G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

CHUCHI

ESG

Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG

Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung

on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nagaaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in
a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in
a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable
at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The
transcript reads as follows:

CHUCHI

ESG

Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI

ESG

Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI

ESG

Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI

sabing ganoon

Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,

ESG

Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka,
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI

ko up to 10:00 p.m.

Eh, di sana

Mag-eexplain ako.

Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG)

Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot
ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung
ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI

Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG

Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak.

Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi)

Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue

ESG

Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa

hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano
ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

ESG

Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka

kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay
at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG

Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka

puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI

Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG

Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka

makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil
tapos ka na.
CHUCHI

Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG

Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,

nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI

Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG

Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.

Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal

case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation
of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record
the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said
conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
Contrary to law.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable
provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A.
4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of
secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the
said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where
a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an
injustice. 12

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted
the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant
to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding
that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990.
Hence, the instant petition.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,"
provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court
of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations
or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
Thus:

xxx

xxx

xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would
you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill
or outside?

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill
as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

xxx

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the
above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded

conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair,
it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board
of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the
parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are
being made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.

The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein.
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section
1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as
in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or nonverbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are
likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication"
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and

"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory

Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations
being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as
well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of
their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized
by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of antisocial desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy
of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue
of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate
R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant
case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the
use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner
to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondents clinic
without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the
Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting
in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys
fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court
declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent,
ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using
them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes Ai to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and,
therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of

Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing
private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty.
Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive
order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court
took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed
with merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.],
he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial
Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On
September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which
order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the
genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as
malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity
of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice
for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal
separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent
submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission.
For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and use the same in her
action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more
than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of
securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the
decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only
because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order
of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this
Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against

the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999]

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 14, 1994, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but increased the death indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique Ike Lingan, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
The information against petitioner alleged
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of
Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena Integrated
National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by boxing
the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said
victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence
of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly
caused his death.
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990,
Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station
DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment
City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated
themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage
and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought
out his camera and took a picture.[2]
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco,
approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture.[3] Jalbuena
replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job.[4] Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.[5] When Jalbuena
saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his
companions.[6]
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three
of the policemen on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front
of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them.
Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the
incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.[7]

Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner
for around fifteen minutes.[8] Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena
and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo
Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?[9] Petitioner Navarro then
pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said,
Ano, uutasin na kita?[10]
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: Huwag namang
ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate.[11] Petitioner
Navarro replied: Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo.[12] He then turned to
Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and
Lingan.[13]
This angered Lingan, who said: O, di ilagay mo diyan.[14] Petitioner Navarro
retorted: Talagang ilalagay ko.[15] The two then had a heated exchange.[16]
Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at
magsuntukan na lang tayo.[17] Petitioner Navarro replied: Ah, ganoon?[18]
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his
pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face.
He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead
which floored him.[19]
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang
testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon.[20] He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan
sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon.[21] He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made
him sign his name on the blotter.[22] Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His
right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.[23]
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office,
while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station
manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken
to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.[24]
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange
between petitioner and the deceased.[25] The following is an excerpt from the tape
recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: Im here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. Im out of the
problem.
....

Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .

Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do
not fight with me. I just came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against
me. Im the number one loko sa media. Im the best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan!
Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!

is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the
mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible.
The defenses evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the
circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena,
lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or
cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or injury.

Lingan: Im brave also.

Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa
akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na
may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang
minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!

Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva
Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how
Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie
the claim of the defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by
the latters falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellants aforesaid disquisition. We have
carefully evaluated the conflicting versions of the incident as presented by both
parties, and we find the trial courts factual conclusions to have better and stronger
evidentiary support.

Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?

Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan,
testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan,
hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta,
buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley,
hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin
nyo sa hospital yan.

In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellants
aggression does not impair the probative worth of his positive and logical account
of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his innocence, appellants
unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted,
clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm others.
Apparently, the same motivation that led him into assailing Jalbuena must have
provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and
humiliated him and further challenged him to a fist fight.
....

Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice,
but he (petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he
fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete.[26]

On the other hand, appellants explanation as to how Lingan was injured is too
tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature
and location of Lingans injuries as shown in the post-mortem report (Exh. D).
According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the
course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his
left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion in
the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E). Certainly, these injuries could not
have resulted from Lingans accidental fall.

In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:

After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the

prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN

ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE

SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON

SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE
RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on
the ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The
testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not,
for this reason alone, unreliable.[27] Trial courts, which have the opportunity to
observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while
testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given
credence.[28] In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial
court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It
may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record,
wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications.[29] Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan
was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.[30]
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording;[31] that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;[32] and that
the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.[33] A sufficient
foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a
heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the
police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting
the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of
Lingan, issued a medical certificate,[34] dated February 5, 1990, containing the
following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:

....
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

= BLOW ON THE HEAD

Dr. Yamamoto testified:

Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number
one, which is oozing of blood from the forehead?

In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states:
Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock, will you explain it?

A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.

A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog naalog ang utak or jarring of the brain,
sir.

Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It is possible, sir.
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete
floor?

Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?

A Possible, sir.

A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.

FISCAL:

Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?

What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings
No. 2 doctor?

A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?

WITNESS:
A May be, sir.
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q How about shock?
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?
A Yes, sir.
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because
the butt of a gun is small, sir.

FISCAL:

Q How about this findings No. 4?

Which of these two more likely to cause death?

A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.

WITNESS:

Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?

Shock, sir.

A Same cause, sir.

Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?

Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?

A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, sir.

A Same thing, sir.

....

Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have
caused it doctor?

FISCAL:

WITNESS:

Could a bumping or pushing of ones head against a concrete floor have caused
shock?

It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.

WITNESS:

FISCAL:

Possible, sir.

How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?

A Possible, sir.[35]
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro
hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on
the forehead with his fist.
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or
threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act should have
been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any
unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting,
or irritating anyone.[36] The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately
precede the act.[37] People v. Paga, 79 SCRA 570 (1977).37 To be sufficient, it
must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly
be proportionate in gravity.[38] And it must immediately precede the act so much
so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the
commission of the crime by the accused.[39]
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of
petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso,[40] we
appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who
shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words.
Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner
Navarro.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was
Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this
mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty
that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating
circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.[41] In People v. Castro,[42] the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in
favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where
the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be
appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed
right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public
functions.[43]
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was
homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.[44]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced

to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.[45]
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 is in accordance with current jurisprudence.[46]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a
prison term of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO
HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondents.

Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference

System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic
services and social security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the
implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government

PUNO, J.:
Secretary, Department of Health
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and
reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with
the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;

Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,

Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated
as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical
support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish
a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with
the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in
the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their
respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press
Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as
lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media
information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the
importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services
and social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is
required to achieve such a system;

Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall
be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the
following:

Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit
regular reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of
implementation of this undertaking.

Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

I
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January
22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On
April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A.
THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
B.
THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues

relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at
bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to
uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308
is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No.
308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that
the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent
Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All
signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No.
308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on
standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

Respondents counter-argue:
II
A.
THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B.
A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING
ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C.
THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D.
A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN
PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.

We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to
issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is
all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and
foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking
domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line
between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive
to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.
Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another
will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to
alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes
of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. 14 The executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by
the officials and employees of his department. 18 He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control, the President
also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President
to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and
regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that
is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order
is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is
a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural,

functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in

administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with
Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of
the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book
IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on
National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure.
These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general
administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government,
the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the
executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government
budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal
administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment,
supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by
administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security,
the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice
of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No.
308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order
redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State
as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make
rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with
a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because
it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office.
Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies
delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card.
No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of
administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress
to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining the traditional
limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations
however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must
he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a
substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority
to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make
laws." 28

III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it
cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially
it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."
29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme
Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has
a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found
within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31
viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations
from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment
in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there
is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice,
Enrique Fernando, we held:

individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.

All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is
expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it
stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea
that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable
torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.
35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and

recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. 37 The

Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38 the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to dwelling. 40 Invasion
of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules
of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1)
the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs."

list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by

taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern
is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute
to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some
science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the
use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various
technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for
identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific
biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used
to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options
available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to
privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does
not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population
data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be
used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation
to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No.
308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information
for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.

Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to

biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term
"biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide
precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's
own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic
is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the
individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most
biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN)
for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the
individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card
or PIN. 48

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an
individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to
avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency
will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the computer or in the documentary
file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan
availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements
for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the
electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too
great for some of our authorities to resist. 56

A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology

scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number
which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49 and
becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology
requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50
Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical
technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology
produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is
known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique
combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the
name, address and other basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even
that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity
for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these
information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and
access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors
are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.
58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to
the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information.
When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system

is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data
for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard
of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against selfincrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over
what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-tograve dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the
most graphic threats of the computer revolution. 64 The computer is capable of
producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at
different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored
data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple.
When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can
be extracted together with other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the
information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions
would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical.
Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true
to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately
smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that
could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics
technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the
case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other
factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular
activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics
and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of
reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by
the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more
widely accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the
physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and

software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum
standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules
and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O.
No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and
bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of
data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73
Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and
reports. 74 These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the
SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government
agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal
aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to
Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the
right of privacy by using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the
purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation
of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of
services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes
that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are
rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid
police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to
make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income
and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was
enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing
the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a
statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently
detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it
was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have
been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it
is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental
right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or
regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for
the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be
diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally.
They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that
the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is

demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect

human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can
do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by
the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In
Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of
whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the
names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a
doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972
required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in
the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse,
so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized
computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients
and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication
because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open
to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug
addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally
protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's
interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy,
the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The
Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws
designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification
requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made
upon recommmendation by a specially appointed commission which held
extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and
contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid
down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of
the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also
prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In
view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy was
justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308
lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not
per se agains the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and
transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve
the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information
system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social
objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more
efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data
stored in the computer could help good administration by making accurate and
comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key
decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84
and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his

personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from
libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good.
It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a compelling interest
justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We
reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by
this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v.
Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic disctinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of
a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate
to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No.
308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin,
Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an
unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that
because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too
quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the
statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners, v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO,
AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION

identified students photos was not confined to the girls Facebook friends,4 but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5cralawlawlibrary
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her students
Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STCs
Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation,
STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner
proscribed by the schools Student Handbook, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

VELASCO JR., J.:

The individuals desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society
is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;
Apparel that exposes the underwear;
Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually
suggestive messages, language or symbols; and
Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

~ Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data. Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors,
were, during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresas
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan
(Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at
STCs high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at
STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only
in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the
photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective personal
Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which
include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing
that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escuderos
students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures
in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr.
Purisima), STCs high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that
during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials
present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap),
Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents
the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr. Armenia M.
Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City
against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed
that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded
Angela from joining the commencement exercises. On March 25, 2012, petitioner
Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor.
On March 28, 2012, defendants in Civil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes.
That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the
students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance
of the TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following
considerations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;
The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only.
They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have
known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or
ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the
victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the
minors were called immoral and were punished outright;
The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital
copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus,
the Facebook accounts of petitioners children were intruded upon;
The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information,
data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory; and
All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with
Civil Case No. CEB-38594.
To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their
childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas data be issued; (b)
respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial,
judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed,
saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained in
violation of the childrens right to privacy.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quo held that the photos, having
been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost
their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs
through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the
schools policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10cralawlawlibrary
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a writ of habeas
data should be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy,
however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors
involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order
dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein
respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together with the
supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed their verified
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz:
(a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are
engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas
data may issue; and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas
data.
The
dispositive
portion
of
the
Decision
pertinently
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

Procedural issues concerning the

availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.12cralawlawlibrary
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individuals
right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact,
defined habeas data as a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age.13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment

of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence
of a persons right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.15cralawlawlibrary
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the
case at bar, this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social
network (OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among
millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap
created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leaves
an indelible trace in the providers databases, which are outside the control of the
end-usersis there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users?
Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this
case.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearancesContrary to respondents
submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Section
2
of
the
Rule
on
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

the

Writ

of

Habeas

Data

Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a)
Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b)
Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have
been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age.17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to
the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after

explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed
out that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy.
The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in
cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or informationRespondents contention that the habeas
data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is,
nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall
be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the
Rule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys
the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of
public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be
in the business of collecting or storing data.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
engage means to do or take part in something.19 It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries
the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of
a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach
of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business

is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of
the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view
of rapid advancements in the information and communications technologya right
which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of
the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common Right
to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1)
locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23cralawlawlibrary
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent vulnerability to attacks
and intrusions, there is more reason that every individuals right to control said flow
of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a
reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding
privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of
OSN users, [i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better
known as wishful thinking.24cralawlawlibrary
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same
vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26
promulgated on January 30, 2013, recognized that [t]he law has to take into
account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it
will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts
respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.
Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the
Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in
OSNs.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in
OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At
the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializingsharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.

Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to

the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and
to stay connected to other members of the same or different social media platform
through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the
services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of
personal bulletin boards or walls, the contents of which are under the control of
each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything
from text, to pictures, to music and videosaccess to which would depend on
whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts.
Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation
of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use to
stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going on in the world,
and to share and express what matters to them.28cralawlawlibrary
Facebook connections are established through the process of friending another
user. By sending a friend request, the user invites another to connect their
accounts so that they can view any and all Public and Friends Only posts of the
other. Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other users Public or Friends Only posts, among others.
Friending, therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships
with other users, whereby the user gives his or her Facebook friend access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29cralawlawlibrary
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook
was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a
users profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to customize their privacy
settings, but did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its policies that, although
it makes every effort to protect a users information, these privacy settings are not
fool-proof.33cralawlawlibrary
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or wall, except for the
users profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy
setting:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,

statuses, and photos, among others, from another users point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on ones desire to
interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information
as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless
to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can
view that users particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is
not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users
are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant
access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.35cralawlawlibrary

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right being
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their childrens Facebook accounts,
downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this
was a breach of the minors privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were
under very private or Only Friends setting safeguarded with a password.39
Ultimately, they posit that their childrens disclosure was only limited since their
profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who
are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing
said post without their knowledge and consent. As petitioners children testified, it
was Angela who uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the five
of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.

This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a
protected expectation of privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that my students showed
me some pictures of girls clad in brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed
me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in
[F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on
the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then
logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various
photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos
were public i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize
in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the users
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37cralawlawlibrary

In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors testimonies for one key
reason: failure to question the students act of showing the photos to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them.
Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible
only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escuderos claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, selfserving, thus deserving scant consideration.42cralawlawlibrary

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or
deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.38
Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for
instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her
Facebook page and sets its privacy level at Only Me or a custom list so that only
the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by
the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and accessibility.
Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but
it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or
information within the confines of his or her private space.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn account that
her students, who are the minors Facebook friends, showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be
able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escuderos
students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were,
in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other
Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other
words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were
kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the
issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were
uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against unauthorized
access and disclosure.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public, it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement
in
US
v.
Gines-Perez44
is
most
instructive:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake
and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices

that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.45chanrobleslaw
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that [t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital
images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of
privacy in view of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)
Facebook allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the
tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;47
(2)
A good number of Facebook users befriend other users who are total
strangers;48
(3)
The sheer number of Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4)
A users Facebook friend can share49 the formers post, or tag50 others who
are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her
own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details privacy to
Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is
not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The users own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at Friends.
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not
Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in As post, which is set at
Friends, the initial audience of 100 (As own Facebook friends) is dramatically
increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends or the public, depending
upon Bs privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is
effectively expandedand to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebooks proclivity
towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it
encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that
OSNs have facilitated their users self-tribute, thereby resulting into the
democratization of fame.51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post,
with visibility set at Friends Only cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to
be very private, contrary to petitioners argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to
task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as
it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents
reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed
to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality
that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to
the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not
tantamount to a violation of the minors informational privacy rights, contrary to
petitioners assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to
affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other
than bare assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy,
they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the
photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the Me Only privacy setting, or that the users contact
list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the Custom setting,
the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit
access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or
all the users friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that the best filter is the one between your childrens ears.53
This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers
in general is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a
cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her
own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.
Responsible social networking or observance of the netiquettes56 on the part of
teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespread notion that
teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or
general
wisdom
to
conduct
themselves
sensibly
in
a
public
forum.57cralawlawlibrary

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may
be most timely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations
have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber
citizenship in their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the
children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58
Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,
as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in
view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents
in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is
encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that to
limit such risks, theres no substitute for parental involvement and
supervision.59cralawlawlibrary
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the students
rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever
they engage in cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough
to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much
information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought
to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online,
they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more
importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be
opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed access to
such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege
to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of
their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track
of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially
because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the sites layout
often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors privacy
rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the
court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP.
Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawred

G.R. No. 193636

July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence
Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents.
DECISION

(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task
Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their
activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP
and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which
classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists
the prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated.17 The first
entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein
petitioner Gamboa.18

SERENO, J.:
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a
review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3
The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police
Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos
Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission
to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body,
which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission,8 was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view
to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa
Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential
report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission
Against Private Armies Report to the President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11
and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered
on her to the Zearosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the
Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she
pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of
PAGs in the Philippines.15

The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in

Malacaang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to
comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan
armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven
(67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP
data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been
vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is
largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued
communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel
in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner
Basbao stressed that the Commissions efforts have preempted the formation of
the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the
PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto
Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability
to threaten and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective
of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commissions
recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs
previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on
April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups,
the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the
portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos
Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission.23 As a result, she
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her

supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and
police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos
Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done
to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports
against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br.
13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition
meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit
all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zearosa Commission as
basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from
forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or to any other government entity,
information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the
court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with
supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23
July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two
criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder
and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a
Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in
authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as
NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to
comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data:
(a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation
and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions
and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of
the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge,
in possession or in control of the data or information.31 They also contended that
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32

In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, Gamboas right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The
untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security
that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be
exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right
to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed
that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboas activities. It cannot be denied that
information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order
No. 275, the Zearosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of
private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx

xxx

xxx

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided
information that made the Zearosa Commission to include her in the list.
Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on
the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the
subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this
database to the Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35
The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official
positions, information on her may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held
that the Zearosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs
and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a
necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38
raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as
either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof
to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;

RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the
list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation
of her right to privacy, to wit:

4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa
Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;

5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as
an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa
failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty
or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on
the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents
were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling
the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with
due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on
her must be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to
present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from
respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to
privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that
seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the
right to privacy vis--vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized
as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the
provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this
view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it
is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning
of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."

facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to
various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These
cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a
legitimate one."
xxx

xxx

xxx

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded

recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea
that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44
(Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the
right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect
for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. xxx.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.

xxx

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz:

xxx

xxx

x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for

five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of
soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable
torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.
It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised
Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of
trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an
offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v.
Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is
not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons

affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy
should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,
we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial
transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the
individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a
valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling
enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective,
the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered
a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing
or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist
a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which
our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the
European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the
protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced
the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right
of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander),
a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the
Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone.53 He
was refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an
unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register, which
was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was

prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security

control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55 on the
right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant
his classification in the register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating
to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity
to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private
life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following
grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave
the citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising
discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the
authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing
social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued
(see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22,
55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of
appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate
aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the
instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security
must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the applicants
right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national
security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic
authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public
information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the
suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national
security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate
interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain
sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to
public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek
judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart from
those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading
a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available
to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case,
and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of
protecting national security, was a wide one.
xxx

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xxx

66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly,
ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis,
the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of
the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person
concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively
applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph
31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the
safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide
margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider
that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the
individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to
which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to have been
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component
of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar
fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being
an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing
of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state
interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of
the state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides
for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O.
275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs
with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with
the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use
compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275
likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the

PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the
performance of its functions.63

intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a

persons ordinary sensibilities."67

Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties;
(b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety;
and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature.1wphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed
to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In
any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage
to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers
and functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter
collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored
them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary
to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to
the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers
mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
released information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to
Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent
and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1wphi1
Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which
was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure
that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in
place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and
accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to
make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during
specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the
discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting
in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in
existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to
caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities
empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to
privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance.
In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted
against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As
public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when
the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant
to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be
denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.