REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Constitution Hills, Quezon City

JUAN MIGUEL LUZ,

Appellant,
Re: Reassignment/
Transfer (Appeal)

-versusTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EDUARDO ERMITA,
Appellee.
x--------------------------------------x

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(of CSC Resolution No. 06-0216 dated 1 February 2006)
Appellant, Juan Miguel M. Luz, by counsel, respectfully
states:
TIMELINESS OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
1.
06-0216

This is a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No.

(the

Resolution)

promulgated

by

this

Honorable

Commission on 1 February 2006, which dismissed Appellants

Appeal of his reassignment to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), for lack of jurisdiction. A certified true copy
of this Resolution is hereto attached as Annex A.
2.

Through undersigned counsel, Appellant received a

copy of the Resolution on 3 February 2006. Hence, the instant

motion is timely filed in accordance with Section 72 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which provides:

Section 72. When and Where to File. A

decision or ruling of a department or agency may be
appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof
by the party adversely affected to the Civil Service
Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper
within the same period.
A motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the same office which rendered the decision
or ruling within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND OF THE CASE

Appellants qualifications
3.

In 1987, Appellant was appointed Presidential Staff

Director of the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) in the Office

of the President during the administration of President Corazon C.
Aquino, where he stayed until mid-1991. As head of the Regional
Operations Group and the Political Affairs Group, he worked on a
number of major projects including local government autonomy
and the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.
4.

In

January

1991,

Appellant

became

Career

Executive Service Officer (CESO) upon the general instruction of

President Aquino that all presidential appointees secure a CESO
eligibility and rank to shield them from the vagaries of political
processes and changes in presidential administrations and their
particular concerns related to appointments.1

See Annex B of the Appeal.

5.

After four (4) years in government, Appellant returned

to the private sector.

From 1995-97, he was Vice President for

Corporate Affairs at the Far East Bank and Trust Company. From
1998 to February 2002, he served as director of operations of the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Advisory
Council, the private sector advisory body to the APEC Leaders.
Concurrently, he was also an Associate Professor at the Asian
Institute of Management from 1997 to 2002.
6.

As part of his community work, Appellant served as

Executive Director of the Philippine National Museum Foundation,

a private sector foundation that raised funds for the renovation of
the National Museum in time for the countrys Centennial
celebrations in 1998.

He also served as trustee of the Heritage

Conservation Society of the Philippines for two terms and is

currently a trustee of Museo Pambata ng Pilipinas.
7.

With a Bachelors Degree in Liberal Arts from St.

Marys College of California,2 a La Salle Christian Brothers

institution, and a Masters Degree in Public Administration from
the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,3
Appellant has expertise in the fields of community development,
government policy, business strategy and administration, and
education management. This is the reason why former DepED
Secretary Edilberto de Jesus invited him to rejoin government as
Undersecretary of Education in late 2002. Appellant accepted the
He graduated magna cum laude and garnered two awards for academic
excellence James L. Hagerty Award (School of Liberal Arts) and St. Thomas
Aquinas Award (Integral Program).
3 He was an Edward S. Mason Fellow in International Development.
2

offer because he wanted to serve his country by contributing to

reforms in the DepED, which in the mid-to-late-1990s had the
reputation

of

being

one

of

the

most

corrupt

agencies

in

government.
8.

On 12 November 2002, Appellant was appointed

Undersecretary of the DepED. In the same month, he took an oath

of office (a copy of which is attached as Annex B hereof)
pursuant to the said appointment. He then took charge of the
Finance and Administration of the DepED.
9.

Appellant reactivated his CESO rank as confirmed by

the Career Executive Service Board.4

10.

After Secretary de Jesus left the DepED in August

2004, the Appellant continued to serve under former Secretary

Florencio B. Abad and OIC Secretaries Ramon C. Bacani and Fe A.
Hidalgo, successively.
Appellants contributions to reform the DepED
11.

As DepED Undersecretary, Appellant carried out major

reforms in the areas of finance and management systems. Notable

among these were:

Providing direct funding releases from the National

Treasury to fiscally-autonomous high schools and
school divisions through the Direct Release System;

Establishing the DepED Procurement Service;

Drafting of a new textbook policy, as well as designing

See Annex Bof the Appeal.

and organizing the National Textbook Delivery Program

to ensure the timely delivery of over 50 million quality
textbooks to close to 42,000 elementary schools;

Decentralizing the payroll service of elementary school

teachers;

Fixing the automatic payroll deduction system;

Re-engineering the Departments Provident Funds5 in

order to have a professional system; and

Forming

Brigada

Eskwela

(National

Schools

Maintenance Week), a project undertaking minor

repairs

of

schools

involving

various

school

stakeholders, the local community, local government

units and the private sector.

Brigada Eskwela

significantly minimized problems encountered during

school openings.
12.

Since 2002, education reforms, both in terms of

financial management and support to academic programs of

schools, have helped establish the image of the Department of
Education as one of the five least corrupt national agencies in the
Social Weather Stations annual Enterprise Survey. This has been
cause for great pride in DepED considering that it was formerly
one of most corrupt agencies in the survey prior to that period.6

5 The Department Provident Fund has a nationwide portfolio of P1.1 Billion in 16

regions).
6 During the entire PGMA Administration, no procurement, personnel or
financial scandal has rocked the Department. The lone scandal attributed to the
Department involved a controversial error-laden textbook procured a decade ago
but which are still in the schools. The Department recalled the textbook and put
in place a tighter textbook evaluation process to prevent such errors from
recurring in public school textbooks in the future.

13.

In sum, Appellant is a highly-educated, competent,

honest, and dedicated public servant. His knowledge, competence

and integrity enabled him to generate significant financial and
material support from the private sector for schools under the
Departments Adopt-a-School program.
Malacaangs post-dated checks
14.

On 23 August 2005, the DepED received a letter from

Congressman Antonio Diaz stating that President Arroyo had

approved P20 Million from the Presidents Social Fund (PSF) to be
used for the congressmans scholarship fund in the 2nd District of
Zambales. Included in the letter was the first P5 Million, in a
handwritten check drawn against an unmarked non-commercial
account in the Land Bank branch in Malacaang.7
15.

The DepEDs Chief Accountant, Mrs. Olivia San Pablo,

immediately called the Appellant to ask what to do with the check.

Baffled, he requested her to show him the check signed by Deputy
Executive Secretary (DES) Susana Vargas with the handwritten
amount and name of the payee, the Department of Education. The
check was dated 21 August 2005, a Sunday.
16.

Incredulous that Malacaang would issue such a

handwritten check, Appellant asked the DepED Chief Accountant,

Ms. San Pablo, to call the office of DES Vargas to inquire if this
was in fact a genuine check.

A copy of this letter and the proof that this check was deposited to the DepED
OSEC Trust Account is attached as Annexes I and I-1 of the Appeal.
7

17.

After Ms. San Pablo reported to him that the Office of

the President confirmed the existence of the check, the Appellant

called Congressman Diazs Chief of Political Affairs staff, Ms. Cora
Maestre, to inquire about the purpose of the amount and the
manner of the disbursement.
18.

According to Ms. Maestre, the fund was to be

distributed as scholarship assistance given to each public high

school student in the congressmans district at a rate of P350 per
student, notwithstanding the fact that public education is free and
requires no payment of fees.
19.

Appellant was then told that the P5 Million should be

transferred to the Zambales division office which would, in turn,

release the money to the congressmans office, which would then
distribute the same to the student beneficiaries directly. To
liquidate this amount, each student was to sign a list similar to a
teachers payroll when the latter receive their payslips and
paychecks from the division.
20.

In a telephone conversation, DES Vargas told the

Appellant that she was not privy to the Presidents decisions on the
PSF but that the Fund was disbursed solely at the discretion of the
President.

Hence, the scholarship project as discussed by the

congressman must have been in accordance with the Presidents

instructions.
21.

Upon the request of DES Vargas, Appellant agreed to

have the first P5 Million check deposited to the DepED central

office trust fund. He, however, instructed Ms. San Pablo, not to
transfer any fund to the Division of Zambales until the Department
received in writing a clear program of work and the process of
disbursement and liquidation from the congressmans office.
22.

On 2 September 2005, three similar checks of equal

amount (P5.0 Million each) were forwarded to the DepED

accounting office from the PMS for deposit and transfer to the
same division of Zambales. The dates on these post-dated checks
were 3 September 2005, 3 December 2005, and 3 March 2006.8
Appellant noticed that all three were similarly handwritten as the
first check in August, though they now bore two signatures - those
of DES Susana Vargas and Erlinda Bautista de Leon as head of the
PSF.
23.

The DepED accountant reported to the Appellant that

there was no accompanying documentation with the checks.

Neither was there a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO),9 nor a
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA)10. Moreover, upon checking with
both the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Commission on Audit (COA), she confirmed that the acceptance of
post-dated checks are against government rules on accounting and
auditing procedures.

8 Certified true copies of these checks are attached as Annexes I-series of the
Appeal.
9 The SARO is the notice from the DBM to a department that informs the latter
that funds are now allotted and can be obligated. In effect, the SARO provides
the department with the authority to spend funds.
10 The NCA is the notice from the DBM that the cash has been deposited or
transferred to the account of the department and can be drawn against. Only at
this point in time can a check be prepared and/or released to the payee.

24.

Upon the request of the Appellant in a letter dated 6

September 2005,11 COA Assistant Commissioner Arcadio Cuenco

wrote a letter stating that:
Please be informed that the issuance and/or
receipt of post-dated checks by government agencies is
prohibited under GAO Circular No. 68-110 dated
October 10, 1968 pertinent portion of which states:
Checks presented for payment must be
drawn by the payor himself and made
payable to the agency or head of agency
Under no circumstance shall the following
checks be accepted: (a) checks drawn
payable to the name of the agency head or
any of its officers, (b) indorsed checks, (c)
postdated checks, (d) stale checks, and
(e) out-of-town checks, except those which
are drawn by the Government or its
instrumentalities. (Emphasis supplied)12
25.
from

On 6 September 2005, the Appellant received a letter

Congressman

Antonio

Diaz

dated

September

2005

requesting for the transfer of the two cleared checks (21 August
2005 and 3 September 2005) from the DepED central office trust
account to the DepED Division Office of Iba, Zambales.13
26.

Appellant called DES Vargas on 7 September 2005 to

inquire about the post-dated checks she signed, which were

personally delivered by the congressmans staff.

Her reply was

startling. She sounded perplexed by the Appellants query and

asked what the dates were on the checks. When asked why she
did not know the dates on the checks being the signatory, she told

11 A certified copy of the letter of the Appellant to COA is attached as Annex J

of the Appeal.
12 A certified copy of the letter of the Commission on Audit to the Appellant is
attached as Annex K of the Appeal.
13 A certified true copy of this letter is attached as Annex L of the Appeal.

the Appellant that she usually pre-signed blank checks for the PSF
but would give these directly to the President. She said she was
not privy thereafter to the details of the checks, nor to the projects
for which they were intended.

Furthermore, she could not

understand nor explain why two of the checks would be postdated.

27.

On the same day the DepED Chief Accountant called

the Appellant with another urgent matter. The PMS called her and
Mr. Mandy Ruiz, the Departments Chief Budget Officer, to inquire
if another PSF check could be deposited directly to the division of
Zamboanga del Sur for the projects of Congressman Isidro Real,
thus by-passing the central office in an effort to cut down on the
overall processing time for the check.
28.

On 8 September 2005, Ms. Maestre of Congressman

Diazs office came to inquire if DepEd already deposited the first

two (2) checks and if these could already be transferred to the
division office.
29.

The Appellant, not wanting to veer away from the

proper accounting and auditing procedures, decided to return the

four (4) checks to the PSF, including the first one (21 August 2005)
already deposited into the DepED central office trust account. For
this purpose, he called the Departments Chief Accountant, Chief
Budget Officer and Cashier to his office. The official receipt for the
second check (3 September 2005) was cancelled since this official
receipt had not yet been given to the Office of the President/PMS

10

and the check had yet to be deposited into the departments trust
account.
30.

Also on 8 September 2005, Ms. Yvonne Chua of the

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), having

heard of the post-dated checks from her Malacaang source,
came to see the Appellant to confirm if there were in fact such
checks received by DepED.
31.

Early on 9 September 2005, Friday, a staff of PMS was

in Appellants office waiting to pick up the three checks. Appellant

called Director Marietta Tamondong of the PMS and informed her
that the amount in the first check (which had already been
deposited) would likewise be returned to PSF but through a DepED
check.14
32.

That same day, Appellant informed OIC-Secretary Fe

Hidalgo of these developments. The latter concurred with his

decision.
33.

Deciding to return all of the checks that constituted

the P20 Million grant given to Congressman Diaz by the President

through the PSF, Appellant, on 10 September 2005, cancelled the
Disbursement Voucher for the first P5.0 M and instructed Ms. San
Pablo to return the amount to the PSF using a DepED check.15

A certified copy of the letter documenting the return of the checks is attached
as Annex M of the Appeal.
15 A certified copy of the cancelled voucher with the Appellants marginal note
(written instructions) is attached as Annex N of the Appeal.
14

11

34.

On 11 September 2005, a Sunday, PCIJs Ms. Chua

posted the story on the PCIJ weblog site which became a source of
news for other media organizations.
35.

On 12 September 2005, Appellant left for the United

States for a conference in New York City. That same day, the PCIJ
blog appeared in the Philippine Star.
36.

While Appellant was in the United States, OIC-

Secretary Fe Hidalgo received a letter, dated 13 September 2005,

from Congressman Antonio Diaz requesting for the release of the
first P5.0 M (date 21 August 2005).16 This was eventually released
upon the instructions of OIC-Secretary Hidalgo.

After the release

of this amount, the DepED received a Deed of Donation for the

same P5.0 Million signed by Cabinet Secretary Ricardo Saludo and
Undersecretary Ramon Bacani of the DepED, and notarized on 15
September 2005.17
Appellants termination
37.

Appellants worries started on 13 September 2005,

when his office received a letter from the Executive Secretary that
read:
We wish to thank you for your services as
Undersecretary, Department of Education, effective
immediately.18

16 A certified true copy of Cong. Diaz letter is attached as Annex O of the

Appeal.
17 A certified copy of this Deed of Donation is attached as Annex P of the
Appeal.
18 Annex C of the Appeal.

12

38.

As Appellant was then out of the country, the OIC-

Secretary called him on 16 September 2005, while he was still in

New York, to relay the news.

39.

Stunned by what was apparently a termination letter,

on 20 September 2005, Appellant sent a query to the Civil Service

Commission asking whether or not he was terminated and if any
such termination was proper.19
40.

On

21

September

2005

Chairperson

Karina

Constantino-David of this Honorable Commission wrote Appellant

a letter20 stating that:
For
an
undersecretary
position,
the
qualifications are: Bachelors degree, three (3) years
supervisory experience and Career Service Executive
Eligibility (CSEE) or Career Executive Eligibility
(CESE). Considering that you have met all the said
requirements, the status of your appointment is
permanent. As such, you have security of tenure to the
said position.
As a permanent official, you cannot be removed
from your position by virtue of a mere letter. You may
only be removed for cause as provided for by law, and
after due process. Considering that the termination
letter did not mention any cause or reason for your
termination, it is obvious that the Office of the
President
was
working
under
the
mistaken
assumption that your appointment was not permanent
and thus, you may be separated from the service
anytime or at a moments notice.
41.

On the same date, also in response to Appellants

query, Career Executive Service Board (CESB) Executive Director

Mary Ann Fernandez-Mendoza replied that since Appellant did not

19
20

Annex D of the Appeal.

Annex E of the Appeal.

13

resign from his position, the letter from the Office of the President
could not be taken to mean termination from the service, and that
Appellant

may

continue

performing

his

functions

as

Undersecretary of DepED.21
42.

Appellant immediately prepared a letter informing the

Office of the President that he was going to continue to perform his

duties and functions as Undersecretary of DepED with no
disrespect

intended,

and

that

his

concerns

were

focused

principally on continuing and expanding education reforms.22

43.

Two days later, on 23 September 2005, Malacaang

announced to the media that Appellant had been terminated as

undersecretary (of education) but not as a CESO. This was later
modified as to be a reassignment to some other government
position of same rank. Again, the announcement was modified by
the Press Secretary, who stated that Appellant had resigned as
Undersecretary.
44.

On the evening of 26 September 2005, the Press

Secretary was heard on radio stating that Appellant was being

allowed to stay as Undersecretary of Education.23
45.

On

October

2005,

Appellant

received

Memorandum24 of even date from Appellee, which reads:

In the exigency of service, you are hereby reassigned from the Department of Education (DepED)
A copy of this letter is attached as Annex F of the Appeal.
A copy of this letter is attached as Annex G of the Appeal.
23 Copies of the newspaper clippings are attached as Annexes H, H-1, and
H-2 of the Appeal.
24 Annex A of the Appeal.
21
22

14

to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

to a position at least commensurate to your Career
Executive Service (CES) rank.
The Memorandum reassigned him to the DOLE, without specifying
a position or a definite period.
46.

On the same day, Appellant received a letter, dated 23

September 2005, from DOLE Secretary Patricia Santo Tomas,25

stating that since the Appellant was being moved from the DepED,
she was requesting that he be reassigned to her department.
47.

On 14 October 2005, Appellant filed with this

Honorable Commission an Appeal contesting his reassignment to

the DOLE.
48.
any

On 18 November 2005, Appellant, not having received

Comment

from

Appellee,

submitted

to

this

Honorable

Commission a letter requesting for a decision of the Appeal based

on the pleadings and evidence filed, and requesting that the date of
hearing, if necessary, be set as soon as possible.
49.

Appellee thereafter filed his Comment dated 25

November 2005.
50.

On 12 December 2005, Appellant filed with this

Honorable Commission a Manifestation with Motion to Set Case for

Hearing and File Reply.

25

A certified true copy of this letter is attached as Annex Q of the Appeal.

15

51.

Without awaiting action on the said Motion, Appellant,

on 19 December 2005, filed his Reply to Appellees Comment.

52.

On 3 February 2006, Appellant received a copy of this

Honorable Commissions Resolution No. 06-0216. The dispositive

portion of the said Resolution, reflecting the Majority Opinion, i.e.
the opinions of Honorable Commissioners J. Waldemar V.
Valmores and Cesar D. Buenaflor (the Majority) states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Undersecretary
Juan Miguel M. Luz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
Hence, the instant Motion for Reconsideration where Appellant
respectfully submits that the Resolution dismissing his Appeal of
the Order dated 4 October 2005 (the Order), signed by Appellee,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, is not supported by evidence
on record and contains errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to
Appellants interest.26 Appellant concurs with Dissenting Opinion
of no less than the Chairperson of this Honorable Commission,
holding that:
a. The Commission has jurisdiction over the appeal of
Luz.
b. Luz has security of tenure in the Career Executive
Service.
c. Luzs reassignment to the DOLE was tainted with
bad faith and was not done in the interest of public
service.27

These are among the grounds for a motion for reconsideration stated under
Section 40 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
27 Dissenting Opinion, p. 19.
26

16

GROUNDS
I.
THE
HONORABLE
COMMISSION
ERRED
IN
HOLDING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
APPELLANTS APPEAL.
II.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ERRED IN RULING
THAT APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE SECURITY OF
TENURE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ERRED IN RULING
THAT APPELLANTS TRANSFER WAS LEGAL.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE
HONORABLE
COMMISSION
ERRED
IN
HOLDING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF APPELLANTS APPEAL.
53.
concluded

In the Resolution, the Majority swiftly and erroneously

that

this

Honorable

Commission

cannot

take

cognizance of the case because it has no jurisdiction over the

Appeal of Undersecretary Luz. The Majority initially opined that
presidential appointees of CESO rank should question their
reassignment

before

the

Office

of

the

President,

following

Paragraph 5(e), Article IV, Chapter I, Part III of Presidential Decree

No. 1 or the Integrated Reorganization Plan.28

28

This section states:

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or
transferred from one position to another and from one

17

54.

However, recognizing that the Order subject of the

appeal was issued by authority of the President, the Majority

dispensed with the need to go to the Office of the President, but
immediately jumped to a higher level, that is the Court of Appeals.
The Majority invoked Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
explicitly enumerates the Office of the President as among the
agencies whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
They justified resort to the Court of Appeals by saying that nothing
in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)
categorically vests this Honorable Commission with jurisdiction to
review actions of the Office of the President.
A.

Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure is not applicable to
Appellants case, as said rule
applies
only
to
awards,
judgments,
final
orders
or
resolutions issued in the exercise
of quasi-judicial functions.
-----------------------------------------------------55.

It is conceded that review by the Office of the President

is inapplicable to the case at bar. As the Honorable Chairperson of

this Commission correctly pointed out in her Dissenting Opinion,
since the reassignment ordained by the Executive Secretary was
presumptively the act of the President in line with the doctrine of
qualified political agency, then the same could not be appealed to

department, bureau or office to another; provided that such

reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service
and involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided further, that
no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than every
two years; and provided, furthermore, that if the officer
concerned believes that his reassignment or transfer is not
justified, he may appeal his case to the President. (Emphasis
supplied)

18

the President, without miscarriage of administrative justice.29 It is

a settled rule in administrative law that the person who
promulgated the decision cannot be the same person who will
review such decision on appeal.30
56.

The Majoritys resort to the Court of Appeals, is

however, a patent flaw which even law students can easily detect.
It is clear from the provisions of Section 1, Rule 43 that the said
Rule applies only to appeals from judgments or final orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. That the provision
mentions the Office of the President does not automatically mean
that review of all actions of such office fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. What is controlling for the
application of Rule 43 is that the decision must have been
rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.
57.

Quasi-judicial functions involve the determination of

rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which

applies to a specific situation.31 As the Supreme Court aptly
explained in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of
Appeals32 (also cited in the Dissenting Opinion, p. 4):
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
Dissenting Opinion, pp. 2-3.
GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128523 September 28, 1998 citing
Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49711,
November 7, 1979 and Anzaldo vs. Clave, 19 SCRA 353 (1982).
31 Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77372, April 29, 1988.
32 G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996.
29
30

19

persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine

questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of
specific persons are affected it is elementary that in
the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process
must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)
58.

It is evident that the Order reassigning Appellant was

not issued after a consideration and as a disposition of conflicting

claims. Appellee, in fact, describes the reassignment as a
management prerogative33, effectively admitting that it was an
administrative, and not a quasi-judicial, act.
B.

This Honorable Commission is

mandated
by
law
to
take
cognizance of the instant case.
--------------------------------------------------------59.

This Honorable Commission cannot abdicate itself

from the responsibility of acting on Appellants appeal.

No less

than the Constitution mandates this Honorable Commission, as

the central personnel agency of the government,34 to decide by a
Majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before

33
34

Appellees Comment, p. 3.
1987 Constitution, Article IX (B), Section 3.

20

it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution.35
60.

Moreover, Section 26 of the Administrative Code of

1987 (Executive Order No. 292) specifically vests this Honorable

Commission with jurisdiction over personnel actions, which
includes transfer and reassignment, in accordance with the rules
promulgated by the Commission.36 Accordingly, Section 71 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
pertaining

to

other

personnel

and

non-disciplinary

actions,

provides:
Section 71. Complaint or Appeal the
Commission. Other personnel actions, such as, but
not limited to separation from service due to
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity during
probationary period, dropping from the rolls due to
Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL), physically and
mentally
unfit,
and
unsatisfactory
or
poor
performance, action on appointments (disapproval,
invalidation, recall, and revocation), reassignment,
transfer, detail, secondment, demotion, or termination
of services, may be brought to the Commission, by
way of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
61.

Indeed, this Honorable Commissions authority to take

cognizance of Appellants appeal of his reassignment is undeniable.

As the Chairperson interestingly notes her Dissenting Opinion,

1987 Constitution, Article IX (A), Section 7.

Book V, Title I(A), Chapter V, Section 26 of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides:
35
36

Section 26. Personnel Actions. x x x

As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or
progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as
personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment,
detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel
action shall be in accordance with such rules, standards and
regulations as maybe promulgated by the Commission.

21

Appellants appeal is not novel to this Honorable Commission. In

fact, in CSC Resolution No. 03-066937 (penned by the same
ponente of the subject Resolution, Honorable Commissioner
Valmores), this Honorable Commission, without question, gave due
course to Ms. Virginia L. Trinidads appeal of her reassignment to
an inexistent position in the Commission on Internal Revenue.
Appellant now wonders why this case elicited a different treatment
from the Honorable Commissioner.
II.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ERRED IN
RULING THAT APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE
SECURITY OF TENURE.
62.

Notwithstanding its position that this Honorable

Commission lacks of jurisdiction over Appellants appeal, the

Majority discussed the merits of the case but incorrectly ruled that
Appellant does not enjoy security of tenure as DepED Secretary.
A.

Appellants
appointment
as
DepED Undersecretary is not
coterminous.
--------------------------------------------------------63.

The Majority denied Appellants right to security of

tenure by arguing that Appellants appointment as DepED

Undersecretary was coterminous; hence, Appellant serves only at
the pleasure of the President as appointing authority. In support
thereof, the Majority relied on the 11 November 2002 and 23
September 2004 appointments38 issued to Appellant. Both of these
appointments,
37
38

expressly

qualifying

the

appointment

as

Promulgated on 10 June 2003.

Annexes 1 and 2, respectively, of Appellees Comment.

22

coterminous with the appointing authority, are attached to

Appellees Comment.
64.

As

the

Honorable

Chairperson

rightfully

noted,

Appellant was not personally furnished with a copy the 23

September 2004 appointment, the latest appointment on which the
Majority based its conclusions. Truth is, Appellant was apprised
thereof only through the copy39 attached in Appellees Comment.
Being unaware of the 23 September 2004 appointment, Appellant
did not take an oath pursuant thereto. The Majority confirmed
such lack of oath of office in its opinion stating:
x x x There is no showing from the records,
however, that Undersecretary Luz took an oath of
office on the basis of this September 23, 2004
appointment. x x x40
65.

The absence of the oath of office, not to mention the

dubious issuance of the 23 September 2004 appointment, renders

the Majoritys contention that Appellants appointment was merely
coterminous untenable.
66.

Without the oath, Appellant cannot be considered to

have accepted the 23 September 2004 coterminous appointment,

if indeed such was officially issued. Book I, Chapter 10, Section 40
of the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly requires all public
officers to take an oath of office, to wit:
Sec. 40. Oaths of Office for Public Officers and
Employees. All public officers and employees of
the government including every member of the armed
forces shall, before entering upon the discharge of
his duties, take an oath or affirmation to defend the
39
40

Annex 2 of Appellees Comment.

Majority Opinion, p. 5.

23

Constitution; that he will bear true faith and allegiance

to it; obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by duly constituted authorities; will well
and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the
duties of the office or position upon which he is about
to enter, and that he voluntarily assumes the
obligation imposed by his oath of office, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. Copies of the
oath shall be deposited with the Civil Service
Commission and the National Archives. (Emphasis
supplied)
67.

The

Supreme

Courts

holding

in

Lecaroz

vs.

Sandiganbayan41 (appropriately cited in the Dissenting Opinion, p.

19) bolsters the need for an oath of office, thus:
To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the
full investiture with the office. Only when the public
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his
right to enter into the position becomes plenary and
complete. Until then, he has none at all.
68.

Considering the foregoing, what then is the basis of

Appellants appointment? The answer is not the 11 November 2003

coterminous appointment, but another appointment issued to
Appellant only a day thereafter.
69.

Intriguingly, Appellee attached to his Comment copies

of the two (2) coterminous appointments (dated 11 November 2002

and 23 September 2004), but failed to include a copy of the 12
November 2002 appointment.
70.

The existence of the 12 November 2002 appointment is

undisputed. The Career Service Executive Board (CESB), in its

Resolution No. 545 dated 10 August 2004,42 confirmed that:
41
42

G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999.

Annex B of the Appeal.

24

Mr. Luz left government service in 1992 and

was appointed to his present position on November 12,
2002.
71.

Even the Majority acknowledged the existence of the

12 November 2002 appointment in its narration of facts.43

However, it seems to have neglected, if not deliberately ignored, the
import of such appointment in the case at bar.
72.

Notably, the appointment issued to Appellant on 12

November 2002 was not qualified as coterminous, viz:

Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you
are
hereby
appointed
UNDERSECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, vice Ernesto de los
Santos Pangan.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter
upon the performance of the duties of the Office,
furnishing this Office and the Civil Service
Commission with copies of your oath of office.
73.

Importantly,

Appellant

took

his

oath

of

office44

pursuant to the 12 November 2002 appointment.

74.

Following the oath requirement in the Administrative

Code as well as the holding in Lecaroz, Appellant holds office as

DepED

Undersecretary

based

on

the

12

November

2002

appointment, which is not coterminous. Clearly, Appellant cannot

be dismissed from office at the pleasure or whim of the President.
He has security of tenure.

43
44

Majority Opinion, p. 4.
Annex B hereof.

25

B.

Appellant is fully qualified for the

position of Undersecretary.
---------------------------------------------------75.

The

Majority

further

posited

that

Appellants

appointment is not permanent, and therefore, he does not have

security of tenure. They based their contention on Section 27 (1),
Chapter 5, Book 5 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
defines a permanent appointment in the career service as follows:
(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment
shall be issued to a person who meet (sic) all the
requirements for the positions (sic) to which he is
being
appointed,
including
the
appropriate
eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
76.
1997)

of

Under the Qualification Standards Manual (Revised

this

Honorable

Commission,

Department

Undersecretary must meet the following requirements:

(a)

Bachelors degree;

(b)

Three (3) years supervisory experience; and

(c)

Career Executive Service Eligibility (CESE).

77.

Appellant meets all of the aforesaid requirements. He

has a Bachelors degree in Liberal Arts from St. Marys College in

California and even has a Masters Degree in Public Administration
from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University. He has more than three (3) years of supervisory
experience

both

in

the

government

and

private

sector.45

Importantly, Appellant is CES Eligible as confirmed by the CESB in

45

See paragraphs 2-6 of the Appeal.

26

its Resolution No. 54546 and in the 21 September 2005 letter-reply

of its Executive Director Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza47.
78.
sterling

Apparently, the Majority did not consider Appellants

qualifications

as

sufficient

compliance

with

the

requirements under the Qualification Standards Manual. This is

because the Majority improperly construed and expanded the last
requirement of CES eligibility to mean that Appellant must
specifically be a CESO Rank I. The Majority reasoned that since
Appellant only possesses CESO Rank III, he fails to satisfy the
minimum qualifications for an Undersecretary. Accordingly, the
Majority held that Appellants appointment is merely temporary.
79.

The Majoritys interpretation of the CES eligibility

requirement, adding qualifications beyond those expressly stated

in the Qualifications Standards Manual, defies elementary rules of
statutory construction. Expressum facit cessare tacitum.48 What is
expressed puts to an end that which is implied. In other words,
where a law, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.49 Hence, the Majority cannot impose qualifications other

Annex B of the Appeal. In Resolution No. 545, the CESB restored the CESO
Rank III of Appellant.
47 Annex F of the Appeal. In the 21 September 2005 letter-response of the
CESB to Appellant, the CESB Executive Director confirmed that Appellant is a
CES eligible occupying a career position in the Dep Eds plantilla with item no.
OSEC-DECSB-DEUSEC-4-1998.
48 This is a variation of the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius or the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of
all others (Agpalo, infra).
49 Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank vs. Peters, 16 Phil. 824
(1910); Collanta vs.
Carnation Phil., Inc., 145 SCRA 268 (1986), cited in Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory
Construction, 4th ed., 1998, at 221.
46

27

than those expressly stated in the Qualifications Standards

Manual.

C.

Jurisprudence
cited
by
the
Majority are not applicable to
Appellants case.
----------------------------------------------------80.

To bolster their claim that Appellant is not qualified for

the position of Undersecretary because he only has CESO Rank III,

the Majority quoted the rulings in Dimayuga vs. Benedicto, et al.,50
Achacoso vs. Macaraig,51 General vs. Roco,52 and Cuevas vs.
Bacal53. In these cases, the Supreme Court held that for an
appointment

to

be

permanent

(and,

consequently,

for

the

appointee protected with security of tenure), the appointee must

possess the rank appropriate to the position. Further, the Majority
relied on these cases in contending that security of tenure in the
career executive service pertains only to rank and not to the office
or the position to which they maybe appointed,54 thereby,
affirming the Appellees argument that Appellants permanent
status or security of tenure pertains only to the CES, but not to the
specific position of Undersecretary. For the Majority, the President
may

freely

move

Appellant

to

any

other

position

in

the

bureaucracy, provided there is no diminution in the rank he holds.

50
51
52
53
54

373 SCRA 652.

G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991.
G.R. No. 143366, January 29, 2001.
G.R. No. 139382, December 6, 2000.
Majority Opinion, p. 9.

28

81.

The Majoritys reliance on the aforesaid cases is

misplaced.55 As the Honorable Chairperson of this Commission

succinctly explained:
While the Supreme Court decisions on the
Bacal and Roco cases may have been applicable years
ago, these are no longer controlling today. At that time,
the rule was that for a CESO to have security of
tenure, his/her CESO rank must correspond to the
position he/she is holding, that is, he/she must have
the appropriate rank. Corollary to this, it was also the
rule that a promotion in position merits a
corresponding adjustment in rank. Neither was the
rank promotion ladderized. Thus, by merely adjusting
the rank, as CESO VI can become CESO I if he/she is
appointed to an Undersecretary position. Such a
system played havoc with the principle of merit and
fitness and careerism in the third level of the
bureaucracy.
Cognizant of the deleterious effects the two
decisions had on the security of tenure of career
officials, such that every time they get promoted in (sic)
position there will necessarily be a time wherein
he/she would be insecure because his/her rank is no
longer appropriate to the new position and has yet to
be adjusted to the appropriate rank, the CES Board,
as early as 2002, via Resolution No. 453 (Revised
Policy on Original and Promotional Appointment to
Career Executive Service Ranks) has already changed
the rules. The correspondence or equivalence between
rank and position no longer exists. CESOs are now
required to start at rank VI regardless of the position
they are holding. Also, promotion in the position does
not mean that the CESO will get a corresponding
promotion in rank. The CESB has set the
requirements that a CESO must meet before he/she
can be promoted in rank.56
82.

The CESB clarified this shift from the rule prevailing

during the time of Bacal and Roco to its new policy in Resolution
No. 548 s. 200457 as follows:
x x x

55
56
57

xxx

xxx

See also Appellants Reply to Comment, paragraphs 4-7.

Dissenting Opinion, p. 12.
Revised Policy on Security of Tenure.

29

WHEREAS, in the case of Secretary of Justice vs.

Serafin Cuevas vs. Bacal (G.R. No. 139382 dated
December 6, 2000), the Supreme Court ruled that
security of tenure in the career executive service is
thus acquire with respect to rank and not to position
and that the guarantee of security of tenure to the
members of the CES does not extend to the particular
positions to which they maybe appointed a concept
which is applicable only to first and second-level
employees in the civil service but to the rank to
which they are appointed by the President;
WHEREAS, in the case of Luis Mario M. General vs.
Ramon S. Roco (G.R. No. 143366 dated January 29,
2001), the Supreme Court ruled that two requisites
must concur in order that an employee in the career
executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit:
a) CES Eligibility; b) Appointment to the appropriate
CES rank;
WHEREAS, the above-stated rulings of the Supreme
Court were based primarily on the policies, rules and
regulations then of the CESB, which were quoted by
the said court in the afore-cited cases;
WHEREAS, the above said policy set by the Board
upon which the appropriate rank ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case of Roco vs. General was
based has already been revised by the Board
through CESB Resolution No. 455 s. 2002 which
states, that a CESO is considered a permanent
employee and, therefore, guaranteed security of
tenure in the CES regardless of the CES position
he/she occupies or the rank/level to which he/she
is appointed;
xxx

xxx

xxx

NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,

the Board RESOLVES as is hereby RESOLVED to
revise the policy on security of tenure in the Career
Executive Service (CES) in conformity with the
pertinent policies of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) for third level qualified incumbents. Henceforth,
attainment of CES Eligibility by an incumbent of a
CES position is enough to enjoy security of tenure
in the CES provided he or she has met the other basic
requirements of the position established in the
qualification standards set or approved by the Civil
Service Commission based on the recommendation of
the Department or Agency concerned;

30

xxx
supplied)
83.

xxx

(Emphasis

Based on the foregoing, Appellant, being CES Eligible

as certified by the CESB,58 is a permanent employee entitled to

security of tenure. The Majoritys contention that Appellant is
holding a position not equivalent to his CES rank is, therefore, of
no moment. Indeed, as the Honorable Chairperson correctly
pointed out, to apply the Bacal and Roco rulings to the case at
hand would only result in injustice. Had the rules not been
changed, Luz could have had his rank adjusted to CESO I by
virtue of his appointment as Undersecretary.59 This Honorable
Commission should not allow itself to become a vehicle of such
injustice.
III.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ERRED IN RULING
THAT APPELLANTS TRANSFER WAS LEGAL.
A.

Appellants reassignment does not

comply with the requirements for
the application of the mobility
principle.
---------------------------------------------------Appellants reassignment
service.

84.

was not made in the interest of public

The Majority sanctioned Appellants reassignment

under the mobility principle.60 However, as extensively discussed

in the Appeal, the application of the mobility principle is subject to

58
59
60

See Annexes B, E and F of Appeal.

Dissenting Opinion, p. 12.
Majority Opinion, p. 9.

31

certain requirements laid down in CESB Resolution No. 548 s.

2004, thus:
RESOLVED FURTHER, that notwithstanding the
permanent status of appointment of a third level
official, he/she is covered by the mobility principle
enshrined under Article IV, Part III of the Integrated
Reorganizational Plan, as approved by Presidential
Decree No. 1, as amended, dated September 24, 1972,
quoted herein as follows:
e. Assignments,
Transfers
xxx

Reassignments
xxx

and

xxx

Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, members of the Career
Executive Service may be reassigned or
transferred from one position to another;
provided that such reassignment or
transfer is made in the interest of public
service and involves no reduction in rank
or salary; provided, further, that no
member shall be reassigned or transferred
oftener than every two years.
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, to ensure compliance to
(sic) the above-quoted mobility principle, reassignment
or transfer shall be effected only upon the
availability of the corresponding position, it being
understood that a floating status is not within the
contemplation of this principle. Assignment to a CESO
pool shall not be considered as a floating status.
(Emphasis supplied)
85.

Simply put, a transfer or reassignment of a CESO

under the mobility principle must comply with the following

requisites:
a.

It must be made in the interest of public service;

b.

It must involve no reduction in rank or salary;

c.

It must not be made within two years from the

employees last transfer or reassignment; and

32

d.

It must be effected only upon the availability of a

corresponding position.

86.

The

Majority

considered

the

public

interest

requirement satisfied by the letter of Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE) Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas (dated 23
September 2005),61 requesting that Appellant be transferred to the
DepED. Notably, such letter came after Appellees 13 September
2005 letter62 thanking Appellant for his services as Undersecretary
(or after the euphemistically-packaged termination letter as aptly
termed by the Honorable Chairperson in her Dissenting Opinion63),
and Malacaangs press releases about Appellants termination.
Obviously, Secretary Sto. Tomas request is nothing but a mere
afterthought issued to subterfuge the initial scheme to remove
Appellant.
87.

Furthermore, as the Honorable Chairperson correctly

held, Appellants exemplary service and expertise will better serve

the DepED which has a substantially bigger budget and number of
personnel than DOLE. In addition, DepED, unlike DOLE, does not
have full management complement. DepED operates without a
head and with only two (2) undersecretaries (one of whom acts as
department Secretary), in case Appellant is reassigned.64
88.

Appellant

agrees

with

the

Majority

that

the

determination of whether a reassignment is made in the interest of

61
62
63
64

Annex Q of the Appeal.

Annex C of the Appeal.
Dissenting Opinion, p. 16.
Dissenting Opinion, pp. 18-19;

33

public service is within the sound discretion of the President. But

Appellant also agrees with the lone dissenter that the appointing
authoritys prerogative in such case is not absolute. It is subject to
limitations

such

as

the

requirements

laid

down

in

CESB

Resolution No. 548, and must always be exercised in good faith.

89.

The

principle

enunciated

by

this

Honorable

Commission in the appeal of Trinidad, Virginia L. Re Appeal,

Reassignment65 (also penned by the Honorable Commissioner
Valmores) is instructive:
While it is true that reassignment is a
management prerogative which the Commission
does not normally interfere with, the same is true
only, as held in CSC Resolution No. 96-3651,
absent the showing of grave abuse of discretion. In
other words, grave abuse of discretion must be clearly
shown in order that the Commission may take up the
cudgels for the employee reassigned (MONTIEL,
Rolando, CSC Resolution No. 94-1006, February 17,
1994. The authority under the law is not intended
as a convenient weapon for the appointing
authority to harass or oppress a subordinate on the
pretext of advancing and promoting public interest
(INHAYES, Oscar J., CSC Resolution No. 98-16-08,
June 24, 1998). (Emphasis supplied)
90.

Neither can the Majority invoke the presumption of

regularity in effecting Appellants reassignment. As will be

explained in the following paragraphs, such presumption is
rebutted by evident bad faith and political motives behind the
reassignment.

65

CSC Resolution No. 030669, June 10, 2003.

34

Appellants reassignment effectively results in a floating status, if

not a reduction in rank or salary.
91.

The 4 October 2005 Order, 66 reassigning Appellant to

the DOLE, does not specify the position to which Appellant will be
transferred. Without such a position, the apparent intent of
Malacaang is to float the Appellant as a punishment, in clear
violation of CESB Resolution No. 548. Because the purpose of the
transfer order was to put Appellant on floating status, the
Appellant is deemed to be have been constructively dismissed.
This especially so since the Appellant would then find his situation
in the DOLE intolerable and humiliating such that he would have
to eventually resign from the government service.
92.

Presently,

there

is

no

vacant

or

available

Undersecretary position in the DOLE. Thus, even if Appellant is

placed under a new designation, his office will definitely be a lower
position, resulting in a diminution of his rank and salary.
93.

The

Majority

admits

that

the

reassignment

of

Undersecretary Luz may not perfectly conform to the provisions of

the said CESB Resolution (CESB Resolution No. 548).67 They,
however, contend that non-compliance therewith is immaterial in
light of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Dimayuga,
Roco and Bacal. According the Majority as between the CESB
Resolution which is merely an administrative rule and the cited
jurisprudence, the latter prevails.

66
67

Annex A of the Appeal.

Majority Opinion, p.10.

35

94.

The Majoritys contention does not hold water. First, as

explained above, the cases cited by the Majority precisely are

inapplicable to Appellants case, because of the change in the
CESB policy. The Supreme Court in crafting jurisprudence,
decides cases in accordance with the prevailing and applicable law,
including administrative rules and regulations.
95.

Secondly,

as

the

Honorable

Chairperson

of

the

Commission correctly explained in her Dissenting Opinion, the

CESB as an administrative agency has full authority to promulgate
and, accordingly, change and construe its rules and regulations.68
B.

Appellants
reassignment
is
politically motivated and tainted
with bad faith.
---------------------------------------------------96.

The

Majority

sweepingly

set

aside

Appellants

allegation of bad faith. Amidst the screaming backdrop of political

manipulation, the Majority denied the presence of any political
motive.69
97.

A careful examination of the events that transpired

prior to Appellants transfer, however, shows that Appellees act

was tainted with bad faith and motivated by purely political
reasons. Quite clearly, the Appellant was removed because he was
an obstacle to the wishes of the President that she distributes the
Presidential Social Fund with no restrictions, and even when funds

Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-17509, January 30,
1970).
69 Majority Opinion, p. 9.
68

36

are not available, hence the post-dated checks.

The Palace

demands blind obedience, and this the Appellant could not give.
98.

Appellant and the Majority downplay Malacaangs

financial maneuverings, which Appellant rightfully refused. Both

Appellant and the Majority conveniently omitted this from their
narration of facts and deliberately failed to address the issue of the
post-dated checks. The various documents (the post-dated checks,
disbursement vouchers, etc.)70 evidencing Malacaangs attempt to
carry out an illegal disbursement of public funds, however, belie
the Appellant and the Majoritys denial by silence.
99.

Moreover, as the pointed out in the Dissenting

Opinion, Appelees bad faith is apparent from the deliberate

omission of Appellants 12 November 2002 appointment in
Appellees Comment. Said appointment, unlike the two (2) others
dated 11 November 2002 and 23 September 2004, do not qualify
Appellants appointment as coterminous. Furthermore, the 12
November 2002 appointment is the basis of his title to office in the
instant case since it was pursuant thereto that Appellant took an
oath of office.
100.

Appellee very well knew that Appellant is a CESO

with a constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure, yet it

sought to dismiss Appellant through a termination letter dated 13
September 2005, only four (4) days after Appellant decided to
transfer back to the PSF the three (3) checks supposedly for

70

See Annexes I P of the Appeal.

37

Congressman Diaz. The timing betrays Malacaang s political

motives behind Appellants termination.
101.

This Honorable Commission and the CESB have

both written the Appellant that termination of a CESO without

cause and due process of law is illegal. Hence, in a desperate and
fraudulent attempt to lend a semblance of legality to Appellants
removal from the DepEd, Malacaang qualified on 23 September
2005, i.e. ten (10) days after the issuance of the termination letter,
that Appellant was terminated as undersecretary (of education)
but not as CESO. Malacaang

later changed its stance and

disguised the termination as a reassignment to some other

government position of the same rank.71
102. Malacaang s cover-up did not end with its conflicting
declarations.

Knowing

that

the

termination

reassignment) is patently illegal, Malacaang

(disguised

as

deviously made it

appear that Appellant resigned and that it merely allowed

Appellant to continue its services as some form of accommodation.
Worse, Malacaang

declared all these through press releases,

obviously to humiliate Appellant before the public.

103. This Honorable Commission should not and cannot

sanction such dismissal tainted by bad faith. Just like any other
employer, the government cannot transfer an employee as a result
of discrimination, in bad faith or as a form of punishment without

71

See Annexes H-series of Appeal.

38

sufficient cause.72 As this Honorable Commission has consistently

ruled, (t)he authority (to transfer employees) under the law is not
intended to harass or oppress a subordinate on the pretext of
advancing and promoting public interest73.
104. This Honorable Commission can draw guidance from
the Supreme Courts ruling in Pangilinan vs. Maglaya,74 protecting
government employees from political vendetta. In said case, the
Acting Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office was
separated from service the day after his public exposes on the
anomalies involving his superiors and his threat to file cases
against them. Although the Supreme Court admitted that it was
constrained by law to uphold the termination of a temporary
employee, it did not hesitate to express its disapproval of the real
political motives behind dismissals and declare that the removal,
in fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion:
It is not difficult to see that the petitioner was
replaced because of his expos and his threat to bring
charges against his superiors. His relief was clearly
an act of punishment if not personal vengeance.
This is not denied. The respondents, while invoking
the law to justify his separation, have made no effort
whatsoever to justify their motives.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It would be a sorry day, indeed, if a civil

servant could be summarily removed from his
position for the "sin" of complaining about the
irregularities of his superiors. This would not only
impair the integrity of the civil service but also
72 Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. vs. Gramaje, G.R. No.
156963, November 11, 2004.
73 Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 030669, June 10, 2003 citing CSC
Resolution No. 98-16-08, June 24, 1998.
74 G.R. No. 104216, August 20, 1993.

39

undermine the campaign to encourage the public,

including those in the civil service, to expose and
denounce venality in government.
Pangilinan's denunciation of the non-reflective
license plates was not the act of a rabble-rouser or a
publicity-seeker. The record shows that he quietly
brought the matter to the attention of his superiors,
giving reasons for his misgivings. They took no action.
Feeling frustrated, he sought the attention of the
media and told them of his objection to the nonreflective license plates. He cited the laws that he
claimed had been violated. He narrated his efforts to
prevent their violation. He spoke of the indifference of
his superiors. In doing all these, he was exercising his
right as a citizen, and especially as a civil servant, to
denounce official misconduct and improve the public
service.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Pangilinan
was
separated
the
day
immediately following his press conference. The
Court sees the action as a retaliation. The public
respondents say they were merely terminating his
incumbency in accordance with existing law. The
Court sees that termination as a punishment.
Under the expanded definition of judicial
power in Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution, the Court can declare the acts of the
public respondents as tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and therefore invalid. (Emphasis
supplied)
105. All told, Appellant humbly and respectfully submits
that this Honorable Commissions Resolution outrightly dismissing
his Appeal deserves to be re-examined to conform with law and the
evidence presented, and, ultimately, to afford justice to public
servants who continue to uphold honesty and integrity despite
political pressure.

40

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
prayed that:
1)

Resolution

No.

06-0216

promulgated

by

this

Honorable Commission on 1 February 2006 be set

aside;
2)

Appellants appeal of the Order dated 4 October 2005,

signed by the Appellee, be given due course;

3)

The Order dated 4 October 2005 reassigning Appellant

to the Department of Labor and Education be nullified
as illegal; and

4)

Appellant be retained as Undersecretary for Finance

and Administration of the Department of Education.

Other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises, are likewise

prayed for.

Quezon City, 20 February 2006.

Counsel for Appellant:

ROWENA V. GUANZON
PTR No. 01321430, 1/17/04, Cadiz City
IBP Lifetime 1020636, 8/20/04, Bacolod
Roll No. 33534

DAMCELLE S. TORRES
PTR NO. 4181522/1-03-2006/ Makati
IBP NO. 665395/1-05-2006 Laguna
Roll of Attorney No. 49400

41

MAE NIA REYES

PTR No. 7358436 / 1-31-06 / Q.C.
IBP No. 646026 / 1-31-06 / Q.C.
Roll of Attorney No. 151262
Suite 311 Centro Plaza
Scout Torillo corner Scout Madrinan
South Triangle, Quezon City 1103

Copy furnished:
Secretary Eduardo Ermita
Office of the Executive Secretary
Malacaang Palace
Manila City

Registered Mail No. ________

Date _______________________

EXPLANATION
For lack of personnel, a copy of the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration was served by registered mail, rather than by the
preferred mode of personal service.

MAE NIA REYES

42