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Fugro-McClelland
ABSTNACT
This paper reviews the methode generally used
by oil companies to determine the conductor eetting
depth required to avoid hydrofracture of cohesive
soils during drilling for the first casing string.
Traditional approaches are compared with an approach
developed by the authors, and the results of each
method are compared with teat data obtained during
geotechnical site investigations offshore.
A case
history is presented which showe the effect of the
authors deeign method on the required conductor
setting depth, and indicates the considerable possible cost savings and safety benefits available from
effective conductor design.
INTRODUCTION
The advancement of any kind of borehole ie
dependent on the cuttinge being continually cleared
from the bit face.
This is usually achieved by
direct circulation drilling, circulating fluid to
the bit through the drillstring with the returning
fluid and cuttinge passing up the annulus between
the drillstring and the borehole or casing. If the
marine casing is not set deep enough, the pressure
of the drilling fluid may lead to formation breakdown and loss of circulation. Apart from difficulties in then advancing the borehole, this may also
result in not being able to monitor and control
shallow gas effectively.
Formation breakdown can
also lead to wash out and lees of support for the
foundation of a structure.
Correct assessment of
the required conductor setting depth may therefore
have not only economic but also safety implications
for the well-drilling operation.
One poesible method of determining required
setting depth is to perform hydraulic fracture
testing (HFTs) in the field.
This may however
References
and illustrations
FIELD TESTS
During the geotechnical site investigations
performed for platforms in the North Sea hydraulic
fracture tests (HFTs) are often performed in order
to determine tin situ!! the fracture pressure which
causes formation breakdown at various depths below
mudline.
The test is most frequently performed in
hard clays using the type of apparatus preeented on
Fig. 1. The typical procedure for performing euch
tests in the North Sea is as follows:
1.
2.
at end of paper.
167
OTC 671:
3.
The packer is inflated to seal the test section, and a wireline dart is lowered to the bit
to measure pressure during the test.
4.
2.
The steady
rate.
3.
4.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
v
CY=
or
coefficient
at est
of
= ko.p + pt
o
... (3)
Au
= ko.p + pt/2
o
... (4)
= ko.p
o
(ko>l)
... (5)
(ko<l)
... (6)
2.
3.
a Poissons Ratio of 0.5 is sssumed for, cohesive soil under undrained loading.
Au
168
WC
6713
= 2,ko.p + uh + ptt
o
... (7)
or-u
p ,
o
.,.
(8)
2.Au - ko.po
...
(9)
Ur - IJC =
Uv-u
Au+p
-2,ko.p
... (lo)
kO.PO
Au = 2.au + po(2ko-1)
where
... (11)
. . .
(12)
... (13)
169
Whilst the above data is limited, the statistical correlations indicate that the shear failure
approach presented here is the more appropriate
method for calculating setting depth, From the data
analysed here, it is suggested that the excess
pressure calculated using the shear failure appreach should be divided by a factor of safety of
1.3 to give an allowable drilling fluid pressure for
assessing the required setting depth. This approach
should result in a greater than 95 per cent statistical confidence of avoiding hydrofracture. Records
from actual well-drilling operations and further in
situ HFT tests may allow this factor of safety to be
reduced with time.
CASE STUDY
The shear failure method described above has
been used in the establishment of setting depth for
the Draugen Field offshore Norway. A/S Norske Shell
is the operator for the field on behalf of their
to
partners Statoil and BP Norway, and proposed
install a concrete gravity base structure supporting
10 well slots with six producing platform wells and
some subsea wells. The conductor arrangement at the
gravity base structure is shown schematically on
Fig. 9.
The water depth at the Draugen platform
site is 252 metres, and the drilldeck is approximately 313 metres above mudline.
It is planned to
install the platform in the field during the summer
of 1993 with conductor setting starting a few days
after platform installation.
The soil investigation covering the upper 130
metres of the soil revealed clay layers with varying
shear strength.
The strength in the most critical
layers, i.e. between 50 and 150 metres below mudline, varies between 200kPa and 1200kPa as shown on
Fig. 10.
NO hydraulic fracture tests were performed, partly due to cobbles within the clay layers, which could have made the use of testing equipment very time consuming,
For the gravity base structure, analyses were
performed relating to the condition following installation of the structure. Following placement of the
GBS structure, the increase in the total horizontal
and vertical stresses beneath the structure were
calculated using elastic theory (Poulos and Davis
(1974)).
Equations 5 and 6 were then modified to
incorporate the increased stresses directly, and
equations 11 to 13 required modification ae follows:
AU=2.Su+p
+Ap
o
where
. . .
v
CONCLUSIONS
The data presented in this paper indicate that
the traditional minor principal stress method of
estimating conductor setting depth is generally
conservative, and may result in much deeper setting
depths for the conductor than are actually required
to avoid hydrofracture during drilling for the first
casing string.
The shear failure approach as
presented in this paper ia considered to give a more
realistic assessment of the actual required setting
depth, and ita use, in conjunction with an appropriate factor of safety, will often result in significant savings in the casing programme.
The use of the shear failure approach has led
to a saving of more than 50 metres on the Draugen
conductor design, and has avoided the need for a
more expensive installation method using thicker
wall conductors and heavier plant.
The shallower
setting depth has also eliminated the requirement
for special procedures to install the conductors
through a sand layer which would have presented a
significant increased risk of encountering shallow
gas.
APh
... (15)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
po(2ko-1) + 2.Aph
.... (16)
ko.p +
0
Au
2.su+
Apv
Aph
shown on Fig. 11, whereas the shear failure appreach indicated that a setting depth of only 70
metres below mudline would provide an acceptable
safety level of over 300kPa difference between the
calculated fracture pressure and the estimated mud
pressure.
This difference was equivalent to a
factor of safety of 1.39 on excess pressure, resulting in a greater than 97 per cent statistical confidence of avoiding hydrofracture. This probability,
in conjunction with the confidence given by the
apparent lack of hydrofracture during drilling
operations at the site, resulted in a 70 metre
penetration being considered an acceptable conductor
setting depth for this project.
(14)
Au
OTC 6713
----I [u
)TC 6713
10
A.LDRII!GE
ANI
SIGNAL
CABLE
F T DART
2.
3.
_SLllJING VALVE
FOR PACKER
4.
5.
6.
PRESSURE SENSOR
Overy,
R.F. and Dean, A.R. (1986), Hydraulic Fracture Testing of Cohesive soil.
Proc.
Offshore
Technolozv
Conference.
-.
Paper No. OTC 5226.
-OPEN
,,.iil
Fig.1
,,
1000
TJUF
Hydraulic FractureTestEquipment
RF
II
800
k
CLOSE UP
PRESSURE
I
i
STEAOY STATE
PREsSUBE
BIT
I
4
600
?w
uP
<
400
200
PUMP OFF - +
PUMP O Jb
PUMP OFF
o
0
12
TIME
16
AFTER
20
START
24
OF TEST
28
(rein)
171
32
36
40
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
I I I
,,l!!
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,,!!!
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,,
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1!:
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,,11,
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TOTAL STRESSESIN-SITU
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200
1,1, l,
i,lll,
0
,,!!
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i,
1 ~ 1, 1, 1, I
i,
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II II II II II
II
II II II II II
.
-1
IO
TOTAL
STRESSES
DURING
ORILLING
-200
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Fig.3
Hydrostatic,Mud-umand
InsituSoilStresses
Fig.4
Changes in TotalSoilStresses
DuetoDriUingOperations
(MPal
40
40
(MPa)
1-
I
60
60
I
I
Y\\
1
80
80
100
I
I
1
I
100
120
I
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120
140
I
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140
50
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o
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.
140
140
--
HFT RESULTS
MINOR PRINCIPAL
STRESS PREDICTION
SHEAR FAILURE PREDICTION
Fig.5
173
(B
RATIO
o
RATIO
MEASURED/CALCULATED
MEASURED/CALCULATED
3
40
-1
SD
[
60
MEAN
+1
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MEAN
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