iiiitihil:.
net
Mee.
e/
i
1,241:
Pi
4
4t4tlat
. :,.44
4CO. :**:*44
is ; a'Ri/p.tiog 6,
-Wittert-faitiArr-Ilia717371
abont it, reinsicing that :thift :aait , Of thia cal4bs,
.
J, b th
ed.:74ntai. L170..M4 to in the
7, aM
0.6401.tiig
-VT It. . boaate..of a line to ttle;lalio4iato::irilaititiVelli***;
;s:hecii.. I state& for details,
of
Ny ova estimate of ths
thotiiieneSt 7le- that 40610.e ponitiOn hat: :bosa. weakened; to that .estent .vith
to :tell; Conan/atm of
assistaace.froa 17-'41.4T1 is
and also eonsoIeus, o.f MILIIT i n2prestrit etrenth with the
ort.
Cbanielliiri'f. !sito Is lennocse aware of tvosa as a possible tooroo of
- te to eaotirt hi*.
ter :the rensaan given above, is raibar. Clopa
TreneVrliItil e -Point
riev, the sithatioai. sinUtattsfaotory.

7. tek-tiov novo to
cotstints vaepoos oroonrsament seen*, on ...which we:km.1e
i aTrtilretao . aOtsirnom. UTILITY. told: a
host4O1kes:tenziwe reports froa L
In iL .genoral *Ott Ines . with the story told to
regrigrFlit 6 of 113.241.-61. AOnarling to mane
ATend. repOitei
I repracentatirea were 44714.k. and R.-0 :1c0....51Vppg:411p.1:(1) .

.hiosievor,
stiiiii.e..ficored. With ,hie Tarl'attlr fink to Resharg,. end. the eoatilselon to he
ftml. and aria
Per (tont, with par par cent to go to tho:r
The
rest
of
the
stOr;r:
is
the
sone,
with
t
e/
e
st.
1
1.
:
po
.porri. i/es;;;:risii ti :: 44174:30.
rksrtikirting to TrliPIWIX1 , end. the latter Minim .hail shout it in as
is -that .3.1g.112.. while he *no in .Corstay :nevi not
Ani4iitieitel:::Wrinttle.
iniklYAtlitgliP;htii- '01io,.175',ILIM. itiii3 assured his of a neutral poi/Mien:4o
:IL a sa.zo asourid E that he ham .akirer
Str41Mrs dasea1IP.4% tdit:h
t
o,
sebetentiate
the repeat* of.._,
'sion:any evidition::.
law Ult. end itiidotintte.eass

SEC,i1RITY

8. 1thIle on this subject, it would appear that UTILITY is fax lessdospiy involved. la C.
:a than bad previously balsa ascend. , Aa a.sort
of trial *allows, I told inuan that 1 was haring. Ina& next day with
A
whim
batty to be a member of tho board. To PT groat
alispriss,. aad for the': solateat to .Wf . aossittrabla isaredtaltw, liana?! said
he had swear hoard Of
. This was doubly aetslaillsg La view of the
featithat, at the Chrisimat party at Pala*, .pqmg4. rather in his cusie
had maiitionid.
as
a. te looklala ip. Fie:tare ay confusion,
then, whoa L. J poszt ay .:told-Ste that he bad set sees :VOSILlisteo'before
the Afar in Berlin 'and had not -Oata been wars that ha
*till 'alive
told sa. that helical:dim raw . aach :interested la org trallairasflia I cozU
hia about C A'Zit** "Iiitik**IiiiV....easvitraatisit
.L
.4.143:a pitilkt lidaPeadalit had, ar d- 41.7- wall
have a polici'itt beepireg. his sini . 00stacits aepartitstraa essa another.
D. To cenolude on a picimat note, hors is a teatative list of sone
at tAft1.1Tre s 'iraltirs . Chiefs of Station s (diplomatio .coaretit- Trance, Ma6,22..
Ottit/420.I'. Sicin; DPIAB14:: 1isL,=140.114. Ita2, Ttget4r..114Z.FP (Gad holP 125!)ge inteadu i4CillMit theive repriasetatioas to a sin4amiss and a Ocorataity.

P_:.5: '..4"..rlelaniarnlor. astipalift:sto thaleestess. .biaisieaci.:. K . asiload:VUITT

abeUt r-- TJ role in 1-!

3 ....j.-ili*4.1474.t-:14.1042/2 cortab1 islOitte to get tn 1 the ast sad that

:5,
tio*:.:(0eltin).',5;*::;i4ii..iiiFieijisi',
I:=1.0 kepi*. hiss ;,daziiiiivii; to C I reasons.
-3'.flessame,
hisfei secuietari,
CI interest.
. ere.
in it 'in,: WhiCh accounts

FC)i7ra.
SECURFIV

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FORM NO, 35..8

NOV 19.51

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 STEII.L11.1.C.f

, k S

ou . ; 90261
7

STCURIFY INFORMATION

...,

TO:

SR JUT t G'..P.MT.T.T (P1III I, L'I:l') ;11r't Tit (V-11.;:i,

: FROM
SA1 . 7.)
-. DIR .UCT011, CIE * -. -,
;:.::.

593
rtr.'rri;r,

. CONF .1 .-EE 6.-"'

2235z

19

. :INFORMATION : C6P:,..2 0 F 1 p F.! /ops I, F lpi-TO,._ F I /R t. - 2

:::- . .
:

FE8 5.5

FB

oin:41666
TO

SVP-21 S5AL2

fl .FULL /..; 593 (IN 35.2.Ws)

.

.
,
.,

3. NO CERCG.0,TO 7 PO:i7.1-.VIR DIPO. NO Tr.ficf.:Es, YULTr."-OL.A..

OT SFr' lii 1!1111:3

..

:24
,

C;114.111.P.:1",

.,,: ,

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B TISIIDi`hi.M10.-1 /alai t,;_-, STN2171

1

:1173kit
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OBER.:t7.7.?1011-11:IN 1511..."331../IT F.FFFILENT., F011TIIRli'r.71 .PF.RS TA 1-1111Q -.FRE:MI:T..

. c

-
. ,:..
..

L'EQUEST:t11.) LY.CEPT ICA MADE .. dtTLli EFtTSFD .

KU P A' , J. 33- I 1. 11 IL, t.f.7 1 .4.AT)1

-
..
.,,.

AT.,P ANGFWGIT WITH 1'AROG.1 141YLVITAUTS CIF

'

113T VILTINS, F2 K.T.-....1711 I S TI1ANSFI:P. TiZOM BUIGARY-4 TO ITUNGAIIY TO PF.P.1-PT ETLEIME

.
. .

_171?.1-: on caiT.EIIIIT ACCESS !I

1.410(b

DcitE

P11'71 DIG P.:',1C:1:8 PI !I

3f,

'

i.

DECLASSIFIE0

AND
EA
RELSED
CENTRAt INTU
8Y ..

AISENCE
AGENCY
SOURCESMENOOSEXEMPTION328
9
NAZIWARCRIMESDISC
LOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

...

I-

17.111172/,11

TO

II

9r
"srcb0rivrtio,oR g Aitom

ic mon nnFrss lin MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

COPY NO.

..

4,
-

OFFICIAL
Rae AIR

DISPATCH

-0111.14. /7/7

=II

DISPATCH NO.

IA:
SPECIFY AIR OR SCA POUCH

Y1?
ratiallataa
CLASSIFICATION

TO

Chief C._

FROM

Chief, la

SUBJECT:

1S 1953
DATE:

DESENSITIZED

GENERAL.

Ckm.

per CSK 43-26

CM,

Ritmo German Intelligence Regresestativ e in Race

SPECIFIC.

Lips
IMMIMMUIS

recent conversation
otennes4lants

3,, Genaral R
app
he
Al iniicated.
-Ince
GM/C31 . Denier Gersten : in
'cislaa: the official :intelligence
bee
. GESIM:Plans to" liadt tbe-Gls
a ceiretarld

Gerson Chirrinssent,
a angle man and

on of the P.cms
to the a
i culesquantly
t

2. GiorTri4
Station in Oct
prodded biogra

lancea
COCIre

ilmAr0

' . tbat

Hane MG101 . was . arrested 6:E2

one . Captain .WAIDMAN,

tion sobieb . is nag

at. a . nissd.on

and

to:liesdp.

and a occapanialiisis:'fic*rded

-'0

that the Italica

As of March 1947,

4. Please do not pass this inforce.tiOn to liaison at this tae.

Removed from iiireteert
CS Classitioat
JOB
Box:
77-

HOG/iw/214ar53

2f1.:

N TP

,fr

IWZIPE3,fft -Ter.

itELCITTRVOFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER .
-J

CORM NO.
JUN 1641

Si.Z.

DECLASSIF I

EL

'CLASSIFICATION.

R oosEggpf BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENC1
SOURCESMET HOOSEXEMPT
ION 3821
NAZI WAR CR IMES
DI SCLOSURE
DATE 2005

AC1

Ne417/14:
.AUTHENTOCATrNO OFFICER

emenimaig,

GPO 63.39073

. Form No, 115-37

(1u.3 1947)
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INFOt SRO;

To: DIE

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FROM;

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRECEDENCE:

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ROUTINE

eo APRIL 193

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MESSAGE OUT NUNBSE:

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1953

29 APR IL

MESSAGE IN NO.

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51(11 60A AR-380-5.

CONTROL
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SECRET x4;*i!-

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(lone 1.947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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To:-

ma, sra Jul

PRECEDENCE: ROUTIXE

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UWD

. GEZILEN,.. MEM 'POSSIELV:

4111, WM REINHARD

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ROIJTINO

FORM NO.
NOV 1951

(#

35_85

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5
6

IN 20708

3o APR 53

TO:

DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM

SR REP PULLACH

ROUT I NE

EE 6

0109Z 1 MAY

ACTIONS
INFORMATION:

COP, Fl, FI/OPS; FI/STC 0 SR 2 0 WE 20

PULL 5514
TO:
' REF c

CITE: PULL

INFO: DIR SFRAN

7-.5677 (IN 20133)

C.

PRESUMABLY TRAVELLING UNDER REAL NAME REINHARD GEHLEN, HOWEVER

-,
POSSIBLY USING RE I NHARD GEHLEN- VAN VAERNEWYCK OR , ROBERT GONTARDo
END OF MESSAGE

1IMA SSIFIEll+111111 R EL
E ASED By
CE1ITRL N!T I'LlfEkICE AStNit
SOUICES KM1013$EXEMPI!DN 3021

NAZI WAR CRIMES Di SCLOSIlit Ati

CATE 2005

DATE

7-- 4. MA
COPY NO.:

IT is Fc5Ralim5tKirfdlaRE'k:diirilor.THis:mEssAGE

(44)

SECiET
wroRt3Ariom

AIR

if

of Use. Misch

4 BiesT

1252

Chief E.'! , Operational

Tranceitta/ of Sample Granada and Card to UTILITY

RI: :,:tiltr5716
Banl000d in a sample granado forwarded bje
kis card to
J to be passed on to VtilinT.

with

4 War 1V63
Dictribstiosit
Pall (2) witk 2 soolosares
(2)
Wash .(3)

it=

rue,* (2)

tt1 AND
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811
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NA71 WAR t11114ES01$C1.1111C1E AC1

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211111

SECRET
f!Tonranom

/ (./

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFIC I Ail)

SECRETCONTR OL
NMIE: GEHLEN, Reinhard
/
( /last, first, et al)
Bowl: 3 Apr 02
; Erfurt, Gennany
(day, month, year, city/Prov e )

TITLE.9i Gen.

Photo (if yes, date & file):

_I

- 2 JUN.1353NI.J..;.4
;.t
7.:".......,,,r4.
ALIAS: see next Pag e:I,ra .
mw011.7.z
-....1,...4.T.
App. Age:
( + or -# of yrs
Religion:

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION:
Ht: 174 ems Wt: 65 k g Eyes: blue ' Teeth:
Face-shape: round

Complexion: blonde Soars:

smaztj

maw.=

>war'
CO

.*1

gal=

Hair: dk blonde centre/mow

baldness
- 4Coot
Build: medium

Lamm

Prondnent/ident. features: military bearing) very pink and white coloring,

young looking' compared with chronological years ) small mustache
FATHER: Ctqfz1N, ;Ialter.
1871
(last name, first ) et a).) (titles) (Birth day-mo-yr.: city/Prov.)
OCCUP:

RESIDENCE:

MOTHER,: (maiden name); nee von VA.DIZFECK, Katharina Margare e b. 1881 *

OCCUP.:
RESIDENCE:
BOTHER IN LAW: Sis
-TDLITZ-KURZBACH, Joachim, Sec 45
SPOUSE: nee SEYDLI'17,-KURZBACH, Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene '
Lie gnit z
elm
:MHLEN, Katharina, b. 19 Jan 34, Berlin:MILEN, Marie Therese, 4 Sept 40/
Christoph, b. 11 Feb 37 1 Berlin:GEHLEN Dorothea ) 28 Feb 43 Leignit
RESID:B3RG, ,Kra.Sta.mberg/Feldst.r 68
TEL.#
.
#/floor)
'(city.:Ituhirb/Province street

BUSINESS: merchant
ID#0587767
' 0066440
PASsFbRT#_

issued: 20 Jun 1951 for countries: US

3) Sept 49 ) Stuttgart
US
issued:
for countries:
3 Mak 47, Frankfurt/N.
ir;sued:
( date
city)
issued:

oBG; t se

COVER. UNITt
POS'N: chief, 9011 FAD: 1946
S#
Payroll # 3002 Cryptonym: UTILITY

/1 , 5.19 '712
e)B 03 611

E Card 1/

ID Card #

Em.ergcncy #
SPECIAL EOCUMENTATION: Pistol Permit, GC 01082, 20 Mar 51
,
SUMMARY OF QUALIF., ACTTV.
.* occasional references to Gli."!LEN von VAN01 4:, which would indicate that
either slbject or his father combined their surname with that of subjects
mother - this is a fairly common practise in .Germany
References: MGM': 3446, attac 17 Nov 49; Mak 14279, 7 Feb 50; M.CaA.14959,..20,.Ear
1950; MGK'.1 6130, 28 Aug 50; VIFPA,5751, 29 Sept 50; MGFA 4364, 9 Nov 503-11GLA:45114;
LOLA 5260, 17 Feb 51; L:GLA 5608, 10 Mar 51; MGLA 7487, 24 Jul 51 . No 378, attach'.;
/MLA 8460 ) 8 Oct 51; MSZA 716, 5 Jan 52; MILL 1963 ) 4 Apr 51; MGLA 7582, 30 Jul 51;
MGLA 11678, 17 Ltv 52; MGLA 1540, 20 Mar 50; VGFA 3657, 17 Apr 50; 14GLA 1806,
18 Apr 50; MGLA 12873, 19 Aug 52; LA 323, 26 Sept 52;spULL 4439, 13 Nov 52;

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY
2

GILLEN, Reinhard (cont)

Aliases:
SCHNEIDER,

Richard, Dr.

b. 4 Mir 05

KK No H 47B-955
Gun permit GC 01025,
Gate parte to Nicolaus

HOLBEIN, Rani
b. 21 Jan 05

AGO Card D 147996 : (Jul 49)

1 Mar 51

GROSS, Dr.....

-mama, Richard

b. 3 Apr 02

Dr.

....GONTARIXJ-Robert'
b. 4 liar 05 .

Pasaport No 49203:Unitary career:

Entered military service, artillery
1920
commissioned 2nd Lt
1923
let Lt
.1928
1933-35 War academy, Berlin
.

1934

. Capt..

3.93.5.38 :;General Staff misigpnent

.193738 . i.Firat Gen:Staff Officer, 10 Dept. Fortifications
19.39
Battery'.:65iiihdai,-.Major
SePt;232:AoNov. ,39,Ja';(G43) 213d Div
90A0,e1.9. 40 Chief :-,Of.'*itificitiona, Ge n .. Staff
Ju140 to Nov 40; Adjutant . : to Gen. Haider, ._Chief of Gen.
. . Staff
lioi,39tsciJul40iYOKH i. ,...Gi.uppe' Linde abeidiiigung
It. Col '

19l
NOr:40:'tO , Apr42,..04ction. Chief in Division for Flans . and Operations
:

,Gen Staff .. (Chief Cruppenliiter I Oat)

Col
1942.
Apr 42 to Apr 45,Chisf ABT Fremdheere, chief of Eastern Military lute:nivel(
Dec.1944.Brig.Gen
Alir,1945 Dismis s ed by special order of Hitler

47 45 American

PW
iv
t..1

tc;:t

SECRET CONTROL
us OFFICIALS ONLY

34710.284 23 June 1953

1s meeting with C..

Ahard Gehlen 401.

Ir 9 Jume 53..

3 toll me of Utiltty l s visit of three weeks ago..

When they parked in Utility's car on a concrete footpath
in a part near the Dolder. After a couple of hourt, their
tryst vas interrupted by the police, who addressed them
somewhat as follows: "What are you godiamn qermans doing aramm3
There were three of you when you arrived (
here
driver had probably.beenaent valking)and now there are only his of you. I suppose yo,.i mUrdered the other felbewi .. Etc.
.30= rather set and. returned..
.Utility, according to Li
prematurely to Bevariawherethalandpolisei are bettor .
mannered, at least in their dicconcie withgensial'effiCare.
Jubviously enjoyed Utility's discomfiture. it least
he enjoyed telling about
.
in
5581 68..6.-1.-594
-

DECLASSIFIED 'AND R.ELEASED BY

CENTRAL IN TELLIGENCE :I.GENC`f
SOINCES METHOBSEXEMPT !ON 332E
NAZI W CR INES BI SCLOSURE ACI
DATE 2005

_
-

1";.ET

. .:: : lief, FIE

.,

. '

INFOs COM

28 July Meeting with

-UTILITY - istif
(43- .
._....
.. -42 16.

LW;
ismearraa

111P1saia

omas
c

. smayel04
. IN=
lemaraes

CO20

ti9i3 ;;,

Lria
CE:1

a would
1. UTILITI was well aware prior to the meeting that E _
discuss (a) ELAY.Ve statements to Asoham regarding ZIPFEIVELAIZ rulations and
n requesting a reduction in xuatlx
(b) a recent letter from unLITY to E
controls over ZIPPFR operations.

!
,
.
,
;

GOK421-tr.i enthe evening of 27 July I . had the opportunity to read.

"t3T, II,IT/ t s "ArAtinnotis ft on his conversation with .p.!N. Site these
nOteS:-. were , not.lintended for ismeriea:n . eyee, I consider them an nocurate description of the report 'BOIT ...give. While IlaR211had . described
BIAMC. ?e: remarks .to Aseham fairly aocUratalii,. haled -irked that he
hacillint:t.61-t it in apiiipriate . time to takeleinie in arzy
1L1; he.Imd. hoiivirer,: ..at, :a -latter opper*S.:-.Ment,-,s.d.Vieed.-"be-th
le
r Mirka hardly presented -a
J
that
IIO

had
tvo
sides.
It'Vould,-tippeiu
:
el:An
14iie
..6#1":111,:that. '
ia ..iitteinOting to keop - peac r, with eli aidati which le tali Conde:oat
with as . character.
; .led off with a very_ clear crut statement of BLAa t a:, Charges
2. t-
r f4 . *4:t.iiig any reference to caeaiiiti(er.-t1TILITZ
l 4
7:.zuy:
,ytoCinted;.entr.vere a nattar of considerable ootieera,ici
g
i-t,c
rwaftte

iscisaii : 01. :10...hia sines therreiresonte4 a distinct threat to our objeCtivia

'Vi5$.N'Vi

.
:j. vinzrr, showing no, evidence of being; emotionally disturbodAtt..the
ha ,tven;brideflibt4::,93/4
chargeav:indicatid-,that he :via:aye:re of them di** he __
11412tV2SPrzEvt*Iiitituadapjtj
after.;121e'iretira4.,: Ile iiiieyed the history of the
;Iiiintelittletsi,t;citeMeii;s:iiiiit,:ihe'.ilnrigtmilitery lizi5autAliiid:tilitiVii?loilarnsoircidilas i,:to . . misic, ;either dn
., : 1 ettvi or via tiOrlip depending on
. . ...*, s on
Marl 5 i:Iti:'. .':aliiiiii

Lii.Sit Gsg.i.t& td'I_-_k

-am
11=-.c

:Baser Pullach
Chief Of-':-:.........._.,
. .',Oil.F.:RATIONAL',..- _

RPM

e....
.-..,

SqLlt 41/1

ea(

29 July 53
(::
: ;

!'

--

D ECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELL IGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I0N392B
NAZI VAR CRIMES D ISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001
2005

-2-

ix1LA 4741

the teethed of handling. However, UTILITY had never been %rifling, in the
abeenoe of apecific instructione from the hancellor, to pass ZIPPLIt reports
to the BLANK office fox indiscriminate handling until he received assurances
that only persona that vete not'conaidered security risks by either PLANK or
UTILITY vould be involved. There the negotiation inevitably hreake dawn
eines no agreement on security of individuals in the BLANK intelligence office
has been reached. Again UTILITY emphasised that BLANK and NOftt.have personally
alvaye had the benefit of the ZIPPER final prodect.
M4.21t

E . t

Liaihas always gotten the UPPER Weekly intelligent!.

stesecry; that he did not pass it onto BLANK was not beeense of .

&n.1 expressed limitattnn by ZIPP211, (SoureeCABINICNi . ZIPpIR

:eirtiaer fin Bonn), ruring the absence of MANK7as&POKN. in the DM
these repOrte %.forel paseed to BLANK's aide,IPUBKH4 Thus, the !tate.
sent in emp . 0942i pare led. appears to be

44 In response to question by i UTILITY expressed 'the view.that.

BLANK is :a sincere, honest, vell-motivated and fairly aapeble individual with
whom UTILITY and ZIPPER could and would work once the problem of 'CAPOTE;hee
been resolved.

Oa= This is UTILITY l a eenaiatent position on BLANK;.-hoestrrer,

on several occasions UTILITY has expressed akepticismof MAW&

ability to handle the job of Defense Miniater"Once. Germanqsartja.!
nation in We.atern Defense becomes a reality, BLANKti.eiceeni:W.
.drinking and its. effects on his sense of socceritYes
Physieal wad mental 'stamina hat otaationelly been the inbjee4i.*:
derogatory comment in ner presence.
5. Eventually the conversation turned to 'CAPOTE. UTILITY described his
early effort to cooperate with the BLANK office (i.e..CAPOTE)
to do no by trrarralsr. .CANTE had "sabotaged" this effort promptlY.atid*llidor,
when
dame to consider CAME a security risk; Or hope of.4.:reikerat*Ne
meat Vita gains. In spite of this, IITILITVirtated in Illaequivixial terisi4
not participatiel in any attiokSuPon:COC/TE...1
"
asked UTILITY if he had ever pezeed-der*tot7
6. . At 'Ulla' moment
imforMitionenUArOTE,te'the governMeet, UTILITY immediately repliedthit-be
had never passed a derogitoryreport enCAPCT$.to either
goi-arnment
arte: the oppeeition (Le, the SPD); the 4Iteptioh to this atateMesitiebei.eidded,
wae-in otei:Siona ayes:ix-or two ago wheu the Chanoellor e oftiOe anked lim for
his Vieitor4ApOTE, UTILITY further stated that he bad not been eiked:to give
either:written or verbal teitimony in the current investigation oRter11.:,tby

:
..

tha-tiet (tio).

l .
EST : Va 1 uE COP
-

::, . , y
t. ..;,t. ',`. -.:,.:,;,p4 . r:Pp

i
All!.11
: 1 ::1: ., ta:.,
B
R EST
E S T 4 :i
;

: MLA 474

111

7. There was farther discussion of the intrigues that surround this

complex situation in Bonn but too above points struck ma as the highlights
of the 'conversation. What was accomplishod7 In the first pleee it has been
impressed upon UTILITY that MURK still vents to see UPPER make its peeve
with MANX. Secondly, he is aware that we vieV the charges of political meddling, even if such charges are related to the nerer-ending intrigue parromuitng
..the co, andJosoph RUMEX complexes, vitt) disfavor. Third]', UTILITY' visa
maneuvered into the position where heyas forced to take a firm position on.
the question of his role in tho enti4OOT&eampaign.

----

8. Fro ,1 - ,19$1 the Oars= Mission vas =latently involved

unproductive harangue over the relative merits of LIFFEft
a long and
on the one hsMd and the CAOCITAAFILLicomplex on the other. 2 8athiers' oonfv.eaus dwelt almost exclueively.with this euhject. I find it truly sbboking
to Seta bask through the files to see .t1.8 theteande of words ()feeble traffic
And hundreda of pouches that deal with the petty intrigue surrounding the vam.
tinning conflict between the ZIPPER and CAPOTE, groups. It reflects not only,*
, a tromendoutuaste of communications expenses, but more important, the'diomipation of-the efforts of a number of our most oxperimaced preonnel in an Offeirt
hat.has nothina to do with the production of intelligence sad far lees with'
our orer-alI MARK interests than the effort env/este. More than that, the
continued intense prsoocupation of well-known senior UBAR( staff members With
leading parsOnalities on both Aden has, in fact, encouraged the continuation
of the NV,.

9. I think we have grestly exaggerated the importance of the UTILITY,/

g.ANI/QAPOTEz eletionship. I do not. Lhink it merits the attention it is
..aviOrdod...Intentionally we bare refreined nrom reporting dosin of nizoarrolited incidents brought to PUB by the dozen TIPPERitme who muddle arinnid.in,
:1'oncs labelled. it.
BOnn:ooming in contact with the "opposition camp" as
reports to thoir respective MARK contents. are
Obviously, Onn andZIPPER
.going to be'elantod, bairied on belt-truths end highly provocative. Uheo C. :1
. ,./eftOeirianytx-ro and.a .half year ago I resolved to bring thieplar-by-plezr4*-rtineOf_the,XIMaPTOTE foudAo an end. I see no useful purpose.sei'ved
disputation of detailed reporting on what BLAinC4
_V:or anyone else in Sommhas;said.
APOTtiL-

10. All Oorr,.ans in the intelliganoe business ere up to such thane days
that they do not tall us about. ThecOAPOWZIPP5Rfeed is, in a sense a
herring that has been effectively utiii ed to conoentrete our attention on
surfene squabbles, while often ignoring natters that are in realitr vital to
the long-range inttrests of KURARK.
11. I have the distinct impression, certainly one that was fortified 1)7
visit to Wszbinton, that the general aligmaantof forces sndAnteresto
in the German intelligenee scene i5 . well understeod.on the German desk and
wfthinnythst the Otrman Hiasion can, to aMansiderahla degree, rely upon

Isr last

7V

it

'

LL 47441

during periods in the past when this situation existed that the Boan/PLB

vieys vere reconciled without much unnecessary cable traffic between

Washington and Germany.

j. I . feel that routinely pouched reporting on the backgreund.of

in the ZIP112/UNROWTIfield is frequently aithernat available to or not taken into oensiderat4n by senior MARX offieisls vho.do
Tied and are infinenosdAy-eahlviiihic. .A : periodin re-reeding of the
entire files on CAPOTGOn the ZIPPAAITOBbiffli history, an the EsUSINGE4/
tr
subjeota involved
BiaLLAChlIERIN devolOpments since 1949 and on
in the . develonment of EUBARKpolieY vis-a-vis German Intalliganots circles A
provides a pz41-rzquisite . perspeotive for sound interpretation and evaluation i
developments, -Admittedly, this cannot be done b7 cantor MARK officials
simply because the time is not available; therefore, .it seoms to he a desk
: .

..deraorenanta

function of greatest Importance.

LEW

13. I will prepare a separate pouch on subject

tviNI

(b) in par5i 1 above.

';

%i

:..f

Nuilj

SECRET

MLA

47.41

the accumulation 01. apt/Zit/MOS end baftround that emistmin =Jo* and
concentrate its attentionless on the ocOrovarsiel figura of coots, mho,

OFlk

1'2144

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC.

. DATE Of

7. SOURCE CRYP TONYM

10. DISSEMINATED IN

6. DATE PROCESSED

5. ANALYST

s y moOL No.
tNro.

4. DATE

9. EVALUATION

II. DATE.

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
13. TRANSFERRED TO

2. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

RI FILE NO.

I
PERTINENT INFORMATION

,L-

VON GEHLEN

-01RA-0121_.. 02
JUL 53

DOB ?
_

C1T

c
ThEAMER1 CAN INTEL SERVICE, WHO
AGENT
OF. CANDIDATE SUPPORTED BY THE SERVICE
WAS -THE
FOR HEAD OF GERMA N I .S.

rICLASSIFI ED AND RELEASED BY

CENTR CL I NTEl.LISENCE-AGENC1
SOURCiSN ETHOOSEXE10110N 3B2E
NAZI

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20.05

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10-91011

CLASSIFICATION

, Chief, 41%

DATE

Attu :Jae, iltollo,N . arra

Representative ' E _.3

29 Juli 1953

ii

FROM : .UniOr

=MGT: wow
:ream Activity of KallA, alias Roiolto or Carla.GITISTINI
sources
Dote of Teat 20 April 140
'
net* Reeds
nor 1953
CIMMEMMEMINMe....01.0.1

54

SroluAtiont
II
;

i.
21

1, The
inform on stueurised below iss
and cant rogardim p

.;

a:gorged frac Obsoristior

ta gotitities at Earl RM.

. .
Orensczvjcc, lives et Linz but alp
p
at Saltbukc. Thr-ii/etiOns of the dliFel
cert.tioly
-Telbets:a
a Lila ltatSM Kart WS are not limited orclusiroly
to btavinost, tinieh is-uporent tree the confide:nue of HP= to
source's informant -4o also wan able to take a br giant* at
sou of =8.4 letters. (See attachment 1).
. 1...
. /,
_.
. .
3. Rail comearcial office in Rini is ran birareld
dies
MCC) and ia 10:34attd it Via Appia 21, tiniZM1?.756.
L. RAW relations with polio* ciefitiels end arid:ail at the
of the Interior ere not clear, at least in the neat of !statements
RAS8
oasts to his friends in confidence,
2. Lois

rt

-4-4./tsneJ

on the seem, or.. at least it seem, is the onal

who is end in not with the CIO in Aavtrint but wiso oppeare
present time to Mu ties with ULU mid MASS' friends.
6. In Attachment 2 ere re tad certain statements node in confietence
;1;7:
.
A/.
;
:I
.
-1.ne /4/"MhZ
OM Of the Sicherbeinatdienst u to who would get .the most important
positions in the reorganised Oman intelliceno eerviee. /4/911 -40
--rfifeaMe

ft

PIP1CVItA990
Mit% 61-28A

IL

111-41110 1

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b.

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tOi

:n1
stl)

'Ally 1953
i4r0

,,

7. From information avail

, it sefts clear that. the iosition
of the group urvier Colone
who rartielpsted in the plot
,against Hitler org a
Admiral CkliVIS, ii the strongest.
(Lois :DM belongs to the
. .,
WM.t
Neer
The eg-peararce of th
the 3 3.,
i
e boo ,
who under the naue
I. ar , the Spies", a;:pears in-TME very fivorible lighi beiaiiie
of his attempts to cause injury to HEIHZ in a disloyal mannei;
he was suspected of being in collusion with elements believed to
be Soviet agents, reasons for which he was
elated together
with the two officers ut the at: "Atom
ma).
ifizs &trim. 1Sse Attachment 3

..0.

qv:

1;11:

ii911

Silli
!

9. But General HOTTL I s relations th the So

constitute another circumstance which %eras
te doubts dh c
arose regarding him and which mat always be considered in the
event that he should succeed, in spite of everything, in
obtaining a position in the tlerRan service.
10. Rs is pointed out. in Attachment h, Colonel KEINZIe
representative arrived in Rome on the 14th of this month to 'rake
contact with HASS and, probsbly, with functionaries of the
Kinister of the I .terior (BARLETTA, CAPUTO) 4th whom there
apycars tm exist a :oasis for semi-official collaboration.

U. On the strength of this information, it is possible to Siie

the following deduetions:
a. The reorganization of the German Service is
effectively under way not only in Bonn, but,
*leo *broad;
b.

.;

HASS, who in agreement with the K.I. works

also under the none of ?Wolf(' (or even Carlo)
GIUSTINI, is the person intended for dork in
Italy under ormeercial cover;

e. The visit of MEP must indicate a kind of

tolerance on the part of the Italian authorities
.0 Irrteetigsticeme in course to identify.
Preparei by
28 July 1953
Distribution:
3-flash
2-Piles

44.1
:1/111
;pipit!
.PrItYt
11'.11c)

3F.CRilISECU111Ti EHMKATICII

Attac
illum;nts Ii(as listed ebova)

1.11"
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Nir""414..-1.7.0.........B.0.--.

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(114
S C
Security i'nfor:: at

on

Sttactcoant sr. to
01P4-1215
!tilted 29 July 3.953

la Tt is nou poe:ltlo to clarUy .a previous report which referred to

the contsnts of a letter fres Lois D1 in which explosives were sentionedt
Lois EDER proposed to HASS a commerc i al colleanroton for the sale of exslo. sivas in Rely and e/seshers, wttji
ex.-officiel of the rman political
service, whose address
Ftrn44uustt Raichber ri 3edmov,nstrasse L,
Linn/Donau.Source
not y sure
Tie name o Lha person corresponds,
as is likely, with that of the firm indicated above. Source states, and
this is the noro important point on the basis of declarations -by !ASS himself,
that the above firs collaborates very actively with sone Soviet conaands in
Austria under the plan of economic sebotsge in the *stern Zone or Austria.
To this and other similar fires the Soviets sell, at. favorable prices, large
quantities or general food products which are then resold under cost in the
Eastern Zane of Austria, thereby atking morsel prices fall. It hes been
possible in the past for Source to ascertain personally that this singa/ar
form of econonic collaboration was related to a msre important istelligence

collaboration. Under this aspect, considering the oftictel position or EDER,

*responsible' at the
an rvice in Austria, RDER-RAICHSEROER and
RATCSssRaIR.RAss contacts appear strings unless one Ashes to presuse a penetration attesp i by the Semen service into sone Soviet circles.

2. Source was ibis to view some passages of a letter of bid Iron the
RAI:ME:MRS to the MEM firs. In this it was stated that TNT, of the 80 SO
type, was not available and offered instead aDonarite N in its various types.
HASS explained to Sours, that the loponarite is of Seiviut origin or, at last,
manufactured in the Soviet Zone of Austria. A specialist, in explosives could
sesily determine its orisin.
3. Source was nb/r en see and study the technical description of the
explosives offered: vfonssite IV, Donarite 2 m, and gelatine mDonarita IR was
offered, Subject was particularly surprised that the description dwelled more
on the methods of use, an were to blow up railroads, bridges, concrete construc-

tions, etc., how to prepare charges and primers for various types of strong-

holds and terrain, than on the technical characteristics. In conclusion, tho

language vas note military than technical. This is nue possibly to the particular nenttlity of the manufacturer (tie instructions were written directly by
the .factory and not by the intertesdiary firm).

4. WS proposed
to negotiate
for the sale of tide materiel
ti(frg
7$11441211_
who sells and exports alailar *aerial, especially to the WAdle Estes,

[ I I LI
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oru-12]..i

chted 21 July 1953

Tho :roman Information Service

1, Forwarded

condensed torn is further information p icked up fron

the farm Service which is in process 7f roconstitu-

tir,S recently regarding

LI on.

2. In the euemer e f' last. year, there were already very clearly outlined
two groups of aspirants fer the constitution of the new (Inman Information .
service, nee grorp as hoaded by Col *eel SIM, candidate of SLAM; end .
functionary of the Security Service of the Gernan Federal Republic' another
group had as its chief the ex-Abwohr General VON 013i4AI, 404. ot.tha.Affericen
Intelligence Service, :elm U43 the osi4tdate sunecr
t. Fif vice

v. E
dkit:
3. In Austria at that. time, the, cedros-Of 11Z , a group were constituted
as
follows:'
.
. .
-Chief of the Sr-ice in Austria - Wt.UI ROTTL

Yice Chief of the Service

:cretery of (AST

- Miss

"action Chief

(Lin) 20 1 .

- Baron

SEI pins)

- Lois WI (Ltn)

Courier

14.0. )%41t tlburg)

G Shortly after the constitution of this cadre RM.

consigned to the
O
courier YOH AL9SRT a sealed /attar far 81.M. VOW LIIERT, to whom it oopeered
not entirely correct for BM to deal directly with 3lei,Nr, inasmuch as infLos
direct superior las
opened the letter which contained disparaging statements against MIX end SIER, Leto whet: they learned of the letter's contents,
obtained the removel. of war.. (here are traces of this correspondence in
the hands of the Italian authorities.) Baron MAST also withdrew fro the HSI=
group (in this circumstance a trip to Roo by I(.4SI , s secretary did not take
place). Imeediately, ICITIL and baron RA.? agreed to work in instria with the
CERIUM group. From this moment a struggle ensued In Austria betamen the representatives of the two groups, 110Tfl t s group sepparted by the American 'Service
which :ranted to keep the new Dame Service under control.

5. The events of the past days (torrtis arrest) were allegedly the result
of this struggle. The requisition of the periodical edited h
to placing M o s position in Austria in a critical light.
6. In retaliation, EDER end his friends in the IIE/142 gra
uP Alleggedli
furnished the &African Service, which wu already in posseteion of frozen:Airy
information, definite proof of the collaboration of fiCTTt with the Scrria ts,
p roof that led to his arrest, It ow that, in retrospect, the position of
SICK3
Security Information
4

11-2.

.3.,tat1

It7-..1740k

thilii icli ti sii:, ,c '7iJ1I

11

.1

4,4,1!IVA,

i 1.
,1
Aisilili i
Iii
ri.
,.(ii186
1iiiigi?
ii0881'filiill .
PM
wj,

,smi
giry.ktipry
ri
o
li
i litiiv : s9r1/8151 a
wiii*brimeipattgXt'yiiNftill'otutoil

-,

S.

'''''''''''
.....
. . .......
:
.
:
;
.:
.
.........

;::: .......
.'; ' ..

SC7E7
Sacurtty !nfornat!oo
AtA4chmant 2 to
OLttA

'Pap . tvz

51ren MA 7 also iz critical. (In tha cave of ttUdP, for exorcle, part of
the correspondence with 1,133 was interce p ted; not, however, the intelligence
re p orts uhtch tM.i.recotved at mother address, probably Salzburg, care of

itr AIliaRT.)

7. Uhat is RSV position in this? - He has continued to remain with the

oas tried, up to the
Prosent, to maintain food re/ations with 13f7L in the event that the LI'MEN
:rrnup gained the u pper hand. This, at leact, is his version which, in consideration of oast events, should be taken with som reserve.

l EINZ ;,,roup which appesrs to him to be thee stTonzer,

t;

3. The reasons for the presumod ascendency of the tlah2 group lie
essentially in the :act tnat ThZ already ham a strong official position in .
lona and in he fact that it ts not possible thatBono =cording to MSS,
could accept. GURL gh, a well-known American agent, who ;as tho minor narit of
. 'being anti-Heti, as compared to t2.3INZ, who was one of the top eon in the

;es
:;ff

MAUS conspiracy.

m.

SECREI

Security Information

m'

iiit:
.
Ai.

'

7
PI i 111/
I.

'''..))
11 il

,tae!Pirii
7 t . 7- ; i t,
rsr.,,
,- ,Y,Aur, 17-7rn
n1 4-tkff:t.,7 0!
7
f
T3 1-, trrlf:;1"41r,I
13,
7
i?;:)(;c;;;;)c, ,,
iiri8i1 1 ilii R01 0; #0 ? li (c,i1Si,c j . i irii ):1114
I i n `c )* i l "IP
ttW
/11111111
iA'

III
iti -h, 1 . 1 1 i g i{1/1/ Niffil li

AC.

S C 7 F. ?
rat ors% ti on
Attachment 3 to

OZA - /213
dated 29 July 1953
The ;mean Intelli imice Settles

1, no former General of the Sicherheinst.dienst, Willi Win (author

or the bnok "The War of the Spies" which he wrote under the oseavionans HAZN)
tise mcently a:rented be the CM on ttre charge of military espionses in favor
of the Soviet Union,
2. The arrest, according to correspondence received by HASS at S.:labor&
is intimately connected with the arrest of the Leorican CIC Officers LW=
end RIME?, presumed Soviet ants and aecomplicee at 111JITL Cat the occasion
of Min i s wrest, SCS I correepondence was also impounded and the latter
preoccupied by this notwithstanding his efforts to mini-doe the 87ant.
In the oast WASS, .4.11 the period in which hc. lived in Ataetria, took
upon himself to warn morrt. that their contacts with Soviet Colowel =RN in
Vienna had been discovered. According to MSS, ICITTI f s version was comp/eterly
setisfac tory*

gColonel SIVal is it student at the University of Ler.ingradj

La
Of little "mortar= that he was revealed to be a friend of AB4111:13V,
Chief or the Soviet Security Service, recent/7 renoved. In the rois of
otodent he was sent to Vienna to locate and eventually phetograph,
culbarel notarial in the libraries of Vienna and other similar institutes.
Thin tairk was obstruoted by the fact that nearly all the technicians o"
libraries and eatural institutes lad been purged because they were Maris.
3TET121 then assenbled In Vienna so ne of these technicians, Belong when woe
Harm who in the put had been a teacher of philosophy and hia.ery at the
University of Vienna. He acce pted and vent to Vieruut many tilos to see
=RH, no hamn being tore in this AS it was astray a cultural thing.
Unfortunately, he forgot to connunicete these contocte to the American
'terrine..

S
3oour tor

C F. T
1.rif MAO

on
.

.3' i

'T
/
1 iiii i

IiiillilifilliFi l ' i N i filTi =t , I bll.iri, i

IlinVill i

I l i t i l li '" ' I'' k

t /

ittriotti
tt mit , t

ty of Lois ELIO, Itesber of the t.rsr.vm Intel/ID/ma rvice

of-

Source Coments This Information is ruii: confirmed by another of

Source + , informents tn contact with HASS..

Iti

IC
T
ecuttt Informs don

ly

CONMENTINI.
SECURITY INFUMATIT4

47,
Li-eh /eA) .20
10 August 1953

MENORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT:

General Reinhard Geblen t s Views on

the World Sitdation

1. Attached is 4 letter from General: Reinhard

Getien to the Director forwarding a statement of,bia
views on the world situation. Thisipaper . aue prepared
it the request of Genera/ . Truscott. I-feel ears that
you and Er. rent will . be interested in its contents.
2. For your convenience

CLP:
ditstt
Etraa
.freaull4

a rough: EngLtsh trans-

CO:

gWart

lation is also attached.

OBWMicti

men:

op00000

arms's'

ritZ4V

RichaWHilma
Chief of Owitionas-WP .

frit,

Attachments (2)

E0t#1: .6 Aug 53
.R6/iiritten: .RHelms/ecd - 8 Aug 53
trEkribtition: Orig &]. 2- ExA14xlitrk'
1 - DD/P file.
1 - DD/P Chrono

CONFIDENTIAL

r.

essee
llEttABIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELL 'BENCE. AGENCY
ODOM MEINDON EXEMPT iON3B2B
NAil WAR CRIMESDISCLOSBR E ACT
J01

200$

;:

DECL ASSIFIED ADD R

ELEASED DY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENLE-46ENCI
SC113:ESDIETHOEISEXEMPTIQN3D2E

tut viIR CRIME

FORM NO. 8r.s_85

NOV I 9 ri

2005-

....

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IN 12222

AUG 53

6
7

SECURITY INFORMATION

DIRECTOR CIA

TO:

SR REP FRANKFORT

FROM:

ROUTINE

AUG 21 1953

1540Z 2i AUG 53

ACTION: EE (1-4) .
INFORMATION:

Doi (51s, 0/001 (

6) g.

DD/P (7), COP (8),

FRAN 835TO: SPULL

Fl

(9,40)

CC:.

INFO: DIR

Is20

ivesk GI S.

CITE: SFRAN

KAPOK
RE: PULL 6232 (IN 12008 ) 0 FRAN 8333 (IN 1205,)

i. IN LIGHT i9 AUGUST TALKS WITH ET

:2 DO

NOT FEEL DISCUSSIONS

WITH UTILITY URGENT. WILL SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER MY..
RETURN. FROM SWITZERLAND.

2.. UTILITY OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO PANIC US INTO CONCESSIONS.

AS STATED PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPMENT NEW PATTERN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH

ZIPPER MAY BE IN ORDER BUT ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAREFULLY CON-.

SIDERED FULLY-STAFFED PLANS. IF PROBLEM URGENT SURPRISED UTILITY

DID NOT RAISE IT AT JUR MEETING THREE WEEKS AGO.
3.

-3 HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION WITH

AMERICAN. HANDLING OF ZIPPER OR SUGGEST CHANGES IN EXISTING- ARRANGE-

MENTS. HE DID NOT DO 80 BUT FULL OF PRAISE FOR AMERICAN MANAGEMENT.

5)SSIBLE c_ - :=A NOT SINCERE BUT IF SO DIFFICULT SEE MOTIVATION.

4. BELIEVE UTILITY'S CURRENT CAMPAIGN ON HIS OWN

j\

,ss

0 WITHOUT

GOVERNMENT KNOWLEDGE OR BLESS NC-. MAY BE :TRYING FORCE IMMEDIATE

31
COPY NO.
V. aro

1 6-68792 1

IT IS

FolibibbEk TO . iakE ACOPY

THIS

(4-4)
MESSAGE

f'st4

2:1. AUG 53

SECRET

FRAN 8353

I N i2222
PAGE TWO

CONCESSIONS ON CHANCE POST-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE MAY BE LESS FAVORABLE

TO HIM.
5. IN ACCORDANCE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS THIS SUBJECT, REQUEST
UTILITY AND YOU PREPARE PROPOSAL FOR NEW RELATIONSHIP.
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

.-

Subject: Visit with General Heusinger in Austria

1:-

. 10. Continuing, Heusinger said that the Washington suggestion

of the replacement of UTILITY as head of the German organization

-i

was out of the question. He has very strong lines .to:thechancelle':',.:--4.11.-'-.4.11

and Globke and a great reservoir of loyalty among the
Nor did he believe that I g erker could take over and still hold the

organization together. Sooner orlater the Economic Section'---(45/W):;4:i.:::Sections

(44/H.
over
by
the
Economic
Ministry,
the
OB
taken
would be
and 45/L), by the. De. Cense Kinistry, etc'. and the concept of
intelligence service would be destroyed.* * * * * * * *

,.,-......,11ECLASSIFIE0

V;

Ail REL EASED I?

.CENTRAL
INTELLISENCE
AGENCY
:SOURCES METHODS
EXENPTI ON3121
NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREAV
DATE 2001
2005

attAXL. 216
Debriefing of Dr. Karl SIIII1431 1 September 1953
Head of Resew.Ch as wellas Director of the VIplplant of West German TelefuAken
who was.:.held . in the USSR . fron 1946 until 19521
ST31151LidisCribed . Gehien Ms . one of West Genstar's moat acnte oberevers of the
andtecjInical 11Q60.0 . and his milimach . group s se
extraielr'capable.-HMA'heardch of Gehlen thrm ex Col NEM, who was
e now chief of their
Telefunkn l s:Security :officer during the war and i.
frien&ship..
small'office in abenn..Aware of Heusinger-Gehlen

DECLASS

I Fl ED
AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL IN TELL ISENCE AGENCY
SOURCES MET HODS EXEMPT I ON3B213
NAZI WAR CR IMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001
2005

SECRET \-

rikii4304

Security Information

11 SEPT 1953

Chief, Es

INFO' CON

Chief of . Uas., puilach

OPe-rational..'
paiettel Article, 26 August 53

- &fiatAr-1.1-4
- t.

ye are forwarding a
1. For 7our : information and retention,
article
appearing in a recent
GERIM
E/
pbotostat of ens..inti4ZSZ/GLOBI
issue of Id :adata.
aAktat he heard through
2. On 23 Asigiust GE111211 Worsted T7 'i.tisat
an anti-girrernmental
aVB) to the Sitieiti
In
his contact (garZIGE,..
'pre-election atticskl-14111riiie OFILEN veal
'emitted this , article . 4th...X4123.1i...and found thit the
3.
cows:tears
latter : wits
in vlecr of
ctioEm.
and
vith
Z
baa,'been
linked
it
-faitheaanonget the :11.16C&zs.
fitiri and suitoions
.
.
,..
..An - intetreitiWesid . unexplained ; point .J2 that .the organisation!
to titctrVOi44.
contact, lecti
reporting.
bit-of
.
and
erintid
4C:::::0
liCattnn of:11;
Cue*
. Anna

Appionieds,
DEC LASSIFIED . AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INT ELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES M ETHODS EXEMPT ION3B2B
J4WW4Edftis
(v. att.)
3 Com

NAZ 1 WAR LRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2001 2005

WV

le September 1953

PIG/9*k

SECRET

EWFt
Z2fACP

03,

Security InformatToil .

EGLA

583a
--

- 8 uui iy5j

SECRET

Chief of Mission,Frankfurt
, (Attu : C.

INFO: ER

(For ASCHAM)

Chief ci
fBe,
aS Pullaah
OPERATIC/I ZIPPER
UTILITY' s Study Prepared at Request of C-

_f or ASCHLIf.

Iou..ill rectal' that 'UTILITY prepared, at our request, a study

sUr.Weltlage, tt dated 6 July_ 1.953, which us forwarded as
an
itrft to personal letters to to th . and A.scham
.
;
.
itr.i.iis.
.
itu
. Wei' eitrictly his ,oici
. work on this occasion and I
1,

;,:ts.ek
ieatche4 a . itii "od
*.'...,__,_._
_:__
,: 4a1" of : importance* to h is ef for:
:.:_
i
over-seeevnaelal
tia
....
tha t urliur6:. Who 1.8 inclined .
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to

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be

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.
23-.,;efiiiijWhat put . out that he has ne.ve:C.ilhad any reaction.
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.tOURCES METVID,S, D:ENPT I ON3321

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Security In fcrfittrot

-'


II

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SP- GO -Security

Informanor

Chief of Hisaloh, 1,renkntrt

OrLI 1 4 V3.5

Chief of Dime, Loan

IN u

P08.

Operational/CALL/CMG
Friedrich clitleam NEM
Ref! ' ;FAXA:-.2969 Of

1.

6 October 1953

On 29 September 1953, Robert H. HELLUOWEr of the BICOO (Jtseral Counsel staff

{naturalised US citizen of Oeraan'origin) gave me a ow of the attached
cote (photostats, attached) from Judge.Dr. LORSRTZBE of the Landgericht
netts:Lens requesting - M=1 0 permisoion to have General mum and Tomar
HEZMAXS splicer:es silicoses in the trial of the Ebate egainet.Hellout

RIAMli

4.1-covb-

traaL terlscx

blc . -

REZWKSi*-Dutcal atisen, wastormerly-eith ODI HIDCO in Wiesbaden and is

2.

now,:e01-ofe4 ..vith :USA (P0A)11700.::During the E1AM)-trialli1060 received

theAse07e0sot,regording REZEMRS'ard. A 92attime.roCunseltd-sgoinet
:perititt4ng,: WWW.P.S:to . eiPPVTe454;Sli'Grea g . Zrepested:-thi4iiiecoUniel,
.4n44111=BROUN ,:iaid that in actdeati . MZEMASS would net:he perSitte4
. . to teotifi:

Concerning, OCHIM, rtold MIL:BROM that he.sts. not . a US empleyeciend..

therefore outside 111000 jurisdiction. -HEILBROEil also mentionelthWithe
Oermiaitsd : seked him forthi4ddreie of OBBLEN-an&X.:tald:;:hiihatdid.:.
net*now*ything atout hisschertsabOite. '.41SILB116%04iffihO*10:14Tzalli'.-.
.4pfi'xi:etaTrus that K1000 had rio iiroraationonO1I4(.

uc G.'

(ac

.(1):1-Lt

SUrS

7--7

fr Judge in Wiesb. 1G Jul 53

6ctiOmir 1953
.:.%

Diets'

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" " (DIRECT)
1 -'1V15;
" (DIRECT)
(single Cl to ea)
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DECLASSIFIED AND RE4,#SP-Ii.Y.f.'

CENTRAL INTELL I6ENCE AGENC)
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTI . ON 3132E
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I WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE AC1

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BLISHED

DATE OF
INFORMATION " v 53

newspaper

Daily

DATE DIST

ERE
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No of PAGES

rE
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SUPPLEMENT

10 Novemb er

53p

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IC-Pt 7

REPORT No 00-W
CD No

UNTRY German Federal Republic ) O erman Democratic

Itepublic
BJECT. Political - Inteliience activities
W.

SP 28

11 Nuvember 53

Tip..

NGUAGE. Uerman

-----------7
I
IVAP.M111.6
I

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE

USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

: TRCE I DENT IF I CA TI ON
Sources as indicated

Secret

Restri cted

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7-7

NEST
,Alunoefs in oarentl,eses refer to alfeende so'.
3 i-ovember, .0ans Joachim -eye r submitted alle f_:ed secret
Jo
Ps: the first tine in
documents at an East Berlin press coafereoce which,
and
ie s of the
7:7.S also attended by reerescatat
a
the foreign pcoss, ue:!er claims to have .een the de i ,uty c.c.:ef of vest
. the direcf3orlin inte-lionce office sup . osealy engau?d. io espioaae aLjer
tion of former General dehlen.
Geyer read a statement which he made to the GDR State Security Service
after his flight to the East at the end of October. According to his state- .
ment.he turned over all secret documents of the West 3erlin branch office
X 9592 of sehlea l s organization to GDR authorities as a proof of his good Alio
He claimed that he had been misled into working for the organization, because
he w:-:c told at the .bef.:ifining that he wou l d be working in the interests of
sier,any.. According to jeyer, the organization was composed df former intelligence officers of the jerman . army. The offices, he continued, used.innocuous
finu names as cover aames. The espionage organization was financed entirely
by the' Americans and was operating under direct orders of the American intellij.ven espioLage missions for economicv.
L;ance , serv ice loots -Lathe UM were
military and political targes. The organizatioa, Lieyer stated, was espec.
ially. interested . iti'informatioa on the protection of brides and in the
recraitind of radio operators and the setting-up of covertradio transmitters.
Geyer recue:ited all his former coworkers in West jerlin and West uer.aany
to stop their activities. and to follow his exarilple.
.i.;, orden the official spokesman at the press conference, intimated that
was generous
Lieyer woulf..; . not be prosecuted, as the government o2 the 0 Hand
who
.
had made a Liistake and admitted their
toward all Loose
were now trying to make anends,
V
, Colonel 1rmao.. of the State Security . Service then gava otails on the
Liermah chiefs of alleged bfanch offices of Uehlen's . orc,a;,ization and-cited
and addresses of official's or.' *Lie Ameris:;;. intellience ' servi ce in
TAW'S

-Hest -J-erlin Hc! too, clairriedthA the on,aniation was closely cooperating
UT7C ??. being flown.
wit:; the Llerican5 . and also chared tftlt the jerman av,ents
Re,
ubii
in
American
courier
pianos.,
from W,st Bsri.in to the :.lentian
and. that the (- n(Lents had code numcors Widch protected them from interference
Je pro:lised further revelations aod also .Ave the na:K,s
of' a n=ber uP 2ermanents who had been arrested during tile. pa54,
e further ,:.har;-;ed t!nt the espionai;e activities had. .also e;:- . .ehded to P.aand
aJH to i.;zec?u)slovakia,
th

s! .

r; :,.

)\ij,(

.4

conference Iccmic . d the kterles aod the

the uriljix!tor or thc e5 ! )1.onGe !:xtj.vitiev
cotact :,etwe o
ferhin
,111;ti,m1:1
ni."!
;'or (.. !.;H
fJ
is!

it

more than 3 million Eollas a year for oper.L4g hi3

and
',la:: not
at, the
-;:raSL
0.:
. 1, 1t
in i4orthf,:rn .Crauce, he stated.
es ::icliaa -'. e in Paris a.

Cti.70

3 o.:.!n
Aftc,r the press conference, tne jJurnalist. , s
C1:0::::U.-n
arld
Cic aLa oriz . in. exacsives.,
tran.SREPACZ'S
tnat the :;laterial
.95920. All those present
of j rahch uffice
d
not
Eive
any
direct
:indicat i ons of
as not L; 'fake, but that it d i
sabotage and esp1ona61.

Political observe r s jr Berlin. feel. that :le'er was working for the Tfa
ast o.d.y after he
Stat,e Security 'Service for a long time and fle. to the k '
had collecGed enoae.,n ma i3O.:ialo
spokesx ,ia . for the West Berlin investigating Gommittee of Free Jurists
stated that, the.existeace of OehiLl's r)ranisation was a well-known fact
and that it concerned itsolf with euestiens of military couoter-espioPage.
Americans vas
How,,, ver, he' added, that r D-opemtion between 0,s:nlea and the
nion
was
the
fact that
i
for
this
or;
.
unlikely . . One . or the reasons he-ave
not . ia the
,aad
:
i
in
the
3r1ti3h
,
locte
the c)fice in vh:_cl G::::hie:A worked was
ederal
'zovernb
kq erican sector of 3er1in0 A ,I est 3erin spokeSman for the
'meat st a ted that jenlen's organization was'privote and that the Federal government had nothing. .to dc. with i t .. (1)
laro-FTEarlin creles call the case of 4ans Joachim Geyer a very
It is said that indications have co ne to light that Geyer
serous
hr,d infiltrate0. one of Genien'S.est -j erlin office's with a definite mission
Tiven to him by the Gilt State becurity 'Serv i ce. ;Lin. this conoection it is
.,-;ointed out that the :..1. DR espionage service hA'succccded in the Dr.. inse
-kidn.p ppin case in infiltrating an o[Tht into an important est
office. juriniT. Geyer's activity in the .v.ir,st Berlin office, the State
iloStile to the dc rcid.Z.19
rity ''):::3"ViCE: was aole -GO a-crest a number c'
accused of laxity
1. 1 the basis of this fact, the Uehlen t;ronp is now

in the choice of its mrsonnel.

Investitions have shown that ;:eyer's statements on 6 ,to:sember conest ,erlin and . 416 -est jerlin office were correct..
. cea-in hic aZ.;res
n!,d a furnished room, and kiLaimed to be a vritere: 'Paulsbergp the
haci an apartment at the address in
alleg,Cd chief of U r:A:UE:11 s tn-auca off
j,ish Scctor''6iven by Ueyer. Drxim; the weekend from 7;,-(7) ,',ovember;
thr:
hi . ,1 ,7 and cannot-1'e
Paulrre, sud.:!eoly moved out, takir4; his flmniture
foond. Y())
(1)

e.

11 .iov 1Y..)3

I I L,

IL. I

loci 35-85

CUSSIF1ED MESS
' AGE

1=1140

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
112

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13 k10 11 53

IN 34134

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TO

DIRECTOR , CIA

194.03K

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INTELAMNTROI.
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ON 6 NOY \VETLE COM -UNMA TED TO HASS BY LETTER THAT(COLONEL)

NE. INZ HAD BOWE LAYS PREVIOUSLY FEDI EXPELLED IN DISGRACE

FROW GERMAN

S 8. FOR COLLUS I ON VI TR 1/3 J 8. KETTLE ME]) THAT I NVE3T13A TO 0148 STARTED: 0

BY BONN AUTHORITIES ON BASIS ANTI 00VT PRESS CAIPAIGII PROMOTED BY HEINZ

CLANTE.STINELY IN HAVPURG WEEKLY, N8PIREL," AND THAI' ACCORDING INFO HIS
(HOET7LE) POSSESSION, THE'YETI DIRECTORATE "NEf.ILEN) KILL RE'rEgANINE
POSITIONS ALL MEMBERS.

kavicE AND OF AU. THOSE FIRED ON fEINPS ORDER8

REGARDLESS OF REASON.. METTLE ' CLAIMS HE PIILL . RE* ACTIV TY SOON.

,

20 HASS EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND INCREIUL I TY. HOITEVER-STATED DID

NOT FEAR FOR HIS POSITION. FADER IN LAW OF PRESENT DIRECTOR MUNICH
CENTER 18 GEHLEN I S DEPUTY; THEREFORE, POSSIBLE ALL UNITS SUBORDINATE TO
MUNICH MU. NOT BE TOUCHED AND THAT ACTIVITY i U. NOT BE INTERRUPTED BY
Y,

1E1121 8 REPLACEMENT.

30 SOURCE: E
la MI crow

A'4 10 NOV Cale

LAI Lai Cr.

END OF E8SAGE

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'
answer to(OSpt 16195
Subject:

File

J/!z1:0624'6ii-

Owen Lattimore

"This is to advise you that this information was furnished

in a letter dated 3.4 December 1953, from-Assistant Attorney.General

.
.
Warren Olney III of the Criminal Division of the Department :of ;Justice
who advised that the data was received from a person Who.. prefers to

r emain anonymous. Mr. Olney- . has been made ; cognizant . ' Of-"your dp3 cific
iFiterest in thia:: Matter and it is -suggeSted.that'.you!'contact.'
- 1,thiia',::fOr:?" ..the identity afid- Iodation of the -,source .involVed:". --
.
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'Cover Sheet .froaCS.,T.04 . FIT; intoally and notfiii,; att.ributiOn -:::4.55-.,

,..:.'0.1;ney! a -anonymous source is 'thought to be a former CIA employee ..._
COknizaiAl-,',,I .-' '-z-,
-; .. 'Natc

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1' . '...,...,

on

s':. :r- ' .

. ..., : 7 ..f :.4.:#.,,,.. our,. activitip s- ..in : thiS . . fieId, whb is . a per6onaL.:.appaint.anca of Oiria'1:41.

or one of his
. . . ...
. . subordinates.
. .. ..

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELL IG ENCE AGENO
SOURCES METHODSEX EMPTION3B2E
NAZI WAR CR IMES DI SCLOSUREACI
DATE 2005

5 - 28

P.

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I.

it4
7

11,1.44'
15 December

ft
UNII:Cft

lemora edum

of Covercatiqp.' ilitb(Dr. Rams .4.1JBK4,)

o Ci

1953

EC 2 4 19F.

......1
had a *et:min t; with fr.aatsaelcretatit.

1
the :.:chaumbar t; .aaais, - . win, at loon hours on the motvd,ea;

of IL ''lectomber 1953.,
-
f
1.

C._

aLd c_

2.
r.
ins

C ;%;

iehlen prganIzatioc.
confirmed ttiatitiuneral

had

to testy.

aotivities before
Comittee or. the 134:Si eltaf.) Dr.

had ftrI. attempted to . fcc est all this meeti:4' .b.ut. Was now pleased that

U. had t aken . -place aid CoiLd tie eonctdered 'a successful forward step.
(.!.;6)it?;:::. had tried- . to get ire touch'iut tb .
.3.. to infors . hi.et :..)f the
met:tir.g.'before it too,.. dace hut. as unable tocuike.a..connec.tion.)
explai--;e1
J'AFCritiof the au, the head . of the
a-r.d his de;:utT I VTI.tz ! :1:1,riA/L-Prj had requeated . a eva rq;
a whole ....- The cor1ttee wished to be
be
or: ...he "A:rseing of . t he
bout Ue - 0F..erations
urganizaLabn 3.rz gereral and.
-4rticularly
wyshed
to
.accusatioa that the organktation
1.045 active ta-1: ternal test Cwrotein poltt.tcat-Matters. A prelintfltry

.
L.
.ih.;;..wes held on.I0' PeCelber betimc% ..1A-FEH
hLk1t on. the one
O:. the'other. the cometittee leaders.
'.:.
and
t.ILNK)

were.. sattsi'ied .witit' the exploratiohaprovided but ihsistett that .the

'or,Ly..ostisfactory wAt;:.eira.--,ce before the whole .

conriittee...L ' eetehz; . he;:ore tht *hole committee her tooe ?lave .
11 '.',Icenber.
to Si...St:I.:1C deLatlu we're Eialcod about Oehler) oi.eraLionae . cOrtnittee inao . ir,ror.zed alia.11..,,hol (it; .ertaffair and Oor.eral
.O1 tha! .. a . tura .ehtt ;:isditrt 0his organiAntion n131...tta
'eniAtAsited
:dhc%-704nd.
ih pjAittvo fOrtann.lotmilienet
catlittee thAt. he 64S 'it)%
.
. tit; t
terr.al ivrnan- p%)11t1 ....dp . hud
%hem 4A)
flOCSih'
Lrlttnc... his organ:.vition. into the j ..workm4t...
cnalittee.
ttic
2. r) COlV t . 4:41d
ordani...`m..inn.eas relative";
CLea. *n . .4 Was. .poc.,
r al1e.,.;00, a coilettioh
former Zi'D offtvera.
Lnat
:.wma very het/pr-il and
(At tr
too:.' a very loyal Id
rd to tiA:#4 1 .%,4I)11 1(h .

se, 1 . %he . axidrestions "absolut viattiv". 'loud - . "sC,

SS&
PLANK , 9
we
regard Tti 1...4 :el
Jr.Lito organiCcirding
UltiLty;..%e
1-,Lerat1on
The
rIrganizatton at ttm earlint
teen st..te.:vo teit,,soc0L11 40. t o k t tiosi.c;, l4:ANK

evnl
toote
nt,nrr .tt, the ktt
St11: wr t ftr, S .',01.01..;
a-A does
Lo try to take over art of the active collection proram.

144,bit.1"
!.?1"
k

%..)

It was

opi..ion ,.hat. this discussio wttn the

Committee

was a step forward because it. hat convinced certain importailt membera

oi
flu:Klestag to take a fr.vtrable attitude with regard to the
organ za Lion

3.( irofessor Zugen Ki./j0fla Ur. .silf.k4. introduced a problei wt.th

regard to trofessor Fuger) Ktk::: and the :-.uropean Unity :lovement. He
introduced ..he subject by saying that x. ?avii was involved in many activitien do-InectO with European Union besides his profest-orship in
narststadt d cis cor.nections - wi th a publishing house. Ap*arently . at.
the present NOment the German section of theti..uropa 6eweicurtglhas
cial problems. A special CO 4111. L Lee has been installed over
to
.su,.erinted all. business and financial activities: . This . 244C01.1 CO01
Mittee consists of three directors; staineiy, the journal.1ettfitT.DLit.Pit104
11.1/fr...41;.10i 'of Hamburg,: andkJoae.F.Milf.Li./ilil
utlestag member0r.
'unich
COchsen
of I
chtficialtril are SUCA
tt 11 ,s71/ON
."--"rt.
apgroached(Chancellor ArtnIA :Fa and asked or financial assiatance from
ate :. 'ederal ..eputilic. He informed
thancellor that the indebtedness
of the ovemerlt. amounted to 260 a:0 . DV. .-ecullarly
heard from another Behave that .1C.) iol, reported to the dirsctora o.
tri...ecial committee that the indcbted r :csz was 73,000 DM. For his inforrta. tion and that .of tht- Chancellor', 7)r. JwIlr.t.
----TTwo 1 -like to :ti :d out

SOme exact inrcrmation to clarify this discrepancy. At the roam -time,

has heard that "Cif:" intends to at

for not carryind out

certain editorial projects for Ahlch he was giv.. advances.

is
WC: iirterested tr, damaging !OK)" but, ir there it a financial. .::eas, he
'hope!: -rat it can te cleaned up quietly and inthou!.:publicity JO that
t)te..."..tropean Union x111 not. co"., 1 .-te discredt.t.
!.tould li.te 40
anCertath from as xr rUQ hits debts to h.) A-Africans or it' Litt AracriOamia

r.ave financial claims on him or the oversew, and, if this to so, discuss
th 4r. the possibility of he,
matter
such a way as iior. to
.
dm-A t m t.he -Jrcpean Union mo ... -Ticni. (rt. ir rot . clear wi itht,r %!.:$
Is
1 rea tdstnt
-vOLved 14 his 081
I
t'.cr
;Lroii;kaisctien
j.restdont or
,(4.L.Aqn", th.
rman seett ...
.....!ntoh

glarl I f: as to wI.ether a 'copy el' the ' reret

L. ' r.
))1 %II, tor'
"^ Ors7 / . rt oe ivas tr;ei l t nart been pustled to01 . .
stao.eft that thin matter woo beint.. looked after 14.,,i 4 cop.) ta ..ti* atria, ent
was br ti t : prepared for trannatit.tal t . ir. J.)11:1.

Joa
watt resit .dad .w( t'.
5. 0r.
rvv,..ffd. l..1.,,Yect.
thy.
Ank.AU!...,...
-1..)!.=..ttted
ut cev,norohip with T.
UP'. *Ain was:a ver,y
f!ha.rtjl:Ir W2.01
=
Vra,athettic Vlar ri mint lli CO/0! oC Ve y ica41;,, PA4:cat#14
admitted that Wit, ,froar$0. ;to t Jblic wula " W. twitatIle tt 0:0114Wi p racli4g
rt:r..1.!.1

12:.e.t

thts , ,osetioh 1,4afinitaly.

In tar

ir.io , a Feting It` tn4. -iwts

,
2

have to be arra:qed v1t nr.C;erd aucE%rus lind other vocal critics or r

censorship so that some arrangement could , be made that would satisfy the
normal security requirements of both the Allies a' id the zeiieral Republic.
01..0fiKk. was reminded that we had brought up .
6. CDIL9tot-Raaro,_
subject of expanded.activity On the part of the CD:: )et.-Buero and
'had asked . who were the . appropriate people in th18 - .si,here. OLOBIC4 *.re. imated "chat this Was Largely a ;atter for the( Kaiser *.linistry arc . that
(0FtADL3in Berlin was itAII,ER's man for such f.A1,1-CDU matters. .f.ince. we
orithaUy asted 411.CKNotere a referent in this field, be flatly
stated that ilECK had nothing to do with this matter Ittt.confined
propaganda attentions to internal Federal Itepubl lc affairs.. With re-,
. gard . to expansion, hemerel,y r4oted that . Exil-CP , wishes to . beCooe more
tkie.1 hope to get . frorISCHAFFFERithrouFh the
active b . ./t needs money

'Kaiser Uinistr y .
the

7.: Fac3ing reformer.. klii . a:eat to Olt: pos;iLtalicy -of a four-power

'conferen.oein F t erliri. Ae 1411:itecl out .the ( joan ,Foster t)tn,-(..t.sA5 tateenent
that tnc, Araeridm.-.3 reOrded L.ne .co..iference as ar, at.te:apt tc.. 'rare a
peacsful reunificatioN of jftraany, that we would insist on free, elections',
Arid Littler no , , circUmstances would' we rAve - de jure . recognition to the GM
..;werereen .t. :GLOM!. 3aid that the :oral .epUb.lic was slaking plans to
loo ..aftr some 700
i. ikrulr.
Ile expected i.:ast . Zo7:e propeeze-de t:J . be. intense but. had .ceen no iJrchic.:. /...dications at it. ?.e. intimated , that if they intenstfivd propagunda
would probably
tionstry

counter-propaganda ; but. that., if the. t.ast if . Ion.- thingff. fetriy. qUtet

wr) 1 .11 i.) prat,ahij be 'fairly quiet. also.
.

LJ.

't .

ft

444.11
,

441

0-g"aki

s4r4:

Lunobeon with YOU WX883111 5[Wie1suidi 5 Jan 1954

,

This was the first oorrersation that I have had vithlWielandlin isez7 mouths
since he is stationed, in :Prison GenorallIMDtl e staff. Hs peisisistio re Z.O.
Was pleased r oster Dulles recent efforts on behalf XDO. Reports relations among
XDO military planning staff excellent. [Wielandinaitains no other contacts in
We left this subject since he sewed
Organisation.

_Pszi40.;
.

as

anxious as I to talk about the

In the early d_eys Of' association with Zippero l lAe-land

--- jkas the asst to
oontaat
avoided
with
lair/cans;
was =friendly
di
errilmation.,Vielan
who headed L

and very mid. This ney havo been related to the various scenes that devoloped
T)4,_and several members 7821 in 1948 parties.
out of relations 4osimar7
Ors,"e l ly we caste to apprl4iate..giOl!s ability and intelligenee. Rs replaced
.Rorn,,tafter[11:1 ,1 left for Amt Blank.liTielaalhas mellowed much daring the last two

- Years. His Catlook has . improved vIth

intRarIe.:

E.,ilielgindispoks openly and At length on the perso ality of Utilit=was aware

111.nd
tha.f Utility had just firealReikerjas deputy.';]Wieliankibr no means
to the shortOoningt.of

On issue of Olt or 0-2, ;-Yielini jurge4i us hold. the lino with tIt1.7.ity and not
permit him - be carried ova, trfthe - idea of 'early legalisation aniierXlmnk.

..rWielangiitd:Rorn fhisTe obviously becalm less congenial.*.ileena more Spoidel

security ond blin in his loyalty
"A ' 'C.
manthe'nossen..
nns lairs (13)e id: on issue
tryw .Lof
taiiiiiid1011Tions7,7 MC theory.

hil*..andziest4
loan.
:.3".:'exte4"
t43'.81taenli.e."to"
j and4NiterAlan osr_rfhay a ctuaily
sed thatonlysliandt
Noi
T)openly said. this bouldn' t be better if t

...-

-(cosinent1 :: : Soneme eks later I bad. dinner vithil[ensingerAin Bonn. He reported

recant Yieleniij y isit and else. confirmed 000ling of personalrelations. .11drefa3es
wOrk*Lunder:XiilmenneiggoOlnier no circumstances will he- take 9ete)iiii.A.;4....:
office;" . Vhetherieligiyill beconelir2;reno.ins a question. However,
in the end. probably slake the roguired
liaria ' so cionvinC48: --of LW: (ability tlui-t
adjttithents.)

-.:..4 .

A V

4,

,A.,.
..
N .U.A

A k304 .
ie.? '401
..,44t0

AI v

DECLASSIFI ED AND
RELEASED BY
CENTRAL IN TELLIOENCE AGENCY

-1
SOURCES MET HOOSSX EMPTIONYLO
240
NAZI WAR CR livIESDISCLOSUREACT
DATE 2001 2005
X50.53 Remil

SECRET

(H7ton Filled

In

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

IDENTIFICATION

DOCUMENT
z.

RI FILE NO

4.-J7.,

- :1_10071::;
4.

7. SO6R1E CRYPTONYM e.

6.

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

DISSEMINATED

10.

DATE OF

IN

DATE

08 JAN 54

( WIRAZ;b2399

BONN I .S .

5.

SYMBOL NO.

3. ETIligt_PB SOURCE-60

INFO.

9.

EVALUATION

II. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
12.

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

TRANSFERRED TO
RI FILE NO.

13.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
IR,.

hp,. F.N. RET

A :A Ittt if - IIRI'llRag OE ( 1B 1311-1 f.E1,111 AL INFORRAN T

REPORTED THE F OLLOWING ON 24

NOVEMBER 1953 t

1
AND 014'n CIALS
HEINZ CASE DUE TO INTRIGUE GEN . REINHARDT GEHLEN, I._
OF BLANK OFFICE . DUE TO DISCOVERY GEFILEN INTELLTGENCE CENTER EASTERN GERMANY
HIS POSITION ALSO UNSTABLE. IT IS AN INTERESTINGFACT THAT GEHLEN ATTRIBUTES
POWERFUL BURNING TO INTRIGUES IIIKENZ WHO SUSPECTED BE IN CONTACT WITH RUSSIANS.
ALLIED SERVICES HAVE SLOWED DOWN CONTACTS WITH WEISBADEN AND WITH GEFILEN IN
BURNING
EXPECTATION THAT BLANK AND THE AMERICANS CLARIFY SERIOUS SITUATION.
OF GEHIEN EAST GERMAN CENTERS HAS SACRIFICED MANY FIRST. -GRADE INTELLIGENCE
E4EMENTS AND CAUSED COMPLETE BREAK COMMLISCATIONS AND CONSEQUENT LOSS SOURCES
OF MAXIMUM IMPORTANCE. AMERICAN SERVICE VERY MUCH ALARMED AND HAS ORDERED
RIGOROUS INVESTIGATION OF FUNCTIONING OF ENTIRE GEHLEN APPARAT. "

fEE CRT : S4Si. 1. FI Yi TEE

6.1. 41. 111 116 ERtiret Et
A:6E1E:IN IC 11

SMICESNETHOOSEXEMPIION
30
NAZ I WAR CR IMES
DI S
U.TE

2005

CLOSURE A 2C E1

,
15.

F!LE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM
11.57

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7.46)

VIA LIAISON

DATE.;
TO:

January 15, 1954

fair-et:tor

-Central Intelligence Agency

2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

ROM:

John Edgar Hoober, Director

Federal Bureau of Inuestigati on

SUBJECT: OWEA LATTP/ORE

ESPIONAGE - R
PERJHRY
This Bureau has been advised that 'General
Pe inhold Von Gehlen . , a former Nazi officer Who was a
top official in the German Intelligence Service during
World, War II, can obtain information concerning th e
-subject front a source, such as Gr.hzrd Eisler, as well
as from souraes ova Liable to him in Moscow., USSR. Von
g ehlon, who can be contacted in Munich ., 'Germany, reportedly is known to your Agency.
It is requested. that., if fe.asible, you contact
ron . Gehlen to ascertain if he is 'in possession, at this
of information concerning lattimOre and to deter-.
mine-whether he can -obtain data concerning the subjects
from day of his sources, including sGerhard Eisler, and
those known to him In Moscow.

.if-C14$

MID

fit/ EAStki)

CEIVCR AL 1071.1. 16E1(

Ail E

SOORCESPIFTHOOsEX6PlI0N38i
AZ! WRCkUI ESD. I SCLOSUU At1

VATE

2005

CONFIDENTIAL .

FOR CO ORDINATION WITH

,CFA

tc-S Da' I
Lu3-

bl9

111,1,

20 January 1954
M.M.RAT4:litS:4 TO

COPS

nicim

Eleatente

1. During General Gehlen's . 11 .Dedeisber Ives da .tAtion bf-,fore the

Parliamcntary CoorAittee he ustEi a graphic chart to show the extent
cirt3 ntrtiber- of former 2.:S and Z pereccm g within the LIFF:La , complex.%
Headquarters
Wage Scales
Ist-Ix
I-III
Total
Waffen SZ
Algemeino ,--.33 & SD
Police drafted
into SD

,f;aert.t.iseeldeass
1411

IV-I1

Totals

157

284

132

529

1102

13

21

12

18

30

14

The top vase scale is I.

2. In terms of SS . and SD percentage 7,:IPT' ,11i cleiles they are better
off than most West German tzlinistriea,

Peter Slone'

DECLASSIFIED AND

RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELL I 6E NCE A6 ENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I ON3B113
NAZ I WAR CR IMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003
2005

oce,A-4-Ar
DR-AP I

(.:RET

EGLA

TO: BE
SUBJ: Former Nazi and SS Membership in ZIPPER
.4404..10110L
-:6ego

.1. Over the years there have been numerous allegations made by
various individuals and factions within the West German government to
the effect thatrIPPER's ranks are heavily weighted with former Nazi
and SS-types. In view of the fact that . Naziiam in the German Government
appears no longer to be a problem of such primary concern, it would
seem that a report dealing with the incidence of these elements within
SIPPER might well be Made at this time by way offinalizing the matter.

2. Study of POWs

files which contain background data

on nearly 600 ZIPPERites (about half of the kregvam total of ZIPPER membership) reveal 76 ZIPPERites known to have been either former SS, SD, SA
)1:embers, NSDAP'members, War Crime offenders and/Or a combination of same.
The 76 who . fall into the above category represent about 13% of the ZIPPERites whose background is known to us.
3.

It will be remembered (EGLA 683) that UTILITY gave us a copy

of a chart used in his presentation before the EDC. Parliamentary Committee,

11 Dec 53, to show the extent and number of former SS andSD personnel
within the ZIPPER complex. A summary . of these figures, which we considered
a farily accurate statement of the facts (dince copies of ZIPPER personnel
statistics are on file in UPTERUST's office), show that of 1102 ZIPPERites,
51 are either former Warren Ss and/Or Allgemeine SS and SD. For comparison's
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL_INTELLIBENCE AGENC_Y.
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I ON3B2B, ,
NAZ I WAR CR IMES 0 I SCLOSURE
DATE

2003

2005

ET

_LI

I II

1 . 7-77

7-

SECRET
sake:

UTILITY figures of
SS, SD & SA
Si out of 1102 ZIPPERites = 5%

10B Figures of
SS, SDA SA

50 out of 600 ZIPPERites 8% checked

From the above comparison . we see that POWs records show only a 3%
higher incidence of 88, SD and SA-types than did UT1LITY's statement.

In fact, from a review of our findings we find nothing to seriously.refUte - ZIPPER's claims "that in terms of SS and SD percentage they
better off than most UPGROWTH ministries."
I. By way of further comparison it is interesting to note figures

recently compiled 1:TOGA/Bonn from Berlin Documents Center records which

show that the present Bundestag has /29 or 26.5% former NSDAP members.
UTILITY in a memo dated 8 ?larch 1950 to C.-

stated that:

"Of all full time coworkers Of the staffs of our organization

(including District Agencies), 28 percent of the 785 coworkers
in question were former members of the NSDAP."
We may consider UTILITY l s 28 percent figure to be a fairly conservative
one in view'bf the fact that CI.'

_7 study (para 1) shows=up

only 13% ZIPPERites in all former Nazi categories.

S. This report deals with numbers and percentages in an attempt

to be as factual as possible, There are however, certain individuals

still in the employ of ZIPPER whose records appear from a qualitative

SECRET

SEC r
-3standpoint particularly heineous; and for said reasca a brief synopsis
of each has been attached. MS feel it is a bit late in the game to do
anything

more than remind UTILITY that he might be smart politically' to

drop such types.

SECRET

.1

FLEGEL, Arwed

@ Alfred FRIEDMANN
@ Hans MIGSCH
@ Hans HIETSCH

B. 8 Oct 1914
Occupation: ZWeigstelle . 4 (Cl/CE)
1933
1935
1936
1937
1939
1941
1943
1944

Joined Allgemein SS
"
Weffen SS
Sturmann SS
Rottenfuehrer SS
Uschaf SS
HPTschaf SS.
Ustuf SS
Ostuf SS.

In 1935 FLEGEL chose the Weffen SS as a career and at the time of the
capitulation

held an important administrative position in the SS-Sanitatshaupt-

amt, Berlin. Escaped from Neunegamme where interned w 4 th other SS leaders.

Eascaped with Heinrich S PRINGER who interested him in de CHELARD who hoped
for revival of some form of National Socialsim. De CHELARD wanted to
collaborate with anti-Bewegung, an organization allegedly formed by some
European intellectuals aiming at a United States of the World. FLEGEL
went out of his way to establish fresh contact with his SS comrades to
solicit their support for anti-Bewegung.

FRIEDE, Willy Heinrich

OPIX, Frank

B. 30 Sept 1917, Arendsee

Occupation: Org position (original) GVH; .V-2835

1 Oct 1930 -

Entered NSDAP
SS 41,1 1498
SS rank - ObersturmfVehrer, May 1939
HJ Membership 1929-31 SA
"
1930-32
Employed by HJ (sinceabout 1$37):
Hj rank: Bannfuehrer
Holder cf Golden HJ.Badge und Totenkopfring

Since 1 Jul 44 Belonged to Reichsleitung, Einsatzstab . des Reichsleiters

Rosenberg (Sonderstab "Wissenschaft")
Pre-Hitler organizer of Youth groups

Was groomed for deputy Gauleitership when Hitler came

to power.
Held high party rank - became inspector general of
W, German Hitler Youth. Considered one of most
successful Nazi youth leaders.
He has stated openly he was not de-Nazified and did not
desire to be, only read denazification being one of
inner compUlsion.
After war soon met ZIPPER interests. FRIEDE considered
actually working head of ZIPPER Rome group , under
Hans GEHLEN. Tasks:
1) Order of Malta connections;
2) CI work in former German SS circles;
3) Vatican connections.
List effective 10 April 51 included FRIEDE as Special
Connection S-1936. Active in Ruhr in framework of
GVL and a staff contact of Sec 122's OKLAUSNER.
Jan 53 POB saw original report of V-2835 who . works in Dusseldorf/Duisburg
area under cover of Nordwest Deutscher Rundfunk,. correspondent or executive.

FIEBIG, Conrad

V-7038
@Konrad FIEDLER
@Konrad FISCHER

B. Sept 22, 1909, Breslau

Occupation: Section 161 (Dienstelle GVH); transferred to Sect 8801
Stuttgart (Old 33 KU, Stuttgart)
In May 1946 CIC submitted request subject's ap prehension. Charges:
1st Lt in Allgemein Schutz-Staffel (Elite Troops, SS) and a Kriminal-

kommissar in Gestapo at Breslau.

FIEBIG also a Justice of a Sondergericht (Summary Court) and alledgedly
was responsible for many mass executions (EGQA 49744).

SOMANN, Otto

@LANGE, .0tmar

. B.
Occupation - Org: Dienstelle 161 (GDR-Poland Ops)
.11

1926
1926-31

1931-44
1944

AWARDS:

SA-mann
"NSDAP - Ortsgruppehleiter"
SS Units - Oberfuehrer
Inspecteur der SIPO und.des SD in Wiesbaden
Golden Party Badge
"Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Bronze und Silber"
SS Totenkopfting und tearer of'SS'Ehrendeger
Kriegsuerdienstsdreuz I Klasse mit Schwerten

OWIDENER, Karlgeorg

(MOE, Karl

B.
Occupation: Org Dienstelle 11 (GDR-Poland)

1931
1931-32
1932-36
1936
1937-40 .
1943

.,. NSDAP

SA-Scharfuehrer
SS 7 Untersturmfuehrer
Sicherheitsdienst der SS - Hauptstrumfuehrer
SD, Berlin Div
SS H/Stuf (Major)
Allgemeine

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SECRET

Nemo of conversation

19 November 1953

with kichpd'uottelet

Press Inhere in .th Oehlan Organization

..1,4-*./C a 5)
4 4,---4714

f the OBS arranged an appoint1. On 1? November ohardottle4

3 attd. held h Otarrereation lltsting'from 505 4:141 6100 lent with L
Pm.

2. gotellet Amid that

ho, aa well as

other correspondents, had

collected material of -their SITIT1 on the Gehlen ,Grganissation opci wished

to . knots in light of the increasing camas in the Llerean press, how

they ehou.ld handle the subject ard if they obtad-check it but-with

Aroorioan authorities. Nottelet asked me what I Chad tell him of 'they
background of the Gehlen orgaisatoe. rum. jr: Sittelet that I hal
heard well of hue,-that he was undtaiutedly . a reitaanable man and that Icottid.ohri.ously tell him nothing, It was established that I ihtd offi-'' ' .
oially given hin an answer of no commanto gesever we agreed- to die
.
cuss 'various hypotheses -off the nand,
,

3. The first hvothasifts . I outlined was that he and other able

besides Ameri*, also British ani .Germen;

had been 'stumbling over -leads to the ilaaett- story-for-some-time.- TX- CorrespOndents, including

they
they followed these leads ey
evente4.37 would =sae- to a dead end. *en the correspondents attempted to geVin touch With reapiiiitable
or leaders. almost no serious papera lied carried this subject through
to a codalusion and most of the oolamentwhad appeared in the morW.nissz.
sationa.1 press. If it were trues as stated, that tht gelatin: tatinitation
was an incipient German intalligeuee organisation surely-'this would be
a matter.of intermit - to and Rotate protest from manf notated, Boise of
these-would normally tie lierictuk'. 010,1 British-IBS, Itzahah BItra tmt the
_

BEV, the met Blank and the Brit who-might hi presumed to have -vested
vs interest, accvand (ISAIMI. -The-list-would-be gate ler& i -one
?counted all or the organisations; that eight wish to investigate or
. take an attitude ..upotr such a matter. If fate wApposition is tratt -that.
an A.noipient Gordan inteLligenbe organization- has =Late& for now tine
- - and if none Of -these ..refcy interested, parties have'complaiMel -and it in-
quiriea lead to blank odd at all of titan sources, is it not- ir reasonable hyptithesis that this matter, if it ifras stated, has Itoasehee or otherbeen
coordinated tath all the interested Patties? ' , If th3.e-hyttottaisin Ia aotug.
is -110t on the :track of:eona a coop .but is .running ihto ffit: matter. that: _
:
emcee te have befit- iathei therotighlraoirditiated alaing' the prcrparle

interested particle.

--

SECRET

/1.
.../.

!:.J

b. The second hypothesis is to consider the accusation that this .

organization has been sponsored by the Americana. If we follow this
.eupposition to its loOsel cenclusion we at realize that on the
American side would be involved at the very least the Dereirtnali of the Army, Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency. If these
three departments are 2.nvolved in any matter over a long period of time
it would neem obvious that the coordination between them would . entail a
frequent review of policy and a corresponding review of budget.. Both. .
at.nd budget reviews on a long-existing project afe eannor-VWithih
the American Coverairaint etruoture, if thilTh grientiit---to he trate enct.

Americans are involved but the correspondent believes t. hare is aomethint

wild or dangerous about the scheme, than he is leaning to the sensationalist
stand that the Americans involved are either knaves who are deliberately
squandering Government money or fools who are having the wool pulled over
their eyes by the incredibly astute Germans. Te the answer probahly not
some place in between the Americans are neither knaves nor Poole?

ta,V

5. The third byPothesis dealt ad.th lir. Hottelet i s expressed fear

that an indepandsat German intelligence organization Wight be a poser factor that could get out of hand. I suggested that the bypothesia that
this organization was to be a GIS did not lend itself to Such .e. conclusion.
.If it is to be a central Intelligence service it is obviously coming late
-on-the scene.- Amt Blank has already vested interest in the military field
and the EDT has vested interest in the field of internal 'security. Thia
would seem to insure that the necessary chocks and balances are already
built into the system cm the -German aides The tear-of-eaoh-a -developmentwas always possible but the cheeks and balances already existing plus the
hypothesis -that this matter was coordinated node this fear aeon eaminthat
unreasonable.
.6. The next hypothesis concerned what emaments should be lama by
Americans in official positions; mappens, I said, that this organization
might be a future carman service and salvoes it might.presently be supported
by the Americans. fion/d it not, therefore, semehighly logio.al that no .Apirriciel in an 'official positiOn wt.:mid- make any comment upon sorithing . that would one day be--an entirely senaan-asetterT Any cent Oven eamier
the present relationships between America mai earmany would 13000611" a
permanent part of the reioord of such an organisation mad would in the long. run be neither good for the camases nor the Aurigae. )er. Hottutct
therefore should expect -to receive only one -answer; usalay, ano orzwentse
7. The .last point discussed was the toudi one'pf the purpose to
be served, if any, by American correspondents - pushing .this etorfe I
.asked-BoOelet-if-he were ender pressure by his front office to produce
something on this matter and he admitted he had rine/red ne'macda instructions:
'asked him if he felt he owed it to his public to produi: this story end
. he conceded that he would feel this neoesakty only if it varied the public
interest.Fron our previous hypotheses , X nuggeeted that it might be *On.
eluded that the public interest would not be served unless Wen a oompictit

.1

SECRET

SECRFT
story and that all an inoclaplete story might do would be to stir up
the lunatic fringe, of publtd - Oranion. Dottelet .agreed that on the
basic of the various aesumptione re -1201-4acuaasci , he *Geld- think the
?Atter over peripuely before broadcasting anything on this ,:satt,er. , He
pointed out, however, that the borreepOndents were in -the
position r being on the track of what smelled like a good and-faecinating story but had no idea haw they should hanile it. r asked tdru
be thought a background briefing of reliable correspondents was one way
to handle this. He said. that it would be valuable for them in circler to
guide their handling of material on this matter which was alasoitt inevitably
cooing into their hands. I told bin r would. iirrestigate the matter f'
whether such an off-the-record briefing Waa possible. ifs in turn, as a
good correspondent booking for a gawp, auggeuted.that correspondents not .
be iturited to a briefing but any of then who pursued t44a trUbjecV to
.Digggra upper reaches night be given a background briefing. I to.1.4 him I
would inquire into this matter and let him knot sometime in tbs .:tear future
.

whether any such briefing was possible.

8. I mentioned this conversation with sottelpt to Ifr. Dow ling and

he stated that Don Gook of the /iest York !Jerald Tribune had brought up the
subject with- bin. IV:* Dueling thought that the invent 0r-614ing. n6 06161eht-- - --
but ben.n3 willing to thrash out various .bypotheaes and suppoeitiona with.
certain chosen reporters night be an advisable way to get the leading
correspondents on our side in this natter. Ity only opposition to en-oh
disoueeione or to briefittp is that I dislike setting A precedent whereby
:reporters trill beat their trty to this office on mutters which e eem to be
in our field. They would take up may hours a week.

SKRET
202,,

t2A,1

(\

EGLW..578

Am

Chief of Miesdon, Frankfurt

Attn: Chief of Base, Pu1laoh4

Chief, KE

Operational

4AERE

Oven Lattimore

.1. We recently received the following from ODENTrs

P ODENTI has been advised. that General Reinhold

(sic) von Gehlen, a former Nati officer who was a top official in the German Intelligence sertioo during . World .War
III can -obtain information concerning:.the .subject : from a
source, such as Gerhard:neer., at well : at-trom:sources

slitilatttle to him in MODOCrito USSR. Van Gehleti, can be eontactel in Nunieh, .0sratine.

F4.41
-45

tz=c.

remiram

gelac.
2. We. were re-emoted look::into this matter. In
cad thatGeneral ..
sumer we have. state& that Wa wore
Gehlen would have ,.inforztadjte .. of .any.ninforktatiOn
.
!eV opt but that, l iiiierthilits,' . 1sto;votild: eifike;: dfiatiO4
ilizlzm
Ilailten has
inqufrisi of our *oast:eta tO 'ate/Site
or Can provide, 4:1 feet:24AI=
etstfP4t
.

.
3. Naturally, in view of the political Is:facet/0ns
of a *cheek on sishject,....a Ainited *tea:cities:4 . ve .expect
you to make the -approsseh-iniineh's: zanier that it not appear as a requiimient.tr# as a die rest &Mc.

Distributions
3.

Fullest (DIRECT)

3 -Frankturt

1.- RI

-2 -..EE/FIG/Z
ifefiAN

EE/CE

peter
sichel DECL ASS IF t E 0
AND REL
EE/FI
EAGEG Ey
CENTRAL ,INTELL IGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESNETkolispEMPT ION
Mi
NAZI WAR CR fM.E1V4

IIATE 2005

0CL0SURE 40

EE/fI/G,.

ttig,

"'"'W-.6a?

FE 13 1.1 1954

TO:

Direct-Or
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM:

Deputy Director, Flans

SUBJECT: Oven Lattimcre

Nazaing

1. Reference is made to your request file no.

100-24628 dated 15 January 1954, for ieorm:tion regarding Owen Lattimore.
2. It is highly et:likely that General Reinhard
Gehlen can obtain information on Lattimore from sources
alleged in your memorandum to be available to him.
Gehl= does not have eources available in Moscow, USSR
and to our knowledge Gerhard Eisler is not accessible
as a source. Furthermore, in view of the publicity of
the Lattimore case, we are convineed that General
Gehlen would .have informed us ateny information available to him on Lattimore. However, ye will make discreet inquiries of our contacte to determine whether
Gehlen bee, or can provide, any information on
Lattimore,

=2,
C.*

MAJI
CX21

3.. Due to the very. sensitive nature of our connection with General Gehlen the inforastion given by

your informant is i'matte of eerioni concern to nx.

We therefore request that you inform us, if possible,

Of tbs.identity and location of the source of the misinformation provided inthisreport.-Ws ere partioa.
larky .cohoerned.vitkthe queStiOn.of.theinformantes
Inowledgcof the connection existing between this
Amoy and General Gehlen. If additional invmetiga-.
tion is . necessary to fulfill this request, we Would
.appreciate it if you would carry out such an investi-

gatiOn as expeditiously as possible. .

TCS!'046195
EVEIGNG
5 February 1954
Distribution: Orig ec . 1 - Addressee
1 - . STO, 1 - RQM/RD; 1

EVFIGA

ECLASS IF 1ED
AND REL
EASED BY
NTR AL I
NTELL16ERCE
AGENC1
8RCESHE
THOOSEXEMPTION3021
NAZI WAR CR
IMES DI SCLOSURE
AC1
DATE 2005
D

_I

7%

1r&-

tattal &tido lumtravat &lay"

aotztat sztvnut. Katzdtattatt
Utttlakttstart Et. C.

February Bit /854

Tot

Dt rooter
Central Intelligenee Agency
2480 Btreets. N. r.
Washington, B. C.

1,0V

If

g
r 1 ,1 aaalliAdifite

at tact, =m arta vo
su 5

Date 1

Br

counia SUFIC&

Attention: Deputy Director, Plane

Vtroal

\Ica

Subject

John =gar Hoover, ifireator

Federal Bureau of Investigation
2

Zt?

ow( LAMMOBI
ESPIONAGS
PRRJIIRT

*CkReference to made to your oommunioation dated

Februy 12, 2954, tn whioh you request the identrity alZet
location' of the source who had advised that (were`,
Beinhard/Vehlen could obtain inlorwation from Gerhardigisler
and from Masao's, on, pertaintng to Lattimore.
The is to advice that the information was
fur n4 shed us in a letter dated December 14, 1958, from
Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney XXI of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Tuettoe who advie-ed that the
data was received from a person who prefers to remain
anonymous. Mr. Olney has been made cognizant of your

specific -interest in this matter, and it te suggested that .:2!

you contact him for the identity and location of the source.:
involved,

177X6
OULA651FIED AND

p.,

RELEASED BY

11 ,.

Nut,

t4: ;--; .

/V

tntlIAL !NMI 16ENCE AGENc)

tbUOttMETWOOtEXEMPI I il ti 3..82E
I ViAlt tiliME101SCLOSURE AC1
tffi

FOR COORDINATION WITH

MDEX

SHOW
/9,3-y
RI COPY

4:-/

Ti
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

..6

DATE

23 FEB 54

TO

DIRECTOR

.4t

SECRET

Mttriravicomersrarenrrro,

(1/ Xkit

FROM

Del (1)

ACTION:

FEB 24 1954

0/001 (2) ADDED: DD/P (3), DD/I (4), COP (5), EE(6.41),
ONE (12.13) 0 OCI (14-18)

INFO

6526 ,(IN

21115)

ROUTINE
. PRECEDENCE

2327Z 23 FEB 54
INFO: SFRAN

TO: DIR

CITE:

-77 )

ASCHAM FROM C7
CLEARED SWITZERLAND MULTIPLE CONTUSIONS NO FRACTURES.

iggt

,FOLL TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS MAY BE TIMELY.

t.,!A

..t. THERE WILL NOT BE ANOTHER 17 JUNE, WESTERN EFFORTS TO

1130MOTEREPETITION OR EVEN MINISCULE :DEMONSTRATIONS

.11.33.4

WOULD AB T

ca6.1

DISMALLY AND.PRODUCE SEVERE CONDEMNATION IN BOTH CFR AND GDR.

2. INTENSITY GERMAN FEELING OVER TRANS ODERNEISSE
TERRITORIES FAR EXCEEDS THAT. OVER DIVISION OF GERMANY. WHILE

- NO DESIRE

FIGHT TO REGAIN INSIST LEGAL

CLAIM BE PERPETUATED.

3.. RE NIE 105 SMALL MINORITY EG UTILITY WHO AWARE

MAGNITUDE SOVIET DESTRUCTIVE POWER CONFIRM MY WORST FEARS TO

,Anedimalig4.1

:200-4D100

.tlg

4074

iLiUg

BLACKMAIL THREAT. SPECIFICALLY I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT WESTERN

. .
.EUROPE WILL NOT FOLLOW US INTO GENERAL WAR OVER ANYTHING OTHER
THAN DIRECT THREAT TO ITSELF; AS FOR BERLIN HIGHLY DUBIOUS THAT

'NON GERMANS WILL IN THREE YEARS CONSIDER IT WORTH INCINERATING SELVES!

FOR.

501 :C

gUtg ,s( BERLIN WILL BE SEALED OFF TO KEEP CURTAIN AS TIGHT

EL L
FNIELLIGENCE AGENCY
ET
S
C

f- geld, c o I

11i.. E.SM.
-ETHODS EXEMPT ION3B2i.
0141"520324ES
.W.4t
lf l%
IDDEN TO MAKE A COPY . OF THIS MESSAGE
Qkr
ZA 0.1. 2005'

. RIMEGOIsci u Ed

Copy No.

SECRET
23 FEB 54
( p 21115)

.
PAGE -2-

AS POSSIBLE ON SOV ZONE. THIS MAY wELL'BE FOLLOWED BY CREEPING

BLOCKADE, HENCE I DEPLORE FACT THAT rESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS
' STATEMENT CONFINED TO "ATTACK" ON BERLIN.
5.. LINCOLN BIRTHDAY ANTICS . mCCARTHY t LIENNER , AND CO HAVE,
CAUSED RENE w ING LOATHING AND CONTEMPT AMONG ALL CLASSES.
83-1 ROLL CALL ON CONTINUING SENATE COMMITTEE TAKEN AS PROOF
BY MANY THAT mCCARTHY HAS COMPLETELY TERRORIZED CONGRESS.
PRESIDENTS FINE SENTHIFNTS RECEIVED VERY CYNICALLY IN ApFENcE
. DECISIVE ACTION DIssOCIATE OR DISCIPLINE RIGHTw ING DEMAGOGUES'.
END OF MEsSAGE

SECRET

VIA:

(snare

AIR OR SEA

DI.

moo

.,1

/ MLA
NO

7946

\.

Y APO IC

.eE
CLASSIFICATION
TO

: Chief, ES

DATE.

.(Attn:,

FROM :

INFO: CCR4

Chief of Base, Pullach

..
SUBJECT: Gm)Emm.-- ,:tverationaI:
, Ciaerflattimore.
_

SPECIFIC-

REF* ',BM!'

57 8 4 Feb

54

In compliance with reference diapatCh, EL

took this mmtter up withJITILTITI on 2 March 54. uTILITy was well informed on the- case. .
but stated clearly that Zil Jtzli haa no original information to contribUte,

DECLASSIt I tO AND RELEASED I1Y

bt11tRA1 INTI M 16EicE AGENC1

NtEtMETHODSEXEm PtIoN 3B2E

fiAll WAR tft NES DISCLOSURE AC1

Ott Hilt

\ per

'D

'7*

ale,_
41116*4

ftarTo
ktta
*C.1,41t)

.
.

DISTRIBUTION
' (DIRECT)

3 March
r7r,% 51-28.A

54

4111Zro

I II

:a
TO

Director
Federal t3ureau of /nrvestigation
. 3. J. Papich
ttention:

FROM

Deputy pivictor, Plans

44 rn 40-d

tTli

SUBJECT: Owen Lattimore

1. Reference is made to your request, file

#100.24628 dated 15 January 1954, for information concerning Owen Lattimore and our reply of 11 febmar,
1934 (CS D13463.95).

2. Our,coutmete have informed as that General Cohlen stated in &never to a query= Subject
via the Frees on te oase
that he was
but that he had no original information to contribute.

10;6-18576,

CiECIASSIF I ED AND RELEASED BY

CENTR INTELL !BENCE AGENn
SOURCESMETHOOSEXEMPT ION 382E
NAZI WAR CR IMES 01 SCLOSURE AC1
LATE 2005

EE/FIGNSZ:

24 March 1954
Retyped, 26 Farch 1954
Distribution:

Ctig & 1 - Addressee

1 - STC
1 - RCK/RC
1 - RI
2- EE/FIG/Z

';'
,.<4

4.

"f-47:

26 2itrett 1954

elli
West German
ganisation Bureau

kodiaAvk

On 17 February 1954, the following informetioe was obtaimed

from Informant 6030, who obtained this information from Sub-source of
unknown reliability;

The reaowned German Secret . Service (Geheimiienet) chief, former

Oersan Ari NinarAl (fun) Gehlen is- again becoulag active. Although,
until recently, the exietence of a Garman Seoret Service led by Othlen,
ab,sa
has been Officinfl,y denied by the )(1st German goverment inBonn, it
has now officially appeared.' .Appoarieg before deputies of the West
German Federal Diet (Bnmaesteg) meabers of the West German Committee
4:=0
for the Ituropean Defense Community (DC), 0ohlon reported on the
poso4 tasks of his organization. This organisation aims to report
LILA
military occurrenoes With the %stet Zone of Germany, and is practically
massms%
a Gorman 'intelligence." .Gehlen mentioned no ward of a 'political
inte11tg4isce. 4 )(embers of the Waist German MC Committee were favorably g:S=
imprestesibvthe stateMente med. by NO:len, former department heed of the
15y,,M40.11eire Ost* (Section for Foreign 'Nast Armies) withia the former
Commank of the German At (Oberkoendo der Sehraeoht).
mestaime
.

irtm411
-'
, t:ItA s, general ly known that the Bureau Geblen.was-establithad
cavaAn order for them to obtaiufromGerman agents operating ermar.

,I

44....Z040-0f.Cormany, information* pertaining,:te.he Soviet

an eneraois
'on. For *this. project, the establis&neet
Buzemu
Q.hlan
pal:alla
y
ed
that
the
.
neceeeary.
It
..wdm
tO&;Statee . appromimatily 30

to

40

livaa7g4

aillios . 0ormahNaeks

4.20 Get*. Harks

materialize, the. zsintsnencs
apparatus,
financed
and -conducted' by the *rim's
of such !intelligence
on German Soil,' would be illegal in the face of *German sovreigntx.. Presently, Geh1ei.41,11 eft/ vc a . finalIcial . Supporter who . would.replane. the.:;. (.61itire

'cthis Geriesua Peace

COI)

ajus

:i"romity

to convince hig)i Veit. Garman afficialtuanCISASial - Diat members in *Bonn of the necessity of incorporellAg

ANLeriasita...-: Ttittihe?risirlirattem pting

hii "serviCO :itto.thoOfset.Permmi goverument; Gillen is also attomptimg

has limited his activities

inDrplmorAnstria-to domestic political. matters. It is believed that with
sufficient financial leaking, Gehlen 'would enlarge his aotivitieu in

togait onitaCisairs : Upper AnstriaAnd., to date,

Austria.

Su

Soureni (e.3)

DECLAS . S 1 FIE0 AND RELEASED BY.

CENTRAL I NTELL I 6ENCE A6E\NCY
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DATE

2001

2005
..

DMA= X.HSLSCM, 430th 010 Det.,

/legion B1

0261114-11

CONFIDENTIAL
Fefl-COORDINAT40(
77)

arfz-z-t-

FG

17 -

efir,x- 5, 51

CI

KURARK/ZIPPKR Am*I'ivomnim

9. OurrentVtt folloving represent the areas of unsolved differences

between KUBAPJC and ZIPPER'
,......_.... ,
a. !:44.; pusr End relsted activities are producing intelligence which
UTTLTTY is passing to UPTHRUST and not passing to /MARX.
b. UTILITY. is no longer neking any pretence of effecting coordination
`with. tua' regarding his 'Third Party" relationships both within and outside of
Gernesays he is naming out routkos clisidestine c=hondos of intelligenoe with W 115"?',.
errangementa with other 1 ,,,iplCk . kr
otheir services and IsYwteastatically_deceloping.ii
eerviaite.

of
th intil1icnce trii6eriti. or 'are lirectl,y
ern=
'that
involved .with US intelligence agencies. .
d. WPM is intentionally dragging its feet on a number of unresolve
security cases .suohasUJ DM.DFUL. Not only ZIPPER eecurity but a mnaiderabl
amount of .US tonds is involved in time oases.

/Mee
.

el
a. mat= hes. over a period' of years, systematically taken Into the Izua
e lleadviertersr- intelligence atiiite account' of all caeca end sinecures which havea
been a witer of Sharp TOB/rIPPER differenoe of opinion. His Subordinate staff=
no lefigarb&heiLi . recpC*Lblej only unurr is anthoriscd to accuse: theae RC=
sboulh be permitted -to 67.in'AbiemeneRm45
caies . witkr_
haealti*Oien . .diffianittoAiterminea . Since his orn . pereanal :tieelbrether . eummiam
.01(ntftniii#1=4024.40:111gRi .204dad Alepeoial connections") are invelyedi4ireet et=1:
dritiOisit* ins prop04 cp0iOnitend sti4eotire relation 1;3, VTILITr: More
sericusiOhe.extent::.of oni . kneelidge of tl eat casee is such :that, confronted ti
the Inaterinli-IITILTIT 'Wield probably initiate an Dm:sedate crack deem cat the
.
aiseunt-erInformation that flows into POD through routine administrative 'report:0mm
travei'viruCheraieto.
. .4491.4.

lassra
10. Our pretiont thinking is that 'Ore will avoid any open friction with
over- these insues . untd1 the political devoloPments between now and 1 :IX%
ars:behind'ue. If legolitat.ion..ie possible under eny . eiroUstirt.anoas during the
saucer, it would
varrel :with ..11111:4T. st,.this tire. Oti the other
hood/ we may
AliAliNiewlitl*AVXSAV,114:::441;e14404S:eiatters if /MARK
sponsorship for a pr4StiatkigOititett#14,1sIttedlipti: .
.
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DATE :

/ek

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E-E/FIG/Z

528

SECRET

e.c.svol====.4.RALLT.J.0,11,

MA.Y 1954
:

IMA11111111111:11192M111111111

FRANKFURT MUCH

Fl, FI/OPS, Fl/STO P WE 2, Fl 411

.2224Z 21 MAY; 54

ROCTrINE

P ft E.CIEDENCI

CITE `;DDL

INFO SFRAN SPILL

131R

1.

FYI ONLY NO ACTION. OVER KUBARK OBJECTIONS

NAUER ,UTILITY
'

ur 82650,

44695

visrain

PAR IS 24

will(

CONCURRE=

TRAVEL UNDER UNF37.IN

PASSPORT,..

OF .TRIP,?..TO'llIPLOIT Ali CHANNELS FOI,',CERkii,T/FRENCH

?a,tsrfpc.p:,Fq

21.ND SUPPORT-, OF:ZUG BY .STRENGTHENINd NNECTIONS E

D ECLASSIFIED Allt1 RELEASED OY

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COORDI'NATING'.OFFIC

AT
.

Bericht
Uber Gesprache des Leiters der Organisation mit
dem Chef des franztisischen Nachrichtendienstes
(SDECE), Generaldirektor PierreBoursico t,
in Paris am 24. und 25.5.54.

Zeitplan.
Montag, 2445,
09.00 Uhr Ankunft Paris-Est.
Abholung durch Verb..4)ffz. des SDECE.
09.30 - 12.30 Uhr Vorbesprechungen mit Verb.-Offz.
SDECE zwecks FestIegung der gegenseitigen Gesprachsthemen, Fragent
Bitten und Wiinsche.
Vorbereitung'derhevorstehenden
Gespracht.
.15.30 - 19.00 Uhr Erstes Gesprach un grOsseren Kreis.
Teilnehmer:
Von franzbsischer Seite:

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Generaldirektor Boursicot.
Leiter des I-Dienstes.
Stellv. Leiter des . I-Dienstes.
Abt.-Leiter SU und Satelliten.
Leiter des III-Dienstes.
Leiter . der Auswertung.'
Bearb.SU-u.Satelliten-Wehrmacht.
.
Leiter NVW.
-Pers.Sekretar d.Gen.-Direktors.
Vertreter SDECE in Bern als
Verb.-Offz.
Leiter der Organisation.
Begleiter.

21,00 . 23.45 Uhr

Abendessen beim Generaldirektor mit

anschliessendem Gegprach im kleinen
Kreis.
Teilnehmer:

Dienstag, 25.5.

Generaldirektor Boursicot.
Leiter der . Organisation mit Begleiter..
Vertreter des SDECE in Bern.

10.30 - 12.30 Uhr 2. Gesprach im grbsseren Kreis.

Teilnehmer wie am Vortage.
13.00 - 16.00 Uhr Mittagessen betm Generaldirektor.
Alle Teilnehmer an GesprAch.
21.50 Uhr Abfahrt Paris-Est.

2.) Verlauf der Gesprache.

a) Erstes Gesprach

Thema: Weltlage.

Grundlage des Gespraches waren meine AusfUhrungen,

welche in Stichworten in der Anlage wiedergegeben
sind. Sie waren der Ausgangspunkt flit' eine eingehende Diskussion Uber verschiedene Fragen, wobei erwartungsgemass die Lage in SUdost-Asien und
die Situation in Genf mit ihren Folgerungen Schwerpunkte bildeten.
Die pbereinstimmung der beiderseitigen Auffassungen, sowOhl bezUglich der weiteren Entwicklung,
der. dem Westen drohenden Gefahren, der gemachten
Fehler usw., als auch der dem Westen sich'bietehden Chancen und der einzuschlagenden Wege, war
bemerkenswert. Auch Uber die Forderungen der
Stunde waren sich beide Gesprachspartner vallig
einig. Mr. Boursicot wiederholte bei dieser
Gelegenheit semen Standpunkt, dass - ganz gleich,
ob mit oder ohne EVG - das Zusammengehen der bei. den Nationen Frankreich nnd Deutschland eine un- .
umstOssliche Notwendigkeit sei und dass fUr die
Beziehungen der beiden Dienste zu einander weiterhin nur fife alte Devise gelten Winne: Eine.
enge Zusammenarbeit auf der bisher beschrittenen
und bewahrten Basis absoluter gegenseitiger
Loyalitat herzustellen.

Die Themen und die offene GesprachsfUhrung bei

der Diskussion zeigten erneut, dass Mr. Boursicot.
und seine Mitarbeiter unseren Dienst als gleichberechtigten und im Rahmen der von den beiderseitigen Regierungen gesteckten Grenzen befreundeten Partner ohne Vorbehalte anerkennen.
Persbnliches Ges rach am Abend.
Das Gesprach war zunachst allgemeiner Natur und
berUhrte die verschiedenartigsten Probleme. Mr.
Boursicot brachte zum Ausdruck, dass man zur Zeit
keinerlei Voraussagen .. sowohl bezUglich der inneren
Verhaltnisse Frankreichs, wie auch der Entwicklung
der aussenpolitischen Lace Frankreichs,thachen
ne, dass er-im ganzen aber doch hoffe, dass der
EVG-Vertrag so wie beabsichtigt zustandekommen
werde. Die Entwieklung werde stark beeinflusst
durch die . Ereignisse der in den nachsten Tagen
statttindenden-Kongresse der MRP, sowie der franzdsischen Sozialisten.

t.
1 :

Im Laufe des Abends kam die Rede auch auf die

Zukunft der Organisation. Mr. Boursicot gab
dabei der Uberzeugung Ausdruck, dass Deutschland noch,in diesem Jahre - ob mit oder ohne
EVG - seine Souveranitat wiedererlangen werde
und damit auch einen deutschen Nachrichtendienst, dessen Aufbau im Ubrigen ureigenste
deutsche Angelegenheit sei. Ein vorsichtiges
Sondieren ergab, dass auch schon vor Herstel lung der Souveranitat eine UberfUhrung unseres
Dienstes voraus g ichtlich keinem franzUsischen
Widerstand begegnen wUrde. Dabei ergab sich
der Gesamteindruck, dass diese Frage - sobald
es soweit ist zun gchst auf der deutsch-franzbsischen Ebene vorbereitet werden muss, da
em n Anspre6fien der Franzosen . von aierikanischer
oder englischer Seite auf diese Frage hin zur
Zeit nicht zweckm g ssig sein dUrfte. FUr mich
ergab sich der Eindruck, dass die eleganteste
Lbsung ware, nach enfsprechender VorbereitUng
auf deutsch-franzbsischer Ebene die Franzosen
zu veranlassen, dass sie ihrerseits die Initiative ergreifen und die amerikanischen und
englischen Bundesgenossen ansprechen.
Das zweite Gesprdch im_srbsseren Kreis befasste
sich mit den beiderseitigen ND-Erfahrungen im
Einsatz gegen den Osten und im Einsatz des.
Ostens gegen die westlichen.Nachrichtendienste.
Es stellte sich heraus, dass die Erfahrungen im
wesentlichen gleicher Natur sind.
FUr die Zukunft wurde vereinbart, Erkenntnisse
Uber Personen, vor denen Zu warnen 1st, auszutauschen und bei ghnlichen Zusammentreffen auch
die Erfahrungen auszutauschen. Gegenseitige
Bekanntgabe von abgeschalteten.Mitarbeitern,
soweit sie nicht aus ehrenhaften GrUnden abgeschaltet werden.
3.0 Zusammenfassung,

Die Atmo.sphdre einer freundschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit

zwi. schen unserem Dienst und den,Franzosen . hat sich
wei.ter verbessert, auch wenn dieie Zusammenarbeit defacto technisch erst in den Anftingen steht. Die entstandene Beziehung kann eine tragf ghige Unterlage fUr
die unter VerbUndeten in der Zukunft nbtige Zusammenarbeit bilden.

!
. !

111

Aufzeichnung
Uber die vom Leiter der OrE. vertretenen Gedanken zur weltpolitischen Lage anlasslich seines Besuches in P.
I. Die derzeitigen Positionen in Genf
1) Der OstbloCk 1st zu einer gross angelegten Offeneive gegen
den Westen angetreten, die diesen in Schwache und Unentschlossenheit antrifft. Sowjetischer Imperialismus Und
koloniale Emanzipation vereint verlangen Beteiligung an
der Neuordnung Asiens oder zumindesten Anerkennung des bisher erreichten status quo. Hierbei 1st die SU vorwiegend
an der Behandlung der weltumspannenden Probleme.interessiert,
whihrend Rotchina versucht, den asiatischen Raum unter seineM
Einfluss zu ordnen.
Vor der Genfer Konferenz war es noch nicht klar, welche
Ziele die kommunistischen Partner.im einzelnen verfolgen
werden. Oberstes gemeinsames Ziel war die VerhinderurK
einer harten USA-Politik in Asien'unter Ausnutzung der antikolonialen Haltung der asiatischen "Neutralenn.
Fiir Genf ergaben sich etwa . folgende Rollen:
Rotchina als Wahrer asiatischer Interessen:
SU
als Freund der asiatischen Staaten im kolo-'_
nialen Streit Asiens mit dem Westen.
Vietminh als aktiver Kampfer gegen die westiichen
Kolonialmachte.
2) Der Webten steht - der sowjetischen Offensive unentsChlossen
gegenUber. Nachdem sich die USA aus Genf weitgehend zurUckgezogen . hatte fiel England' die fUhrende Vertretung des
WestenS'in Genf zu, Die Wahrung .. speziell ritischer Interessen.in Asien .zwingt-England : jedoch eine Schlichtunge;rolle
auf, derbn Erfo2g noch nicht absehbarist.
II. Die Zielsetzungen in Genf im einzelnen
Das Ringen um die westlichen und Ostlichen Einflussphdren kann
jedOch nur zutreff end beurteilt werden, wenn die Krafte in . ;
Ost und West und'die MOglichkeiten der Nerwirklichung der
Ziele einzeln untersucht werden.

)1

-2

1) Die weltpolitischen Ziele der SU sind die gleichen geblie. ben. Die HerbeifUhrung der Weltrevolutiun ist nach wie vor
der selbst gestellte Auftrag der SU. Gewandelt haben sich
nur die Methoden zur Trreichung dieser Ziele. Dies wurde
nach Stalin's Tod notwendig, weil im Innern der SU die
Krdfte Uberansprucht worden waren und sich nach aussen
die Gefahr-einer politischen Isolierung abzeichnete.
Als Folge davon wurden im Innern die ZUgel etwas gelockert
(Besserung des Lebenestandards) und nach aussen mehr Friedens- und Verstdndigungsbereitschaft gegenUber dem Westen
gezeigt, ohne die erreichten Positionen zu gefahrden. Die
politische Taktik wurde wendiger und daher fUr den Westen.
gefdhrlicher.I
Seit 1945 war die SU bemUht, ihr militdrisches Obergewicht
im europdisoh-asiatischen Raum durch Ausbau ihrer Streitkrdfte fUr eine kontihentale Kriegf(thrung zu erhOhen. Diesem
Ziel.diente auch . die StOrung des Aufbaus militdrischer
Ktdfte'des Westens, Im asiatischen Raum brechte.die sowje,
tische Politik folgende Ergebnisse:
Stdrkung des Freiheitswillens und -kampfes der asiati-
schen Kolonialviilker, die politisch und militdrisch.von
der SU unter-Ausnutzung aller antiwestlichen StrOmungen
unterstUtzt wurden. Stdrung der-amerikanischen Bestrebungen : einer wirtschaft
lichen Hilfe, mit der der westliche Einflubs im asiati- schen Raum erhaltenverden sollte.
ZUr Testigung. der neu gewonnenen Gebiete in Asien bedarf
eS'erheblicher Anstrengungen der SU besonders auf'wirt-.
schaftlihem Gebiet: Hilfe im Ausbau der Industrien und Aus7
gleich auf ' dem .Agrargebiet. In dieseM Zusammenhang ist emn
erweiterter Ost-Westhandel fUr den . Ostblock besonders wichtig.
Die. .stlindige ' Vertiefung.der politischen BindUngen der Satelliten an 'die SU hat sich besondets nach Stalins Tod_als
rictwendig erwiesen HierzU dient:das Heraussteilen der. .
II SOuVerdnitdt" der Satelliten und das Eintreten fUr selbstdn7
dige kommunistischeStaaten im asiatischen Raum. : Es gehOrt
Zum Geschick 'der eowjetischen Politik, ' dass den verschiedenen Satelliten gegenUber verschiedene Methoden angewandt
werden (SonderbehandlUng Rotchinas).
2) Der Westen zeigt gegenUber'den grossen Zielen des stens
keinen einheitlichen'Plen, nicht einmal in der Methode des

014
3

Vorgehens. England, das gewillt 1st, die "Tatsachen" anzuerkennen (Rotchina, status quo in Asien, Ost-Westhandel),
erho t die gIeiche Haltung der SU hinsichtlich des Commonwealth. Es 1st noch nicht bereit, sich einer Politik der
Macht anzuschliessen, wie sie gegenwdrtig noch durch die
USA vertreten wird.
Frankreich hofft auf eine Ausweitung mOglicher Differenzen
zwischen Peking und Moskau Uber Ziele und Tempo der bolschewistischen Ausdehnung in SUdostasien, nachdem es seine militdrische Position in Indochina nahezu verloren hat. Nur
die Aussicht auf em n militdrisches Eingreifen der USA in
Indochina kOnnte die Gegner dort eventuell zum Nachgeben
zwingen.
Hinsichtlich der USA .besteht die Gefahr, dass d.ese bei
nicht erfolgreicher Fortsetzung der europdischen Politik.
.ihr Interesse an Europa verlieren und entweder zu einer
isolationistischen Politik oder zu einer Zustimmung zu .
einer Teilung der Welt in*Interessensphdren kommen. Da Europa die. Hilfe der USA braucht,um sich gegen den Bolschewismus halten zu kiinnen'auss alles getan werden, um den euro-.
pdischen Beitrag zur Verteidigung zu realieieren.

3) Eine besondee Rolle in Hintergiund der Genfer Konferenz

' sPielt das VerhdItnis der kommunistischen zu.den nichtkommunistiechen neutralen asiatischen Staaten..

a) Indien hat eine zunehmend steigende antiwestliche . Haltung

eingenommen undA.St . dem sowjetischen . Einfluss auf wirt-.
:.schaftlihem und kulturellem Gebiet stark.ausgesetzt.
Seine Haltung zum Kreml.wird auch von der Hoffnung
stimmt, ddss dieser.der.rotchinesishen Expansion in
Asien Grenzen setzen kOnnte Indien gibt sidh . deth offen-'
baren Trugshluss hin, dees estegen die. ikommunistische
Lehi*immun eel. Tatsdchlich wird es allmdhlich den
.sowjetischen Einfluss . und Truck'erliegen, wenn es den
Sowjets weiterhin gestattet, ihre geschulten und gut ge-.
tarnten Agent en in seinemjande arbeiten zu lessen:

t) Rotchina steht vor einer schwer Idsbaren Aufgabe,.,einerseits der Motor des asiatisohen . Yreiheitskampfe s zu.
bleiben und andererseits . seine StellUng ale Grossmacht
zu konsolidieren. HierfUr benOtigt.es 13uhe und Zeit, um
die umfangreichen Programme duf dem Agrareektor; der
Industrialisierung, des Ausbdues des Verkehrswesens usW.

durchfUhren zu ktinnen. .Nur der Erfolg dieser Programme

wird Rotchina eine gewisse Selbstdndigkeit gegeniiber
der SU ermdglichen. Es erscheint daher.nicht gerechtfertigt, schon jetzt it wirksamen Gegensktzen zwischen,
Peking und Moskau zu rechnen, die auf die Laze in Asien
entscheidenden Einfluss hdben.kOnnten.
III. Ostliche Stoeskraft und westliche Sicherheit
1) Die politische Entwicklung der letzten Jahre zeigt deutlich, dass es keine regionale Sicherheit mehr gibt und dass
regionale Interessen der. bolschewistischen Stosskraft gegenWeer nicht mehr verteidigt werden kOnnen. Das gilt far
.Europa wie fiir die kolonialen Rdume.
2) lieben der militdrischen AufrUstung des Ostblocks gelang der
SU die Bindung und die Zersplitterung . starker westlicher
Krgfte. Nach diesem , Erfola ihrer Politik versuCht sie, der
Welt einen sow,ietischen Priedenim Molotow-Plan aufzuzwin-
.gen, um damit.den westlichen ZusammenschluSs (Nato, EVG).
.unwirksam zu machen. Dem gleichen Ziel dient die Spaltung
...Deutschlands durch Verleihung dersogenannten Souverdnitdt
an die DDR. ndziel fiir Deutschland 1st die Abspaltung auch
der DBR . pus dem westlichen System. 3) Fiir den .Westen kommt es darauf an, zU einer Politik des
"Realismus" . iiberzugehen und zu erkenneh, Class der Ostblock
'nurmit Machtmitteln zum Einlenken.veranlasst warden kann..*
. nmijrbmisse mit dem. Ostblock bieten keine EndlOsung, sondem
stellennur einen Zitgewinn des Ostens dar und vermindern
.dessen .Risiko. Aber gerade die Erhijhung des sowjetischen
Ridikos-ist die ndchste. vordringliche Aufgabe des . Westens.

.'

;
j.

SEC iT'r<,
'

'EGL-A

9336

Chief. SE

Chief of BASS; Pullsoh

Utility's Visit to Paris
1 Attaehed report: of Utility resent visit to Paris WaS paessit too
te request that it be handled with trbleost can to ens
e with h
his bad repOrtel to us gets back to the Fre:Wu
mwarda th
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rogation that wed
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stiO;estimstivof the favorable

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setter of
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It is requested that

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this reprt
o be given limited distribution.

DIRECT

attach

Jose 1954
DECLASSIF I ED AND RELEASED DI
CENTRAL INTELL I 6 E. NCE AGENC)
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DATE 2305

SECRE

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AIR

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SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

Chief, WED

TO

DATE:

Hog-1425

4 August 1954

FROM : laingChI-ef778TFIWIWYRW,
;.

SUBJECT:

GENERAL :715p e
SPEC! F IC.

Argentine . Press Reports on German Intelligence

C-.
4110

There are attached several clippings from :BuenoS-Aires'dailies

..

.
1954 .

touching on tha.events in Germany following the

A

disappearance of

JOHX , and tha intelligence activities of

G :onglial. ReinhOld'.GustavGEHLIN)ft o bable succesior to ,THIC. It is

believed that these articles may be or interest

to

Headquarters.

..

dateline refer*: Agpncia Latina.

[p

ctc,v

DECLASSIFIED AND

1Vsu

7 AT6Vwr*lipping

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2005

w/enclosures

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agentemSoyieticos en el goblet slempre .eat4 . 13sio fuerte iruar7
,110:.d.ei.B.911=::'.",:
: .

:ptobiteegfOegurictadidgul6::

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actdnae

cn

BallitiactualidaCettgeneral

Oehler,. eiCempleado Ipor

doe .IInidds:;pare:[..la'.reprealOn
la
del .esplonaje:eomunista
en
zone :occidental. . .
El,general :Oehler fue . Jere
de los Servicloe 'de "Intellgencla" en, el frente orlentardesde
1942 ,.a.1945. pero fue.hecho
pride ne ro 1)6..4 trop as ;',:norte.
americana.% Pocos meses, des.
pueedeeu3captura fuapuesto
alfrente de iurr:reducido grupo
desoficlales:alemanes del mLsmo . serviclo pare anal izar-y
claalfIcerfinfOrmes secretos reuntcloc:ponRe!ch sabre la sl.
tuacldn.-sovietIcicAl-comenzar
la-.eguerra:f rim". el Oral.70ehlet . recIbl6 una-misIdn . mucho
mas. importante. puce deb16
hacerse cargo de una againeach% cuya mtslOn especlflca
era lograr informes sobre les
netivldades Sovleticas. Como
consecuencla de ello. el personot a atm Ordenes aurnentO

Infiatig
famlog

Egg
tremwsix
CIOZ)

Masti

Dr.
AMT FUR VERFA
Ex-General Gehten als neUer
Leiter genannt.

Bonn, 2. August (AP) En

scheint fast etcher zu sein. dna
ein ehemaliger Lierrral der Weir.macht. der zur Zeit, (lir die VerWigton ataaten. die Sowjet-4piona g e . bektirnpit, ,nach dOni VertChwindon- dosAN'AJOIlif in- die
Spitz der westdeutschen'S pionagesbwehr treten wfrd. Sett der
Letter des Verfassungsschutzarntes am 20. Jul! nach Ostberlin
nerschwand. hat Bundeskanzler
Adenauerimnier dringender- die
Zuzlehung und Mitarbelt des eheina.Ugen Irealilentnants Reinhold Muds
h en gefordert:
Dr.-Ade rbereltet eine dmattache, Reor g anisleruhg der von

John geleiteten Organisation vor,

mid es 1st ro8glich, daze diese
durch tin neues Amt ersetzt warden wird. Driiinal nub Johns

Verschwinden wurden gegen den

Weston gerichte; j Erlartmgen
dieses Mantles nacb.. Schallplatienaufnahmen fiber die Sender
der Sowjetzone Verbredtet. Die
westlichen Zeitungen waft= dl.
Frage auf, ob John -Masked wic.htfge westdenteche mid, !allilerte
Geheinuaisse verraten hat. Allerdings batten filch sledge Beamte
In Bonn wetter en die These, dass
Jam verschlepptwurde-tmd nicht
freiwillig filichtete.
;
Leiter . des Abwehrdienstes der
.:Wehrmacht inAnssland . .

Aus .zustAndigen Kreieen wird

Ex-General Gehlen,..der blshen
Misch . wenig. hervorgetreten lot,
als der Mann .bezeleluust; den der
Regierung-schef fitr*:. die ....Leitung
des westdeutschen ; Gehehndienstes . :misgewiL)31t :hat,. semis 'die
Bundesrepublik ihre Sonnerlinitlit
erhAlt .und ihreAnfrestung im
ZusaMmenhang. mit der. gernelnsamen Europts-Verteldigtmg beginnt. Gehlen.War non .I942 bls
1045- Leiter 'des A.bwebadienstes
der Wehrmacht an der rtissischen
Front, wmde aber-von 'den Nord
amerikanern , gefangengenommen.
Dies ..stellten ihn'arrdie- Spltza
eines klelnen Kreises
flirter des Geheimdienstes,
wie em gefangengenommen worden wren, mid beanftragten 13312
damlt, die Informatianen atutzuworten, die die Naziregierung tiber
Russland gesammelt hatte.
Als der "kalte Krieg" einsetzte,
wurde Gehlen mit mehr als einer
wichtigen Aufgabe betraut, die
sich nut die Feststelltmg neuer
gehelmgehaltcner. . Einzelhetten
fiber die Sowjetunion bezog. D!ese
Aufgaben brachial . eine 'resent.
Helm Erweiterung seiner Organisation ml t slch, die, vie' es heisst,
Jetzt fiber 4000 . Angestellte vetMgt. General Gehlen hat den
Sits dieser Organisation munch
Misch bet Milnchen .verlegt. Die
deutschen Zeitungen meldeten.
die Organisation Gehlen
rund sechs MlIllnen Dollar
itch von den Verelnigten Staaten
.
beztcht.

dass

Dr.John
Von alien biaherigen Pressemeldungen . ist absolut richtig, daze JOhn
die #azia hammte. Infolge zahlreicher Liebschaften hatte er oft se4ne
Arbeit etwa visrnachlacsigt. Er it ein el*er Preund Cies Ochmensepp.
- jar. Josef Mdller, langjariger CSU Vorsitzender in Bayern und Justize.nister. Anzeichen einer Entfdhrung eind bis zur Stunde nicht feststellbar.
Einer der fr,Lharen 4omintern3ekretdre glaubt Beweise fUr eine ZugehOrig
- keit dea LT. John zur "itoten rapelle" zu haben. Stimmt dies, dann it
o:fensichtlich, dass J. V- Mann der Sowjets war.
Unwahr imt, dasa am 20. Juli J. sehr deprimiert war, an diesem lase sak
ich ' ihn noch bei der Veranstaltung in Pl5tzensee und in der Bendierstrasse.,
Dass(Dr.1ohlgemut Kommunist war, war seit qahren bekannt.

wird dehr wahracheinlich am kommenden

Innenministar . Dr. chrOder
i
4ag eine Ericlarung der Bundearegie-ung zu dem ganzen Komplex John brinr.:
gen.,
Da John &anon mehrfadh - seine Auffaasungen geandert-hat, it, falls er
nicht freiwillig ging, doch mit seinem Umfallen und Verrat zu rechnen.
(Josef Mailer steht im Verdacht eine Doppelroll e in der deutschen Poli4,
tik zu s p ielen. '3iehe euch den Pall Dr. Phillip)
4 Auel. bach). .
Al s Leitnder Mann der Lufthansa hatte John damalel einen grossen4nrtell am Aufbau der sorjetischen Luftfahrt, er hatte einen der beaten
Fachleute nach der U ntsandt.

DECLASSIFIED
AND REL
CENTRAL
EASED OY
TEL
SOU
L1SENCE
RCES ME
4T11HO
AGENCY
OSE
XEMP
NA2I WAR
CRIMESDISCVION3928

DATE

2001 2005

LOSUREACI

Der ?all Dr. J o h a.

An eiacm w axmcn Ab.nd, ia dq_zweiten . Halfte dee . Monata_Mai, wurde

KOln in eincr kleiaeren u esellechaft Dz. John, dez Prdeident de a .Ft v.ridcaverfaasunra-Jcbutzamtes gefragt, weloae Auswilkun die Flucht der
zahlzeichea .:borldufer dea sowjetischen Nachrichtendieanstes fUr die
6U haban kbanto. Jr. John, tin grosser stattlichez Herz, blond, mit
Uesichtsfarbe und immer aehr elegant gE:kleidet

blaucn Auger),

hasti;7. em n neus Gias WhIcsky em n und antwortete: "Ein Isehr

ectmerer 6chLa6, der nicht ohne Folgen fUr:die Politik, vox allem fUr
die Auesenpolitik, bleibea kann. kach dann nichtvwenn die Folgen
nich: 6ffentlich in Lraeheinung treten". "Und was ware gewesen, wenn
Beria iii Aualand geflachtet'ware?" fragte einer der U erT,rachateildann 7 Dr. John machte eiae Pause, trank ia einem Zuge
nehmer.
aein Glas leer - dann 1./.1ren die.Folgennicht . zu Ubereehen . - es wdre
ein Vezlorener Krieg, - aber bisher 1st oWas nicht nicht dageweaen,
daea der Chef einee . l achrichtendienstes zu seunen Gegnern Ubergelaufei
' 1st".. Das se te Dr. John unmittelbat vor seiner Amerikareise, 2 Mona7;te vor seiner Verscwinden in den Liowjeteektor von Berlin. Damit hat
'Dx.. John selbst die Folgen seines Verschwindens bei . seinen Gegnern
beuzteilt. NatUrlich kann Dr. John mit eineM Beria nicht /crglichen
we.den. 3eria wax nicht aux Chef der NKWD, mondern gehOzte zu den fUij
reaaeh v.;:ilinern der 6ovjetunion. Dennoch, die Folgea des Verztchwindens
von Dr. John eind achlimmer, alts de.r Mann auf der otrass, :doh voretellen if.311:12-ka
im Jahre 1950 da3 neugegrandete Bundesamt fUr Verfasoungez.chutz
einen prAcenten exhalten 3o11te, waren 3 Kandidaten far diesen Posgeringattla Chancen
tea auser6ohc:n. ar. John hattc ur3png1iuh
waren
Loiter er neuen (Leutcchen politischen o1izc1 zu vezden.
die oritiuchh Einweise, daas Dr. Johe de x Mann oei, der UUrataus

fa-

wOre don Posten eines Prdaidcaten beim de e 3undesamtes f :Ar Vexfassuir,g3scr;utz zu dbernhhmen. John cci vielfach dberprUft worden und
aeinc ..11vt!r1aesiicoit ausaer Zweifel. r sei em n Mann des ''estons und
war in dor I; Oh 0.11 onrnission, die
2.ivaterdemoiccat. 2:deco OW: t
cianehmen ciente, ent3encidend, die deuttachtu wi.Len. ZUfr CCI eT
Mil: eine Formalitdt. Die
oeho
dean die e.zcon x. John t:;ariintiertc niQht aux eine gute ::,usammenar-

b 0:3 t LI:rat k; C.L

dice

t:ondern ;?li(.2h, dans

n.:1111

bei%

1-:;

t uh U . r 1)6/

v,rde
cre;

. .1.3,1111

r1c1.1.ii,

A :IoL)1,:m.

.;:)

V ...,....)0.;;cri 'mar,

t L. :re d n

J. vJ.L

Acdc:o it/

or

Inn end lit;

la

uoh:1

nu r vieleo

1:Johrichton-Dieamte,
die Abiln:ten dos briti-

(D1.John)

.'13 war der Hauptverbindungsmann zu dem englischen Geheimdienst und

nahm alb eiaziger Deutscher an zahlreichen G eheimbesprechuagen mit den

linglandern tell.
Dr. John war aber auchmehrfach von den Amerikanern eingeladen worden,
die Vereinigten Staaten. zu besuchen, um dort die Tiitigkeib des amerikanischen Ueheimdienstes kennen zu lernen,'um die Fragen der 3ekdmpfung der kommunistischen Spionage in Europa zu koordinieren und um die
Schulung des Nachwuchaes durch di E .. :J1rfahrungen des amerikaniechea uncU
de a deutschen- 6eheamdienstea zu besprechen. Im FidhlinR. 1954 traf sic/a
seinen amerikanischenf Kollegen, wie er.nach
John
nit

meiner

kehr erzilhlte, unglauelich viel gesehen haben. r

eel

nicht,

wi

e 'ein

gern gesehener Gast, aondrin vie ciil .alter Freund. und Sundeagenosse
1Yehaade1t: worden. Selbetverstandll en hat ei an wicht:igen BesPre.chuid-
gen . leder UJA teilgenommen wad wohl auch mehr - erfahren al c die zahl-'
Teich mach der UziA ruisenden Bundeatagsabgeoraneten. ia eriibrigt
daralif Rint=r6321x= hinzuweis en, dass Dr. - ohn (moll
dem (l eheimdi en
der USA in der Bundesrepublik aufs Ongste iusammengearbeitet hat.
J

mit

t.

6r kannte die 3chwachen und auch die starken Seiten der Amerikaner in

Weuteuxopa und war in viele . ihrer Plane - eingereiht. - w enn auch der
Kontakt mit den Fraazoien nicht eleS 'en g war, wie mit den Engbibadern
und den Amerikanern, ao'hatte en auch in den Nachrichtendienat den
Franzosen genbgend Eicblicik, um , dessen Ttigkeit und kethoden in der
Bundesrepublik beurteilen zu'kOnnen, en kannte vor allem auch deren
Aufbaus.
Falln Di. John seine Kenntnisse Uber den Aufbau, die Zukunftsplane und
die alsammenarbeit der G eheimdienste der westlichen Welt dem Oaten be

kannt gibt, ac hat Moskau eine grosse Schlacht gewonnen. l ildr die Bun' .dearepublik fat das Verschwinden Dr. Johns'nach - Ostberlin emn auasereadentlich hurter Lichla.
Die mit glossal: uorgfult gehdteten Geheimnisae Uber die V-Leute dea
Bundesamtee fUr . Vertissungsschutz in dem Parteivorstand der &I'D und artderen w icLtigen . Kommunit;tischen Organisationen, ;J.e Aufdeckung alien
Karten der Bundesrepublik im Kampf geFen den Kommunismus, die Bekannt-gabe .11 derjenigen .6tellen, die in der Bundesrepublik civil mit dem
ih beschaftigen una ihre
oammeln von Nachrichten 1.1a
Eauptkarldle urni ..ue11:2n difi . hedt2ut et, (131 . 7 rIlhevolle itvb,.)ii; Gen let z ttia

nauc:uttanci,

:11 i eh :.:wcoen. JrHh.r 11.1.rou: wue: t; t.!

go-

alssea nx die ':e2;b1c)utochn arbeftc:t,

Persohen, f.ihrende ..)Funic t71 oftice,

1. Qa und noon der Bun6et,republi .:7. 3neh.vieht.11 weitt.73ben.
Dico

u_.;-conon dii, cins cfti 0:-rt-,(11

welch'
t wo-

0,

C.,.]1Q;n

(Dr. John)

- 3 .-

smAiardatbrozzdajcIliscincriartmmorittErrexiackx,mcitudsratount Es gib t ab er
such saderc Poigen, aie das Verschwinden i.L. Johh.s auSlaste. In der
BUndearepublik . he.c..rscht ein grosses Duis cheir_ander in der A.rb ei t der
geheimen liachriclitendienste.- Lin groeser 'Tell 6er bisherigen V-Leute
it .abgesetzt, verschiedene "le.rddehtige" Mital:beiter werden Uberpriift
Die .4 eheimuade, beson.lers 'die rait Cl'estberiin, getindert, die Zusarnmenarbeit/der Ts e ta dcht e aur dem Gebiet des geheimen Nachrichtenwesens
stoCkt. In der :-.:orrjetzone .herrecht . bei ell den;jeaigen.Personen, die .mi'
dem i5wiat3saint dr V erfassuagesebutz arbeitc.kten un aicht verhaftet:
sina, p anis ob.6 Angst. Es

d sehr schwe4: werdeu., ktinftig emz.inden in .

der sowjetischen Besatzungszone zu finden, der der Bundesrepublik Nach
richten ilber die . ostdeutsche Regierung, SED oder
zu liefern. Men
wild . es nicht tun, ..auch wenn man aus l'eind.scb.aft zur Diktatu.r heraue
es wollte. 'AuCh unter den .1Kommunisten der 3undearepubliic . wird men
alkunft Behr schwer Mitarbeit:r finden kann.en die, wenn such vom tom-

munitimu:3 enttauscht, bereit sein werden, den restdmtschen acherheitst

beharden iber. AbsicLtxi und Tatigkeit der KEJ D zu berichten,
Des -Buudesamt wird in der nachsten Zeit Ge
tui zahlr eiche.r tintersuchungen (ibex die Ttigkeit des Amtes
Dicnstag let betr
der.
bc.,reits eingeladen
Aueschusa de
zahlr eich er .Deb
ten . vein. Scalimmer wird siell .auswirken,. class Eimer& r Lte diejenigen, .
die Geir,ner de.1 haziemu.s waren, nun verdiichtig mind, nicht die geniigen-.
de Abneiguns g .;;ELm (len -sten zu haben. Dr. John hat mit s einn Verschwi
den Ja.ic;ht nur den iCommunisten, riondern auch

einen grossen.
Dien.st: erwiesen. Grass. 1st die kr efPhr, dass in Zukunft die iiberzeus,ten Deinokraten aus wialitigen Stelinne,en gedrangt und durch Iazis ersetzt ive Lien, tamer mit der Begriindung: 'Au e acherheitsgriinden". DarLib es wird in den aktiven liazikreisen zur Zeit am rreisten diskutiert.
In diesen lixsisen rechnet man jetzt auah auf die Unterstatzun.g . der eat,
tausehtentinglander und Ameriitaner..

MG
Z11121

FallJohn

Tataache ist,..dass John seinen w eggang vorbereitet hat. Also in der vol-.
len_Absicht des V errats. Wahracheinlich abet. hat er schon weit d em zwei!
ten Weltkriege im Dienste der Sowjets gestanden. Darauf laust vor alleni.
schliessen t . dasw er eine enge B ekanntschaft mit Herrn von und zu Puttlitz hatte. Puttlitz war auf Verlangen der Englander vom 18.7.4E bis
1.7-447 Oberregierungsrf.lt der Landesregierung in Schleswie:-Holstein. Putlitz, Be.i .t 1924 mm diplomatischen Dienst,. arbeiteteseit , einer Reihe
von Jahren far die Sowjets,'Wurde . wdhrend-seiner Tatigkeit in der deutschen Botschaft in London, 1934 unter EiDbentrop, in . ttnem Londoner Klub'
HOmOsexueller aufgegriffen, von dem englischen Geheimdieruat erpresst.
Damals war Puttlitz mit John befreundet.
Thtttlitz verschwand iM SpUtsoMmer 1947 spurlos au s Kiel und ging zu den.
suwjets. Seitdem hat er eine betrachtliche Zahl Intellektueller aus dern!
bUrgerlichen eager far die - Sowjets . gewOnnen. Westdeutschen Behdrden war
bekannt, dasa Puttlitz zuletzt im Marz 1954 John in Kan besucht hat,
Puttlitz, der . zwei grosse GU-ter in Mecklenburg besitzt, it heute noch
zu einem. erheblichen Tell deren AgentUmer, obwohl sonst gerade in Meck4
lenburg die Enteignung sall y hart durchgefiihrt wurde. . .
w atsache it weiterhii, daws John wiihrend'weines let zten Pewuches in der
USA sich faat . ausschliesslich mit 'den Amerikanern dber Fragen der Verteidigung er besuchte alle interessanten amerikanischen Verteidiguags-.
anlagen - man zeigte ihm auch neue waffen und berichtete dber deren Effektivitat - der Abwehr Und Spionage aprach. Zumindeatens utit den Spdtaommer 1944 stand John im Verdacht far die
sowjets to.tig zu wein. Die geOsate Wahracheinlict,keit spricht dafdrt
dass der ganze eng1iL4che kommunistenfreundliche Kreis in wirklichkeit,
bewusst oder unbewusst, fir die Sowjetregierung tatig it. aohn hatte,
ausser mit dem bekannten Arzt Dr. Wohlg . mUt mit einer grOaseren Zahl
SEL) Mitglieder Kontakt.
Der 6kandal beateht darin, dasa zahlreiche PersdnlicLkeiten der Bonner
Offentlichen . und behrdlichen Stellen Uber vielew Bescheid wussten ohne
etwas zu urternehmen. Die Korruption der engliwchen und amerianischen
Besatzungsbehdrden, Uber die ich in frdheren Jahren Oft berichtete, ermOglichte . fawt nur Leuten diewes chlages die Arbeit.
bereitet aich nun darauf vor, m6g1icthst noch
im Auguwt daw Erbe dew Amt es fdr V erfaauungwwchutz zu. dbernehmen.. Im
Apparat Gehltn, wie auch im "BUNA" und in "KYNA';:" werden gefeenwIrtig
nib den Yall John, vorgenommel
Umatellungen volgenommen, in ZuwammelihmeDie von Minilte schrOder abg-gebene ..rkliirun7'auf der Bundespreawel.n*
konfer-nz von 26.7. it ir Alb e rnh e it uno ea eire LititverHen1::eadune;
b e f P-1

60 eift

- 2 -

(Fal1 John)

'lain in Verbindung zu dem P oliztiprasidenten nach 1945

John . Ataad weit e\
in Schwerin, Hano rK a h 1 e, wEarend des span iachen Ijrgerriegea
war
Ic
dieser Brigadechef.
.

Ali3

derITSA sl.nd metre Experttn, unabhiAn

vonei.andtv, in der Eunde . s-

repubth eintroften. 1-Antr (1.!.r ersten warHarzy'

. , r1t

rmann, ' de

vox a11tm in Li amburg ErmittlunEen 3n;tte11te.

Dit Landewamtel fill' l erfassungsschlitz, cit.. in den Strudel der Erm-it-

lungtn einbtzocren tind, ddrften, dl die L';nder wich wehren, die aufzulsen, b ,Nitehen bleiben. Diese Amter nnnen hOchatents in Niedersachsen und fietaen als echte Schutziimter angesehen wtrden. I:teinetsfalis tind
s i t tc in tichlecwig-Eolst .r.in . und Hamburm. In Schltdwiw-Holstein ist.
vom . Chef angetangen, zumindestent . in der.Z1ntenle, .Allee morsch, ia
Hamburg hatte z.B. bi vor wenigeni"rbchtn.die 'Illefrau de* "niters der .
'BeschaffungAsttlle, - . des herrn'von. b euut, ollr -NichtiFen Akten in ihrer_r;
Verwahi. ung. 80i; der zur VerfdcE;ung:Ntehenden

werdcn ohne. Ih.a,iden-,

beleg auagegeb&n,-zumei .At fU.c Arcmhol.Eine ernwte Abwchr

tu gibt in der aundearepublik nahczu 40, in WeAt-

Oerlin zwiachen 40 lulu 50 Ueheimdienste - die volikommenzuverlassiv

it, it ed in der 3undetprepub1ik nicht.
Unwidertiii:ochenen 4te1duagen sus . Bonn . vafolgt it welt .etwa 10 Juli ein
1eitender , ,J eamter de a Bundesverfaaaungsschutzamtes bereitt nach OdtberBegtatigung it nirstndu zu erlangen).
lin gegangen.
Noah it nicht bewicsen,

dit zahlr-ichen Y erhaftungen in 010;otr1 in

und in der Zone im unmittelbaf . en Zusaalmenhanx mit dem Fail John kitchen.;
bi iwt, dakr4

Ab)4perrunx B erlin * von dtr Zone- m i t

efftLctivta Kontl . olic dami !, jui Zuwammcnhan stel.

&=OUSer

T Cil

der

um John von der Presat gtmeldtten skandale dirtt

istimmen. fatdacht iut aber auf jedf-m ?all seine trunkaucht und em n ger9dczu ph4aom .7na1ea Gedachtnin.
29 . 7.1y 54.

i)e'\ sliirtiGc kom.rdw g 31:iwche Lit. . ..1. .u.:1,..e.-veau:::.::Age-utza:Itchs

)r.
1 c * u Lt 66 J -_r- al uric; 4;teht vor wc. iner Penibaitrunp:. In .3onn
i
bemaht *iel. KardinalFrin d, 6oLu, je:tzt seine 6k.:hdtzLine ia die
r f.tc . lieht Aoz
...chLiwigdpouitionen za b. in;, ..:runt - ...c vim' ueute
katholi.che
Pilur!
cr.e1Qht.
eitc.m
nicht
dcren
nuto.f; bci ,.
.; "d.t * i': no...h qicht
g
Ailed unatcb J.Irluf, daau auLAI di-. ehtm.
:,:.1,1nct h;lb,:n.
In Jcilutelro,31:.,ion ,rn .inu, ein'
CI-2":-

.NA.Li

E;10WRC

m0

MG

Fal 1 Joh n.
(Erganzungen zu Prenzeberiten)
rlshornt ttilt ritr SE.,;FdhruAr. mit, :;ass ninn z:vtl.AuslieftrungsErsuchtn der Weutmachte ablthntn werde. Es stien brit s Voxktbrungen
far VtrhOr Johns im Kr'nml getroftcn.
Sowjetzontn Prominez dusstrtt: Duro!, John ati nicht nur dit
Abwthrtatigkeit au s dem Rahmvi geworfcn, sondern man hofft such wesentliche politiucht Argumentt zu btkommen. John kOnnte z.B. klar ,.agtn,ob
die Amerikaner im Raum Kaiuerulautern au$nchliesalich Verteidigungsan,
lagen bauttn oder nicht. Zweitel bti den Spitztn Outberlins, dans John
au s !rein politinchen Motiven gekommen
Dr. pereOke, fidher NiedersachsenMinister, in . di Sowjetzone gtflOhen,
duijerte sonderbarerweine im November 1951 zum hessischen Lande:;vorsitzenden der "Deut4chen Snzialen Partci":
.Ich habe neuliob eint fUntstiindige Unterredung . mit Dr. John crehabt.
r mich ffUr v011ig*oay hUt .."
Er hat.mir veruichert,
Mitarbeiter Dr. Gereckes wurden angev:icsen: -"Falls einmal etwau pausieren-solltt", dann nur auf eine Vernehmung "aurch Dr. John prUdnlich"
.zu bentthea. Nach der Flucht Dr.Gerecktu wurde in Atinem FrankfurtcrHauptquartier erneut die Parole auGgegeben4 "Nur von Dr. John peruOnlich.vernehmen las'senl"
In Industritkreisen war C4 mitt:: 1953 aufgetalLtno dans' ein themaliger
fdhrender Funktiondr diner kommunistischen Tarnorganisation bei Bawerbungen al s Referenz ausgerechnet Dr. John angab. Der Mann kannte Dr.
John nooh au x der wi(1er .. tandxizeit. Iridutrie11, uprachen damalu dariiber
dawa . John offenbarPer:ionen:blind vel . traw!, .enn VIC ihm nur alu Anti
Nazi bekannt seien. Man hilt damnla noch den Ge6anken
dass
istxxxImixm evtl. auch andere Zusammenhdnge mOglich uein kOnnten..
Sowjetzonaler Informationuchtf
fzagte'im Pcbruar 1952 bt. i einem
Gesprtich: ".... W;a halt,!-n Sit von Dr. John? It .er c!in konatquentex'
Mann in seiner TE:tigkeit?" Die Fra grest!. 11ung erscbitn schon damals
monderbar, aber es. war kin Zu.:iamm .!. nSanif zu kocitruiren.
In Bonn hakt man:
a) Gtntral'Othlen, nnvblich John:, Nchal-f .Jtcr -tgrier (Chef de rs amerikanischen Abwehrdien.te in .1)utchland) habe In der vel. angen'en Woche
"eine dickt 1kto John' dem Bunde4ikanzleramt .z.ue--ttlit. Darin aei
John schwer bet. John hdtte davon erfahren,* und e
ei ihm klnx
geworden, da4, t,I amEnd ,.t .Dazu Auutrumg . au.
unterreicht;:ten
Venn John politi,ch saubcr gewesen ware,
4rtisen:
er es
eine Unt ,.!ruuhumr, und AustinanJeri;etzun,L ankommen lassorn
. ten Angehbrig der Organisation Grhlrn erhaftet
Vor Monaten sind im 0 4
worden. An deren Familien viirdtn j .,tzt in ttwa 80 :fallen Pensiontn gczahlt. Dasselbt werne ich nun ver,bdrkt wiederholen. 6e1bst drr B..z.rut
des politischen 16enten sti ip[txt also mit Penuionsvericherung vdrkndpft und uer 1.:oontik
Au4, britiwchtn J:.; rmittlungen (special Branch) tigibt sich tolende Version, die im Gegensatz zur amtlichcn thtutchen V(trulon tti: Pall
Joham6.44!! in gr6sutrem Znuammnbang iztatM., nwerden.
vAX John
Pannt im gzovu:tn
dem sojrtisch .ni Geh-qmdiens"
mu

Schldsselfigui. zum Fall John 4ei)von Puttlitz, aorj:-ti4cher

Kont q kt- erfoZgt ,In in .nc731ami. 1944 ?;v1pchen von
Puttlitz, / Han,. Kahle, 0btr4f; It
an.
ob$;on

und
john.
Anodley
/
Ms.Adinell
Olivia ,
kr:Jai-a meiner
111i r,1'ti..,,o-r1
john
n vom
woi

fi)-1:uh

-1

7011

Pall John)
Putilitz babe John in der Folge expreast una zu &einem Werkzeug S e
habe John u.a. 1953 den so w jetiachr-hollrindischen Agenten-macht.So
_

Lhland, (del in 2a:time-MIA "Fall Hein" - Amt 'llantc eine t:olle spielt)
mit del& versolEen und ihm'zul . Fluaht v ierhelfen miissen. Beim), habe in
tinem Brief vom 26.10.53 an John diese Behauptung festgelegt und weiter behauptet, John hatte Ithgland gebeten, ihn (John) zu-sahonen". .
Dieser Brief des Heinz an John aei uater dem gleiahen Datum verachledenen hohen PersdnliorKeiten der 14 epublik zougeleitet worden. :)ie hatter'. aomit Kenntnis von dem Verdacht gegeu John gehabt. Britilepahe Abwebtx aei dberzei)gt, dais . John "mindestena oeit 1951" Kon=
takt unterholten habe und (Ube:: Puttiitz) "in voller K enntnio"-in Abhangigkeit vom sowjetischen Nachrihtendienst gerato!n - sei. Britiaohe
Vermutung: . jobn habe duruh tdtige tiltige Mithilfe bIltiache .DiploMaten Mc Clean und 3uLzess in einem Agentenweg bei ThUringen ermliglicht
- g rit. ''1115 (z,ecret Service) habe festgestellt, das mehrfach Treffen!.
fu
Putt itz-John im 11usedes "Edelkommuniaten" Dr. Wohlgem Ut atattgenttenv John hatte Verbindungen zu dem SED-Zentral-Komitee-Mitglie;
den
";
MeiRsaex gesucht, um "FrOntwechael" vorzuAthmen.-- ; Weitere 41.0,- /d.
Kia11
rune erhoffe mtin von - einem Arrangement'eines."Agenten-Treff".

..

Dessiers dber fthreade PermOnlichkeiten der Bundesrepublik, die durch

John. im BuVerfaasungaschutzamt peradniich abgelegt und genhrt worden
seien, collen inn Original verschwunden ein. Gefahr kUnftiger Lrpressungsv ,..tr4u6he an diesen Per5ionen von sowjetischer :3eite.
Fahndung und:IttlunL werd,:. n auf deutocher Seite getdhrt vom Oberbundesanwalt(Dr: Tichmaan pers'.inlich. Von Karlsruhe in dao guJustizMinist. abgeatent .StijAttianwalt Labsdau. Ihm zugeteilt von der Sich
erungsgruppe: . Kriminalrat \Vogel.

Gall e n angefordert worden seia, well diesei

alte Komplex . liamxistx hit): herein spitle.

Die kitten "Eote / ,-apelle

(von 29.7.54).
L, den 31.7.1954:7

Li

Visoeilaneoun Finance Data

r224b`

Received fromlIENIT on 17 May 1954

88 S alary is DM 1845
66 Salary DM 1324
DM 500 to an unidentified Rote Kapelle Source
DM 500 for 88 1 s representation
DM 25,000 88 received directly from Baxter not the house
loan) hae been repaid.

DECLAGGIF I ED ANO RELEASED BY

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Ghief." PCB
Cbief

rak-vk

-gAtita (4 1?3 0

AUG 24 1954
_

Ba1114.

mos chief, la

Bern

chief, CoMf

CALI/C4Itektatisisal ZIPP1112

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::.

_,

te341 the ust.bledgeeed

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sitar
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"7
4 4: :: "Ft. eit. 3,2
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..
.
.*.thin this
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...hist:en that litietosta

r.::this : 13 'being . pecusea Oa to you for Ithictinrer

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General notes from:

DER SPIEGEL article/photo, 25 Aug 54; 240 GEHLEN ReinbArd
Sommer 19424arz 1.945: Reinhard GEFfulli, Chef, Abteilung Fremde Heere Oat
Grupue I: Frontlage der Sawjet-Union (der Heeresgruppen-Gliederung entsprechend, in die Referate Lege Nord, Mitte, Std und A unterteilt),
Sachbearbeiter der Einzellagen (Lage-Referent) war normalerWeise
emn Generalstabsoffizier (Major oder'Oberstlautnant).
Leiter: WESSEL, Major i.G.
EISELE, Oberleutnant
FUERSTp, Cberleutnant
nr ) Hauptmann
CR
HOEFERuMajor (deceased.)
SCHILLER, Haupt:Mann
SCHUELE, Oberleutnant
Gruppe II . Aligemeine Lege in der Sowjet-Union (Menschen-Reserven, Wirtschaftspotential, geographische Spezialstudien)
Leiter: HOHEISEL (Klaue), Major
HALLER, Sonderfthrer.(z)
GOELLUTTZ, Oberleutnant
HAUCK, Dr., Major
RE1,C Oberleutnant
RITTBERG (Graf), Hauptmann
RITTER, Oberleutnant
.
.
Grippe III: Lage.adost (Balkan) upd wechselte spdter elm der Abteilung
Fremde Heere Ost in die Abteilung'Fremde Heere West Hber.
Leiter: 'I
BUCHHOLZ, Oberleutnant

Gruppe IV (Lace Skandinavien)

V (Dolmetschergruppe)
Others: kORNCHEN, Hauptmann
LETSCHERT, Oberleutnant
'von der MARWITZ, Hauptmann
OGILVIE,.0berstleutnant

von VARNEWYK, Leutnant

WIESEMAHN, Zahlmeister
Note: these names have

D ECLASS IFI
ED AND REL
EASED BY
C ENTRAL IN
TELL
I6ENCE
AGENCY
SO URCES MET
NODS EXEMPT
ION3B2B
NAZI WAR CR IMES
DISCLOSURE
ACT
DATE 2001
2005

been carded: PLEASE DO NOT MOW HOTOS FROM FTLR.

HEFT 35

25. AUGUST 1954

8 JAHRGANG

DAS DEUTSC,HE N,ACHR1CHTEN-MAGAZIN

EIN MANN OHNE GESICHT"

'hatte die Zliricher Weltwoche" kijrzlich resigniert und ihren
Lesern vermeldet, Geheimdiensi-General Reinhard Gehlen
lasse sich nicht photographieren: ... nicht einmol der gra(lten deutschen Bildagentur gelang es, em n Bild des ,Geheimen' zu bekommen." Jetzt liegt jedoch eine Gruppenaulnohme
vor, die im Fri:Mich; 1943 von der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost
im Generotstab des Heeres im OKH-Stobsquortier Mauerweld bei Angerburg (OstpreuBen) gemocht wurde. P.einhard
Gehlen war vom Sommer 1942 bis zum Marz 1945 Chet dieser
Abteilung, die nach Kriegsende den Stamm des Nochrichtenopporotes bildete, der heute von den Amerikanem tinanzied
und wiederum von Gchlen geleitet wird. In Gehlens
Generalstobs-Abteilung war die Arbeit in drei Gruppen outgeteilt. &rupee I: Frontloge der Sowjet-Union (der HeetesgruppenGliederung entspreehend, in die Relerole loge Nord,
Mille, Sud und A unierteili). Sachbearbeiter der Einzellogon
(Lage-Reterent) war normolerwcise em n Goricralsrobsollizior
(Major cdor Oberstleutnont). Gruppc 11 belo8te sich mil dot
allgemeinen Logo in der Sowjet-Union (MensclienReserven,
W mschollspoicnriol, geogJaph i sche SpOZiOIStudien) OfU000 Ill
schlie8lich beartscitete die Loge Stidost (Balkan) und svechsebe
speiter as dor Ableilung FICMd0 HCCIC OSI i;I tlic Abmilung
Fremde Home West ubr.rr. Unto; Gohlen entstan(ten noch neJ.,
die Gruppen IV (Loge Skondinovien) rind V rDolmo!sciJor
j gruppe). Sitlend von links nach rechts: Mojo ispolor
Oberstleutnono Dr. Natick, Wilts(hortssachbearboitei Gropoc
unbekonH: un:-,,, kcnrit; Oberst i G (sparer Generalleurnoni)
Sochboaibu,

ter Loge Skandinovien; Major I. G. (spate; Oberstleutnant

I. G.) Hoheisel, Leiter Gruppe Major i. G. rgetatten) HOter,
Sochbearbeiter Loge Mitre, Gruppe I. Zweite Reihe (I. n r.):
Houptmonn (sparer Major) von der Morwitz. Kommandant des
Stabsqu ...rtiers; Name unbekonnt. Leiter Gruppe III; Maot
i. G. (spCier Oberstleutnont i.G.) Wessel, Leiter Gru p pe I;
Houptmann (sparer Major) Graf Riliberg, Sochbearbeirer Personollage, Gruppe II; Houptmonn (spate( Major I. G.) GrOner,
Soebbearbeiter Loge A, Gruppe 1: Oberleuinont Letschert,
KorteiRelerent; Nome bet:0nm (heute. Ost;ane), Leiter der
Rogistratur; Ober l eumant Eisele, Mitarbeiter Gruppe 1; Name
bekannt (boot,: Osttone), Kortogiopli Dritto Reiho (I. n
burnout ispoier Obedeuinom) von Vornewyk, Gehille des
Kommonclomen Stobsquorricr; Oberleumont (spate( Houl p lmann) PC11,:, Milarb.211Cr GrUPpe 11; ZahlrtleiSter (spare r Ober
Jahlmeister) Wieseinann, Mitarbeiter Kotter-Relerol; Haupimoon (spore( Major) Karnchen, Verwaltungsaulgabe n : err
ockanni; Hauptmann Schiller, Mitarbeiter Gruppe I, Ober
leitincm! (spa:or Houptmann) Ritter, Mitorbeiter Gruppe II:
Obeileomont Schtilc, Mitorboiler G r uape I: Name kmbokonot,
LL. ,ier des Photolobars. Reihe (I. n.jr.): Oberleutnonl
tspoier Houptmonn) Bucitholz, Mitarbo.iter Gruppe 111; OberIcJinoni von Hogens, Mitarbeiter G r uppe I; Oberleutnont
unbekadm; Sonderliihrer (Z)
fl ower, Mitarbeiter Gruppe
iJneekonnt, SaehHollei, Milorbet:or Groopc
boa:belie( Loge Nord, Gruppe I. Or)eileutnani (spbJer Haupt.
Mitarbejter Grtippe II . onbokonm; J_Jnbckannt.
rn onn)

ILL 11I

ert

"..1! ,

,4-4 riv

DER GROSRE UNB

RKANNTE war Stg ueral.a..O.
Rei nhard Gehlen,
Chef des von
'Salle linanderten ttnd
ante rika'nlacher
1111 ZUSIIMMellhallf
snit stern
Pall John haufig genannten
NaehrIcht endienstes,
bla zaps Pasirisen Tag
e. Jetzt(miles
1st es der Bildagentor
Associated
pees,
sehatsea,
I il!ribli Als O
Ge hlens,
berst len Rriere relict,Photo
en he statten.

- - ---- -

r
. ......i .4,0
.(7

Der geheime Herr Gehlen

Nie 'soh man tin Bild von ihm, wenige kannten ihn, abet in den Semen Wochen
war viol von Ihm die Bede. Mehr noch von selnem Amt, dos semen Namen tragt
und dot von Geheimnissen umwittert jet.. Im Zusammenhang mit der Affare John
wurde Genera/ a. D. Reinhard Gehlen schlagartig popular. Mon erfuhr. daB er vor
Otto John gewarnt hatte und man Nine einiges Ober den Nachrkhtenapparat, den
or Im amerikanischen Auftrag aufgezogen hat. Fachleute behaupten, daB im ..Amt
Gehlen" die wichtigsten Nachrichten out dem Osten einlaufen, und zwar nicht nur
out der Sowjetzone, sondern ouch out den Satellitenstoaten und selbst us RuBland.
Mit Nochrich ten aus RuBland wei8 or umzugehen. darin hot or eine zwalfjahrige
Erfahrung. Im April 1942 wurde dem damals vierzigjahrigen Oberstleutnant Gehlen
die Abtellung ,.Fremde Hem Osr anvertrout. Domit kom er sum erstenmal mit
dem gehelmen Nachrichtendienst in Beriihrung. Er fond sich schnell zurecht. Bald
konnte or den Ablaut - der Katastrophe on der Ostfront genau voraussage.n. Dos
brachte lhm die Ungnade Hitters und zugleich die Aufmerksamkeit der Amerikoner
tin. Mit ihrem Geld und seinem Wissen haute or in den Jahren nach dem Kriege omen
Apparat auf, der hoffentlich bold der Bundesregierung zur VerfUgung sleben wird

W.,

/,..:" ....);,...
.

.--",

Das 1st
General,
1,Gehien
-.

.4-4

onoral a. D. Reinhard
G Gehlon (52), von dam
40
DILD kUrzlich ca
ugend.
photo ver8fientlIchte, Ilegt
jotct auch In volle y Grafie"
VOr. Liner Aulnahme reIgt
don gahefmnIsumwitterten
Leiter eines bedoutenden
Nachrich tendienstes, der In
Wes Ideutscbland flit die
A morikaner arbeltet, aft
Oberst im tweiten Welt
t'' :c g Goblet, hatiA 111iPI

/;112r,

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENC E AGENCY
SOURCESMETNOOSEXEMPTION3B28
NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACT
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.ith Ii M3.,A C

CIil(y Cliti."::0;p0

..

FOREIGN SE 1{ 1 . ICE DES l' '1' C 11

..

..

53

USIS BONN
USIA

FROM
TO

411V .VCP, . FO.

.11,114i,l; DA.!, t:er.

1-4

ni ce'. 7 -N
f

wAslilsGToN

_Se_PteAtbOr 3,9.

3.954

DATE

: 4,4
-"J

, DEPT

ACTION

40

I.

'

'4 1

/0/Y1 Mr //s._./e/* /c/

For Dor: !
llise

rMan Pres React on to t.e personality , and Activities

. of exe4enera1 Reinhard Gehlen

SUBJECT- W

. .6 Intelligence organization, reportedly sponsored

.Ex-General Gehlen and /1 1
. .and financed by the United States, became subject of press discussion for the
first time in October 1953 when Sovzone security chief Ernst Wollweber started
gigantitprOpaganda campaign denouncing Western underground activities in the
East Zone. _Papers then reported in detail on the past and the professional
qualifications of Nx -General Gehlen, stressing the fact that Gehlen's depart' ment in-the-German-arMy headquarters had been the most effective body of all
competing Nazi Intelligence organilatione charged with counter-espionage activ
ities in the East,' -Duringthe last months of 1953 the press also raised the
question of how the -Gehlen organization could be put under . German authority
---after_s_the-Federal-Republic had become sovereign. While reporting that a-nuMber
colIaberated with Gehlen, papers did not by and large object to
of former Nazi s
'
the ex -General e s affiliation with former.Rimmler men, opining that the exGene:al had been guided by purely professional and not,politieil consideration
i1ding lip his orgaisation0
.

Preos.attention focussed again on ex-General Gehlen and his organisation

after the defection of West German security chief Otto John - Gehlen was named
as a possible tuccessor0. Sensational and donservative .publications alike carTied lengtAy'features on the Intelligence expert, pointing .out what a."mysitexd
ea" persOnaiityGehlen.was. After a Swiss Magazine allegedly . offered 500 DM
for a picture of Reinhard Gehlen 9 photos began to appear in the lest Garman
, press which 'showed -the ex4eneral,in his, youth and as an officer WESTDBUTSCHE
-BMIMSCHAtr, howevero.front -paged the most often publiiheclpicture of.Gehleap
atating. in the taption:that thephoto.did not look like Gehlen and that no one
knew . as yet 'what the former General really looked . like. Most papers 'stressed
the ex-General e.s extraordinary skill and qualifications. The only paper available. which strongly objected to the existence of the Gehlen organization be...
(MUM) it was "financed by the4mericans," was the neutralist, fellow...travelling
ZULDAER VOLKSZEITUNG which wrote that'Gehlon was the most representative example
of foreign Intelligence activities on German soil, which 'constituted a' serious
,.. obstacle to4n East .4est agreement. 'Other papers, however, demonstrated . a mere
objective attitude with regard 'to the "fact" that the Americans sponsored
4ehlen._ Seme . publicatione's aia that the organization' coatabott'25 million DN
.yearlygranfaMeunt which the Federal Republic would have been unable, to spend
ing . thelirst years of its existence. Gehlen o s loyalty to both the Ameri
the Gern:.s was underlined by several papers. .

,hl

Npit:

a_firc

.-

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORTER

e./C(1 (CA/Z.

P=COORDINA

WITH

4)-)1,.-1-e__

C7/

, 2 pages

rat..

UNCLASSIFIED

1)t-

The Protestant weekly CHRIST UN]) WSLT professed to know that Gehlen was
1"no longer" financed by the Amerioans but had received funds from the Fede
Chancery during the past months. The weekly stated that the organisation
Gehlen was therefore a'purely German institution now. It favored the attach
mente the Gehlen organization to the future Defense Ministry immediately
: after the establishment of that body. The position and the funotions of
Gehlen . and his organization should be clarified and determined, as coon as poibible since the Soviets would undoubtedly increase their Intelligence . activities since . Johns defection and Gehlen in particular would - be in a .position
to deal effectively with their aotivitiee.

The independent WESTDEDTSGHE . ALLGEMEIDE 0 the news weekly DER SPIEGEL and
the neutralistWESTDEUTSCRES TAGEBLATT wrote that Under Secretarr . in the Chan-..
eery Globke and former Tinder Secretary in the Chancery Otto Lens who became
known for his attempts to establish a "Propaganda Ministryo" planned te estab-

lish a State Security Ministry and were assisted in their plaits by Reinhard.
Gehl= wh4o.thereby hoped to gain a foothold in the Federal Government. These
.publicati /ons maintained that Gehlet had Consciously misinformed Federal Minister of the Interior Schroeder with regard to the John case. Schroeder was opposed to ;the establishment of a State Security Ministry 9. if for no, other reason-than that an Interior Minister could not favor the establishment of an
omnipotent security authority independent of his Minietry. .Gehlen 0 Globke .
and. Lenz were said to have attempted. discrediting Schroeder by leadinehim to
make statements with regard to John which would make him subject to .widespread
public criticism..

licst Publications dedicating special features or articles lo'Gehlen 'and

his organization were rather favorably inclined toward the'exi.General and his
future attachment to a Federal authority. Of this group of publicatians:only.
the illustrated weekly . MUENCHNER . ILLUSTRIERTE veiced doubts-at to the' eligibility of Gahlen to the post of Western Germany g s highest security . chief in
view of his former "close Cooperation 'with the Americanset 'hIs alleged "bad
reputation" in most Western countries and in particular the extreme publicity that had recently been focussed upon him.
&lover a number of papers discussing the John . defection 9 the necessity'
to recirganise the security system in Western'Germanyg And the possibility- of
-centralising. all Intelligence aCtivities under Gshien afterthe.Federai
public had become novereign rejected the ex-General as a possible candidate.
Most of- these papers opposed on principle the concentration of too much power
generalin the hands of one man. The Mainz ALLGEMEINE
ly
against replacing."Britain g e John" by "America's
.Gehlen.": . The . nationalist AACRENER NACERICRTEN said that.Gehlen should 'under.
no 'circumstances be introduced to fill the void left by John's defection since
"in a certain sense Gehlen o s fight . against John reflected the rivalry of the
American and British secret' services on German eoilp"

51100,,Not

LI COPY
UNCLASSIFIED

fee. seph B. Phillips

Director
Office of Public AffairA_J

LL
re.m...manws.movami..51eNsOrmoressINMENNwIROIM

f-

.;
'

OFFICIAL DISPATCH
VIA

DISPATCH NO.

JUR
ietctirv
$U Mai

SECRET'
CLASSIFICATION
DATE

TO .

Chief, 1E

FROM

Senior Representative, a

SUBJrCT t antiatu.

SEP . 7 iget
meat

Frankfurt

Otto John

ortcote Article in Dutch Weekly

1.

In view of the ty interest evinced in the ease of Dr. Otto JOHN arid
in the be:. the article which appeared in the 28 August edition of
re Veekblada may have slipped by unnoticed, it is
the . .h .:.;:- hertwitrror youic-r
forv
reatiou. In an effort to save time, the
writer will dictate a rough translation of those parts which &wear to be
of greater interest in an effort to euemsarise the meat of the artiole.

2.

The first column can be considered unimportant build-up,

section say be of interestt

. r
'..)
...;

*Bowyer, except for the se-called official counterespionage serviceS, there

still seittral other organisations about which, the public: seldom Wears
anything. A ehort time egc when Dr. Otto JOHN fled to the East, the iforld
beanse aware 4th entonishment that the Germ= Federal Republic is blessed
with three ititeLligenoe services. Fret 'there is the offieial Bureau for
are

but the follodng

I.

the Protection of the Onietituticult This Bureatt is responsible for the..

.. ..:

protection of the Federal Fspublio against left- arid rightAting elements.

It hes &net of agents in the Fast. Bent -to it there was - and is - the
counterespionage service of the so-celled reau Blank s , the future German
Ministry of War and Defense, . The "Bore= Blank, which is rtiriatly jespcneible

.1

' .

to irdenauer, is established in a former barracks in Bonn Vihuge

barracks)

II
;

and has a staff of

&blast

elceil

1,000 formar :ordeal= an offieuta.

CZ service of the Bureau Blank was, until a yearaago under the direction
of an adventurous old-timer in the espionage world ) X. V :Lmic,The Bureau
Berlin where
Blank also hen three offices in Vest Berlin and two in
primarily tailitary information from the Nast is colleated. k
Thn

:I.

Attach:sant NB only)
28 August Fdition of ItElasitiars
3

Septenber 1954

Distribution
1118..wiatt,
6.1
2-

2 - rrokfurt
1 'OPPA
1- ZOIDI file

4.

...,.

Keekblado

r_r_
. RI

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION.

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.,

'SECRET

Yojit:}
Rage 2

3 September 1954
SEP

retro priwaigAtUel

It vu only through the JOHN Affair that the exixtence of the third,
and by far largest West German espionage organization, cams to light.
In well-informed circles in Bonn one had long been convinced that the
importance and danger of this a-credos w real. The chief of this
service in the former Brrgedier (aeon' " N" ". In this oEfult
4,000 persona world:38j
organization there are presently more
3,000 in the..political section and 1,000 in the military section.
'Reinhard GBIEMR was one of the young, IntUant officers who had a swift
career in Hitler t s army. He originally came from the artillery but,
shortly after the outbreak of World War rf, he was assigned to the
counterespionage section of the German high crowd. At the time of
the capitulation OM= was chief of the itGruppe Frelele-Feere-Oste and
directed the espionage and counterespionage services of the German
Army in Russia. He succeeded in escaping from the Russians with his
valuable agent files and arrived in the Vest where he - largely because
of his files - was received by the Americans with open ants, la early
as 1947 he received instructions from the Americana to build up a new
net of agents and American Headquarters in Frankfurt financed the socalled GE= group, a continually expanding net of agents In and around
Berlin, after the Russian blockade .of Berlin. Bina, 1948 each year the
Americans have placed at the disposal of =LEH 25 7 ,141 3ien marks for
the expansion of his orgsnization. =MEN Readvarters are in the village
of Pollaoh, fourteen kilometers south of /43nich. A barbed wire fence
three meters high and electrified surrounds a huge area containing
barracks, fuel, houses, stores and even a school.
leg eeLlent rmoreesim

"Reinhard =ES is most in his middle50 1 s, slender, not too short, with
tainitache. Evan in civilian clothing his
thin blond, hair and a
military tearing betray:I him. Bann Journalists saw him for the first
time when he was questioned in a secret sitting of the Eundestagdeel
with the questions concerning EIXI. Re made an excellent impression on
members of the Pundestag. For more than a year influential persons in Bonn
behind the scenee have been uorking to make the GM& organization an
official service of the West German Federal Republic, The Americana would.
rather be rid. of GER= not only because his organization lInn gradually
become too large and too expensive, but also because they suspect that
he does not share his loyalty with certain persons in the imaediatt circle
next to the German Chancellor. Apparently this Were teQ./r.)Rans4mos1E

saDr.F...1

S ECFIET

raii 046
-PM" 3

3 Sapteaber 1954

who, in the old days; Was a loyal servant andxBooltlist and who was
allegedly the founder of the national seoialist race laws. Thus, it

was Dr. GLOBKE who proposed to the Federal Chancellor that the
CEHLW organisation be incorporated as the official counterespionage
service Of the Bans= Blank.

,/

wAfter General GE=1, as mentioned above, had explained his program

to the Bundestag on 16 December 1953 and had made his "excellent
impression", an agreement was reached in )(larch of this year between the Bonn goverment and GEHIM to the effect that the OE= organisation
weld be taken aver by the Vest Germ= Federal. Republic. The Federal
ReptibLio
provide 22 million marks for it per. year.

w Ent Theodore
a., who initiated the plan for German divitices is the
14nropean Army stubbarelyreAtsed to receive the GEM argAniSatiOn.

saw vAa agents were aupposed tab. formaermembers of the

Infamous Gestapo and BD.
TOO

Ac
.-L
anOttel 1129142a
wrhe CESUR organization has not yet been accepted by the West German
Federal Rapublio. Bat GM= has time ead. he has friends with a great
deal of power. About week before the flight of :OBE to the East,

4It

General GERM handed over to his friend GLOM a thick dander with
the title, "Otto amt.* This dossier ended up on Adenauer t s desk.
After reading it, the Chancellor said I don f t went to see that men
again." This decision, hich was heard by a large number of persons,
reached JOlig too and that we, well have been one of the reasons which
forced JORti toIto the Ea$t eaulithich has induced the English

joircnaldit, Berta GPM, to write a series of articles under the title:-;

"Is Hitler Really

:-:";c!:;

t,

win the mean while the agents of the =EU organization, of the Boren
Blank, and at the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution
are continuing their work ill their buildings in East and Vest Berlin
and so are the e.gents of the fourteen other secret services establiehed
in Berlin. At least tiro, perhaps even three of these services, are
working for theigest German satellites. They too have their offices in
West Berlin, The Weet Berlin police have a section set tip to handle
special orders. This section, which is not established:in the building
of the West Perlin police headquarters but in a store on line of the
busiest streets of West Berlin, has more than 100 specially trained and
carefully selected officials working for it. The moat important

.,
-

SECRET
' Page 4

slpeptm:;,-1,.. 1954
qualification for the members of this section is an absolute fxilittaal
integrity. We have received a great deal of the materiel that ye have
used in writing this article from one of the coccuuvting officers of
this seatioas"
3. The remaining two columis are not believed to be particularly ge r:4w

to the subject and are prima-11y journalistic. It is believed r

sey, if Reesiquarters cons3siera the matter. interesting enough,
.idsh essio;
contaOt with the journalist who wrote the
.
Ileins
WI. At any rata; the article itself and the sections trans1
bovi are forwarded for Readquextera l interest with information
copies to The
and;Pranktttrt.

THE INTERNATI
( NAL WAR FL: MUSEUM .
38 DWIGHT STzcIET, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTIM
Dm CLABBITC=R. RuwMaM Authriged 0014.0.tor:

/Past Casmaxdor

Tomer

/Pomo-

American Legion
Veterans of Foreign Wars

Majority Leader
New Raven Board of Aldermen

National Burgeon General

Veterans Foreign Wars of the United Stake

'1*

September 8 1954
Lieutenant General Reinhold Gustav Gehlen
Bonn
Germany
Itzr

dear General

We haTe ..been reading with interest of your

ea soo tat /onis and mould appreciiite ...yery 'much
an7.6.UtOgraphed:: photograph of :yours tobe
-p1ioeic1 3: here. w ithjead ing mil i tar3r personnel
Nay IVO be'favored?
With beat wiehea I am
Sin rely,

(Dr )Clartinoe R4Rung

(9 R :XL
Rffi-AqvirrOED

fit wiltOtt
ffORAL lTflt v6NCt
tY

AOMY
SOURCUMEIHOOS
EXEMPT ION31111
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CRIMESOISC

NAii

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LOSMACt

-"!-itt
'...r17-4S

Lieutenant , General Reinhold. Gustav Gehles

14 itAk. 01044

!'.;

7ir

- %tt,

.,.04

C.S. Monitor

SEP 8 1954

'Man in Shadows' Spotlighted

By J. EntlYn
Central European Corres pondent et
The Christian Selene, monitor
. Bonn, Germany
During the recent controversy
over the defection to the Soviet
zone of Dr. Otto John, the name
of former Lt. Gen. Reinhard
Gehlen has cropped up constantly In almost every discussion.
He is either represented as the
great opponent of Dr. John indirectly responsible for exposing
the forrher President of the Office for the Protection of the Federal Constitution, or as hispossible successor in that office.
Herr Gehlen's name has been

M.Y. Times

s'Er
Spy' a Suicide in Berlin
BERLIN, Sept. 5 WP)The
West Berlin police reported today
that st Western agent suspected
of being in the pay of the Communions had killed himself with
poison in his Moabit prison cell
yesterday. He was identified as
RolfMiddendorp, 32. He waverrested Friday on 'suspicion of being a double agent and of giving
the West. German Government
false information about ' Soviet
zone production.

C.S. Monitor

SEP 7 Ilraf

In the shadows for a long time. It was his task to deal with
He has been the subject of fan- military secrets and espionage
tastic rumors and legends., These and counterespionage in Easthave gained greater credulity ern Europe, especially in the So-
than would ordinarily be the %net Union. Such a job required
case with the head of a secret the weaving of a network of
service organization because of agents and careful and patient
the abnormal conditions existing activity in many spheres.
His reputation for reliability
here since 1945, and also because
so very little has been known and expert knowledge of his
subject
was well known to those
about him.
who counted, And when the
Virtual 'Unknown'.
United States forces came Into
Until recentl y few people, Ger- Germany and were looking for
mans or others, had any idea as someone to assist them in their
to what Herr Gehlen looked like counterespionage work, they
turned to Herr Gehlen
so much so that a Swiss illus- naturally
since he had an ortrated magazine went so far as especially
ganization more or less still into offer 500 Swiss francs ($120 tact to bring with him.
approximate), for a picture of
Today, this former lieutenant
him. A little laterbut not in general of the German Army
answer to this advertisementa presides over the "Organization
picture was dug out of the Gehlen"as it it known to most
archives. It showed Herr Gehlen Germans. Its headquarters are
as a colonel in the former Wehr- In a closely guarded area at
macht. This must have been Puchtal, near Munich, in Baabout 10 years old, since he al- varia.
ready had risen to much higher
Heavy . Cost Rep.orted
rank before the end of World
. There are many contradictory
War II.
reports
about the financial aid
The chief of a secret service
organization naturally does not It receives from United States
sources.
The Communist.. press
court publicity about either his behind the
Iron Curtain, men- close . contact with Chancellor
Person or his activities. But this tions a sum of
a year, Konrad Adenauer . who would'
much is known about Herr while here in $3,500,000
Bonn the rumors like to see Herr . Gehlen in
Gehlen. The son of a Prussian run to . 25,000,000
marks, or charge of what was once Dr.
officer, he himself became an ar- nearly, twice that amount.
Since John's job.
tillery officer in the Reichswehr. there is
no
way
of
getting.tosanY
As a ,young lieutenant he was approximetely 'accurate figure
:. Coordination &Mitt
stationed with his regiment at on this matter, it must suffice to
the'enher hand; Heir Geh- Schweldnitz, which is now in the say that an organization which lenOn
has been concerned specificterritory incorporated de facto has' .. 3,000 , and'' 1,000 ally with military espionage, and
in Poland.
personnel must requi
re Is said. to have no desire 'to .be
In his early army days he dis- military
a lot of 'money to carry out its connected with' other 'aspects:
tinguished himself as a horse- investigations.
which .: would 'concern civilian

man and an all-round sportsman .Herr In ippearanee

matters..

and was Very popular among his nothing like' the film .version of ' In any case; when this whole .
fellow officers. He was early rec- a. secret ,agent : He looks likea affair . of Dr.- JOhn arid . hill
ognized by his superiors as hav- Prussian officer; but would pass cessor is discussed.ln.thifederal.
ing more than ordinary ability. for. a .. successful businessman Part iarnentVit generally i
hoped
and when the reconstruction of rather . than 'a -controller of .: es- there
be some clarifleatiOn,
the Wehrmacht was carried out pionage . and such activities.
of a situation'in which' there' are
later, Herr Gehlen became a capIn connection with the John so . many - different :countertain in the Ministry of War.
case,' , there , have . been 'many espionage 'organizations here in'
Skilled Secret. Arent
press'.. statements to the , effect the federal' republic, and that
During World War II. he was that the Gehlen oraganization some ' coordination-can' be I
for a short time the commander had long' superseded 'The Office achieved both in the interests of
of his old regiment. But his real tot-the Protection . Of the "Con-' more reliable tnforrnation,-and
career began when in April; *Minion, in the favors of the of economy. The achievement of
1942, he became member of federal government Further; a larger measure of sovereignty
the General Staff responsible that 'there were and 'still' are by the federal republic . doubtless
for the "foreign armiesEast." some very prominent officials in will react on this problem.

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THE SUNDAY STAX WftstitAgton, D. C.

107011AT. serreataga 20, 111/4

John's Super-Spy Rivals

Muscled Him Out of Bonn
By Joachim Joesten
"Beware of the deviltry of secret . brought to chancellor Adenauer's
service intrigues; don't ever drink attention.
from the. poisoned cup of counHeinz was incriminated on various
ter-latelligenee, for that poison is mints; He had been aa active Nazi
end-- terrorist (which he never , delethal . . ."
This strange Warning was con- nied); he had been mayor of a town .
veyed In a letter addressed on March in the Soviet zone in 1945-6 the
30, 1953; by the then head of West used his' office -to spy on the RusGermany's military intelligence serv- sians, said Heinz); above all, he had
ice, Lt. Col. Friedrich Wilhelm - had traitorous dealings with a rnYsHeins, to the then head of the Fed- terlous Dutchman, a double or tritile
eral Security Office, Dr. Otto John. neent named Jan Eland (blackmail.
Since then, both men have left office, Heinz claimed).
the former by dismissal, the letter
After studying the Heinz. dossier,
by defection..
Adenauer . summoned his. "Defense
It may seem surprising that West- Minister," 'Theodore Blank, and orern Germany . having no armed dered him- to fire. his intelltgenee.
forces of its own as yet, should pos- chief forthwith. This was done efs
seas a military intelligence tv-rvice. fective October 1, 1953,

Actually , Bonn has haf.

John
Under
Fite
or preparatory Defense Ministry for
No sooner had the Heinz case been
about four years. an embryonic mill- .
tars, intelligence service developed settled than there appeared 14 4
within the agency . Since 1050, it has German magazine an article Oharging that Dr. John himself had been
been headed by Lt. Col, Heinz.
a friend of Eland's, had paid him
John's Empire,
hush money and had sent him off to
Also In 1950, there was established Switzerland. Almost coincidentally
the. Federal Office for the Defense With the publication of this article,
of the Constitution, or Federal Secu- Eland died in Zurich on November 3
rity. Office. Dr. -Otto -John became under mysterious circumstances. -An
*its chief. Although these two agen- investigation Of his death is Still
des -Were designed to. serve. widely . pending In Switzerland.
Again: a few months later, there
different. endsone for the purposes'
of Military Intelligence. the other to appeared in the London Daily Ex- 'combat subversives of the extreme Press a series of articles written by
right and leftthe y soon- became , its star reporter Sefton- Delmer. He
Involved' An a bitter wrangles over charged that the "Gestapo lioys"
.itirisdletion. The battle was intensi- were coming back in Germany with
a vengennee.. Me. Delmer specifically
.. fled bit- personal rivalries between
t named 'Gen. Ghelen and Cr. 'Hans
:Beim and John.
Globke
in this ccinnection. '
To comPlielte matters even furInformed observers, watchin g these- .
ther. there existed, long - before
firew
orks. quickly put two and tars
either of these two German secret
together; Oen. Gehlen Was gunning
services seas set up, hush-hush orfor Dr. John: and the latter (who
"Galen-.
Aranization known as the
had worked closely with Sefton Del,Apparet."PdI that- originally was
mer in London in- 19444) was firing German surrender, he was set lip in
known about tnis hybrid outfit- was
back from both hint.
.
his Old business in 1946, but under
:that It had been act Up by the
In Rine of- all the (rather slily) new management. -Since then, the
-Americans. with headquarters at
-Pullach near Munich; that it op..' attempts that: have been, made, both Gehlen-Apparat has mushroomed to
in Bonn and elsewhere, to cloak . or- extraordinary proportions. It has a
mated a far-flung network of espiodistort Dr. John's startling act; in- Staff of 'more than -1.000 persons
nage and counter-espionage behind,

formed smacks in . 0ermany heists not counting- informants and agents

the- .. .Iron Curtain: that it was
heeded by a .former Nazi general. never for one moment-been Unaware in. the fieldns compared to the 800
of the real background of his de- employed by the Federal Security
Reinhart Gehlen, and that it was
section: John, after hiving eft- Office in Cologne. .
financed out of United States Secret
Mated his weaker rival, Heinz. -was Goble Rules U
Service. funds.
.1y
himself
being 'pushed to the wall he
u esneosi
Gen: (lehlen unquestionabl y Is
, Nov n
Gen.
Clehleti is 'riding on top,
his -stron ger rival, Oehler,.
one of the Most. Intriguing "living
a- happy
. One week before Dr. John crashed -but . he.'18 far frorribetne
lefiends" -of the postwar period. For
tion has been
a Icing time. his'- personality and ' through the Iron Curtain extension man. His organiza
:background -were elo'aked by , such that bisects Berlin, Oen. Clehlen had falling to 'pieces in the past few
banded to .Dr. fla ys Olotike, Chanimpenetrable mystery that reporters
having, betrayed
qf Dr, .
cellor Adeneuer's state secretary mid The
ttonof
-could not even -come by the genof Gehlen's agents-1n
identity zone
-eral's salver first name. So some- chief of personnel, one of those fat ' .the eastern
(he
can hardly
'body : celled him "Gustav" and the deadly dossiers marked "Otto John." . , a e known More than a few of
It wee placed immediately on the
f:nerne stuck.
.
deafer his urgent per-stampede
have ),' Rather,'
there
a
think'
- It is still being wldelY used as it Chancellor's
of Gehien
menhas
whobeen
-nickname,- as-in the catch ohmic) sonal attention.
that Dr. John knew . ail about them
Exactly what this- 'dossier co' n- and that he is telling the Russians
Sle Gustav" ("Sive my re.
,gards.to Gustav") which is coming tamed Is not known yet, and per- all he knows.
.
haps
never will be.' -It is taken for
. into fairly general use as 's synonym
at all:. On December 11.
is that
oughh, that. 1Stshocked
, : dwelt 1053, Gen,
Of "Mind . your own business." It , granted,, thoug
denim:An
preparation
for
on certain'alleged aspects of his. new
was-first employed as a challenge Dr.
"central
ewrole
3ohn's private life, which
' to supposed secret listeners on the
chief oi
:telephone, since it is widely assumed Adeneuer -- so much that he toldbefore the roc Committee
. .
peered
-In Germanyrightly or wrongly Olobite: "I never want to tee that
of
the Bundesta g.. It was. of course,
:that the Gehlen-Afsparat has been man (Dr. John) again."
tou
f:traril
aers
ieeo
imbe
small
e reent
w
The security chief,

by hie
pamoef
in embers
engaged in Avire-tapping, eVen with. own informants In the chancellery were allowed to attend this exclusive
sive
in
Federal Republic.
took Adenauer at his word and de. briefin g on - the . organization and '
. parted for pod.: - :. .:-:' ' ''' actlylties : ..of :,the:.qelilen-Apparat.
Present ivas. i member
:There .1:was 'no:love lost between . Otto, John 'was regarded air."Brit- oneOf-those
alai
'br.. John : and : Oen. Denten, any .sin's man." . After his successful . of Chancellor Adenauer 5' .own party
...snore then, between..the latter and 'escape-from Nazi Germany . in July, named :Karl' Franz Schmidt:Witt, Heinz.. All three looking 10,4.,4) he had do_nd to London by way '
....This
: gentlemen went over to
tto,-the day :Meat ' Germany. would '3'.tugal..
Spain-and
thS , last the' Reds: one.,month after Dr. John
antt Por .d
;regain.' her.; seaerelenty fought m an
". of ' the ',, f n e.-. had worked Auto
mackdone
:
so: .,.- -. .
.
.:
Ifigreelst* for,Zauprentacy In a field closely With 'British. Intelligence off1-: ,, There.is,nrify , on.e po
i-ribirioneluwhere the -Marquis of Queenaberrf cers and had' made
props-. . sion:.What the Russians; -at--this
xules,
applied. ,. . 'gentle ,.broadcasts :over-t13BC... ,His'stag e: don't know about the Gehlen:
4111e...:tiotinif51l. `of.Cat Heinz :seas candidacy for the'post'ins preildent :''Apperat,'just isn't worth knowing.' -: f.',Dr,#John's:.' makingp but with a - of the -Federal' Security Offiem:was )" , The Bonn ,Republic is .not: yet five; .
piendlY, assistlrom the: Clehleri,or- warmly : sponsored ,' by . the ..British - years.. old,. but -It hasvalready.. hath
AtinizatiohilIt Caine about !est ./ley- : . occupation- authorities.. r. .,...- -....... -,,, r. three t,. intelli gence .: services y which.
Oen. Gehlen..en the 'other hand.' . have kilted each other off,. leaving
' 'Umber,- after-Dr. : John had pains'takingly compiled a voluminous dos- ..was and- is "Ameeieets man.".*. After, both.Americans and British high and
was
'
a brief, spell of captivity after the dry.
W. Heinz" w* '

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Ci2.114.~

haat_

&j

t6z:664._L_p
tArYv-kik--t

7/1

0-4-stC.

GA4(,(---

OPERATION "E", Mosoow,Ogonek, October 1954.

by V. Krasnopollskiy

MYSTERIOUS GENERAL
A slim, bald-headed army officer, dressed in a
tight-fitting .German general's uniform, sits stiffly

&n a wooden Chair. His face bears the features of a

typical Prussian militarist. - Apparently, the photograph
is takeri.-from a group picture since one can see at his
side a pair of. feet wearing boots and behind hilth'seVeril
breasts decorated with iron crosses. The caption states.
that this is a photo of General Heinhard# Gehlen, that
there does not exist a post-war photo of the general,
and that he is now in charge of a counter-intelligence

organization, financed by the USA.

On 20 August 1954, WELT, a. Hamburg newspaper . published his Photograph and playfully added that this was
the "mysterious"..Gehlen the .man without aface" as
known by the "RetN04,14-4m.P0. 1 and the German, as well
as other, news publIcatiOns../).
When . Gehlen, using a pseudonym, arrived in Bonduring the early part of August,',Ahe.German-preas,....
announced that he had visited Shei4derlanister of

Interior at.Botn, had held discussions at the Federal

-OhAORitsiab- and -had frequented Blankb office
It also stated that Gehlen's
'METO-Fk of WarBonn.
A

organization would be incorporated with the government

at Bonn and that Gehlen would be in charge of all
intelligence organizations which.sprouted in West
Germany.

This news was designed to.appe4 the nerves of

'Prithe
severaLBonn.OperatOvs. For exampl
e, complained that.Bo , West Berlin,
-and al of West . Germany have been transformed into
"spy Jungles." -It woUld . be well if all Of these intelligence centers and organizations would fulfill their.
functiOns. A chedlthasindicated that spy . gangs collapse,
one_after,another. The GDR Is not flourishing as Bonn
Is, and several Bonn operators have preferred to go
over to the GDR.
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WC
Mt=
AMCM;
Woman
Cue:*
Iimax.11
04.2

Who ls this Gehlen?

During the , war, Reinhardnehlen was in charge of
that Intelligence Directorate of Hitler's Military
_General Staff designated as the "Foreign Ammou.ef.mob"
East" which was directed principally against the Soviet
Union. The work of Gehlen o s Directorate was coordinated
clodely with that of SD (Security Services), SS, and
gestapo.
In 1944, after the shooting of Admiral ganaris, - Chief
of Hitler's Military Intelligence and Counter-intelligence,
riga military intelligence including Gehlen l s administration was placed under the complete jurisdiction pf
Himmlero AlthOukh Gehlen was a close friend . of Kanaris,
t he knew how to getalong with Himmler, Kalnenbrunner,
S,: jASitellenberg and other high executioners of the Third
Reich. After the fall of the Third Reich, Gehlen
appeared In the-American Zone. He was a "war prisoner"
for only a short time. Already in 1946, be began, with
American sanction,. to create a huge espionage-organization. From the .very beginning,, his lieutenants were
chosen from-lists of "specialists" Which indluded Hitler's
spy and gestapo agents. Millie other espionage centers
were organized, Gehlen remained in the dark.
On 17 March 1952, Delmer . wrote in the British.
"Attention is called to the name tgeh1en4,
a name which-will cause much disp1easures-Aeh1ermmii-4.
piialthe key tesAhe s py' networkcreated.bYlranaris,
Himmler, andlikdilenberg."- In conclusion, Delmer noted'
p
that Gehlen'ap
arently became the Chief of'Intelligence

Services of the future . European- Army.

.
.
IL451)
This article did. not create' any sensation on 'the
tAA
streets. As revealed by spies unmasked 'in GDR, Gehlen
received.17.milliOn dollars' in 1951 and 25,million
. rws
dollars In . 1952 from thelmeridans, Other sources
OaaA
state that he has_tieceived . 47-million dollars annually.
DAILY EXPRESS,

zudiviskori '

SPIES, COURIERS, SPOTTERS

mr,s4,01
0

The trials of West 'German spies .unmasked in the GDR

revealed that Gehlen t s -organization consists of-apolitical
directorate with 3,000' people and a military.directorate
with 1,000 people. Among the agents, there are-courier's,

sti-'00
radio personnel, spotters, spies for recruitment,.inve
.o102.!
.gators for determining the suitability of personnel for
2

espionage activities, guides for bringing recruited

personnel into West Berlin, and finally sources (agents)
for collecting and transmitting intelligence information. The latter, likewise, are classified according
to their "specialty."
Fronts Of various commercial firms are used to

cover up Gel:len t s organization. Forged documents are :

prepared by the "Secret Technical Services" in Stuttgait
using the name of the "Swabian Industrial Representat4W rCompany-as a cover. The Americans Supply documents to
many agentsWho become Gehlen's couriers-to and from
West Berlin and who travel not, as ordinary passengers
but on American 'transport planes;

))

Recently, NEWSWEEK, an 'American newspaper confirmed

that Gehlen t s Headquarters, the "General Directorate"
is located in Pullach, a Suburb of Munich in the American
Zone and that It is surrounded with a barbed wire fence.
American barracks and warehouses are used to camouflage s,
the : "Directorate", In addition to 40 CIC personnel,
.there are over 400 people working for the
i':CIC agents look after Gehlen t s organization and
control the expenses of their appointees. The admAnetra
has braripeS in Munich, Bremen, Karisrutgarmstadt,
- andShtokriitmnear Munich. These branches are subdivided
iisfto'erietwork of sections In West Germany, West Berlin,
and'the Saar District.

pOg
.
r----------

Specialized schools are organized for training

spies.
GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS TO ALL
.

At the end of August . and the beginning of September,

East Berlin'llewspapers publishedinformation-about
the ::cases Y ofteiverarhundred . of'GehlenWagents : who were
arrestecl.on : . 2-and IAugmA14:-9ne.oftheSearticles
revealed how one of -t.
6 1. (ife:hts s waS carrying a concealed
:doedinent:entitlea "General assignments to
This
document was printed on,4Tmicrofilm hidden in an .
.electrie light switch.

PR

Here.is, for example, assignment 2 , of the document:

"Determine the results of allielaircraftbuzzing of
-railroad lines, roads, bridges,, large communications
networks, etc. and observe the recanstrution work.

liat.Agt

eA

Y. IS

The 19th asaigpmpt asks o observe.the effects of

aircraft buzzing.ot wer industries and chemical
enterprises and also to,note reconstruction work as
atlieo result of the buzzing,

The 15th assignment calls - for the observation of,

losses'of population because of aircraft buzzing.

The 10th assignmento which is of a cannibalistic

nature, asks for the, obsergation of the.number of
-hospitals andythe outbreaks of epidemic
patients
-diseases,- In other . wOrds, this asaignment is designed
for bacteriological warfare.' . This activity of spies in
time of war is.cialed . "00eration E."
. Oehlen I S agsnts do not hesitate to recruit minors
for their' vile assignments. .Recently, 'because of the
vigilance . offtailroad worker. , a. 16-year old student.
from West. Berlin was arrested for-distributing.provoeative
eafletdq4eesiumblfteknt've instructions to Pour Sand in
railroad-ear axle-boxes, to destroy Signal wires, etc.
_
It was revealed that this boy was:recruited by -.L.71/-'-q)
adult agents In West Berlin. When theYparents eamufte
..dilyzy, who did not' know anything Of the
.
appealed toitrWest BerlinicoUrt to pUnish the agents
,redponsible.for leading their son to 'such a reprehensible crime, the judge dismissed their plea on the
40n:a
.grounds that similar activities are not punishable by
law.
ON THE EAST. AND' ON THEHWEST

gangs are active 'not only against the

ODR:but:aldWthePeopleis.Democratic-Nations,.chiefly
Poland and Czechoslovakia. . For example, in the
beginning . ot:August,'a great Gehlen organization consisting'of several dozen people was discovered in
Czechoslovakia.. Also recently, a gang of Geblenls
agentswas arrested in Poland. On-12 July, NEWSWEEK,
reported that Oehlen l s agents are operating not only
in EisternEutope but- also in Western Europe, the
Far East, and the Near East.

Gehlen is especially active in France. His agents

are trying to,fidgits pro-French circles and to

Lola
. gra
perimutail
w:

Mampa:xp"
'w40,0Aim
tgaC

galta
C010
itjal
Cita

I; 1

expose diem.
(/'/
Gehlen has a strong administration in Western
Germany. His agents spy on West German people who.
struggle asainsg,Oe division of Germanyoftry to provoke;'&1-0- VOI1ect compromising forged documents.
Commercial firma which try to restore : their economic
relations with GDR and People lsDemoaratia countries
are kept under Observation.
In addition to this, the wide awake eye of Gehlen
is always present at the Bonn Government. Some highly
placed representatives of the West German regime are
agents. Gehlen has his "14ezidents",
found to
also,in the Bonn offices which are competing with MX
Gheral lts00104ww,As an agent in Blank!s office and .
Radtke, the Deputy. Chief of the Office for Guard
'ffirConstitution is an agent l using the pseudonym R1ger.'
The CIC penetrates into the Bonn Government through
Gehlen.
At the, time of the Berlin Conference of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, Gehlen tried, with false documents,
0 promise uph West German officials as 011e
tzter.,
Pfleiierer, FrZidenlsburg, and Lemmer by criticTiihg
Adenatier!siporiffeinevelopments.
Both of the Hitlerites--Len, Adenauer i s former
Chief. of the Chancery, and Globke, the present Chief
of the Qhancery-are closely connected-with Gehlen.
NEWSWEEK, states that Globke is the liaison agent between
Adenauer and . Gehlen. WELT AM SONNTAG reported, "Ge
IR
is'atquainted personally with Adenauer...His repor
are sent directly to the Federal Chancellor inumburg
'Castle."
THE SECRET BECOMES CLEAR

The security organs of the. GDR have dealt heavy

blows toiGehleh l s gang of spies and murderers. Sections
of gangs . with:ftilomplements were caught,'and not only
the regular agents; but Gehleni s intenl igence informers
were also arrested and sentehced.ThetdeMocratid'Press
of Gehlents
e
published full accounts of the'structur
rganization.and its activity, the addresses of the many
Intelligence networks of Gehlen, and the names and pseudonym's of. his leaders. All of this increased 'the vigilance
5

Si MIL

of GDR citizens and opened the eyes of many complacent

people.
u)The numerous traps have -Caused a panic among the
spaes. Many of them have decided to cease their
activity and keep quiet; others, including several
leaders such as Prater, Kapanke, etc. have appeared
,voluntarily and repented.before0DR security organs..
This does not Mean that Gehlen's gang is completely .The . West German press has reported that .
.Gehlen.will be the chief Of intelligence in the projected
London Conference of the nine Western governments.

liquidated.

The secret has become-clearTE6W-the.American

and Bonn powers had tried to "save face" with the
scandalized General-Spy. , The ugly picture of the Bonn
regime, .which was forced to seek support from the
American-supported spy gangs, has been unveiled, before
thesyes of the public. All theworld sees how the
ruling circles of USA have decided-to . depend_on the .
-4....t.7t/
rebuked spies of Hitler to help them prepare the

andemodeme "Operation E."

CAPTIONS FOR PHOTOGRAPHS

1. The socalled "Cs

al Directorate" in Pullaph, an American

restricted area near Munieh, is the main espionage center of Gehlents

henchmen.
2. Material evidence of Gehlen l s espionage aetivites was exhibited in the

press conference o rcem. This exhibit conrists of propaganda leaflets and:

inflammable Materials carried b7 air balloons and 'bombe with timeclock
mechanisma which are designed for blowing up and setting fire to GDR
enterprdese.
3. In October 1954, at a press conference it .Berlin, Orofessor)
Alt* Nordent. GDR State Secretaril submitted newdocumentary-evidince
abbut American intelligInce activities and est German* agent!.
Jee1 and-his.brother William Henry tarr, American citizens, Who
escaped into the GDR, appeared at this press conference. 14 41 ] in m Henry
.
Starr is shown answering questions of the correspondents.

t.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIOINCE A1ENCY

/0

SOURCESMETNDOSEXEMPTION3B2B

Z.:314 10 921

NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACT

DATE 2001
r.

2005

9 2 /

- 4. OCT 1S54

Chia;
Chiorear Dietoi

.u1

ach

.71- .)t Cal

'Donn

' nolt4IP
CtiOratio
.

074

1, 4,,roat with mt.= attc

_ 3 . .aJzttE.
Sunivf,
ku.g .

:70:20

a: G

.4$ roi

w1ert.

too botlro

7. This . roittamin;1 c :arlary or tha gotta tocrioa or acravareatient

biktitalstst

2.44/lune,

. ao lacitisi4 related hie C702 tzprozoimu or Mums-Mt= ix/4W on a sVatin

ttaa ETA,...tting that carli xdara r UTiiaP4 aetr=ci smatizIlait,p hington 152+3S0
Arlsestlii . baroiris 411=5,-PWSCIVbecame bakad or tho Uninch-tovornmant. kzetrazi4zatt /men

Clo artnotrey ard drivo &wing tba first =totir44 b r hi:

iigriiiiadV011)
export:v=3 in economic sad tistal =attar= in the. mint . recent
canater.eitionlzhIchliated esverzl Sours ittd took gam' in asobata t ts tsob..inotrata 41tittle
. .
etatad that 0.1MAK . hid no infor-AsUjon o.17 ang wire(
." : 4

0121

. 4162..*iti* ittitt4MitO tand th4 cao=niatt at-Senovate Ltizti..and 17:1ST atitioad

ea=tat deal at :aaneva. but that Mr614.Watt .ttulat tato
4441;i42.4Liihit er"-Aziziuttith ittvevati a tora.cdtimosiblite poattkitoiie-ist this lecg.vim
..
Visiiiitts,thak.ha4::beiton,ezhibitatel .174touta or t ea ircirkkatovolt
.

-
=1/ptiedIt3,41 D

--- tWalsv

istrortiou-reattved frea-c-7
Aitt1)34.;.)IMPIVAkeitaltropart-ther eitilz rate= of Gerasu aoteretiOnikr and jt
"
izaidea
go

MAT
mama

penatuatat

.14jawite: emihas leitat ilti) Importance or public opittioa ant the esareetcr Cei
thI.or h,andlizq pehliettr
eigt
or .theIzo pram 4A Aaartiss. Ufa daaeribatt
prosse
la
a
&Ora
iule,
=ARC
does
tint
;mar* handouts on WPM nroze
' tit(' t1ii.T3',4, 5,4
g.""
_,
A*0201 zroaa * fl do aa gacovragi, fib* Twoas to aulasit stzt...ltata eh = Par cactakmrthiSi
limited
to
labarlize
t

to
publiaatiba.tUacttoniG
o
iveitir
iftititi
pdtaliehad, would to titatz itaxtal to this natiensal
patti otica arta* ithich*g
Walnut. XtiNult to ri"..lt either edunra or agezr ad:atm-tiro Infor-Altion in auck:
artitaaa..
12"
o4 ..rzeo
foart utro not particularty eiguirlaa
tts innsrva 'rims cn. this 3bje
tit). crpottoi4d.tU atroa=tcat 7ith 404sizi a ,thouchta on this trabject,
3A61
y

:.

Et

hid

P-13,3

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`--v' /7 I. ) 1^- /"/

10 921
29 Levt 5.4

MI:AMP

.:71.4
?

cAT6gT: Actual 2y =MA !leo nada groat etridoa

tho. Utter Nrt if 1953.

cormact .

pith the Gormaa prose since

4echas described in sow detail the re/Atli:m:11p of vatax wiu2 u20

TS Gengrosa He discussed the canner in oUsh the KLIWT. te4 o3t.a mossertad

to a sulocespittee of the comlittos dealinC vitb tho larger doreana badGete =Aldo
stiziag the demonstrated reliability ami roeponsibiLity of t-4 =bore of tho. coo*
clittee, Although %Mtn * as 41 eXCICAltaVO VOXICZ) le rat rocralzied to rerroel trAsu
Wont,. infornation of covert activities, Asehen has placed oanatdcroblo Coat/dm=
in the =WO r COOV308 involved Ido haves, in t4r21 4123:7312r treated r...i3J.VC tem
ferestien 2.4.-uve2ly
'temper-reserve s
di scuvato4 with IT.17.1"-Crfe Itisara1/41 abotrt
tradgoto was at the disposal or llocbtal to co'
re an:creme=
'`-verittiona. many of a =art paUtial 13,aturo T docidolla to dros spon this
sera =silly related to de/aims by the MC shich sscre to be earriad act by
,
MAIM,
-

The

r 1 of the togair

leM1121.1ggattlAa
es Ascbsaisarsod Iftnan at ever getting involved pith sag activitissis

_clasipol-to inflames intatnal pablie opinila

the gam:meat win alsay's !se
intalimal prams and pub/ie apiniva =din to wappert goversmxtt iiNius6 . 1gbith cay-ba

streaglroppesad by the emesitioo

1102181.6-441111
a. itactosi sada istaltasised the curlers seri tree character at the press.
4s2ttiele shich recentir described Tin= and r- rpm tat derOgstorvtatme
frelitited =49: in asevie of this* retteeret beds ha Saida subscittad:tbs
A.o:CriAa Waloh.pursuod its tss=1 pelirqi of catraentiaco1y Oa inforOation
oontiori to the tetanal. ixiteroctv
'

;..s.

4`.'

di'
the *t. substantive aloccat of 1.ho alb:music:Lk tad=
the ueetcwoble revettagattrt of the heed of an
caoslori
Ancticiattra AttonaisZJ ot the Imeettigative d init=tio4vroviding tivstl
tottio-The 7.Probliftsagr Involved te 441(firotna a sorittiV extie and tbs mord
nail% otEXAMMI , Oun.aaftgoards eocourit7ee tio of ErtotiMa 442bet stated,
hiss epproutisetsly r_ povio . ind aro rooponsiblo ftp coritnoting backgmn71
cactigatiorto on proopiCtirt Otaff Occtors.
b. - Astlhlatt ottrunite- the Cad= tbat ozbonative tookiround cheek, arn
tba 1:Ithat torctr4ed apirtat hiaboaavel , pezetration,. Bs not that post facto az).
. animation of the tocircrond,dotii on,tho coot sorio gi dedociidoc and ospionsgsysoass
of the pest fee ye= Inevitably revaeled internatisn shlubp properly almazato40
ahead Ism came the ir.ditldnal to have teen labor...led a bed oecor1.t7 risk .

till.=

agreed

with Aeloaes analysis and deccribed

MOof

_
the Problem) thst; niv*

faced ZrelliR.--andk of legal status, incouDiate films inadequate securit y aimacia

tz
,"

\C.=

1, I

-;"c
4
106A,Q*)1
".0

,,.

15*

inI.A 10721
29 3opt 514
with VORfitnt, etc.
Lagaliaation or 4rPrir-R
a, tr.'11.= acplainad hie rem= for praising for an ear17 legalisation

of

b, Azar% aanured
iejlaxL

rit.

that we aharo hits desire for an early /*pia.

4o IET

a vm.rrr referred to tic oarliar letter to Anal:an t s madam:mar -and

Aselhase'that this remained an accurate onrassdno of hie positiOn.- in
aSalr setts:ra j OT11,1417 added, tho futtro rela llooship at ZinVt and EDAM could
'Pio= OM. CiOttir thltri it is todai. Isplaining this statements be rioted that
iess7 persona who opPoao EIMIP 5 legalization are eagerly osorotdog tor intoruor.
toil tablet% !plaid Awe that gpiSll'i o rolatioos with MUM go hecrond that which
could to oattaitiarott i=aptatao ixi s4 orgInization aspiring tO hecor.e the
aseed
ctr

h, Asatues
. . =missed full Istdoratanding on this point,

ComaNt Uzi gm:lotion or ar pm etaptucttizie Ito 041321 igaraiorgtpbars,

:i4grottin5 . at operational files with taTIARt lfl ret.tlinitoS /Va. not tOutifttianZT
ti.,Troo:ovar,i =.hod .earliar briefed Mahan on thti prOhlian, ,justo.4t
taie,44v . ;rioz-. to leoWc Arini-14 1,7111=4, citing pgiticel ocainielettedporko had
tia datavould not ha do:14440'4131 -1-Muzi,
medirlit diediaion. that* for .tho proentz.
. a, ;schtse told MIL= of his satialbotion vith ZUSALV41.???Z.rolaticese
trzi.saptiaisodthat his astAuSi an4 trust tor mr= o an: 1 vitas avidgat
IlIttliat.tiat:tha.Vha was. the only Gorten that /Latham /see .aceing
thiie trip whiatt
124*-1434*1 'with rdnitaia pnblicitcr,

Alto had bean rather aztonaivalT belated on VTILITI ts ACM

the elettuir through. the , nag awl*. 14 and MUTT
who called tha,.SignS13 0 . 1Z/1 *probably did not know
tatit.;tha.:sight 'or;tha . . 20thet .: 4111,r -that. hiti visit to zentlle;Sin Was doatined
trip, EtirOnd that:pairrt thy . can lame: anythisc bat . ciszer, Asebtat
Irgasta4'hiS.:-owa.. coacaria:. 4w14 71M Xt../eitli the Obetoetilaot tbat the Gesi4s gam
aistimaaisaaAktdAnnWOlit..in . its Ittsitiss *Aft= .thtt Soviets end the woztraz
Sodiagussinzi lot specific .tarronalities. tolliswed

cirs Alts. initiltay A-

b... UTILITY -noted. that ha lael had urban reaervations about JY-111
prior to his defaction.but had mot been in posaession or any poeitivo information
that JOH3 use in toushwith the Soviets,

cou 10 921
29 :-e?t

.
0, Thera waa ao.la dAsouslionof tho rritioh role in the crAft1 ease
with ',717.111 1 8 deeply rootact sunpicioz.a of the Pritts22 rotlooted
.4 Errairl exprosaad hia deep =warn lath high .slavel penetration of .1.1701011111, There vraa no detailed discussion,
.._:herla prior to the antetio4
trixted Ascisoma.,in detail/ um.= had bona intireal -o( this ienadiotoly teem
mostiag with Aeahaz,

ZI.M.,119451412alja,
a, irt1117.1" said that acmeohn....va ir the I'd7 low nacCeearie
Wee shot:1d be limited to ahsagoe that did not itnelva the banie lame
b. .ra reply to a aponific (pasties* Tx,
.irr.m= labelled as
vistit) all Atari= attic& de:Ittihad hie &mina to take the MT coder hie 11111414
Ai' 400 14701Atiatt ia poaition that intornal securitir ard external. intelligence

- ;(1riel,4ing 'etratterospionage), should be saparatode

watagazzatuageat
atreenod the ivortance -or the carecutivio tranob. of th* Verfaffil,
.
:16**::b417. 447t.!:e10117f.ilitiaOtitfr for cavort Oporationae. DTI= 4grocklE133 ta4 44,Chanir,.,
Air-thtV....:Pan:_far a aortae C. This Would lam the linfal outhoritr itt Vale - **Oar Ihiichiatimoltivo: In this connattiork, 2111417:ectod thcplaiVtiOhlat igt
*.***14417._:costiittatta vrfccr non an very oicratellz ohixsona-oetaloliehad

1*floiatiatary'avgport, .lachea tha.o. .,aht t2111 was a rood coliztion- .io long an
tothoritt of the execattore It343 clearly diorizt!do

7,175,,t
,

Go

the .
-ther
e1.9..L....A&_g_..3321

Asobiiti4isd
,who
. ,had sbort17 he
. ore *bona .brie
P*414ned :c tha:, p4aaihilit0-of a.erizarta weridoz against coloatniao ita.1
fitatimeant tO Aachen: that he woo prepared .:ta cooperate *MI, IBMS
Itilantzpsart-Or,:the. globe where ()amens naiad be ershetive and tho ftreit
ctismaieutti::Idged be carried out. Udall thankad hiss and exprenand the viva that
-Pa10 :::Weilixibtadly.wearo *tax areas,
. .

e:

112"11.=1" tol4 iliflebsu thatUPC=7n

. sae zedm piaos to

111110Matitfoi urrzat it the Liza ot tranofore

tionlitga

nittaCeall

*trizei told urn.rn that rYatrit was promicki to bolo oat rinancisnr
duria2C the sx64iod or edieetnont followinr; laaalizatinn it ouch asnietenza ehovad
be naceeauT,

PY

13 7.1
27 3(1-,A, 5/4
3. :ID,1!1-77 axprozlood
,roc1at0n
zratitlx10 ror tho oppartAralt:: to
visit with lachsm4 , Prior to f.ho aootings ApohlSkatat ,Ad that haintso1ud to um /
gp a
ths oppartuaity to talld
Q v=wot ophioved muo-oxact27 taWrkr
771Lrier mama in un artvlicat grano-o: mind# wit% h.to
vj4xi r,z4rrau1. that
th &Rambla and posvibia4
a lodgmrallaa and alma oaoparntion with alflAgEu

LI

454J-1

CONFIDEN.!Al
Vatr-to.:t R1.4.ALf

October

19514

NIMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

S UB JECT

Article on General Gehlen Appearing in "Der

Spiegel"

Attached is a copy of the 22 September

19514

issue of "Der

Spiegel" which I mentioned during our conversation on 7 October

1954 and which you expressed an interest in seeing.

_7

Chief, Eastern European Division

1 Enclosure:
22 Sept 514 issue
of "Der Spiegel"
BECLASSIFIE0

AN O REL
EASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROURCESMETNOOSEX
EMPTION3B 2B
NAZI WAR
CRIMESOISCL

DATE 2001

CONFIDENTIAL

2005

OSUNEACT

I._

e end Elenet-,

' tk,e!

c(-(LEN

-Theetteeliettr#5.;iell the story.

:
.
14010,-;!.!**OiGOLE.Ii. Ao the MOPP is dent:exacted beam vie
' " .
t',n.t.i.Tediiington'trece.w.

:CLASSIFIE0 AN
0 REL
EASED OY
GENCE AGENC1
SOURC ES
METHOOSE XEMRTION
302E
14,4211M
CRI.MES I SC
LOSURE AC?
'1E 2005
CENTRA

 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EASTE1N GERMANY
Oct. 29, 1954

- FF 7 -

In one of the published letters from Adenauer to the Western Powers,

the Mr Chancellor demands Confirmation for the fact that the preperat ions for the future defense -contribution of the Federal Republic ehould
not be hampered by the exercise of controls. This was' then also agreed
upon in:the london.and Paris. agreements. In another letter Adenauer
gives confirmation to the Western Powers of the .fact that . even after
the coming into force of General Agreement No. 2, "every ccimmander of
(word missing) Western Powers continues to be entitled to take appropriate
protective measures including the immediate -use of arms" as soon as he
deems this to be necessary.
Adenauer confirms thereby that.the notorious emergenc y clause of the
General Agreement is to remain in existence for decades.
KPD Executive Communique
ADN,. in
1700 GMT--L

Gerw.r. Hellschreiber t East Germany, Oct. 28, 1954,

(Text)
Duesseldorf--The - Secretariat of the executive of the KPD Considered
: A den;Ule.i.;ts :PaiisSgreements and the new..note.from the Soviet Government
.72

on the peaceful solution of the European and German questions at a

meeting on Oct. 27.
.
The 'secretariat :states in a communique that the _implementation .
.
of the i'aris:strea ties .: would render the peaceful reunification of
GerMany-. 4possible for 'a -long time The new note from the Soviet Union,

on the other hand, opens the way for the German people to achieve the
restoration of their national unity this year.
The' corritiniq be; stresses thatfAdena uer . I s assertion . -that the Paris
treaties_iiOuld ;::establish the: sovereignty,of:-West . Germa ny misleads the
population, .e.s....the .Occupation Rovers have reserved to themselves all

rights with Tegard.t o

. .the reunification of Germany, the conclusion of a

peace treaty, and the

, ;status. .

..

Adenauer. t s; assertion that the agreement on the Saar is of a provisional'

ra. cter,i.S.; also .completely misleading .Article
6 . of the agreement
.
; the
lays down, expressly, tha any influencing of public opinion-against
Saar sta tuteiend,:any Support- for political parties- or associations.'which
oppose ;the seta ra tion of the Soar from Germany. is forbidden. In
ve
the 'llplebiec-site" on the Saar agreement the population_ is only to have
the right - to decide . between the retention of:the-present state of .
affairs or the Paris agreements.
DECLASSIF I ED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL I NTELL IGENCE AGENN
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/4 1

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EASTERN GM:MANY
Oct. 29, 1954

- FF 8

In conclusion the KPD executive points out that the decision on the
implementation of these agreements will not be made either at conferences
in London and Paris or in Adenauer Is Cabinet in Bonn. The decision
rests with the German people, particularly with the millions of workers
whose Will was expressed unequivocally in the resolution of the MB
congress against the rearmament of West Germany.
The ITD.executive -urges all workers peasants youths, and women to
appeal to , the . Lower -House deputies to refuse to approve these treaties and
instead to press for -Four-Power negotiations.
Schmidt-Wittmack Statement
BerLin ADN, in German Hellschreiber to East Germany, Oct. 28, 1954,
--L
1313
(Text)
Berlin--An ADN representative has asked the former Lower House Deputy,
Schmidt-Wittinack, for his opinion of the London and Paris agreements.
Mr: Scbmidt-Wittraack states:

The agreements concluded on the one-sided military pact between the

Federal Republic and the . WesternPwers seriously endangers the
-reunification: Of Germany.. : The Sa-en-:agneement "meari. ...Virtuilly e renuncia
tion :of the:Sear and-Contradiets: .:ell Lower ildUse resolutions regarding . .
the Saar.
"Al]. nationally . conscious Germans-above all those .in-the Lower House-now must' have Abe -courage to threw the :correspOndingi -conclueion. , . This
con'lusiononl,y be to a ppOint : e new: lead of gdverriient . I will;
raorboi;*, exliteeia mY opinions, on these queetfozas :-itt the- next. - reit days"

61 "

.. ix
BA-Aso

02.
'
taXunit
7#22702:5

OrM-

' 0 '

RES ISTANC E:::DXLEGATION

s:,:gOileslt. Vienna to
attend; ithe? iintreins titinaT festival itiek-1.d.f, the.!;:rViiiiitiftide!ikkrenient in
Vienna.
Zvieii;:Weired1tBieblik!agetdi-.6f the
De utsCh'.0--:
end Prof
Nations1kPnizewjrmr
Pri zew i nriei- WOlfkait'.. fight.)
Lea Grundig ...ane.members Orthe'delegati6i5.-
Oct. '28;. l954;- 6856 mer--L)

.NNT SPY . STOR4noVel abOut Atte .

. .

timor4mo
QM,

d:101

eapionage
organitatiOtii-the GDR .:3713I . be:-piibIished by:.the:,'Berlin'Kdingiebs
Verls ' 1t,tirr
The r,oval will'be':titlid: .; "Zr
the Beg inning'
the End." Itwas written . bY. -a former leading
collabOtatdrof' . the Gehlen organization, Ha ns JoachiM:GeYer. (Bent
ADM, Oct. 27, 1954, 0808;(W11--L)
a civitis

%VC=

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1954

MO Deputy Diroctor (Plans)

SE1301M:

Suggestion that vaun t s Dezighter

Attend. Ameriose College

Colonel Critchfield spoke to me

attenstlag 621 A
merican

eleout OM..="11 e

daughter

college anti wonted Smith. I tad him

that I torppcsed this maid be

orroxed. Ws of sty

partners l* ase President of the Board.

of 'bootees

forcer law

at Smith but,

doubtless, there are other and bstter waive of arranging

thlit,

if it is thought desirablg . roe nay wish to

8413ition it to the

Director.

f-

Chief, :rasters Butepean Division

ces

cn

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-men

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - addressee

i-cu
- ICE I/G'."
1 -

DE CLASSIFIED AND
R ELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTEL
LIGENCE AGENC1
SOURCESM ETHOOSEXEMPT ION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CR IMES 01
DATE 2005

SCLOSIJRE AC1

I P r.)rr

C :

Chief FI/RQM/OIB

December 1954

Chief, Contact Division, 00

1-1589; 00/C Case 17055

1. Clarence R. Rungee of 38 Dwight Street,. New Haven

is listed in the local directory as a naturopath; he has
a hospital in another part cr New Haven. We have not determined his local reputation in the field of naturopathy
since it does not seem important in-this case.
2. Rungee is not a native of New HavenjTt-Paa..been
.1.12.hecity,,for a good many years, and the4nternational,
Ira0PliglOieuni'atands for his private collection offlags-there n ii no museum as such. Ten or fifteen years
Bungee become interested in collecting flags, botnAniericaxi:T
which had some historical interest. This hobby
he . deVelOped to such an extent, that he travels over the United States giving lectures to patriotic groups such as
the American Legion, for which be receives either a fee or
a percentage of the gate. It hna been reported that be makes
as much as five thousand dollars per show. He is apparently'
known . quite widely throughout the country and his lectures
are veil-attended._ In fact, he appears to be locally known
much more for his lecturing than for his doctoring.
3. No information has come to light as to why Bungee
should be Writing high-ranking foreignAlenerals for biographic material, but it is quite possible he wants to use the
information in one of his flag talks:
;2.
4. In accordance with your request, no direct approach
was made to Mr. Rungee.. Contact Division is closing thiacase.

DECLASS IF I ED.AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENC)

SOURCEG141THOOSEXEMPT I ON 3BZE
NAZI WAR CR IMES DI SCLOGURE AC1
LATE 2005

/=

SE BET

.47

taL4 -1215

Chief of Mission,. 'rostrum

Attanticau Chief of Base, i-ullsch
Chief, EE
.Qperational
Amnion a- People and Pisces
1ak-1117k

rucreammi

noel/ there_were no trance in Lisedecorters_or =NW tiles em

,Dr.;Clarteee L'IMES. Or his'easectref we asked. ELPUMP to noke'a discreet
Cheek. The results sill no donbt an VTILM:
a.
sef381t S4reeti Mei pavan is Ilated
Ur:eatery
an
a noto2opatb4 he has a hospital in another
in the leoal
part of Nes Haven. Ve have oot deternined his local reputation in
Wan field of astaropethy since it does not seem important in this
caee.
b. Ausgpe.is not a active ofieS Nivea but hall been in the

city for a good stmayzearep and the leteroational.War Flow MOMS.'

stands toT bla primate collection of flage-.-there is no se en

eact Teo or fifteen years agol Pongee become interested invollactias

both American an& tareig04 which hal
no historical interact.
This hobby he davaloped.to such an =teats that he trovela over the
Eralte.a statei fideriog lectures to patriotic grove auch'es the
American Legion, for which be receime -either a fee or a percootege
of the gate. It has teen reported tnat be robes se each ea five
Mk*,

thomaaalAollars per ahem. - Me is apparently known quite wide17

throaghmat the coastry as* his isetares ore well-ettesderd. In fact,
he appears to be loyally known mob noro for bin lecturlog.thea for
his doctoring,

c. Mo infecastioahme cam to light as to lazy ! 200geo mbould he

mriting high.canking forolgx generals fox biographic notarial, bat it
is quite poesible he sesta to use the indernatien in one of hie
flag talks. .
21

C:

EE/FIG/Z

EE/FIG

December 1954
Distribution:
10

3 -FRAN

2-EE/FIG/Z
3-P013--DIRECT 1-RI
1 :jet
EE/FIG/ztt...
7

AND RELEASED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE
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lit MIKA

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CRIMESOI9CLO9UflACI

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VtLC N

/ r ,

--

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TO

801

FROM

88

SUBJECT:

AC)

12 January 1955

"Orieutierung No. 72"

REFERENCE: Your Memo No. 10690 of 23 Dec 54.

As already stated orally the concerned "Orientierung" quotes only an article of the "Rheinische Merkur".
The author of this article is not connected with us.
Drafting this issue of the "Orientierung", it has
been a matter of consideration whether the reproved paragraph should be omitted. Mr. IYOIBT8CH . , thought this not
to be necessary because the nature of the various quoted
newspaper articles is known to our people. It goes without saying that we are not interested in any respect to
un ermine the reputation of the American soldier, while
t e concept of German foreign politics is a close alliance
with the United States. I thiak there is no danger that
this quoted paragraph could be misinterpreted among our
people.
As I pointed out in our last conversation, it is
not our business to mix up with the matters of our future
defense ministry. On the other side it is natural that
all former German pF6fe .i .sionaI soldiers are emotionally
.beholding the present development of ideas in this sector.

We should have a good democratic army under an effective

parliamentary control, but an army which is trained to
fight hard. I think it would only be necessary to. take
As leading principles the latest training regulations of
the American Army instead of the quixotic ideas of some
young men who may have the best will but no practical
peace-time experiences in training and operations. I
may point this out only as my private opinion because
It may explain to you why so many former German officers
of the older generation are worrying so much, even .when
they are not personally involved. I think we have' only
two years more time, then it will show whether or not in
the long range Europe will get lost to Communism. There-fore, everything should be done not to waste this time.
Under no circumstances the development of the
world situation since the last three years' gives any
reason for an over-optimistic prospect.

.BEST AVAILABLE CM.

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ED114-4296

Chief of Nissica, Itankrurt

Mal 42iiefat Dam, Pelleoh
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Gal

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General GE

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#.use1stieat ad pot orato uith. 712. law _f011ozdag
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21 , 291.

BENSON R. MOORE man

1/54 Ill paw.= af WI

5,10,

17/5 .

WILLIAM NENRy STARR; wa*

JAMES SAMUEL' STARR
.

INTERNAL SECURITY - R
& GE

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:
Subjects reportedly in Russia, 'FRANZ NEDGEBAUER, allegedly
kidnapped by subjects, reported to be in Poland of own volition.
Interviews and information re subjects , former.. associates and
contacts set forth.
- ------,---- ....

-P.

)ETAIL3 t

.
On December 12, 1954 the "Newark Sunds.y News carried an International News Service story,datelined Berlin, as follows t
.

"Two American brothers began a journey yesterday

into the oblivion of the Communist hinterland that is
reserved for inept Rod Agents.
..
"Soviet orrtciale 041. 4 WXWAM WRY 4TAAP, g9L
and JAM STARR, .0, of Westville, New Jersey, had

been granted political asylum and were en route to

Russia, .

"The two had planned to live and work in Nedrun East Berlin, but their faUlty work in a Red
engineered kidnapping' and their clumsy statements at

Mk Is in FBI Investigative
upon int makes no f .commendation .- .
fw chum or dsippray41. .

'

Amoy= Iwo
romaluatos

MIMI MINT

MS MOT Symons MI TIMM MASS

IN OIAMos

00111011 Of

a/ Bili/eall

TIN WON

r ' -"I''-:,

(6.100.3 .6241.8)(6. 00 -.. 394319)(FIEG. MAIL)

1 New Orleans (Info) JIM)

1 - Philadelphia (Info) (RN)
1 - San Francisco (Info) (2M)
2 - New York (RM)

PROPE-

Cr .. f .
L.._. ...,

.1.414

.!

!.

14 '

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outside of agency to which loaned,

.9 .. ents are to be distributed

I. O. mama maw Irma M-Ossall

RI WY
DECLASSIF I ED ANC RELEASED BY .
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENO
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPT ION an
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FOM COORDINATION WITH

/1--,<32Z

NK 100-31813
NI( 100-32447
a later news conference apparently induced the Communists
to move them far behinc: the Iron Curtain.
"Red officials were. taking no chances the brothers
might change their minds and mako the comparatively.
simple journey from East to West.Berlin
IIA
merican authorities said the brothers had been
in close contact with American Communist Party officials
before making the trip to Germany. American investigators are still working on the theory that the two
acted for some time as Communist Agents in West Germany
and West Berlin

"American Officials said that the STARRs had made

themselves useless for future work as Red Agents and
that their news conference s tatements were so clumsy
as to be of little use for propaganda."

On January 3, 1955 the "Newark Star Ledger" carried an

Associated Press story . which was datelined Vienna and was as
.
follows:
,
.
..
"Radio Warsaw said yesterday a former West
Germsa
iz Espionage agent has asked Communist Poland for
polit al asylum. The broadcast identified him as
FRANZ NEUGLBAII:Ut i, allegedly one-time Deputy Chief in
West erlin of an American financed espionare organ
, iluttion headed by a. former German Generals RBI/WARD
.i GXKLEN. Officials in Vienna recalled that NELTGEBAVER
disappoared from Berlin lait September, .

"The Warsaw radio quoted NELIGE13AUEit as saying

he fled to Poland because he did not want to take part
in West Germany' s war preparations."

NE
Nit

100-31813
100-32447

On September 24, 19541 Newark Confidential Informant

T-1, of known reliability, stated that according to unevaluated
information received in GArmany from sources of unknown . relia-

bility on September y, 1954, the subjects may have bean in- volved'in the abduction into the Soviet sector of Berlin of one
FRANZ NEUGEWIER, described by T4 an being a Polish refugee
and an agent of an American sponsored intelligence service,
The following inveatAgation was conducted by Special
Agent PHILIP. J. CARROLL at Westville, New:Jersey:- . On December 3, 1954 Mrs. GRACE STARR, 271 Elm
Street, Westville, mother of th subjects, advised that she
had received a.letter. on Decemb 2. 1954 which wavdated
.November 15, 1954 - from BRIGETTE AUJECK, j14-A) Ludwegsburg,
Preyse Str. 2, Germany.
Previous correspondence between NAUJECK and GRACE
STARR dated September 19. 1954 and. Uctober 10, 1954 indicated
that NAUJECK had =own WILLIAM HENRY' STARR while he was in
Germany and that NALJEtK was at loss to understand the subjects'
Alefection to. the Soviett... NAUJECK bad also stated that she .
had written to the Ruaaian Commander in . Chief.of the East.
German Sector and to the East German Press Minister in an

effort to locate the subjects.

In the letter fromBAUJECK dated November 15, 1954

NAUJECK pointed out that she bad not received answeri to tier
letters directed to the Russian Commander in Chief of the'
East German Sector and the East German Press Minister..
. NAUJECK also pointed out that she hid moved to
Southern Germany because it was necessary for her to give
up her studies at the Free University, Berlin and eek employment. NAUJECK also mentioned that her mother lives in
the Luesian Zone in Potsdam and is .employed
as a teacher.
.
.

NAUJECK indicated that she vat aware that Mrs. SUM.

had been interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and stated that HE/GIY STARR I s landlady in Berlin Underwent, and

Ni 100-31813
NK 100-32447

is still undergoing the same. NAUJEOK continued by saying

that she had offered the "F.B.I." all the information she
could give and that she wa n under the impression that the
.
'F.B.I." had some trace of n2NRY and JAMES,
.
.
' In this letter NAUJECK stated, "The strange thing
is HENRY was introduced to me by a good girlfriend of mine
whom I had met six years ago E h7 since that time have only .
corresponded with, and now her uame was given by . the
German Press. Professor in that' conferenceas someone who had
been working for the Communists."

East

NAILTECK identified the good girlfriend" as one

ELLE ,EILRAUER who had emmigrated to the United States. .
,

Newark Confidential Informant T-2, - another governmental agency which conducts security type investigations,
advised that in October, 1954 Mrs:. ELLEN ,EILISUER, of Dixon,
Illinois, was interviewed regarding her : association with the
subjects and her knowledge of their activities. - In view of .
NAUJECK's remarks in her November 15, /954 letter tollre.
GRACE STARR describing ElliffAUER "as- se:moo:m . 4h* had been
Working with the Communists", a resume of information furnished
EILHAUER to T-2 is set forth:

tribe,

Mrs. EILHAUER said she Imew WILLIAM STARR as HENRY

,STARR but never met his brother, JAMES, and believed JAMES
bad remained in the United States. She dated STARR and last
and she
swam for four days in Berlin during February,
has not
nor heard frowhim, sinoe that time. She
disclaimed any knowledge of his desertion to the East Sector,
although she stated she was suspicious of the reason for his
extended stay in Germany when She noted he was in possession
of a German driver's license dated March * 1953. STARR claimed
to.b4 in the television business with his brother and three.
others in the United States and he claimed to be in Germany
for the purpose of establishing connections for this company.
He diiplayed no Unusual interest in international politics
nor in Mrs. EILHAUER's position, Re expressed a desire for .
peace and co-existence with the Ruseians. STARR gave no

1954

seen him,

NIC 100-31813
MC 100-32447
evidence of pre-Russian or anti-American attitude. He stated
he thought the Negro was treated unfairly in the United States
but did not suggest Coenaudsm as a remedy, Mrs. EILHAUER
stated that in her job with M.A.. she did not handle any
classified material and she categorically denied ever having
given any official information to STARR and - that all matters

'.
discussed with him were already public knowledge,
During the course of the December 3, 1954 inter.
view with Mm. STARR, Mrs, STARR advised t t in December,
1954 she had received a letter from DULCIE X.; CAULEY, 154
Burke Street, Darlinghurst, Sydney, Austral ia. Mrs. STARR
did not remember the date the letter was sent or postmarked.
In 'the letter MC CAULEY stated that ehe Is working for the
Burrough l s Company in Sidney. MG CAULLY further stated that
a girlfriend, .name unknown, with whom she is acquainted,

flew to Australia a -couple of weeks ago because of her father4

death, This girl told AC CAULEY that the POLL had been
coming to her . house about once a week looking for MC CAULEY,
In conclusion, MC CAULEY indicated that she intends to take
a trip to MCWaal, Canada in March, 1955.
"
. . .

--

DULCIv-MA ' ac CAULEY, who Was deported by tha-Immi..

gration and natural zation Service in September, 1954, has
been described as a former girlfriend of JAMES STARR subsequent
to hiadepartUrefrom
the United States.
_
. .
'Mrsi, DORI MINGO,' 210 Westmont Avenue, Haddon Township, New Jersey, advised that s ihe . is iden fical with
D0RIS1B R.UN, who formerly resided at 440 Grant Street, Camden,
New ersey, She advised that she became acquainted with the
STARK family approximatelyfolr years ago and had dates with
WILLYAM HENRY STARR on several occasions. She recalled WILLIAM
telling her that during World War II ha served in the Merchant
Marir,o and was befriended by the Russiane when he was ship..

'

NK 100-31813
MK 100-32447

wrecked off the Russian Coast, She also s aid that on numerous
occasions WILLIAM started to talk to her about Communism
but she told him she was not interested and he would discontinue the discussion, Mrs. SENINCEN continued by saying
that the night before the subjects disappeared, she accompanied
the subjects to the apartment of DULCIE MC CAULEY located
at 318 Penn Street,
ew Jersey, where DULCIE prepared a dinner for them, Lur . 4- the evenin WILLIAM was
apparently nervous but did not ..ay anything about going on
a trip.

Mrs. SENINOLI concluded by stating that DULCIE

MC CAULEY had remarked shortly after the subjects had left
the country . twit JAMES had borrowed t.200 from her..
The following investigation was conducted by Special
Agents PHILIP 4 CAREOLL and JOHN R, BRETTI:

eicas, 615 Broadway, Westville, New.

(Mrs 4
J rseyvadvised on January 7, 1955 that until a few months
6 she had ranted an apartment in a home owned by DhNIEL.
TARR. brother . Of the Subjects; in National Park, New Jersey,
s WICKES-advieed that tiL IE MC. CAULEY- had rented *a room
in her apartment for a . psriod al time: but MC WILEY eventually
left National Park and *movet . to,:Pamdeh :baCaUse , t he and Mrs,
WICKES Could not gat along,. Mrs.:HICKES said that she is an
Australian girl . and - prior to . 1946" she worked for the United States Navy in 'Brisbane, .Australia, ,.xuring this s same period
Mrs. WICKES advised that DULCIE. MO CAULEr worked In . the United
States Nevi canteen on the same base, Mrs. WIChES continued
by saying that she came to the United States' . in 1948 and that
the subjects visited her apartment frequently to see .MC cawr.
Mrs. .IiICES said that she was left with the impression that
the subjects were Commaniets but. did not feel that it was any
of her business. According . to Mrs, NICIOS, MC CAULEY went
out w :.th IMES STARR frequently but that she did not See the
subjects, with one exception, after MC CAULEY moved to Camden:
Mrio: WICKES said that the one exception was about two Weeks
prior to their disappearance in 1953 but at that time they did
not indicate to her that they were planning to go to gbropeo
-6..

o gol
I.

NK 100-31813
NK 100-32447
AT CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY
Newark Confidential Informant T-3, of unknown reliability, but who knew JA I:C..3 HARR for a period of six months,
advised on September 30, 154 that during 1952 JAMES STARR
had in his possession postcards from an unidentified organization, stating that meetings would be held at certain times
and dates at either 5th and 7:1.4.22 Streets or 7th and Sirklev
Streets in Camden, New Jsirse,
Newark Confidential Informant T-11., of known reliability, reported on ;ace:Ether 31, 1954 that the International
ilor::ars Order maintained their headquarters formerly at 5t12
and Berkley Streets, Ca.-nden, Now Jones".
The INTR2NATIONAL WORKER3 ORDER (Iwo) has
been designated by the Attorney General
of the United States pursuant to Executive
Order 10450.

I !At' . [
,

..FOL.

2 1. VP
Chief, 0
(Attnt
Chief of Base;.

12 768

C-

11u llanh

INF)t COM

Operational
,AWDRACO:..6

1.. We 'Propose that plans be made for two:U;iii4a5' groups during the
-next year. The first group mill come from the ZIPPER Evaluation Staff and
includes KLOTZ (Economia), 1111MANN (Military), FURTH Military) and
Dr. GRUENAID (EocnomiwSifter). This group should have_pertly the charaoter
of earlierWIMOO)tripe with greater emphasis on pgge discussions at.Heed-

quarters. DTILITf Would like to seed either :MEM OrATIPInkali on a strict

duty . status for several days to join the group in Washington for the ICUCHAP..-v
discussions.

2. The 'moon& Il i*AC6 3group this year Should includmon/y operational

peresmcalitiee . emd, if Possible, extend to lzWividunls like erWAGNMR, the'chief
of the Mita
base in Bremen. This group mould be scheduled for autumn 1955
at the earliest,
;3is snherittin4 the basic
30 G
pose4 and shoildo if possible, be the esaort.

lettor on the first group pro-

Cer,:r4

4. 1 with to am:beets* the unastimous opinion *hong the POS'etaff that Cm:2)

17,114411:I tetp* have left a deep imprint on those ZIPPERitee whO partioipaindja
Our ocatin-qing dome relationship with individuals such as Etrosa,
00; 1401112 and 8SIDEL'iss me believe, not unrelated to thin. program.
IT*A414
post

CS2 .

5. I shouldalso like to take this opportunity to remind you of pest METE!

peroposalttha;IITILITY again Tilsit Washington either just before or /uet after 3.1
the ettabliohment of IMMO. I have from time to time mentioned this to histosanemra
and me should be prepared to follow through at the appropriate time. Stith a arzr
visit seuld*.I believe, be the opportune moment for Asoham to review the oonaftee4
tastmco
Uinta of our %lateral Agreement 'with UTILITY.

rgItV

DECLASSIFIED

REL

Dimas

AND
EASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GENCY
SOURCES METHODS
i)MT
rig
3O

EXEMPTION3B2D
ISCLOODREA CT

NAZI WAR 0C1 RIA 2E0S0U5

DATE
2

el" A)

zia.44

C._

2-

IDD/P.A.4i:Art2.
_--__-_----

MAR. 18 1955

NEMORANDUM. FOR Chief of. Operations

SUBJECT:

Visit to the United States of 'General GEHLEN

1. On several occasions in the past Col. Critchfield has

either just be
suggested. that General GEHLEN visit Washingto n
fore or shortly after, the legalization of ZIPPER. In addition
position in general with the German
to further strengthening oUr
Intelligence Service such a visit woad present an opportune
moment for the DOI to review the contents of our secret Bilateral
Agreement with GEHLEN. Col. Critchfield has now brought IT the
again in the form of a specific propoSal and urged that
hatter
preparations be made to follow through at the appropriate time.
2. It is requested tnat approval in principle be granted
for this proposal at this time. If this approval is granted we
that we are in general agreement with .
will notify Col. Critchfi eld
the proposal and consider the most appropriate time to be shortly
after legalization. We will also request that any firm plans be
Cleared with 112 well in advance.

DECLASSIFIED AND RE
LEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELL 'BENCE AtIENCY
SOURCES METHODS
EXENPt ION3121
NAZI WAR CRIMES DI ICLORDNW,
OATE 2001 2005

Z.
+.rrn Eur one an

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"he

ORIG : C
UNIT

Exr

ROUTIM

SECRET

:....528

31

DATE

28 MUM 1955

TO

SR REp t- PULLACEI, FRANKFURT

oy. oi O r7u

(/1/f.---

5
6

6,33

FROM . DIEIECTOR, CIA

CONF : Et,(174)
'INFO

.Dincr (

DIR 45614 (OUT 75470)

ROUTINE

1926Z 31_ MAR 55

INFO: SPUN

TO: SPILL

u
Fovuo),

.-Co.p....(D.d1/4/pb/Olp (8)

FNECEDaNCE,

CITE: DIR.

KAPOK
RE: BMA 1216E1 -, ARA 5
1. PROPOSE xrrum TRIP APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE. BELIEVE EMT APPROPRIATE
TIME maw AFTER LEGALIZATION. FURTIM FEEL SHOULD NOT OCCIR

twin

NEGOTIATIONS SECRET BILATERAL AGMENINT FULLY CONCLUDED AND AGREEMENT FIRM.

2,, WILL AWAIT YOUR FIRM PROPOSAL AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

END OF MESSAGE
cOECLASS

itfso

,41:14.?A,'%-t.t.
(k.1"

1E 1E0 AN

E NTR A L

INTELLIG0 RELEASED DP
ENCE AG
SOURCES METHO
ENCY
DS EX
EMPT
NAZI WAR CR I
ION391 11
MES 0
DATE 2001 2005 .18408111ft ACT

6*(6
c""
COORDINATING 'OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SAUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDE N TO MAKE A COPY 01 THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

MENDRAIMUN MR; The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT* Visit to the United States
of General WHIM
11111M

1. Colonel Critchfield, Chief of the Pullaoh

Operations BUG, 11MA suggested that General =LEA
visit Washington either just before, or shortly after,
the legalisation of ZIPPER. It is believed that such
a visit would contribute conaitiarahli toward further
atrengtheciAg ourposition in general with the German
Intelligence Service and that tho moat appropriate
time would be Miura", after legalization. It is
expected that by this time we will heel concluded a
secret Bilateral Intelligence Agreement with ZIPPER
and the visit will give you an opportunity- to discuss,
among other tangy, the contents of this agreement
with OMEN, in event you deem is appropriate.
poroltiltarzIttwee:ache r:111: is tedist Iolonel
principle with his pro-.
DECLASSIFIES' All

REL EASED ST
CENTRAL 'INTELL 11ENCE AGENCY
SOURCESNE11100S EXEMPT 1003120 NAti
CRINESOISCLOSNRiAtr
DATEWAR
2001 2005

Cable attached

EWPIG/2/
29 Match 1955
.Dist: Orig.& 1 - Addressee
2 - Chief, BE
2 - EOI/OV.

'2

Eastern baroPsall

Pivild22

.14 III L iI

162

CLASSiFIED MESSAGE

5 MAY 55

KTE

.x)

: DIRECTOR

ROM :

nOUTIfia

S-E-C-R-E-T

PULLACH

RAY5 1955

cno0-!---E
: COP, Fl, FI/OPS, CI, Cl/OPS'; WE 4, FI/R4 2, S/C 2

i7O6z 5 MAY 55

UPULL 0575 (IN 39889)

TO

SFRAN

RE: TIR

ROUTINE

eftECEDENCE

CITE. .SPULL

INFO:

00 5 03 (OUT 83815)

01/4-6 - .zerqz.
1

1.

SPEILEL APPRAOCH TO

EXPRESSION DESIRE MEET E.2.

J WAS BASED ON UTILITY

re-r7

J AFTER UPSWING ESTABLISHED.

UTILITY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION L

J OFFER ARRANGE

MEETING IN PARIS CIRCA 12 MAY. UTILITY FEELS IT INADVISABLE

TO MEET L7

_I IN PARIS UNTIL HE LEGAL HEAD UPSWING; WOULD

/APPRECIATE ANYTHING E-

:1

CAN DO TO FACILITATE FUTURE MEETING,

END OF MESSAGE

ECLASSIFI ED

Alla REL

EASED 8?
INTELLIGENCE AGENC1
SOURCEGMETHOOSEXEMP T ION
ME
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE At)
DATE 2005

CENTRAL

IT

IS

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS

:::
. 1.ESSA.
-
111

CoPY No- .

OFFICIAL DISPATCH
'CIA

(Specify

DISPATCH NO

A:: or Si Pouch)

BaQw-23971

cl.A.F.:;incAnoN

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

TO
FROM

SUBTECT

Cnief .1M3
GENERAL
SPECIM

DATE
=0:

Chiefs of Mission
Berlin, Bonn, ?Zech

Operational/CARTACDTROVE
0721117 Report of 28 January 1955 on STARR Brothers

there investigation
1. ODIZArre 28 January 195
0 mother of
address
for
Brigette
IfilUZZOK.
reports a new
1954
with the
..-ibjects
received
a
letter
from
e.
MIC
letter imams
return address Ludwigsburg, Preyss Str, 2: G
the Russian or
evised. les. STARR that she had not received
- lobereabouts of
: East Germ= officials on her request for inf
Zone officials
the =ERA. She informed Mrs.'STARR of her reque
her wove to .
GO a r
in a letter of 19 September 1954. NAU
her e
at the Free
,Sote.whern Germany the !'7art that ahe had

o add that her mother

University of Berlin and find emaae
lives in the Russian Zone in Potsdam
es. a teacher.

2. In additiOn to the abov

report might be of interest
ThB atory stated that the
ezy3.um and vre:ce =route to
faulty vork in a Red mirth
later news conference e;ppar
behind, the Iron
3, A 3 J
quoted as foil
Agent has ..- *.-,,,,
him as Fran -luit
Marie flume',Il

Rel
Berlin

information in the OSOMY

er 2954 nievark Sunday Bates"
ested and. received political
lines by stating that their
end their clumey etatemeuts at a
Cermsunieto to move them for

k Star Ledger" AP story (Datelino Vienna) is

es said yesterday a former West German Itspionage
for political asylum. The broadcast identified
edly one-time deputy chief in Vest Berlin of an

gemisstiou headed by a lar.rea._Gesate!tam

in Vienna recalled that raittitatta diesepearod from

CeptrAber. The Warsaw radio quoted NTIOUSBADER as saying be fled to

Poland because he did not vent to take part in West Germany's

Var

preparations.'

t,
DECLASS IF I ED ANIplq(b,plg

BY

CENTRAL I NTELL ITYNT AG _NCI

SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION 382E
NAZI WAR CR IMES 01 SCLOSURE
BATE 2005

AC]

EtILA 14 168

Chiefs EI3
(Attn: =.,
Chief

a Rasei Pullach

.3)

INFt COM

UlTILITY l s Visit to the U.S.A.

1. UTILITY 'feels the following are the minimum conditione that must exist
before his trip to the U.S.A.:
a. .UPSWING established and its initial position in the government
established.

b.. The completion of action by the appropriate .UPGR)WTH.- Office defining

his authority as Chief IJPSWINGfor negotiating agreements on intelligence matters

gi.

with

2. :T bP.: 3.' ..ttie

that UTILITY'S views an this matter coincide with ours.

,.:..Uip:ITTI - eStimates that UPSWING Issue will have been decided by 1 July .5.
...'iii)..i.e._iithe':;leosPeOts to have theinitial. relationship With U} )WTR settled
with other ' services Will have been
stia fr
the 'lest hal f of SepteMber- seethe a . likely tzline

the time. . 11171,177.

for time,....he maSk fly one wiy.
as a.:ifearie.s:of....gettini.!difs:!Ota*:

fairs will : permit' him

he is ,pressed
trip
has urgedthe

neime; spas

the .publicd.ty dtring the past:year or twos travel: in a..trae..

;tAitti14: :.atinoliV.ciirdnly attract attention: While we.. .is:till. haveSciat

...i,t4.e.w.'of;

aliszight

in the caabf

( ,
,

.IXEST

.4.',..teat
-

.
Hi

prodno.

.watld ,von* . explore the.:problene.

As 1 redell,. we managed this

DSNER In one of-the'originai ; ;OTIOOtrips.

-HUMMED AID R ELEASED I*

MURAL INTELLI6E4CE ARENCY
SOURCES METHODS
EXEMPT I DN30/ENAZI WAR CRimEgDISC1,0111111Ati
DATE 2 00i 1005

0,4 .tAu

SE'r

r- r
-U . ...

=CRAB= FOR: Director , of Central Intelligence

Visit to the United States of General Gehl=

SUBJECT:

1. Several veeks ago we voiced our agreement in principle to a

proposal by Colonel Critchfield that General Wilma visit the United
States after the establishment of the German Iateiligenae Service.
Colonel Critabfield has now informei us that Gehlen considers the
following as the minima conditions which must exist before he undertakes a trip to the Unite' States.
a.

The GIS must be established and its position in the

government clarified and secured.

b. A clear definition of his authority, as Chief Of the

GIS, for negotiating agreements on intelligence matters' with friendly services most have been rendered
apprOpriate office of the Gerian government.

by

the

The above, I-believe, coincides with our views an this matter..

2. ' . 0ehlen nov estimates- that the GI issue villhave been resolved by : JUly 14 .1955. expects to have the initial relationahip
vithlMOKAWelailfiel by,SeOtether 1:aabsepes that his authority
riaiiidais . liathaie . been diefinetbi.that time.
to negotiate
Thins,:it:VenlOiptiser at this time that the last half of SepteMber
voilChe . n likely time for the visit.
tEtCLASSIF Iltill ANC RtLEASEN OT
CENTRAL INTEL', 10ENCt ASEOCY
ki
BOURCEsmETH005 EXEMPT ION3120
NAZI WAR cRIN ES015CLO g UREACT
3
DATE 2001 2005
Chief, Eastern European Division
EE/ONI
6 June 1955
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CiEE
1 - RI.
2 - EE/FIO/Z-A

DE:17100E3 'CO CEC:, 1

SECRET

-H/0176

10th June,

2955

Marshal .2.HUKOW

The following rebaarks about Marsh& ZHUKOV appear on page 13 of the

9th adition of "TIME".
"When the chance came for a military course at Mosoow's Frunze

Aoademy he grabbed it. Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov thought him

"somewhat slow", but sent him off to Germarky to study under General
von Seeckt. The black-haired young Russian was a stronge figure among
the shaven-headedw monocled Prussians, but Suordsman Zhukov could
outfenoe any of them, as he later could outfenoe any Russian officer
who served with him. From von Seeckt, chief theorist of the new German army
that was already forming, Zhukov learned the strategy and tactics of the
"breakthrough".

In addition on page 15 of the German Military Text Book,

Ubersicht uber Hohere militarlsche Fuhrer der Raton Armee" (August 2944)
is the enigmatic entry against 1928 "Besuch einerKriegsakademie". The
author of this book was "Colonel" GEHLEN."
We would be grateful for any comments you care to mkke.

G.ECLASSIF I ED AND RELEASED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCI
SOURCESK

THOOSEXEMPT ION DOZE

NAZI WAR CRIMES
DI SCLOSURE AC1
DATE 2005

hal,171.LESaisti
. 11. aaaixt

as radallife
obtainlaferamtiont Ivo/data,
7 ameated it as a ceodi ehttaft SC=1 Wirt Uter this Tear
ea Me attli barIcatitee

2..C7LA- V-k 130

0 tk,cx

DECLASSIFIED AND R
ELEASED BY
CENTRAL tPTTLL16ENC.E AGENC1r,
(11.1RCESI4ETHOD3.EXENPT
101.3132.1.
NA fl WAR CRIMES DI SCLOSURE

2005

AC1

T 1955

MPBOBLIMilt FOR: Di:In:tor of Central Int-ell/gem.

SUBJECT:

Letter free General GehIsm

. .

.
.

Attached ii a latter for you fromtlenera/ Oehlen mho empreassa

-his appreeirctica for the manner of trmateant given the meMberm
his argsnisetionsbo visited the United States lest etnth.

c-

Chief, Eaatern &roman Division

1 Ireloinie:

NA,

tZtiUde
444 41

C1/81:jr3
Rirtriiittiap:Omos of Chiefs EE rag
prig

;en dre nee

1 CAE

1 RI

DECL ASSIFIED ADO

II ELEAS' E' D .111'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ADENCY
SOURCESNETNOOSEXIMPTION3120

NA/1 IIAR
DATE

c511111011CLOIUDEACT

/001

2005

Spy, Service,
COldWar CSPiorilige, the Coreintiiiists'haVe
a built-in advantage: an estiznited.ro
lion party members in over 6o different
countries, all of them potential . agents.
The West has many more Wendel friends
the. 'oppressed- inside the Communist
empirebut since most of them are
inaccessible or terrorized by the police,
Western strategists rely most .heavily
on professional intelligence outfitsthe
U.S.'s CIA, Britain's Military Intelligence,
France's Deuxiime Bureau, etc. Last week.'
West Germany covertly Confirmed what
had long been widely suspected:: Bonn,
too, has its own . apparatus of antiCommunist spies. BlirO Gehlen, as the
Germans call it; is new to become an official, arm of the . West German government.
Anonymous. Prussian. Mere mention
of the name Gehlen Is enough to make
U.S. intelligence chiefs In Germany clam
up and try to look blank. For years both
Washington and 'Bonn refused to confirm
that the organization existed. But since
. the Communists themselves took to blaming "Gehlen agents" for acts of sabotage
throughout Eastern Europe, enough facts
have leaked out to suggest that Biiro
Gehkn not only exists, but that it may be
one of the' best intelligence networks in
the business.
Something like 4,000 Gehlen agents,
some of whom served as German spies in
World War II, are at work in Europe and
Russia.:Some.range as far afield is Cairo,
Istanbul and -Madrid. Their chief former
Bsiiadier,GeneralrAlizAhst*IGettlft;i4s,': .
.641.4.01 11101pod roida0304,:

Gehlen rose in World War T T. to behead ef ,the "Enemy .Army-East,"

the super-secret,intelligenee staff that
evaluated the reports of a vast network
dl German agents ranging the Eastern
front from Leningrad to the Cituatsus,
Because his realistic appraisals cm Soviet
strength clashed with Hitler's %vish-thinkGehlen often drew the Farces lire.
Once, the story goes, Hitler read a Gehlen
paper and exploded angrily: "What fool
dug out this nonsense?" But events proved

.Gehlen's gloomy reports right.

No Picture. When the Red army
smashed into the Reich, Gehlen fled west,
taking his files with him. He made three
copies of each of his records and deposited
them at three different addresses. Later,
when the Cold War came, U.S. intelligence
officers found the Gehlen files invaluable.
Gehlen was flown to Washington and returned to Germany with the secret understanding that he -would rebuild his intelligence apparatus and set it to work for
both the U.S. and Western Germany. Reportedly, his terms included that he never
would have to operate against the "German interest," and he himself would be
the judge of that interest.
Washington does not admit that the
U.S. has financed Gehlen's activities (the
preferred phrase is that he enjoys a "favorable relationship" with U.S. intelligence agencies). Niro Gehlen's headquarters, a clump of houses surrounded by
barbed wire, is south of Munich and not
far from Dachau. Outside the main offices
the Stars & Stripes fly alongside the flag
of West Germany. Gehlen himself stays
out of sight. He is married and has four
children;' he' loves fast cars and still has
a student's fascination for tricky paraphernalia, obsolete codes and invisible inks.
The only available photograph of Gehlen
' was taken when he was a colonel, twelve
years ago.
'5F

,.4

inCIASSIFIES MtAtte ft*

COTIAL lUttitt
PUREES METHODS
Irft4PT
NAZI VAR
IONHiD
CRINESDIS

DATE 2001 2005

DLODUNI

.`ttio
- '1 DeigIS

trsii
ftbdo

'

AIR

-14

2?
Chief, Ng
Chl.of

' of Boards Punaoh

INFO t COS

UTILITY, a Daughter

1;111D7-1213, 3 Thin 54.

1. flume &soma thin ratter ulth a number of our oellescueo vitt ftratMEd bbodedge of both Smith aod Radoli.M. It Le a fa.1.47 =dam aged=
tiotai tor /ITILITr i a daughters the latter =red be tha better volution. Ws heue
wrIttaudirettly Radaliffse for oatelopee mod otbmi. matila3.41 witted Eater=
tang ilkght be ef inteattat to loor.
7TILITre daughter is ourreutly *LC iz t. tIreat Merit, Ciefie3*.
withtil /*if dvei law win lc= tbr Rome to eposti a =lath vith TrEILT/Va toother.
She -veal riPaitia
to Hoe& ftir isentiv3 meld; in Septsabor before depertii for
Pitreitat:Watizatd avast 11121 rear trIth eue of 11T/L121 1 6 rulattvue itho ie.& mop.
luttla4141446her in tb Clizzazi Welk/. in Lisboa.

31* re
.
Lta.tstAtatattmeir Woad that the CRUM= to agetaitit 'Attu be in
oni) ,3Pitter:betttre rite:Tett ti-Seruangre
Mali&
:rataatting 11614Catttr aredit fir ler cleats; et
Witlifteistliatr:elleatItiiitibar of veiled oeureas thet 4fl tive . her a EMIEstimmudirettadiiiii-Orthe Thaiteid States in a year of ate*. Tier Reed& is not
et 41.
eaffieti

iso Tbisi itlittiatbd only to bring you

. date on this natter. A sPoeital
to
prejeet iii be - evieeitted chrive the nod felt meths efter
plena era rim
.

DECLASS IF I E :0 AND RLELEA5E0..BY.,

CENTRAL INTEL I 6.ENCE. AGENC1

SOURCES METIPSEXEMPT I ON 382E
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Grego.

a Jay 55
4.

-7

SEC; E

Ban

705-4

// Chief ) EE
Chief Of Station, Germany

INFO: Chief PCP

cAuvoi;44-4-4
-;British : Comonts on IS Matters
1. On 21 .1jUly t'.40 undersigned attended a luncheon given for the newly arrived
replacement of . .0 . freneht,IS Liaison Officer. In addition
to C :I . and Ott undersigned, CIC,U.S. Air Force. 051 representatives and . . Etril4W
3 and l c
Liaison ofauere
2.mare present..
2. After a considerable amount of wine had been consumed C
m made the
statemelt that he vas glad . to be leaving Bonn because the Gohlen Organization Was
going
start running things and both he and his Trench-bosses were aware that
the UV-woUldbecome an even weaker and more ineffective instrument. C.
said
theAT felt the BfV would eventually be abolished and the French were becoming .quite
alarmed at the manner in which they were being treated and handled by the German
Defenee.Ministry OffiCials. r_ .7 said that with the exception of-cs.
one in the Defense Ministry was available to ham anymore and oven the FrenCh)
military officials have noticed a uoolness on the part of their German counterparts.
p
3. The shove comments by -a acted as a catalyst to get-4;
and C:
:2,:etarted an the subject-of U.S./German military relations. They
said it was tt, bad that the U.S. had seen fit td 'ally herself closer with the
-M
'Germans en military and intelligence matters tha-lwith their. alliee.
stated that he and his colleagues. had often discussed the problem of tierian - remilitatilaLmn end they were convinced that a.re.birth of. German militarization,
whether it be in Western Oeriany or in a united craggy would in the long. run be
a more dangerous threat to world peace' than the Soviet army. .Both C.
?t,Aind
very bluntly felt that the Amarica-z1 had :sold their sauld to the.Germanz
a
became of their frantic and hystericaltee to thwart the Soviet military
strength. They also felt that while it was mainly through U.S. initiative back
in 1951 and 1952 that the Germans'remilitarited, the time has new been reached
where the Germans are raPidly-getting the upper hand in these matters.

. 4. They oonsistenti brought up Zipper and it was quite obvious in talking

with them that-they -felt we had not been truthful with them as to the extent of
our past and planned cooperation with this organization. _m: already knew
that . UTIUTY had . met former American Colonel TrumamSmithAn Duesaeldorf. Both
C.
eulled.my leg seme!hatby'saying that it wouldn't be long
3 and
before ' Zipper defects to 'G-2 and_thatAitwas quite obvious that the U.S. Army
was getting.veryieozy not only With llermen Defense Ministry officialabut were
paying increasing attention to German intelligence officials.
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
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/COPY

84ET
,/

5. The Britieh inferred by these etatemeate that they were aware of .

friction between ICUBAIUC and 0.2 end it was apparent that they were watching
D'. both said
this alleged feud. with great interest.. The Britishers:5 and c
they regretted very much that during the itenediate posktodwar period the U.S.

did not expend more effort in trying to solidify the Allies,. namely 'British end
Pre*, in intelligenee and military- matters. . . very openly Stated
that there is less cooperation between the Lritiab, the Americans and the
Trench than certain Allied cooperation With the Germans. Be was apparently
referring to U.S. intelligence cooperation with the Germans. He seemed
rtther bitter and cynical about the subject and finally stated, *IPS better
drip the subject since . I might say things I would later be sorry form.

S.comments that the BfV is becoming an irkeffeo)stated that they had a great deal of confidence
and fair . Buhert. Schriibbera end that he had known him for quite some time.
Be said. Obribberati.s young and energetic and would fight to prevent his office
froti : b.e.inVdeenina ed by "certain outside agencies that your'..kmericane have yotir Lingers tn.
6.

In answer to C

tive instruokeat, C

_These coinments are being fsorwarded to help asseasvhat sone of

level think,:iitt'OiVII.S./German cooperation.
Allies:'.
.
ed"
,-the:fliforking
. . ...
.."

C.

our

....7:41,,,n
4.,,,
-,-; v.,, ..,
W th lostolisttiort
at the oiodiooti Us
trip as off mitt oono time eater . La ;XL Litoidostotlago he. kw
that las to els to Rake tads trip rith a. beiso dao=001 bat titogionioit:
la mitts to trent
., :,,,,t1..; to is ids frlioadb c ____I
is a gootors or good
---1 ,la ogeoftesitoo
Mt trip.

SECRET
DECLASS IFI ED AND
RE LEASED BY
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TELL
!BENCE
AGENCY
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IMESDISCLOSUREACT
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2005

BEM Pliakttl

PULL 7.64- 6 . (IN 14512) 27 August 1955

During Adm. RODGERS early summer visit to Pullach he invited GEHLEN
visit sixth U.S. fleet sponsored by U.S. navy.
Party to include GEHLEN; Seep OBERMAIER, Chief .ZIPPER navil Evaluation
Group; Lt. Cmdr RICHLY, Navy Rep Munich; and Chief of Staff Comnavger.
GEHIEN to travel with German passport 8553501 under name @Richand GEHLER (SIC).

Extraction
Cable filed NAVAL MATTERS

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GEHLE,N-201

NOTES FOR INCLUSION IN "LETTER FROM THE FIELD"

met UTILITY for the first time at an informal dinner at
5 Angubt 1955. UTILITY, by choice, was not acC_
Oompanied by other senior members of fiis staff.

C.

.1

:Ps home on

Although the conversations ranged over a wide number of subjects, including the political aspects of the establishment of UPSWING, the Geneva Conference, the current political situation, current PP operations, VPSWINGIs
future PP chart,e,:, , and the possibilities of a visit by Ascham to Germany
and a later visit by UTILITY to the United States, nothing new emerged from
this session.
UTILITY was blunt in his criticism of the U.S. position at Geneva. He expressed the opinion that in the realm of international politics one should
never tell a Russian that one will not shoot him and should under no circumstances be an convincing in this position as President Eisenhower ISMS
at Geneva'. This is, of course, the basic position reflected in recent
political reporting both to us and to UPTHRUST. I thought the evening
would be a good basis for continued good relations between UTILITY and the
'CURARE Chief:of - Station!in Germany. If the conversations uere somewhat .
mild in character, it Was only because the meeting came at a time when
J had problems or any particularly interesting
neither UTILITY nor C
new developments to discuss with each other.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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("0

(--(ite-fy

SECREI

Lugusi 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CEWDIAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

Some British Comments on U.S./German Military and Intelligence Cooperation

.".7' reports that at a welcome lun1. C

cheon for. the newly arrived ,French Liaison Officer at Bonn,
which was attended by all Allied Liaison Officers to the German Internal Security Service (BfV), Messrs. ::1
and
I of 1: /made the following comments . on
U.S./German cooperation regarding military and intelligence
matters:. They regretted that the U.S. had allied herself
more closely-with the Germans on military and intelligence matters than with the APies and were quite blunt in expressing
their feelings that the Anericans had sold their. souls to the
Germans because of their frantic and hysterical desire to
thwart Soviet military strength. In pursuing this topic it
became obvious that they felt we had not been truthful with
them as to the extent of our past And planned cooperation with
ZIPPER..,
was aware that General Geblen had net
former'COlanel:TrUnanSnith. Showing their awareness of the
and C
friction between CIA. and G-2, Messrs..r.
stated that it wouldn't be long before ZIPPER.defects to G-2,
and that it was quite obvious that the Army was not only cultivating GerMan military but also German intelligence officials.
2. A copy of the dispatch is attached.

:1

frt. t

Chief, Eastern European Division

DE CLASS
CENTR

Attachnent: 1

IF I
ED AND

RELEASED BY

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.GROUP DEPARTING MICR 1100 HOURS

DINZCITZ:TR.011.A14

VIVI

SEPT. UTILITY WILL REIUB.N.PIUNICI4

FLIGHT. ILL ROT VISIT SPAIN.;

RE LEASED BY
IDENCE AGENC1

DECLASS IF I ED AND
CENTRAL I NT

- LL

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ION 3B2E
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.FTLE: 230,8' !
4..
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x - 240: ZER.t.4. iteirluat

12Ga,-2332

Gauzier

SECRET
Chief of Base, Yullach
Chief IILS

22 September 1955

MICROILMa
FEB 1 4 1962

DOC. MICRO. SER.

OperationalInterest in General 0-sh1es's Backcround

CI Branch, G-2 11.8.4RITOR, has informed this effiee that
BC1413-01, 8 ..;;,.. _...-_-?,....e,
.143244 " L"4
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ill a I Sr frog 173.114011.4.= as R sztd, his organisP tdszt. as the-:..0.
riaBOITA*2 ..-aiiiahed int'ormaitiStmon Gehlen l s war recOrd ani, tbetbOr..:
Galen ivait a Nazi.
2, The abOys obviously comes. from intercepts. klasztteb. az C4-2. is always 14i1udtant to pass informatiden from mph mire,*
-that 1a1121,1;e1; into German, hands, it 1.s reciaeirted i rott..Nreil this
when, passed. -ter coliaeial the interoot source as far' as POStilae.
information. is the by-product of an isr/related operFurther,
a-103U
for.=
3. This inay . of course be on.ly a journalistio
article or 'book or it may have smae operational s . osatoe.
the.
G-2 . sta.tema. that CIO()
Tel-rod.
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ctrsi'a
siFBiEwoere
ANDI7Ega
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C E NTR
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fe. --;.i.

ISENCE AGENC1
'1933EXERP T ON 3B2E
NAZI WAR CR IMES DI
SCLOSURE ACtl,
DATE 2005
SOURCES PIET

Dist t 2401
3-003.-
2-40:15
21, Sieber 1955

I. LE COPY
AVAILIti
EST

-; 1;::
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:1

CE-Hte 1,;
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26 5 e p tozber 2955

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OpeiiatioiaptV',..AL1
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pOisi146 itieroz. in connection with reference is the

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,.1"gpfies
.
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: infittion. 0.1, this nature in of intereci tous*
::

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED-fly

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S.OURCESMETRODS
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DATE 1001 1005
.

.."..
. .

..

1
P

fPnpl?

11

D ECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CEJITRAL INTELL I6ENCE AGENCY (

4- -N37

SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION3B2B

NAZI WAR CR IMES 0 I StLOSU RE ACT
DATE 2001
1005

MUNICH REFRESI. s:TATIVE

OF
COMMANDER, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, GERMANY

*I ;sflaigETLIMITED
ir I

'

In reply
refer to

VIA=
Sort 00017-55
12 October 1955

tr.IMTICIN

DISTRIBUTION

From Munich Representative of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, German,

Director of Naval Intelligence
ICI
Subjt Visit of General.GRHLEN, head of the German Intelligence Service, to the
Mt :. Sixth Fleet

Mom

Final (1.) Copy of Memorandum received by MIEN aboard USS SALEM (CA 139)
(2) Copy of Plan of the Day of USS SALEM (CA 139) of Wednesday, 7

September 1955

4C.0.10

(3). Itinerary Of OREILEN's visit to Sixth Fleet

September to 10 September 1955 General MEILEN, Chief of the CIA

isponsared German Intelligence Serhoe(GIS), and the Chief of the 013 Naval
Evaluation Section, Albrecht . 0BERMAYER, were guests of the U.S. Navy aboard
the entirCiialat
iihips::Crthei . U.S. , Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

1. From

LANS

erierabl

0:21

124f
trIt his ad_ used lila ,.own
.GitiraNN:Ukeituthe. s .pseudOntre "Dr..
%-iteGglap:-..i.The4de nti tiee of the German visitors were..knoWn. ci ' riiitiOerii-r

=LW;

6fItlikSii0i0Set and a: few members of their Staffis . Within.: 9614

.
entiiii :iiiiit::was closely controlled and known only. to,.AdMirai

Cdr LW.

HARRI

denianY; Capt. R. G. ARMSTRONG, Chier.'of

ntellige
nee Officer, caniatpati *arxf .ort'ideikiii:;! iie;:tiiiii .
I
SON Jr.,

The Coteitatia plane wan used to ana

but the -*Paisengers were not identified to the crew. .Tticirviskt
from

:iliaitiai4i-xiiiiil

Viii.14 C0erdi.ifittad

2.

the

laelsiggf
AiLiesia-

with the ohief of the CIA's GIS spontior unit.

It . 1S ',believed that the visit watt a complete awls:esti and that GICILEN.waa

greatlY.'inPrassed? . and gained eonse understanding of the capabilities and..taske

of*:mader*.naval forces. A' detailed: report of the visit is-set forth in the partigraPhi .lielow. An 'itinerary of the . trip is forwarded as enclosure (3).

3. Tip

from Munibh to.Villetranohet .

.
.
. .. ..
.
.arried
at..ziteadbirg
.
Gen.
GlOrliN
and
"SEPP"
OBERMAYER
:
:
:
1955
is. - brf:5 8. ept*nber
.AFS.f.,eaCOrteid .t. byk , ... ;.,(CIA). The . trio remained in the oar, .Parked . iiiititide
of tail:!:;.:31*Iiiiii*O.1:piiiii.4...ukii the , plane arrived. prior to .the;.arrival,.of4he
..COMNMIER;;aircraft,.-the ., party. wan 'met, by this officer, .and CPO the 'erikiiiil'of
iEhe:.;a4iiiiii,::;?fl:Cipti...11: C1...'.ARYSTROISKI, USN, Chief of ..Stiff,. COMNAVGER:,::,bEitriN,
-Who'':,,,d3iiiii.s;'iiiit.iiiCS*;to-..traVel',..by air, expressed gratitude for iiiiii,iii13.1i1:,:iiiiiii.*
Capt. ARMSTRONG. After a smooth take-oft, GliElLt
airl::afbliitis
. .. lardviditd: . bi.

06

..

.. . .

arm'.

LIPitt.1

STRISUT

ON

*xer mns:D -DISTRIBUTION

WCOORDINAT WITH

rite

1NiFIES
`"'

M3,,N

*1

 1(; ;
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"

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12 October 1955

'

2 :

SECRET LIMI 4M DISTRIBUTION

enjoyed a box lunch (inapite of the bumps caused by head winds). He remarked
about the effectiveness of the pills and inquired about the possibility of .
getting a small supply for his planned journey to the United States in January.
Obviously content with the world, =LEN talked about his coming CIAmisponsored
visit to Washington, D.C., and his desire to return leisurely by ship.. He also
talked about a vacation he plans to take with his family 'next year; he likes

canning and outdoor life.

b. While over Frame heading for Marseilles, GEHLEN talked about his eldest

daughter (21 year's old) and her return frOm Italy the day before. Ife, stated
that his daughter is at times a courier for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and that during.her last journey an inquisitive . GermanCustoms Official almost
found, the diaomatio pouch. GEHLENwaSproud of his daughter's foresight in

06.
eireea*

placing the pouch below a layer of soiled femicine *niceties" at the bottom of
the bag. The official inspected the contents of the hag as far as the soiled
"niceties" but terminated his inspection tnere. Use 'of his daughter for courier
nine was necessitated by lack of personnel at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
According to OEHLEN, the courier runs are not as dangerous now as in the days

'Just after the Ministry of. Foreign Affairs was recognized by theAllies.

c. OBERMAYM made. no secret of the written. brief which he bed prepared for
: InALE OMEN On'the.U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet activities in s the Mediterranean aid on
magma the NATO'Stal Commands. He had prepared athree. (3) page essay on the .history
g
of a-Medan adiaft carrier which was carefully 'read by OIMELEN. Prior to the

mn

eammame
4ECC

briefing:VEHLENasked the 'source of the material. In German, OBEMIUDEM mussmmed.

7S$7.
1rozrepen4ishlications And the 1444
11-. .

Arrival_and.E*1144. of 5 September 1955:

::gt9
.INCZC

a. .0ustoms . delays, identity . andpessport inspeCtiOns were. avoided at Nice

by the *arrangements made by LCDR N. W. HOLLOWAY, Flag Lieutenant to the roman:ander
Romance Sixth : Fleet, LCBR HOLLOWAY met the plane with two (2) sedans and arranged a
cor;) smoothopessage off the field. GERM admired the warm sunny weather and tropical
NAml scenery and:talked about the history of 'Nice and. Villefranane..

ICX:1.
b. At the pier near.V111efranche the OWSIXTHFLT barge awaited. the. party.
The party went aboard the.= SALEM at 1735' aid was greeted . byl,CDR , R4 0: HAMAN,
U. .TheSAID1.was so spotlessly clean and shipshape that the party "begged
pardon 5 when shoea . missed the runners .on deck. OEHLER was impressed by his first
oentaot withthe U.S. Navy, and especially with the attention devoted to him.
Havseed :wa - souveniir a memorandum presented him with the'roster of ship's
officerships., 001,ores, soda fountain and tobacco shop hours of operation, etc.

keoPy-of - thie memorandum, which' pleased

enclosure (1).

E.

amiLzpi

0 I?, T

very much, is forwarded as

CON 3 OF 4 COPIES

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That evening, in preference to attending the movies on the fantail,

ORMRN strolled the narrow streets of Villefranche in the company of the party.
While waiting for the captain's gig to return aboard, this officer talked alone
with GEHLEN.
5. Events of 6 September aboard . UM SALEM:

64 07Z.V.,,

c,C411,454q,,11,

4-1,4
9.,
co*r
A

, a. On 6 September after breakfast, SALEM hoisted anchor and proceeded at

slow speed to her rendezvous with the Sixth Fleet. After an inepection of.shipls
spaces, GEHLEN came to the subject of GIS accreditation. He anticipated no
serious setbacks and foresaw no difficulties in gaining parliamentary approve'
of his organization. He realized that it would be dangerous if the Gies
accreditation were made a political.issue,-andconsidered it his personal
achievement that the GIS is above politics. He said he tas influential friends'
in both.the government .and opposition partiei, but still anticipates lengthy
parliamentary debates. He is prepared to make minor concessions as the debates
progress. With binoculars in hand and seated in the command_ chair on the
Admiral's bridge, OMEN was the picture of a man with confidence in his future,
and appeared to be in command of the situation.
b. Prior to the last luncheon aboard the SALEM on 7 September, =MEN
asked this officer if Admiral OFSTIE would like a short briefing on the GIS.
This was left to his own discretion, and he appeared very pleased. Immediately
preceding the luncheon a small Corsican fishing craft appeared whose Skipper
asked help to repair his engines. GEHLEN followed the fishing craft incident
with interest and was impressed that the cruiser stopped to render assistance
to the Corsican craft. The lunch was a festive one and the atmosphere relaxed
and friendly. Seated to the right of Admiral OFSTIE, GEHLENimissed a bite
several times in his eagerness to provide quick and accurate answers to the
Admiral's questions about Germany, its economic condition and future.
c. .After lunch the party relaxed in comfortable chairs and engaged in social
conversation. Afterwards, GEHLEN gave a dignified briefing on the GIS, and avoided
Be presented matters accurately, including, details
any attemPt . 4.sensationalism.
- of initial setbacks. .According to GEHLEN, the last parliamentary recess found

FIAA
(WA

the OIS aviepted In 'principal, but various technicalities including opperoTal of

the budget remain to be settled during the October-November parliamentary session.
He antiCipated.no problems, however, which he could not overcome by the:concessions he is prepared to grant.. The GIS mission,- as explained by GEB42tri iS

the collection and evaluation of 'political, economic, and military intelligence.

Be explained that his Chief of Naval Evaluation, OBERMAYER, will be assigned
the naval evaluation desk at the' Ministry of Defense in addition to. his preient
responsibilities with GIS. He stressed the need for centralization of all
collection efforts for economy reasons and added that this trip made him realize
the teed . for reliable naval intelligence. CIEHLEN then talked about the "small
but effective" future German Navy in the Baltic which was to be ready to fruatrata

K.,,,t44

FiT
.00414

li-ez1"174-

1_1;;;' ;,
'

- . LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

COPY -3 OF 4 .COPIES

free,
VLRten
Sort 00017-55
12 October 1955

....ay-.

any Soviet attempt at invasion of Denmark, and added that the German Navy may
one day be worthy of a offensive mission in the Baltic. Be talked about the -

need for close cooperation with the NATO intelligence community, and indicated
that he had taken steps to establish liaison contacts with other countries..
GEE= made it plain that he hae close contact with Chancellor ADENkURR, and
predieted that the Chancellor's mission to Moscow is bound to fail. -According
to GEHLEN, AMMER was cognisant of the fact that he might meet hard Soviet
demands and hardly be accorded an opportunity to enter into serious negotiations.
Be therefore excluded from his party the Minister of Economics and his advisory
staff. - =LEN believed the Chancellor might sUoceed in negotiating the release
of the German prisoners of war, but that Soviet propaganda would arrange for
the credit to. go to. theGDR. It must be said that =LEN fascinated his small
jaidience, and that he was aware of this fact.
d. In the late afternnon a briefing was arranged for the visitors in the
of Admiral OFSTIR. The compoeition of the Sixth Fleet and some of its
geereeeeoperations and' operationalareas were reviewed by Capt. R. L. SMUT, the.Plans
: Mmwg

nena p
resence

4 =and Operations Officer; logistic and supply problems were presented by Capt.
7
lh' aegwift. D STANDUY, Fleet Logistic Officer. (=LEN displayed 'keen interest in the .
n_z ienintricate supply problems and the U.S. Navy developed methods of refueling and
:=A repaendshing at sea.

0_2
=T

e l Escorted by, Admiral OMITS, GLEN was shown the assembled fleet. and
bothaircreft carriers. The Plan of the Day, forwarded herewith asanclosure (2),
fee--.41mtes ' 1415 as flight quarters to transfer passengers to the USS :- COEAL . SEA.
!!::::OEHLENewithperfUme from the ship's store and.a box of cigars 'for State
REGRUSacretWrIrDr. GLOM, was transferred with Capt.-AMMON by the first flight.
:::MBSTheeart4rwas sent away With friendly waves from the Sixth Fleet Commamder and
his staff. ' During the visit =MEN extended an invitation to Admiral OFSTLE to

.0"

visit him in

Germany.

fra#26. 7 .9 Sptember-033

'Baia

a. The bell.eopter was met by

Admiral pCSTROM, COMCARDIV

6,

and his Chief

of Staff, Sborti.l after be arrived on the Admiral's bridge, GEHL=

on the sharp diffellince

between the SALEM and' the

commented

CORAL SEA.' OKHLEM.remarked

that the crew of the SALEM sweat to maintain her polish and dignity, that of
the CORX6 SEA to get a herd job done. His remark was appropriate, since the

CORAL SEA
in midst of refueling from a tanker . which was topping-off
destroyer on the other side.
WAS

b. With refueling underway, two cruisers and a submarine nearby, and

refueling and replenishing shies on the horizon,'GHLEN was at a lose to find
the right camera, although he had two (2) MINOX cameras (one loaded with black
and white, the other with colored film); one (1) Minotlightmeter; one (1)

Robotcamera with telescopic lens; one (1) Leica with telescopic lens; one (1)
fr,

n!STP!'7!..n.W9

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Ser: 00017.55
12 October 1955

Exakta loated with oolared film; and one (1) Minox fixed to his binoculars.
He respected the desires of the Commander Sixth Fleet, however, and avoided
taking pictures of electronic equipment.
c. Attar dinner-GEHLEN watched the landing of jet aircraft aboard the
darkened ship. As the first jet landed with a deafening roar and a terrific
Impact, and the heat of the jet thrust reached the bridge, ammo jumped hack
against this officer, believing the jet had crashed. As other jets landed
in precision he expressed his admiration for the tactics developed by the
Navy, the efficiency of the entire crew, the technical superiority of
the U.S. Navy, and the strategical importance of a modern aircraft carrier.
7. Oh . the.morning of 8 September =LEN was among the first to arrive at
breakfast and was eager to observe the launching and landing of aircraft.
miew During breekfast he thanked Admiral EKSTROM for the opportunity to witness
carrier operations, which he described as the most interesting and exciting
technical development he had over seen. Throughout that day it was impassible
C=41 to talk to him on any topic not pertaining to carrier activities. He listened
Colt) attentively to all explanations by Admiral EKSTROM, his Chief of Staff. and
Capt-ARMSIBONG, and shught out every opportunity to learn more about air
operationia . the carrier's tasks, and naval aviation in.: genaral. Escorted by
wawa a Marine orderly, =LEN appeared to be in his own milieu, and he enjoye d.
every minuteCt it. The next event of interest was the trans:ter of a hospdtal
wgziC case by highline from a destroyer to the carrier. Afterwards, MELEE was
introduced to the film 'Victory at Sea",parts of which were shown in the
emme
Senior Officer's country briefing room:

Com

rgie
i

8. a: After the catapult?.: launching of 6 jets on 9 September, GEHL= Asked

this officer about the ISoasibility of a U.S. Navy invitation: to General.
BEUEEMMERand ox-Admiral WAGNER to observe carrier and fleet operations.
Se=mito According to MIEN, these two individuals will be influential in the development of the future German Navy, and he felt that they should be made aware of
eapabdlitiee of modern ships and the vital strategic importance of naval
15261 the
caption.. =MEN asked.the advisability of. inciting State Secretary Dr. GLOMS
for a'similar visit as aguest of the U.S. Navy. Later, he .turned to Admiral
EKSTBOM to learn.aore . About the plane of the Sixth Fleet and the U.S. Navy's
plans for its operational forces in this area. GERM then talked about German
military activities during WW II in the Black Sea area and the Balkans. fie
stated that the Sixth Fleet was preserving the moral of the peoples.of.Groace,
Italy, and particularly Spain. Be explained that even in Germany the presence
of the U3Wfortes in the Mediterranean is most assuring, and that most of West
German .pleumIng in the Near East is based upon the presence of the Sixth .Fleet
in the Mediterranean. That same evaning . at the dinner table and prior to the
moviie he spoke freely about his views on India, Turkey, and Greece.
b. =LEN twice invited Admiral EKSTROM to visit Germany, and offered to
place a ear at the Admiral's disposal.
C! . F ;,,.....;').;_41.tr,
i,
.J .*-.

..1..; I.1 I

..

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OF 4 corns

-6-EC10,111

ezaarr jIIIC TED

VLEtton
Sart 00017-55
12 October 1955

DI23TRIBUTION

9. Arrival in Palma, Majorca: 0800 on 10 September-the arrival at Palma,

Rajarca.the 21 an salute of the CORAL SSA. and the whits dress uniforms
ispreiased -MILEIL Later he voiced his appreciation of the need for reliable

navallatelligince in the countries of call of the Sixth Fleet enl aiked

ichether ! thelixth Fleet would appreciate the receipt of OIS intelligeOtte.
as Wasthe secordtime that CIEHLDI indicated the poasibility of arranging
for the :resale of.STS colleoted intelligence to U.S. Navy operational

memuu.d406

10. Stvolling through the streets of.Palms, OMEN talked about the Spa:at& .
peOple,their history and struggles, and displayed keen knowledge of the

.461iiidel;and economic conditions in Spain. . SOcomiented upon the loyalty

of t6i1Plinieh ineneral, and in the.uteoc.:: of secrecy, he revealed that he

eitZkainkieda:very friendly liaison with leading Spanish militar7.tpirsona1ities.:::4t11030 that morning the group departed Majorca for Munich aboard the

COOMMit.Tiiircraft:
-has

that:GE4i1i t s visit was in every way a success. Es was

.irisi1Ay!;:;11**.ed- .137 the Sixth Fleet, very pleased by the attention and
couiteMen telly*: him by Admirals MST= And ISSISCX, and very- anzious -to
ainthe . rempecit (and support) of the U.S. Mew/ for Ms organization.
-1

V. L. RYCILY

Copy tot
i

Com toa 2 to COMM=

Copy /by. 3 to CIA (6966 SW) for Col. CRITCWIZE.De s

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-143-1-M-1111"--)

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- 6 -

COPY 3

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AWN

UNITED STATES SIXTH FLEET

ESERAMISE221111,1_2621FAB,
Welcome aboard the Flagship ce Commander SIXTH Fleet..
The attached list of Stiff'Officers, notice of hours of
, operation of the ship's stores and instrudtions concerning the Flag Mess
are provided for your information.
The Captain's Cabin- has been assigned for your use while
aboard. Your room Steward's name is VRBARES.
You are invited to eat all meals in the Flag Mess which
s:composed of the following members

VALK R.A. OFSTIE (Commander SIXTH Fleet)

CAPT . C.L. FREEMAN (Chief of . Staff-to ComSIXTERat)
CAPT R.L. SHIPLEY (Plans and Operations Officer, Com3IXTRF1t)
CAPT E.D. MANDL? (Fleet Logistics Officer ComS-IXTHP1t)
LC. T.E. BASS (Flag Secretary, ComSIXTRF1t)
LCDR E.W. HOLLOWAY (Flag Lieutenant, CosSIXTRF1t)
liaifei,,rlet' me know if.I can be of any assistance during your visit.
Very Respectfully,

Is/ E.W. HOLLOWAY

E.W. .HOLLOWAY
Lieutenant Commander, USN
Flag Lieutenant

Enclosure (1). to MUNICH REP of

COMNAVUER Ser 03017-55

Sunrise: 40610
Sunset: 1855

USS SAL74 (CA 139)

PLAN OF 1:71t DAY
Wednesday, 7 Septeober

1955

UNIFORM OF THE DAY: Officere and CPO's: Working Khaki

Undress White BAKER
Other Enlisted:
Perinea to correspond
Carry out 'At Sea" routineexcept as noted below:
0000 - 2400 - SALM AD Ship and Rescue Helicopter Guard
0500 - Prepare to TOP-OF? one Destroyer (Divisions concerned call own perraonnell
0630 - Man stations for refueling destroyer
0545 - Destroyer alongside for fueling
0600 - (1) Reveille
(2) Early breakfast for observers going to USS WORCESTER
0630 - Breakfast
0700-- (About) Transfer Damage Control and Engineering Observers from SALM
tolieiCESTMR by #1 and 2 MWB or high line fore and aft. Rig debarkation
net-Starboard Quarters. UNIFORM - Officers and CPO's - Working Khaki
with ties; Other Enlisted Undress White ABLE
eaki,
0730 - Nustei. Cmitations
and
AA
Surprise)
0740.(aboUt):General
Quarters
for
AA
Firing
(AA
George
.
1136. - Noon e1
1240 -, Nan616:and Gunnery Control Stations for competitive Target Designation CZ=
1300
141

(iiOtit)41ight Quarters to transfer passengers to CORAL SEA

1700 --(1) iteninemOal
19
awm:It
(2) (A6ailitY0bservers return to SALEM by boats or high line fore and aft
tra.
P.1
,
1915 -. Priiteit:Crit Mid-Week Devotions (Crew's Lounge)
2000 - vies on the Fantail
gsgift..4
rocele=kg,
=KLUX
irvvrtFesz0,,,,q,4..
s&-wit t4A
=RUSSELL
00-04 LTJG HOFFMANN-LTJG R.B. RYAN
ENS BLBRICH
ENS HOLDING

04708 LTJG:MC'EAUGHTON-LTJG LEAHY

,08712 LTJG!. WHEELER-LTJG MOLTHEN

ENS ADKINS
ENS CHANIAN

12'16;LTJWWX:HALL-LTJO KELLEY
16-18 . LTJOIERNALD-ENS YOUNG

. MIS RUSSELL
ENS HOLDING

18-20 LTJG,H6FFMANN-1/1'JG R.B. RYAN

20-24 LTJGFI6 NAUGHTON-LTJG KELLEY

-mr_swl&
Crorj:
16,41.JI

Agna
1. Allotaents will be started and/stopped at the Disbursing Office Today.

.
E. M. LUBY
Consander; U.S. *Wry
Executive Officer

Sr 60017'55 .
End: (2) TO MUNICH REP, CONNAWER

UP117-

SMRET LIMITED DicTRIBUZION

Itif (LEN
1145:

5 Sots

:p*mes

0:2L

and bia Naval

_,/

Assistant, Albrecht "SEPP" OBEMMAXER

Departed Munich via COMNAVOER Aircraft from Eaubiberg

Air Force Base (Munich vicinity)

&wort: can R.,

G. ARMSTRONG,

LC] V. L.

Chief of Staff, COMM=

=MX, Munich Representative of COMMER

C=1
Cat,sio,

Lummbson: Box lunch Aboard aircraft

RAJ

.1700:

mrmaull

Arrival Nice: met by LCDR F. W. =AWAY, pert Oleg

Lieutenant, COMS/XPRELT)

1735s

Arrival Villefranche

17401

Departed Villifrandhe via COMMITIFLT barge

1745:

Embark Flagship USS SALM (met by LCDR. G. HARTMAN,

usN, ba i t - Fleet Intelligence Officer)

&mac

1815:

Dinner in Admiral OFSITE's Cabin

COD.
RAJ

Biliettings GERM in Captain's Cabin

teticC
r4C43:

Re= IMAM in Cabin

alta
6: Sept:

315

2030T2130

Sightseeing Villefranche

0745:

Breakfast in Admiral's Cabin

Escorted by ECM HARTMAN through ship's spaces

7 Septa

/413

200:
1

Luncheon in . Admiral l a Cabin

1300:

Gunnery exercises 3s

1500:

Rendezvous of the Fleet

2001

Dinner in Admiral's Cabin

19453

Movie

07.45:

Breakfast in Admiral's Cabin

6330:

Inspection of below deck spaces, incl. engine room

10151

Gunnery

1400:

Emparture by helicopter to CORAL SEA to observe flight

ditid-5 a

gure

in Captain's Cabin

exerti4, including A/C sleeve runs

rdperatiobs

UMtTFJ

r.)!'..117T1111710V

WaTED DTSTRIEUTION

- 1-

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Tprn

1530:

Refueling at sea

Billeting: GERM: Cabin of CAPT D. P. SMITH Jr., USN, Cbief of

, Staff, Commander Carrier Division SIX
Herr OHERHATER: Cabin 0256
1800:
1900:

S.aPti

Dinner in Admiral's Cabin

Jet night operations and air strikes (darken ship)

0745:

Breakfast in Admiral's Cabin

0915:

Observation Of air ;strikes

1206:

Lunch in Admiral's Cabin

1400:

Inspeotion of ship's spaces: remote control drone

gunnery exerci2le

1950:

Highline transfer (Hospital case)

ie

2915:

0236;
,: .
4

.07451

076

in Senior Officer's spaces

Replenishment at sea
Breakfast
Replenishment

at sea

Luncheon

Air strikes inoludingrooket,

and low targets

A/A firing

on Saltsialta
samesum

=MC:

Dinner

INCIC

Movie

Breakfast
Departure by barge to Palma, Majorca

Demme
Cie)
Lagest
ireola

Sightseeing in Palma
Departure by =Nom Aircraft
6251

Arrival in.Munich
;-1

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T:Operational..
Oeneral GRUS I N VISIT to the 8ml FtEET (U.S.)
'
1. Attached la ono copy of a TOP SWIM report prepared by this Pkixieh
anted of thir'Coonnsidars t1,8, Throes, Gervestnyo . On the recent visit at
.General. OMEN to the Tani Fleet in the *aterraneso

It

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inpreasioa that tkti viait reprosentt asi..lapertant eclat:Kimtairilain 'effort to itakotrinato General GEM.ES and bin

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07MT...A COatiratit'er of the STITH U.S. riceto visited
(RNakd.Aon 7 October 1955.
One401* ..of thin .report has been retained at POD and 11111 be rade
2jonbin . raxt ..vintt to Pcillitoh.
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DECLASSIFIED A EASED BY
CENTRAL INTELL I8ENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I0N3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACT
DATE 2001
2005

3 e

7L-

aranslation-

"Die Welt"; Sunday, 13 November 1955

21o. 46 -- page 7

This story of feats. enters Secret Service"No-tran's-Land" during

' and after the war. To the public, Reinhard Geblen, chief of

the "Organization Gehlen", and head of the most important German

intelligence and counterintelligence organization, is a "man in
the dark". It is the first time that we learn, from a wellknown journalist, the story of his personal encounter with the
General, around whoa rumor has woven .a web. Juergen Thorvald,
the .writer who became remade through the numerous books of contemporary history he has written since 1945, is one of the few
outsiders who saw Gehlea with his own eyes and talked with him.

I...... THE DARK

TU
. K - MAN
mmm.a..====momowmal.m=
====================

First Authentic Report on General Reinhard Gehlen

By Juergen Thorwald
Winter was descending upon us, the winter of 1951,.when I first.
env ex-General Reinhard Gehlen. The name of the man who, in the
:romantic shimmer of secret service adventure, has become the
:target of so much, puzzled conjecture, was still unknown to the

public then.
What preceded my first meeting with this man was a-simple storyy
My boOk "En begann ander Weichsel" (It Started At River Vistula),
which was published in 1950, was the first to give, in come detail,
a description of.Gehlen and of his position or chief of the General
Staff Department "Foreign Armies Eaet" during the Second World war
which was then known only to a few specialists. Gehlen wanted lo
meet the author or the book who was unknown to him, and to /earn -.
how he had s come to know of Gehlen'e important role during the
Second . World. War.
Since I had not had the elighteet notion of Gehlen's existence myself before I itartod writing my book, I should like to begin with
devoting a few words to the circumstances involved. While I worked
on the book which describen the collapse of the German Eastern
Front in January 1945, end the flight and expulsion of the German
civilian population from the territories: east at Oder and Noise,
I 'paid a visit to ex-General Guderian, The General had. been the
chief of the General :itaff of the German Army daring the tragic

battles at the eastern front.

DE CLASSIFIED AND
RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTE LLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT

ION3i2i
NAZI WAR CRIMES

DATE 2001

DISCLOSUREACT

2005

EC-

At the time I called on Guderian, he dwelled humbly with his wife in

one room of an old religious establishment in the little town of
Dietramesell, between Nunich and Bad . Toela. During an entire day he
told me of his experiences in the fateful months in the winter of
1945; and in particular he spoke of the various desperate attempts
be had made in December 1944 to dissuade Hitler from launching his
senseless western offensive in the Ardennes i" and to persuade him
instead to assemble all available forces to reinforce the eastern
While Guderian .raked up . the memories of all this, he who
suffered of a grave heartdiseate, felt once more the feverish en.
citement of those winter weeks long one by... His face was hot we
he, repeating the words then spoken on both sides, described the .wild
quarrels with Hitler, and how Hitler had simply refused to bellete in
the situation reports which mentioned the strength of the Soviet
Armies. It was then that for the first time, as far aal was concerned, the name of Gehlen . was. mentioned.
Guderian's Story
"Thanks to the unequalled, outstanding work of Generalmajor Gehism,
who was the chief of my.Department 0 :oreign Armies East' at the time',
Guderian said in these name words, "I knew of the troop:concentratiOtt,
of the plans, arid of the strength of the Soviets almost in detail. .
Everythino Gehlen reported at the time, proved uftorwardelo be eerroct, when things began :to happen. frequently before had I had omega..
sion to observe the almost incredible carefulnene and exactness-of his
Intelligence work in regard to the Soviet enemy. Therefore, I nevem' .
queetioned his prediction that the 'Soviets would begin a great often
sive against our eastern front in January 1945."
"On Chriateue Iva 1344, I had again appealed in vain to ilitler in his
headquarters, which wan then in Ziegenberg in 'Jesse, to reinforce the
eastern front and to protect the German civilian population", *Gederiai
continued, "and during the night which led us into the year 1945 I vett
once more to Ziegenberg. Gehlen had drawn for me exact maps ) which
were understandable at a aingle glance and which depicted the
operational Plan of the Soviets. Bat when I spread them out before
Hitler, he swept them away. 'Who dug out that nonsense ?" he cried.
And when I mentioned Gehlen's name, he yelled: 'That man should be
locked up in a mental institution !, I explained to him that Gehlen'a
work in the field of intelligence evaluation wee probably the best
that could be hdd on . tho German side. Should Hitler wish to put Gish- .
len into a mental institution, he might -just as well send me along, too.
Rit/er quieted down, but did not change hia opinion.

January 1945, in a mood of extreme deepair, / drove to Ziegenberg for the third time. Thia time i brought Gehlen along eith Me. It
was a real sacrifice for him. In all probability, baseless abuse would
be heaped on his head. When Hitler enterea the room ) he merely vast a
glance of furious contempt at Gehlen. .!e stared into Gohlen o s face,
grown hagcard and yellowish-pale from gall attacksolna4 months of
overstrain. His eyea showed the hatred' of umhm wao7well enough

On 9 .

. 3 in his heart that Gehlen was right, but Who would not for all the
world admit that he was right * since admitting would have meant
hie own end, Hitler did not interrupt Gehlen when he made the
Alituation report upon my request. As usual, Gallatin made his
statements with soientifia exactness and with intellectual
superiority, He ignored Hitler's stare. His report would have
convinced any . reasonable person. However, between Gehlenos
realism and Hitler. there was no bridge. I, too, was unsuccessful
when I-added the statement that it was now "five minutes to
twelve". -We returned to Zoasen without results. The catastrophe
set in during the night from 11 to 12 January 1 9451 and Gehlenls
prediction found a tragic justification ..."
Gehlen Throws Out His Peelers
So I learned for the first time of Gehlen o s existence from Guderian, without the slightest notion that Gehlen, with the help
of the Americans, had long ago resumed his intelligence work in
regard to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Guderian t s statements concerning Gehlen were confirmed more than once during the
conversations I had subsequently with other surviving witnesses
of the conflicts between the leaders during the last months of the
war in the East.

There is no doubt that, without my knowing or suspecting it, a

sort of intelligence exercise of "how to approach an object" was

carried out, before I met Gehlen in person for the first time
eighteen months later, in late Fall of 1951, I have no proof, but
I am sure that a few ex-officers who volunteered information which
could be used as source for the second volume of my description of
the Neat German catastrophe "Es endste an der Elbe"(it Ended at
Elbe .iiver), and allowed me to interview them in person, had reaeived instruction from Gehlen to look no over and fina out what
kind of a percoa I was.
Finally I was "openly contacted" by a General who had played a not
insignificant role in the battle of East Prussia, and who had been
dismissed by Hitler because of his consideration for the civilian
population. Many months before I had interviewed 4im concerning
his East Prussian experiences. He asked me if I should like to
talkwith this same Generalmajor Gehlen whom .1 had described. I
agreed. But even than I learned nothing at all of the role Gehlen
began to play around that time.
Meeting Place NUnich
An appointment was made to meet in the evening of a Thursday, in
lived at the time. That night I had some work to
Munich, where
do in an editors' office in Uunich-Uarlaching. It was there that
'Since I had no idea of intelligence practices,
I was to meet Gallen.
I was to experience a . few surprises in regard to this meeting.
It was already dark outcide, when a polite, well-bred young man
entered the ante-room. De said that the Doctor was waiting for me
outside, in his car.

"The Doctor ?" I asked.

"Yee,. he smiled obligingly, "that is how I address my chief, with
whom you have an appointment. He would like to dine with you in
Schwabing..."
.
I did not show my surprise about the discovery that in 1951, then
many former officer lived in very reduced circumstances, a former
'General owned a ear and played the host. I merely naked what I
'was supposed to . d0 with my own oar.
maiden tally, I still do not know who he was -The young man
assured ma that he would drive the car. to Soheabing . himself '4..
When we came out-on Harthauser Strasie, I saw no car there, except
my. own, and the Mercedes which was the property of the pUbliaber.
Kindler. However, the young man took me another hundred.seters
along the street. There, : under a tree, stood a dark , Opel Kapitnen
with dimmed lights. The door on . the-driver e s right side went .Open,
and the inside light was switched on for a moment. The only person
in the -car eat behind the wheel, a slim man.of . abOut fifty years,
in a dark-grey wait. He turned his face to me, pulled a grey glove
off- his right . hand, and- offered it to Mee
"Gehlen", he said. Nothing else. But one single glance in the
half-light at the unusually high and wide forehead told me that
this was the man whom Guderian had described in such convincing
terms.
.

Talk At Night

The young man closed the door from the outside, ind'Oehlen drove an
to the tenter of the city. There was a light evening mist, However, it did not take me long to discover behind us the lights and
the broad radiator front of my own oar. rverything really SOOMed
to run smoothly like a well-oiled machinery. Soon, however, .I had
no more tice . to watch the street and the lights behind us, becauee
Gahlen began abruptly to speak of the problems of our times, and
to ask Tuestione. And 'even during this drive, in the dark of the
ear, he spoke with such Captivating clarity that,; after hardly tan
minutes' driving, I was aware, with wonder, that here I was driving
through the Munich evening side by side with a certainly unusual
type of General -- a type which lacked the single-mindedness and
the gruff:lees f had so often encountered in numerous previous inter-

Vine.

When, after a short while, we sat oppoeite one another in the

drawing-room of a one-family house which had apparently been re-,
quisitioned by . the Americans, or perhaps still wee, and which stood
in one of the.remoter etreste of Schwabing
whilevof course,
both ears had been parked in another street, around the corner -and wore served sandelches by a silent male servant, I saw Gehlents
head and his figure for the first time in bright light. And this

-5sight confirmed tho impresaion I had gained on the ways It would

never have occurred to anyone who sae him or the first time, not
-knowing of his paet that he had been a generals'
.There was nothing about him of that helplee eness and forlarnneas,
nothing of that feeling of vanished groUnd under One's feet, and
of being unable to find one's way in a changed woride which
characterized so many officers in those timoe. He seemed to
radiate steadineas, clarity, security, uuperior intellectual analyals or post-war timee, combined with the eractical abilite to
find his way in chaos.
He was of. medium height and slim, but strong. His suit wee inconspicuous and simple', negligently worn, one might -say, in the
manner of some Nngliahmen, or else in the manner of persons whoue
minds are active, 'whose occupation keeps them awake, and who are
not paetioalarly concerned with their outward appearance. He wore
a grey suit with a grey pullover, and brown loafers with crepe
soles. The tie was in a negligent knot. To Mention it right at
the start: his trouser pocket did not bulge with a heavy eun, es
someone . 11t14 said somewhere recently, ner did he wear a holster
over his shoulder with a plata' under his left arm. Needlean to
say tket he did not Wear the dark elessee without whice eome people
seem i capable of visualizing an intellieenoe man. H16 left breast
pocket contained a few revolving pencils, and a htndkerchiei.
unnoticed in the D-Train
.e
It is very probably because of his natural inconspicuous:lees in
dress and manners, that t few montha*ago, at a time when.C;ehlents
name was on everyone' s lips, Gehlen could, with a companion, ate?
into a second-class compartmeet of a D-train which was filled with
Journalists -- of all people. Geelen sat amonget therd, read his
newspaper, and listened to the conversation about himbelf,.and
hoard one of them say that it was a "disgrace" that no one had as
yet succeeded in gdtting hold of Gehlenin Bonn or in ::lanich, or at
least in taking a picture. After eeveral houre -..lohlendeocended
his place of destination; it had occurred to na one thut he might
be the person they waated au badly. It was this,eutwo.rd inconspicuoamnose which kept my mind buey

At first eight, this inconspicuousness could even be applied to his

face, if one took in only his thin blond hair, bin light eltin which
rather abruptly was red on hi u cheeka, - and the certainly not very
ilegsnt short. mouutache. However, if one looked at hi u forehead,
and especially if one . felt directed upon oneself tho p.anutrating,.
searcnine gaze out of dee-set eyes, the sensation of inconspicataanose vanished. This glance was a strange mixture of the seneitivo
'intellectuality of a man of'learning, and of the wide-awake energy
of an organizer, but also ot: the guarded versatility a: a diplomat.

-6.
This, then, was Gehlen who sat over against me while 1, in vain,
meditated upon the question what kind of person the Eastern front
General Staff officer and intelligence expert might have become,
whom Ouderian had so singularly praised. While Gehlen ate only a
few morsels, aad drank little, he *ant on with the general
political-hietorieal convereation he had begun in the oar, and
which. conf!.rmed that ho felt no ressentimente whatever toware the
past, or . toward the victors.
Gehlen explained that the leaders of the Soviet Union, unless they
should betray their own ideology and destroy the ground under
their own feet, would never, and could never, abandon the plan of
communist conquest or infiltration of all of urope, and ultimately
of the world. It was the miesion of the weetern nations, he said,
first to join forces, and then, overooming mar ressentinents and
the historical national contrasts, to build up a power which would g
by combative action, render impossible a. sudden farther expansion of
the Soviet power.

Such equilibrium of political power, he continued, must not be the

basis for another attempt to destroy the Soviet power and the Soviet
nation through war. Even if it should be possible to ainquish the
Soviet system, the eastern nation, with its millions of nationconscious inhabitants and with its enormous economic resources,
would still remain an tremendous world power, or would at arsvrate
soon regain that position. No --. the present power policies.pernit
the carrying out of patient long-term polnies for the eoaceful re-construction ot hietorical Europe and Germany, True, ho said, one
must be flexible and patient, and one must learn to recognise, and
to exploit, the phases in which the partner is willing to negotiate,
the phases when he wiehes to stake back, or when he feels theneed
for rest. -Even the Soviet nation muet needs go through such phases,
in consequence of domcetic economic problems, in aoneequence of the
nationalism of the so-called satellite nations, and in the first
place, in consequence of the -- while communistic -- more nationaliettM
developments in test eeia.
However, Sehlon pondered, the basis required for such lone-term
policies would be.the never-ending pursuit of exact knowledge of
the developments inside the Soviet Union in all walks of life. It
would be only by etch knowledge that protection could be granted
against illueions and wich-dreaming with their fatal dangers, while
the Soviet Oovernment would never leave the ground of cold realiutic
thinking. Only such knowledge could safeguard the reality of our
own political work, and would prevent us and our own primary need for
security from dropping off into sleep because of such wieh-dreaming.
When Gehlen had reached this point, I asked hint "Do you think the
western intelligence services can curry out uuch services now, considering that during the war some of them defended Soviet aims which
had in part been depicted wrongly ?"
Gehlen looked at me. It was as if he gazed from out of a fortress of
supreme knowledge.

"Uistory", ha said oracularly, "will probably determine one day,

whether those intelligence services you have in mind have
painted a wrong or a correct picture, and how nrch of it was
right or wrong; or whether, and to what extent, governments
were unwilling during the war to listen to realistic situation
reports.
In The Service Of The USA
"An intelligence service truly devoted to its mission ie never
engaged . in . political affairs. Its soli mission is to drai an
infallible picture Of the situation, with all means it has at
its .disposal4 and with scientific oxactness regardless whether
the picture is pleasant or unpeeasant. It will have convincing
power only if the government to which it presents the picture,
knows by experience that the service is incorruptible t enot in.
fluenced by domestic politics, or otherwise, and pureues truth

with iron determination.- These prerequisites have not always

existed in the past, and nnteverythere, including Germany,

However, that iu what the future is for, namely to learn from
the peat, and I am sure that much studying . and building up is
bein g. done at preuent ..."

The eueution was on the tip of my tongue to which corners of the

world Gehlen's department "Foreign Armies Last" might have been
scattered which, if Ouderian was right, had collected more knee..
lodge about the Zoviot Union than any other intelligence- aeririce

of -the western world. But Gehlen, diplomatically,. prevented the

queetion which aould have gone right to the core . of the work he
was performine jUet teen. Instead, we talked about hoe I had
come to write my book, and how to present correctly his role
during the last tragic weeke of the Second World War in the East;
and. did I think I might one day want to write, the history of the
German counterintellieeece, including perhaps its fate after the
collapse.
And that hroueht our ceaversation to an end. When we patted, a
sort of-shyneua prevented meefrom asking frankly what Gehlen had
done with hio life after the war, end whether he had found a good
position in some businese, as his appearance ueemed to indicate.
At any rate, I made a mental note of what he had said about future
policies and the mieeions of. western intelligence eervicee, and
today, when it has come true that a policy of wide-awake realiotic
flexibility le necessary, I find fur-sightedness in what he said
au well so a definite earning against the illusione of these times.
Our cars drove away in different diroctionn, in e thick fog,

learned from a not . exactly . taciturn po?itician

in Bonn that Reinhard Gehlen had long ago turned his department
" w oreign Armies East" over to the americans, nearly intact4

Two weeks later

Next instalment

Birth of tha Oreanizatien Gehlon.

Picture of Gehlen Among

Legend;

Group of Soldiers.

All Pictures of General Reinhard Gehlen

Are At Least Ten Years Old

This picture shows Gehlen (the person who stands alone

in front) Surrounded by his soldiers during the war. .
There exists no picture of Gehlen taken after the war.
Even the great photo agencies Aid not succeeciin taking
his picture, although they had promised high rewards.

Picture of General Guderian

Legend: : .

Five Minutes To Twelve

showed the cloak-when General Guderian called..on Hitler
to obtain from him reinforcement for the eastern front.
In Vain. Oehlen's work, which Guderian had termed "unequalled and outstanding", had been futile.

Picture of Rit;er
Legends

"That Men Hhou]d Be Locked Up

In A Mental Institution"
said . Hitler . when he was shown Gehlen's report about the
plans for an offensive of the Soviet Army. Hitler
refused to. believe -- but Gehlen was right. (On the
1Wtt side, behind Hitler, Pieldmarshal Keitel, on the
right Bide General Helder.)

Translation

"DIE WELT",
:Sunday, 20 November 1955
page 9

HE

IIA

IN

THE

DARK

Factual Report About General dehlen

By Juergen ThOtwald
It was one of the first wintry days in 1951.
A dark Opeli-Eapitaen was rapidly crossing

the' streets of Munich, in a light evening

mist, driving toward the center of the city,
A little later, the two passengers of.thie
oar sat facing each 'other in a little villa
in Schwabing. - This was the first meeting
between the mysterious General Reinhard Geho.
lea, chief of the largest German intelligence
organization, and the well-known . writer Juin..
gen Thorwald. Thorwald wrote this report on
the basis of this private-conversation, ant
the subsequent encounters. It thrOwi a light
upon the life of Gehlen, the mysterious "Man
in the Dark".
Gehlen was born in Erfurt on 3 April 1902, as the son of the pUbliehar
Walter Gehlen, afterwards directoref-the Ferdinand .,Hirth Publishing.
louse In Breslau.. -He attended. the classical Gymnasium in BreslamaJand
passed final examination there in 1920. That same year he became e.
"Fahnenjunker ti (officer-aspirant) of the First Battery of . the Artillery Regiment . 6 in .fthweidnitze

This decision Was unusual in those days; Germany was being disarmed,
the officer's career offered scant prospects. It was even more remarkablesinoe Gehlen,. like his brother who became a scholar, possessed all the qualities required' for a scholarly profession. His
father, who had been a professional ofeioerbefore he became a pub.
Usher, had no doubt influenced him in this respect. In'1920, his
father could not possibly know to what extent the planned Reichawshr
would be reduced. It was only in 1921 that it was decided to fix the
number of military personnel . at 100.000 men.At any rate, in the course of the following years young Gehlen went- .
through all the phases of . tae officer's career in the Heichswehra 'On
1 December 1923, after two years of servioe with troops, and after
having attended the Infantry and Artillery School for a year, he
beoame a Lieutenant. In 1926 he was ordered to attend the Cavalry

2
School in Hannover, where he was promoted First Lieutenant in 1928.
In 1929 he returned to Schweidnitz as an Adjutant of the Artillery
Detachment stationed there. He remained in this position until
1933, when he was detailed to . a General Staff . training course,
This order was a special honor at the time, before the sudden inflation of military personnel due to rearmament and Second 'World
War. It is certainly a matter f'dispute whether or not the methods
of selection were one-sided, which Generalobertt von Seeckt . had

established, At any rate, these methods asked for considerable intellectual:faculties, Rarely were more than sixty or seventy young
offioers of the entire Reiohswehr, in one and the same year, ad.
Mitted.to General Staff training which was then still disguised as
"Fuehrer-Gehilfen-Ausbildung" (training of leaders' assistants)*
One of them was Gehlen.
Military Academy in

1934

When the Military Academy in Berlin was reopened in 1934, Gehlen was
one of its first students. In 1934 he was promoted Captain.. In 1935
he was attached to the General Staff , of the new German army, in the
position of Adjutant to the Oberquertiermeister I (Deputy Chief of
the General Staff). That, too, was an honor, since most Military
Academy students were transferred back to the troops.. From 1936 to
1937 Gehlen worked under von . Manstein who was then a. General in the
General Staff t e Group Fortification. He then served with troops,
like all other General Staff officers. Gehlen completed this assignment in Liegnitz as a Battery Commander in 'Artillery Regiment 18.
When the Second World War broke out,' the hurried, sometimes improvised
.estibliehment of reserve divisions brought Gehlen back to General.
Staff service. He became First General Staff Officer of 'the 213th
Infantry Division, which belonged to "Wehrkreis" (military area) TIII
in Silesia, and which formed part of what was, called the "Third Wave"
during the Polish campaign.
.
Immediately after the Polish campaign, lehlen (who was now a Major)
was eent back to Group Fortification in the General Staff. During
the French campaign he was the Liaison Officer of von Brauchitsch,
High Commander Of the Army, for the Army of Busch as well as for the
Armored Groups of Roth and Guderian.
Raider's Adjutant

Before the war in France was over, Gehlen had become the Adjutant of
Generaloberst Helder, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and six
months later he was the head of Group East of the Section Operation
in the General Staff, under General Heusinger. While he was there,
he was promoted Lieutenant Colonel. For the first time he was Oenfronted with the problems of the Bast which were to play so great a
role in Ids future life. Up to that time, however, he had never had
any connection with the Intelligence Service. His appointment to
Chief of the 12th Department of the General Staff in Spring of 1942,
upon Raider's instigation, oame as a surprise even to Gehlen. This

department is better known under the name of "Fremde Heere Oat"

(Foreign Armies East).
Ever since it had been established, the department "Foreign Armies
East" ...its counterpart was the department "Foreign Armies West"
-- had had. a mission which, in a way, was of intelligence nature.
The real military German intelligence service, "Abteilung Abwehr"
(Department counterintelligence) in the High Command of the Armed
Forces, under Admiral Canaria, supervised through its sub-department
the procurement of intelligence concerning the military strength .
and the military plans of the enemy. This intelligence was not

evaluated there. The material collected was passed on to the

General Staffs of the various branches of the armed forces, These
General Staffs then instructed Ic-Sections, for example "Foreign
Armies. East" and "Foreign Armies West", to compile this intelligence
in coherent situation reports. In addition to, and in competition with, the Intelligence Service of
the OKW under Admiral Canaria, the . "Reichssicherheitshauptamider SS"
set up its own extensive intelligence service, i.e. Section 6-under
SS-Brigadefaehrer Schellenberg.:
At first Reichseicherheitehauptamt was compelled to reutriot these
activities to political intelligence, since the Alitary Intelligence
Service of Admiral Canaris blocked its way. However, it was their
intention from the start to get Canaris out of the way at the first
opportunity, and .to push Section 6 to the too of an extensive . political-military-economic Intelligence Service. However, these efforts
were doomed to fail because of the ideological fanatism, the onesidedness, and the dilettantism with Which the task was tackled.
This intelligence service, for the establishment of which they were
straining every nerve, could not become the ideal successful
geuce service which would procure sober and absolutely objective information, simply because it looked through the colored speotacles of
its own ideology, On the other hand, it was just this fact which
gave it a chance in Hitler's eyes, a better chance than the champions
of incorruptible objectivity would have, since he, too, wanted to see
the world only through hi& own colored spectacles.
The Department "Foreign Armies East" had every reason to know this,
even before Gehlen became its Chief. Hitler's -first steps on the military grounds had been uncertain; when several victories convinoed
him that he had been right, his uncertainty turned into a.dangerous
certainty of his infallibility, and thereafter he wanted no more
exact situation-reports. This had become very clear when the Soviet Union was attacked. Actually, the blame was not his alone. Generaloberst Haider, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, knew
quite well that his Department "Foreign Armies East" had not worked
satisfactorily until the and of 1941. Raider's strange fate had led
him, einoe- the putsch in 1938 againat Hitler had failed, via many
victories accepted by him with mixed feelings, into futile opposition
against the attack upon the Soviet Union; he felt that the Department "Foreign Armies East" had provided him with quite inadequate and
unconvincing material, which was not strong enough for him to use for

-4

his opposition. His opinion was that the departmento-including ite

chief, was antiquated.
nen in winter 1941/42 the disaster set in for the German army inthe-East, when the first signs of the collapse became discernible
and justified Halder's pessimism, he decided upon a thorough-reorganization.
The Birth of Organization G.
Ealder had not yet abandoned all hope that he might ' convince Hitler
of the fatal -dangerousness of his boundless military adventures by
'confronting him with strong facts, A new department "Foreign Armies
East" was to furnish him facts and arguments. Helder put forty-year
old Colonel Gehlen in charge of the organization of this department;
he knew . why he selected a.maa who knew nothing whatever about intelligence activities. He knew Gehlen. He knew the qualities which
had made this man an outstanding figure even then. Not only was
Gehlen anergetic l .and had the qualities - ef a great organizer; he
also, possessed all the ta/eats of unincorruptible, cool, scientific
systeMatist; he had the intellectual farsightedness of a man whose
thoughts went beyond-military: affairs into the .fields of economy and
politics. Last, but not least, he poeaeused that touch of empathy
and intuition which is -indispensable in intelligence work. If Helder
has ever shown psychological insight, it was in this instance.
I do not know what Gehlen thought of Hitler and his national-socialist
policies during the first years of the war. He was probably. as indiffernnt as many other officers who afterwards became the victims of
the 20th of July, At any rate, when he assumed. hi u new duties, his
intellect, cool as it was, had already clearly distinguished between
illusien s and reality.. Ht, 'an old and close friend of Stief and Finokep
knew, what to think of Hitler's policies and Hitler's warfare, 'His last
illusion, if he had had any, must have been the one which mad d him
accept the mission. It was the hope nursed by Helder end Many othersp
that they might still persuade Eitlerpthrough the force of circumstances,
to turn back and desist.
Shortly after he had taken over, Gehien had spoken to a young officer
who had been detailed to his staff shortly before, and what Gehlen
said is characteristic of what he had in mind in regard to the East,
which was to be his future domain. His words were characteristio also
for the plans he had for hiu department and his work.
The young man's name as 'Terre. He was a Major,' and he bad just gone
through the ordeal of the heavy ninter battles near Stalino with the
German Mountain Corps. According to Heere l p notes, Gehlen asked himi
"You probably expected to be given another assignment ?"
"Yes, Sir".

-5Hitler/s Illusions
Oehlen: "I'm sorry. My General Staff officers must be young, :and
they must have had battle experience, and they must know Russia,
Tou can Count those who are eligible on the fingers of one hand...
The Department I have . taken over here has done careless and thought
less work,,"
"It will be our Jose, Gehlen continued, "to obtain anii, 'objective,
Comprehensive, and convincing picture of the situation, and to draw
this picture with such exactness that no one in Supreme Headquarters
can overlook its import. That is our chief task, which has first
priority, and we can carry it out only with fresh and vigorous per,sonnel.".
And: "The result of our first task will make it mercilessly clear
to ui that it was a. perilous illusion to believe that our military
:forces could defeat Russia. We must get used to speaking openly.
The Fuehrer l s idea of conquering Russia by force, with the aim of
inconsiderate exploitation as if it were a German cotony, : cannot but
boing ruin upon-us. The-work of our Department will make it clear
to us, with scientific exactness, that there is but one chance for
us to settle the problem of the Soviet Union satisfactorily. We can
remove . the Soviet system only if we succeed in making allies of the
Russian . population, What you saw when you advanced, pictured tho'
situation throughout . the country* . namely, that the population is
singularly inclined to. welcome Us. They were spontaneously willing
to help us. However, the instructions of the Sup reme Command of' the
Army forbid us to use this willingness for our purposes...Everything
depends on whether or not we shall succeed in making the requite of
our wOrk so convincing that the Fuehrer will realize that there is
absolutely no hope for his policy of power, and will accept the foot
that this war can be brought to a good end only in cooperation with
the Russian masses...which eld must not mean that Russia is going to
be a Utopian colony of Germany...".
'These words prove that Gehlen, who Ind just emerged from the anonymity
of General Staff officer, did not think of the mission he had just'
'started on merely as a special mission. Despite the frequent stomach
troubles of thechronically overburdened worker, he soon mastered the
task Raider had pegged out for him.
Agents in the Ural
He selected young able-bodied organizers. He knew how to make effeative use in his department ofpersons who know Russia, persons who
were technical, economic, agricultural, and political experts, some
of whom had been misassigned to some orderly job in a staff office.
When Gehlen discovered that there was only a very thin stream of intelligence flowing in from the department "Counterintelligence" of
the High Command of the Armed Forces, far too thin for him to obtain.

a true pioture of the situation in the Soviet Union, he used his

own initiatives Canaria, wise and skeptical, foresaw that he
would net hold his office very much longer; . he not only gave
Gallon authority, but helped him, too, Canaria realized that
the endeavors of the Reichseioherheitshauptamt to have him/i.elieved
and to take over . his agency, would be suntessful in. the "end. He
thought that shifting his intelligence activities' in 'the East over
to the department "Foreign Armies East",'whose previous work had
largely consisted of mere intelligence evaluation, might be the
only way to stem what was evolving.
As time went on, Gehlen succeeded in colleoting his min informs...
tion about the Soviets. Other officers were appointed to positions
in-theeounterintelligence agencies of the East front armies whieh
had often been inadequately filled.. "Frontaufklaerangstrupps"
(frontline reconnaissance units) were established in Army Groups,
whose sole mission was to establish exactly how strong the enemy
was, and what he planned. to do.
Every prisoner was interrogated; oombat patrols were sent out to
capture certain persons; every Soviet soldier's pay-book, every
Soviet newspaper, every Soviet APO letter, every imprint on captured weapons and installations was studied. The total information,
when evaluated, produced an amazing amount of intelligence ;aterial.
Systematic collecting and studying of all'available newspapers, of
world radio news concerning. the Soviet Union; the interrogation and
employment of civilian Soviet specialists on this side of the German
front (it was the first time that this was done); the evaluation Of
aerial photos, and the employment of Russian anti-Soviet agents
which reached as far as the Ural -- all this made the compilation of
situation reports possible of a kind never known before.
Gehlea adjusted his raconnaissaboe activities to the Soviet .system,
and extended them over long periods. Realizing the difficulty of
finding collaborators in high Soviet Party or Government offices,
who would collect highest level information, he sent young anticommunist Russians back to the Soviet territory with the instruction
to work their way up in the Party and to report back after ten or
fifteen years or so.
It seemed at the time that he could not have more . than a ten-percent
chanee to succeed. That hi a chances were actually much better, became evident many years after the war when such men in high furiationg
actually gave signs of life.
bonnfall
In May 1944, when Schellenberg finally reached his goal of getting
Canaria out of his way and taking over the military intelligence

service, Gehlen's department "Foreign Armies East" had long before

become an independent Intelligence Service which covered the entire
eastern area,

r7171

-7Thie.was the seoret of Gehlen t s suocess: organizational skill;

oreative imagination in weaving the intelligence net; the ability
to win honest friends, and their confidence, among the anti-Soviet
Russians of those years; and the systematicassembling of minute
mosaios . ehich had been neglected before, and which now revealed
piotures of the over-all.sitUations. In his Methods he .broke
definitely with the system of one-sided military: aspect's, and. in-.
eluded -everything of ..e. political, economic, industrial, and even
philosophioal nature, Gehlen t s situation reports were Justified,
as early as in 1943, bysubsequent events, with a precision which
had an'alarming effect upon experts,

Next issues
Flirtation With Death
Gehlen Makes Conditions to Americans

.4:

- 8 -

Picture of Gehlen
Legend'

A Penetrating Eye -- An Energetic

Chin

are the distinguishing points-in Gehlen t s faoe. This

picture was taken during the war, it is one of the
very few snapshots taken of him, and it Already shows
the clarity and eelfassuranos, the supreme intellectual analysis, all the qualities which have always
been mentioned ey Gehlen t s coworkers.

Picture of a Sohoololass
legend'

4 Slim Youth of Eighteen

This picture was taken in 1920.. A reader of WELT AU
JORNTAG kindly sent it us. Re was Reinhard Gehlenfs
olassmate during nine years, in the Koenig-WilhelmGymnasium in Breslau. Gehlen is the first person in
the first row, on the left side.

Picture of Canaria
Legends

Admiral Canaria
lent G. a helping hand. When the SS felled Canaria,
the Gehlen organization had already taken over many
of Canaris i missions,

Picture of Himmler
Legend:

Hinder Interferes
Himmler tried to increase his influence over the
military intelligence Service of which Admiran Canaria
was the head, through the Reichssioherheitshauptamt,
Department 6, under SS-Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg.

Translation
"Die Welt",
Sunday, 2 7 November 1955

THE

MAN

IN

===== =Ma. 72.732

THE

DARK

Paotual Report on Gene mi Gehlen and

His Organization
By Juergen Thorvald

IIIaLIRTATION WITH DEATH

When.Gehlen took up the position of chiefof the Department "Foreign

Armies East" in 1942, he thought that his mission . should not consist
'of . tero collecting incontestably clear situation reports on the
strength and on the intentions of the Soviet enemy, the deadly grimness'of whichone hoped, might still deprive.Hitler t s. military adventurousness of its basis,
Helder, *hose thoughts had been trained along purely military lines,
might be satisfied with the idea that he might succeed in deviating
Hitler's mind from further Offensives in the East, which would then
make it possible to start on a defensive action according to plan.
However, this . Was no solution for the unprovoked fighting in the
East, considering what might happen afterwards.
Raider, Too, Was Overthrown
Gehlen1 whOie mind Already reached further, beyond purely military
matters, joined men who had discarded all thoughts concerning the
appropriation of.Soviet soil on the part of the Germans, and who
wished to conclude an alliance on a confidence basis with those
millions of Soviet citizens who were ready to rebel. against Stalin.
Gehlen wai aware that these endeavors (he knew that in this idea
men like Wagner and Stauffenberg agreed with him) could be successful'on/i if put into practice swiftly, as long as the East was Still
aware of the German power, and'as'long as Stalin's government had .
not recovered from the first shook. Hitler's and . Rimmler l s policy
of "destruction of subhumanity" had already greatly Shaken hope and
Confidence in the occupied territories. .Should this policy Of contempt and murder be continued, it could not but result in a wave of
hatred; never to be overcome, ihstead of in the readiness of millions
to believe in the Germans as their helpers in their fight Against the
government in Moscow. It could not but drive the Masses toward
Stalinp'and it could not but provide Stalin with an opportunity to
tike the lead in a war of liberation against the Germans. Gehlen
foresaw that thici development would make Stalin a national hero, and
that the Soviet population would gather around him -- not in oommunistio unity but -- in a patriotic fervor like they had never known
before, Not only was it necessary to. bring Hitler to his senses in

- 2 regard to military affairs; it was also neceseary to abandon the

idea of Germanic colonization, and the absurd conception of Russian
"subhumanity",
When Gehlen had assumed responsibility, he did everything in his power
to support strivings to that effect. His decisions were Of a very
stimulating nature. ,There was an interrogation camp for captured
Soviet Officers in Loetzen which was under his command, and where.
Soviet prisoners were indiscriminately treated on an equal basis;
numerous Russian and 'Ukrainian' persons emerged from this camp who soon
played a leading role in the various attempts at establishing Russian
troops and at organizing liberation movements. It was his department'
which picked out General Vlassev in Loetzen, brought him-to Viniteal
and tried to prepare the read for him to become the head of a Russian
liberation movement against Stalin.

I do not know meetly how long-Gehlen believed in the . poaeibility to .

put such ideas into practice, under the prevailing circumstances, On

the one hand, considering the speed with which he obtained knowledge
of the reality, of Soviet life, he must Soon have realized the diffioul.
ties with whf N. the farrier Soviet citizens wereconfronted because lot
the dissimilarity of thoUght . among Greater Russians, Ukrainiaihepara
tists, or Caucasians. They may have overoome the difficulties in the
end. _However, it proved hopeless to convince Hitler of the deadly .
grimness of the situation, at least of the military part of it.
Halder's hopes Were completely frustrated. Raider was overthrown.
Gehlen realized that there was no chance any more ot changing Hitler's
thinking, dominated U.S it was by obsession and obstinacy. And there
were already signs of. the birth of a new hussian nation under communist-nationalist banners, welded togegher in the struggle for liberation, and proud of their common successful fight against the German
intruders.
Gehlen, pivot of an intelligence service through which he obtained it
picture of the truth which became clearer by the day, lost any illusion
he may nave had within the shortest possible time. I have reason to
believe that in 1943 he was still following a trend of thought which.
was being pumued by several of those men who afterwards became viotimo
of the 20th of July 1944. This trend of thought had to do with a,
radical change of policies in the Bast, and with starting an untrammeled liberation movement against Stalin after the forcible disposal
of Hitler, Himmler, and Posenberg. He clung to the hope that in this
!ay. , in the East, he couY attain a semblance of peace within a
reasonable time; that he could explain to the world that the Germans
had turned their back upon Hitler's policies of acquisition; and that
they might become strong enough in the West to bring about a peace
which would not necessarily require unconditional surrender,

When I had in second, long conversation with Gehlen in 1953, in the

course of which we talked of his connection with Vlassov, this point
wee touched only in passing. , Uowever, I am mire that Gehlen realized
very soon that such hopes and plans were unreal. A't the, end of 1943,.
it was irrevocably too late for any suceeseful political change in the
East.' Gehlen would no longer lend himself to awaken hope in Russians
or Ukrainians while there was nothing in German leadership to justify
such hope. He thought that it rould be a crime to get anyone of them

-3-.
into a position which could not but stigmatize the person as a traitor,
and as a German hireling. He tried to help all those who had openly
joined the Germans at / the times when there had still been a hope that
the political attitude of the German leaders toward the East might
change. He certainly did so when it became necessary to bring as many
of them as possible to the West.

The

SS . Against Gehlen

Gehlen t s skepticism, and his smiling sarcasm concerning the talk about

the dangerous power in home policies which, it was believed, may

accumulate in the person Of en intelligence service Chief, date back
to those tilos. The weapons of any large intelligence service ) truth
and reliable information, are desirable for the truly powerful only if
their power is Combined with wisdom and insight. 'Therefore, by 1943
Gehlen had realized that even the most perfect achievements of hie department were no longer of influence upon the fate of Germany in the

'Beciond World War..

"The legendary General Gehlen", one of Schellenberg's closest coworkers.
told mei-years after the war, shortly before Schellenberg died, "want4d
Hitler removed just like the-20th-of-July group wanted it. We were
sure of that. Had not Guderian, in those first days after the 20th of
July, : proteoted quite a number of members of the General Staff against
whom there was no immediate proof, by swearing to their faithfulness to
Hitler, we might then and there have succeeded in getting Geblen at
least remoVed from his position. Ha-d the war lasted only six more
months, it would have happened at any rate. However, Gehlen must
surely have possessed too reliable information as that he could still
hope, in mid-1944, for a successful attempt at Hitler t s life. He
certainly knew that the masses in Germany, and the soldiers and young
officers still believed in Hitler, not in some unpopular General Staff
officers, Fieldmarshals, or long-forgotten . old politicians...I am convinced that it was thia*ich prevented him from joining the groups of
assassins, although nome of ten were very close friends of his, He
hated illusions and. day-dreaming. He accepted the defeat already as
an inescapable certainty...We still clung to illusions. He had none.
He saw only the naked reality, We knew that. At least we guessed it,
and that was one more reason to remove him, But there was no more time
for it, Developments were going over our heads...".
The man who said this did not know that I knew Gehlen. But he did know
of Gehlen t s role, His frank words were probablra correct description
of Gehlen t s development during the last years of the war. Ile did his

work to the very'last with his usual exactitude. However, his hope for
some sort of effect upon the leaders, if he still nursed any such hope,
cannot have been but very slight. In those days when Guderian was doing
his very best to obtain reinforcement for the eastern font, the last one
outside the German borders, his hope was directed upon the reinforcement of this frontline and, as far as it was still poeoible, upon the
military protection of East Germany at the sacrifice of the western
front. He would have no illusions about what was in store for East Ger-.

- 4 many .should the pendulum of Hitler's conquest policies swing back.

However, Guderian l e endeavors were, at the best, desperate attempts
at . rescuefwhioh eould not change the general fate of Germerave
Not later than in mid-1944 did Gehlerhegin with making extra copies
of all reports, files, studies ', and material in archives which laid
bearing on theSoviet Union, and to store them safely in secret .
airraid shelters in fortified Upper Bavaria. The contents of the
'ardhives of the department "Foreign Armies East" were reproduced so
that it was practically impossible to destroy them. Gehlen t s-purpoie was not . at all of a personal nature, as has sometimes been
asserted in the course of the past years. He never thought of saving
his own skin, or maintaining his living standard, or maybe obtaining
some nebulous career, by offering the invaluable material of his
archives to the Americans.
Plans for A Courier Service
Gehlen t s objectives wee of a different nature. ,What he wanted; in
view of the disintegration, expected with certainty, of the alliance
- between Russia and the western powers, was to do his share in informing the governments of the western powers, America in the first
place, of the real aims of the Soviet Union, and of the display of
its power, with the aid of the material accumulated in his archives
and staffs. The logical consequence would be to realize the necessity
- to restore Central Europe, and, naturally, also Germanym ' Cehlen had
no illusions about the speed of such development. He had even less
illusions about the willingness of the !lest to accept his offer. And,
. incidentally, .Gehlen t s fficer i s training under a national system
. could . not simply be oast off. Re -Jealized that nationalists might
easily misinterpret his behavior as that of a traitor.
Vhea I talked with Gehien in 1953, I asked him about this bide of his
aotions it the time.. The simple anawmer he gave me made me guess his
inner struggles in 1944/45.
On or About 19 'April 1945 the departaent "Foreign Armies East" Aas
traneal.Ted from Camp Maybaeh near Zossen to Upper Bavaria, in the
.vidi7.1ty of Miesbach, and so the safety of Gehlen l a triple archives
Tas Ai good as guaranteed. He then divided his department into severe/
. section*, and assigned to each section key staff members whom he had
-1st into his plans. They had instruction to let themeelves se taken
Prisoners by the Americans, not to conceal their identity, and to make
Z(ao precise statements. A sort of courier service was installed, by
which they could remain in touch even after the arrest. On principle,
exact statements were to be made only when Gehlon would give the word.
Farsighted American General
While the tanks of the American General N.tton roiled through Bavaria,
Gehlen and the closest of his :taff lived in two olpine farms somewhere
near Miesbach. Gehlen himself lived in the so-called Elends-Alm, He
intended to give himself up as soon as the first troubles of occupation

would be over. The Americans did not climb the mountains. Only after
some time did they search some of the mountains for SS-troops possibly
hiding there. Only once aid they come near the Elends-Alm. When they
did not return within a few days, Gehlen went down to Miesbaoh, and
gave himself up. He handed over his papers. He explained who he was,
and that he wished to talk with a high-ranking American intelligence
officer in higher echelon,
lb American intelligence service was in existence at the time with any
"resemblance to the huge, and apparently very efficient, "CIA" organizaa
Sian of our days. There was a political intelligmace service with very
limited possibilities. It was under the strong influence of leftist
liberal "parlor pinks" Who played an important role in American polities'
life in those times. In addition, each branch of the American Armed
Porces had its own rather limited military intelligence service. They
were not interested in information about the Zoviet Union. There . was the

CIC (Coanter Intelligence Corps) which was an organization supposed to

'proteet . the American troops against agents, saboteurs. etc. This CIC had
inflated in the briefest possible time in proportion to theeimmensenees
of the territories the American Army covered while advancing In Europa.
Numerous communists obtained important functions in it. The activities
of the CIC consisted Chiefly of hunting down nazis and "militarists".
It was in the nature of its activities that it was blind to communist
infiltration.
The first office to which Gehlen reported was a CIC agency. At any rate,
Gehlenswas of sufficient interest to be passed an to higher authorities.
It was the. period when General Staff officers were subject to so-called.
"automatic arrest", and when the plan was conceived to banish German
General Staff efficers for ever to a remote island.
In the course of the next weeks Gehlen passed the usual intermediate
stations, and was finally taken to the so-called "Intelligence Center",.
Headeuerters Seventh Array in Wiesbaden. It was here that, after several
routine interrogations, Gealen happened to Meet the American Intelligence officer in the rank of a General, to whose initiative the present
Organization Gehlen owes ite'existence.
This General was one of the few high-ranking American officers who waa
aware of the fundamental contrast between the political und ideological
world of the Soviet Union and that of the western powers (at the time
he was. at variance even with Eisenhower and with the entire official
American policy and strategy).
The name of this General has remuined a seceet to this day. He took it
on his own responsibility to :release some of Gehlen t e most important
staff members from interrogation camps and POW camps. The most important parts of the files of the Department "Foreiga Armies East" were
shipped to Wiesbaden from the secret places where they had been stored.
Shortly after, still in Summer of 1945, Gehlen and several members of
his staff traveled to Washington, with the files. .There, too, in the
top organization of the American Army's Intelligence Service, were a
few officers who watched the new world constellation after Hitler's end.
They had no influence yet on political and military decisions. But the
were powerful enough to make their own decisione in their own fields,
Their names have also remained a secret. When I asked Gehlen in 1953,
he flatly refueed to give an answer.

The reasons for this secrecy were clear at the time, and in a way
' they are still olear today. The agreements those officers subsequently made with Gehlen on their own responsibility were
actually high-handed and nlawful acts. These acts were in contradiction with the polioieb their own country was following, and it
was only by subsequent developments that they were justified.

Generous Partners

What Sehlen had to offer waist - a well-functioning intelligence

organisation against the Soviet Union, the only one then existing
in the world. This muit have meant tench for mon who:foresaw that
the American Intelligence Service would soon.be Compelled to deal
with the problem of the Soviet Union on a world-wide scale. To.
.make use of-Gehlen and his men meant that the American IntelligenCe
Service would .vary soon.be'superior in this field.

What GehlendaManded in return was indeed extraordinary. The obvious thing. for the Americans
have been to Spicy . Gehltn and
his staff as German assistants, as they did With many German exGenerals and specialists in the so-called "Historical Division".
One of the most prominent Germans 'employed there was Helder, .
Gehlen!s former chief, who had appointed him chief of the Department "Foreign' Armies
would

Gehlen refused to be-employed in such capacity. He demanded that

the successor organization of the.Department !Foreign Armies East"
be a purely German organization, under his sole control, but with
an American liaison office, and with a fixed American Dollar
budget. Secondly, this organization should work for the United
States only as long as there was no sovereign German Government.
As soon as that Government was established, Gehlen, being a German,
could not but feel responsible to it. .Thirdly, Gehlen demanded
that his Organization not be foroed to furnish, information
bearing on the East, nor material directed against the interests of
a future German state.
with no

Strictly Secret
in forced to oast one's mind back to the situation as it was
then, in order to understand these demands. Hardly anyone dared
believe in the restoration of Germany. The Morgenthau.dreams had
not ended yet. The polity of unity among the victors, of friendship with the Soviet Union, was prevailing. Officially it was
Soviet Union other than of a
prohibited in Germany to speak of
situation, it certainly
peace-loving democratic power.
required an unusual amount of knowledge of political realities to
make such demands.
One

the

In

this

On tha other hand, even more was demanded from the American officers
actually aocepteehlen t s demands. It.would have beam easy to
employ German assistants. Soon after, the British Intelligence Service, too; made use in secrecy of German advisors whose previous
work had had bearing on German eastern polities, or who had been

who

- 7 -

German.officers.in Ukrainian and Russian antiStalin formations.

But.the restoration of a complete German intelligence organisathat was a game with considerable rink,
tion
In strict sedrecy,'in the disguise of an' Ameridan civilian agency,
.Gehlen and..his Chief staSf members resumed their work in seclusion,
in a romoteplaceim-the'Spessart.
. . .

. One after the other, thavformer staff members and sperolalists were
: released from their respective damps, some of them under mysterioum

circumstances. Old connections were reestabliihed4

cigarettes were a useful item of the first budget..

AM01108,11.

Thus the "Organization Gehlon" was established..

Its security system worked eoiffectively for many years, that.
hardly an outsider in Germany had the least inkling of its existened,
even after its activities had been accepted in Washington as a par%
of the new line in American postwar. policies.

Next iSSUOI

The Visiting

Card

Accepted

Espionage Trials Cause Sensation.

"Picturese
Mountain Scenery-.
Legend.:

When the ear hid ended, Gehlen withdrew to

A Remote part. of Upit. Bavaria.
Rio archival were also safe* Prim here hs
.deeeandedto the -valley and gave himself
up to the Americans

Piotare of General Vlasson and of Female Workers

Legend:

Female Workers Listen to General Vlassov

Gehlen wanted to conquer bolshevism with the aid
of the opposition against Stalin in the Soviet
sphere of power.

Picture of Gehlen
Legends

With Vlaseov l s Troops

-Gehlen Takes the Salute*

Translation
"Die Welt",
Saturday, 4 December

1955

THE MAN IN THE DARK

m= ======= =====mma==.7a========m= ===== ammasuwaymesa

Faotuai Report on-General Gehlen and

His Organization.
ByJuergen Thorwald

IV. "Agent 0031" Becomes Loquacious

Once or twioe, in recent reports about Gehlen and his organization, it has been pointed out that the first great
success of this organization was the breakUp of the entire
net of agents in West , Germany of the Czech Intelligence
Service in 1948 and 1949. No more was divulged.
At the time the American Intelligence Service claimed all
the credit for that destructive operation. To the press
conference, especially convened for that occasion, President
Truman stated in November 1948, on the day . after the largesoale arrest action against the Czech agents, that this was.
the greatest feat of the American Intelligence Serviele.
Actually, this feat had'solely . been accomplished by the
Organization Gehlen, although it is true -- and this
Justifies the American point of view -- that it owed its
existence *the USA, and that it as still a'part,of . the
American Intelligence Serrice, much as it aspired after
independence, . Surely, a man . like Gehlen . reserved, extremely suspicious of nationalistic selfpraise, and a very
clever diplomat --would never demand that the true teats
be published, and that the American reports published at
the time be corrected. -Nevertheless, the actual facts
differed from what could be divined from the rather brief
reports published at the. time*
On 9 November 1948,. the American Military Police arrested about forty
men and women,. most of thee in Bavaria, They were mostly Sudeten
Germans. Some were sent to Lands p erg, others to the interrogation
.camp in Oberursel, and for a few months they disappeared from the
scene. ' Next to nothing was published about O. Of the little that
was said, the population of Germany hardly took notice, after all the
arresting and interning that had been done during the preceding years,
and in view of the struixle for the daily bread which was still
going on.

1,

An espionage case tried in Munich a few months later, on 17 February

1949, in an American hospital in Koeniginstrasse, came quite as a
surprise. An American Military Committee, presided over by Brigadier
General.Jehn L. McKee, sat in judgment. The Prosecutor was Lt.Col.
Thomson. The American Colonel Crawford had been assigned Chief
Counsel for the Defense. Only one man sat in the dock; he was about
thirty.-one years old. His name was rantisek Klecka.. He had been a
waiter on the Orient Express, and had been arrested on 9 November
1948.: At first the trial was overshadowed by the general security.
regulations. As usual, there was only talk of violation of the Military Government Law Ho.8, according to which persons who endangered
the safety of the American Army were subject to trial by 'a Military
_Court. .However, surprisingly, the secrecy ban was lifted in the
course Of the trial, by order of General Clay and upon instruction of
Major General Maxwell Taylor, who was then the Chief of Staff of the

American Forces in Europe.

Twenty Years Hard Labor

The proceedings were turned into a public trial so late that the Sentence to twenty years hard labor was pronounced almoet immediately
thereafter, However, the public, if it was interested at all in it,
at least learned that Klecka, upon instruction of the Czech Intelligence service, had held an important position in a net of agents,
whose mission had been to spy out the location of American and British
troops, the development of German industrial enterprises'and traffic
routes, and the political attitude of the expellees in the American
zone of occupation.
Throe Women Accused
Soon after, the American Court under McKee reconvened. Agab Lt.Col.

Thomson acted as the Prosecutor. There were five men and three women

in the dock, who were accused of having'held decisive-funotionz in

the net of agents of the Czech Intelligence Service in West Germany.
They all belonged to the group which was arrested on 9 November 1943,
There was 26-year old, spirited, intelligent Gerti Doerre from
Moschendoill the wife of Dr.Hablick, at the time in charge of the
residence permit office in the Bavarian State Commissa7iate for Expellee Affairs, Maria Hhblick; and Edith Mittrich, student and Jour-

=diet, the last two from Viunich. The men were the waiter Adolf
Prank, and Franz layer, Hebert Kruse, Walter Friedrich, and 24-year
old Egon Riehter. Almost all of them were Sudeten Germans. They were
all accused of haviug.systemutioally betrayed military, economic, and
political secrets to the Czelih Intelligenoe Service. All of them had
made only part confessions. All of them pleaded that they had been
the victims of a delusion, or,et the beet, that they had furnished
faked or worthless iniormation, in an effort to . protect relatives
against reprisals who still lived in Czechoslovakia. Cu the first
day of the trial Certi Doerre still smiled to herself, z_ad Edith
Dittrioh flirted as if she were in a dance-hall; apparently they were
sure that little could happen to them.

Suddenly, on the second day of the trial, 3 March 1949, the first
Surprise bomb went off. A stranger entered the courtroom as a
witness for the Prosecution. He had coarse features, thin black
hair, wide cheekbones, a turned-up nose, and a flabby, pale skin.
He looked neither at the Prosecutor nor at the Members of the
Court.
As soon as he entered the courtroom, the faces of several defendants
grew.pale and showed unutterable, pararyzing terror. He was none
other than the ahief of that field office of the Czech Intelligence
Service with which all defendants had cooperateds Staff Captain
Ottokar Fejfar, cover name ill ilipowski", or otherwise known by the
number "Agent 0031". It was brought to light that his agency had.
controlled all Czech agents in Weet.Germany.,The American Prosecutor, after a side-glance at the defendants who
were frantically trying to regain their composure, stated that Pejfar had left Czechoslovakia after the overthrow 01' the Czech Govern.r
.ment Banes, since he was opposed to Gottwald f s communistic regime..
When he Wmigratedi-he took along with him all the material of his
agency, his order book, the list of all Czech agents in West Gormany,
and carbon copies of the reports the agents had made. Fejfar,and.
his files were now at disposal, to bring the crime home to everyone
of the defendants in Court -- and not only to them-, but also to
numerous others who had been arrested months ago, and Who would by
their trials receive the punishment they deserved.
From this moment On, the situation of the defendants was hopeless.
The Prosecutor,. assisted by Fejfar who made his statement, aad produced proof, in a low voice and with downcast eyes, but concisely
and olearly, unrolled a full piture of their aotivities. From 1946
to 1948 they had, more or less frequently, grossed the German-Czech
border illegally near Muchlbaoh, Reheu, or Grafenau. They had met
Fejfar r s mediators in the customs buildings on the Czech side, and
had then proceeded to Franzensbad with Czech identity papers. They
had handed over their material in the hotels "Europa" and "Corso",
and had received rewards in the amount of between 10 Dollars and
200 DM, and had then been given new.assignments. All of thea had
cover names. For example, Gerti Doerr was "Annabella";. Edith
Dittrioh was "Manon"; Maria Habliok "Leila"; Rooert'Kruee "Don
Joe &",
And The Second Witness
The Doerre girl, who worked in the , OIC office in :ifoschendorf, had
made reports ooncernin6 Hof, Rehau, and the CIC. Dittrich, who had
been an IRO secretary for a time, had provided information on the
airbasee Neubiberg, Schleisaheim, and Fuerotenfe1db2.-nak. daria
Hablick had taken to Czechoslovakia documents belonging to her unsuspecting husband and Ahich had bnaring on hin official duties,
some still in. the envelopes of the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, Franz Bayer had furnished material on the troop drilling
grounds in Paderborn; Egon Richter provided information on British
troops and installations in Lueneburg, Hamburg, Erlangen, Hof, and

Kitzingen.

- 4 trowever, the Prosecutor did not content him gelf with Fejfarts
testimony* , On 8 March 1949 he led into the.courtroom another
Staff Captain from the controlling agency for We gt Germany of .
the Czech Intelligence Service. This was Staff Captain Vojteoh
Jeralel4 known to Several defendants aujiofmann. That.his

- . testimony was of so. decisive importance was due to the fact that
he had been a aloes coworker of the Czech Staff Captain Janda who
.had been Pejfar , a predecessor as the chief of the controlling
newt" unti1 . 194% Jerabek testified to the number of
. offioe
. .
bordercrossings of the defendants, including those made before
Fejfar l d time.
The evidence liai3 so overwhelming that the. Assigned Counsel Crawford and the German Coundel Weinberger could not but restrict
themselves to explanations of the -- sometimes tragical -Circumetances which had driven the defendants into their role of
.agents.

There was no denying that Janda and Fejfar, and their staffs, had
systematically. sought to get a hold over Sudeten German expellees
in Germany by enablingthem to contact their parents and relatives
who had stayed behind in Czechoslovakia, Wherever this bait did. .
not have the desired effect, they did not hesitate to make them
give in by threatening that they would take it out on their

_relatives..

More Trials
However, the efforts of the Counsels for the Defense had but little

effect. Frank and Xmas were sentenced to 18 years of penal ser.

yitude; the Doerre girl to 12 years; the Dittrich woman to nine
years; Bayer and Friedrich.to . eight years; ?Rata Hablik . io s even

years; and Egon Richter to one year.

The Court was still in session for this trial, when two more trials
lwere ' oPen4d in Munich, and others in Central and North dermay.,

jot one of the agents who were arrested on 9 November 1948 escaped
..the verdict of the Law.

Meantime every observer.had realized that this had indeed been a

d e ol give bltw o They had hit the core of. that part of the Cze gh Intelligence Service which worked in West Germany, After this success,
by which they had obtained the lists of all the agents at the time
.employed in West Germany, the raiding of the nest offered no diffiOultiee.
': The Czech Intelligence Service which had been compelled in 1945 to
begin from the bottom up, faced - complete ruin in Went Germany,
Several years' hard work was wasted, and its result blotted out,
They were compelled to start all over again with building up their
organization, and it would take years.

Gehlen Puts Two Men To Work

But how had this been achieved ? Was it mere luck and coincidence ?
Had the flight of Fejfar and his staff to the West come as a surprise

to:the . Ame ricans Ar had the American Intelligence Service brought,

o r; lured,14hes e :tso men to the West . by a . carefully -worked . out plan T
J.a%ooamancehad they come t o W ee t41; m, 04e
v..
an0e 4r.44 44 11 8A Agi300nA4

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" Ji -

iliaff: . Capte14 , Janda, who had:boen, the preVicuschlet; and-3f 110 may
have been 'aMre1404 . bad . been, replaced on. 1, AP415 1944311-r.. St af f. Captain,Fefarybp .141.4 been a,Member Qf the . Second, pepar,tment:::cince
Spring ,of 19471..;,1t, wao 4 believethat Fejfar did not possess a very

.
Ft
v.r1
.2.

1:4

1ifw

?`::)!WEto7

ttAtt:a

active mind; he had been a follower Of Bence, and he expected not

- communist regime in the long ran
.mitch goo d to come from Go ttwal

for his hlb person).

It was believed that Fejfar may be persuaded to change over to tad

West.

Therefore Gehlen put two of his men to wok in 'Carlsbad with the
instruction to start out-with watching Fejfar t s private life, and to
establish private connections With him or with his family. In Karlabad-this mission was a matter of life or death.
Although the two men took months over feeling their way to approach
Fejfar; although their work , was eased by the fact that Fejfar was
not averse to alcohol,
the day. came that the groping about had
come to an end. They were compelled to uome out into the open and
speak with Fejfar. If they did, they would have only two alternatives* success or failure. If they failed, they would be arrested
on the spot. Some trifle, a touch of fear on the part of Yejfart
might be fatal at the very last moment,

However, the man who talked with Fejfar, found a man who was ready
for anything. Yejfar was possessed of fear of his own regime. He
declared his willingness to escape to West Germany, on these conditions: (1) complete freedom in the West; (2) safe transportation
to the United States; under no circumstances did he wish to stay
near Ozeehoslovakia, or in Europe at that, In return, he was willing
to take with him on. his flight all important files of his Controlling
Office, and those which contained the official correspondence with
the superior office in Prague, the Second Department, and certainly
the code-book and the papers about radio communications.

Many weeks were required in Fall ot 1948 for the preparations of the

flight. It was necessary to confide in other officers of the con-

pictures

Counsel for the Defense and Defendants

in the Espionage Trial in Munich . .
:Legends

Sittings :John F. Deery, Couneel for the Defense,

Behind him the ittexpreter. Standing (from USW
left to right) Egon Richter, seen from behind;
Adolf Prank, Walter Friedrich, Maria Rabliek, Nertie
Doerres and concealed behind her, Robert Kruse,

Picture of General Clay

Legends

Public Trials
demanded the American General Clay to be held
against the Czech spies,

Pioture of Gertie Doerre

Legends

Cover Name "Annabella"

The defendant Gertie Doerre. The twenty-six year old
girl forgot to smile when "Agent 0031" appeared as
a witness for the prosecution on 3 March 1949.

Translation
"Die Welt"
11 Deoember 1955

THE - MAN IN TEA DARE

Factual Report on General Gehlen an
Eie Organization

V . ' Skilfully Cloaked Branch Offices

It Was- in Fall of 1953, approximately seven years
after.the establishment of-the "Organization Qehlen"', and about four years after the Czech. Intel-.
Service was raided, on which occasion the
organization had attracted the attention of the
insiders, that Gehlen and his organization stood,
for the first time, in the limelight of publioity.
The reason was a propaganda campaign launched by the new
Chief ofthe S tate . Security service of the Soviet !one, Wellweber; he started the campaign on the occasion of the first
successful abduction of a subordinate member of the organize.'Lion from West Berlin', and the infiltration of the first
agent, whose name was Geyer, into one of Gehlen t s lower
echelon control agencies in Weat Berlin. The story of this .
campaign, with all concomitant circumstances, will be told in
another chapter. At this mooent, on17 one thing is of importanoes the campaign, launched with the assistanoe of the
whole Soviet propaganda oreanization, showed clearly the
effectiveness Gehlen's organization had developed. The fact
that Wollweber, after a *while, put a price on one million
D .-Mark on Gehlen l s head - 7 the offer still stands -- is
further proof.
At this point, the Organization Gehlen had already left the Spessart,
the scene of its modest beginnings which were based solely on the
trust of a few americans. By Fall of 1953, it had grown into an. organization with two to three thousand full-time employees, (By now the
number has grown to three or four thousand.)
Gehlen had moved to Pullaoh near Munich, with the beet of his Men.
There he metalled himself in a strietly secluded settlement, surrounded hy . barbed . wire, which had been built some time after 1933 as
r audelf-Hess-aettlement", had later on been used for military purposes,
and had been enlarged by a number of wooden buildings. It consisted
of some two dozen buildings, and American troops had requisitioned it
at the end of the war. :Not only Gehlen and his staff, with the technical assistants -- radio operators, secretaries and others, including
were houned there, but their families, including Gishthe drivers
lens own family Of five, lived also there..

- 2 Life As In A Camp
The unusual genesis of this organization, the chaotic first years in/
post-war Germany, and the fact that at first the relations between--

the. occupation powers were oonfused, had made it necessary to stay

hidden even from nai l: own fellow-countrymen. Thus, they lived quite
isolated in the camp, with a camp school for the. children. Had the
children attended normal aohooa during those first years, they would
have been asked questiOns about their fathers' occupations; other Children would have wished to visit the "Gehlen-children" in their'

own home; and all this wouldvery soon have resulted in discovery.
The consequences of the disclosure would have been immense, con-.
sidering the distrust of the French and the British of any German intelligence organization,, even if it was' supposed to ' have only limited
independente,-and also in view .of the considerable influence the
Soviet Union.was still exercising on the occupation policies in Germany.
By 1953, the situation had greatly changed. A skilfully thought-out

security system concealed the entire organization under a Maze of industrial, commercial and research inetitutiona, and allowed almost
full freedom of movement. - Only the existence of the so-called "Board
of Directors" in Pullach indicated that there was something unusual.
about the set-up. This was . ofno importance, however, since it was
hermetically closed to outsiders as an enclave of the Amerioan occupation power. The telephone lines were under American control; the
cars stationed permaneatly there had American license plates. Those
of the German cieilians who had since moved to dwellings outside of
the camp.-- if for nocther reasons than that the number of 'available
dwellings was inadequate to house all the families
were easily
concealed among the large numbe. of American civilian employees, or
they passed for independent industrialists.
Gehlen And His Family
By 1953, Gehlen himself, and his family, had already been living for
years in a wooden house on Lake Starnberg, and he had driven the 28
kilometers between the lake and Pullach back and forth in his Mercedes 220 With no one out there ever suspecting him of being anything
but aanocessful commercial industrialist who worked in Munich, and
whose private hobby was elementary woodwork, and other playful oocupations. The family led the same life as millions of other Cerman.
families., There was little difference as regards the closest of his
staff.

Thostparts of the Organization Gehlen which worked outside of Pullaoh

headquarters, merged into West German civilian and economic life ) at
least outwardly, Organized by commercial experts as "General
Agencies, District Agencies, and Branch Offices" ) and actually working
under the cover of all sorts of business lines, the lower echelons of
the organization spread out as far As the eastern borders of the
BritishAmerican occupation zones, and later on of the federal Republic.

The "branch offices", the lowest echelons of the organization in

West Germany, had the immediate control of the agents who worked
in the Soviet zone, in the Soviet. satellite nations ) and in the
Soviet Union . proper. No branch office handled more than six
agents-Or "T-Maenner" (Tertrauenemaenner confidential agents).
No ir,Kenn kaew the chief of the branch office; no branch office
.chief knew his superior ) his district ohiefl , no distriot chief
knew the General Agent. No T4ann knew his fellow agent, except
in very special oases, She forwarding of assignments, and. the
_transmission of information were dons by untriers in all sorts
of civilian dieguisea l . or by reports deposited in, and collsoted
from ever-changing place!, and by radio messages.
It is a- fact that by 1953 the organizationGehlen as a reiult of
years of hard work, had infiltrated its agents into important
, Soviet zone party offices, ministries and industries; and that
was not all; thworganieation-had also agents in high positions
in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, not counting the
large number of agents who'watched . certain events ih these countries
from the outside.
The information which reached Pullach through radio operators and
couriers via branch offices and commercial representatives, were
added.to - the results Of minute evaluation of any material on the
East Bloo printed, or broadcast, or obtained by radio monitoring
service,. "Reading between the lines", an art acquired daring the
war, had become a masterly skill long ago.
During the war already, Gehlen had extended his field of activities
far beyond purely military intelligence service, and this development
was continued in post-vat years. By 1953, the so-called military men
were by far in the minority. The civilian experts -- among whom were
many who had grown up in the :Soviet Union -- were the determining
factor, They' worked outside the organization which was cloaked as an
economic set-up, as research inetitutes of all types. While elsewhere in . Germany there was ao agency who had a clear idea of the
development of atomic science, for example, here there were specialists
collecting pebble after pebble of the mosaic. Numerous experts were
at .disposal for consultation, from linguistic philologists to geologists, who actually worked in their own professions outside the organization, Some of them had, been initiated into the secret. Others

had simply been commiisioned by the research institutes to carry out

special tasks.
The Warning system

Whenever a branch office; or en inetitution, was endangered, in other

words, whenever the camouflage seemed to be no longer safe, it was
diasolved. Specialists of the organization saw to the legal side of
the liquidation, especially the transactions provided for by the
oommeroial laws. Warnine, systems had been worked out for the agents
employed in eastern territories, which were set in action whenever the
arrest of . an agent, or of a "V-Mann", jeopardized the safety of other

persons,

4 -

.,
The purpose, of which an unbelievably large portion was actually
achieved, was to avoid losses by selecting as carefully as possible,
by training meticulously ) and by .anticipating any kind of danger*
The final goal of all the work, however, was to collect information
.
on the aitustiOn in the laet,"and on the .intentions of the East,
the exactnesi of which would be confirmed-by.subsevent events*
I . d0 not think that I am betraying .a secret if I pay that the si'tuation reports made by the Organization Gehlen forms* the results'
of the conferences in Berlin and Geneva with a clarity which was as
.bare of illusions' as it was cool and bitter. I-Should. add that.I
aoquired this i knowledge . not from'Gehlen, but 'from Germans aad.
-Americans WhOattinded these conferences after having read Gablen's
'reports,' and who had in their innermost heart nursed the hope that
.
.
for once this realist may-be wrong. .
How could this organization be set up at 'all ?- When I came. to know .
Gehlen a little closer, I, toe, had for
little while believed in
the legenderymiracle-Working.power of the Dollar, .Whoeverrkeeps in
mind, however, that Gehlen's annual budget has neverexceeded five
or. six million Dollars,, 'or approximately 25 million DM,. and Whoever
compares this with the "fact that (to judge by the information I have)
the police of the .Hansa City of Hamburg swallows 66 million per year,
and Munich's City Police 11 million per . yeari-Will cease to believe
in the miracle-working Dollar in Gehlen t e case. Twenty-five. million
MM . for an organization whose arms reach as far as Siberia, will seem
an almost ridiculous amount as compared With the 66 million for the
police in Hamburg whose radius of action "comes to an end in Poppel-

buettel", as the'"Spiegel"-once put it.

Not Only Dollars

No, it wasn't solely due to the Dollars, and the time* had soon come .
to -a close when American ci6arettes and food items could be had from

Gehlen, a currency highly favored then. No one could get rich hers.
Instead, one could ruin one's health; the men at the top w , re exposed to the pressure . of an incredible workload, just because the
means were, after all, always inadequate. It is a fact that young
men between thirty-five and forty have had strokes becauSe of the

overload of work * Even incredible achievements, however, cannot be

the only basis for 'a development like that of the Organization Gehlen*

The basis for this development is probably formed by the elements of

which 4.4thlen's'work Consisted during the last phase of the wars aboveaverage organizatiOnal effioiency, 'Combined with incorruptible
scientific exactness, extreme thriftiness in the use of personnel and
Means. This thriftiness embraced, anGehlen told me in 1953, "the
refusal of any assignment, the expected result of which-would not
justify the 'risk; refusal of that man-wasting magnanimity so often
encountered in our field; thorough preparation and working out of
each assignment, taking into consideration any possible danger; rejection of dilettantism, vhiCh may under certain circumstances replace

experience and knowledge by idealism, and whist, in intelligende work,

invariably leads to catastrophe and useless sacrifice of men."
Very Dangerous Adventure
An experience I had myself made it clear-to me how deep this viewpoint
is rooted in Gehlen t s minds

It was the time when certain 'information from Upper Silesia was
causing a eenSation in Germany, The information said, among other
things, that the Soviet Union- had begun with sending Chinese to Upper
the gaps in'the'labor market and to populate the ..
Silesia
areas evaquated . by the'Germana." An editors' -office hit upon the idea
that a reporter might. sneak into Upper Silesia through the Bast zone
and all through-Polandp.perhaps'in thesdisguise of a Vistula boatman * .
But who could be persuaded to accept such assignment ? Only'a man who
had trouble keeping his head above . water.
A Special Assignment
One evening in mid-March 1952 I Met A atoung journalist and his wife in
a cafe who found himself in considerable financial difficultiee. The
.soulan t s tears attracted my attention, and . I suspected that something
was wrong. After some hesitation I was told what was amiss. The
young man was to make up . his mind until the next day whether or not he
would -- with a camera in his trouser pocket, in the disguise of a
boatman, without knowing a single Polish word, with an advance payment
of a mere 1.000 DU, and against a ridiculously low reward.in case of
success -- undertake an adventure which was almost certain to throw

Mu

as a spy into the hands of the 'security authorities of the.. Soviets

the Poles,. or perhaps already those' of the Soviet zone. The boy,
finding himself in a situation which seemed to leave no choice, was inalined to accept, despite his wife's despair.
I was determined to' prevent the undertaking of this adventure, if only
for the . reason that I have always been opposed to mixing journalism and
espionage. I remembered suddenly what Gehlen had said about the 861.3110w

leesness of such amateurish doings. I had no means to get hold of Gleho.

len directly, by calling a . secret number, for instance. After a lit04

thinking I found a way, and appealed to' some one,'
had collaborated
with me when I wrote my first books, and 'of whom I had reason to,beliiVe
that he belonged to the Organization Gehlen. Gehlen learned of the case
of the young journalists and of the plans for the undertaking. Two days
later the young man, who had speaking and writing knowledge of several
languages, had found work in some office unknown to me, * and was in a position to decline the "suitide mission". A few months later he found
employment in his own profession.
This may have been an exceptional case. Numerous other senseless adventures of agents and saboteurs have been. arranget.and . carried out

6 -

on Other evasions by one Of those "information agenoiei" which

existed in'West Germany at the time, sOme of whioh, surviving to
this day, have been confused with Gehlen by persons ignorant of ; the true feats.
The Secret of Suooess

.
.
. That Geblen succeeded in leadinghis.organisations, untouched, up
to . 1955 'despite the confusionsr' the colliding opinions, and the
anti...intelligence tendencies Of German domestic political life t ist
in my opinion, due to :these few .facts:
that he restricted himself definitely to the field Gehlen
'pegged out when he became the
Chief of the Section "Foreign
Armies Bast"s procurement of intelligence from foreign
coUntries t with a-definite orientation toward the eastern
world;

'
** that he prepared himself for the teak of serving the sovereign

German ' Federal Government 7- regardless of which deMoaratio

as an unprejudiped, neutral inparty might be its basis

formant;
**4 that he kept the organization out of thejungle, which existed
for many year's, of mutual spying. on politicians, power groups,
and parties in.CerMan political.lifer
On this point, however, I am touching upon one of. the most interestingahapters,, namely, how the connection with the Federal Government.
was eatablisUed t and with the opposition, especially with Hurt.Schu..
macher,' which connection was surrounded by numerous misunderstandings;
andlehlea l s potation in reeard to the Agency for the Protection of .
the Constitution, hi' connection with . itu notorious President John,
and with the Information Office of Blank's Agency and itu first chief
Heinz.

Next Issues
"A Sordid Business Dual

11

The Case of the Traitor Otto Jahn

- 7.

Entrance to a Park

Piety:reel

Legends

This is the gate which Geblen passed daily

on his way to the secluded headqua7ters of
his organization.
The area occupied by an American agency in Pula.
lush near Munich also embraced Gel:len t o Wick.
Unrecognized and unknown, he and his family
lived for years in a woOden house on Lake Stara.
berg, about 28 km free Pullaoho

Allen Dulles
Legend:

Allen Dulles ' a brother Of Iohn.Poster.Dulles$,-.

Chief of the American Intelligence Service, with.
whom Gehlen'used to cooperates

Village Square

Legends

An idyllic spot inlavaria

harbored secrets
A village hotel stands next to the . OhUrch, In
this,tPullach near Munich resembles many other
small country towns,.

Ernst Wollweber
legends

Sinister Opposite Number

Ernst.WollwebezYChief of the State Security
Service of the Soviet tone put a million .D4MAalk.

on Gehien ls head. .

Europe's
New
Master Sp
fZ r)

kcv

Reinhard Gehlen looks harmless,

but he makes Russia tremble.
He's off on a new , gigantic

intrigue

By NORBEiRT MUHLEN

What is more, Gehlen's Soviet secrets are

never "on the market." They are available
only to the authorized hush-hush agencies of
the United States and the West German
governments. Partners in the cold war, both
desperately need precise knowledge of the
facts of Communist political, economic and
military life. America --- a newcomer in the
field of international intelligence 7eives
the most benefits from having at its command
a foreign source of information on which it
'
can rely.
-pehlen is camera-shy and hates publicity.
When his picture was published for the first
time In Germany, although it was only cut
from a 10-year-old group snapshot, every
copy of the newspaper carrying it was sold
within a few hours. In his personal appearancenothingseems to fit the popular idea of
the master spy he is. His neighbors in the
Upper Bavarian village of Sternberg, where
.he lives in an unpretentious lake-front house,
saw no reason to doubt him when he introduced himself as a businessman. When he
drives every morning to his city office and
spends his evenings quietly with his family or
working in his garden, he looks . mort like a
fairly successful industrialist than a leader in
the cloak-and-dagger industry.

Ills nisi

Big Spy Network

Gehlen joined the German army at 18 and .

served for 23 years on routine jobs before he
made his first contact with the undercover
BERLIN
world. That was in 1943 when the Russians
began to roll back Hitler's armies. The
In thc world of international
German High Command was ignorant of
affairs, nothing is so dangerms as
Soviet troop movements since its intelligence
relaxation. That is why Western
machinery had broken down in the interstatesmen who have welcomed the
necine struggle between anti-Nazi army
"Geneva spirit" . are remaining
officers and power-drunk Nazi S.S. leaders.
very much on the alert.
The General Staff instructed Gefilen to dig
And even though the lion. Curup information on the Eastern Front about
tain has opened a Crack, it still
the enemy- armies. Opposed by the Nazis,
conceals a vest amount of *forwhom he hated ever since, he calmly, duti. mation. of aucial importance to
fully and efficiently set up a new spy network
Western security. For this reason,
in the East.

the value of* certain 52-year-old

So well did he do this job that it almbst

German : Who looks like a s suCcessful . banker remains undiminruined him. When he was ordered to report ished,.and has perhaps even increased in the last feW months.
on the situation to Hitler in person, he preThis Man is Reinhard Gehlen, who for the past . .10 years has
dicted that the Germans* would soon be
. been running a highly effective spy system for the United States
:defeated by Russia. The Fire:bra flew into.
and its allies.. roday be provides the West with its- key.European
* rage and demanded ,that. Gehlen be com
listening post.
The West didn't always take .Gehlen too seriously. ,Back in mitted to an insane asylum. He was saved.
1950 he Warned against the appointment of Dr: Otto s John as only by his commanding general and soon
thereafter by the fact that his forecast came
.1read of the West German investigating office against subversive
. soak:ides: Gehlen suspected John of being himself a member of true.
After the defeat Gehlen surrendered to the
the Cominunist underground, but his warning was not heeded.
American Army. His American questioners
.Four 'years later John defected across the Berlin 'border to the
flOviets. In his first public statement behind the curtain he -laughed when he told them he was an intelligence expert on Soviet affairs and eager to
.
attacked Gehlen as America's most dangerous spy.
. 'After the restoration of West German sovereignty, Gehlen's hand over his collected reports. He described
-organization was returned by its US. sponsors to the German the Soviet's bellicose preparations against
,governnient. 1n-4 -secret night session, Chancellor Admirer their American allies, sand revealed his net urged-hia cabinet members to. entrust the organization to his work of informants, his storehouse of infor'ovnvi.personal responsibility. Though the decision Was %kept a mation, his 'methods of finding facts in the
secret,' this 'reporter has learned that the cabinet agreed. Gehlen Kremlin-ruled countries but to no avail.
Only after several months in a prisoner-of: lats.:therefore, only one boss the head of his government.
war camp was Gehlen discovered by an intel'Continued rn page 46
The large organization. which
ligence officer on General George S. Patton's
:

.01a7

staff who had him flown to Washington. In

, Galen founded and runs, deals exclusivelyan interview which kited for weeks, Gehlen
with . secietsirom behind the Iron Curtain.
impressed his captors with his memory,
Since the Soviets forged that curtain for the
recalling tens of thousands of names, figures
particular purpose of hiding their slave world
and incidents. They proved to be correct as
from Western eyes; and since their secrets are
well as most valuable to the American cause.
part and parcel of their plan toconquer the
free world, 'it was . imperative for Western
A Duel Between Experts
self-defense to get: hold of these secrets.
He
was
'returned to Germany with permisehlen's organization is different from the
sion to, set up a new intelligence network
Jarnost,100.otheas that operate in the shadow
'restricted in its . operationsio the Communist
of theiron Curtain and offer.Soviet secrets to
sphere, 'strictly supervised by Americans.
the West. Most of these outfits hang out
There was one condition his own. He was
their shingle in Berlin, that half-Soviet, halfnever to work against the interests of a free,
free city. Some are set up by the Soviets.
democratic Germany.
themselves' to mislead the West. Others are
In the 10 years since, Gehlen has fought
run by adventurers who dreamed up their
an almost daily battle of wits with his oppoinformation at the very coffee-house tables
site number, in East Germany, Ernst Wolffrom which they sell it.
weber. A heavy-set, tough professional Com..A' Really "Reliable Source"
munist,. four years older than Gehlen, Wollweber's adult life for 30 years was devoted to
When American 'officials explain, however,
espionage, smuggling and sabotage on the
that a certain fact or 'figure came from
world's water fronts for -the Communist
Gehlen, it is . accepted. The Gehlen label
movement. After the war he became East
makes it a sure thing.
Germany's Minister of Transportation, then
its State Security Minister in charge of secret
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
police and foreign intelligence.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I ON30213
NAZI WAR C RIM.E S D I SCLOSU RE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

maritime expert turned Communist and in..

charge of W ollweber's Division of Fleets an
Ports ssas . Walter Grarnsch. He did such
meritorious work that the Communist government
Continued on next pup'

The Hunting Grounds

awarded him the Certificate of Superior Service in 1953
and promoted him. Several weeks later he fled with his
family to West Berlin.
The reason was that on his new, higher job he would
have been of little use to . Gehlen whomunder the cover
name of "Brutus" ---- he had served all these years. While
pretending to be a Communist he kept Gehlen posted on
the plans and moves of his enemy.
To all outward appearances Gehlen's network consists
of a number of various business firms. Without arousing
anyone's suspicions cars can be registered, office space
rented, trips undertaken. When legitimate customers try
to deal with these companies, they find nothing unusual
in their opera:ion.

College Campus? No, Espionage Factory

Only the "director-general," Gehlen himself, knows all
the companies that form his wide-flung Undercover business
empire. From the directors of these concerns down to the
branch managers, none is aware of more names than those
of the five men working under him. These men in turn
have learned only the address and name of their direct boss.
Although surrounded by all thc secrecy of a major
atomic plant, Gehlen's headquarters at Pullach, a charming
residential suburb of the Bavarian city of Munich . and far
away from the Iron Curtain, .seems once you . have
passed its heavily guarded crirrance which is closed to
most everyone to resemble a quiet college campus.
Many of the 400 people working in the compound of 24
former villas are indeed scholars in many scientific fields,
from geography to nuclear physics. While they direct and
evaluate the findings of the men in the field, they themselves though in less glamorous, less dangerous ways
are on the hunt for Soviet secrets.
+Their hunting grounds are Communist newspapers,
statistics. other. "open material." When the last East
German election reSults showed the Votes cast at "special
polling places," their number served to confirm the East
German army's present strength as Gehlen's agents had
reported it. The "special polling pines" were set up in
the barracks of that new army, and by an oversirht their
election figures had been published in the routine breakdown of the vote. HapDily, such oversights occur often.
They're Doing It for Freedom
The combinatinn or cloak-and-dagger methods with systematic research in a streamlined business organization
is one of the reasons Why Gehlen's reports are so accurate.
Intelligent newspaper reading and statistical analysis count
at least as much in his work as beautiful ladies in - slick
evening gowns and men hiding behind many disguises.
Also in contrast to old-fashioned espionage where
traitors were bought for a price, most men working for
Gchlen arc sincere patriots -- often from Soviet Russia
and her satellites ---- who wish only to help the West in
ridding their countries of Communism.
To win victory over a powerful enemy We must know
his strength and weakness more thoroughly than he himself does. Gehlen may well be worth as much as an
infantry division ready to defend freedom, The End

RARE PHOTO shows .Gehlen in days when

Wide Work
he:

ran a spy outfit in com petition with Nazi SS

31

Chief 7 Offiaeo PuLlsi. eh

Ohief';ofBe, onn

Etta

7g2

Infor Chief, BE
COS

OPeratioiuil/ZIPPER
American Letter to UTILITY
wie. zaRate cover is c letter addressed to UM.T.TY from.
This letter carries the noti17T East th , Streetfitex. Ycti;is a.._
in.
.. When it ,arrived
.
11. unbelcannt" ..and "Amerik Efotisehaf;t"
.
tidatien
it
to
y.
mcs:;nutcanateiciall
postal iection at the :Embassy it
reads
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MICROFil*MEr>
FEB 14 1962
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23 December 1955

maeluumm TOR:

DireCter of Central Inte1.li4en4s

SUBJECT:

Visit of General Geblen to the United States

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In a recent disiaten Colonel
, ii . Janeeny , sicskonla
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14 The ..akd translation cis arti .. ; s atkta.sct 11 The Nan in the

r s vhich &mired
Wcat for 6, 13, 20 and 27
Doty tcr . .
December 1955, was prepirthe
translators
Nceroliter,taid
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6I$cA. It is forwarded to you for that reason taut tor whatever interest
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.

:diseassions at the UV concerning its activities, its rosponsihtli...4*,,(4.g. in defensive CI),. etc freqnsiiity pecdnoc,
" Vities of the Goblin Organisation. ..Nriiiiattbee,!!:**.141WC,t
"

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natutral one,

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Germau . Arma Formes

D.TUCCT:

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.CON FIDE N TI A

COPY

4 ,-, P . ! 'A

DEC 315

Translation
"Die Welt",
18 December 1955 .

Introduotiont The Events of This Week

uesi

CL.
C:=
BAA
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Gwm
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Co!:,

AAA

All of . a sudden, a brochure with a very striking yellow cover has

disappeareq,Upm 4phe4windoen of the Soviet zone bookehope. Its
title was ITI'LlaC;ae. 'tainaan,7", and a conspicuous black band bore the
name of iti-authort DT. Otto John. This brochure . contained the
statements the former President of the Federal Agency for the Protection of. the Constitutien made to the world press in East Berlin
iiiiie:weeks after his disapPearanoe. This brochure is of great.
importance now. It contains material Which'is of definite- significance for the solution of the mystery which surrounds otto John.
It may be true that Dr. John was taken across the border
between the sectors on 20 July 1954 .ahile he was under
the influence of drugs
it may be true that he lay unconscious in a hospital in

Larlshorst, for two days --

it may be-true that he found himself a prisoner of the

Fted ArMy when he regained his senses, ang that he vas . exposed to all the pressure which is usually brought to bear
in such Vises -but, when Draohn, on 11 August 1954, went up to the platform and
stood before the microphone telling the international prema,:and the
western world. listening at the loudspeakers, of the reasoni Whi:he
had Changed frontlines, and when many journalists, from thie . free .
world orpsequeitioned him.afierwards,.noone present had the in:proision of looking at a hypnotized man not master of his senses
and making his statement under presatrei

Aside from oany utterances which caused a sensation

in the West,
bringing discredit on the Federal Republic and on the Chancellori
and being. very: hsavy harden on the:relationlirbeiween the Redatel.
Republi6 and other nations, he also aiolareti . that there werw4ecret
supplements toihe*EDC Treaty, 'while. the Federaldhaneillor had
definitely denied their existence. It *is else Of grave political
consequence, especially for the German-French relations, .thatJohn
stated that the Organization' Gehlen was running an aepionage.organistation in France. This etatement Allied an extraordinart . stir in
Franci.and . was a very heavy strain on the relations between Germany
and Fiance.
John did what he could to bring discredit on thelOrganisation-Cahlen.
He deolar4 for example, that Gehlen had among his'large:fitafi . of noworkers . fOrmei SD- and SS-leader z who had sturdered'airminiretiatince.
fighters.' He accused Gehlen, and Blank's Agency, too, of opening

their doors to fascists waiting for their chanoe to resume power.

By all this he tried to cement the propaganda theses directed

against the polidies Of the Federal Oovernment in general, as well

as against the aotivities of Blank's Agency and against rearmament.

Upon the question of the representative of "ftenchener Abendseitung",

why he had not voiced hia opinion in the F ederal.Espublic, John
replied; "Hid I said in the Federal Republic what I have said here,
I would . not have been Able to continue Say political activities because of the position 1 held, mince I would have been arrested on the
charge of having abused state secrets."
In vies of Dr, Otto John's return, the imporlancer of the sixth part
of our Factual Report by Juergen Thorvald is greater still. Thorwald
throws light upon the thick underbrush of intelligence agencies in
the Federal Republic!, and on the relationa between General Gehlen and
Otto John. '

T . HR'MAN

T.0

DARK

Factual Report on the German Intelligence

.Organizations
By Juergen Thorwald

161M
mama

T,.Dr. John and General Gehlen

Shortly before this report came out, but at .a time
when its appearance had already been announced, I met
on Rhein-Main Aitfield, before I started on a flit
to OeliadaeLeu NULI1h11:_had helped. me . with wt. first
ion the collapse of Germany in the &List by
puttisic;diaiiis'fat my.: disposal which they had kept

during the war. _This minliskod'me wortiedly; "Are

rsfully enough
it ove r
whatAtia:Youstre:Mritimg.now 1 . It won't di to
publishthatu
I think:"
.

you. atm* ....712U,90TO.:: t2i0 .141t .

Imaaseem

reir2
Ingsion

I replied that I thought it was high time to tell all

I haerlearned in the course of the past years, either
by chancing upon it, or by my own adroitness.. It.mr
opinion, it is.necemeary that the. public should learn
as *ugh as possible about Intelligence in Oft-satyr and
that an end be . ptt to the_noneetW-being broadeist out
Of Cheer ignorance by parties and other Organisations
about the Agetci , tor.the:FiCtectiOn of thi:Temilitits.

.nonsense stiMmtimila -- which was

l eCOUnteitatelligence,
.
v .tebIenvabcitt4iank
..abou A.
.000 the CIO, about the
-humanity", - and about the numerous private intelliEctoe
peddlers.

During the past six years Germany has become a front-line area where
the intelligenceorganizations of the two political world powers in
East and West collide. The example of Austria set at liberty and
rank with secret intelligence organizations righting each other in
Austrian territory, shows that ouch conditions oaanotbe changed by
iimple reunification, or neutralization. The only remedy is the
setting up of a strong officinl German intelligence service which
deprives the encoded of a democratic Gorman state of their 'basis on
which to establish support points and from where to oaAry out their
hand, gives friendly intelligence
work, and which, on the
.organizations no reason to use German territory us a basis for their
activities to the extent they are till doing it now.

>mem
SMIam

PALI
mama

Kg=

=ma

Ma:
;i!!!

mosail6
fiememm

4:o0
laelA

-Soviet Agents

Up to 1948, the Soviet Intelligence Service was absolute master of

the situation. The Soviet latelligeace Service, faithful to the

principle: "It is the aim of the Soviet secret intelligence service

abroad to incite the rebellion against the capitalists", had exploited the situation arisen chiefly because cf the political Ulu:Acne
the Americans were nursing, but also because of the infiltration., cf
left-:radical intellectuals, from the British Labour -Party, and because
the newly established French and Italian Intelligence Services were
saturated with very many communist rosistande fighters.
The huge double organization of the Soviet

Intelligence

Service, which

eOnsiated of the civilian Committee for State Security (KGB). and the
-military Main intelligence Administration (GRU) of the Defense
. Ministry, and was supported by KOminform as the center of the party
espionage activities in all coudtries throughout the world, had within
a wary short time placed its agents and.friendseverywhere, even inside
western governments. The free transportation granted eastern refugeeet,
and ' their settlement by means of rao : throughout the world, were already
items in themselves to disperse Soviet agents, recognized as such means
only s ie ery much later. - I n West Germany, Sowict agents Moved into
positions anyhow, either in occupation agencies-or in the slowly

. developing German agenciee, and they are still there.

The Intelligence Services Of Poland, Rumania; Bulgaria Hungary, and

Czechoslovakia were set up by the Soviets exaeily like their own. They
did the same 'in 1949 in , the Soviet zone, when the State Ssaarity Sir-

'vice was established, There was nothing in the. West at the time to
resemble even reaotely that nassive,well-trained intelligence organization which missed nothing of what happeted in West Geriany,
Mistake Upon Mistake
That is the explanaeion for the diaproportionata importance the
Gehlen organisation,. small as it still was, galled 'when. western
policies rare changed. yOr a longtime it remained a small group, as
compared with the feverieh growth of the long neglected American' , In-

-4telligence Service. Being merely tolerated as on outeider, and fur

too insidnifieunt at first, it was not influential enough to bridle
the energy with which many Andrioane started their 'work in GermanY,
with , no experience as regards eustern problems, The result of mach
money-fed energy eau the growth of numerous intelligence and sabotage organisations, many of Which employed Soviet emigrants or refugeee from the East in v ent Germany, und very uoon proved to be unsound.
Yell-meaning and zealous Americans Wore doing exactly what Oehlen
disapproved of on principle. They were themselves inexperienced, and
they worked with inexperienced personnel; they lost men and moterial,
and within the briefest space their agencies were infiltrated by
Soviet agents. Wherever they failed, they left behind a proletariats
of agents who *old themselvea ri Ght and left, eve.
en to West German
power groups who wanted materiel against persons they wished to get
rid of, What British and French intelligence services did, was not
much better in many instances, but their mistakes did not count so
.
{much.
Even organisations which had been established in Germany with definite
aims and with American money ended up with entering the field of intelligence, where their diliettantism could not but meet with futile
disasters which eclipsed the work they were actually supposed to.do ,
namely, to unmask inhuman and illegal actions of the Soviet zone
authorities, to publish them, and to help their victims.

Cameo
4:=D
4:Zb
Una
u1

No SS-Members
All these secret activities .hich were initial mistakes of the American
Intelligence Service while it grew from non-existance to the world-wide
organization of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) it is today,
were the soil on which the jungle of intelligence agencies throve,
and the unscrupulous intelligence deal to. which Germans fell victim.
It is a fact -- and on this point I was not satisfied With one-sided
opinions ascertained in a owiversation, for example with Gehlen -:that,Gehlen and his organization kept away from the afore-mentioned
inatitUtions during all these yeare. On-the other hand, the . developmerit, of the Gehlen organization had the consequence that wherever an
attempt Was made to set up German auiiliary intelligence organizations,
they were doomed to, failure'
because the core of German expert* gathered around Gehlen. In selecting his staff, Gehlen refrained
from emplOying personnel which had had any connection with the SS,. not
for reaions . of 'resentment against his war-time opponents in the Section
"Foreign Arniee Eant", but on principle; ' and he did so even if it
leant losing. a valuable Worker who'might perhaps go over to the East.
On one 'occasion Gshlsn told' me, during 'a conversations 7iiiilligsnoe
eor!Clonedessary. because no state desirous of maintaining itself and
.
of . acquiring . in independent political position, can . do en
go yim:61.mA is not kept objectively informed of what happens elsewhere.
411 American Whom I know well .once coined this word about intelligendm
works
Our business'is so dirty ' that it can be handled only by

-5.
gentlemen ?' Whoever forgets this principle when he sots up his own
organisation, cannot but drown in the mud which does well up in
these days, at least around the edges of our work kooglo
Gehlen.did not mention the name of the American. 1 learned it
aocidentklly a few weeks ago, during a conversation I had with an
aMerloin JoUrnallnA in California. If I have caught the name corand I was told that he was one of the
rectly, items aiTBOse
ried
ti
Amerioan
Intelligence Service.
mot-who-had-re g
Even now, "Organisation Gehl",. Agency for the Protection of the
Constitution, and Blank's Counterintelligende, are often (mufti:sod.Gehlen's field of work, however, has from the beginning been the
collecting of inrormation from foreign countries, outside the .
Vaetern.borders. . It was only for a brief interval that Gehlen was
fdroed to use a few'of hie men-for the type of work the Agency for
the Protection of the Constitution it handling now!, this was when
no German authority could take up the fight against the growing
activities of the 'Soviet agents. In other words, it was in defense
against soviet agents who had been sent to West Germany and West .
Berlin to Work against Gehlen's agencies. But this was invariably
kept within the limited scope of his organization.
tr . ,
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Three Hundred Sources of Danger

Therefore, no one could,have been more satisfied than Gehlen, when
in . 1950 the "Federal Agency for the: Protection of the.Canstitation"
was finally .established with agencies in sadh Land. 'lla Soviet
on the one hand those who collected secret iiifernatUin,
agents
on the other hand those whose. mission was to penetrate :government
agencies, yarties, trade unions, youth, and economic organizations
-- met with practically no hindrance at the Uzi. .TheeLgenis were
supported by a host of organizations which, in . the.diaguise of
mocratic institutiona l purpued solely the aim-aither 7 to undermine
German dconomic life by provoking. strikes, or to weaken public
opinion by their so-called "peace propaganda". 'ander /Sinister of
the . Interior Lehr, no less than 300 of such organizations were
known. About twohundred of them survive to this day..
No Exchange of Douniments
When the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution was establiehmkon 27 September 1950, it had no criticaliontict With debt-.
len l ierganization at all.. There could be-hardly'anything aa'imnselees ai . the assertions which were afterwards made abOut:ntirs4y.
between Geblen and the first President of the . Agency fOr thelVetection of . the'Constitution, Otto John. Not only W8.9 there no
critical Contact, there was hardly :anyeontact at all between:thee.
As I have said before, Gehlen could not but welcome it that th5.
security of his own organization in Went Germany should be safe-

-6.
guarded by West Germany's viz authorities. That was, and is, the
definite mission of the political Home Police, for which Gehlen
has never displayed any talent. A parallel situation prevail in
the United States with its huge CIA Intelligence Service under
Allan. Dulles which collects information from foreign countries,
and with the internal eecerity organizatIon (protecting also the
CIA in American territory) of the FBI under Edgar Hoover. When Gehlen was asked -- as far as I know, because there was a
shortage of specialiste -- to put such men at the disposal of the
Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, he complied. The
selected gentlemen separated entirely from Gehlen's organization.
The Deputy Chief of the Vederal a ency for the Protection of the
Constitution,(Lieutenant Colons
tko, who ie etill in office,
came from Gehlenleorgunization.'
4/

It was a quite different question on principle whether or not

Gehlen considered the first :'reeident.of the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, Otto John, reliable enough to trust
his own . organization unconditionally to him.. When I mat Gehlen On
one oacaaion twenty-one month. before John's flight to the Soviet
1111r-46
I sone l :Gehlen made no reference to John. Also in onn, later on, .
haufrained. from warning aeainat John. lie probably acted in this
4t:::a manner .because he for g es* that those who, due to a laisoonOsierad
4=:t feeling of, solidarity, were going to any length to play t.4S.SS'a
reeietanoe fighter off against the ex-General4 would attiOuii
.rivalry feeling-s to him whatever might happen. On the atii4t.hand,
'maimajtrue that Gehlen steered clear of trusting John with aii
terial which might have bearing on his organization.
I can well imagine that he felt uneasy about this."also-ona-of-thereaistance-fighters" who had always been auepected of hating 'been a
member of "Rote Kapelle"; who had joined the Intelligence Service
in England; who had participated in the Nuernberg trials as an . in:::Mms' terrogator of German priaoners-of-war and asaiatant . to : the Prosecummcg:
tionF and who had then, at the pressure exerted by Ehglieh friends
of his, been appointed President of the Agency for the Protection of
Imaram
the Canstitution, although he had no qualification at all for that

CsOF:0

.16m64R

fmcm

position.

The fact that John wont over' to the communists on 20 July l9541
justified Gohlen's personal prudence in regard to his.man. In addition, John's return flight confirms what Gehlen thought 'at the
time, namely, that John . iasno true communist agent. Gehlen had always 'thought of john as of one of tholie invertebrate intellectuals
with no sense of reality who taksrefuge to political day-drmamiatg,
and whose aimleeinesa induces them finally to believe that their
dream 'will come true in the East, until willy-nilly-they - mak, the
personalacquaintance of the East. John . was not allowed to return
.becauee, of any particular feeling of Sympathy with this human driftwood between the powers prevailing in our time; his return was made
possible in order to be able to find out the truth, and to be
to return the blow which had been struck at West Germany by John's
eastward migration.

Blank's Counterintelligence Arena/

Easier than in the "John case" cones the thought of rivalry in the
case of Blank's connterintelligenoe ageacy. In this MIAS, too,
a West Germa n intelligence agency was born-in 1950 when Count
Sohserin had been , appointed Adenauer l s . first military advisor.
Uohwerin recommended the appointment of ex-Lt.Colonel Keine to the .
potation of Chief of this military counterintelligence agency. In
.1343, Heinz had been the Commanding Officer of the Regiment *Bran_.
denburg" which the German Counterintelligence Service. had stab-

lished at the time for the specific purpose of carrying out sabotage
_missions in enemy country. When Schwerin was overthrown, Reins
stele& on in Theodor Blank's , Counterintelligence organisation.
Gehlen's field of activities included thereconnaissance. of the .
military strength and the military plans in the Soviet . trea.Thersfore, this task was apt to overlap with t he activities of-the intelCt1V
ligence . agenoy which Was supposed to be entablished in Blank o s Agency
ramiga, under . Reins. As much as Heinz tried after his failure in 1954 to
represent himself as being a victim of Gehlen f e attacks, it does- not
Nampa correspond with . the facts when carefully investigated. Of 'lours*,
orminacs
Gehlen could not help disapproving Lt.Colonl Seine's strivings 'in
Blank's Agency, if only for practical reasOns. In other coantriss,
the new organization had long ago asserted itself,, the procurement
orwliitary information ia . the . aisaion of a comprehensive orginise..
ti tom collecting material in foreign countries, than forwarding 'inch
12MINInt
to the Army, neer,' and the lir Forces, or lhellintetry of
information
CEMZE:
Defense
respectively.
The latter has at its disposal, will'fci* the
strags
itto
pretectioti of its Own troops against enemy 'agents, not for the coliaMtV
looting of information, officers of the secret Intelligence lervice,
who in this case really deeerve the name of "Abwehroffiziee". .
Penang
:2wma

CerA

Lzuf

It is logical that Gehlen could hardly be in favor of the endeavors.

made in-Blank'', Agency. Did ha take them at all earious . ? .Certainly

not. Whatever Was undertaken . therewithout funds worth mentioning,
without a staff of epecialists, and under the . leadarehip of an erratic
person like . Heine
she was soon found to be unritiable
was
speedily. termed "kitchen-intelligence" byWaggingIongues. an oxgani..

sation . not at all capable of catryinuoutimportant eissione. Here,

tOos developments proved that Gehlen Was right; ' Reins became entangled in.rather einister oases, the origin Of which went.back.tm his
previous activities. when he Was the chief of a private intelligence
agency. Beim had not kept clear of the morass, and so he drowned,
dragging his work down with him. Only one intelligence Service of
importance remained: The Organization Gehlen.

Next Issue:

SSD-Chief Ernst Wollweber's Great Campaisn

Picture of Frau Tohlgesuth escorted by two men.

Legend:

Marched Off, The Wife of Shady Dr. Wolf..

gang Wohlgisuth
It noon on 23 July 3.954, two criminal valise
officers took Brau Wohltemuth to the:Policia

forAnterrogation. Otto John had gont, to

Bast Berlin with her husband, a aellAcnciu

Berlin phyeician.

Picture of Dr. Otto John

No legend.

Picture of Friedrich W. .Heins

.1
A

Picture of No..2 Ludwigetrasea

TAtia*:

The:house,2, LudWigetrasso in .Cologne

'Optitirly

The: House of Thousand Secrets

"
the :main, office Cr the T4daral Agincy
PrOilo#On of the -Conatittaion in'aactititliditlit
liaere, and JObtri workd there . bafare he Agito
-

;;:;&,=

1a
0
1

skk

AntiRed:SPY i

1\-0
br 1 fI Is

Off 411410-

BONN. Germany
former prodigy of the German general /staff Is
America's No I spy
'
WIthet; Reinhold 04th/en's Milt ever
being mentioned in an appropriations
debate in Cong ress. be *ends ' Nix
lion dollars a y.er (roil the United
States Treasury.'
Thousands of agents o: diverse na
tionallties are on his payroll. teactlier
with Uta t 'elite of . the old German army's
eounterInteliigence corps."
Like at atomic inetallatise, his . heat
warier. ins American restalaillesed
property war Me** in Baraele
sealed off with terisedowire eftt armed
state- Whew
The Central Intelligence Agency and
the Pentagon appear to trest this retired German lieutenset general more
than the y de any Allied statesman.
"''on his, secret reporte, which evaluate .
the . ftetclings of his costly anti-Soviet
espionage operations as far beyond the
Iron Curtain as Siberia. depends much
Amerkan defense planning.
GEHLLN HAS WORKED. for the
United States uninterruptedly since be
surrendered to. Anserlean trdepe in the
cleaing days of the. war in 1045.
nett he was assigned to comb thrott gls

4imer Nazi 'Defeatist'

s-F

Then Dr. Otto John, Welt arms!, 'athief and Jealous rival of Gehlen,
openly deserted to the Communist
East July 20
John's Intrigue against Gehlen was
divulged In both Bonn and Rau Berlin.
Even the secret rendezvous house acres* .
the Rhine River from Bonn. .where the.
Chancellor and Gehlen frequently conferred was p:npointed for the idle
curious.

mity

WEST GERMAN newspapers de

mended that Gehlen drop his mystery.
Noting that this "tireless general' was.
reputed . never to have been photo*wised. leering tabloids printed a
.splisieb of Week ink for his "portrait."
Pally, the Nees Buhr Zeit** , at
Dweeklarf proudly wine sit with wafts* *dares et (WOW With his eeittaisr..
intelligens, staff ea the Rustle trent
A farmer Elaff *leer, unable le bear
*we Seen*, had *hutted* go* to
tha Dereeldlif pager wills MVOS& asi.
ask

In the Invasion of Rusts. Its

served tinder Gen. Adolf Renshaw, wow
one of the edictal planners of West
Gems* rearmament. In April. U142.

youthful Gehlen was sing led set to bead

the vital new caanter-intelltpense meLion, Premde .Heir. Olt.
Many Germ* front eannsanders gave
gasilnio_d praise to .Gleithei'a semmeriso
pp Use Red Army. Ma use wisowned for
aft ,liniteripieftegateeiro. gate Aar
gm volt tar ?rota =t
figiltativaly at the
1K)NE 0? HIS peeeent-day admirers.
inetading Ines high in the Bonn govern.
meet. , claim that Gettlen's organization
bee been free of blunders Bu: except
far the British secret service, no other
Intelligence agency Is more feared by
.Iron Curtain seentrift.
At lead awe, Oseinstedst * gableage*, h
.lieseetrated &thieve ear

esImand post be West Ihmetla. They lest

bark mast steels lee last Oermim
smerey piths. to wipe
spy ring le Besithy.

of him wite ablet.

Bat Gehl* 4 still a. dadoe to ml..

How , of hls eountrynson, a agars of
doubt with ellen *legislate.
Ms sever man* for his headitherisni
M.Pesh Is Sneddeeteehe Indeetriews....
Meath Germ= Itstishry UtL1-.1
Singiarel dwells:1.1:1%M
.

is et. ;==iX.Z.
. the rases of secret ieformatiOn oo Rus- ripl=

Awl zz.,

as a :aratuagera,ama asKaaar'"
prisoner. Having. 'commanded the teat/. .
_
west
German.
y there
.
. ter-Intelligence . secUon, Ftemde Heart
emtrolum,
hidi,Adsid
'
usaiK7e;
aaratid
Ost (foreign' armies east!: on the,,..RUS
soak
aiin front from 1042 on, hla . aisabils of
.
tio equipcinnt and eourisea
So7iet military strength was so consist.

THR
RAIC
PRI
NC1PLZ
of
ope
ration
nutty
wotuid
up
Y
saccitrite
that
he
ent l
'Ida which he brought with." him

being executed. is

defeatist.

54

es old one In svr history: /Waist en

was one if the - kie idols that . Agents knowledge of the aiiiienai. OP
'urged sae ,riesi regime, web- la .
4sarstus to oat little ring. At
*stern lawless. is win . over
Ow
_ wiarsere, put together the fiegmeittary.
eisa - people web gessereedty whd. PIMP
fiel4 reports Into an MUM1or!!1,1111W110 ..ipentmosale of information.
: log
101 ab cim
f Optima the Kim await. K K
bet *seam swiftest itaisaw . ..116M.
r Gemuw men. so ma me
Boviet . Union weld set le . Overvb0.101. KIK* and
by German mthtta,y meso SS.
. rusersd to have been ..paraehieted
, Instead., two . million 'Soviet w* pals Ilialead. White 'Kuala. sad the .Ukrales
- *ere, who might have-fou ght leyelly.kre saw asa.bsown le have. died se Onn.
. 1042 In s German-led cruse& strictly Aineftel Wile* or behwe Wrist After
1ga1 nSt the Kntnilist wer """
_
d t .111ring spade. Oekri
aBast Germaay 1//ii
",
Kt am Gamma.
tub human musety ia Nazi IIRTAITIMUNI
4011 enmpa.
eent.sre
Slaw.
it was Gehl. jai who pr141141 to Gehlen's primary Weston is ti ideas.
tele)) yolice chief Heinrich Illmmier ft 'lilyand locate at all tense the forward
*44 "a ' ersatim
and satellite
armed
forces. This
is
.indeeground
resit/Ince'dr."
behind the 'at ..floviet
undausemai
to maid
...clarity.
way&
H. :retoo
.se
socinot Rtlahn
l
wi
lfd.it

400.000 Anserican'..BrItials and !mesh

m eled...en
:.Poltab
out-meting West German*. '
. hat hat eatir.Reale .A quiet..vroops
4eholarly man with a high
ouchhorelmod, receding fair hair.' and large
oest200 It to Misr
oomOmo6 area. arblen kaki Ulm an y thin g but
ailastkr .py.
.1n the . last 'IS
of
khiiigi ruse trout egoauts - hugisomik. , Ho has the dipped terse vstech of the
r Prefeesion. tut),. uses to rum
gonirsec
"4; 4,.
44'
_
-rrvisern! litany eurrent copies in
pima*: Masao . lif.:41111ivisCfbwqr4vel , &canton with lila Ilene:mantes esHee
aseeee
s hie sams elleit. hw
innitha , .a prisiffften .worte see sntot
speed illeablit
detail taOata ownt
at=
_
_oet
Upped Aaseeliesa POW. T a be waselr_toho
OFINI astatarassair esisanant Meer a persTeeKrZnim
sorially . thessaCnitiste . deff to orgsnlU mi tjuay sERvics his been his
11!"1" 2".'llte.'Son Of the &rector Of iterts.11ehing
9411
caMiar
Sta
Un44146-1Stiles.
ter.the Untied
l'hotiae.Gehlin was born-in
Thar.
A fter . 00m Pleting weondrry scheol
gt _._
A VEIL Or tf.CIECT Wound the i lio.
'n
19214
heKiii1117dlieut
t
it
r
'r
.
Golden
erwinisaUsn

was.
ripped
off
try:
t

enant's
.t.. /nest
savernmeet..igat year tumnifzElen.

asidisagai
ier
the
June
17
anti-Communist
revolt.
ea
the
Wawa,
taupswie,
-j
As hundreds' of Soviethating Germane *se a dia04obil sosieL Net NEN MC
Hetes was in power . OM delfts
were . rounded . up In a reprisal cam- eine .
eirod promotion. I. septab: Ng war
paign that went on for months. the Last egOesad ta:the Rai* Weir Illinhierya
Berlin government denounced virtually dream spit Ise anthitlees.ftialetoliftles.
all, of them as "Naal.Ge.hless agents." . Gelden's brilliance at desk ;week'
Thal was the lint mew * mile* ell. :insight the eye of hie. Deniers, lie was
isms ef the Delft rerthet bad heard el appointed to the general staff In INS
Mid elevated to major a. year later.
the efteder, little fees* eases Is his . His flret . war experience, came is the
Araeskaalsaaeal Maven= hidosset.
WS conquest of Pelee& In 1540, be was
In Bonn. Chancellor Konrad Adananer Olson *neer for the Army high . earnWith Ouderien's *after . spear.
knew kW Intimately, of eourse. His deep Nave
. In their 'weep scenes Prance.. His ..
confidence In Gihlen ha y contributed: beans
reward was s lieutenant colt:Maim
Jhi

g. fo

uninientlonally to much more unwanted

publicity this year, when the Citncellere
storied preys. ins ip take y e r the
orgarttatacm under West Ger...,rsIgnt)

set provincial
Oehlea's worst Jell : te dale was !rem
a carefully plea** Ceessawhit canker.
The Assettraachad ad Idea in 'spying so
felmith psetiabas . is Paris. This premised Oaks Mora.
Whatever . repreeentatreas Gehlen
maintained In Paris were there prowess
s to act as liaison with Atittielli (kn.
leAcd Gruentlser, supreme commander
of both United' States and Allied fortes
In Europe.
Out Gehl* bastlh pulled his men out.
A typical ease of macabre error has
sone to light in West Berlin. Involving
not Gehlen s own ertiip but an Arneriean
agency with Which hU operaUons ant CO.
ordiruited.
TWO EAST GILLMAN atomic seen.
Lists and lour skilled technicians were
smuggled out of, the Soviet Was and
lodged et ono of the agency. Berlin
-havens." preparatory to being down far*or westward.
The haven had a German honsekeeper
whew boy friend acted as a tipster for
the Americans. At hest one American
repel* he was suepicious of the boy
frWd, but higher offIcials failed to do
anything about It.

iftesill One moreftg the vithes Immalsfast teed Ins dregged, ail aft smihOseeweft* higftives were Writhes with
pecalysia. sod the hey -friss& otsvieusty
Canwesmial deefthowesot. shipped wt.
With all Use cum* furor over Geh
lea mined up by Had propaganda at
talla and jealous politician* In Bonn,
imams inalikely . that Cbaneatior Aden.
MIR WM rev** hisi earlier plan ti cow-

II

base nature eivernawnstal issowpAies

astivitietelnlo one big emperors' office

the little general.
it is also usalikaly that tiohion's
talents mill not be treasferred official*
hear the Americans W Use Germans in

new form Is the coming year.

The rate for which his experience
beat wits .htim would he counterinbeill
*seta 'Oaf in the future German . high
emmaand. Out a nsan who has been In
the hire Of foreign . power for nine
wen a friendly , power such as the
= .114afts has become. is not with-.
asCitstolpasp In hop= top advenr.e:.
'.Ciereein
Usimai's. lest oftwbeasentethrzwel
mr
ei Waft& erapiss.ebaroner
.11113bmw essears.
=
-tier emirst1;111211*
halifil- tiWarisit

hanged as a traitor.

DECLASS IFIED AND

CENTRAL

R ELEASED HY
INTEL LIGENCE AG ENCY

SOURCES M
ETHODS EXEMPT I UN3B113
NAZI WAR CRIMES
DIS CLOSURE ACT
DATE

2001 1005

AIR

Chief of Bose, Fulleoh

ilinn Chief of nation, Oersomy

Chief, EE

Chief of Baser Bonn

Operetta/
John TAM
REF:

sou 7781, 7 Dee 55

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INT:LL !BENCE AGENC)
SOU3:ESMEH0DSEXEMPT ION 3B2E

NAZI WAR CRIMES DI SCLOSURE AC]

DATE 2005

/1.4. .examins4ion of Avedvartore filee meals that Fri Jahn

*EL; ,3roberi.r77:.Zast: Trth . Street., New Tort Citti yes the dobjest
'eennectioa.ezith him regeost far ea
of a' dispatch . froo kArd
autograph fro& a prominent Inilviaeal. worn ens varied for
hie *Ire .
information: mai la . geol 1951, reported. that . TAEZ% .
Wt. been the cobjeatei of a. apecini - ODENCT inquiry in October /949 . pradicestesi upwa their requests for notogreztot from prostnent
pros In the United Steles andetiocitere. itt thist tine :it
enbvereivit vas deternined. that 'neither 1A13 :',easer
latent In the cellection of 'estotrophe. MEM atated-theCdioblact
and .his rife hat. risco been the consi of eseercani.eiougandato
connection with their notogroph. collection activities.

6 as 56

Pristeibutioekt
2 - COB, Boon,
3 COB. Pun
3.- COS, Germaigy
- EE/G/Z
I - RI
.
RMP/da
ZE/G

ottattg
EE/G/E

(file

GEHLEN C

SECRET

JCEU ,711C0

JAN 3 1956
Ctdef, POD
Chiet:of Station, Bonn

INFO : EX, cnS

Operational
jpeol,.

W.

aer.

on Omura alines

Artialeis

titr!!##,IMI.-11,11),..istlutit*Nooraltstata of
tigeatul4re : aada at thii

'

O at

suj,:;:.:47!: '

..;er
4

&C

copy* eath trans.

1141

(A

and B)

ff
U

:DEC LASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INT ELLIGENCE
AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION3B213
NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACT
ATI 2001
2005

A 7.

RI,copy,

SECRET

SECRET

THIS aLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED,

SUBJECT

I.

(NAME, IN ROMAN LETT

GEHLEN, Reinhard

'AND III NORMAL ORDER)

i:
`.. ,

(Gen)

'ciiilid

.!-A

1,1

:.

14-,
Igri:- .57
- rffl
, OFFICE DESIGNATOR
-----T

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

FIRST

COVER NAME

.t
.1 16. INTEREST IN. SUBJECT .
.ESPIONAGEOR CE ACTIVITY
....
OPERATioNAL CLEARANCE
OTHER
-

7. OCCUPATIONAL *SPEC I ALTI ES, EDUCATION

'

all aTailable information

SPECIAL

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS
.1... :
k . .iaaerloan'nti-

LOCATION

.- 19334 : _
. 19354
_:. .

19314;5:2

' ...DATES
- 1,945 ... .

LOCATION

ACTIVITY

RELEASED BY
IN TELLIGENCE AO -,-...1%."'
. ,
SOURCsE SME T4013EXEMPTION al.
;A:Li,.,'

pill Al.

'CENTRL.
A

sig

. NAZI
. . WAR- CR IMES ill SCLOSURE441*Ca,
6 ATE 2005
-

/92U1ES

.
ITECLAS S IF I ED.A-ND

. .

- 4 ''''' -

. .1,4r ;A:eidemyt Berlin

General' Staff
6i

..

.: 17. INFORMATION REQUIRED

..

TIME SUBMITTED

ADDITIONAL DATA

,';

...

8.- MI L I TART. SERV' CE

2206 K
2451

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED?

_NO
..gX.. YES
_.
116,:. TYPE OF REQUEST

.,

Kra. Starnberg/Feldstr 68

'

REQUEST FROM

: ROOM, BUILDING.
5 EXTENSION

German

MAME, pf.,_o.01 GI NATI NG OFFICER

BIRTH PLACE zrfurt,

4. 81

'Berg,

DATE OF REQUEST

-...

3 Apr 1902

5. CITIZENSHIP

..., ,,

30 .husaary 1

b': 21 Jan'.3.9Ci5
b. 's J-Apr 1902 .GROSS p Dr

3. BIRTH DATE

-=..,(-) t

%-.._

. 14.1.4E4...11.48 I AILL SeELL IIIGS CTC NUWIF.Eab .EIC. -_- .. ... ...,..
w4.12.'4104
- t o illemrai . Dr !
lit"Itli i 'Robert '...'

.i.
,V..4 )lit_P5
, b 4 Hai . 1905

REL )NSE TO
REQUEST NO...--'-'64 ),--40_

.
.,

I
.

.
..
-

10. DESCRIPTION .(HEIGHT)

.. .....:,:.:: ;:;:...:. i-'''..... .. .
174. cad

-.WEIGHT)
.- 65. g.

(EYES) - . (HAIR)
blue
. Alk . blond

(RACE)

.
(OTHER)

11: .SPOUSEA,=. ( I F ,WIFE, G I VE MAI DEN' NAME).

'

:ITZ.-KWIZWICH;. Herta .Cterlottees

ivi Helene
.1.1.iifigeEni EMtEltial II MMF,D.s gif AM .1 L Y ,.. AA=TI E S Eattar
ins
.
b _./7 Jan .3. __ Ifaiie ,:.Theierie .,...:. ,. .x... _
fiee von:VIERNICir
izrz ilbsiatharina'M
argarete

CH 9 *.'Joachim.

30THER.::S I GNI F I CANT ; OATA

. (POLITICS.
.

RELIGION.

ETC).

p'
h :b .:11e k'l, ' '
...bei:;:t&iii,.-;:28'..-Fetil-laig.?..:-.....:.

to

' ATTACH EXTRA' SHEETS MIEN

' NEEDED'.
-

NSERT CARBON; 111: , ..OUTwFORMS

(NS TRUCTIONS
....
.-SEND .: -BOTHHSHEETS-TO :
..
I

.
I -.12S

roam. No.;..50 1 :REfl:ACES Foam

"

J'-t

1 ISTD1-

COMPLETELY.
..SEE CS I -10-7
.19/
': .

..

1:1

14.

TV\ t11.."-sa IYA

rYN atsS izri g. C-

A-41.1

1-f-e Y

;Lad
T-e,12, I s

A.,\J tic,

nau-178os

3. :0

Chief, EE
AU: C.
_
Chief Of13asei. Pullaeh

Info: ;COS:

.s*fonf:
Proposed Education of

uTILITr l s

Daughter

REF, .PaIA-14998;tuam-1211

1. As a follow up to the proPosals mad. in:E0412l3:-oonoernin"

UTILITY. '" daughter's attending Radcliffe,
-:vand C.
:7 spoke with her in late December 1955.
2. She was very interested in,, attending any- college in the.United
States but because ehe was not familiar with any particular institution, had
no real preference. In additionvabe will he going to Portugal this year
and does not want to enter ()allege before September 1957.
fr.
.3 proposed thats
3.
.r.
-leek Radcliffe about wspecial" student
requirementi. entrance tests, and Other registration prooeduree. Radcliffe 'a
answer .to
-11e'letter is as follows:

am . writing in reply to Your recent letter to say that

we do not have special etudents at Radoliffe College. If your

friend wishes tO .have

his daughter makeipplioation for
adnission . to. Eaddiffe College, she would have to register for
the full series of College Board Examinations ard apply as a
full time freihmen:student ! here.-.Please /et us know if you
have any furtherquestiOn,"
.

4. In light of this, it appears that Radcliffe will expect her to

fulfill all the
testrequiiements whinh,beoszes of her intention to
stay in Portugal. until the summer of 1957, tj4fl be a very difficult procedure.
,
. to ask if special arrangements for
5. t: ..has requested ? C:
ber entrance -can be made by.ruALRx, or if such arrangements are intended.
Distribution:
3 -(DIRECT)
3 - 'CO'S
9 February 1956
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTEL!. IBENCE AGENC)
SOURCES METHOSEXEMPT I ON 382E
NA! I WAR CR IMES DI SCLOSURE AC]
DATE 2005

t71

I 24:114.471308

Pace 2

6. viii
PCS take no action peniing reaript c

C
Approvad

t
tr;,'

C.

71 =Mtn

By JOSEPH W. GRIOG,
United .Press Stall Writer..
BONN, Feb. 9. .The boss
of Europe's:newest spy net..
work carries a heavy . re.'
volver, flanks himself with .'
armed bodyguards and has a .warning on his gate, 'Vanserous Dog."
He is a man Of many faces,
but only one -.PlibtOgraph, of
him exists and that is at
least 15 years old.
He Went into business Offi.;1.,.
cially only this-week,
,
5:: he --is tan:Old;..hancf.atIspy%,,,3.
ing\on the Russians. -Be has.,,'
an estimated 4000 agents op.
.erating.frbm.East,..Germany...
to Red. ChiriEL..

Lt. :Gem : Re' Itibliidsctlisti'i

Gehian became president of
the Federal Intelligence

. and '-blaolied.-

In; .

Red
,
by Wiestv...Geriiio':.,.. ..Rialtlent
Theodor. HeUss. . His deputy, armies, . he
:.lo
whOse.ideritify,Ati.,,:a4.
1 I mostly ., renejeCreb ,:work

like,thotie..10t,.,,Zilk:!.:cith?:111 .-:',....;giide y. Russituf. 'prisoners, and

....thet;thlert,iirtith#461.i;.';*a.'Pdeaerters,.,
d
-arThYil.,:sriff
e!l!eti' .-11i'm he .: had
. work

Hshid -bii.dgefl.q,0".1',414,1\liv."..?=: bleAkitIde

nohien
- A

Gen'

ary
.0j3-:.;.$6800

',before

itoi:',..iipottedR the
- countable only to Chancellor
'fit -tuietiCOn: .- Gehenauer,and - shipped
ntilie
941.,peth
len to.ith
'11e*ed
a moun t.

sent 'Gen.':'Gehlen 3.-,baek : to

-
niz;e ,Gen; ,Geh!win4t,..these ..: Germ any ,With an agreement
In the know say heLi-alen. to build'::tiri,..American-aponto;fceep
netwIcourskiian
the
eedy
der, of medlui -height,*lth
on .
.
sparse-fair ba'lr,ahlghfore. :

set eyes?:- ancticliiipusly.: tic

. truding ears. Sometlm ,, he
che;
Adinetirtieilie-11-;#11417ShaVen.
, He has.Iieen L variously- de.
abiiiied'.-AslOOkliielike ,a his.

lar#Y.
manwhich Is 'Whatheis...
AUnL
Hist. caree
' " eqi4a1iltOilktEAlf
r.,
a
; of thi..Old:.)VtilittilithtilliOs.
t ,fle.tvair,tiornAkt:.,Xtlitit,',flow
In the tOtiietl:ohe,';,:,lhe'..,Sitm

-c; of
e

He entered the army3:1109,20

as in artuieb, tenOt;D,By
'
-lie was in t otinibutiid
iv, artillery regiment on the
' 1A 942
'RuSIan-.1rOlt . Thai-year. he

o ).beciame
t

his

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION3B2B
NAZI WAR CR IM ESDISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001
2005

401t,: Gehlep .:14/ops Post

!Wald Ilibatte 'Pftvir envie.

BONN, Oct. 13 Gen. Rein.
hard Gehlen, the chief of West
Germany's F'e deral Intent.
genee Agency; said in an inter
view that he. planned to con.
tinue in his job for three more
years, countering reports that
he would be forced to resign
Galen came under- fire last
summer after disclosures that
former Nazis holding key jobs
in ht ::Agerig-Virere : 04cior
the' Soviet Uriftiti

2463

F.,

z--..4-(X.T.. :--

13 February 19%

OECLASIIIED AND RE
LEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES
METHODS EXEMPTION3828
NAZI MAR CRIMES DISCLOSTREACT
DATE 2001 2005

Fraalduit
Director, CLI
C O NF :

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COP; Tl * F 1 /OPS, FIA1 2, SiC 2 .!

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114
Extraction

from FBIS DAILY REPORT, FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS, No. 33 -- 1956

Thursday, February 16 1956 (USSR and Eastern Europe)

"GRIn'AN USES NAZI AGAINST WARSAW STAISS

"Berlin, Deutschlandsender, in Germeua to East and West Germany, Feb. 15, 1956,

1600 GMT - -L
"(Text)

"Deutschlandsender his learned details ()fa . talk between Under Secretary of

State Globke . and Gehlen, head of Bonn's espionage organization, as well
as some of hit leading assistants from circles . in close contact with the
Federal Chancellor's ' Office in Bonn. The war criminal mad former deputy
Gestapo Chief, Fritz Pansinger, who returned from the Soviet Union
last October, also participated in this exchange of views, which was mainly'
concerned With.the . intensification of the espionage activities of Gehlen
against the Warsaw Treaty. states,
"During the Second World War, Pansinger cooperated closely with
Gehlen's section, Foreign ArmiesEast. In his capacity as Chief of the
GestapO in the Soviet Baltic republics which were occupied by the
fascists, he endeavored in particular to enlist corrupt anti-Soviet .
elements for the Gehleri apparatus.
"Cm the other hands Geblen furnished the .Gestapo with extensive material,
which went either to Schellenberg . or Bansinger. As late as April
1910, pansingeralet Gehleeron the inatruCtions'of s-Kaltenbrunner in
Bavaria 'in order to reOrginize the espionage abPiratus against the
Soviet Union which at that time masteing dissolved,. It VVA stated
during the conviriation with Gehlen that clOsi-relations already
exist again between Gehlen and Pansinger."

OfCLAS6IFIED
AND RELEASED
CfNINAL
BY
INTELLIGENCE
A
GENCY
SOURCES METHODS
N
AZI WAR CRIMES EXEMPT ION3B2B
OA

D/SCLOSU
REACT
TE 2001 2005

irtt

eri

"Th
360

LB/MK 4DATE : 24 FEB 56

I
1

TO

11-fl---

G,

i -3

DIRECTOR

FROM :

PULLACH

ACTION:

,EE 1-46! !

INFO :

7,

DC I

8,

D/DC

OOP

9,

A/DD/Pje 10, Fl 11, F I /OPS 12, Fl

4GEHI-6

puLi

entozott4c:

TO: DIA

NFO F RAN

CITE: PULL
:10tum

RE: PIRJ.-17-1.14(OUT064.5_1,-,
SEVERAL. WEEKS AGO

READ COPIES LETTERS UTILITY SENT

C:=

VA
VARIOUS
U.S GENERALS THANKING T
FOR CH :II STMAS GIFTS,
:..ABSTEMIOUS UTILITY THANKED GEN PHILLIPS FOR BOTTLE COGNAC AND
:..-. :ADDED EXPRESSION ASSURANCE THAT "YOURSELF APO YOUR SERTICE .

i4i!.;t4m4-]

: .-WITHIN:TTHE SCOPE OF THE TREATIES ARRANGED BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES'i

CAN

.
*;

. ,

MADEE
r

,.

ALWAYS COUNT UPON OUR FULL SUPPORT, SHOULD YOU DESIRE ITS"

NO R EF LEGAL! ZAT ION, COMPETENCE UT IL 1 TY IN SOF NEWT IATIciNMAI

:;:..:.014;.:FUTURE LIAISON

ARRANGEMENTS,. ARMY MAY HAVE READ MORE INTO

:.ABOVE .QUOTE THAN !NTENDEO. IN F ACT, LETTERS WERE PREPARED BY Fiwf.m.ma

lft3 i3 E. 13 tAf'Eli ALIAS ROGER iHO HAD Mt

s s ION TO DO NOTHING OUT

ADKkOWLEDGE -GI FTS . ALIAS HARTW I STATES UTILITY HAS "T

**' ' 'commuNiCATED WITH PHILLIPS ExCEFT FOR ABOVE.

DECLASSIFIED AID
END OF mESsAGE
REL
CENTRAL INTELLIBINC EASED BY
E
SOURCES 1ETNOBS
Y
EXEMPTIOARN3E8N2CB
. NAZI W4 gRINES
DISCLOSUREAC T
DATE '20

01 2005

ABSTRACT

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE CIPY r:o.

sew.

DECLASS IF .I ED AND R EL EASY

CENTRAL I NTELL I ENCE
ENV'
SOIrrt\ESME11100EXEKPI ION 3B2E
ti AZ I WAR CRIMES DI SCLOSURE AC1
2005 ROUTING
4I

291
MG/ .MK
29 FEB 56

DATE

DIRECTOR

FROM : PULLACH.,.

ACTION:

FE 1-6

I INFO: DC I 7, D/DCI a, COP 9, f /D r)/P/P 10, PPC 11-13, CI 1h, Cl/OPS 15,
FI/RI 16-17, S/C
0D/I 20, AD/CI 21
'6' CY C. 6- Al
1-PULL,3506 (1N 29261)

TO : DIR
t2ciagg
=go

1.

ROUTINE

1952Z 29 F r R 56

rgeLEUCA.G.

CITE: (PULL

WO: FRAU

UTILITY VISIT SCH r DULr D END APRIL. CONSIDERING TRAVEL

BY SS UNITED STATES SAIL/NG 3 MAY, LE HARVE, OR SS AVERICAN

SAILING 26cAPRIL0 WILL BE ACCOVPANIED BY AtIAS:HARTWIQ AND
POSSIBLY Y L7* .

3 WILL RETURN BY AIR AFTER SPENDING CIRCA

12 DAYS IN U.S. WILL ATTEMPT Fin? , UP A PLAN IN UP7TING WITH

UTILITY 2 MARCH. UTILITY AND PARTY WILL BE UJDRACO
WILL ALSO ENDEAVOR FIX DATE FOR UJORACO
2.

CE GROUP..

UTLLITY DESIRES TRAVEL UNDER ALIAS; OTHERS WILL USE

TRUE NAMES. ASSUME THIS CAN BE ARRANGED WITH ODYOKE AUTHORITIES..

3.

RECOMMEND BRIEFING FOR UT I I !Ty r tIPHAS I ZE KUCHAP AND

PARTICULARLY 1KUJUMP

ti.

AL I AS HERDAHL" HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT UTILITY rn LL

BE ABSENT VIHF.11 C

VISITS MUNICH AND THAT C .

ILL BE ABSENT

WHEN UTILITY IS AT WO. Iv. DO NOT FEEL THIS DECISIVE BUT'MAY

BE FACTOR AN C

JIS *WANG HIS VISIT MUNICH.

5.. 'REQUEST , CONCURRENCE ABOVE. WI LL CABLE DETAILS AFTER

:TALK WiTH . tiri;

6 TY.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

,;

7-4(6R //i---3

. ,F,Olsk 18

DILeATCH NO .

VIA:

312

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

CLASSIFICATION
TO

FROM '

Director, MARK/
(Attn: Robert A. Ascham)
Chief ceilS; Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERALSPECIFIC-

Info:

.cos (Attn:

L.

(11X1iit3iiie

13 March Conversation with UTILITY

1. On 13 March UTILITY invited me to come, unaccompanied by any other

member of myetaff, to his office to discuss a matteref some importance and
considerable sensitivity. No other member of theJIPSWINCP -staff was present during
. the Conversation.' UTILITY had just returned from a strenuous week in Bonn, was
suffering from a cold and, quite unusual for uTILITr, gave the appearance of being
somewhat fatigued.:
.

uTrurr believes that the general political situation in Europe is

2.
.deteriorating. In his opinion events in France and Italy are moving toward the
reestablishment of Popular Front governments. The .political Situation in the
Federal Republic of Germany also appears to UTILITY to be fraught with : growing
political difficulties which could lead to a rather drastic change in'the.cokPlexion of the government once'ADENLUER Ie leadership is no longer a factor: Although UTILITY believes that the German population is quite. unsuiceptible. to.
'communism and unlikely to accept a Popular Frontgovernment, he ia-co'nvinced that
the penetration of significant segments of West German . society assumes enorious
prOportion'fali understood by no .one. He is:not . optimistic that'there4mnild.be
adequatm opposition. to a neutralist . politicalaovement combining the Socialists
and the anti-ADENADER elements of the Right--a coalitionl ..Whicth UTILITY' considers:
almost is disastrous as a Popular Front movement. He: emphasized
he does. not
consider the problem acutevthat the' preseit trend , could perhaps be reversed if
a and Coalition would emerge 'after. ADENAUER leaves the'political.scene. He brings
this problem up at this particular time only because "of his forthcoming visit to
Washington and his desire to discuss this problem with Ischam'Personally.

3. IIIILITTis convinced that he as. head ofIIPSWIliTiwatild not survive in a

neutralist/nationalist government with'Itnch individuals as Identity 1, 2 and 3"
in paver: Such 'a governMentletuld, tintin maintains, bs'iralnerable , to political
penetration and eventual control by the East. Its' establishment vould mark, the
beginning of a period in which UTILITY would feel morally justified in taking all
possible action, including the establishment of an illegal apparatus in the Federal
Att: 1 - Identities under s/c
't DIST
.
4 1 Dir, KUBARK (Attn: Robert A. Asoham) . - DIRECT - 4/1 att
Nii
1 COS, Germany (Attn: C.

as

above

DE

13 Mar. 56
la 51-28A
"" 1949
MAR,

ASS I FIED
AND R FLEAS 0
C ENTRAL
' 6tAsictitrippE N rE
OuNtEs mETNO.DS EXEMPT
NAZI WAR CRIES

DATE 2001

y
A ENCY

I0N

36713

DISCLOSURE ACT .

2005

-2-

-ii-EGT4118. 312
13 Her 56

Republic, to oppose elements in Germany supporting a pro-Soviet 'policy. UTIllYr

would like to discuss with Anthem a plan for such an eventuality. Re requested
that he be given the opportunity to do this during his visit in Washington' in
great privacy with only C 2 present.
it. UTILITY then went on to say that he is hopethl that the need for surth...
action will never arise; that he . can have 'another eight years as Chief of UPSWING
in which to systematically develop his organization along sound professional lines,
based upon a 'lei or laws -passed by Parliament and an opportunity- for development
within the gOvernment g olidly alignedwith the West.

NI*

SVABATE COVER IDENTITIES TO:

IDENTITT 1 -

ireib3rt WEERIEM:.,
*

2 '

103a)1.8--3121 13 Mar

'

"

"-LENZ

3 - Joapf42-241JEIL
-

2135r-

oigocI
609
4 at= 190

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le

312 OM IEVLL MC PROP tarbta

TO DWG= ATTM3123 OVitO MIMI= 0121:36 =SEX TIM POOP= 3COM

Of 033 VOOC.
COD OF 11236302

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

tstO
erl

CENTR !BENCE ASENC)

SOUR CESMET:4003EXEKPT ION 3132E
NAZI WAR CR IMES DISCLOSURE AC]
DATE 2005

41

, 4t=0.4,k.:3:*

ckfa

4154;CSO2S3

SCCT CT

Allf 1 6 1956
Chief, PullaohT0iierat1One Chief of gue 1 Bonn
Pp#ris#C41/40:14/CALL
UPS - INU/Nineaptper Article on : :ILLITY andVP::,...,AGT

1. On the off-chance that this has not already boo available to you,
we are transiitting for your intonation a'ane-bage article on UT MITI and
April 1956
lf?TatitiO, Ithich. .iiippeared in the spteial feature emotion of the I .
.1(Identity 1).
'edition -of r
2. The appearance of this article in this publication in possibly of
3 will recall cocstonting
particniar interest far the following reasons:
terns upon an ar.ticlo on trTI1117 and :t1PIU1130,. which had
2 (Identity 2) and was poblished by Identity (3) several
traccilitrItteiibk..: C.ing fact in. that the sttanned art.icle, while apparently
:
:The-:interest
:
vicat.hiCieio:;._
(the writer ia taxed as Identity 14),in
vtritteKisbi:', io*O-One other. than C.
n rerreiCiiers..outepaltenlY tatvrable to UTILITY and p--mma aid appeared i
C.
2
was
nnacd
the
new
aditor-in-chiet
of
only :a"feW:Iteekei after C.
_3. in .vieu of the foregoing . ceineidence and in view of the fact that the
:for
..underi4need.f.laintai* a ei:ieCial...=aonneaion-type relationship with C
17,/41)()4..1pnrifeSOS; it will be appreciated. if F.Cil were to aciViee us of any indicationti..ftliat. 112/1"XiX has been able t&establith a sim i lar or, perhaps, even in
sgiint4ypO relationship With C

Eda10041..Vp

15

leten,t'ity.
Shoot s/C from S/C
,

A1956

DistribUtioni,
2 ..tPCIBi/Onols.
Nt 3S, W

only

13 only

DECLASS IF I ED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL IN TELLIGENCE A6.ENC1
SO URC ES METHODS EXEMPT ION 382E
NAZI WAR CR IME S DISCLOSURE ACI
GATE 2005

S EC,

End_

(1)t

nerpoversche Preave"

( 2 ) 1.!-

7.1144

Irriuskfurter Rundschae.

j!
I.

Weissmann

Gilirg Alaxzusder .

"t...

SEC