EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner,

- versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO,SHERWIN

TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE
TABANAODEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA
TABANAO and VINCENTTABANAO,Respondents
G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were
partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in
January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an
agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them,
consequent to Jacinto Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership. Among the
assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of
land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the
local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islandsand Prudential Bank.Throughout
the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimely demise in
1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanaos heirs any statement of assets and
liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnerships
finances. Consequently, Tabanaos heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner
an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue,
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the

estate of Tabanao to sue. OnAugust 30, 1994, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs of Vicente Tabanao lack the capacity to sue.
RUlIN: NO. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children
are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanaos death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent .Whatever claims and rights Vicente
Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by
operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted (Civil Code, Art. 774). Moreover, respondents
became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente
Tabanao died. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion
Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to
acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their
decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the
decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand
fulfillment of petitioners obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were
transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek
the courts intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit, and the case isREMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,

Branch 60, which is ORDERED to determine the proper docket fee based on the
estimated amount that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said plaintiffs to
pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to
conduct the appropriate proceedings in Civil Case No. 416-C.

JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

MAXIMO MENEZ, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 121940. December 4, 2001
FACTS: On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
sold to a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of
168 square meters located in Rosario, Pasig City. A day after We issuance of TCT No.
436465, or on February 20, 1974, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep sold the subject lot to
private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr. In December of 1990, he discovered that the
subject TCT was missing. He consulted a lawyer but the latter did not act
immediately on the matter. Upon consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of Loss was
filed with the Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy of TCT No. 436465 was
issued. Private respondent sent notices to the registered owner at her address
appearing in the title and in the Deed of Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for
the ,registered owner in Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog
City, Tacloban City, and in Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their search
proved futile. On July 8, 1992 private respondent filed a petition with the RTC,
Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 436465 to replace the lost one. To show he was the owner of the contested lot, he
showed the Deed of Absolute Sale. The petition was set for hearing and the court's
order dated July 10, 1992 was published once in Malaya, a nationally circulated
newspaper in the Philippines.During the hearing on September 3, 1992, only Menez
and his counsel appeared. The Register of Deeds who was not served notice, and the

Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor who were notified did
not attend.
On September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his evidence exparte. The trial court granted his petition in its decision dated September 30, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads: On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San
Agustin, received a copy of the abovecited decision. He-claimed this was the first
time he became aware of the case of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who,
according to him, died sometime in 1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant
of the property and the heir of Macaria, he filed his "Motion to Reopen Reconstitution
Proceedings'' on October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order
denying said motion.
ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to notice?
RULING: No. Petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property based on
the memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim, that
he is an heir (nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot and
the present occupant thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum of
encumbrances. There was compliance by private respondent of the RTC's order of
publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. This is sufficient
notice of the petition to the public at large.
The court agreed with respondent court that the proscription under Com. Act No. 141
on sale within the 5-year restrictive period refers to homestead lands only. Here the
lot in dispute is not a homestead land, as found by the trial and appellate courts. Said
lot is owned by GSIS, under TCT No. 10028 in its proprietary capacity. Moreover, as
far as the violation of the 5-year restrictive condition imposed by GSIS in its contract
with petitioner's predecessor-in-interest is concerned, it is the GSIS and not petitioner
who had a cause of action against private respondent. The GSIS has not filed any
action for the annulment of Exhibit "D", nor for the forfeiture of the lot in question. In
our view, the contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and until
annulled in the proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. For now, the said

contract of sale is binding upon the heirs of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including
petitioner who alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound
by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.

Heirs of Sandejas vs Alex Lina

G.R. No. 141634
February 5, 2001
Facts:

It showed that there was receipt of money with promise to sell and to buy with the
sum of P100,000.00
Issues:
a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title to the
property referred to in the subject document which was found to be in the nature of a
contract to sell where court approval was not complied with?
b) Whether or not he was guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the CA that he
[bore] the burden of proving that a motion for authority to sell had been filed in
court?

The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 17,
1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition, in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife,
Remedios Sandejas, who died on April 17, 1955.

c) Whether or not undivided shares of Eliodoro in the subject property is (3/5) and the
administrator of the latter should execute deeds of conveyance within thirty days from
receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent?

On July 1, 1981, Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas.
Likewise on the same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator.

d)Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-intervention was converted to a money

claim and whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court could approve the sale
and compel the petitioners to execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone
of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr.?

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the
records burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. As a result, he filed a Motion for Reconstitution of the records of the case on
February 9, 1983. On February 16, 1983, the lower court in its Order granted the said
motion.

Held:

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-inintervention was filed by Movant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7,
1982, movant and administrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound
and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and
absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the
estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas.

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of
the parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition -- court
approval of the sale -- as contained in the "Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to
Sell and to Buy" (also referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead, they assert that because

The Petition is partially meritorious.

Obligation With a Suspensive Condition

this condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of
land was converted into a money claim.

of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application
for approval of a sale of the property under administration.

The agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a suspensive

condition -- the procurement of a court approval, not full payment. There was no
reservation of ownership in the agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the
Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This
they could do upon the court's approval, even before full payment. Hence, their
contract was a conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.

In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's
obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of
the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether
petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will
unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
Second Collateral Issue: Intervenor's Standing

When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take
place only if and when the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, the intestate court's
grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in
petitioners' obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor.
The condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the
parties were bound to fulfill what they had expressly agreed upon.

Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is
authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence,
the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion
for Approval.
Third Collateral Issue: Bad Faith

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect
the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the coheirship or co-ownership. In other words, they can sell their rights, interests or
participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the
selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis,
but only with the court's permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in
the present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.

Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he informed
respondent of the need to secure court approval prior to the sale of the lots, and (2) he
did not promise that he could obtain the approval. However, Eliodoro Sr. did not
misrepresent these lots to respondent as his own properties to which he alone had a
title in fee simple. The fact that he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional sale
did not automatically imply bad faith on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only
for the purpose of binding him to the conditional sale. This was unnecessary because
his being bound to it is, as already shown, beyond cavil.

First Collateral Issue: Jurisdiction of Settlement Court

Fourth Collateral Issue: Computation of Eliodoro's Share

Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over
ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance
of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8

Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed
parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugal partner of Remedios, he
owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the remaining half, in his

capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's share should be 11/20 of the
entire property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should
cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth
(1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of three
fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.
Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth
of the entire disputed property. It should be based only on the remaining half, after
deducting the conjugal share.
Ruling
The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further explanation.
Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate - under the concept of
conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the
surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.25 After the
settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then
distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this
preliminary determination of the decedent's estate has already been taken into account
by the parties, since the only issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoro's share is
11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
WHEREFORE, The Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent
is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share equivalent to 11/20 of the disputed lots. SO
ORDERED.

REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. AIDA

FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
FACTS: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of
spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his
common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land,
situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and
T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his
daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of
Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title
from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on
August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15,
1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00,
he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of
the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina
Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint
against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She alleged that the
signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan
dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.

In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or
simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.

We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of
P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in
cash for the land.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court.

The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent

statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether
the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not
even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase
price.

ISSUE: May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his
illegitimate children?
HELD: No. The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the
contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that
Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983,
when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in
operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and
selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not
withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the
bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she
earned P50.00 a night at the club.
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a
net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for
P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.

Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and
hence, null and void.
Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions
insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in
1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate
daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent
respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property.
Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the
titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land
involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive
respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the
estate of her father as his only legitimate child.

In their answer, the defendants declared that they have been living in Canizas house since
1960s and the latter executed a holographic will, wherein she bequeathed to the defendants the
house and lot in question. The MTC rendered a judgment in favor of Caniza, However, on appeal,

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or
intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be
deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and held that action by which the issue of defendants
possession should be resolved not in accion interdictal but rather in accion publiciana , which is
cognizable in the first instance by the RTC. CA affirmed the RTCs judgment in toto.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.
During the pendency of the case with the SC, Caniza died and her heirs, Amparo Evagelista
(niece) and Ramon Nevado (nephew) substituted for her
. CANIZA v CA 268 SCRA 640, February 24, 2007
FACTS:
94 years old Carmen Caniza, a retired pharmacist and former professor was declared

.ISSUES:(1) Whether the defendants established the right of possession of the subject
propertywithout the holographic will having been probated.

incompetent by judgment of the RTC- Quezon City in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her
(2) Assuming the ejectment suit is proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Canizas legal

niece, Amparo Evangelista, who was the appointed legal guardian. The former was adjudged as such
by the court because of her advanced age and physical infirmities, which included cataracts in both

guardian had authority to bring said action.

eyes and senile dementia. Evangelista, acting as the legal guardian, filed a complaint with the MTC to
eject the defendants Estrada in the house and lot owned by Caneza. Based on the amended

HELD:(1) NO. A will is essentially ambulatory which means that at any time prior to the testator's

complaint, it was alleged that Caniza, out of kindness, allowed the defendants to temporarily reside,

death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no

rent-free in the subject house and lot. But because of the urgent need to meet her expenses for

right can be claimed there under. Art. 838 of the NCC explicitly provides that "No will shall pass

support, maintenance and medical treatment due to her advanced age, Caniza requested the

either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of

defendants to vacate the subject property but to no avail.

Court.

An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason

Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, Rosalia a petition for letters of
administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, who was at
the time in state of senility.

deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
possession is apparent, which is she needed to generate income from the house on account of the
physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T.

SANCHEZ AND MYRNA T. SANCHEZ, petitioners,
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD,
ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES AND ROBERTO S.
LUGOD, respondents
G.R. No. 108947 29 September 1997
FACTS: Private respondent, Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child spouses Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while the other private respondents are the legitimate
children of respondent Rosalia.
Petitioners are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.

In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and
fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967,
Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia
Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and
Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said
sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower
court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership of the
properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a
probate court.
ISSUE: Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct
orders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively passing
upon title to the properties subject of such deeds.
RULING: As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it
issued its assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate
proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it
could resolve questions of title only provisionally. It is hornbook doctrine that in a
special proceeding for the probate of a will; the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the

case at bar. Jurisprudence teaches: [A] probate court or one in charge of

proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so. Furthermore, the trial court parties compromise agreement. Such disregard, on
the ground that the compromise agreement was not approved by the court, is
tantarmount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law.

Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February 12, 2008

Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago,
with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his
father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also
questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of
their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was executed
and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence
Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for
filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of
the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on the other

hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly exercised his
duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of
existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his
duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a
criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper. However, he did
not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In
resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was
affirmed with modification against the respondent and in favor of the complainant.
Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the
Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?
Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional
misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon
1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil
Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the
practice of law for one year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition,
because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public
and as an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a
Notary Public.
G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs Heirs of Fortunato Doronio
FACTS:
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante were the registered
owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 352. Marcelino
Doronio and Fortunato Doronio were among their children.
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino, while respondents are the

heirs of Fortunato.
A private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino
and the latters wife. One of the properties subject of said deed of
donation was covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a
significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of
adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on the title, the
adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda,
whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent
property is Fortunato Doronio.
According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire
property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in
favor of their predecessors.
The heirs of Marcelino filed a petition For the Registration of a
Private Deed of Donation, which was granted. This led to the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title. The heirs of Fortunato
Doronio filed a petition before the RTC in the same PETITION,
praying that an order be issued declaring null and void the
registration of the private deed of donation and that the new TCTbe
cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed.
Respondent heirs of Fortunato filed an action for reconveyance and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner
heirs of Marcelino but the RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of
Marcelino.

Respondents appealed to the CA. They argued that the trial court
erred in not finding that respondents predecessor-in-interest
acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by
tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation was
null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid,
only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino
Doronio and the latters wife(they argued that that only half of the
property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation
because it stated that FortunatoDoronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda
and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the
eastern side. Respondents posit that the donors respected and
segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the eastern half
of the land.); and that respondents acquired ownership of the other
half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription.
The CA reversed the RTC decision.It likewise ruled that the donation
of the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors is invalid
on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents
predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.
Aggrieved by the decision, the heirs of Marcelino petitioned the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that ONLY HALF OF THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-ININTEREST of Marcelino (since the donation of the entire property in
favor of petitioners predecessors could not have been valid on the
ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor,
Fortunato).

The issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio

must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed
upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court,
in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to
ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as
other related matters involving the settlement of estate.
Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs
can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or
not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
2. Whether or not the deed of donation is valid.
The Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter
nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect
only on August 30, 1950.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made
in a public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described. The law likewise provided that the gift of real
property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document. It

is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void

unless made by public instrument.
Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of
a new TCT in favor of petitioners predecessors have no legal basis.
3. Who then are the owners of the subject parcel of land?
Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has
not yet been determined in a proper proceeding who among the
heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it.
It is still unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones
entitled to the properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante. There are still things to be done before the legal share of all
the heirs can be properly adjudicated.
Respondents cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive
prescription of the portion of the property they have been
possessing. The reason is that the property was covered by an OCT.
A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated
even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be
defeated by prescription.
The issues as to who truly are the present owners of the property
and what is the extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The
same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of the estates
of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

Thus, the decision of the CA has been REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The SC ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the names of
Marcelino Doronio and his wife, and the restoration of the OCTin the
names of Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
Cresencia Tubo Rodriguez v. Evangeline Rodriguez
G.R. No. 175720; September 11, 2007
Facts:
Juanito Rodriguez owned a 5-door apartment. In 1983, he executed a "Huling habilin
at testamento' giving petitioner Cresencia Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner,
apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin(deceased husband of respondent),
apartment A; respondent Buenaventura, apartment B; and Belen, apartment C.
However, in 1984, the deceased executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in
favour of the petitioner. In 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against the respondents, alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the
property, and that in 1984, she allowed respondents to occupy the units. However,
without her knowledge and consent, the respondents separately leased the units to
Magpantay, Navarro, and Escota. Respondents claimed ownership of the property by
succession. They alleged that the deed of sale was simulated and void. The MTC
rendered judgment in favour of the respondents. The RTC reversed the decision of the
MTC. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. MR denied.
Issue:
1.Possession of the property.
2.Ownership
Ruling:
1. *Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys
the right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in an
ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the court
may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure to determine
the nature of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the
resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not

proper in the summary action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership
of the specific apartment sdisregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and
that the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the property to petitioner prior
to his death. -ya! duh!--> Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property,
the question of title is not involved and should be raised by the affected party in an appropriate
action in the proper court.2. However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is
not ousted of its jurisdiction. Section 16 of Rule 70.(ROC)
All that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner
of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other
evidence to resolve ownership. But this adjudication is only provisional and does not
bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
*Wills The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at their
respective decisions: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento 2) Deed of Sale 3) TCT No. In
the name of the petitioner and 4) Partition Agreement executed by both the
respondents and the petitioner. Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we
find that there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the petitioners
claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of
possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no
legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or
validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public
policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed
pursuant thereto cannot be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to
said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession.
Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito
Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs

at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime

FRANCISCA MAGHIRANG and SERGIA GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ATILANO BALCITA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
--------------------------------G.R. No. L-22067

December 2, 1924

GREGORIO EMPALMADO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
SERGIA GUTIERREZ, opponent-appellant.
By the appeal in civil cause No. 2643 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sergia
Gutierrez seeks to reverse a decision of said court, whereby two parcels of land were
declared to be the exclusive property of Gregorio Empalmado and of Esteban Reyes,
respectively, free from the claim of Sergia Gutierrez that said lots are held by said
defendants subject to a contingent reservable interest in her favor. Connected with the
action above mentioned is the proceeding in the second appeal, wherein the trial court
declared that the first of the two lots in controversy should be registered in the name
of Gregorio Empalmado, free from the same claim. Because of the intimate relation
between the action instituted in behalf of the appellant, Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee,
and the registration proceeding in which she is opponent, the two causes were heard
together in the trial court and will be here disposed of in a single opinion.

The basis of the claim put forth by the plaintiff Gutierrez is the same as to both
parcels, but the facts constituting the respective defenses of the two defendants are
different. It will therefore be convenient to state first the points pertaining to the two
parcels in common and then such as pertain especially to the controversy over each.
It appears that the original owner of both parcels was one Bonifacio Gutierrez, who
died about the year 1902, after having been thrice married. The first wife left no
children, but the second wife left a daughter, Zoila Gutierrez, who intermarried with
Atilano Balcita, one of the defendants herein. To this pair was born a daughter,
Gertrudis Balcita. Zoila Gutierrez predeceased her father; and upon the death of the
latter, the two parcels of land with which we are concerned passed by inheritance
directly from Bonifacio to his granddaughter Gertrudis, then a mere child. Gertrudis
Balcita herself died on December 9, 1912, at the age of 16, leaving no heir except her
father, Atilano Balcita. The plaintiff, Sergia Gutierrez, is a daughter of Bonifacio
Gutierrez by his third wife, one Francisca Maghirang. Sergia was therefore the aunt of
Gertrudis Balcita, on her mother's side, and as reservee under article 811 of the Civil
Code she should succeed to the title of the two parcels which Atilano Balcita
inherited, or should have inherited, from Gertrudis, provided all the conditions
necessary to the assertion of the reservation right are fulfilled.
GUTIERREZ VS. EMPALMADO
Parcel A. In the year 1905 Atilano Balcita sold the parcel A to one Vicente
Almario. As the land belonged to Gertrudis, a lawsuit was instituted in her behalf in
1912 with a view to recovering it. The litigation was compromised by the
reconveyance of the land by Almario to Gertrudis and the payment to him of P1,200,
which was the amount that he had paid for the property. The money necessary to
effect this compromise had to be borrowed by Gertrudis, or those representing her;
and although the point is subject to discussion, the preponderance of the testimony is
to the effect that the money was obtained from Gregorio Empalmado under an
agreement by which Gertrudis Balcita undertook to convey the land to him for the
sum of P2,100. The document, Exhibit B, constituting the evidence of this agreement
is dated November 28, 1912. In addition to the signature of Gertrudis Balcita, which

is questioned, it bears the signature of Atilano Balcita and two subscribing witnesses.
Gertrudis Balcita died of dysentery on December 9, 1912, and on December 12
thereafter her father, Atilano Balcita, executed the document Exhibit C, whereby he
conveyed, or purported to convey, the same parcel to Gregorio Empalmado, it being
recited that he had inherited the land from his daughter Gertrudis. Gregorio
Empalmado immediately entered into possession, and he has subsequently maintained
possession under claim of ownership.
For the plaintiff, Gutierrez, it is insisted that the document, Exhibit b, is not authentic
and that the name of Gertrudis Balcita subscribed thereto is a forgery. The trial judge
was of the opinion that the due execution of this instrument had been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence; and although the question is debatable, and the point
not altogether free from doubt, we are of the opinion that the trial court's conclusion
on this point should be affirmed. The two subscribing witnesses both say that they
saw the girl sign the document upon the date stated therein, and this is corroborated
not only by the testimony of Gregorio Empalmado, who was present at the execution
of the instrument, but also by Atilano Balcita himself. The only testimony to the
contrary is that of Sergia Gutierrez, who says that the girl was too sick for some time
prior to her death to admit the possibility of her having signed the instrument. It is
true that the questioned signature appears somewhat suspicious, but we have not
sufficient data upon which to pronounce it a forgery, considered as a mere question of
penmanship. Certainly, the instrument expresses the agreement that would naturally
have been drawn upon under the proven circumstances which gave rise to the
transaction.
Upon the foregoing state of facts the trial judge found as a matter of law that the title
to parcel A passed out of Gertrudis Balcita and became vested in Gregorio
Empalmado before her death; and although Gertrudis was then a minor, the
conveyance was only voidable and not void. Moreover, as his Honor pointed out, the
contract was evidently advantageous to the minor because she thereby obtained the
money necessary to get the property back from Vicente Almario, with the consequent
saving of P900.

These conclusions of the trial court seem to us well founded, and the result is that, as
to this parcel, the inchoate reservable right asserted by Sergia Gutierrez never came
into existence. In this view the conveyance executed by Atilano Balcita a few days
after the death of his daughter Gertrudis operated as a mere quit-claim from him, as
title had already vested in Empalmado under the prior agreement with her.
No error was therefore committed by the trial judge in dismissing the complaint in
case No. 2643 in so far as it affects parcel A and the right of the defendant
Empalmado thereto; nor did his Honor err in ordering the registration of the same
parcel in the name of Empalmado and his wife Felipa Brion, regardless of the
opposition of the plaintiff Gutierrez.
GUTIERREZ VS. REYES
Parcel B. As already stated, this parcel comes from the same source as the parcel
A, that is, from the estate of Bonifacio Gutierrez. With respect to this parcel it appears
that on May 28, 1906, Atilano Balcita, being then in possession and asserting a claim
of ownership, sold the same by a contract of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of
P200 to the defendant Esteban Reyes. In the document constituting the evidence of
this sale Atilano Balcita falsely declared that he was owner by virtud of having
inherited the property from his parents and that he had been in quiet and pacific
possession for fifteen years. Esteban Reyes was a purchaser for value and bought in
belief that the land really belonged to his vendor. The period for repurchase under this
contract was ten years, which passed in 1916 without redemption having been
effected. It is not clear whether the purchaser under this contract entered into
possession during the time stipulated for redemption or not; but it is agreed that, with
this exception, the defendant Reyes had, until the institution of this action on May 10,
1918, exercised actual and adverse possession, to the exclusion of all other
persons.lawphi1.net
Upon the facts above stated the trial judge gave Reyes the benefit of prescription
under the ten years statute (sec. 41, Code of Civ. Proc.) and held that the right of
Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, had been thereby destroyed.

We are of the opinion that the conclusion thus reached is erroneous. We may accept
the legal proposition that occupancy by Esteban Reyes, pursuant to the contract of
sale with pacto de retro by which he acquired the property, and prior to the expiration
of the period for redemption, may be considered an adverse possession as against
everybody having a prescriptible interest, notwithstanding the existence of the
stipulation for repurchase. As was said by this court in Santos vs. Heirs of Crisostomo
and Tiongson (41 Phil., 342, 352), the insertion of a stipulation for repurchase by the
vendor in a contract of sale does not necessarily create a right inconsistent with the
right of ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the nature of an option,
and the possible exercise of its rests upon contingency. It creates no subsisting right
whatever in the property, and so far from being inconsistent with the idea of full
ownership in the purchaser, it really rests upon the assumption of ownership in him.
But it must be borne in mind that the true owner of this property was Gertrudis
Balcita, a minor, and the period of limitation did not begin to run against her or any
person claiming in her right until the date of her death, which was December 9, 1912.
It must furthermore be remembered that the plaintiff does not claim in the character
of an ordinary successor to the rights of Gertrudis Balcita; her claim is based upon a
positive provision of law, which could no operate in any wise until the death of
Gertrudis Balcita, when the reservable character first attached to the property in
question. From this it is obvious that the right of the plaintiff which even yet is of
a purely contingent nature could not be affected by anything that had occurred
prior to the death of Gertrudis Balcita; and as this action was begun in May, 1918, the
ten-year period necessary to confer a complete prescriptive title had not then elapsed.
What has been said makes it unnecessary to express any opinion upon he more
recondite question whether Sergia Gutierrez really has a prescriptive interest in the
parcel B, but we may observe that the position of the reservee under the Spanish law
is very much like that of the ordinary remainderman at common law, who is entitled

to take after the termination of a particular life estate; and it is generally accepted
doctrine in common law jurisdictions that if the life tenant loses his life estate by
adverse possession the interest of the remainderman is not thereby destroyed. (17 R.
C. L., 982; 21 C. J., 972, 975, 1013.) The reason for the rule is said to be that, during
the existence of the life estate, the remainderman has no right to possession and
consequently cannot bring an action to recover it. (21 C. J., 974.) As was said by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in Webster vs. Pittsburg, etc., Railroad Co. (15 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 1154), "No possession can be deemed adverse to a party who has not at the time
the right of entry and possession."
From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment must be affirmed in so far as
concerns the registration of parcel A in expediente No. 409, G. L. R. O., record No.
14769, and in so far as relates to the dismissal of the complaint against Gregorio
Empalmado in case No. 2643; but the judgment in the same case must be reversed in
so far as relates to parcel B, now in the possession of Esteban Reyes, and it is hereby
declared that said parcel is reservable property and upon the death of Atilano Balcita
will pass to Sergia Gutierrez, if she be then living. Let a certified copy of this
pronouncement be filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Laguna for
record pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 2837 of the Philippine Legislature. So
ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs.