REPUBLIC ACT NO.

6716
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF WATER WELLS,
RAINWATER COLLECTORS, DEVELOPMENT OF SPRINGS AND
REHABILITATION OF EXISTING WATER WELLS IN ALL
BARANGAYS IN THE PHILIPPINES

the President, shall be allocated by the Department of Budget and

Management to augment the appropriations of the Department of
Public Works and Highways until one hundred thousand (100,000)
water wells, rainwater collectors, and springs are completed as
envisioned in this Act.
SECTION 6. Effectivity.This Act shall take effect upon its publication
in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared to be the

national policy to promote the quality of life of every Filipino through
the provision of adequate social service including, but not limited to,
the provision of adequate potable water supply made conveniently
available to every barangay in the country.
SECTION 2. Water Wells, Rainwater Collectors and Spring
Development.The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
shall, within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, undertake
construction of water wells, rainwater collectors, development of
springs and rehabilitation of existing water wells in all barangays in the
Philippines in such number as may be needed and feasible, taking into
consideration the population, hydrologic conditions, costs of project
development and operations, financial and economic factors and
institutional arrangements: Provided, however, That the DPWH shall
deduct not more than five percent (5%) for supervision, engineering,
technical and other overhead expenses or fees: Provided, further, That
each barangay in the country shall have at least one additional potable
water source.
SECTION 3. Operation and Maintenance.In order to ensure the
proper use of the water facilities herein provided, a Barangay
Waterworks and Sanitation Association, herein referred to as BWSA,
shall be formed and organized for the purpose of maintaining the
water facilities: Provided, That pending the organization of the BWSA,
the water facilities shall be operated and maintained by the barangay
council. The BWSA shall be composed of the member-consumers who
shall administer, operate and maintain the completed water facility
and shall be registered with the corresponding municipal or city
council. The BWSA may impose such minimal charges as may be
necessary for the maintenance and normal repairs of said facility.
Nothing herein shall prevent any resident of the locality from using the
water facility under the same terms and conditions as the memberconsumers of the BWSA. Organizing and training the recipient
communities in the operation and maintenance of water systems shall
be conducted by the DPWH prior to the turnover of such facilities to
the BWSA subject to the guidelines to be formulated by the
Department.
SECTION 4. Submission of Report.The Department of Public Works
and Highways shall, within ninety (90) days after the approval of this
Act and every one hundred eighty (180) days thereafter, submit
periodic reports to the respective Committees on Public Works and
Highways of both Houses of the Congress of the Philippines for
evaluation and consideration.
SECTION 5. Funding.The sum needed for the implementation of the
construction, rehabilitation and repair program shall be taken from any
available appropriations for the Department of Public Works and
Highways in the General Appropriations Act for 1989: Provided, That
funds for this purpose shall also be included in the General
Appropriations Act for 1990 and 1991: Provided, further, That the total
program shall be completed not later than June 30, 1991, and:
Provided, finally, That there shall be equitable and proportionate
appropriations of funds annually for this purpose for all provinces,
cities and municipalities. In addition, a portion of financial grants and
concessional loans extended to the Philippines by foreign governments
and multilateral agencies every year, the amount to be determined by

Approved: March 17, 1989

MUSTANG LUMBER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the
Bureau of Forest Development. The Special Actions and Investigation
Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner. The SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices
and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its
cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound. The team was not
able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the
owner. The team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue
thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. On
4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's
lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure the remaining
stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source
and origin. Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an
administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the
seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by
the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from
disposing them until further orders. On 10 April 1990, counsel for the
petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of SAID Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days to produce the required documents covering
the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of
lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied
the petition. Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an order
confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as
those found in their lumberyard.
Issue: Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and
that petitioner should not be held for illegal logging.
Held: The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be
construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that
lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not a crime. On the contrary, the SC rules that such
possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included
in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products
as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing
plant," which reads: Processing plant is any mechanical set-up,
machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wall
bond, block board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber
in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter
alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used
in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.

PRINCIPE VS. FFIB

FACTS: August 28, 1990- Philjas Corporation, whose primary purposes,
among others are: to own, develop, subdivide, market and provide lowcost housing for the poor, was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). February 19, 1991 - then City Mayor
Daniel S. Garcia, endorsed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) the proposed CHS. Thereafter, or on 07 March 1991,
based on the favorable recommendation of Mayor Garcia,
respondent TAN, issued
the
Preliminary
Approval
and Locational Clearance (PALC) for the development of CHS. On July
5, 1991, then HLURB Commissioner respondent TUNGPALAN issued
Development Permit No. 91-0216 for land development only for the
entire land area of 12.1034 hectares covered by TCT No. 35083 (now
TCT 208837) and with 1,003 saleable lots/units with project
classification B. P. 220 Model A-Socialized Housing (p. 96, Records),
with several conditions for its development. Three (3) days thereafter
or on July 8, 1991, respondent JASARENO, allowed/granted the
leveling/earth-moving operations of the development project of the
area subject to certain conditions.
On November 18, 1991, then HLURB Commissioner AMADO B. DELORIA
issued Certificate of Registration No. 91-11-0576 in favor of CHS, with
License to Sell No. 91-11-0592 for the 1,007 lots/units in the
subdivision. Eventually, on December 10, 1991, respondent POLLISCO
issued Small Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) No. IV-316 to Philjas to extract
and remove 10,000 cu. meters of filling materials from the area where
the CHS is located. Thereafter, or on January 12, 1994, Philjas applied
for a Small Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) under P. D. 1899 with
the Rizal Provincial Government to extract and remove 50,000 metric
tons of filling materials per annum on CHS 2.8 hectares. Thus,
on January 17, 1994, respondent MAGNO, informed ELIEZER I.
RODRIGUEZ of Philjas that CHS is within the EIS System and as such
must secure ECC from the DENR.Philjas was accordingly informed of
the matter such that it applied for the issuance of ECC from the DENRRegion IV, on February 3, 1994. On March 12, 1994, an Inspection
Report allegedly prepared by respondent BALICAS, attested by
respondent RUTAQUIO and approved by respondent TOLENTINO re:
field evaluation to the issuance of ECC, was submitted.
Consequently, on April 28, 1994, upon recommendation of respondent
TOLENTINO, Philjasapplication
for
ECC
was
approved
by
respondent PRINCIPE, then Regional Executive Director, DENR under
ECC-137-RI-212-94. A Mining Field Report for SSMP dated May 10,
1994 was submitted pursuant to the inspection report prepared by
respondents CAYETANO, FELICIANO, HILADO and BURGOS, based on
their inspection conducted on April 25 to 29, 1994. The report
recommended, among others, that the proposed extraction of
materials would pose no adverse effect to the environment.
Records further disclosed that on August 10, 1994, respondent
BALICAS monitored the implementation of the CHS Project
Development to check compliance with the terms and conditions in the
ECC. Again, on August 23, 1995, she conducted another monitoring on
the project for the same purpose. In both instances, she noted that the
project was still in the construction stage hence, compliance with the
stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a
follow-up monitoring inspection was the last one conducted by the
DENR.
On September 24, 1994, GOV. CASIMIRO I. YNARES, JR., approved the
SSMP
applied
for
by Philjas under
SSMP
No.
RZL-012,
allowing Philjas to extract and remove 50,000 metric tons of filling
materials from the area for a period of two (2) years from date of its
issue until September 6, 1996. On November 15, 1999, the
Ombudsman
rendered
a
decision
finding
petitioner Principe administratively liable for gross neglect of duty and
imposing
upon
him
the
penalty
of
dismissal
from
office. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following respondents are
hereby found GUILTY as charged and meted the respective penalties
provided under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules,
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, viz,:
Antonio G. Principe - Penalty of Dismissal from the Service for Gross
Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may dismiss petitioner from the service
on an administrative charge for gross neglect of duty, initiated,
investigated and decided by the Ombudsman himself without
substantial evidence to support his finding of gross neglect of duty
because the duty to monitor and inspect the project was not vested in
petitioner.

HELD: As heretofore stated, the responsibility of monitoring housing

and land development projects is not lodged with the office of
petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987 spelled out the mandate of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the agency
that has authority over petitioner, which reads:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy.- (1) The State shall ensure for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as
well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present
as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system
that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
Section 2. Mandate.- (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying
out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
countrys natural resources.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 90, the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission, which became the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), is the sole regulatory body for housing and
land development.
BALICAS VS. FFIB
FACTS: On March 12, 1994, an Inspection Report allegedly prepared by
respondent BALICAS, attested by respondent RUTAQUIO and approved
by respondent TOLENTINO re: field evaluation to the issuance of ECC,
was
submitted.
Consequently,
on
April
28,
1994,
upon
recommendations of respondent TOLENTINO, Philjas application for
ECC was approved by respondent PRINCIPE, then Regional Executive
Director, DENR under ECC-137-R1-212-94. A Mining Field Report for
SSMP dated May 10, 1994 was submitted pursuant to the inspection
report prepared by respondents CAYETANO, FELICIANO, HILADO and
BURGOS, based on their inspection conducted on April 25 to 29,
1994. The report recommended, among others, that the proposed
extraction of materials would pose no adverse effect to the
environment.
Records further disclosed that on August 10, 1994, respondent
BALICAS monitored the implementation of the CHS Project
Development to check compliance with the terms and conditions in the
ECC. Again, on August 23, 1995, she conducted another monitoring on
the project for the same purpose. In both instances, she noted that the
project was still in the construction stage hence, compliance with the
stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a
follow-up monitoring is proper. It appeared from the records that this
August 23, 1995 monitoring inspection was the last one conducted by
the DENR. On September 24, 1994, GOV. CASIMIRO I. YNARES, JR.,
approved the SSMP applied for by Philjas under SSMP No. RZL-012,
allowing Philjas to extract and remove 50,000 metric tons of filling
materials from the area for a period of two (2) years from date of its
issue until September 6, 1996.[4]
Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3, 1999, a fact-finding
investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman through
its Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly filed an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
several officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
and the local government of Antipolo.
The charge against petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part
to monitor and inspect the development of Cherry Hills Subdivision,
which was assumed to be her duty as DENR senior environmental
management specialist assigned in the province of Rizal.
For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not
conducted, claiming that she monitored the development of Cherry
Hills Subdivision as evidenced by three (3) monitoring reports dated
March 12, 1994, August 10, 1994 and August 23, 1995. She averred
that she also conducted subsequent compliance monitoring of the
terms and conditions of Philjas Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) on May 19, 1997 and noted no violation thereon. She further
claimed good faith and exercise of due diligence, insisting that the
tragedy was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse did not
occur in Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent mountain eastern side of the
subdivision.

On November 15, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a

decision imposing upon petitioner the supreme penalty of dismissal
from office for gross neglect of duty finding:
RESPONDENT BALICAS
Records show that she monitored and inspected the CHS [Cherry Hills
Subdivision] only thrice (3), to wit:
1. Inspection Report dated 12 March 1994
2. Monitoring Report dated 10 August 1994
3. Monitoring Report dated 23 August 1995
Verily, with this scant frequency, how can respondent Balicas
sweepingly claim that there was no violation of ECC compliance and
that she had done what is necessary in accordance with the regular
performance of her duties. She herself recognized the fact that the
collapsed area is not the subdivision in question but the adjacent
mountain eastern side of the CHS. It is incumbent upon her to
establish the same in her monitoring and inspection reports and make
objective recommendations re: its possible adverse effect to the
environment and to the residents of the CHS and nearby areas. Her
defense that the position of the CHS shows the impossibility of
checking the would-be adverse effect clearly established her
incompetence. No expert mind is needed to know that mountains
cause landslide and erosion. Cherry Hills Subdivision is a living witness
to this.[5]
Petitioner seasonably filed a petition for review of the Ombudsmans
decision with the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated August 25,
2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and
affirmed the appealed decision. It found that the landslide was a
preventable occurrence and that petitioner was guilty of gross
negligence in failing to closely monitor Philjas compliance with the
conditions of the ECC given the known inherent instability of the
ground where the subdivision was developed. The appellate court
likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution
dated November 13, 2000.
Petitioner now comes to this Court for review on certiorari, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, of the appellate courts decision. She
alleges that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in
affirming the Ombudsmans conclusion that:
1 There was gross negligence on the part of petitioner
Balicas in the performance of her official duties as Senior
Environmental Management Specialist (SEMS) of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
Province of Rizal, DENR Region IV; and the alleged gross
neglect of duty of petitioner warranted the imposition of the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
2. The landslide which caused the death of several residents
of the subdivision and the destruction of property is not a
fortuitous event and therefore preventible.[6]
ISSUES: WON the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in:
(1) holding petitioner guilty of gross neglect of duty and (2) imposing
upon her the extreme penalty of dismissal from office.
HELD: In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we
have
to
look
at
the
lawfully
prescribed
duties
of
petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations are silent on the specific
duties of a senior environmental management specialist. Internal
regulations merely speak of the functions of the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner directly
reports.
Nonetheless, petitioner relies on a letter [7] dated December 13, 1999
from the chief of personnel, DENR Region IV, which defines the duties
of a senior environmental management specialist as follows:
1. Conducts investigation of pollution sources or complaints;
2. Review[s] plans and specifications of proposes (sic) or
existing treatment plants and pollution abatement structures
and devices to determine their efficiency and suitability for
the kind of pollutants to be removed and to recommend
issuance or denial of permits;
3. Conducts follow-up inspection of construction of pollution
abatement/work and structures to oversee compliance with
approved plans and specifications;
4. Recommends remedial measures for the prevention,
abatement and control of pollution;
5. Prepares technical reports on pollution investigation and
related activities; and
6. Performs related work as assigned.
It is readily apparent that no monitoring duty whatsoever is mentioned
in the said letter. The PENRO, on the other hand, is mandated to:
1. conduct surveillance and inspection of pollution sources
and control facilities and undertake/initiate measures relative

to pollution-related complaints of the general public for

appropriate referral to the regional office;
2. comment on the project description, determine if the
project fall within the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
System[8] and submit the same to the regional office; and
3. implement
programs
and
projects
related
to
environmental management within the PENRO.[9]
In addition, the PENRO is likewise tasked to monitor the project
proponents compliance with the conditions stipulated in the ECC, with
support from the DENR regional office and the Environmental
Management Bureau.[10] The primary purpose of compliance monitoring
is to ensure the judicious implementation of sound and standard
environmental quality during the development stage of a particular
project.Specifically, it aims to:
1. monitor project compliance with the conditions set in the
ECC;
2. monitor compliance with the Environmental Management
Plan (EMP) and applicable laws, rules and regulations; and
3. provide a basis for timely decision-making and effective
planning and management of environmental measures
through the monitoring of actual project impacts vis--vis
predicted impacts in the EIS.[11]
Based on the foregoing, the monitoring duties of the PENRO mainly
deal with broad environmental concerns, particularly pollution
abatement. This general monitoring duty is applicable to all types of
physical developments that may adversely impact on the environment,
whether housing projects, industrial sites, recreational facilities, or
scientific undertakings.
However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed on the HLURB as
the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. It is
mandated to encourage greater private sector participation in low-cost
housing through (1) liberalization of development standards, (2)
simplification of regulations and (3) decentralization of approvals for
permits and licenses.[12]
P.D. No. 1586[13] prescribes the following duties on the HLURB (then
Ministry of Human Settlements) in connection with environmentally
critical projects requiring an ECC:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas
and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative
or upon recommendation of the National Environment Protection
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or
areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership
or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said
critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation
reorganize
such
government
offices,
agencies,
institutions,
corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
In the related case of Principe v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau,
[14]
this Court found Antonio Principe, regional executive director for
DENR Region IV who approved Philjas application for ECC, not liable for
gross neglect of duty. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and thereby annulled the decision of the Ombudsman in OMBADM-09-661, dated December 1, 1999, dismissing Principe from the
government service. We ordered his reinstatement with back pay and
without loss of seniority.
The rationale for our decision
in Principe bears reiteration: the responsibility of monitoring housing
and land development projects is not lodged with the DENR, but with
the HLURB as the sole regulatory body for housing and land
development. Thus, we must stress that we find no legal basis to hold
petitioner, who is an officer of DENR, liable for gross neglect of the
duty pertaining to another agency, the HLURB. It was grave error for
the appellate court to sustain the Ombudsmans ruling that she should
be dismissed from the service. The reinstatement of petitioner is
clearly called for.
OTADAN VS. RIO TUBA
FACTS: Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 26,
2004 filed by the petitioners of this Court's Resolution dated February
23, 2004 denying their petition for review on certiorari for late filing,
the Court resolved to DENY WITH FINALITY said motion for lack of
merit. It is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal has the effect of
rendering the judgment final and executory. Moreover, the petitioners
mainly assail the Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75014 finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) when he issued the Environmental

Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. 0201-021-313 to the respondent Rio
Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation for its Hydrometallurgical Processing
Plant in Barangay Rio Tuba, Municipality of Bataraza, Palawan. The
issuance of the ECC is an exercise by the Secretary of the DENR of his
quasi-judicial functions.
HELD: This Court has consistently held that the courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the
government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special and technical training and knowledge of such
agency. It has also been held that the exercise of administrative
discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged
by the government agency concerned, and not by the courts. This
Court has likewise consistently adhered to the principle that factual
findings of quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality and are binding even upon
the Supreme Court if they are supported by substantial
evidence. Further, administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in
the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of its adjudicative
functions. This latitude includes the authority to take judicial notice of
facts within its special competence. The petitioners failed to present
compelling reasons to warrant the deviation by this Court from the
foregoing salutary principles.
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK VS. LANZANAS
FACTS: On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G.
Principe (RED Principe) of Region IV, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary
mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro,
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto
Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding
ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. The mooring facility would
serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCORs power barge, which,
due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4
megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for
the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a
land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the
mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of
issuance or until 30 June 1999. Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks
from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the
ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners plea on 15
July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC
and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of
the mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1)
NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for
Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric
Cooperative (ORMECO), which is engaged in the distribution of
electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto Galera.
Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as
additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro
represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia.Petitioners further
prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had
already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial
court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the
construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the
same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCORs manifestation that the
provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking
the construction of the mooring facility.
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO
and the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the
complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without
cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no
jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental
Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need
to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of
the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605,
[8]
Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,[9] and the provisions of
DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO 96-37) on the
documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the
implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms. In its

order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and
dismissed petitioners complaint.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint
for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: The Ruling of the Court: The petition has no merit.
Presidential Decree No. 1605 (PD No. 1605),[23] as amended by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically
threatened zone the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay
as protected by Medio Island. This decree provides in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
construction of marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial
structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial
docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of
its mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and coastline by
large barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of
destruction by other human activities are hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants
and other commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued
without prior approval of the Office of the President upon the
recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis
supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of Puerto Galera
Bay as protected by Medio Island,[24] PD No. 1605 does not apply to this
case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of the
enclosed coves of Puerto Galera [25]and thus protected under PD No.
1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have
first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use
the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply 14.4
megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro,
including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a
government-owned public infrastructure intended to serve a basic
need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a
commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or
commercial docking as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No.
1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No. 1605
which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas,
hotels and restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code
to emphasize the legislative concern for the maintenance of a sound
ecology and clean environment.[26] These provisions require every
national government agency or government-owned and controlled
corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit
concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before
implementing any project or program that may cause pollution,
climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of
cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant
species. Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance
of EcologicalBalance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or
government-owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in
the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction
of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
non-governmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact
upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or
ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall
be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Section x x x 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall
not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided,
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[27] the Court interpreted these provisions in this
manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26
thereof x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be
interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among
those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may
cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause

the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop

land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or
plant species; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where
these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as
petitioners admit,[28] the mooring facility itself is not environmentally
critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects
mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring
facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at
issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the
operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the
construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power
barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and
27 of RA No. 7160.
TECH. DEV. INC VS. CA
FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated
February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N.
Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's
plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The
letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring
with him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following:
a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of
Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other
document.
At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner,
through its representative, undertook to comply with respondent's
request for the production of the required documents. In compliance
with said undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region IIIDepartment of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
Permit," although among the permits previously secured prior to the
operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate
Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution
Control Commission (now Environmental Management Bureau) and
is now at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is
trying to determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be
installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's
permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure the same but were not entertained.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon
petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's
station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant,
thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation. Left with no
recourse,
petitioner
instituted
an
action
for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent with the court a quo which is presided by the respondent
judge. In its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, it alleged therein that the closure order was
issued in grave abuse of discretion. During the hearing of the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
April 14, 1989, herein parties adduced their respective evidences.
The respondent judge, April 19, 1989, found that petitioner is
entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, hence, it ordered as follows:
In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner's posting of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 to answer for such damages that respondents
may sustain should petitioner eventually be found not entitled to the
injunctive relief hereby issued, let a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION issue ordering the respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and
other person acting in his behalf and stead to immediately revoke
his closure order dated April 6, 1989, and allow petitioner to resume
its normal business operations until after the instant case shall have
been adjudicated on the merits without prejudice to the inherent
power of the court to alter, modify or even revoke this order at any

given time. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued

on April 28, 1989, upon petitioner's posting a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration
dated May 3, 1989. Said motion for reconsideration was heard on
May 30, 1989.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against
the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by
petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the
matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the
environment that requires control if not prohibition of the
operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then
National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police
power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate
measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of
the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the
attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its
plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality
but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that
petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders
and it was required to bring the following:
(1) Building permit;
(2) Mayor's permit; and
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Anti-Pollution permit. 3
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the
complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan,
directed
to
the
Provincial
Governor
through
channels.4The alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures in
the four-page petition were written by one person, 5 appears to be
true in some instances, (particularly as among members of the
same family), but on the whole the many signatures appear to be
written by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain
of said barrio that he has not received any complaint on the
matter 6 must be because the complaint was sent directly to the
Governor through the Acting Mayor.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of
December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant
of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no
proper air pollution device has been installed.7
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the
municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit
issued by an official of Makati on March 6,1987. 8
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to
operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on
December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,
1988.9 Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate
its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution
and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the
community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction by the trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld
the action of the lower court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge
investment in this dollar-earning industry.1wphi1 It must be stressed
however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and
contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people,
from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.