Bayan vs, Zamora

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel
to discussed, among others, the possible elements of
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to
a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United
States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5,
1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by
(2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art
XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they
provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section
21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for
such treaty to be valid and effective is the
concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of
Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with
treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain
extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions
of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain
the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between
transient and permanent. We find nothing in

section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or

facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats
the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty.
I.

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the

United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The
agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President
Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops
and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for
the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA
violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . .
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.
II.

THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated
petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the
constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty

must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when

so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the
first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article
XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum being unnecessary
since Congress has not required it.

ordinary meaning except where technical terms are

employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the
United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of
an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
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This Court is of the firm view that the
phrase recognized as a treaty means that the
other
contracting
party accepts
or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require
the other contracting state, the United States of
America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

The records reveal that the United States

Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of
America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the

words used in the Constitution are to be given their