Poster PO-22

ADVANCED RISK ASSESSMENT OF LNG STORAGE TANKS

BASED ON RISK-BASED MAINTENANCE PLANNING
EVALUATION AVANCEE DE RISQUES DE BACS DE STOCKAGE
GNL AU MOYEN DUN PLANNING DE MAINTENANCE
BASEE SUR RISQUE
Hajime Anzai
Masayuki Kobayashi
Tsuyoshi Endo
Nihonkai LNG Co., Ltd.
1-1612-32, Higashiko Seiromachi
Kitakanbaragun, Niigata, 957-0195 Japan
Jun Takahashi
Takashi Ibata
Hideaki Nakamura
Dr. Akio Fuji
Isho Nakachi
Tatsuo Tsuji
Masaki Torigoe
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.
1, Shin-nakahara-cho Isogo-ku
Yokohama 235-8501 Japan

ABSTRACT
Risk Based Maintenance (RBM) is a new technique to provide optimum inspection or
maintenance plans according to relative potential risk. In the present study, a new RBM
technique for LNG storage tanks was developed. The technique is composed of a three
stage-procedure in order to assess the risk in view of simplicity or strictness due to design
information and operation histories of tanks. The first procedure could provide the tank risk itself
briefly to compare the relative risk among plural tanks. The second is also a simplified method
based on the severity of consequence particularly. After the higher risk tank on site is identified,
each component or location consisted of the tank is assessed with a semi-quantitative method
according to detail information by the third method. Therefore, the risk of each component could
be compared. Based on the result, the maintenance procedure would be prioritized among
assessed locations. In this study, these procedures were applied to RBM assessment on two
LNG tanks made of 9%Ni steel and aluminum alloy respectively as the inner tank material. As
results, it is found that weld joints in annular plate with shell plate or welded region on bottom
plates hold the higher risk in the tanks. Furthermore, the risk after 10 or 20 years future could be
assessed according to the prediction of aged conditions by this procedure.
RESUME
La mthode de Maintenance Base sur Risque (RBM/Risk Based Maintenance) est une
nouvelle technologie pour laborer le plan optimal dinspection ou dentretien en fonction de

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limpact de risques potentiels. Dans la prsente tude, une nouvelle technique RBM qui sadapte
aux installations de stockage GNL a t dveloppe. La technique est compos de trois sortes de
mthodes dvaluation ont t dveloppes pour permettre de considrer et valuer les risques
dans de diffrents points de vue; les premire et seconde consistent valuer lensemble de
risques de bac. Ces deux mthodes ont permit lidentification des bacs haut risque. Aprs
identification dun bac haut risqu, par la troisime mthode, chaque composante ou endroit du
bac est value avec la mthode semi-quantitative servant les informations recueillies. Aprs
lvaluation, le risque et la procdure dentretien class par priorit entre composantes ou
endroits valus dans le bac ont pu tre compars. Bacs GNL en acier Ni9% et en alliage
aluminium sont valus par la mthode RBM dvelopp, et il sest avr que les joints de
soudure entre la paroi et les plaques annulaires ainsi que la soudure des plaques de fond sont des
endroits faibles du bac GNL. Cette mthode a pu faire ressortir ltat future de ces endroits dans
les 10 ou 20 ans avec leffet de vieillissement naturel tant pris en compte.
INTRODUCTION
Risk Based Maintenance (RBM) is a new technique to provide optimum inspection or
maintenance plan by comparing potential risk relatively. That has been recently applied for
maintenance planning of fossil-fired power plants or petrochemical plants and other equipments.
For LNG storage tanks, however, it was said that it is difficult to apply the technique without
enough in-service inspection data and degradation assessment. In the present study, a new RBM
technique for LNG storage tanks was developed. Then the technique has been applied to two
tanks of 9%Ni steel and aluminum alloy (A5083) as inner tank material respectively. The area
intended of RBM assessment in the present study is shown in Figure 1.
Return Gas Blower

BOG
Compressor

BOG Compressor
Entrance Drum
(Boil Off Gas)
Flare Stack

Go to
POWER PLANT
Breezing Tank

LNG Vaporizer
LNG pump

LNG Storage tank

LNG-Accept ion
Loading Arm

From
LNG TANKER

RBM-Applied Area

Figure 1. RBM applied area in LNG plant

OUTLINE OF RBM PROCEDURE
Risk is defined as the followed equation, which indicates a expected value of the
consequence severity when the predicted failure appears at the assessed tank or locations.
RISK = Likelihood of failure x Consequence severity

(1)

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The procedure of RBM is shown in Figure 2. Inventory is made in order to classify

components and locations of the plant in a hierarchical structure. To identify all potential
degraded condition in the assessed tank, it should include all relevant components with the
design information.

PLANT
CUSTOMIZATION
Structural hierarchy Operations history
Damage Mechanics Repair cost
Timeframe
Design
Future utilization factor
Dimensions
Materials, Others
Materials, Others

QUALITATIVE
RISK RANKING
Likelihood
Life Prediction
Consequence
Financial
Environmental

Likelihood

INVENTORY

c2 c3 c4
c2 c2 c3
c1 c1 c2
c1 c1 c2

c4
c4
c3
c2

REVISED
RISK RANKING
Mitigation of
Consequence
Risk Rank Required
RISK MATRIX &
RISK CATEGORY (ci) Change of Inspection
Others

PROGRAMS OF
MAINTENANCE
Next Inspection
Maintenance
Plans

Figure 2. Procedure of RBM

At the next stage, the plant customization that includes the unique data of the assessed tank
is prepared. Historical data on the plant operation, earthquake, wind or other conditions are
included in customization. These data shows characteristics of the assessed tanks. Table 1 shows
a part of the inventory for the studied tank that contains about 600 locations as assessed portions
in all over the tank. Also, other information with material, dimension and shape of the
component, required capacity and others in design drawing for the tank, is prepared. Damage
mechanism at each location concerning the operating circumstances, is defined for the risk
assessment.
Table 1. An example of inventory for the assessed LNG tank
UNIT

Tank
No.1

SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Inner Tank Bottom Plate

Annular plate
Shell
Outer tank

LOCATIONS

Bottom Plate
Patched Plate
Welding line
Seal plate
between annular plate

Annular plate

Shell plate

Expected
Materials Thickness Requested
Damage
Capacity
Mechanisms
Corrosion
SL9N60
6mm
Sealings

Corrosion
Fatigue
Fatigue
Corrosion
Fatigue

Corrosion

19.5mm

Corrosion

At the next step, the risk assessment according to new procedure developed in this study, is
carried out. The procedure is composed of the three-stage methods with the combination of
qualitative and semi-quantitative assessment of the risk.
The results of risk assessment are plotted on the risk matrix as shown in Figure 2. Assessed
locations with the higher risk (Category 3 or Category 4) should be considered to reduce the risk
to Category 1 or 2 by more effective inspection methods or other actions. Based on considered
actions, the revised risk assessment is carried out to confirm the effects of the modified or

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planned inspection/maintenance. Therefore, optimized

inspection/maintenance plan could be decided.

PLAIN Risk Assessment

(Qualitative)

DETAIL Risk Assessment

(Semi-quantitative)

Stage III
Component/Location

Risk assessment of whole tank

At the stage I, the procedure could provide the

tank risk itself briefly according to qualitative
method with simple questionnaires and answers,
regarding tank shape, operation history, and others.
After that, the risk calculation that had been
scored by experts is carried out and plotted in the
risk matrix.

DETAIL Risk Assessment

(Semi-quantitative)

Detail Maintenance Plan

of
Component / Location

Type Assessment

At the first level (grade1 assessment), the

tank risk that appears by the whole tank scale is
assessed for benchmarking of the risk among
several storage tanks in a LNG terminal. The
procedure includes two stages (Stage I and Stage
II as shown in Fig.2).

GRADE 1 Assessment

Stage II
Whole Tank

GRADE 2 Assessment

Stage I
Whole Tank

Type Assessment

Figure 3 shows the RBM procedure for LNG

storage tanks developed in this study, which is
composed of two-grade assessment level.

Start

Type Assessment

RBM PROCEDURE FOR LNG STORAGE

TANKS

[Assessment Flowchart]

Total Maintenance Plan

of
LNG Storage Tank / LNG Terminal

Figure 3. Whole procedure of

developed methods

The stage II procedure is more detail assessment method based on the severity of
consequence particularly. It could assess the tank risk with more quantitative information
included design data, operating condition and others. The procedure may be called the
semi-quantitative assessment. The risk calculation in this stage is carried out under more
quantitative scoring than that of stage I according to the FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) results.
Figure4 shows an example of the FTA result on stage II, which is expressed by six release events
as shown in Table 2 for each tank. These events are not independent on the calculation but have
some relationship among events (e.g. (c) and (d) of Table2). Therefore, the tank risk could be
compared among several tanks on same events. Figure 5 shows an example of the risk
comparison between two tanks.
Risk assessment of each location
At the second level (grade2 assessment as shown in Figure 3), the risk assessment is carried
out with the information according to each structural component or location composed to the
tank.
Grade 2 assessment is composed of only stage III, and at this level, the risk is assessed
according to customized conditions that are in-service loading, response to earthquake, outside
wind and others applied to the assessed location in the tank. Therefore, the procedure could
arrive at answers where locations hold the higher risk in the tank and what inspection or
maintenance would be optimum.

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Table 2. Release events for assessment on stage II

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Release Events
Minor vapour release
Major vapour release
Minor contained liquid release
Minor uncontained liquid release
Major contained liquid release
Major uncontained liquid release

Remarks
e.g. vapour through roof crack or from breather pipework
e.g. tank roof blown off
e.g. liquid through crack in base or shell
e.g. same as (c) but without benefit of bunding
e.g. catastrophic shell failure, pump drop through base
e.g. same as (e) but without benefit of bunding
Major liquid release
from tank

MAJ LR

External fire impact

Major release from

Failure of inner tank

with foundation failure

seismic event

EXT FIRE

SEISMIC

inner tank

Outer tank fails

seismic failure

in seismic event

FLOOR REL

Base slab /

Slab failure fails

foundations failure

inner tank
SLAB

SEIZ IN

BASE SLAB

OUT SEIZ FAIL

FAILS IN

Figure 4. An example of FTA on stage II (Major Liquid Release)

In the procedure, detail inventory and information of each location in the tank are prepared
before the assessment. As the result, a risk value for each location respectively is plotted in the
risk matrix. For the locations with the Likelihood
higher risk should be considered to
reduce the risk. Therefore, the revised
+ A1
risk assessment could make the effective
+ B1
+ C1
of the proposed inspection or
+ A2 + B2
+ C2
+ D1
maintenance clear.
+ D2
+ E1

The three-stages procedure (as

shown in Figure 3) could be used as
combined methods flexibly in the risk
assessment. The tank with the higher risk
could be found only by Grade1
assessment. The location with the higher
risk in the tank could be found for
optimal maintenance plan. On the other
hand, to an important tank, only stage III
procedure may be applied for the
maintenance planning.

+ E2
+ F2

+ F1

A: Minor vapour release

B: Major vapour release
C: Minor contained liquid release
D: Major contained liquid release
E: Minor uncontained liquid release
F: Major uncontained liquid release

Consequence

1: Tank1
2: Tank2

Figure 5. An example of risk comparison

between two tanks (Stage II)

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RESULTS ON LNG STORAGE

TANKS

Table 3. Specification of applied tanks

The developed procedure has been

applied to two tanks of 9%Ni steel and
aluminum alloy (A5083) as inner tank
material respectively. Table 3 shows the
specification of both tanks.

Tank 1
Tank 2
Materials of
9%Ni
Alminum Alloy
Inner tank shell
Above ground Above ground
Tank type
100,000
80,000
Mass of tank (kl)
1985
1984
Operation Start at:

Figure 6 shows the comparison of tank volume with chronological operation start of LNG
storage tanks in Japan. The data of assessed tanks are plotted in the figure. The relation shows
that the applied tanks were built at about 10 years after same size tanks had started to be built.
The fact may be expected that applied tanks were built under a steady fabrication technique, and
therefore less possibility of structural defects is expected. Table 4 shows the history of welding
method on LNG tanks made of 9%Ni steel as the inner tank. The tank applied in this study was
built with the welding methods that were advanced techniques for that day and age as shown
with a line in the figure. The application of the welding techniques has been also continued as
the present normal method. However, some uncertain information about soundness of weld
properties has been remained. The information will be assessed in the risk assessment later.

16

Mass of tanks
4
( 10 kl)

IH I 9N i
IH I A 5083
N ot IH I 9N i
N ot IH I A 5083

14
12
10

A pplied tank(9%N i)

A pplied tank(A 5083)

8
6
4
2

20 Years

0
1965

1970

1975

1980
1985
1990
O peration Start Year

1995

2000

Figure 6. Comparison of tank size and operation start year in Japan

(Above ground tank)
Results of RBM assessment on whole tank (stage II)
Figure 7 shows the assessment result on 9%Ni steel tank at the stage II. Minor vapor release
has highest likelihood ranking but is lowest consequence ranking. On the other hand, major
uncontained liquid release has highest consequence raking and third largest raking of likelihood.
As mentioned before, risk is defined the product of likelihood to consequence of failure, and
finally in this case, the latter event is plotted on the highest risk category among the six release
events. Major contained liquid release is also plotted on same risk category.

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These results are useful for comparison relatively among results, although those may not be
used for risk judgment with the value itself.
Results of RBM assessment on each location (stage III)
In the RBM assessment of LNG tank, the in-service inspection data and component
degradation information may be insufficient. Then, in this study, the method that is
accomplished by using data that could be gathered as far as possible is developed. An example
of the information is described in the following.
Figure 8 shows usage of operating history data (the change of LNG liquid surface) in the
applied tank. These data was then converted to stress amplitude to assess the fatigue
accumulated damage or FEM stress analysis. Also, other data that are, for examples, wind,
earthquake, and others were assessed.
Figure 9 shows the results of stage III assessment. Figure 9(a) is the result of 9%Ni tank, and
Figure 9(b) is that of aluminum alloy tank. Each numeral shows the number of plotted locations.
Table 4. Transitions of welding technology on LNG storage tank
9%Ni : Above ground tank
Component

Welding place

Weld Type

Roof plate x Roof plate

Shell

Base

Roof plate x Frame

Roof plate x Nackle plate
Nackle plate x Nackle plate
Welding (Vertical)
Welding (Horizontal)
Shell plate x Nackle plate
Base plate x Base plate
Anuler plate x Anuler plate
Base plate x Anuler plate
Shell plate x Anuler plate

Butt weld
Fillet weld
Fillet weld
Fillet weld
Butt weld
Butt weld
Butt weld
Butt weld
Butt weld
Butt weld
Butt weld
T-Fillet weld

75

80

85

SMAW

SMAW
SMAW
SMAW
SMAW

SMAW
GTAW
SAW
SAW
SAW GTAW
SAW
SMAW
SMAW

90

95

00

SMAWGTAW (MC)
SMAW
SMAW
SMAW
GTAW (MC)
GTAW (MC)
SAW GTAW (MC)
SAW GTAW (MC)
GTAW (MC)
GTAW (MC)
SAW GTAW (MC)
SMAW SAW-T
SMAW : Shielded Metal Arc Welding
GTAW : Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
SAW : Submerged Arc welding

Applied tanks were built

Minor Vapour
Release

5
Minor Contained
Liquid Release

Major Contained
Liquid Release

Likelihood

Roof

'70

Year

Minor Uncontained
Liquid Release
Major Vapour
Release

Major Uncontained
Liquid Release

1
A

C onsequence

Figure 7. Assessment Result of Stage II (9%Ni tank)

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30

(m )

Inner tank risks are plotted

at higher likelihood ranking in
whole results because of the lack
of information for the inner tank.
That means the items have to be
assessed with uncertainties on
the condition of inner tank shell.
The uncertainties make effects
to reduce the residual lifetime on
prediction.

O peration H istory

25
20
15
10
5
9%N itank

2004/1/14

2001/4/19

1998/7/24

1995/10/28

1993/1/31

1990/5/7

1987/8/11

1984/11/14

Simultaneously, risks of
inner tank shell are plotted at
wide consequence ranking. This
means that the consequence
severities would be different on
the locations.

Frequency
500
450
400
350
300
250

Frequency

200

The outer tank risk is plotted

widely
at the low consequence
100
ranking, because although the
50
0
outer tank would fail, the inner
tank could hold contents.
Therefore, the failure of the
Hight displacements of LNG surfece (9%Ni tank)
outer tank would not make the
Figure 8. Usage of operating data
severe consequence. The risks
are plotted at wide likelihood ranking. It shows that the condition of each part of outer tank is
also different respectively under different circumstances.
24m<

2324m

2223m

2122m

2021m

1920m

1819m

1718m

1617m

1516m

1415m

1314m

1213m

1112m

1011m

89m

910m

78m

67m

56m

45m

34m

23m

<1m

12m

150

The highest risk location in 9%Ni steel tank shown in Figure 9 (a) is the welded joint
between the shell and annular plate. Most of the assessment results, include this location, is
suited to experts opinion of LNG storage tank.
Inner tank risk plotted
Welding joint between
Shell x Annular plate

14 19

22 36

49

Outer tank
risk plotted

25

Likelihood

Likelihood

14 17

22 65 13 32

16

C onsequence

C onsequence

(a) 9%Ni tank

(b) Aluminum alloy (A5083) tank
Figure 9. Assessment Results of Stage III

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Prediction of future aged condition

Figure10 shows the prediction of future aged condition of the risk value on some locations
of 9%Ni tank. Each letter shows an assessed location. In Figure10, (a) is the risk value at present
time, (b) is that of 10 years future, and (c) shows the prediction of 20 year future risk. Those
were assessed on assumption that any loading at each location would be added with same
frequency corresponding to that has been added until present time.
The risk values will change respectively to each location, because that the effectiveness of
each load is different for each location.

Likelihood

C,D,
E

C,D,
A,B
E
F

C onsequence

(a) Present time

3
2

1
A

C,D
E,E

A,B

1
A

C onsequence

(b) 10 years future

C onsequence

(c) 20 years future

Figure 10. Prediction of future aged condition (9%Ni tank)

BENEFITS AND FUTURE TANKS OF RBM ON LNG TANKS
As results of RBM application to LNG tanks with the developed methods, it is seen that
advantages could be found in the maintenance planning as follows.
(1) Maintenance or inspection planning could be made on LNG tanks with collectable
information.
(2) Priority of these maintenance or inspection could be defined with the developed methods,
and that could find higher risk tanks in LNG terminals or higher risk locations in applied tanks.
(3) Transition of the risk in future could be predicted with the RBM technique.
Future tasks are thought as follows. It is necessary to confirm the accuracy of the assessment
results with doing some inspection. Development of the inspection techniques is required
because there are only a few NDT techniques to identify the condition of inner tank shell.
CONCLUSIONS
Risk based maintenance (RBM) technique has been applied to LNG above ground tanks.
From the results, it is concluded that many advantages for the inspection and maintenance
planning are expected. The developed RBM technique could attract considerable attention as a
new technique for presumes the condition within collectable information. At the same time, the
systematic and quantitative method for bounding risk scenarios such as the assets assessment
should be developed.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors appreciate greatly to the considerable cooperation of Mr. Kevin Mottershead,
Mr.Nieil Ketchell, Dr.Dave Worswich, and Mr.Bob Brown of AEA Technology (UK).
REFERENCE CITED
[1] The American Petroleum Institute (1996). Preliminary Draft API Publication PD581
[2] American Petroleum Institute (2000). API Publication 581
[3] The American Society of Mechanical Engineering (1991). CRTD 20-1
[4] The American Society of Mechanical Engineering (1994). CRTD 20-3
[5] Reynolds J. T. (1998). PVP conf., ASME, 360, PP.63-71
[6] Winter P.W. and Browne R. J. (1999). IRR Int. Forum, London
[7] Munson R. E. et al. (1996). PVP conf. ASME, 336, PP.135-138
[8] The American Society of Mechanical Engineering (1993). CRTD 20-2
[9] Gosselin S. R. et al. (1997). ICON-5, Nice, 2641
[10] The American Society of Mechanical Engineering (2000), Sec. XI code case N-560, N-578
[11] A. Fuji et al. (2001), Advances in Fracture Research, Proceedings of ICF 10, Honolulu
[12] Jun Takahashi et.al. (2002), Proceedings of ACSIM2002

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