Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Redlich J
[1] I have before me an application made pursuant to s21 of the Confiscation Act 1997 ("the Act") by the
accused, John William Sypott, that certain property in which he has an interest be excluded from the
operation of restraining orders made by the Supreme Court at Melbourne on 30 January 2002 and 9 April
2002 respectively.
[2] The accused is charged on one count of murder in that at Hamilton in the State of Victoria on 8
December 2001 he murdered Frances Margaret Rook.
[3] On 30 January 2002, approximately one month after the accused had been charged with this offence, an
ex parte application was made by the Director of Public Prosecutions to the Supreme Court for a restraining
order in respect of property at Glenelg Highway, Coleraine, in the said State in which the accused had an
interest. That application was made pursuant to s16 of the Act.
[4] On that day, Habersberger J ordered that the accused be restrained, whether by himself or by his
servants or agents or otherwise, from disposing of or in any other way dealing with the said property. His
Honour further declared that, pursuant to s15(3)(a) of the Act, the aforementioned property be restrained in
order that it will be available to satisfy any compensation order that may be made under the Sentencing Act
1991.
[5] On 9 April 2002 a further ex parte application was made to this Court by the Director of Public
Prosecutions, again under s16 of the Act, seeking a restraining order in respect of the Challenger Managed
Investments Ltd/Howard Mortgage Trust Account No SC064 in the name of Peter James Sypott and in which
the accused had an interest. Beach J ordered that pursuant to s18 of the Act, the accused and Peter James
Sypott be restrained by themselves or their servants or agents or otherwise from disposing of or in any other
way dealing with the said fund. Peter James Sypott is the accused's brother and was a joint beneficiary
under the account.
[6] The Court further declared pursuant to s15(3)(a) of the Act that the aforementioned property be
restrained in order that it will be available to satisfy any compensation order that may be made under the
Sentencing Act 1991. Liberty to apply on reasonable written notice was given to the applicant.
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[7] I observe from the transcript of the proceedings before Habersberger J that his Honour contemplated that
Mr Sypott could make application to the Court if he wished to have the order that his Honour had pronounced
on 30 January 2002 varied or to have part of the property the subject of the order excluded from the order.
[8] Mr Gray, who appears on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions on this application, has submitted
that, by virtue of s14(5) of the Act the Court has no jurisdiction to accede to the application now made on
behalf of the accused. S14(5) reads:
"A court, in making a restraining order, must not provide for the payment of legal expenses in respect of any
legal proceeding, whether criminal or civil, and whether in respect of a charge to which the restraining order
relates or otherwise."
[9] It is therefore necessary to briefly refer to some of the provisions of the Act. S16 provides that the
Director of Public Prosecutions may apply for a restraining order where a person has been charged with one
of the categories of offences referred to therein. One category of offences is a forfeiture offence. Schedule 1
to the Act contains a list of forfeiture offences. The first category of forfeiture offences are indictable offences
against the law of Victoria.
[10] A restraining order is defined in s1 of the Act as meaning an order made under s18. The relevant part of
s18, for the purposes of the present case, provides that a court must make a restraining order if the court is
satisfied that the defendant has been charged with a forfeiture offence and considers that there are
reasonable grounds for making the order and is satisfied if the order is being sought for a purpose referred to
in s15(1)(e) of the Act that an order of the court under the Sentencing Act 1991, if made, is likely to exceed
$10,000.
[11] The orders made by Habersberger J and Beach J were made to ensure that the property would be
available to satisfy any compensation order made pursuant to the Sentencing Act 1991 in the event that the
accused was convicted of the charge which he is facing.
[12] S14 of the Act, in subs(1), explains with precision what a restraining order is:
"A restraining order is an order that no property or interest in property, that is property or an interest to which
the order applies, is to be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person except in the manner and
circumstances (if any) specified in the order."
[13] It can be seen from the provisions of the Act that the term "restraining order" has a specific meaning.
[14] The application made by the accused is one made pursuant to s20 of the Act. The relevant portion of
s20 reads:
"(1) If a court makes a restraining order against property under s18, any person claiming an interest in the
property (including the defendant) may apply to that court for an order under s21, s22 or s24."
[15] S21 provides that:
"On an application made under s20, where the restraining order has been made in relation to a forfeiture
offence ... (a) if the court is satisfied that the property in which the applicant claims an interest (i) is not tainted property; and
(ii) will not be required to satisfy any purpose for which the restraining order was made
the court may make an order excluding the property from the operation of the restraining order; ..."
[16] Mr Gray, on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, submitted that by virtue of s14(5) no order
could be made pursuant to s21 of the Act as it was clear from the correspondence which had passed
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between the legal representatives of the accused and the Director of Public Prosecutions and from para16 of
the affidavit of Mr Noel John Kennedy sworn 21 February 2003 that the purpose for the present application
was to obtain the release of sufficient assets to provide for legal expenses which would ensure that he was
represented at his trial by counsel of his choice rather than by someone appointed by Victoria Legal Aid.
[17] I should also refer to s26 of the Act which provides that when a restraining order has been made, the
court may at a later time make such orders in relation to the property to which the restraining order relates as
it considers just.
[18] An order made pursuant to s20, s21 or s26 is not a restraining order and the prohibition contained within
s14(5) is not repeated in s20, s21 or s26 of the Act nor do I see any basis for its implication in any of these
provisions.
[19] Mr Gray referred me to s143 of the Act. This provision comes into operation where a restraining order
has been made and the accused as a result of the restraining order does not have sufficient assets that are
unencumbered to enable him to pay for the full cost of legal assistance from a private practitioner. In
circumstances where the accused cannot gain access to any of their assets pursuant to any provision of the
Act the court may make an order pursuant to s143 that Victoria Legal Aid provide legal assistance. In my
view s143 provides no assistance in determining the scope of the prohibition contained in s14(5) of the Act.
[20] Written submissions were furnished to the Court on behalf of the accused, which I have found helpful. In
those submissions reference was made to the decision of the South Australian Full Court in Director of
Public Prosecutions v Duggan.1 The South Australian legislation is markedly different to the Victorian Act as
the court is expressly empowered to make an order for payment of legal expenses out of restrained property.
The Full Court drew attention to the fundamental principle that a person accused of a crime is entitled to
employ out of his own resources the legal representation of his choice.2 The Full Court also referred to the
case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Vella3 and the judgment of Kirby P, as he then was, in Director of
Public Prosecutions v Saxon.4 I was also referred to the decision of Director of Public Prosecutions v King5
where O'Keefe J, after referring to s45 of the New South Wales Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989,
which is similar terms to s26 of the Victorian Act, observed:
"... The Act establishes a scheme for the making of orders depriving persons of rights of property, rights
which the law recognises and protects. As Kirby A-CJ pointed out in Director of Public Prosecutions v Logan
Park Investments Pty Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 118 at 125:
'... The right to own and to control property is an important civic right in a society such as ours. Indeed, it is
an attribute of economic liberty. The ownership of property is recognised in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Article 17 provides:
"17.1 Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
2 No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Although these provisions are not, as such, part of Australian municipal law, they reflect fundamental
principles of the law of civilised countries including principles upheld by the common law in Australia.'
Statutes providing for the forfeiture of property have conventionally been construed strictly: Murphy v Farmer
(1988) 165 CLR 19 at 27. Such an approach to their construction applies to such statutes generally and not
just to those provisions under which the ultimate forfeiture is made."
I adopt such an approach to the construction of this statute.
[21] Provisions such as s20 and s21 of the Act are not uncommon. These provisions provide relief against
forfeiture which has typically been regarded as being beneficial and protective of the rights of individuals.
Such provisions should not be construed narrowly.6
[22] I was informed that s14, s18, s20 and s21 of the Act have not been the subject of judicial consideration
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Gillard J in the decision of Whyte & Victorian Legal Aid v Office of Public Prosecutions9 was of the view, with
which I agree, that no application should be made to vary an existing restraining order without notice being
given to those who might be affected by an order varying the original order such as those parties who may
seek compensation under the Sentencing Act 1991.
[29] I will therefore hear argument as to how the matter should proceed in the light of those observations.
Order
Orders accordingly.
Counsel for the applicant: Mr D Ross with Mr K McGowan
Solicitors for the applicant: Melville, Orton & Lewis
Counsel for the Crown: Mr D Gray
Solicitors for the Crown: Kay Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions