Professional Documents
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Article
Journal 36
Multi-fractal Identification of
Sick Markets: The
LIBOR Scandal Case
Journal
The Capco Institute Journal of Financial Transformation
#36
02.2013
SECTION 2
Multi-fractal
Identification of
Sick Markets:
The LIBOR Scandal
Case
Sylvain Michael Prado Consultant, Capco
Ian Rawlinson Managing Principal, Capco
Abstract
Multi-fractal analysis is now widely used in medicine to distinguish healthy and pathological conditions (i.e., healthy
and cancerous tissues). We follow the same approach for
financial markets: fractal tools disclose hidden information
from time series and allow the identification of market abnormalities. Financial regulators can apply these tools to detect fraud and market manipulation. Here we use the LIBOR
scandal as an illustration.
We express our sincere gratitude to Espen A. F. Ihlen for making the Matlab
codes of the multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (MDFA) available.
The algorithms were implemented in Matlab R2012a using the codes from
http://www.ntnu.edu/inm/geri/software.
113
Price behaviors are not smooth they follow booms and busts in healthy
failure and a very high risk of sudden cardiac death, for instance, have
roughness and that the proper language of the theory of roughness in na-
ture and culture is fractal geometry [Mandelbrot (2005), 1]. In 1963, Mandelbrot already identified an erratic but regular pattern in cotton price.
Particular price changes cannot be forecasted but there are scale invari-
cies. While the DM/USD exchange rate had a multi-fractal signature, the
price curves remain the same [Mandelbrot (1963)].1 The cause may be
that even if there are many bits of information in the market at any given
smoother and lacking in sharp local peak. The explanation being that,
time, the price changes for individual transactions may depend solely on
even if the DM/USD market was much larger than JPY/USD, G3 central
bank interventions on the Japanese yen were twice the dollar value of the
(2010)], the fractal perspective highlights the inaccuracy and the dangers
Background
The LIBOR scandal could be the largest insider trader scandal of all time.
aHy(t/a)
presents
could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and then accepting interbank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 11:00 London
aHy(t/a)
is the time series rescaled on the x-axis by a factor a (tt/a) and on the
y-axis by a factor of aH (yaHy).
Financial institutions set their own rates according to the LIBOR in order
to price mortgages, credit, and derivatives products. More than $800 tril-
fraud and collusions by the banks involved in the rate submissions. Addi-
tionally to the manipulation of the euro and the Japanese yen LIBOR, the
cator of the roughness of the original time series: the larger the value of
FSA has identified that between January 2005 and May 2009, at least
173 requests for U.S. dollar LIBOR submissions were made to Barclays
2
3
4
In 1900, Louis Bachelier already proposed a statistical model with self similar properties:
the Brownian motion. Sadly, Bachelier (1900) went quite unnoticed at the time. Although the
Brownian does not have fat tails, it has fractal properties. Today the Brownian constitutes
a particular case (with an exponent of ) of the more general fractional Brownian motion
developed by Mandelbrot and van Ness (1968).
See Ihlen (2012) for a review of literature on medical applications.
http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/definitions
http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2012/07/16/libor-qa/
Until Jan 05
Jan 05-Jun 09
After Jun 09
q=0.1
0.681
0.720
0.645
q=1
0.607
0.571
0.710
q=1.5
0.578
0.409
0.728
A focus on the three-month U.S. dollar LIBOR form January 1986 to Sep-
q=2
0.552
0.285
0.718
tember 2012 highlights that interest rate behaviors have been fundamen-
q=2.5
0.528
0.202
0.694
q=3
0.505
0.144
0.667
from the creation of the U.S. LIBOR (P1: starting in January 1986) to the
q=4
0.462
0.070
0.620
period of falsification reported by the FSA (P2: May 2005 June 2009) and
q=5
0.427
0.025
0.585
the last period assumed free of fraud (P3: June 2009 September 2012).
Table 1
Although the rates were manipulated, irregularities from one period to another are not obvious through a direct view of the curve (Figure 1).
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Case A: H(q=2) is equal to 0.5; the series are white noises: the value
0.2
0.1
0.0
q=1
q=1.5
q=2
q=2.5
q=3
q=4
q=5
Figure 2
Jan 05-Jun 09
After Jun 09
0.3
Until Jan 05
0.4
Case E: H(q=2)>1: the correlations are not following a power law any-
Case B for period P1, meaning that, before the fraud period, the market
more.
used to react with few jerks and relatively quickly to new economic information. The fraud period P2 is dramatically different and contains Case
We apply the MDFA method to estimate the Hurst exponents. The clas-
10
P1
P2
5
P3
US LIBOR
0
/1
01
1
/1
/1
01
/0
01
/0
/0
01
01
/0
01
/0
01
01
/0
/0
01
/0
/0
01
01
/0
01
01
/9
/9
01
/9
/9
01
01
01
/9
/9
01
/9
01
/9
01
/9
01
01
/9
/8
01
/8
01
/8
/8
01
01
01
Figure 1
Kantelhardt et al. (2002) proposed the multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (MDFA) for
the identification of multi-fractal scaling properties. Ihlen (2012) extensively discusses its
application in medicine. The wavelets and partition functions (PF) are alternative methods
and they provide similar results. In finance, the sample sum formula and PF inspired from
thermodynamics are commonly used: Fisher et al. (1997) applied the PF to compare JPY/
USD and DM/USD. Wavelets and MDFA, however, are simpler to apply. In addition, the
MDFA is widely used in medicine and appeared more intuitive as well as closer to our
metaphor on the financial regulation to identify unhealthy markets.
The samples have more than 1,000 units, which is enough to obtain accurate results
[Katsev and LHeureux (2003)]. We controlled that the time series are scale invariant with a
linear regression (see Appendix) of the samples sizes and the parameter Fq of the MDFA
calculation as suggested by Ihlen (2012). Additional powerful tests can be applied [Clauset
et al. (2009)].
115
1.2
12
0.8
1.1
0.7
10
0.6
0.9
0.8
0.5
0.7
Until Jan 05
0.4
Jan 05-Jun 09
0.6
4
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.3
US LIBOR
Ht Trend
0.2
After Jun 09
0.3
0.1
1
/1
/1
01
/1
01
/0
/0
01
01
01
/0
01
/0
/0
01
/0
01
/0
01
/0
/0
01
01
/9
/0
01
01
/9
01
01
/9
/9
01
01
/9
/9
/9
01
01
/9
01
/9
/9
01
01
/8
01
01
/8
01
/8
/8
01
01
0.0
Figure 3
q=1
q=1.5
q=2
q=2.5
q=3
q=4
q=5
Figure 4
1.2
values of Table 1 in Figure 2 to illustrate the Hurst exponent curves for the
1.1
12
10
0.9
0.8
however, while the patterns are quite similar for P1 and P3 (on a different
0.7
0.6
the sickness of the second period. The high level of the curve for the
0.5
third period (P3) may reflect the growing incertitude in financial markets
0.4
US LIBOR
Ht Trend
0
1
/1
/1
01
/1
01
/0
/0
01
01
/0
/0
01
01
/0
01
01
/0
01
/0
/0
01
/0
01
/9
/0
01
01
/9
01
/9
01
/9
01
01
/9
01
/9
01
/9
/9
01
/9
/9
01
01
/8
/8
/8
/8
01
01
0.2
01
01
0.3
01
The calculation of local Hurst exponents (q=2) at each point [Ihlen (2012)]
Figure 5
reveals a positive trend for the last 30 years (Figure 3).8 The increasing
financial deregulations generating unstable markets could be an explanation of the long-term trend.
values of the time series. To control that our results are mainly related to
reshuffling, H(q=2) becomes very close to 0.5 (Table 2) and the time series
develop into white noises. These results in real life would reflect a market
large fluctuations but also to a broad probability density function for the
q=0.1
116
Until Jan 05
Jan 05-Jun 09
After Jun 09
0.532
0.609
0.931
q=1
0.506
0.573
0.694
q=1.5
0.493
0.544
0.588
q=2
0.481
0.506
0.505
q=2.5
0.469
0.458
0.442
q=3
0.458
0.407
0.393
q=4
0.437
0.316
0.323
q=5
0.419
0.251
0.276
Table 2
and P3: Figure 4),10 and the rising trend of local exponents disappears11
(Figure 5).
7
8
Conclusion
Appendix
We confirm the scale invariance of the series by checking that the re-
present direct fractal features which can be directly collected; the time
References
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
12 Multi-fractal studies usually include spectrum graphs. They did not provide, however,
additional insight on the LIBOR question. As a result our discussion was only around the
generalized Hurst exponents.
117
Guest Editor
Prof. Damiano Brigo, Head of the Mathematical Finance Research Group, Imperial College,
London
Advisory Editors
Cornel Bender, Partner, Capco
Christopher Hamilton, Partner, Capco
Nick Jackson, Partner, Capco
Editorial Board
Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania
Joe Anastasio, Partner, Capco
Philippe dArvisenet, Group Chief Economist, BNP Paribas
Rudi Bogni, former Chief Executive Officer, UBS Private Banking
Bruno Bonati, Strategic Consultant, Bruno Bonati Consulting
David Clark, NED on the board of financial institutions and a former senior
advisor to the FSA
Gry Daeninck, former CEO, Robeco
Stephen C. Daffron, Global Head, Operations, Institutional Trading & Investment
Banking, Morgan Stanley
Douglas W. Diamond, Merton H. Miller Distinguished Service Professor of Finance,
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Elroy Dimson, BGI Professor of Investment Management, London Business School
Nicholas Economides, Professor of Economics, Leonard N. Stern School of
Business, New York University
Michael Enthoven, Former Chief Executive Officer, NIBC Bank N.V.
Jos Luis Escriv, Group Chief Economist, Grupo BBVA
George Feiger, Executive Vice President and Head of Wealth Management,
Zions Bancorporation
Gregorio de Felice, Group Chief Economist, Banca Intesa
Hans Geiger, Professor of Banking, Swiss Banking Institute, University of Zurich
Peter Gomber, Full Professor, Chair of e-Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Wilfried Hauck, Chief Executive Officer, Allianz Dresdner Asset Management
International GmbH
Michael D. Hayford, Corporate Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, FIS
Pierre Hillion, de Picciotto Chaired Professor of Alternative Investments and
Shell Professor of Finance, INSEAD
Thomas Kloet, Chief Executive Officer, TMX Group Inc.
Mitchel Lenson, former Group Head of IT and Operations, Deutsche Bank Group
Donald A. Marchand, Professor of Strategy and Information Management,
IMD and Chairman and President of enterpriseIQ
Colin Mayer, Peter Moores Dean, Sad Business School, Oxford University
John Owen, Chief Operating Officer, Matrix Group
Steve Perry, Executive Vice President, Visa Europe
Derek Sach, Managing Director, Specialized Lending Services, The Royal Bank
of Scotland
ManMohan S. Sodhi, Professor in Operations & Supply Chain Management,
Cass Business School, City University London
John Taysom, Founder & Joint CEO, The Reuters Greenhouse Fund
Graham Vickery, Head of Information Economy Unit, OECD
Layout, production and coordination: Cypres Daniel Brandt, Kris Van de Vijver and
Pieter Vereertbrugghen
Graphic design: Buro Proper Bob Goor
Photographs: Buro Proper - Bob Goor
2013 The Capital Markets Company, N.V.
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