The Proverbs and Its Definition 2: A Ka:rmik Linguistic Analysis of

the Characteristics of the Definition of the Proverb

Chilukuri Bhuvaneswar, Department of Linguistics, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India
Abstract
In the first article (see Bhuvaneswar 2015 a)in this series of four articles on the proverb and it
definition, Towards the Definition of the Proverb 1: A Checklist of 50 Important Definitions
and Their Characteristics, we have observed that there are some important common
characteristics that have been used in the 50 definitions that have been selected. They are:i.
popularity including tradition, currency, and cultural acceptance, ii. brevity, iii. wisdom; iv.
truth; v. experience; vi.a. figurative language and imagery and b. metaphorical; vii. anonymity;
viii. social advice; ix. strategies; x. generalizations; xi. fixed form and xii. memorable, xiii.
syntactic formulas xiv. formulaic and xv. authority. In this article, an in depth analysis of these
common characteristics will be made and why their inclusion in the definitions as they are used
is not enough to define proverbs accurately. The critical rejection of these definitions in terms of
these common characteristics will be made from the three criteria of under-extension, overextension, and uncommon characteristic to show their defects. By doing so, the need for a
theoretical basis will be established which will be formulated in the third paper in this series of
four articles in which
three important characteristics for defining a proverb, namely,
secondary, essential, and uncommon are proposed to arrive at the final definition of the proverb
as a culturally confirmed frozen text of a prototypical practice used as an illocution over a
categorial action in a setting for a projected view of life or a culturally (confirmed) frozen
prototypical illocution (as a text)
Key words: proverbiology, Aristotle, Mieder, 50 definitions of proverbs, linguistic understanding
of proverbs, ka:rmik linguistic review, theoretical definition base, holistically

I. Introduction
In the definition of the proverb, as has already been discussed in the 50 definitions in
Bhuvaneswar (2015a), the formal linguistic and semantic characteristics are mainly taken into
consideration. Even though there was some research work done on the speech act functions of
proverbs by Norrick (1985) and others, their findings could not be used in the definition of the
proverb since the pro-cat (prototype-categorial) instantiation property of the proverbs was not yet
discovered until Bhuvaneswar (1997, 1999) of course, in Kenneth Burke (1941 as in
Bhuvaneswar 2015a) in his definition Proverbs are strategies for dealing with situations. In so
far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for
them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes he
almost gets this essential characteristic by identifying situations typical and recurrent but did
not articulate it correctly and precisely: here, the situations are, in fact, categorial in the case of
metaphorical proverbs, and types are identified from one such category to be the prototype which
becomes the proverb by refinement; again, in the case of literary expressions such as Fools
rush in where angels fear to tread, they are made prototypical by choice to categorize social
practice. In other words, the idea of a prototype is not projected. Mario Pei (1964), Seitel
(1969). Roger D. Abrahams (1972) and Harold Burger (1977) as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a
also index indirectly this property. Nonetheless, the idea of the uncommon characteristic was not

made use of in the definition of the proverb, let alone its discovery in the case of proverbs. In
such a scenario, the definition of the proverb became a wild goose chase for the proverbiologists.
Therefore, there is a need to re-examine the problem of the definition of the proverb and put it in
a scientifically rigorous and logical framework.
II. Literature Review
In the history of western linguistics, especially, in systemic functional linguistics, research on
discourse analysis was conducted by Berry (1981 a, b, c), Fawcett (1988), and Mick ODonnel
(1999). In their work, they analyzed discourse structure from an SFL perspective. In the same
field of SFL, Bhuvaneswar (1999) made the first attempt to account for the structure of proverbs
using Berrys model and found out that there are many slots in which proverbs do not occur.
Later on, Bhuvaneswar (2012) made an attempt to provide a discourse structure for the proverb
incorporating disposition and dispositional choice in the systemic network of proverb discourse
structure using the Ka:rmik Linguistic Model. In the process, he causally motivated choice by
bringing in disposition into the system and answered the WHY of proverbs in discourse. Such a
causal motivation was useful in confirming the use of prototype-categorial instantiation
principle (pro-cat instantiation test) based on his ka:rmik derivation of three types of meaning in
proverbs which are referential, prototypical, and contextual meanings. In addition, it was useful
in discovering the P1 (proverb alone), P2 (proverb embedded in a sentence), and P3 (proverb
either preceding or proceeding utterances in a turn, i.e., occurring initially before utterances, and
medially or finally after utterances in a turn) positions of the proverb in spoken discourse.
Bhuvaneswar (1999 and 2012) made an exhaustive survey of the syntax of Telugu and English
proverbs and empirically established that proverbs do NOT occur in fixed structures as believed
by folk knowledge. This along with his other papers on the phonology, lexis and semantics of
proverbs (see Bhuvaneswar 1997 2002, 2013) was helpful in firmly ruling out a formal
structural definition of proverbs. In Bhuvaneswar 2015a, a checklist of 50 important definitions
by various critics across the globe was made and the common characteristics these critics used in
their definitions were identified.
In the next section, an attempt has been made to critically analyze these common characteristics
observed by the critics and rule out these definitions as defective by using the traditional
Advaithic philosophical concepts of Sri: A:di Samkara Bhagavatpu:jyapa:dah (without reference
to religion) as scientific and logical concepts.
III. Common Characteristics of a Proverb in 50 Definitions: A Ka:rmik Linguistic Review
3. 1. Distinct Definitions of the Proverb
50 definitions of important proverbiologists are listed in Bhuvaneswar (2015a) and the common
characteristics used to define the proverb are identified in that paper. In the next section 3. 2., a
critical review of these definitions in terms of these characteristics is made.
3. 2. A REVIEW OF THE DEFINITIONS OF THE PROVERB
From a close examination of the definitions given in Bhuvaneswar 2015a, we find out that some
of them are observations on the properties of proverbs which are common to all proverbs such as
i. popularity including tradition, currency; and xi. fixed form; while others such as: ii. brevity,
iii. wisdom; iv. (general) truth; v. (collective) experience; vi.a. figurative language and imagery
and b. metaphorical; vii. anonymity; viii. social advice; ix. strategies; x. generalizations; xii.

memorable, xiii. syntactic formulas, xiv. formulaic and xv. authority are not common to all the
proverbs. In addition to these characteristics, we can also add morality, criticism of life, social
practice, antiquity, and wittiness mentioned in these definitions. Some are genuine attempts to
define the proverb even though they are unsuccessful while others only describe proverbs.
Except a few critics such as Taylor (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) and Gryzbeck (ibid.) who
feel that a proverb cannot be defined, many others attempted definitions. Whatever be the case,
none of the 50 definitions cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a successfully captured the defining
characteristics of proverbs that will account for the essential characteristics to constitute a
proverb and the uncommon characteristic to differentiate a proverb from an item of another
genre. Since it is space-consuming to review each and every definition given above, let us take
the important points and common characteristics mentioned in these definitions and review them
in a scientifically rigorous manner.
3. 2. 1. Popularity (including Tradition, Currency, Cultural Acceptance and Antiquity)
Among the 50 definitions, around 30 definitions (Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a)
indicate popularity as an ESSENTIAL characteristic in their definitions.
Richard C. Trench (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) brings in the issue of popularity as the most
essential characteristic of a proverb. In establishing popularity as the most essential
characteristic, he discusses and dismisses other such characteristics such as brevity (shortness),
sense, salt, conciseness, (general) truth, authorship, not private but public property, imagery,
figurativeness, metaphoricity, rhyme, and alliteration He also accepts at the same time brevity
and punch as important characteristics of proverbs.
In a similar vein, Edward Hulme also agrees with Trench that popularity is an essential feature,
an absolute necessity (ibid, 1902 and 1905 as 2007, p.6.). He makes this assertion during his
review of 16 important definitions and explanations of Dr. Johnson, Bacon, Addison, Synesius,
Aristotle, Agricola, Cervantes, Howell, Chambers, Annandale, Worcester, Cooper,
Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, Rev. John Ward, Horace, and Ray while discussing most of the
characteristics (e.g., frequent repetition by people, byeword of reproach, ancient philosophy,
short sentences, long experience, sense, shortness, salt, truth, sentiment, short, plain, common
use, figurative, ancient, true) mentioned in their definitions. Out of all these definitions, Hulme
likes Chambers proverbs are pithy, practical, popular sayings, expressive of certain more or
less general convictions (ibid. P. 6) and Coopers an old sayed saw very much and asserts
the absolute necessity of popularity.
In some languages such as Telugu, Samskrit, Spanish and even Greek, proverbs are known by
the term denoting popularity: Telugu: na:nuDi (a regions saying)and cha:Tuva popular
saying; Samskrit: lo:ko:kti peoples saying;Spanish: refran frequently used saying; Greek:
papoiula trite, wayside saying. It suggests that people understand proverbs as popular sayings
in the olden days in some cultures. In Telugu, proverbs are also referred to as sa:stram science
or rules, suddulu wise sayings. In other words, in those areas where these terms are used, the
terms refer to more narrowly about what a proverb is.

Tradition, currency, popularity they are all indeterminate terms and as such are difficult to
measure in practice. For example, popularity is to be measured in terms of people who are aware
of the proverb and, among them, the percentage of people who accept it raises many problems in
quantification with respect to time, place and identification. Time further constrains the notion of
popularity. At one period it may be popular and at another not, waxing and waning. Place is
another problem: it can be a nation, a state, a district, a village, a locality and even a house! As
far as identification of the people is concerned, we can do it on an occupational or religious or
racial basis. But all these factors complicate the quantification of popularity. For example, in
English, certain proverbs are popular among certain occupations but not so within the same
language speaking community (see Filey 1972). Does it mean that they are no more proverbs?
Our experience tells us that they are still recognized as proverbs, as unheard or not popular.
There are certain proverbs more popular in a particular occupational group whose numbers are
relatively very small when compared within the language community. Here, it is a matter of
popularity vs non-popularity but not proverb Vs non-proverb.
Another major issue that popularity or tradition raises is its very choice as a parameter to judge
whether a text is a proverb or not. Do we really require tradition and currency as a yard stick to
determine the popularity of a text? Trench and Mieder strongly say so. Also, many definitions
include popularity as the essential characteristic of a proverb as mentioned above. To answer this
question, we need to know first of all what characteristics are to be included in a definition and
how they should be included. In addition, we must also know how actions and objects are
created. Unless we are clear about these two phenomena, we cannot conclusively decide whether
tradition and currency are to be included in the definition at all! We will come to this point in the
third article in this series (see Bhuvaneswar 2015c). In it there is a discussion about secondary,
essential and uncommon characteristics and it is argued that the uncommon characteristic is the
heart of a definition. [Secondary characteristics are present in some but not all members of the
genre; essential characteristics are universally present among all the members of the genre; and
uncommon characteristics are universally present among all the members of the genre but absent
in other genres, i.e., it is a distinguishing characteristic]. In the case of proverbs, it is shown that
frozen textuality, cultural confirmation, prototype-categorial instantiation, and illocutionary
force are the essential characteristics of a proverb and culturally (confirmed) frozen prototypical
illocution is the uncommon characteristic of the proverb.
A proverb which is current need not necessarily be popular since its currency may be limited to
a few people and in a similar way, a proverb which is borrowed from a foreign language need
not bear the stamp of tradition. However, cultural confirmation may not dependent on wide
currency and tradition. It is so because certain proverbs might have been culturally confirmed to
be proverbs without wide currency, for example, mythological proverbs. In Telugu, there are
many such proverbs which do not have wide currency, for example, in Telugu, ka:gala ka:ryam
gandharvule:ti:rcharu The work to be done is completed by the Gandharva:s; a:vulanu
maLLinchinava:De: ArjanuDu He alone who brings back the cows is Arjuna are culturally
confirmed but not found in regular use. Recently formed proverbs or some vulgar proverbs may
not have tradition and antiquity because they are recently formed, for example, the taboo Telugu
proverb having sexual imagery of impotent mating: Unable to fu.., (one) said that the cu.. is
crooked.

As already pointed out earlier, antiquity as an important characteristic of proverb is a debatable

issue. In the modern world, there are some proverbs such as garbage in, garbage out, Different
strokes for different folks, etc. that have no antiquity. They are recently born and are already in
wide use. His third definition is not a definition at all and the second one is not precise. Proverbs
need not necessarily express truths always.
3. 2. 2. Proverbs as Containing Brevity (including Shortness)
19 (nos. 1, 5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 42, 44, 47, 49) out of the 50
definitions refer to brevity as an important characteristic of the proverb.
Whitings (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) definitions are genuine attempts to define proverbs in
terms of their characteristics. His first definition shows the frustration of paremiologists to find
the defining characteristics of a proverb that differentiate it from others and at the same time
account for any proverb. His phrases often adorned, usually short and usually true all
indicate only the particular characteristics of proverbs but not the universal characteristics as
can be seen from the definition itself. For example, the property of brevity or shortness is a
particular characteristic of proverbs since there are many proverbs which are very long
compared to one word or two-word proverbs.
Trench (2003) finds fault with the accuracy of this description and prefers the term concise
(condensed, quintessential wisdom) because shortness is only a relative term. Moreover,
according to him, a proverb need not be absolutely very short; it can be indeed as long as the
Arabic proverb: They said to the camel bird, (i.e., the ostrich), Carry: it answered, I cannot,
for I am a bird. They said, Fly: it answered, I cannot, for I am a camel 28 words.
However, this is certainly a very long proverb when compared with Time flies. Therefore, we
cannot take this indeterminate characteristic as an essential in defining proverbs. In English there
are proverbs ranging from two words (eg. Time flies) to many (eg. It is easier for the camel to
go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God (26 words
long) ). In Telugu, owing to compounds, there will be long words up to 20 but when translated
into English, it will be up to 50 words! (see Carr 1868, Proverb no. 2067)
3. 2. 3. Proverbs as Wisdom
There are 13 definitions (1, 4, 5, 11, 15, 16, 28, 35 d, e, k, 41, 43, and 44 as cited in
Bhuvaneswar 2015a) that contain the characteristic wisdom and many more can be easily found
in other definitions not selected here. It appears that all the great scholars right from the time of
Aristotle to Wolfgang Mieder (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) have been carried away by the
structural or functional characteristics of proverbs and missed the wood for the trees.
Aristotle (ibid.) considers proverbs as metaphors and brief fragments of wisdom from a semantic
perspective and the same view has been expressed by Wolfgang Mieder (1993) after
approximately 2, 400 years. What a strange coincidence! As we know from many proverbs, they
need not always contain wisdom, for example, as in the case of antonymous proverbs: Better
never than late Vs Better late than never; slow and steady wins the race or it is never too late Vs
Strike when the iron is hot or A stitch in time saves nine. If one is considered a wise saying, then
what about the other? There are several such proverbs in all languages. Even if one argues that
each proverb has its own point of view, which can be considered wisdom, there are some

proverbs which are clearly unacceptable as wise sayings. For example, what is the wisdom in the
case of the English proverb A woman, a sheep, and a walnut tree the more they are beaten the
better they will be; or the Telugu proverb with sexual connotations If there isnt any husband,
elder sisters husband alone is the refuge? Setting aside walnut tree, these are propositions that
reflect the cognition of social praxis of the individuals in the society with a particular point of
view which need not necessarily be wise. Certainly, it is not true in our modern society that a
beaten woman will be better than what she was earlier. On the contrary, such cases become
worse! So also what is the wisdom in seeking an elder sisters husband? It is unethical in
monogamous societies. So is It is as wise as stealing when in want? which if followed may result
in getting hands cut off in Sharia Law implementing societies like Saudi Arabia. Sometimes, the
proverbs are not analytical/true, as in the case of: Every cloud has a silver lining. It is an
empirical fact that all clouds need not have a silver lining. Above all, wisdom is a relative
concept. What is one mans meat may be another mans poison! A very critical analysis of
proverbs shows that proverbs are not, in essence, statements of wisdom but they may contain
wisdom. Thats all!
Lord John Russells (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) definition of a proverb is one of the most
popular definitions and here also, the emphasis is on wisdom. The only difference is in the
manner of its origin. Certainly for a proverb to be formed someone must have uttered it first.
Then only it must have caught on and become popular. However, it need not necessarily be all
mens wisdom, if there is wisdom in the proverb. Again, the wisdom need not necessarily be
shared by the people before its reception by the many. It may be a case of recognition of the
wisdom after its revelation. Nonetheless, that propositional wisdom must have been accepted by
the users, which is a question mark. For example, Hit first and talk next may not be acceptable
to all and they may prefer Talk first and arbitrate next [and hit last]. In spite of these
possibilities there is no evidence that all proverbs are wisdom-bearing. Many proverbs are like
those born from unique incidents or legends or great thinking. One example of such a proverb is
The butcher does not fear many sheep uttered by Alexander the Great when the Persians were
advancing to attack him. The wisdom in the proverb was not perceived by the users before its
creation but recognized after its coinage. Another example in Greek is: Many things find place
between the cup and lipor its English equivalent There is many a slip twixt the cup and the lip!
(see Trench 1853 and 2003:38). In such cases as these, it is the other way round, as I put it: The
wit of one becoming the wisdom of many giving rise to popularity for the wit. As I put it
differently, it can be: The wit of one, the proverb for many instead of The wisdom of many,
the wit of one or One mans wit, and all mens wisdom.
Appersons (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) definition A proverb is a crystallized summary of
popular wisdom or fancy is precise but not universal in its characterization of proverbs. Some
proverbs contain wisdom (eg. A stitch in time saves nine) but some do not (eg. If you cannot
beat them join them do you join criminals and murder people?) and some proverbs are born out
of real life experiences (eg. Mirzis dog in Baluchi). Hence, both wisdom or fancy are not
universal among proverbs
3. 2. 4. Proverbs as Truth (13)
There are 13 definitions (Nos. 3, 7, 14, 25, 27, 29, 30, 35 f, g, h, I, 36, and 40 as cited in
Bhuvaneswar 2015a) which include truth as an important characteristic of proverbs. Truth in

proverbs is an approximate value which means generally valid but not absolutely. A barking
dog does not biteis an animal practice observed to be true in many cases but need not be true in
all cases; similarly, The other side of the fence is (always) green, etc., need not always be true.
A proverb like Every cloud has a silver lining is not true when one dark cloud partially
overlaps another in a series of three or more.
Mathew do Vendones Definition No. 3 (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a): A proverb is a
popular phrase accredited by custom, accepted by the general opinion, expressing a truth that has
been proved genuine suffers from tautology without a purpose: a truth is a truth which need not
be proved to be genuine. In spite of its tautology, it brings in two characteristics for defining
proverbs: tradition and truth value. Not all proverbs are true, for example, Every cloud has a
silver lining. The issue of tradition was already discussed earlier.
3. 2. 5. Experience (9)
There are nine definitions 12, 20, 26, 27, 35b, c, 42, 48, and 49 (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a)
that underline experience. The quotation of Cervantes (Definition No. 42) that proverbs are
Short sentences drawn from long experience is often cited in the review of definitions. Another
English proverb Proverbs are the children of experience (Definition No. 35) is also heard. In
Telugu, both Nedunuri Gangadharam (Definition No. 48) speaks about individual experiences
and Reddy, P. N. (Definition No. 49) talks about social experiences. OED describes proverbs in
terms of some truth ascertained by experience (Definition No. 27) while Mario Pei (definition
No. 15) describes them as generalizations of human experience. Of course, experience is a
necessary ingredient to create proverbs but mere experience itself be it individual, social, or
collective - will not help. They should be drawn from experience and then chiselled into
proverbs. Experience lends to an awareness of social praxis and its categorization; and from it
prototypicalization of that experience has to be made. Otherwise, experiences cannot be
proverbs.
3. 2. 6. Figures of Speech (including Metaphor) and Imagery (12)
There are 12 Definitions Nos.7, 11, 16, 21, 26, 34, 37; 1, 21, 23, 28, and 37 (as cited in
Bhuvaneswar 2015a) that contain figures of speech and imagery. In Bhuvaneswar (2012, 2013),
it has been shown that proverbs can contain many figures of speech such as alliteration, rhyme,
consonance, verbal repetition, parallelism, simile, metaphor, hyperbole, etc. In a similar way,
there are many animal proverbs with rich imagery and at the same many other proverbs without
such imagery. For example, Faraway birds have fine feathers has alliteration and a beautiful
image but a literary proverb such as If you dont succeed, try, try again; Practice makes perfect
lack such imagery. Nonetheless, figures of speech and imagery are secondary characteristics
which are not universally present among proverbs and so cannot be included in the defining
characteristics of proverbs.
Indeed, there are many English proverbs which are adorned with figures of speech at the
phonological, syntactic and lexical levels but there are equally many proverbs which are not
adorned at all for example, Where there is a will, there is a way has alliteration, repetition
(there is a . there is a ) and even internal rhyme in the proverb (There . There) whereas
The early bird catches the worm has none at all in R. P. (r is silent in R.P.). So also it does not
have any syntactic figures of speech whereas He who holds the ladder is as guilty as he who

mounts the wall has parallelism in it. Hence figures of speech is a secondary characteristic with
the defect of avya:pti (under-extension) in proverbs.
3. 2. 7. Anonymity (7)
There are seven definitions (Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, 25, 30, and 40 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a)
dealing with anonymity. Lord John Russell (1878: Definition 4) considers a proverb to be the
wit of one. Stephen Kanfer (1983: Defintion No. 30) considers a proverb to be the anonymous
human history compressed to the size of a seed. So also do F. L. Lucas ((Definition No. 16):
Proverbs are anonymous wisdom literature of the common man in ages past and Effelein
(Definition No. 39): The Proverb is a coinage of the popular mint and owns its currency and
acknowledged value to the people. Gyuala Paczolay (Definition No. 19) also feels that In
common knowledge it has no known author or literary source. Thus, these scholars do not give
any authorship to proverbs. However, James Howell (17C) feels that proverbs are coined first by
somebody and then later on made the collective property of the language community:
What are proverbs but the peoples voice?
Coined first, and current made by common choice?
Stevenson (Definition No. 36) is silent about authorship but looks at a proverb as an evolved
expression from a sententious expression: A maxim is the sententious expression of some
general truth or rule of conduct, that it is a proverb in the caterpillar stage and that it becomes
a proverb when it gets its wings by winning popular acceptance, and flutters out into the
highways and byways of the world. Here, the emphasis is on popularity and not on authorship.
Nedunuri Gangadharam (Definition No. 48) also mentions individual experiences but silent on
authorship, whereas Narasimhareddy (Definition 49) mentions social experiences of several
generations without any reference to authorship.
Many proverbiologists imply by hasty generalization that proverbs are anonymous. However,
from our experience of the formation of proverbs, we get two varieties: proverbs without any
known authorship; and proverbs with known authorship (eg., Shakespeare, Alexander Pope in
English, Vemana in Telugu). Hence, anonymity cannot be taken as an essential property in
defining proverbs.
3. 2. 8. Social Advice (5)
There are five definitions (Nos. 29, 33, 37, 36, and 44 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) dealing
with social advice. Hugh Kenner (Definition No. 29) points out that Being recipes for managing
our affairs, proverbs have been cherished likewise Proverbs use the experience people gain in
skills to project what we are always wanting, some general guide for action. They did this for
millennia before we had acquired the habit of seeking guidance from something written. Paul
Hernadi and Francis Steen (Definition No. 33) also consider proverbs as brief, memorable, and
intuitively convincing formulations of socially sanctioned advice. In a similar vein, Champion
(Definition No. 37) looks at them as conveying advice or counsel, Stevenson (Definition No.
36) as some general truth or rule of conduct , and John Ray (Definition No. 44) as an
instructive sentence. Social advice is very broad to be applied to proverbs. Not all proverbs give
advice. As directive speech acts (illocutions), they may give advice in the use of proverbs such as
A stitch in time saves nine, Make hay while the sun shines, Hit out or get out, etc. but that is not
all. Proverbs can be used in different ways to perform different functions such as assertions,
exclamations, etc. depending on the context in which they are used. For example, in the

following conversation A (me) advises B (my friend Balu) with an English proverb in a Telugu
conversation.
(1) A: anna!
Ne:neLLipo:ta:nu vachche: e:Dadi.
brother! I
go will go coming year
Brother! I will go next year.
e:daina:
pe:parlu ra:y.
something papers write.

Write any paper.

Make hay while the sun shines.

B: allage:

anna.

Tappakunda ra:sta:

Like that brother without fail write will Yes, brother. Il write (papers) without fail.
This metaphorical proverb with an implied directive is used as such with the same function to
advise B to write a research paper.
Look at another example that occurred between me (A) and my friend Prof. Prashant Mishra (B)
in Hindi in which a proverb is not used to perform the function of advising. It is only used as an
assertion.
A: kaha:n
Where

ja: rahe ho: bhai saab?

go ing
brother sir Where are you going, brother?

B: kaha:n ja:yenge:
ji?
Mulla ka daud masjid
tak!.
Where going wiil sir mulla of run mosque near
Where will (I) go, sir! The running of a mullah (muslim priest) is up to the mosque!
Here the Hindi proverb (shown in italics) is not a piece of advice but an assertion used as an
exclamation. This shows that proverbs can be used to perform different functions. In a similar
way, the same proverb can also be used as an assertion in a different context as a follow up move
to support the social action. Here is a hypothetical example for Make hay while the sun shines:
(2) A: When the expert came to teach historical linguistics in a new model,
he made use of him to write a paper.
B: Yea! Make hay while the sun shines.
In the above conversational exchange, the proverb is NOT a directive (giving advice) but an
assertion that you make hay while the sun shines.
Such critical insights into the nature of proverbs can be empirically observed through proverbial
discourse analysis in a systematic way. By such an analysis, we can prove that social advice
which is derived from wisdom can only be a secondary characteristic. Hence, social advice
cannot be a defining characteristic.
3. 2. 9. Strategies and Social Ends (3)
There are two definitions (Nos. 7, 9 and 20 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) that deal with
strategies and social ends. Kenneth Burke (Definition No. 9) considers proverbs to be strategies
for dealing with situations. His description is indeed a very important characteristic of proverbs
but again there are many other genres that function as strategies for dealing with situations. Even
though he has pointed out a discourse function characteristic which is very vital for
understanding proverbs, he has not pinpointed how this strategy has come about. Roger D.

Abrahams (Definition 20) also expresses such a view in a more pointed way: Each proverb is
a full statement of an approach to a recurrent problem. It presents a point of view and a strategy
that is self-sufficient, needing nothing more than an event of communication to bring it into play
. Proverbs take a personal circumstance and embody it in impersonal and witty form. This
point has to be discussed in the context of alternative ways of saying the same thing. [It will be
discussed in Bhuvaneswar 2015c in this series of articles on proverb definition.]
Peter Seitels definition (No. 7) that Proverbs in English may be provisionally defined as short,
traditional, out-of-context statements used to further some social ends is pragmatic like that of
Kenneth Burke, but again does not pinpoint the distinguishing characteristics of proverbs. Other
types of statements can also be used to further some social end.
3. 2. 10. Proverbs as Generalizations (4)
There are three definitions (Nos. 2, 15, 24, 25 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) that point out the
characteristic of generalization. Goethe (Definition No. 2) considers proverbs (as part of poetry)
as generalizations. Mario Pei (Definition 15) considers proverbs as generalizations of human
experience, condensations, oft-reported occurrences of the trail-and-error variety. As I
understand, a generalization involves induction. For example, The early bird catches the worm
or Prevention is better than cure can be considered generalizations but not all proverbs have
generalizations as their propositional content. For example, what generalization is there in the
English proverb If at first you dont succeed, try, try again?. Here, the proposition is not a
generalization but an exhortation; even if we argue that there is an implied generalization in this
proverb since people who have tried again and again have succeeded and so one is exhorted to
try and try again there is certainly no generalization in Hit first, talk next or If you are angry,
count ten. Similarly, in the Telugu proverb chu:si rammante: ka:lchochcha:tta (I hear
that/understand that) if asked to see and come, (he/one) burnt and came, there is no
generalization but a report of an event. If someone does like that (i.e., if he is asked to observe
something, he saw it and spoiled that thing and came back), that act cannot be considered a
generalization it can only be a categorization of that action taken as a prototype. In this sense,
Harald Burgers (Definition No. 24) general statement need not be a generalization but a broad
observation about a situation and so also ONagys (Definition No. 25) observation: assumed
truth in a general, concise form, its basic idea being of general validity, or at least its use considers it
as such. Is not a generalization.
3. 2. 11. Fixed Form (2)
There are only two definitions (Nos. 28 and 32 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) that mentioned
this characteristic of fixed form. Mieder (Definition No. 28) has two definitions in which the first
definition contains both frozen and memorable as the characteristics of proverbs.
Surprisingly, in the second definition, he opted for short and left out frozen, probably because
of the flexibility in the form of the proverbs in their use as pointed out by Norrick (1985).
[He (2004: 7) quotes Norricks observation (ibid. 45) that for well-known proverbs, mention of
one crucial recognizable phrase (i.e., part) serves to call forth the entire proverb. In terms of
discourse strategies, it can be argued that such omissions are for brevity and avoidance of
monotony and repetitiveness but not the truncation of the proverb as an alternative form the
point is since the proverb is already known, it is ellipsed and so the full proverb is meant and not
the alternative truncated form which by itself will be meaningless. Hence, the variation is not a

proof of the alteration of the proverb as a variant. It does not mean that alternative forms do not
exist. In fact, they do as shown in the next paragraph.] By doing so, he missed one of the three
most essential characteristics of the proverb. Whatever be the case, he did not incorporate the
prototypical-categorial instantiation property of the proverb which is an absolutely essential
characteristic of the proverb. Jan Brunvand (Definition No. 32) refines the term frozen into
relatively frozen but still does not incorporate the Pro-Cat Instantiation property.
All the proverbs in their citation form are only the fixed forms obtained from oral use. However,
there may be variants owing to dialectal or other reasons such as dispositional cognition of the
praxis of the same proverb in a slightly modified content or manner. A Dictionary of American
Proverbs (Mieder, et al 1992) lists numerous proverbs with their variants. For example, A bird
in the hand is worth two in the bush has as many as 10 variants by different replacements: a. A
bird in a cage is worth two in a bush; b. A bird in the hand is worth a flock in the sagebrush; c. A
bird in the hand is worth a hundred flying; d. A bird in the hand is worth more than two in the
bush; e. A bird in the hand is worth ten in the bush; f. A bird in the hand is worth what it will
bring; g. A bird in the sack is worth two on the wing; h. A bird on the platter is worth two in the
hand; i. A girl had in bed is worth two in the car; j. One bird in the cage is worth two in the bush
(ibid. p. 51). But the fact still remains that even these variants are textually frozen in their
variant reading giving almost the same prototypical meaning (the abstract meaning as the
meaning of the prototypical praxis) even though their referential meaning is different.
Another issue regarding their frozen textuality is that some proverb users modify the proverbs
according to their dispositional choices or memory failures. Such modification should not be
taken as evidence against frozen textuality of the proverbs since these instances do not point out
the inherent variability of the proverbs if it were so, there should be as many proverbs as there
are choices but it is not so in real life. They only indicate how the proverb user adapted the
proverb for his own use. For example, Every cloud has a silver lining is a frozen text, not an
open ended text. That is why, when someone uses a similar text as: All the clouds in the sky
have a silver lining, it is not taken as a proverb per se but as a paraphrase of the same proverb.
This does not mean that the proverb user has no freedom in choosing the proverb linkers (Telugu
words such as annaTTu like they say, e:do: samyam cheppinaTTu as some proverb says that
are used to introduce proverbs). Consequently, we get different proverb linkers according to the
dispositional choices of the proverb users. Sometimes, these proverb linkers need to be adjusted
according to the context and so chosen but in other cases, it is the user who has the choice in
using/not using them.
3. 2. 12. Memorability (2)
There are only two definitions (Nos. 28, 33 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) mentioning
memorability as a characteristic of the proverb. Memorability is achieved by such stylistic
features as brevity, compactness, figures of speech such as alliteration, rhyme, parallelism, etc.,
and catching imagery. But there are many proverbs which are devoid of all these features.
However, they may contain one or more than one feature. For example, A stitch in time saves
nine has alliteration, Hit first, talk next has internal rhyme but Time flies, and Money talks have
only brevity but no figures of speech. As such memorability is not a universal characteristic of
proverbs. There are thousands of proverbs in a dictionary, but only hundreds or dozens of
proverbs are remembered. Out of them only a few are recalled when put to test. This shows that

proverbs are not really memorable as such. This is probably a myth. They are, perhaps,
remembered because of other reasons such as personal interest, constant use, and their utility.
My mother remembered and used hundreds of Telugu proverbs in her daily life not a day
passed in her life without the use of a proverb. She remembered them because she had excellent
memory she could as well recite hundreds of poems from the Holy Scriptures such as
Bhagavatham, Ramayanam, and Bhagavad Gita and also she loves proverbs and uses them as a
part of her grammar. I do not remember many proverbs even though I read thousands of them
from dictionaries in English, Telugu, and Hindi. Be that as it is, I have not come across any
specific tests of memorability in the case of proverbs and it is worth to undertake such research
in future.
xiii. Syntactic Formulas (4)
There are only four definitions (Nos. 10, 18, 21, 22 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a).Wolfgang
Mieder has already commented on the structural definitions of Milner (that proverbs are
characterized by a quadripartite structure) and Dundes (that a proverb contains a propositional
statement consisting of at least a topic and a comment and an oppositional or non-oppositional
structure for longer proverbs) and showed them to be inadequate to define proverbs (see Mieder
2004: 6) by giving contradictory examples: Who buys the beer determines the party is not a
proverb even though it is quadripartite in its structure like Who pays the piper, calls the tune
which is a proverb ; similarly, Politicians decide but soldiers fight is not a proverb even
though Man proposes but God disposes is. Unconsciously, Mieder is using the technique of
ativya:pti (over-extension) in disproving these definitions had Mieder been informed of these
tools of ativya:pti, avya:pti, asambhava (impossibility), and asa:dharaNa ka:raNa (uncommon
characteristic) in making definitions, he would have re-examined his definitions of the proverb
without being carried away by Archer Taylors incommunicability or Whitings proverbial
markers? Nonetheless, he also could not succeed in identifying the asa:dharaNa ka:raNa
(uncommon characteristic) of the proverb and took recourse to the understanding of the proverb
by selective participants again, the western proverbiologists could have easily identified this
property had they been grounded in discourse analysis. Mind you! Mieder has the vast
scholarship of ten thousand references on proverbs with donkey years of proverberience and he
has quoted Kenneth Burkes statement on proverbs (see Mieder 2004: 6): Proverbs are
strategies for dealing with situations, yet he has not taken this observation into account. That is
why I humbly plead with proverbiologists to be linguists (especially, discourse analysis
specialists). Mieder should take the bold step of listening to my humble plea to include
linguistics articles also in Proverbium, the well-known journal on proverbs of which he is the
Editor-in-Chief so that more causal linguistic analysis of proverbs could be made and
proverbiology better served. Owing to lack of scientific rigour, even such a definition of the
proverb as a short statement of wisdom gives us only the understanding of the participants
according to their own understanding of what a proverb is but not necessarily what a proverb
could be. For example, Dishonesty is not the best policy is a short statement of wisdom vis a
vis Honesty is the best policy but it is not a proverb. He did not use the sword of ativya:pti for
his own definition even though he did it for others! May his splendid proverbial full moon shine
not be linguistics-eclipsed! Unfortunately, none of them hit upon the idea of prototypecategorial instantiation which is I think crucial in the definition of the proverb. In
Bhuvaneswar (2009), it has been shown with numerous examples that English and Telugu
proverbs are open ended in their structure and cannot be reduced to a set of close-ended

structures. However, there are many syntactic patterns which are productive but that does not
mean that proverbs have fixed syntactic patterns.
xiv. Formulaic (1)
There is only one proverb definition (No. 48 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a). Formulaic
proverbs are interesting linguistic phenomena that pose problems to formal, functional, and
cognitive grammarians in terms of their structure and choice. Sometimes, ellipsis can be used to
account for formulaic expressions but ellipsis in proverbs violates established grammatical rules:
eg. The more, the merrier, etc. do not follow the usual rules of ellipsis. Quirk, et al (1986) has a
section on formulaic expressions in his well-known Comprehensive Grammar of Modern
English. Leaving that problem to grammarians, we can say that this property is not universal
among proverbs and so it cannot be taken into consideration in defining the proverb.
xv. Authority (1).
There is only one proverb definition (No. 21 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) that indicates the
property of authority. Proverbs have cultural authority but so do utterances in other genres.
Therefore, authority over-extends its property in defining the proverb.
When Archer Taylor (as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a), one of the greatest paremiologists, has
denied the possibility of finding a definition for the proverb, he has unwittingly turned
paremiology into a non-scientific discipline. How can someone identify an object, an action, or
any phenomenon as that or this without knowing it as that or this? One can argue that it is
not necessary to know the definition to know or identify an object simply because we know
many things without knowing their definitions. For example, someone who sees an animal, say a
cow, and knows it by the name cow, need not know its definition. If he is asked to define a
cow, the definition he gives may not be its definition in the strictest sense of the term: For
example, a definition such as A cow is a milk-giving animal with four legs and horns is wrong
since buffalos are also like that. The reason in such cases is that they have not focused their
attention critically on the individual-parts-of-the-whole and so failed to identify the uncommon
characteristic. But such a failure does not mean that a cow cannot he defined. It only means that
we have not succeeded in finding its defining characteristics. But the issue is we know what a
cow is but we are not able to define it God bless those seers who define a cow instantaneously!
That means something which is not easily detectable is working for identifying a cow as a cow.
This problem demands that we re-examine the methods and procedures for identifying objects
not only as they are intrinsically and but also as they are extrinsically. Further on this issue, is it
possible to identify something by knowing itself by itself without reference to its characteristic
features? In a similar vein, is it possible to distinguish one object from another object without
knowing both the features of the former object and the latter? Furthermore, is it possible to
distinguish one object from another object without knowing the distinguishing features of the
former object from the latter? In the first case, we know from our perceptual experience that if
another object with exactly similar features is seen, then we infer that both of them belong to the
same type. This inference may or may not be grounded by an explicit understanding of their
similarities it can be an awareness of the objects as a whole in their totality: the whole appears
as the whole dominating the parts. Such an awareness can be called as I call it (w)holistic
vision. In this type of vision, one sees the whole as a distinct whole (which can be more or less
than, other than and beyond the sum of the parts) but I-I-I with the sum of the parts. Again,

if one feature is replaced by another, we also infer that both of them belong to the same type but
vary in one feature. This is because of an implicit (w)holistic awareness of both the objects as
having the same whole. For example, if two cows having the same colour, say, black are seen,
then we group them together. However, if one is black and the other is white, then we still group
them together but as belonging to two different colours. WHY and HOW? Why because we are
aware of their commonness as belonging to the same type of a whole; how because we abstract
the same wholeness from both the objects and then identify the contrasting feature of colour and
then group them together as having two colours. Subsequently, after an exposure to these cows
(objects) and their experience as this and that cow to be so and so cow with such and such
properties, we will gain explicit understanding. To sum up, in the case of two or more black
cows of approximately the same height, shape, etc., there is recognition of the two black cows
without an explicit awareness of their specific properties of blackness, etc. However, in the case
of a black cow and a white cow, the contrast in colour is brought to focus by their contrasting
appearance and then the onlooker becomes explicitly aware of this property in them. When a
cow is seen with a buffalo, we distinguish between them by their contrasting features either by
an implicit (w)holistic vision or by an explicit whole-part vision and thus they become explicitly
known. If this were not so, how can anyone identify a cow and distinguish between a cow and a
buffalo? In the case of proverbs, the previous scholars who say that proverbs cannot be defined
could only get an implicit awareness of proverbs as a (w)hole-without-their-parts but not as a
(w)hole-with-their-parts. That is why they said that it cannot be defined. Others who identified
the parts could not succeed in identifying the uncommon characteristic property that
distinguishes the proverb from others and hence gave only descriptions which they considered
definitions. Since such a characteristic was not easily discovered, does it mean that a proverb
cannot be defined? No. It only means that we have not succeeded in identifying its defining
characteristics. Therefore, we should find out why it is so and try to do more research to find out
its uncommon characteristic and then attempt a linguistically sound definition as attempted in
Bhuvaneswar (1999, 2003, 2015, 2015c) .
According to Searle (1969), in principle, what is meant can be expressed. But it should also be
true that whatever is meant can be motivated if we accept the cause-effect relationship: Every
effect is preceded by a cause and Nothing comes out of nothing. From a (ka:rmik) functional
perspective, nothing - from a tiny blade of grass to the mighty cosmos - exists without a
function! Even if one objects to this hypothesis by providing the case of non-agential actions
where action is performed for the sake of action, as in the case of nishkama karma (action
without agency and desire), we say that it (nishkama karma) is itself the cause of performing that
action. Again, even in the case of non-sentient action, such as the blowing of the wind and its
uprooting a tree (and the consequent breaking of the branches as a bye product owing to the
falling of the tree, we can still find a function for such an action at a higher level: Nature as
causing the wind to blow to uproot a tree and the falling of the tree causing the branches to
break.
Another important reason could be the failure to understand the very properties of proverbs, as
revealed in proverbs, comprehensively across different cultures and within a culture. A classic
example is that of considering metaphors and single sentences as proverbs but not phrases,
comparisons and wellerisms as such. Many critics do, at the same time, call them proverbial
phrases that have become idioms by losing their proverbial status, for example, to flog a dead

horse; as . as.; etc. The inability to precisely classify them is itself a proof of the inability on
the part of paremiologists to know the differentiating characteristics of proverbs. For example, in
Telugu, Sugri:va:jna Sugri:va:s command is a compound: Sugri:va + ajna (command) =
Sugri:va:jna and it is considered a proverb whereas a writers cramp with the same structure is
not. Why? Simply because formal characteristics and definitions based on them are inadequate!
The quotation of Anonymous (Definition No. 11 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a). points to
wisdom, imagery and verbal economy in proverbs. The issue of verbal economy and wisdom has
already been discussed. vividness or earthiness of their imagery is again not universal in
proverbs. For example, literary proverbs such as Prevention is better than cure, Better late than
never, etc. do not have imagery at all.
Horace Raynolds (Definition No. 13 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) definition of a proverb as
a pungent criticism of life is again not a definition that captures the distinguishing
characteristic of a proverb. Even non-proverbial statements such as We can only know life
backwards or Life is birth, copulation and death or Life is a tale told by an idiot full of sound
and fury are memorable statements, especially, the last one which is pungent, but they are not
proverbs. They may, however, become proverbs! The other title definition A proverb in the
hand is often worth a thousand words again falls into the same category since a picture is also
worth a thousand words.
Gallachers definitions point out currency and truth value as the determining factors of a
proverb. As has already been pointed out these concepts are problematic proverbs need not be
true and it is difficult to measure currency.
In Telugu, Chilukuri Narayana Rao (Definition No. 45 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015a) who
collected Telugu proverbs extensively (according to one estimate 1,00, 000 (one hundred
thousand) which is not yet proved) defines proverbs as those that contain similarity from their
name sa:meta in Telugu: Sa:meta is derived from sa:myam (similar) sa:myata (similarity) and
sa:meta means a proverb which has similarity in its content with its context. Moreover, in
Telugu, another term sa:Tuva/cha:Tuva is also used for a proverb which gives the same meaning
of similarity (that which compares). However, another term Na:nuDi is also available. It means
a a saying of the people which exactly means the same as lo:ko:kti in Samskrit. What is more,
other terms suddulu (morals), and shastram (wisdom or knowledge) are also used for proverbs.
From these alternative terms we understand that Telugu people look at proverbs as similaic,
popular, ethical, and wise sayings. Captain Carr (1868) called the very first printed collection
made of Telugu proverbs Andhralokoktichandrika by using the word lokokti to mean proverb. So
in the olden days, lokokti and sameta are used as equivalents. Bhuvaneswar 2015c makes a
distinction between these two terms through Proverb Identification Test (PIT) saying that a
lokokti in its strict sense in Samskrit need not be a proverb because it may not have the
prototype-categorial instantiation property of the proverb.
In Venkatavadhani (1974), Sampath Raghava:cha:ri (Definition No. 46 as cited in Bhuvaneswar
2015 a) opts for the definition in terms of popularity or currency. This is similar to the western
definition of Erasmus. As already pointed out, similarity, popularity, morality, and wisdom
cannot be the essential defining characteristics, let alone be the uncommon characteristic.

The great poet Visvanatha Satyanarayana (Definition No. 47 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015 a)
defined proverbs in terms of length and meaning. It is similar to Fullers definition. As already
pointed out, length is a secondary characteristic and cannot be used to define the proverb; so
koddi ma:Tallo in a few words is a secondary characteristic. Moreover, quintessential is also
indeterminate in measurement and can be expressed in a brief statement or in a long statement:
Time flies Vs The camel can pass through the eye of a needle but a rich man cannot enter into
the kingdom of God.
Nedunu:ri Ganga:dharams (Definition No. 48 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015 a) individual
experiences, and formulaic form are possible but they are not comprehensive. Fixed form is an
essential characteristic of proverbs whereas individual experiences need not be an essential
characteristic as already discussed in the case of Russells definition. For example, collective
experiences can also be the content of Telugu proverbs: Distant hills (are)smooth; A barking
dog does not bite.
Also Pa:pireddy Narasimha:reddys definition (No. 49 as cited in Bhuvaneswar 2015 a)) A
short sentence, incorporating social experiences of several generations, and having similarity,
perlocutionary force, significance of sound, currency among people, and melody is a proverb.
has many secondary characteristics such as melody, similarity, and short sentence. No man is an
island has no simile in it; where is melody in The other side of the fence is green?; Money
talks is short but not all other proverbs. So also not all proverbs have figures of speech of sound.
Above all, the uncommon characteristic is not derived by a combination of all the characteristics
grouped together in this definition because the discourse characteristic which is prototypecategorial instantiation is not included but the secondary characteristics are included. This
militates against the universal application of the definition.
As we have seen from an extensive analysis of the definition of the proverb from 50 well-known
examples, all these so called definitions are only descriptions of the characteristics of proverbs
but not definitions.
IV. Conclusion
Looking at language as lingual action and laying emphasis on the formal properties of language
does not help us in defining the proverb correctly. That is why, Bhuvaneswar (2013) opted for an
integrated view of language and examined proverbs from his own Ka:rmik Linguistic
perspective. Now, let us look at language as dispositional action and hence proverbs also as the
same and see what happens to this view of proverbs.
4. 1. Dispositional Action: When the proverb is considered a resource for the construction of
dispositional reality (i.e., the view that language is not only used dispositionally for living in a
context by living in it but it is also created dispositionally by living in it for living in it), it is
generated-specified-directed-materialized by disposition via its socioculturalspiritual, contextual
cognition. Hence, when the proverb is defined as dispositional action, we get a dispositional
actional definition. From the perspective of dispositional (lingual) action, disposition itself
becomes the ultimate cause which is also empirically found to be wrong, since the ultimate goal
of language is not the construction of dispositional reality but its construction for coordination

of action and its experience disposition is a product of previous activity which is ka:rmik and is
a means for the experience of the results of action by the human being (ji:va) and hence the
ultimate goal is the construction of ka:rmik reality for the ji:va as a ka:rmik actor who apparently
transforms (vivartam) into a dispositional, socioculturalspiritual, cognitive, contextual actional,
lingual actional, proverbial ka:rmik actor in a top down a:nushangik process. After the use of
the proverb in a context, he experiences the results of proverbial action by spontaneous
superimposition of ka:rmik action on to lingual proverbial action via his disposition and springs
back into a ka:rmik actor. A similar process takes place in the case of the hearer also.
In this connection, it should be noted that in the set of ka:rmik (K), dispositional (D),
socioculturalspiritual (SCS), cognitive (C), contextual actional (CA), and lingual actional (LA)
realities (Rs), the following level(s) of reality become(s) means for the previous level:
dispositional reality is the means for ka:rmik reality; socioculturalspiritual (SCS) reality becomes
the one of the means for dispositional (D) reality and SCS, CA reality the means for SCS, D, and
ka:rmik reality and so on; and cognitive (C) reality is the medium through which all realities are
construed.
(3) {Experience

[(((LA R
((CA R
(SCS R
Cognitive Reality

(D R))))]

KR}

4. 2. Ka:rmik (Cause-Effect Experiential) Action: When the proverb is considered a resource

for the construction of ka:rmik reality (i.e., the view that language is not only used but also
created to coordinate the coordination of action for the fulfillment of desires and the experience
of the results of contextual action according to ones disposition), dispositional action becomes
the means and the experience of proverbial action becomes the effect for the ka:rmik proverbial
action which is the cause. From the perspective of ka:rmik action, ka:rmik reality itself becomes
the ultimate cause for the use and creation of language which is empirically observable: if the
ultimate goal of the creation and use of language is language per se (formalism), then its main
function should be the use of language for the sake of language only, but we find it to be not so
since nobody talks for the sake of language; in a similar way, construction of social reality per se
(functionalism) cannot be the main function because we construct social reality as a means to
fulfill a higher function of individual experience of living; so also, use of cognitive structures
(cognitivism) is a means for the creation of language but not the end in itself; on the other hand,
we use and create language for the coordination of coordination of action for the fulfillment of
desires and the experience of the results of action, which is ka:rmik.
By looking at proverbs as a resource for the construction of proverbial ka:rmik reality, our
understanding of what proverbs are changes from the formal or functional or cognitive
perspectives into the ka:rmik perspective and so too its definition. And such a definition becomes
the most comprehensive of all as will be seen in the next two articles of Bhuvaneswar (2015c, d).
In the next article Towards the Definition of the Proverb 3: A Ka:rmik Linguistic Analysis of the
Defining Characteristics of a Proverb, the defining characteristics of a proverb will be scientifically laid
out using the Indian advaitic philosophical methods of avyapti (under-extension), ativya:pti (overextension), asambhava (impossibility) and asa:dha:raNa ka:raNa (uncommon characteristic) to show

that any and every proverb is a culturally confirmed frozen prototypical illocution (as a text).

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