You are asked to advise the US president on how to deal with Serb aggression in Kosovo.

The
failed coercive diplomacy regarding the same issue in Bosnia some years earlier is kept in
mind by all actors in Washington. What kind of strategy will you devise?

(The Kosovo crisis 1998)

Memorandum
To: President William Clinton of the United States of America
From: The Strategic Advisory Committee
Subject: Advisory memorandum on US options in the FRY/Kosovo conflict
Date: 18th October 1998

1. Executive summary
The conflict unfolding in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) province Kosovo is a
matter of utmost urgency. Massive human rights violations are being committed by Serb
paramilitary groups and the FRY army, and more than 300 000 Kosovar Albanians are
internally displaced, or have fled to neighbour states. President Slobodan Milosevic shows
limited willingness to pursue a peaceful solution. Views on how to solve the conflict differ
throughout the international community, but the committee recommends the US to take a lead
role in initiating a military humanitarian intervention. The prospects of resolving the conflict
through diplomatic means alone are not promising at present. A military intervention poses
significant challenges to both the US and NATO: violating international law, diplomatic costs
of alienating states who do not favour an intervention, unifying a currently fragmented NATO,
taking a balanced role whilst still stopping human rights violations and devising a political
strategy to ensure stability and peace. The advisory committee has based its strategy on a risk
analysis of an intervention contrary to letting events unfold.
Given the current situation, there are two options:
1) Further pursuit of a diplomatic solution.
Milosevic might yet show willingness to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis, as
shown through the Dayton accords of 1995. This however, does not appear highly
likely at present, and experiences with this strategy from Bosnia should be taken into
account. This option is relevant because European allies are not yet showing the
willingness to launch a military campaign.
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2) Military intervention, whether immediate or caused by the slightest provocation on

Milosevics part.
Forcing a state leader to the negotiating table would involve substantial risks and
challenges, but it might still be the favourable option if the alternative is to witness
another genocide a la Srebrenica. It would mean a humanitarian intervention, where
hard power is combined with efforts to prevent massive violations of human rights.
Such a military campaign must be combined with parallel diplomatic initiatives.
There are obvious implications of these options. NATO has never before used force against a
sovereign state that does not pose a threat to alliance members without a United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) mandate. Complications with regards to international law and
NATOs current and future legitimacy will likely arise, and must be weighed against the
humanitarian costs of letting the Kosovo crisis unfold without NATO involvement.
2. The non-intervention option:
European states fear the development of a secessionist war, where Kosovar Albanians
will demand a country of their own as happened with other republics of the former
Yugoslavia. The logic of self-determination for a former autonomous region based on
ethnicity raises concerns in Spain, with their own challenges with separatist movements in
Basque and Catalonia. Further, because US allies in Europe fear another violent conflict with
hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from Kosovo, they will not accept a military
intervention until all diplomatic alternatives are exhausted aligned with the UN Charter
logic.
Parallel to the threat of force, cooperation within the OSCE framework should be upheld. The
OSCE has become an important channel for communication after the Cold War, and one of
the few arenas outside the UN with a European focus where Russia, the US and Europe all
participate. The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was established on October 16th with the
aim of securing an international and impartial presence in Kosovo. The purpose is both to
report on what happens on the ground, as well as being a verified diplomatic tool of pressure
against continued Serb aggression in Kosovo. The agreement involves a partial withdrawal of
Serbian troops from Kosovo, and the deployment of 2000 unarmed OSCE monitor. The
mission is the result of negotiations between Mr. Milosevic, US envoy Richard Holbrooke and
European allies. It is possibility a last opportunity to avoid a military conflict involving NATO
and the US.
The committees advice to the President is to push the Europeans on the potential dangers of
withholding the use of force too long, and take a similar approach to what envoy Holbrooke
did in Bosnia. The current attempts of coercive diplomacy have so far been mostly futile;
there was no reaction from Mr. Milosevic after NATOs simulated air strikes near the Serb
border on October 12-13th. Threats have so far failed to be credible, as there is not yet
sufficient European political will to proceed with the use of force. NATO will soon lose
credibility if the alliance fails to react when demands are not met. The deadline set by
Assistant Secretary of State Julia Taft for reaching a solution before winter has already
passed.
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3. The military intervention option:

A major concern for alliance members is the violation of international law, which could
delegitimize not only the military intervention, but also NATO itself in the long run. It is
formally considered an act of aggression to violate the UN Charter, and respecting the
primacy of the UNSC is a fundamental part of the North Atlantic Treaty. A 16-member
alliance where several members are not even in favour of a military intervention cannot
legitimately act on behalf of the international community. An intervention without a UNSC
mandate carries the risk of alienating other UN member states in future situations where the
US may require extensive support outside NATO.
However, the advisory committee would not recommend the US seeking an explicit
authorization to intervene militarily in Kosovo from the UNSC. The outcome is already clear:
both Russia and China would veto such a proposition. Contrary to their occasional behaviour,
both states have a foreign policy of non-intervention. In addition, Russias historical close
relationship with Serbia would trumph humanitarian concerns. If NATO violates a vetoed
UNSC resolution (UNSCR), we expect international opposition to be stronger than if such a
proposal never was made. That being said, the committee advises extreme care in this
situation, as NATOs legitimacy would not benefit from establishing a pattern of violating
UNSC resolutions in the future.
Milosevic failure to observe a ceasefire constitutes a breach of UNSCR 1199. The President
could use the violations to justify a NATO intervention, as the resolution demands ending
crimes against civilians and considers such crimes a threat to international peace and
security.
Diplomatic costs of a military intervention must be taken into account. An unauthorized
use of force initiated by the US could cause frosty diplomatic relations with China and Russia,
with the risk to trade and investment this entails. Russia in particular will react negatively to
an intervention, given the mentioned historical relationship with Serbia, but also in fear of
encouraging separatist movements within its own borders.
A military intervention must be conducted by a unified NATO, but several member
states are sceptical towards the prospect of being dragged into a prolonged political
conflict. Yet, despite an unwillingness to intervene militarily at this stage, there is a strong
public opinion voicing experiences from Bosnia, and urging NATO to act sooner rather than
later. There is a widespread European perception that Mr. Milosevic is an unpredictable
dictator and a main architect of the wars that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
The committee advises the President to use telephone diplomacy in a discussion of NATOs
moral obligations to engage in an out of area operation. The President enjoys a high
standing in the eyes of Europeans, who constitute his key audience, not to mention broad
support from the Muslim population. We advise him to call the state leaders of France, Spain,
Germany, the United Kingdom, as well as Norway as they hold the chairmanship of the
OSCE. Telephone diplomacy might also contribute to easing some tensions towards
Americas main opponents: Russia and China. The President may want to let the Chinese
know of American intelligence indicating a strategic military communication link of the FRY
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located within the Chinese embassy compound, a gross violation of all diplomatic protocol
(These rumours have yet to be confirmed, the committee will consult the Central Intelligence
Agency for verification).
Another important aspect of a potential intervention, is to maintain a balanced approach. The
administrations envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, classified the Kosovo Liberation
Army as a terrorist group on his last visit to the area, a fact further underlined in UNSCR
1160. Several alliance members have also raised concern over the eminent drug trafficking by
Kosovars to generate funding for the KLA from Western Europe. To avoid becoming the
KLA Air Force, it is imperative that President Clinton makes it very clear that NATO will
not tolerate any terrorist actions or violations of international humanitarian law by any parties
to the conflict. This message is particularly important to convey to Russia.
To prevent future doctrines being established based on NATOs response to the crisis and
responding to criticism towards NATOs lack of involvement in past situations - it is
imperative that the President is very clear on the point that the Kosovo crisis is an exceptional
situation. He should specify that the US does not believe that the right to self-determination
should be granted to any nationalist group claiming a territory of its own. However, the
United States and its allies are committed to avoid a similar situation to what we witnessed in
Srebrenica.
A prerequisite for a military intervention is the expectation that it will bring success.
Success is defined as preventing further human rights violations being committed against
Kosovos civilian population, in addition to initiating a peaceful settlement between the
opposing parties. An intervention alone will not address the core problem, which is of a
political nature. A post-conflict strategy needs to be developed (see below). A predictable
scenario after launching an air campaign, will be complications related to providing
humanitarian aid, amplified by worsened weather conditions as winter approaches.
Alternatively, the conflict could fester and boil for years to come. Therefore, an external
military intervention might be a catalyst for ending the war swiftly and would not necessarily
be rendered a failure, despite a short-term worsening of ground conditions.
4. Advice on how to conduct an intervention
The President may insist on specific military proceedings, since the US provides over
of the NATOs military resources. The committee highly recommends using solely air power
for the time being. The high price paid for ground troops in Bosnia and Somalia is deeply
engraved in the minds of all NATO members, and an air campaign would minimize domestic
casualties. Moreover, it is likely the most effective strategy for this type of conflict: NATOs
aim is not to conquer territory, but to coerce Mr. Milosevic towards the negotiating table.
Using precision-guided weapons against Serb military targets should minimize collateral
damage, whilst causing enough harm to seriously undermine Mr. Milosevic military capacity.
However, by using air force only, NATO might risk inducing an intensified pursuit of Kosovar
Albanians by Serb paramilitary groups, who do not have the resources to counter an effective
NATO air operation.

Strategic theory from Clausewitz and the US experience in the Gulf War highlight the
importance of devising a political strategy to follow any military intervention. Not
removing Saddam Hussein in fear of whom might take his place in Iraq proved a wise
decision in 1991. However, letting Mr. Milosevic remain in charge in Kosovo is not an option.
The committee advises the Clinton administration to develop a comprehensive peacekeeping
package, including securing the rights and of the Serbian and Roma minorities. This requires
extensive collaboration with the United Nations after a military intervention. If failing in
providing foundations for a sustainable peaceful solution, NATO (and the US in particular, as
the initiator of the operation) will lose legitimacy and respect. A political strategy remains an
important element when the use of force is applied, but the responsibility here is perhaps
greater because force is being applied by a third party that doesnt naturally have a say over
the outcome of the struggle between two ethnic groups within another sovereign states
territory.
5. Conclusion
Considering the steady deterioration of the conflict in Kosovo, and taking into account
previous experiences from Bosnia, using force against Serbian targets may be the only viable
option. If the current situation deteriorates further, and the cost of military intervention is
deemed too high, the international community may face a new genocide equal to or even
surpassing that of Srebrenica. Hence, the advisory committee recommends that the
President initiate a NATO air campaign to end the atrocities following any acts of aggression
from Mr. Milosevic.
However, the committees advice to the President on the options presented is to give
diplomacy a last chance, for the sake of US relations with Europe and Russia. The President
can then authoritatively refer to the fact that he has been seriously committed to a non-violent
approach, while simultaneously preparing to launch a military campaign at short notice. A
UNSC mandate would be a great advantage, but will probably not go through. Yet, despite the
risk of violating international law, the US should have the support of not only Europe, but also
the entire Muslim world should they secure avoiding another Srebrenica.