Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Stephen M. Downes
Department of Philosophy
University of Utah
since 1984 not contained in his books Vaulting Ambition (1985) and The Lives to Come
(1996). The seventeen papers collected here were written over a nearly twenty year
period, published from 1984 to 2002. Kitcher’s papers tackle a huge range of topics: the
units of selection debate, genetic determinism, the species concept, functions, the
the papers present all the elements of Kitcher’s ambitious and wide ranging approach to
theorizing, the use of mathematical models to test the adequacy of biological hypotheses,
social philosophy and political activism. A further salient feature of Kitcher’s approach
is his defense of biology as a proper topic for philosophical inquiry. My hope is that this
plea now sounds dated but part of the reason that it does is a testament to Kitcher and his
science. The overall trajectory of Kitcher’s work over the last twenty years goes from
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generate social criticism. One hopes that this trajectory does not indicate that Kitcher is
Rather than dealing with each of Kicher’s contributions in this volume in turn, I focus
here on a selection of issues and themes that recur throughout the volume: biology and
general issues in philosophy of science, genes and genetics, biology of human behavior,
Philosophers of science have long hankered for answers to questions such as “What is a
adequate explanation?” Kitcher rightly points out that our answers to these questions up
until the 1970’s were constrained by an almost exclusive attention to a small section of
the physical sciences. In “1953 and All That…,” “Darwin’s Achievement,” and “Some
Puzzles About Species” Kitcher argues that our answers to standard philosophy of
science questions need to be modified in the attempt to account for practice in the
biological sciences.
In “Darwin’s Achievement” Kitcher’s main aim is to defend the view that the success of
Darwinian theory is best explained in terms of reasons and evidence rather than in terms
of social forces (contra some historians and sociologists of science). In doing this
Kitcher emphasizes that Darwin’s work is a proper object of study for philosophers of
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may allow them to account for scientific change in some areas – Newtonian dynamics to
Darwinian theory. Philosophers’ focus on certain areas of physics has led them to an
account of scientific practice that will not work across the board. Kitcher’s expanded
Armed with this account of scientific practice, one which owes something to Kuhn
The idea is that with a sufficiently generous account of what scientific practice consists in
we are able to satisfactorily account for a wide range of scientific work. While this
should seem fair enough to philosophers of science now, rather than those working in the
reveals something of a tension in Kitcher’s views about the nature of scientific practice.
In other papers in the volume, Kitcher promotes mathematical models as the benchmark
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for successful scientific theorizing (a topic I return to below). Darwin’s work contains
very little in the way of mathematical models and Kicher’s definition of scientific
definition than Kitcher’s that included a reference to mathematical models would do the
Versions of the semantic view of theories give prominence to mathematical models and
Kitcher does consider such views but rejects them as “no more adequate in characterizing
Darwin’s evolutionary theory” (92) than the hypothetico-deductivist view. But this move
reveals another problem. While it is true that Kitcher is focusing on Darwin in one of the
His point is to broaden the scope of philosophy of science to include theories like
Darwin’s as properly scientific and not to introduce a definition of scientific practice that
only applies to Darwinian evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory since the turn of the
twentieth century has relied heavily on mathematical models and an account of scientific
practice that gives an important place to those models is required to adequately capture
this kind of theorizing. Kitcher says that “perhaps a more refined version of the
‘semantic conception’ has the resources to overcome” (92) various problems but that he
prefers to start all over with his alternate definition of scientific practice. I think that
some kind of refined semantic view of scientific theories holds promise and this is in part
because of the prominent place given to mathematical models by semanticists. The trick
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to a refined semantic view is to acknowledge that not all scientific theories are collections
of mathematical models.
arguing that there are autonomous levels of biological explanation. In this vein he argued
that while molecular biology can inform work in developmental biology or evolutionary
biology, it does not and cannot provide complete or adequate explanations of phenomena
at these levels. Kitcher made the important observation that some form of ontological
One point that emerges from his work at this time is a somewhat robust concept of the
gene: roughly, genes are particular molecular structures, DNA sequences, that stand in
appropriate causal relations to other molecular structures, proteins and or other genes and
these genes have a location on chromosomes. Kitcher seems to be prepared to discuss the
distinctive causal roles of genes during this period. Somewhat later (and not in this
volume) he writes: “consider the thesis that the unit of selection is the gene. Doesn’t this
require some unambiguous general way of picking out genes? Not really” (1992, 130).
(1992, 131). So what of the earlier autonomous levels of explanation? In the view
presented in the introduction to this volume they seem to become various Darwinian
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styles of organization of the facts about birth, life and death and Kitcher says that “our
aware the developments in molecular biology have put stress on standard gene concepts,
including the one he held in his earlier work. Second, he is at pains to distinguish the
kind of pluralism advocated in the “Return of the Gene” (co-authored with Kim Sterelny)
from hierarchical views of the locus of selection. The pluralism Kitcher advocates is not
The radical pluralism espoused by Kitcher here fits with much of his work in philosophy
of biology but it does not seem to fit well with the staunch realist stance defended in The
Advancement of Science. Here Kitcher argues that realism provides crucial underpinning
for his account of scientific progress. It would be interesting to know whether Kitcher
has now decided in favor of instrumentalism over realism in the face of the unique
challenges presented by articulating coherent views of the nature of genes and their role
in the process of selection. If he has, it would seem that he would have to rework his
Kitcher’s pluralism, or his tolerance, has its limits. When he discusses work on genetic
determinism by Richard Lewontin, Susan Oyama and others in “Battling the Undead” he
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important parts of biology. Kitcher’s aim in this paper is to reject genetic determinism
from squarely within the interactionist consensus. He argues that Lewontin, Oyama and
developmental systems theorists such as Paul Griffiths and Russell Gray are mistaken in
thinking that the only way to defeat genetic determinism is to give up on the interactionist
consensus. The interactionist view is that organisms are a product of their genes and their
environment. Kitcher argues that interactionism provides us with plenty of tools for an
that we confront in understanding development but will not budge on the requirement for
this context, saying that nothing either Lewontin or Oyama (and their fellow travelers)
offer in the way of a new account of development can be put to work by aspiring
researchers. This is the move that indicates the limits of Kitcher’s pluralism, because
rather than encouraging the pursuit of new methodologies, or new metaphors, he simply
rights them off in advance as unworkable. Paul Griffiths (2002) responded to Kitcher
developmental psychobiology -- that are founded on exactly the Lewontin or Oyama style
reconceptualizations that Kitcher resists. I do not think that Kitcher would be satisfied
with this reply and I have a suspicion as to why: when Kitcher says that the Lewontin
approach or the Oyama approach “cannot be put to work,” perhaps he means “have not
yet been presented in the form of mathematical models.” If I am right about this
suspicion, Kitcher will not be impressed with Griffiths’ rebuttal, as the developmental
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and can be put to work by researchers in Kitcher’s sense of put to work: niche
construction (Oddling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 2003). This work takes off from
Lewontin’s suggestion that organisms and environments are in some kind of dialectical
processes.
Six of the papers in Kitcher’s book concern the biology of human behavior in one way or
another. One way to look at these papers is as outgrowths from different parts of
Vaulting Ambition. Since the 1980’s the biology of human behavior has expanded
behavior to critically engage only human sociobiology. Kitcher’s focus since Vaulting
Ambition has shifted with the development of new approaches in the biology of human
philosophy of biology which has seen a growth spurt since the publication of Sober and
Wilson’s work (1999), but he has expanded his range to include human behavioral
ecology (HBE) and evolutionary psychology (EP). Reading his critical discussion of
work in these two fields is revealing. Kitcher’s discussion of HBE echoes evolutionary
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There are a few key distinctions between the approaches of HBE and EP that are worth
mentioning to motivate the discussion that follows. HBE researchers focus on relations
between adaptive behavior and environmental conditions. Their concern is with how
draw upon data from human hunter-gatherer societies to test their models of adaptive
human behaviors. Crucially, HBE researchers avoid mention of the role of any internal
researchers share with HBE the view that human behaviors result from adaptation but
give a different account of the selective target. For HBE the focus is the inter-play
between behaviors and environments and for EP the focus is on the internal
psychological modules are adaptations and for HBE behaviors are adaptive.
Kitcher’s critical assessment of HBE includes the charge that a future adequate HBE
psychologists say just the same thing, except that they have a very specific view about the
To be fair to Kitcher, he has more liberal views than evolutionary psychologists about
what counts as a proximate causal mechanism but he does include desires, one of the
evolutionary psychologists’ staples. When Kitcher critically assesses EP (in a piece co-
authored with A. Leah Vickers) he argues that evolutionary psychologists do not develop
the kind of sophisticated mathematical models that would allow us to test their
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hypotheses with any kind of rigor. Here Kitcher sounds like human behavioral
ecologists, whose central criticism of EP is its failure to generate any testable hypotheses
about particular adaptations. Human behavioral ecologists argue that this failure stems in
part from the lack of mathematical models in EP (See Downes 2001 for more on this
discussion).
Kitcher is a proponent of some kind of future biology of human behavior and one of his
criticisms of HBE sharply reveals what he thinks this field should look like. Kitcher
argues that much of HBE lacks the scientific rigor of work on animal behavior. Work in
animal behavior boasts models of the relationship between animals’ behaviors and their
proximate mechanisms involved in the relevant behaviors. I agree with Kitcher that work
in animal behavior should help direct work in the biology of human behavior but it
should be noted that the study of animal behavior also takes place under the guidance of
are analogous to the disputes between human behavioral ecologists and evolutionary
psychologists. The best future biology of human behavior will emerge only after some of
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Towards the end of his highly formal paper on the contagion model of memetics Kitcher
asks “Why have I lavished so much time and formalism on these models?” His answer is
that in order to think clearly about the transmission of cultural items we need to have a
clear presentation of the kinematics of cultural transmission. The analogy Kitcher relies
Darwinian accounts of how trait frequencies change are hostage to the details of
population genetics. The same attitude ought to be standard in thinking about cultural
(229). I think a more general slogan could aptly characterize Kitcher’s critical attitude in
philosophy of biology and philosophy of science in general: “Do the math!” He sets a
high premium on spelling out mathematical models and is highly critical of those who do
not supply such models. Recall one of his criticisms of EP was that they fail to provide
Kitcher is accurate in locating the source of his attitude; it comes from an adherence to
collection Kitcher acknowledges a debt to Maynard Smith and in many places he echoes
Maynard Smith’s complaint: “Some sort of mathematical modeling has to be done here”
(Block and Cardew, 228). It is certainly true that on many occasions in science and in
precise and in some cases reveals them as non-starters. But this is not always the right
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despite its complete lack of mathematical models. There are times when mathematical
models can be revealing and there are times when a critical point can be sustained
without any appeal to the requirement for a prior mathematics. Consider Simpson et al.
The zoologist is not, and surely should not be, interested in reducing
his observations or theories to a purely numerical basis simply because
he likes numbers. His interest is not at all in formulas or digits, but in
animals. He is concerned with the anatomy, behavior, and relationships
of these animals; and he quite properly refuses to fit his studies into any
a priori framework, such as that of formal mathematics or statistics. If
in using such mathematical methods these zoological, nonmathematical
implications are lost sight of the zoologist will also lose sight of the
whole purpose of his work and will fall into futility or even absurdity,
although his arithmetic is perfectly correct. While urging and facilitating
the use of numerical methods, the authors have tried at every point to
guard against these grave dangers and to insist that the methods be used
zoologically, not by rote and not as mathematical abstractions (Simpson and Roe,
1939, vii-viii, quoted in Hagen 2003).
numerous other places in his papers, much useful work can be done in philosophy of
biology with some careful empirically informed conceptual analysis. For example,
work, in this volume and elsewhere, Kitcher has advocated the articulation of
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the sciences (See, for example, his work on social cognition (Kitcher 1993)). Examining
his practice reveals a more pluralistic attitude, including a tolerance for a bit of old
the papers concern Lewontin directly and the book is dedicated to Lewontin (and to the
memory of Stephen Jay Gould). Lewontin’s influence shows up most clearly in the
overtly political nature of much of Kitcher’s work. I am not arguing that Kitcher and
Lewontin’s politics are the same rather that they both see science as a social institution
that is influenced by prevailing social currents and with the power to radically change the
social and political order. Lewontin is more inclined to see science as inescapably driven
by predominant social forces (1992), and while Kitcher acknowledges this point, he is
more optimistic about the potential of science, particularly biology, as an agent of social
change for the good. When Kitcher singles out an example of bad science, he is not
concerned with sloppy data collection or even scientific fraud, his concern is with
scientific work that gives a biased representation of humanity or work that could
potentially lead to social injustice. This approach guides his examination of evolutionary
psychology, the biology of race, the human genome project and genetic determinism.
Kitcher’s earlier work on the human genome project -- for example, in “The Hegemony
of Molecular Biology” – focused on the biological pay-off of the human genome project
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and was driven by his concerns about reductionism. His later work on the human
genome project, including and since The Lives to Come, has been predominantly
concerned with issues of social justice. Kitcher moves into this domain via a response to
a specific kind of objection to the human genome project: the human genome project is a
new eugenics. He starts from the following claim: “Once we know how to identify the
genotypes of future people, eugenics is the only option. It is quite illusory to think that
eugenics that we ultimately practice can be utopian. This issue does not hang on the
science, it hangs on what kind of society we are and particularly how we use genetic
science to promote social justice. In Kitcher’s hands, the examination of the human
genome project forces us to “leave genetics far behind” and confront our social order. It
is for this reason that the believes that the human genome project has “done us an
important, and unexpected, service” (280). What Kitcher seems to be urging here (and in
other places in this volume) is the use of philosophical analysis of issues in biological
science to motivate a move away from philosophy of biology into political philosophy.
Concluding Remarks.
Even if one disagrees with many of Kitcher’s central claims, it is hard to deny that nearly
all these papers each contain enough interesting ideas to fuel an entirely respectable self-
standing research program. Reading these papers together in one volume drives home
just how impressive Kitcher’s contribution to our field is. This volume will undoubtedly
stimulate debate and provide fuel for new research programs in philosophy of biology.
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Colleagues in the humanities and social sciences often accuse philosophers of engaging
in redundant and socially disengaged disputes. Kitcher’s volume makes a good exhibit in
the defense of philosophy against such charges. I worry that if Kitcher concentrates more
on social criticism and political philosophy, he will have less time for philosophy of
biology. Social and political philosophy stands to gain and philosophy of biology stands
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References.
Downes, S.M.: 2001, ‘Some recent developments in evolutionary approaches to the study
of human behavior and cognition’, Biology and Philosophy 16, 575-595.
Griffiths, P. E.: 2002, ‘The Fearless Vampire Conservator: Phillip Kitcher and Genetic
Determinism’, Philosophy of Science Archive: http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000652/
Hagen, J.: 2003, ‘The Statistical Frame of Mind in Systematic Biology from
Quantitative Zoology to Biometry’, Journal of the History of Biology 36: 353–384.
Kitcher, P.: 1996, The Lives to Come, Simon and Schuster, New York.
Kitcher, P.: 1993, The Advancement of Science Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kitcher, P.: 1992, ‘Gene: Current Usages’ in E. Fox Keller and E.A. Lloyd (Eds.),
Keywords in Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp.
Sober, E. and Sloan Wilson, D.: 1999, Unto Others: The evolution and psychology of
unselfish behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
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