RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

VERA V. NAVARRO, 79 SCRA 408 (1977)

FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and
Injunction filed by herein petitioner Michael Vera, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, against Honorable Judge Pedro
Navarro, in his capacity as Judge of Court of First Instance (CFI).
1. Elsie Gaches died without a child and left a last will
testament.
2. Respondent Judge Bienvenido filed with the CFI a petition
for the probate of the said will as he was appointed as
executor. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue filed
with the probate court a claim of taxes particularly estate
tax, inheritance tax, and income tax.
ISSUE:
WON the heirs should be required to pay first the
inheritance tax before the probate court may authorize the
delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each of them
HELD: Yes. Under the law, the distribution of the ascendants
assets may only be ordered under the following three
circumstances namely, (1) when the inheritance tax, among
others, is paid, (2) when a sufficient bond is given to meet the
payment of the inheritance tax and all the other obligation of the
nature enumerated therein, or (3) when the payment of said tax
and all the other obligations mentioned in the said rule has been
provided for. None of these three cases insofar as the satisfaction
of the inheritance due from the estate is concerned were present
when the questioned orders were issued in the case at bar;
likewise, the record is bereft of any evidence that sufficient bond
has been filed to meet the outstanding obligation.

FE QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDA, 300

SCRA 406 (1998)
FACTS: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in
the Philippines in 1941. They had no children. Eventually, their
relationship soured and as a result, Quita obtained a divorce
decree from a California court in 1954
1. Subsequently, Quita married a Felix Tupas but was later
divorced. She married for the third time to a certain
Wernimont
2. Padlan died intestate in April 1972. After his death, Lino
Javier Inciong filed a petition before RTC Quezon City for
the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of
the decedent
3. Private respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the
surviving spouse, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda Padlan, claiming to be the children of
the decedent, opposed and prayed that Atty. Leonardo
Casaba be appointed administrator instead (which the
court granted). Atty. Casaba was later replaced by Higino
Castillon
4. Oppositors Blandina and the Padlan children submitted
copies of the divorce decree between petitioner Quita and
the decedent
5. In 1987, Quita moved for the immediate declaration of the
heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. The
court required the oppositors to submit the records of birth
of the Padlan children within 10 days which the latter failed
to do
6. The trial court held in favor of Quita, citing the ruling in
Tenchavez v. Escanno, disgregarded the divorce between
Quita and the decedent. The court declared only petitioner
Quita and the decedents brother, Ruperto Padlan, as the
intestate heirs of the decedent Arturo Padlan
7. On MR, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that decedent recognized the children as his
during his lifetime. Thus, the court ruled that the Padlan
children were entitled to of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan
8. On appeal, private respondent argued that the trial court
erred in deciding the heirs of the decedent without a
hearing. As such, CA declared the ruling of the trial court
and directed that the case be remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

ISSUE: WON there is a need to remand the case to the lower court
to determine who is entitled to inherit from the estate of the
decedent
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Rule 90 Sec 1 provides that if there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA

PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE
ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and RTC Pasig Br.
156, 252 SCRA 541 (1996)
ISSUE: WON the estate can be distributed prior to the payment of
estate tax
RULING: No.

CAB: There is no dispute as to the right of the Padlan children to

inherit from the decedent because there are proofs presented that
they had been duly acknowledged by the decedent and Quita
herself even recognized them as the heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as
to their respective hereditary shares.
The question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from the decedent as his
surviving spouse. Private respondents claim to heirship was
already resolved. She and the decedent were married in 1947,
while the marriage between Quita and Arturo Padlan was still
subsisting; as such, it was a bigamous marriage void from the
beginning under Art 80 and 83 Civil Code. Consequently, Blandina
is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from the decedent as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

RATIO: No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision
is made to meet those obligations.
CAB: The probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks
of notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations.
Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on
his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The
estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the
said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the
release of the titles six months after admitting the will to
probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution
and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the question of whether the

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with

the formalities prescribed by law.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE; ALLOWANCE FOR SUPPORT; SHOULD NOT BE
LIMITED TO MINOR OR INCAPACITATED CHILD-REN. - It is
settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83
should not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of
the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testators death,
provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age,
civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact
that the right and duty to support, especially the right to
education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT EXTEND TO DECEASEDS
GRANDCHILDREN. - The law clearly limits the allowance to
widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
PROPERTIES CAN BE MADE. In settlement of estate
proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been
paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if
the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the
court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX; AN OBLIGATION
THAT MUST BE PAID BEFORE THE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE.
The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires
that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares
in the inheritance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF PROBATE. The probate of a will
is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and
settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound

mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities

prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy
of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR
OVER PROPERTIES OF THE DECEASED. - The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession and management of
the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration.

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

QUASHA ANCHETA PENA and NOLASCO LAW OFFICE for its

own behalf, and representing THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND
TRIVIERE V. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP, 563 SCRA 426
(2008)
ISSUE: WON CA erred in disallowing the advance award of shares
by RTC to petitioner children and widow of Raymond Triviere is
already a distribution of the residue of the estate
RULING: No.
RATIO: The 2nd paragraph of Rule 90 Sec 1 allows the distribution
of the estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned
therein, provided that the distributees, or any of them, gives a bon,
in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Although it is within the discretion of RTC whether or not to permit
the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such
discretion should be qualified by the following:
(1) Only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending
controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance
distribution (Rule 109 Sec 2); and
(2) The distributees must post a bond, fixed by court,
conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of
the estate (Rule 90 Sec 1 2nd par)
CAB: There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the
petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the
settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two
requirements, or at the very least, took the same into
consideration. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against
the estate allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess
of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC
should have been more prudent in approving the advance
distribution of the same.

NATIVIDAD ARIAGA VDA DE GURREA, CARLOS GURREA,

JULIETA GURREA, TERESA GURREA-RODRIGUEZ, RICARDO
GURREA JR., MA. VICTORIA GURREA-CANDEL, and RAMONA
GURREA-MONTINOLA V. ENRIQUE SUPLICO, 488 SCRA 332
(2006)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Austria-Martinez
NATURE: Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision
of CA which affirmed in toto RTC decision in Civil Case no 47543
FACTS: The property in question was originally owned by Rosalina
Gurrea. Sometime in 1958, Rosalina transferred the ownership of
said lot to Adelina Gurrea.
1. After Adelinas death, testate proceedings were instituted
to have her will probated. Under the said will, the San Juan
lot (subject property) was bequeathed to Pilar and Luis
Gurrea, while of the Baguio property and a property in
Negros Occidental were given to Ricardo Gurrea
2. Ricardo Gurrea, represented by Atty. Enrique Suplico,
opposed the probate proceedings. It appears that Ricardo
agreed to pay Atty. Suplico a 20% contingent fee,
composed of either real or personal property
3. During the pendency of the proceedings, Atty. Suplico
succeeded in negotiating with the other heirs of Adelina to
transfer the ownership of the Spain property to Ricardos
daughter, Juliet Gurrea de Melendres
4. As payment for his fees, Ricardo offered the San Juan lot to
Atty. Suplico to which the latter agreed with the further
understanding that he will receive an additional
commission of 5% if he sells the Baguio property.
5. Ricardo then executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights and
interest over the subject property in favor of Atty. Suplico.
He, then, registered the deed and obtained a new TCT in
his name to the San Juan property
6. After the death of Ricardo, his heirs instituted intestate
proceedings to settle his estate. In the said proceedings,
Atty. Suplico filed several claims for unpaid attorneys fees,
however, all claims were dismissed with finality
7. Carlos Gurrea, the administrator of the estate of Ricardo,
filed an inventory of the properties left by the decedent
8. Petitioners filed a civil action against Atty. Suplico for the
recovery of the San Juan property. The trial court rendered
in favor of Atty. Suplico and dismissed the case

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

9. On appeal, petitioners argued that RTC erred in upholding

the supposed contract of attorneys fees between Ricardo
and Atty. Suplico which provided for the payment of
attorneys fees sin the form of real property because such
agreement is prohibited under Art 1491 NCC
ISSUE: WON the subject property was still the object of litigation
at the time the deed of transfer of rights and interest in favor of
Atty. Suplico was executed
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment it
becomes the subject to the judicial action of the judge.
CAB: There is no proof to show that at the time the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the probate court had
issued an order granting the motion for termination of proceeding
and discharge of the executor and bond. Since the judge has yet to
act on the motion, it follows that the subject property is still the
object of litigation.
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the
estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same.
CAB: While the subject lot was assigned as Ricardos share in the
project of partition executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the
title of the subject lot was still in the name of Adelina and was not
yet conveyed to Ricardo when the Transfer of Rights and Interest
was executed.
Since at the time of the execution of the Deed of Transfer of Rights,
the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina, the
probate proceedings concerning Adelinas estate cannot be
deemed to have been closed and terminated and the subject
property still the object of litigation.
CELSA VDA DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION VDA DE PANLILIO,
and REMEDIOS VDA DE GUINTO V. HON. ERNESTO TENGCO,

CFI Bacolod City, RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES,

207 SCRA 600 (1992)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Romero
NATURE: Consolidated cases seeking to annul the orders of CFI
Negros Occidental in cancelling the notice of lis pendens filed by
petitioner Celsa Vda. De Kilayko with Register of Deeds
FACTS: Maria Lizares died testate in 1968. Upon her death, the
decedents niece, Eustaquia Lizares filed a petition for the
settlement of the testate estate of the decedent before CFI Negros
Occidental
1. The probate court, then, issued an order declaring the will
probated and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the
estate of Maria Lizares
2. In 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was
granted by the probate court. Simultaneously, the court
declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries
mentioned in the project to partition as the only heirs of
the estate; adjudicated to them the properties assigned to
them and ordered the Register of Deeds to effect the
transfer of real properties
3. Thereafter, Eustaquia filed a motion to reopen the estate
proceedings in order that some properties of the decedent
which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to
her. The court granted motion and adjudicated the
properties to Eustaquia
4. In 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares (Encarnacion vda de
Panlilio, Remedios vda de Guinto et al) executed an
agreement of partition thereby terminating their coownership
5. A year later, Eustaquia died single and without any
descendant. Subsquently, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo
Lizares
6. Petitioners Celsa vda de Kilayco et al tried to reopen the
testate proceedings of Maria Lizares and prayed that a
substitute administrator be appointed.
7. The heirs of Eustaquia opposed the motion. They alleged
that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the
testate estate proceedings of Maria LIzares since the order
of closure had long been final

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

8.

The court denied the motion to reopen the testate

proceedings citing that since the settlement proceeding is
in rem, it is binding against the whole world. MR denied
9. Petitioners, then, filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership of possession of real property against the joint
administrators of the estate of Eustaquia
10. The joint administrators of the estate of Eustaquia filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the cause.
Consequently, the filed a motion for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens; the court granted the same. It held
that the notice of lis pendens was not necessary since the
subject properties, being in custodial egis, could not just be
alienated without court approval

become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition

becomes irrelevant.

ISSUE: WON the errors in the distribution warrants the reopening

of the estate of the testator
RULING: No.
RATIO: The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
distribute the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or
parts to which each distributee is entitled. A project of partition is
merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate
which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes
that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled
thereto.
CAB: The records show that in the settlement of the estate of Maria
Lizares, the subject properties were part of the project of partition
and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of the testatrix.
Accordingly, the heirs of Maria Lizares including the petitioners
executed an agreement of partition and subdivision whereby they
agreed to terminate their co-ownership over the subject properties.
These facts show that the LIzares sisters recognized the decree of
partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the
fruits thereof.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a decedent vests title
to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is
erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any judgment in rem, unless
properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court
has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has

ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO

SANCHEZ and MYRNA SANCHEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS,

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

ROSALIA LUGOD, ARTURO LUGOD, and ROBERTO LUGOD,

279 SCRA 647 (1997)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Panganiban

expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and

inheritance tax, if any, had been paid. This order for the
distribution of the estates residue must contain the names and
shares of the persons entitled thereto.

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision

which annulled the decision of the trial court and which declared
the compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding
even without court approval

CAB: A perusal of the whole record, particular the trial courts

conclusion reveals that the foregoing elements already concurred
in this case. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates of
Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93
was shouldered by private respondent Rosalia, who also absorbed
or charged against her share the advances of Rolando Lugod in the
sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Art 1061 NCC on collation.
Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is the law
between them, already contains the names and shares of the heirs
to the residual estate, which shares had also been delivered.

FACTS: Rosalia Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan Sanchez

and Maria Villafranca while private respondents Arturo, Evelyn and
Roberto Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia
1. Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna Sanchez, are the
illegitimate children
2. Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, in
1967, Rosalia filed a petition for letters of administration
over the estate of her mother and estate of her father, who
was at the time in a state of senility
3. Before the administration proceedings could be formally
terminated, Juan Sanchez died in 1968
4. Petitioners, as heirs of Juan Sanchez, filed a petition for
letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan
Sanchez but was opposed by Rosalia
5. Pending the proceedings, Rosalia and the petitioners
executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to
divide the properties of the estate of Juan Sanchez
6. Years later, petitioenrs filed a motion to require Rosalia to
submit a new inventory and to render an accounting over
properties not included in the compromise agreement.
They likewise filed a motion to defer the approval of the
compromise agreement
7. Petitioners contend that CA erred in deeming the special
proceedings closed and terminated arguing that there was
as yet no order of distribution of the estate pursuant to
Rule 90
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that the special proceedings
were already closed and terminated
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Under Rule 90 Sec 1, an order for the distribution of the
estate may be made when the debts, funeral charges, and

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA

MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION
MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

DE MOLO V. FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, 158

SCRA 451 (1977)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Fernandez
ISSUE: WON the present action is barred by res judicata
RULING: No.
RATIO: The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the
present controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a
final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
is, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of cause of action. Not all requisites are
present in this case.
For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered
insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The
decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although
final, involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of
Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be
construed to be final with respect to the probate of the
subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a
judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is
understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate
proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the
contested will. After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is
founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of proving
its due execution and validity, something which cannot be properly
done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is
predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus,
there is likewise no identity between the cause of action in
intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate. Be that as it
may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because of our
ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this
separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will.
Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the private
respondents on this score cannot be sustained.
1.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; REVOCATION THEREOF;
PHYSICAL ACT OF DESTRUCTION; ANIMUS REVOCANDI, A

NECESSARY ELEMENT. The physical act of destruction of a will,

like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and
in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case,
while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be
conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would
not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament.
The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical
act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under
his express direction.
2.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; RES JUDICATA; ELEMENTS.
For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former
judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between
the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of cause of action. We do not find here the presence of
all the enumerated requisites.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR.
There is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar
as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision
of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final,
involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana. As
such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be
final with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered
will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the
action for probate. This is understandably so because the trial
court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule
on the probate of the contested will. After all, an action for probate,
as it implies, is founded on the presence of a will and with the
objective of proving its due execution and validity, something
which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of estate
proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the
decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no identity between
the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE

probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was

precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the
petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the
late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the

position of the private respondents on this score cannot be

sustained.