ARQU / !

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LtPRARIES

ETUDES MARITAINIENNES - MARITAIN STUDIE S

ItT ES M WTAIN ENNES

MAIMAI STUDIES

DEC ' O 002

Introduction

"*
' s par Vassociation canadienne Jacques Maritai n

pubiisW by the Canadian Jacques Mantain Association

EDITOR - DntECTMR
William

No . 11, 1995
r~AhOUrTTE UNIVERSIT Y
SONV"RE - q
~

ISSN 0826-9920

Sweet

COMH t DE RtDACTION -- EDITORIAL BOARD

Lawrence Dewan, o.p . (Past- President), Lean Charette, (President);
Leslie Armour (Vice-president - Vice President) ; Chan41 Beauvai s
(Secrdtaire - Secretary) ; Jean-Louis Allard ; Mario D ' Souza; P Germain;

John Killoran .

THEORIES

OF THE

HISTORY

OF

PHx
J1

t*C4W

History of Philosophy, Personal or Impels' ' 9 P

Y
Etienne Gilson
Lawrence Dewan, o .p .
Histoire de la philosophie et philosophie au tribunal de la verit e
Henri-Paul Cunningham
The Pandora 's Box Model of the History of Philosophy
Alan Gabbey
Saying What Aristotle Would Have Said
Martin Tweedale
Richard Rorty 's History-of-Philosophy-As-Story-of-Progress
Patricia Easton
ProblPmes de philosophie sociale au Quebec: Videe de pauvrete
aprk 184 0
Andre V idricaire
History and Ethics
Ralph McInerny

7
32
61
75
85

98
146

JACQUES MARITAIN AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDG E

madtain vuw / hfarkain
. SAr~irrs is indexed in M
-phtr's Inden t

' '
.

$12 le numdro

icadw de camte re
dolt ftm envoy6e a :/
ms and )
isk .die
1hlli dieec0ed to :

La revue est i

oride Bans The

Philosopher's Index

Subscription : $12 per issu e

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(manuscripts, books for review)

should be sent to :/ Article et iivres
pour comptes rendus devrmt
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JACQUES MARITAIN ET LES

CONNAISSANCE

THEORIES

CONTEMPORAINES DE LA

Can There Be Moral Knowledge ?

William Sweet
Connatural Knowledge
James Thomas
Maritain, Gilson, and the Ontology of Knowledg e
Leslie Armour
St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Knowledg e
Lawrence Dewan, o .p .

159
19 1
202
220

Etudes maritainiennes/Maritai n Studies

ST. THOMAS AND PRE-CONCEPTUA L

INTELLECTION
Lawrence Dewan, o .p .
Co118ge dominicain de philosophie et de thdologi e
Questions 84 to 89, in the Summa theologiae, prima pars, of St .
Thomas Aquinas have, it seems to me, a good claim to be the firs t
systematic treatise, in our philosophical tradition, on the human act of
understanding . Obviously not a mere commentary on the relevant parts
of the De anima of Aristotle, neither are they on altogether the sam
e
lines as treatises like Albert the Great ' s De intellectu et intelligibili . The
discussion is divided into five questions on the act of understanding, a s
performed by the soul when united with the body, and one question o n
intellection by the separated soul . The five questions comprise, first o f
all, three on the human intellection of corporeal things, then one on ou r
intellection of the human soul itself and the things to be found in it (suc h
as intellection), with lastly a question on our understanding of things
which are higher in the order of being than the human soul itself . Thus ,
we have an order of discussion appropriate to the nature of human
intellection (as taught in the treatise), as taking its start from th e
knowledge of bodies, and moving from them to itself and things abov e
itself.
The three questions on understanding bodily reality constitute ,
thus, the largest part and the foundation for the discussion as a whole .
In them, the order is such that the first speaks of the principle of our ac t
of understanding bodies, namely the species intelligibilis : its existence ,
causes and nature ; the second speaks of the act's abstractive mode, an d
has queries concerning order in such understanding ; and the third ask s
about the precise targets, in bodily things themselves, which are attaine d
by this cognition . The order is thus on a pattern of beginning, middl e
and end of the act . We should, however, mention the role of the ver y
first article of the very first question, crucial for all the rest : does th e
soul through intellect know bodies? Is there any such thing as intellectio n
of bodies, or was Plato right, and is intellection really about somethin g
else, a higher order of beings?

22 1

I have said all this to call attention to the systematic character o f

this treatise on the human act of understanding . One would expect t o
find in it Thomas Aquinas ' s most important views on the matter .
Now, at this point I wish to draw attention to a phenomeno n
among writers on St . Thomas, viz how much has been written in thi s
century on Thomas ' s views on knowledge, and more particularly on tha t
item called "the concept " or the "inner (or mental) word" ; and there is
a somewhat associated topic, the "divine ideas" . This interest is not
surprising, since Thomas, particularly in his teachings on the Trinity of
persons in God, has written extensively on the mental word or inner
word or concept . He also has lots to say about the divine ideas .
However, much of the writing by others on these matters has had as it s
focus Thomas ' s theory of knowledge, and one sees discussions which i n
Thomas himself only arose in a Trinitarian context now introduced t o
interpret his views on knowledge in general .
What I wish to underline is that, in the aforementioned treatise o n
human understanding, one finds in the whole of it only one small repl y
to an objection giving ex professo attention to what Thomas elsewher e
calls the "concept " or "mental word " . The present paper takes its ris e
from this interesting situation . A recent paper, typically bearing on th e
raison d'2tre of the mental word according to St . Thomas, notes thi s
failure of Thomas to discuss the word in qq . 84-89 with momentary
surprise, but then immediately shrugs off the situation by suggestin g
that, after all, enough had been said about it elsewhere in the prima
e
pars .' It is just this sort of solution which I wish to question . I believ
that the silence of St . Thomas on the concept in this treatise i s
deliberate, and that it has to do with how he thinks the human act of
understanding ought to be presented .
It is generally appreciated that Thomas underwent a developmen t
of doctrine regarding the mental word or concept, ' but less attention ha s
been paid to this same development as a changing conception of the rol e
of that other form of the known in the knower, what Thomas calls th e
'Tirot, Dom Paul, O .S .B ., "La raison d'etre du verbe mentale dans la pens6 e
de saint Thomas", Doctor Communis 1994, 3-21, at p. 15 . In fact, he sees onlyt
that it is not discussed in 1 .85 .2 . It does not seem to strike him that it is absen
from the whole treatise .
'See the bibliography at the end of the paper . Ch@nevert is most aware of th e,
changing conception of the SI . Lonergan is moving towards what I am proposing
I
i .e . a "pre-conceptual " character for the fundamental act of knowing, though
.
"
of
intellection
suspect him still of a sort of "interiorism

222

Dewan : St. Thomas and Pre-conceptual Intellectio n

"species intelligibilis" [SI] . I wish to highlight this development as a

n
increasingly important role for the SI, so that it becomes the sta r
performer in Thomas ' s conception of the nature of the act o f
understanding.
I will call attention to a string of texts, stretching from end to end
of Thomas's career . Some are taken from discussions of divin e
knowledge, and some are taken from discussions of Averroes' doctrin e
of the unity of the intellect for the entire human race . What I propose is
that they start with a confusion of the SI and the concept (I wil l
henceforth use that term, in the main, for the other item) ; that Thomas
then sharply distinguishes between them (all the while giving the concep
t
a central role in the act of knowledge) ; and that finally the act is
understood as of such a nature that the SI must be featured, while th e
concept, however important for the inner life of the mind, is eliminate d
from the explanation of the very act of understanding .
I suppose, at the outset, that everyone is familiar with such a tex t
as Summa contra gentiles ["SCG"] 1 .53, in its third redaction
. In this
famous locus in the autograph of the SCG, Thomas wrote, struck out
,
and rewrote the chapter, only to come back sometime later to strike ou t
the second redaction and write in the margin still a third . I mention it
because it is a painstaking presentation of the human act o
f
understanding as involving two likenesses of the understood thing, one ,
the SI, which is the principle of the act, and the second, there calle d
primarily the " intentio intellecta"' (though "ratio " , " verbum",
and
" conceptio" are used), which the intellect, formed by the SI, must itsel
f
form in order to understand the thing . This much cited passage shows
us Thomas making a hard and fast distinction between the two forms
.
Moreover, both seem to be of the essence of human understanding, with
its abstractive view of concrete things . This text seems to have served
as a key for much subsequent interpretation of St . Thomas by hi
s
commentators . Let us look at some of the things Thomas said, not onl y
before he wrote it, but also after he wrote it .
Our first text comes from Thomas ' s Commentary on the
SENTENCES of Peter Lombard, bk. 1
. Thomas is speaking of God' s
knowledge of things other than himself. He presents a view o f
intellection patterned on ocular vision. In doing so, he obviously sees
'This expression has some prominence in a text of Averroes which is o f
importance for the present discussion, i .e. Averrois Cordubensis, Commentarium
magnum in Aristotelis De anima, ed . F . Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, Mass ,
1953, 3 .5 (p . 402) .

Etudes maritainiennes/Maritain Studies

22 3

himself as following in the footsteps of Aristotle, using the senses as a n

approach to mind . He will never leave off, throughout his career ,
making this comparison, but in this first instance the picture is ver y
different from what it will soon become . He says that in ocular vision ,
e
" the seen" [visum] is twofold. There is first of all the likeness within th
sense (or within the eye), and there is secondly the thing itself outsid e
s
the eye : it too is "the seen" . On this model, then, we have two item
called "the understood" [intellectum], one the likeness of the thing found
in the intellect, and the second the thing itself outside the intellect . In
accordance with this, Thomas can explain how Aristotle can say tha t
God knows only himself . God knows only himself, taking "th e
understood " in the first way ; yet God knows all things other tha n
himself, taking "the understood " in the second way . "
Since, clearly, God ' s own self-knowledge is being explained b y
the first sort of "understood " , Thomas means very literally that there i s
actual understanding of this inner likeness . I stress this because Fr .
Geiger tried to tone down the sense of "know " regarding the inne r
likeness, as presented in this text, thus bringing it into line with late r
texts .' The full extent of the difference between this text of St . Thomas
and later ones will only be appreciated when one sees the use of th e
sense of sight as an approach to understanding in the later texts .
Since Thomas here uses the sense of sight to present the role o f
the likeness in the mind, and since this is how he regularly presents th e
SI later, I think it is safe to say that, here in this text, the SI is presente d
as something itself known . And from this and some associated texts on e
can see that we have here also what will later be called the "concept " .
The two forms in the intellect are not yet distinguished from each other .
Is this text an isolated and entirely anomalous one? No, a littl e
later on in Thomas ' s career, in the De veritate, we find Thoma s
e
identifying the SI and the "intentio"
However, we also find the doctine of the SI as not itsel f
something known, save through reflection on the fundamental act whic h
is directed towards external sensible things . ' This is important bu t

Thomas, In Sent. 1 .35 .1 .2 (Mandonnet, pp . 813-815) ,

5 Geiger, "Les idles divines . . .", p . 196.
. Earlier ,
6Thomas, De veritate 10 .8, where he is closely following Averroes
where
Thomas
speaks
of
ocular
vision,
and
intellection,
as
a seein g
we have 8 .15,
form
.
cognitional
of
"through",
a
of something "in", in the sense
'In DV 10 .9 .ad 10 (first series), it is quite clear that the species intelligibilis

224

Dewan: St. Thomas and Pre-eoneeptual Intellectio n

ambiguous . It is ambiguous because, while we have just seen texts i

n
which the likeness in the mind is what is first known, and while late
r
texts on the SI will stress that it is not a known, but a principle fro
m
which the act of understanding originates (thus only known b
y
reflection), still the concept or mental word, likewise, will be called a
" known " , s yet a " known" which has the role of making the externa
l
thing known, and which thus itself is somehow only known throug h
reflection.' Thus, to be only knowable through reflection does no
t
is only known through reflection . And this accords with what is said in the bod
y
of the article. I would contrast this with DV 8 .15,
which suggests the In Sent.
visum text . Remember that 10 .9 is in the academic year following
8 .15 (I am not
sure where to make the division into the three years ; Synave divided into 8 4
articles each year, but it looks as though 8 and 9 go together ; 10 would be a goo d
place to start the 2nd year, as to topics) .
'DV 4.2 .ad 3 :
. . .the conception of the intellect is intermediate
[media] between
the intellect and the thing understood, because through it s
mediation the operation of the intellect attains [pertingit] to th e
thing . And so the conception of the intellect is not only that whic
h
is understood [id quod intellectum est], but also that through whic
h
the thing is understood [id quo res intelligitur] ; so that both th
e
thing itself and also the conception of the intellect can be calle d
"that which is understood" [id quod intelligitur] . . .
And in SCG 4 .11 :
But the understood in the understander is the intentio intellecta and
the word . Therefore, there is in God understanding himself th
e
Word of God, as God Understood : just as the word of the stone ,
in the intellect, is the stone understood .
'Cf. Thomas, SCG 4 .11 :
Now, I call "intentio intellecta" that which the intellect conceive
s
in itself concerning the understood thing [de re intellecta] . In u s
[humans], this is neither the thing itself which is understood, nor
is it the very substance of the intellect ; but it is a certain likeness
conceived in the intellect concerning the understood thing, [ a
likeness] which external spoken words signify : hence, the intentio
itself is called the "inner word", which is signified by the externa l
word .
Thomas there argues for the distinction between the intentio and the thin g
which we understand, the "res intellecta" as follows :
And that the aforementioned intentio is not in us the thin g
understood appears from this, that it is one thing to understand th e
thing and it is something else to understand the understood intentio
itself [ipsam intentionem intellectam],
which [latter operation] i s
what the intellect does when it reflects on its own operation .
Hence, also, the sciences which are about things [de rebus] are

Etudes maritainiennes/Marltai n Studies

225

altogether rule out being essentially something known . Accordingly ,

when we are told that the SI is only known through reflection, we canno t
e
be sure that Thomas is yet distinguishing between the SI and th
e
"
,
in
the
sens
concept . He might still be conceiving of the SI as "known
that the concept can be "known " .
However, with the previously mentioned SCG 1 .53 (3r d
redaction), we have Thomas very explicitly setting out the distinctio n
between the two forms, stressing that the SI is prior to the act o f
understanding and only knowable through reflection, and presenting the
e
"intentio intellecta" as a sort of necessary "inner picture " , if I may us
s
11,
the
inner
word,
and
it
such an expression . It is called, in SCG 4 .
Taking
th
e
intelligt7
.
being is described as "being understood [ipsum
example of knowledge of a stone, Thomas says that, while the inne r
word is not the stone, it can be called "the stone understood" . The
intentio intellecta is not called "intellecta " ["understood " ] lightly .
9 .5 . This
This doctrine is developed to its fullest in De potentia
is a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, using human intellectua l
t
life as the approach . Accordingly, Thomas sets out to say, given tha
intellection involves necessarily an understander and an understood, jus t

what precisely is the essentially understood " (primo et per se

g
intellectum] . The answer is unequivocal . It is neither the SI nor the thin
,
outside the mind . It is the concept, terminating the act of understanding
which is firstly and intrinsically "the understood " . t 0
At the same time, however, we must pick up a line of discussion ,
f
starting back in the SCG 2 .75 : Thomas dealing with a certain line o
e
.
The
line
of
thinking
is
that,
if
there
ar
thinking coming from Averroes
d
many intellects, then there are many species intellectae in them ; an
o
;
and
one
will
have
t
these will be merely "understood in potency "
s
criticis
m
'
abstract something common from them . One point in Thomas
, whereas
of this is that it treats the species as "that which is understood "
other than the sciences which are about understood intentions We
intentionibus intellectis] .
1'De potentia 9 .5 :
This, therefore, is primarily and essentially [Primo et per se]
f
"understood " , viz that which the intellect conceives within itsel
n
the
thing
understood,
whether
it
be
a
definition
or
a
about [de]
h
enunciation. . . [It] is called "the interior word" ; for it is this whic
:
for
the
external
vocal
utterance
is signified by the vocal utterance
does not signify the intellect itself, or its intelligible form, or th e
act of understanding, but rather the concept of [i .e . in] th e
intellect, through mediation of which it signifies the thing .


226

Devvan : St.

Thomas and Pre-conceptual Intellectio n

its true role is "by virtue of which something is understood" . If this were
not so, says Thomas, all sciences would be about mental items rathe r
than about things . The universality of our intellectual cognition o
f
material singulars stems from the universality of the SI
. In this
presentation, there is no mention of any concept or " intentio intellecta
"
to be distinguished from the SI, and which would be an " understood" .
This is hardly surprising, inasmuch as the expression " intentio intellecta
"
is right out of the Latin translation of Averroes, discussing the ver y
issue . Mention of such a form might be thought to confuse the issue
.
However, in the De spiritualibus creaturis, a group of quaestione
s
disputatae dating from slightly before [?] the Prima pars,
we have the
same Averroist issue discussed, and in it, Thomas speaks of the "thin g
understood" [res intellecta] being in a way one, yet in a way
many. The
" things " are the concept and the thing outside the mind
." The SI has
its own proper role as control of the situation .
One might think, then, that Thomas has decided to bring the
concept into the framework for discussion of the previously mentione d
Averroist line of argument . However, with the Prima pars it definitel y
takes a back seat . Let us consider the texts .
The main text is 1 .85 .2 . Prior to this, there is the direc t
consideration of the Averroist position, in 1 .76 .2 . In it there is n o
mention of the concept . It is, in the relevant parts, pretty much along th e
lines of SCG 2 .75 . However, I say that the main text is 1 .85
.2 becaus e
that is the moment in the treatise on the act of understanding at which
the role of the SI is discussed . Before looking at it, I would like to not e
that, in the decisive 1 .84 .1, the "keynote" text for the whole treatise ,
stress is upon science bearing on things, with the universality of ou r
knowing located in the realm of "our mode of knowing" the things .
Platonism is associated with a confusion of the thing known with th e
universal mode of knowing .

"De spiritualibus creaturis 9 .ad 6 . This is another answer to Averroes on th

unity of the possible intellect . Thomas is replying to the argument thaet
multiplication of intellects would multiply the thing understood . He says :
Therefore, the "res intellecta" by two intellects is in a way on e
and the same, and in a way many : because, on the side of th e
thing which is known [ex pane rei quae cognosciturl, it is one and
the same, but on the side of knowledge itself [ex parte. . . ipsiu
cognitions], it is other and other. Just as, if two [people] see on es
wall, it is the same thing seen, on the side of the thing which i s
seen, and nevertheless other and other according to the divers e
seeings .

Etudes madtainiennes/Maritain Studies

227

A longer presentation would dote on the scientific portrait of th e

s
SI presented in 84 .2-8 . However, let us say only that it is presented a
the principle of the act of understanding corporeal things, though it s
e
need of being a senior partner " along with the phantasms in th
n
.
In
85,
we
begin
with
a
imagination and the senses is brought out
article on the abstractive mode of our knowing, i .e . abstracting the SI
s
from the phantasms . A . 2 then asks whether the SI is "that which i
o
understood " . We should note not only the main reply but the answers t
the preliminary arguments or objections .
The main reply begins with two reasons why the SI cannot b e
t
" that which is understood" . It would mean that sciences would be abou
It would
items in the mind rather than about things outside the mind .
thus
that
contradictories
ar e
true,
and
also mean that all judgments are
;
every
opinion
would
be
true,
and
every
way
of
simultaneously true
e
.
We
then
get
the
usual
doctrine,
that
the
SI
is
the
principl
taking things
.
is
the
thing
outside
the
soul
"
of the act, but that " that which is known
s
.
No
mention
i
The SI is, of course, known by subsequent reflection
made of the concept .
The objections and replies are of the greatest interest . The firs t
uses the doctrine that "the understood in act " must be in the one wh o
.
understands : since "the understood in act" is the very intellect in act
y
And since nothing else of the thing understood is in the intellect actuall
understanding except the SI, the SI must be the very understood in act " .
s
Thomas ' s reply interprets the doctrines proposedt by the objector a
meaning simply that there is a likeness of the thing understood in th e
g
mind . This likeness is the SI . That is what is meant by the known bein
.
Thus
,
in the knower, or the understood in act being the intellect in act
.
;
it
is
just
its
likeness
the SI is not "that which is actually understood "
No whisper of a concept .
The second objector argues that " the understood in act has to b e
in something, for otherwise it would be nothing at all . He rules out it s
being in the thing outside, because that is material . The only option i s
to place it in the intellect, and thus it must be the SI . Thomas ' s reply i s
s
a lesson on abstraction, distinguishing between the thing which i
understood, which is the nature of the thing outside the soul, and it s
being understood or its universality . It is a reply in the line of th e
doctrine of a mode of understanding . It does, however, mention th e
e
"intentio universalitatis " , seemingly as a note attached to the natur
t
which we consider . The reply actually proceeds in two steps, firs
d
speaking of the "being understood [ipsum intelligtl of the nature, an
" . This
then adding the "being abstracted " and the "intentio universalitatis


228

Dewan: St. Thomas and Pre-conceptual

Intellection

is certainly not the concept of the thing

. The understood is the thin g
outside , .and.]its being understood is something
that " happens to i t ,
[ . . . accidit. .
We come now to the third objection and reply, the
one place
where we have an ex professo
discussion
of
the
concept
(though
not s o
called in this place) . The objector recalls
Aristotle's teaching that spoken
words are the signs of the soul's affections
. Thus, since spoken word s
signify the things understood [res intellectas],
the affections of the soul ,
that is, the species intelligibiles,
are what we understand . Thoma s
answers, once more using his technique of
approaching the intellect by
comparison with the senses
. In sense knowledge, there is first the
operation in function of the sense power's being affected by the sensibl e
thing . Then, secondly, there is the operation of the
imaginative power ,
which forms pictures of absent or even never seen things . In the
intellectual power, both of these operations are found . t2
First, there i s
the operation pertaining to the possible intellect's being informed by th e
SI . Then, the intellect, so formed, itself forms a definition, or
composition or division; and it is these that are signified by spoke a
n
words
. Thus, the spoken words do not signify the SI, but rather the y
signify the items which the intellect forms for itself with a view t o
judging about the external things [ad
iudicandum de rebus exterioribus] .
Here, then, we have the notion,
the definition, etc ., i .e . wha t
elsewhere are called the concept, the mental word, or even the " intenti
o
intellecta" .
The objector had argued that the spoken word signifies tha t
which is understood, and that the spoken word signifies the SI . Thomas
,
in his reply, simply says that it does not signify the SI . Is he
acknowledging that the concept is that which is understood? Hardly . Hi
s
whole point is that it is the external thing which is " the understood"
.
Nevertheless, he does nothing to counter the idea that the concept is "th
understood" . Surely, the reason must be that he has, in his explanatio e
n
of the role of the concept here, said enough to make it clear that i t
cannot have that role . The plain meaning is that the concept comes o
n
the scene too late to be "the understood" . It is, rather, a product flowin
g
from the understanding of the thing, and used by the mind with a vie
w
to making. judgments about the thing
. Such an idea works in clearly
enough with the presentation of the knowledge of truth in 1 .16
.2, which
says that in every composition and division, i .e . every act of predication
,
the intellect predicates a form, representing the intellect's knowledge o f
12The word here (ST 1 .85 .2 .ad3 ; ed
. Ottawa 528al) is " coniungitur", but St .
Thomas certainly does not mean to confuse the two .

Etudes maritainiennes/Maritain Studies

22 9

the thing, of the thing itself . The formation of such predicates would b e
what Thomas seems to have in mind as conceptualization. "
My hypothesis, then, is that the reply of St . Thomas to the
objection speaks of the concept in such a way as to make impossible an y
confusion between the concept and the "understood " .
If I am right, I am correcting Cardinal Cajetan . In his commentary
on this article, he complains that St . Thomas ' s answer to the objection
is inadequate . The reason is that, while it rejects the doctrine that the S I
is "that which is understood " , it does nothing to reject the doctrine tha t
the concept is "that which is understood " . Cajetan proceeds t o
supplement what Thomas has said . He explains that both the SI and th e
concept can be considered in two ways : as a thing, and as a likeness o f
the thing outside . Taken as a thing, neither is known save throug h
reflection . But the concept, taken as a likeness, is known . Still, it is one
and the same thing for it to be known, and for that of which it is th e
likeness to be known . Hence, it creates no problem .
Cajetan ' s view supposes a problem, and works to overcome tha t
problem . His view is that the external thing is known only throug h
knowledge of the concept . My question is : is that really the role of th e
concept here at this stage in St . Thomas ' s career? The strategy of th e
Prima pars suggests that it is not . Thomas is well aware of th e
possibilities of knowing one item in or through another, as in or throug h
a mirror . He certainly presents the role of the concept as a sort of
mental mirror, and there seems every reason to believe that it can
function either as a noticed mirror or as an unnoticed mirror . "
However, in this discussion, he is presenting in the most formal way th e
act of understanding . And he raises the question : should it be conceive d
as a knowing of a mental item? His reasons for not so conceiving it ar e
most serious . It would do away with knowledge of extra-mental reality .
He does not say : it would be angelism . I .e ., he does not say that i t
would an unsuitable mode of knowing for the human being, though it
might suit a separate intelligence . He rather says that it would destro y
knowledge : all opinions would be true! and every way of taking thing s
whatsoever !
Cajetan' s judgment that St . Thomas ' s reply is inadequate, an d
Cajetan ' s supplement to the reply strike me as leading the mind in a
direction Thomas was deliberately rejecting . At the very least, it shoul d
"Cf. ST 1 .16 .2, in toto .
"See above, note 9, the text
understood only through reflection .

from SCG 4 .11 .

The

intentio intellecta i s


230

Dewan: St.

Thomas and Pre-conceptual Intellectio n

be said that Thomas is making the SI the crucial issue in the conceptio n
of knowledge . The concept, however it fits in, is secondary .
Confirmation of this is provided by the presentation of "th e
understood" in the later De unitate intellectus . Just as in earlie
r
discussions, the adversary is accused of error concerning "th e
understood" . St . Thomas carefully presents "the understood" as the thin
g
outside the soul . Knowledge, he insists, is about things, not about an
y
sort of species . Thus we read :
But it remains to be inquired what is the very " understood "
[quid sit ipsum intellectum]? For if they say that "th e
understood" is one immaterial species existing in the
intellect, they fail to notice that they drift in a certain way
into the doctrine of Plato, who posited that concerning
sensible things no science can be had, but all science is ha d
concerning one separate form . For it makes no differenc e
for the present issue, whether someone say that the scienc e
which is had concerning the stone is had concerning one
separate form of the stone, or of one form of the ston e
which is in the intellect : it will follow for both that science s
are not about the things which are here, but only abou t
separate things . But because Plato maintained that such
immaterial forms are subsisting by themselves, he coul d
also, along with that, posit several intellects participating i n
the knowledge of the one truth from the one separate form .
But these [people], who posit such immaterial forms which they call "the understoods" [intellecta] - in the
intellect, necessarily have to posit that there is one intellec t
only, not only of all men, but even unqualifiedly . "
All this, then, merely makes the point that there is something seriousl y
wrong with the conception these people have of the object o f
understanding, i .e . " the understood" .
Now, we come to the positive presentation of the true nature o f
the understood . We read :
Therefore, it is to be said, according to the vie w
[sententiam] of Aristotle, that the " understood", which i s
one, is the very nature or quiddity of the thing ; for natural
science and the other sciences are about things, not abou t
understood species [species intellectis] . For if the
" understood" were not the very nature of the stone, whic
h

Etudes marUdniennes/MarU dn Studies

is in things, but the species which is in the intellect, i t

would follow that I would not understand the thing whic h
is the stone [rem quae est lapis], but only the intentio
which is abstracted from the stone . 1 6
d
This, then, is the fundamental answer, but it remains to be explaine
how it can be true, given the mode of being which the nature has i n
singular things . And he continues :
But it is true that the nature of the stone, as it is i n
singulars, is understood in potency " [intellecta i n
h
potentia] ; but it is rendered understood in act " throug
this, that the species come from sensible things, by th e
mediation of the senses, right to the imagination, and
through the power of the agent intellect are abstracted th e
species intelligibiles, which are in the possible intellect . But
these species do not stand related to the possible intellect a s
"the understoods " [intellecta], but as the species by whic h
the intellect understands, just as also the species which ar e
in [the sense of] sight are not the very [items] seen [ipsa
visa], but those [factors] by which the sight sees [ea quibu s
n
visus videt] : save inasmuch as the intellect reflects upo
17
itself, which cannot happen in the sense .
The important thing for Thomas is to change the idea o f
understanding, so that it does not have as its target of attention som e
pure intelligible existing within the intellect, but the thing which i s
outside the intellect . Certainly, the mental word would only caus e
confusion in the presentation, since it can easily be taken for just suc h
an inner object. Still, in the SC response, Thomas used the twofol d
DP
"thing understood " doctrine, and brought in the concept . And in the
he even presented the concept as the "primarily and essentiall y
t
understood " . Nevertheless, in the ST and the UI, the concept is almos
e
entirely (ST) or entirely (UI) omitted. And while the vocabulary of th
e
ST prefers "id quod intelligitur , the UI presents the issue with th
s
simple term "intellectum " , identifying it with the quiddity which i
present in the singular thing .
e
Is Thomas ' s variation in approach entirely dictated by th
argument with the Averroists? Or does the argument simply help t o
bring out what is truly essential to the account of the act of intellection ?

16 U! 5 (186-194) .

"Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus 5 (Leonine lines

164-185) .

23 1

17 U/ 5 (194-206) .


232

Dewan: St. Thomas and Pre-conceptual Intellectio

n

Notice that it is not a matter of making conc

for the human mind . Thomas is quite clear that all eptualization optiona l
human intellection i s
necessarily completed by the concept . 18
It is rather a question of what
is the essence and what is the property in the situation . To the extent tha
t
intellection is conceived of as essentially an inner picturing, then th
e
concept is essential . That, I believe, is what Thomas is rejecting
.
The importance of this doctrine is that it gives things themselve
s
an absolute priority over knowledge itself, as to the order of objects o
f
knowledge .
Addenda
L One could say that 1 .85
has to do with the concepts and thei r
order . But this feature of the.3-4
situation is not brought out . Thomas i
n
1 .84
.1 has set a pattern, and so we talk about acts of knowing the mor e
universal and the less universal, etc . Definitions are discussed somewhat
.
Is the fact that we are talking about concepts implicit in the very additio
n
of 1 .86? i .e . that the order considered in 1
.85 is of concepts? So be it ,
but the key point for us is 1 .85 .2 .
2 . I think that it is important to consider the arguments in 1
.85 .2 given
against the SI being " that which is understood"
. I think the doctrine i s
tied to the view that our knowledge starts with sense knowledge o
f
sensible things . This is the source of our very idea of knowledge
. It i s
entirely based on the complete ignorance of itself and the thoroug
attainment of the thing itself. It is thus that we see the reality o h
f
knowledge (through our subsequent power of reflection) as " knowing
things even outside ourselves" . We can thus develop the doctrine of th
e
two modes of being, which alone explain the phenomenon .
Once one has the idea of cognition, then one can posit knowings o f
one thing through another, where the one thing is even a form in
knower (as in the theory of the concept) . However, the essence oa
f
18Cf.Super Evangelium . IOannis
S
Lectura, generally dated in the secon
Parisian Professorship (1269-1272)
. There, in cap . 1, lest . 1 (5th revised ed d
Cai, O .P ., Rome/Turin, 1952
. R.
: Marietti, #25), Thomas says :
Patet ergo quod in qualibet
intellectuali necesse est ponere
verbum : quia de rationnatura
intelligendi est quod intellectu s
intelligendo
formet huiusmodi autem formatio dicitur
verbum ; et aliquid
ideo in Omni intelligente oportet ponere
verbum .
Natura autem intellectualis est triplex, scilicet
humana, angelica et
divina : et ideo triplex est verbum . . .

Etudes maritainiennes/Maritain Studies

23 3

knowledge is the possession of the being of other things (and thus of al l

things), and its very existence is known to us through the knowing o f
sensible things (sensibly and intellectually) .
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