Professional Documents
Culture Documents
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
-FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief
Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all
the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio
members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having onehalf (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase,
however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the
Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were
made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would
have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house
of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the
principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the
JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.
Issue: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held: No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of
the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase,
a representative of Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the
JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC,
the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be
given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified
or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no
need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court
should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from
the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying
reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that
Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there
are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the
case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination
of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one
voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other
members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is
immediately executory.
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987]
Facts:
The petitioners who are duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over RTC
branches in the National Capital Judicial Region, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of
the SC, from making any deduction or withholding taxes from their salaries. They
submit that any tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provisions of Sec. 10, Art. VIII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the deduction of taxes from the compensation of the judicial officers
constitute a diminution of their salaries which is in turn a violation of the Constitution.
Resolution:
Salaries of Justices and Judges subject to income taxation and the ruling in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Endencia vs. David are hereby discarded.
The Court en banc had re-affirmed the Chief Justices directive as follows: RE:
Question of exemption from income taxation. - The Court re-affirmed the Chief Justices
previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this
Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of
Justices of the SC as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
The clear intent of the of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment in income tax to members of the judiciary, so
as to give substance to equality among the three branches of the government. The
salaries of the members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax
applied to all taxpayers.
The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject
to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of
such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
-SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ARE SUBJECT TO TAX. Besides,
construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased." (Emphasis
supplied).
It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they
are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those
appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must
be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and
should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
People vs. Gacott, Jr. [G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995]
Facts: Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a quo,
complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z.
Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated
April 26, 1995.
The decision of the court shall be recorded on the respondents personal record. Gacott filed a motion for reconsideration
that the case not be recorded on his personal record for doing so will foreclose any chance for him to aspire for promotion
in the judiciary in the future. Gacott contended as well that under Section 11, Article VII, administrative cases shall be
decided by Supreme Court en banc in disciplining a judge.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to administratively discipline
respondent judge.
Ruling: NOT ALL DISCIPLINARY ACTION PROCEEDINGS NEED TO BE HEARD EN BANC. At any rate, the very text
of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first
clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a
declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the
Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the
whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first
by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this
instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a
Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a
fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of
the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action
by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of
authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members.
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be
decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges
against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year
or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies
that:
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least
three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
That guideline or rule in the referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof rests on the same
rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with situations like the one subject of
this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.
The basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar are hereby DENIED.
conceded power of reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in
this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to
avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
Prudential Bank vs. Castro [A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988]
On November 16, 1984, respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Jose P.
Castro of Quezon City rendered a decision in Civil Case No. Q-42349,
entitled: "Macro Textile Mills Corporation vs. Prudential Bank and
Trust Co., et al.,"
Acting on the letter-appeal, dated June 6, 1988, filed on behalf of
respondent Judge by his children, seeking clarification of the Decision
of June 5, 1986, on whether or not the Order of this Court forfeiting
all of said Judge's retirement benefits and pay "exclude the monetary
value of his accumulated leave credits which he earned during his
thirty six (36) years of service in the government, the last eleven (11)
years of which were spent in the Judiciary," and praying that the same
be so excluded considering their need for funds for the continuing
medication of respondent Judge, now afflicted with liver cancer on its
terminal stage, the Court RESOLVED, out of humanitarian
considerations, and following the precedent in Cathay
"WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES:
" Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities. He may, however, enjoy all vacation and sick
leave benefits that he has earned during the period of his government
service. This decision is immediately executory."
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION
MUST CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION THAT THE CASE HAS
BEEN REACHED IN CONSULTATION DOES NOT APPLY TO
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES.
The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of
the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice
that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of
the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to
decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very
beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases
have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a
certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by
their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the
collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok,"
cited in the Petition, is but an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that
the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after
consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that.
Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a
whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be
assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is
obviously not required.
Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA [G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992]
FACTS: The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground
that it violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8
Section
14
of
the
Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision
and does not clearly and
distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners co
mplain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their
21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement
that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the
derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for
the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of
Appeals.
January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of
P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and
to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels
of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the
supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July
11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original
date
for
the
auction
was
changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court
a quo while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the
rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts decision is unconstitutional
HELD: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10,
for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986,
conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the
Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with
law.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST
STATE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT IS BASED IS AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE
PROCESS.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached
and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
In one case, this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a
decision rife with irrelevant details, castigated the trial judge for his
"extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without much substance
must be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is
also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal
decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the
factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and,
having done so, ends.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE
EXEMPTED FROM THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT.
It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision
does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for
postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions
on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental
matters."
As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already
observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute
resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a
case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are
factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported
by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case
and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution
denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the
legal basis.
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the
time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or
minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on
its evaluation of a case.
DISMISSAL ON LACK OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS
BASED, BUT WHEN DISMISSAL IS COUPLED WITH OTHER
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA [G.R. No. 114323, July 23,
1998]
FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment
rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner,
against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and
controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.
The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted
from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well
cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite
petitioners several demands. The petitioner then informed the private
respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration
shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in
favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the
petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of
the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the
respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to
the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the
petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay
the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned
judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action.
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court
concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court
could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the
contract.
RULING: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the
After trial on the merits before which the Antes were declared in default, a decision was rendered by the trial court on April
9, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed as against defendants Vierneses, and defendants Antes are hereby
ordered to pay to plaintiff, as prayed for in their complaint, as follows:
Defendant Antes are hereby ordered to pay actual damages in the amount of P250,000.00 to plaintiffs.
Defendants Antes are hereby ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00.
Defendants Antes, are hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied therewith the Valdezes interposed an appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on September 12, 1988, affirming in toto the appealed decision, with costs against the appellants.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Valdezes ------------An examination of the decision of the trial court dated April 9, 1986 shows that there are no findings of facts to serve as
basis for its conclusions. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates as follows:
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also provides clearly as follows:
Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by
him, and filed with the clerk of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is the reason why this Court, through Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988, reminded all judges "to
make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the
evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced."
Of course, when a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court is denied due course, or is
otherwise denied, it is not necessary that such findings of facts be made. However, the denial must state the legal basis
thereof.
In the present case, the three-paged decision of the trial court contained in the first two pages a statement of the
allegations of the pleadings of the parties and enumerates the witnesses presented and the exhibits marked during the
trial. Thereafter, the trial court arrived at the following conclusion:
After considering the evidence on record, this Court finds that plaintiff have failed to prove their case as against
defendant Felicidad Viernes, but proved their case against defaulted defendants Antes. The Court finds that there is no
sufficient proof of knowledge or bad faith on the part of defendant Vierneses, and on the basis of existing
jurisprudence, a third person who in good faith purchases and registers a property cannot be deprived of his title as
against plaintiff who had previously purchased same property but failed to register the same
THE DECISION SHOULD NOT ONLY MAKE A CONCLUSION OF LAW, BUT SHOULD STATE THE FACTS AND THE
APPLICATION OF THE LAW. This is not what is contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules as a clear and
distinct statement of the facts on the basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing one-paragraph statement
constitute a mere conclusion of facts and of law arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the
basis thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact therein that petitioners had not registered the sale to them is traversed by the
records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered the sale to them. The court statement in the decision
that a party has proven his case while the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and
the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated.
Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed decision. It merely adopted the alleged
findings of facts of the trial court. Although it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in favor of respondent
Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance with the mandate aforestated.
As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is
predicated. This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the
lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case, the Court has to wade through the
records and make its own findings of facts, rather than further delay the disposition of the case by remanding the records
for further proceedings.
Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 127682, April 24,
1998]
Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner
and denominated as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of September 10, 1997. This
resolution does not in the least depart from or enervate the specific
prohibition against second motions for reconsideration [1] Which are
applicable thereto. Considering however, the increasing practice by
defeated parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for their debacle
instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is
constrained to once again express its displeasure against such unethical
disregard of the canons for responsible advocacy, with the warning that
this insidious pattern of professional misconduct shall not hereafter be
allowed to pass with impunity.
Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors
and irregularities in the disposition of this case to both the Court of
Appeals and this Court, with particular allusions amounting to misconduct
on the part of counsel for respondent private corporation and with specific
imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection therewith.
These will hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this Court and
the vigorous disclaimer of counsel for said private respondent.
Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its
petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent
Court of Appeals[2] was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show
that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned
judgment.[3] This was arrived at after due consideration by the Second
Division of this Court of the merits of the challenged decision and the
extended resolution of respondent court denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present petition
for review on certiorari, the joint comment of respondents, the reply of
petitioner, and the joint rejoinder of respondents, as well as the respective
annexes of said pleadings. Indeed, the parties had all the opportunity to
expound on and dissect the issues in this case, and in some instances even
the non-issues, through the liberal admission by this Court of such
pleadings.
Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court
required respondents to comment thereon, after which petitioners reply
filed without leave was nonetheless admitted, and to which, on leave
sought and granted, respondents filed a joint rejoinder. All these pleadings,
just like those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were so extensive, to
the point of even incorporating new and modified issues, as to cover all
possible aspects of the case to subserve the partisan views of the parties.
Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant
the reconsideration sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on
January 26, 1998.[4]
It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the
parties should further have been allowed to file memoranda, an obvious
ploy to justify a resolution giving due course to its petition, while
simultaneously insinuating that its pleadings were not read. Indeed,
petitioner would even dictate how this Court should have acted on its
petition, with the improbable theory that because the case had progressed
to the rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due course and a decision
be rendered thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably
erroneous submission that since respondent court reversed the decision of
the court a quo, this Court is duty bound to determine the facts involved.
Firstly, this is a deliberate misstatement of our jurisprudence which merely
holds that, in such a case, this Court may at its option review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals instead of being bound thereby. Secondly,
and worse for petitioner, there is no conflict in the factual findings of the
two lower courts as the Court of Appeals actually adopted the findings of
fact of the trial court.
In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different
tack by lecturing this Court on its theory that the minute resolutions it
assails are supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present
Constitution. In characteristic fashion, it insinuates that such procedure
adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional violation and can be
subject of impeachment proceedings. Petitioner is, of course, free to
believe and act as it pleases just as this Court may likewise be minded to
take the appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all
and sundry to now imbibe the consistent doctrines laid down by this Court.
MINUTE RESOLUTIONS. As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al, it has been stressed that these "resolutions" are not "decisions"
within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers
have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial since,
for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals' decision.
This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al., and further clarified in Munal
vs. Commission on Audit, et al. that the constitutional mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and
after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor
stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on
a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised "are factual or there is no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that
prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have
been complied with in this case.
Dissenting Opinion (Justice Aquino):
It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered
in the name of Daniel Cruz. The registration in his name is not proper
because he did not intervene in the land registration proceeding; he did
not defray the expenses thereof, and he has not paid to Generoso Mendoza,
or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6,000 as the price of the parcel of
land.
-MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND LAW.
That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration
objecting to our dismissing the petition through a minute resolution. It is
his contention that there should be an extended decision. As noted at the
outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision requiring a decision
by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, what is
expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why
either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established.
Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy
the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular
judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no
sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being
considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs."
What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in
the early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the decision
spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the
proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon
which its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v.
Henares, the above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following: "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as
another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement
of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on
Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been
held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the trial
court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar."
FOR
THE
VALIDITY
OF
MEMORANDUM
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the
following requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower
court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged
decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it
must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In
other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P.
Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law
of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part
of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no
study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was
merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on
which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course,
also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with,
comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum
decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for
judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are
no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be
employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases,
where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the
time needed to dismiss it.