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Psychologists have long acknowledged the fallibility of human memory, particularly noting peoples
propensity to distort or fabricate memories of past
experiences in ways that are consistent with their
present selves (Ross, 1989). Cognitive dissonance
is one mechanism that has been proposed to
underlie this tendency and account for a wide
range of both mundane and unusual false memories (e.g. Goethals & Reckman, 1973), but it was
not until recently that direct empirical support for
this possibility emerged (Rodriguez & Strange,
2014). We sought to increase the external validity
of this finding by replicating and extending the
link between cognitive dissonance and distorted
memories for prior experience in another classic
dissonance paradigm: the free-choice paradigm.
Correspondence should be addressed to Dario Rodriguez, Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, 300 College Park,
Dayton, OH 45469-1430, USA. E-mail: drodriguez1@udayton.edu
We would like to thank Nicholas Bonomo and Marita Salwierz for their help in data collection.
2014 Taylor & Francis
572
573
METHOD
Participants and design
We recruited 177 undergraduates and randomly
assigned them to one of four conditions in a 2
(Decision: difficult vs. easy) 2 (Delay: immediate
vs. two days) between-subjects design. Forty-three
participants in the 2-day delay conditions did not
return for the second session and were removed
from the data-set. Eleven participants across the
four conditions were eliminated because they
rated all eight cell phone options similarly, preventing the experimenters from appropriately
constructing the choice manipulation. Thus, our
analyses focus on 123 participants (73.2% female)
who ranged from 18 to 56 years of age (M = 20.49,
SD = 5.01). Sample size (n = 120) was determined
via power analysis based on an effect size estimate
of d .50 (see Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones,
2002), a power estimate of .80, and = .05.
574
Higher values indicated more favourable evaluations. These four ratings were used to construct
and confirm the effectiveness of the dissonance
manipulation. Profiles were pilot-tested to ensure
a wide range of desirability.
Participants then completed a filler demographic survey while the experimenter constructed
the Decision manipulation: In the difficult decision
condition, the experimenter selected two phones
the participant had rated as approximately 6 or 7
on the desirability scale; in the easy decision
condition, the experimenter selected one phone
the participant rated as 6 or 7, and one phone
rated as approximately 3 or 4 (see Harmon-Jones
& Harmon-Jones, 2002).1 After the participants
finished the survey, the experimenter explained
that the (fake) sponsoring market research firm
had provided a few of each type of cell phone to
be awarded via lottery to the participants as
additional compensation for completing the study.
Further, the experimenter said that they had
randomly selected two phones from which participants could choose. The experimenter then introduced the Decision manipulation by asking the
participant to choose a phone from the options
presented. The experimenter recorded the participants choice and gave the participant a fake compensation agreement to sign, reinforcing his or her
selection. The experimenter then asked participants to rate the ease of, confidence in, and satisfaction with their decisions on 10-point scales.
These three ratings established a baseline against
which participants memories could be compared
to examine dissonance-induced memory distortion.
The experimenter told the participants that the
firm was also interested in whether product
reviews influence consumer appraisals of cell
1
A few participants ratings did not include the exact
values prescribed a priori for the construction of the
manipulation. In these cases, experimenters chose phone
options whose ratings were comparably favourable in
difficult decision conditions (e.g. both rated as 8s), or
whose ratings differed by at least two points in easy
decision conditions. Excluding these participants did not
change the pattern of results, so they are included in our
analyses. The use of two similarly undesirable phones
would also theoretically produce dissonance. However, we
decided against this form of dissonance induction to avoid
the risk of participants disengaging from the task due to a
perceived lack of sufficient reward. Finally, although an
alternative method for distinguishing easy and difficult
decision groups is to use participants own ratings of the
decision, we opted for the present method to remain
consistent with methods employed in previous dissonance
research (e.g. Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002).
phones. The experimenter presented each participant with reviews of four cell phones, including
their chosen option, their rejected option, one very
desirable phone and one undesirable phone
(according to participants own ratings). Reviews
were approximately 100 words long and contained
the same number of positive and negative statements about each phone. Participants read these
reviews, making note of characteristics that stuck
out to them as being particularly good or bad
about each. This aspect of the procedure was
designed to provide participants with greater
fodder for dissonance reduction (i.e. adding consonant cognition: see Brehm, 1956). Last, participants provided their ratings on these cell phones
again, using the same four rating scales as earlier
(i.e. quality, value, attractiveness and desirability).
Participants in the 2-day delay conditions were
then reminded to return to the lab two days later
to finish the study. For no delay participants,
Session 1 flowed seamlessly into Session 2.
Session 2. The experimenter showed the participants the pictures of their two cell phones options
and asked them to remember which phone they
had chosen.2 The experimenter then asked participants to think back to when they initially made
their choice and rate how they felt about their
decision at the time they made it, along the same
three dimensions (i.e. ease, confidence and satisfaction).3 The experimenter then probed for suspicion, provided a written debriefing and
dismissed the participant.
RESULTS
Data preparation
Spread-of-alternatives indices. Participants pre- and
post-decision evaluations of chosen and rejected
decision options are displayed in Table 1. We
2
Eight participants (6.5%) across the four conditions
could not remember which phone they had selected. These
participants were reminded of their actual selection before
proceeding with the memory items. Excluding these participants did not affect the pattern of results, so they are
included in the reported analyses.
3
Participants also completed open-ended memory tests
for their decision options technical specifications. The vast
majority of participants indicated that they could not recall
any of the specifications, preventing meaningful statistical
analysis of these data. We do not discuss these measures
further.
575
TABLE 1
Mean (SD) evaluations of chosen and rejected options as a function of decision difficulty
Easy
Attribute
Quality
Pre-decision rating
Post-decision rating
Spread of alternatives
Value
Pre-decision rating
Post-decision rating
Spread of alternatives
Attractiveness
Pre-decision rating
Post-decision rating
Spread of alternatives
Desirability
Pre-decision rating
Post-decision rating
Spread of alternatives
Difficult
Chosen
Rejected
Chosen
Rejected
6.95 (1.92)
7.03 (1.41)
5.87 (2.22)
5.59 (1.70)
7.24 (1.48)
7.19 (1.32)
7.65 (1.13)
6.27 (1.60)
.36 (3.59)
1.32 (1.91)
6.81 (1.75)
7.02 (1.32)
5.72 (2.18)
5.52 (1.69)
7.26 (1.16)
7.05 (1.64)
7.50 (1.29)
6.10 (1.61)
.39 (3.52)
1.19 (2.12)
6.80 (1.86)
6.93 (1.77)
5.00 (2.39)
4.95 (2.15)
6.98 (1.44)
7.00 (1.76)
6.94 (1.56)
5.69 (2.01)
.39 (3.86)
.76 (2.32)
6.43 (2.04)
6.51 (1.77)
4.49 (2.34)
4.64 (2.07)
6.98 (1.40)
7.00 (1.62)
7.05 (1.29)
5.34 (2.12)
.07 (4.00)
1.73 (2.15)
Memory-shift indices. Table 2 displays participants decision experience ratings and memory
ratings as a function of the manipulated variables.
We subtracted participants initial decision experience ratings (i.e. ease, confidence and satisfaction)
from their memories for the initial decision experience ratings to assess the amount and direction of
participants memory shift as a function of the
manipulated variables. Positive values indicate
participants misremembered their decisions more
favourably than they initially rated them; values of
zero indicate no memory distortion for the initial
decision experience.
TABLE 2
Mean (SD) evaluations of decision experience as a function of decision difficulty and delay
Easy
Attribute
Ease
Initial rating
Memory rating
Memory-shift index
Confidence
Initial rating
Memory rating
Memory-shift index
Satisfaction
Initial rating
Memory rating
Memory-shift index
Difficult
Immediate (n = 30)
2 days (n = 31)
Immediate (n = 31)
2 days (n = 31)
7.97 (2.28)
8.17 (2.23)
.20 (1.61)
7.94 (1.73)
7.58 (1.75)
.35 (1.64)
7.55 (2.19)
8.19 (2.20)
.64 (1.43)
7.35 (1.89)
7.90 (1.66)
.55 (1.57)
7.97 (2.24)
7.93 (1.95)
.03 (1.61)
7.06 (2.22)
7.26 (2.03)
.19 (.98)
7.87 (1.82)
8.29 (1.74)
.42 (.89)
7.74 (1.53)
7.94 (1.61)
.19 (1.05)
8.07 (1.74)
7.97 (1.79)
.10 (.92)
8.03 (1.82)
7.71 (1.83)
.32 (1.17)
7.97 (1.45)
8.26 (1.53)
.29 (.78)
8.06 (1.55)
8.16 (1.53)
.10 (.79)
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Predictor
Decision manipulation
(R2 change)
Value
.17
(.17*)
1.86
.06
.14
(.14)
Attractiveness
1.53
.13
Ease
Predictor
Decision manipulation
Delay manipulation
Decision Delay
(Block 1, R2 change)
Decision manipulation
Delay manipulation
Decision Delay
Quality
Value
Attractiveness
Desirability
(Block 2, R2 change)
.18
(.18*)
Desirability
2.01
.05
Confidence
.21
.10
.07
(.06*)
.21
.08
.10
.05
.16
.25
.20
(.05)
2.40
1.45
.81
.02
.25
.42
2.26
.93
1.04
.30
1.01
1.99
1.29
.03
.36
.30
.77
.32
.05
.20
.10
.01
.10
(.02)
.08
<.01
.10
.08
.04
.16
.08
(.02)
.27
(.27*)
3.10
<.01
Satisfaction
p
1.07
.01
1.08
.29
.99
.28
.87
.04
1.02
.47
.22
1.23
.53
.39
.97
.31
.64
.82
.22
.60
.22
.11
.01
(.06*)
.24
.10
.06
.14
.31
.04
.08
(.03)
2.42
1.24
.09
.02
.22
.93
2.42
1.14
.60
.86
1.93
.31
.52
.02
.26
.55
.39
.06
.76
.60
For top panel, all df = 121; for Block 1 of bottom panel, all df = 119; for Block 2 of bottom panel, all df = 115. Decision was coded
as 0 = easy, 1 = difficult; Delay was coded as 0 = immediate, 1 = 2-day delay.
*p .06.
Follow-up analyses
A ceiling effect may have accounted for the effect
of Decision on memory distortion: Perhaps participants in the easy conditions initially rated the
decision at the extreme positive end of the scales,
preventing a positive shift in their ratings. To
examine this possibility, we conducted three
DISCUSSION
We designed the present study to examine
whether the link between cognitive dissonance
and memory distortion recently observed in an
induced-compliance paradigm (Rodriguez &
Strange, 2014) would generalise to the free-choice
paradigm. We found support for this possibility:
Participants who made a difficult choice and
exhibited the spread-of-alternatives effect predicted by dissonance theory were also more likely
to misremember their initial decision experience
more favourably (i.e. easier, more satisfying) than
those who made an easy decision. These effects
are consistent with predictions made by various
models of motivated memory, whereby memories
may become distorted to preserve cognitive consistency in the present. In the present study,
remembering ones decision as more difficult and
less satisfying would essentially re-activate ones
experience of dissonance. Through the memory
distortion observed here, this re-activation is
averted.5
Interestingly, the effect of the dissonance induction on memory distortion was not mediated by
the direct measures of dissonance as it was in
Rodriguez and Strange (2014). This may not
represent a truly direct effect of dissonance induction on memory distortion. Rather, the misattribution process proposed to underlie memory
distortion in related areas of cognitive psychology
(e.g. prose recall: Spiro, 1980; hindsight bias:
5
The lack of an effect of decision difficulty on participants initial decision experience ratings, however, is somewhat surprising, as the other results indicate the
manipulation was indeed successful. Perhaps the parity of
initial decision ratings for the two groups is itself the
product of dissonance reduction among those in the
difficult decision condition (i.e. elevated ratings resulting
from rationalisation).
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578
6
Izuma and Murayamas (2013) meta-analysis of freechoice studies (k = 4) that included methodological features
controlling for this potential statistical artefact revealed a
mean effect size (d = .26 [.10, .42]) that was smaller than
one reported in another recent meta-analysis (Kenworthy,
Miller, Collins, Read, & Earleywine, 2011); they argued,
then, that past studies substantially overestimated the
effect due to the methodological artifact (p. 7). However,
the Kenworthy et al. effect size they used for comparison
(d = .61 [.56, .66]) actually represents the average mean
effect size of dissonance effects across several paradigms,
not just the free-choice paradigm. The mean effect size for
the free-choice paradigm alone was slightly smaller, with a
wider confidence interval (d = .59 [.46, .73]). In addition, it
is noteworthy that Kenworthy et al. conducted their metaanalysis not only to estimate the size of the spread-ofalternatives effect, but also to examine the mediating
mechanisms underlying it. They confined their literature
search to studies published in a small number of journals,
selected only studies that reported significant results and
based their mean effect size estimate on only 21 effect sizes
from 18 articles. Consequently, their mean effect size is
likely an overestimate of the true population effect size.
Als-Ferrer, C., & Shi, F. (2012). Choice-induced preference change: In defense of the free-choice paradigm. Social Science Research Network. Retrieved
from http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062507
Arad, A. (2013). Past decisions do affect future
choices: An experimental demonstration. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
121, 267277. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.01.006
Benney, K. S., & Henkel, L. A. (2006). The role of free
choice in memory for past decisions. Memory, 14,
10011011. doi:10.1080/09658210601046163
Brehm, J. W. (1956). Post-decisional changes in desirability of alternatives. The Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 52, 384389. doi:10.1037/h0041006
Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects
and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice
paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573594. doi:10.1037/a0020217
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance.
Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
Gawronski, B. (2012). Back to the future of dissonance theory: Cognitive consistency as a core motive.
CONCLUSION
The present results are consistent with the
hypothesised link between cognitive dissonance
and memory distortion. This area of research is still
in its infancy, however, and follow-up research
should seek to replicate this relationship in other
dissonance paradigms (e.g. severity of initiation),
and identify the complex moderating and mediating variables likely underlying the effects (see
Rodriguez & Strange, 2014). Nonetheless, the present results complement the existing literature,
helping to fill an oft-overlooked gap in the motivated cognition and memory knowledge base.
Original manuscript received January
Revised manuscript received May
Revised manuscript accepted May
First published online June
2014
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REFERENCES
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