United States invasion of Afghanistan

(Redirected from U.S. invasion of Afghanistan)

The United States invasion of Afghanistan occurred in October 2001, in the wake of the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States, marking the beginning of its "War on Terrorism" campaign. Seeking to
oust the Taliban and find Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden, the Afghan Northern Alliance provided
the majority of forces, and the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, New Zealand, Italy, and
Germany provided support. The U.S. military name of the invasion was Operation Enduring Freedom1.

The officially-stated purpose of the invasion was to target al-Qaeda members, and to punish the Taliban
government in Afghanistan which had provided support and haven to al-Qaeda.

Contents

[hide]

• 1 Background
• 2 Military operations
o 2.1 Initial attack
o 2.2 Taliban retreat
 2.2.1 Initial air campaigns
 2.2.2 Land advances: Mazar-e-Sharif
 2.2.3 The fall of Kabul
 2.2.4 Consolidation: the taking of Konduz and Kandahar
 2.2.5 The Battle of Tora Bora: endgame deferred
o 2.3 Operation Anaconda
o 2.4 Post-Anaconda operations
o 2.5 Renewed Taliban insurgency
o 2.6 Psychological Warfare
• 3 Nature of the coalition
• 4 Civilian Casualties of the invasion
• 5 Diplomatic efforts
• 6 Humanitarian efforts
• 7 Human rights abuses
• 8 Protests, demonstrations and rallies
• 9 Disputable information and rumors
• 10 Slogans and terms
• 11 Timelines of U.S. attacks on Afghanistan
o 11.1 2001
o 11.2 2002

• 12 Footnotes

Background

Since approximately 1996, Osama bin Laden had been resident in Afghanistan along with other members
of al-Qaeda, operating terrorist training camps in a loose alliance with the Taliban. Following the 1998 U.S.
embassy bombings in Africa, the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles at these camps with limited
effect on their overall operations. After the September 11th attacks, investigators rapidly accumulated
evidence implicating bin Laden.
In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered an
ultimatum [1] to the Taliban, to:

• deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States

• release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens [2]
• protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in Afghanistan
• close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and "hand over every terrorist and every person and
their support structure to appropriate authorities".
• give the United States full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure

President Bush further stated that the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban
refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult
to Islam. But they made statements through their embassy in Pakistan. Their initial responses demanded
evidence of bin Laden's culpability in the September 11th attacks and included a proposal to try him in an
Islamic court. Later, as the likelihood of military action became more imminent, they offered to extradite
bin Laden to a neutral nation. Moderates within the Taliban allegedly met with American embassy officials
in Pakistan in mid-October to work out a way to convince Mullah Muhammed Omar to turn bin Laden over
to the U.S. and avoid its impending retaliation. President Bush rejected these offers made by the Taliban as
insincere.

The UN Security Council also issued a resolution on September 18, 2001 directed towards the Taliban
demanding that they hand over the terrorist Osama bin Laden and close all terrorist training camps
immediately and unconditionally. The council also referred to a resolution it adopted in December 2000
demanding that the Taliban turn over bin Laden to the United States or a third country for trial in the deadly
bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998.

Military operations

Initial attack

Prior to October 7, U.S. and British Special Forces clandestinely infiltrated Afghanistan to make contact
with the Northern Alliance to organize those forces to over throw the Taliban. There were explosions in
Kabul within a day of September 11, although these were minor rocket attacks by the Northern Alliance.

At approximately 16:30 UTC (12:30 EDT, 21:00 local time) on Sunday October 7, 2001, American and
British forces began an aerial bombing campaign targeting Taliban forces and al-Qaeda. Strikes were
reported in the capital, Kabul (where electricity supplies were severed), at the airport and military nerve-
centre of Kandahar (home of the Taliban's Supreme Leader Mullah Omar), and also in the city of Jalalabad
(military/terrorist training camps). The U.S. government justified these attacks as a response to the
September 11, 2001 attacks and the failure of the Taliban to meet any U.S. demands. The Taliban
condemned these attacks and called them an "attack on Islam."

At 17:00 UTC, Bush confirmed the strikes on national television and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair also
addressed the UK. Bush stated that at the same time as Taliban military and terrorists' training grounds
would be targeted, food, medicine, and supplies would be dropped to "the starving and suffering men,
women and children of Afghanistan." [3]. These drops came under criticism for having the same color as
the cluster bombs that the United States was using.

A number of different technologies were employed in the strike. Air Force general Richard Myers,
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that approximately 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles,
launched by British and U.S. submarines and ships, 15 strike aircraft from carriers and 25 bombers, such as
B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress and F-16 Fighting Falcon were involved in the first wave. Two
C-17 Globemaster transport jets were to deliver 37,500 daily rations by airdrop to refugees inside
Afghanistan on the first day of the attack.

A pre-recorded video tape of Osama bin Laden had been released before the attack in which he condemned
any attacks against Afghanistan. Al Jazeera, the Arabic satellite news channel, claimed that these tapes
were received shortly before the attack. In this recording bin Laden claimed that the United States would
fail in Afghanistan and then collapse, just as the Soviet Union did, and called for a war of Muslims, a jihad,
against the entire non-Muslim world.

Taliban retreat

Initial air campaigns

Bombers operating at high altitudes well out of range of anti-aircraft fire began bombarding al-Qaeda
training camps and Taliban air defenses. During the initial build-up before the actual attack, there had been
speculation in the media that the Taliban might try to use U.S.-built Stinger anti-air missiles that were the
bane of Soviet helicopters during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. If any of these missiles existed at the
time of the air campaign, they were never used and the U.S. never lost a single aircraft to enemy fire.
Beyond that, the Taliban had little to offer in the way of anti-aircraft weaponry, relying mostly on left-over
arms and weapons from the Soviet invasion. U.S. aircraft, including Apache helicopter gunships, operated
with impunity throughout the campaign, while cruise missiles pounded the country.

The strikes initially focused on the area in and around the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Within
a few days, most al-Qaeda training sites had been severely damaged and the Taliban's air defenses had been
destroyed. The campaign then focused on communications and "command and control". The Taliban began
losing the ability to coordinate, and their morale began to sink. But the line facing the Northern Alliance
held, and no tangible battlefield successes had yet occurred. Two weeks into the campaign, the Northern
Alliance, not seeing a breakthrough, demanded the bombing focus more on the front lines. Critics began to
see the war losing its way. Civilian casualties also began to mount. Several Red Cross warehouses were
bombed. Meanwhile, thousands of Pashtun militiamen from Pakistan poured into the country, joining the
fight against the U.S. led forces.

The next stage of the campaign began. Hornet bombers hit Taliban vehicles in pinpoint strikes, while U.S.
planes began cluster bombing Taliban defenses. For the first time in years, Northern Alliance commanders
finally began to see the serious results that they had long hoped for. The Taliban support structure was
beginning to erode under the pressure of the strikes. U.S. Special Forces then launched an audacious raid
deep into the Taliban's heartland of Kandahar, even striking one of Mullah Omar's compounds. However,
the campaign's progress seemed to remain very slow. The last week of October had ended, and it was now
the beginning of November.

At this time, the next stage of the air campaign began to fulfill long-awaited Northern Alliance
expectations. The Taliban front lines were bombed with 15,000-pound daisy cutter bombs, and by AC-130
gunships. Poor Taliban tactics increased the effect of the strikes. The fighters had no previous experience
with American firepower, and often even stood on top of bare ridgelines where Special Forces could easily
spot them and call in air attacks. By November 2, Taliban frontal positions were decimated, and a Northern
Alliance march on Kabul seemed possible for the first time. Many Afghan Taliban troops had terrible
morale, and were regarded as untrustworthy. Foreign fighters from al-Qaeda took over security in the
Afghan cities, demonstrating how unstable the regime had become. Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance and
their CIA/Special Forces advisors planned the offensive. Northern Alliance troops would seize Mazar-I-
Sharif, thereby cutting off Taliban supply lines and enabling the flow of equipment from the countries to
the north, followed by an attack on Kabul itself.

Land advances: Mazar-e-Sharif

On November 9, 2001, the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif began. U.S. bombers carpet-bombed Taliban
defenders concentrated in the Chesmay-e-Safa gorge that marks the entrance to the city. At 2 P.M,
Northern Alliance forces then swept in from the south and west, seizing the city's main military base and
airport. The forces then mopped up the remnants of the Taliban in the gorge in front of the city, meeting
only feeble resistance. Within 4 hours, the battle was over. By sunset, what remained of the Taliban was
retreating to the south and east. Mazar-e-Sharif was taken. The next day, Northern Alliance forces seeking
retribution combed the city, shooting suspected Taliban supporters in on-the-spot executions. 520 young
Taliban, demoralized and defeated, many of whom were from the fighters that crossed from Pakistan, were
massacred when they were discovered hiding in a school. Looting was rampant.

The same day the massacres of former Taliban supporters was taking place in Mazar-e-Sharif, November
10, Northern Alliance forces swept through five northern provinces in a rapid advance. The fall of Mazar-e-
Sharif had triggered a complete collapse of Taliban positions. Many local commanders switched sides
rather than fight. The regime was beginning to unravel at the seams throughout the north. Even in the south,
their hold on power seemed tenuous at best. The religious police stopped their regular patrols. A complete
implosion of the Taliban regime seemed imminent.

The fall of Kabul

Finally, on the night of November 12, Taliban forces fled from the city of Kabul, sneaking away under
cover of darkness in a massive retreat. By the time Northern Alliance forces arrived in the afternoon of
November 13, only bomb craters, burned foliage, and the burnt out shells of Taliban gun emplacements and
positions were there to greet them. A small group of perhaps twenty devoted Arab fighters hiding in the
city's park were the only defenders left. After a brief 15-minute gun battle, all of the foreign fighters were
dead, having had little more than some scrub to shield them. Kabul had fallen.

The fall of Kabul marked the beginning of a collapse of Taliban positions across the map. Within 24 hours,
all of the Afghan provinces along the Iranian border, including the key city of Herat, had fallen. Local
Pashtun commanders had taken over throughout northeastern Afghanistan, including the key city of
Jalalabad. Taliban holdouts in the north, comprised of mainly Pakistani volunteers, fled to the northern city
of Konduz to make a stand. By November 16, the Taliban's last stronghold in northern Afghanistan was
besieged by the Northern Alliance. Nearly 10,000 Taliban fighters, led by foreign fighters, refused to
surrender and continued to put up stubborn resistance. By then, the Taliban had retreated back to their
heartland in southeastern Afghanistan around Kandahar, and even their hold there was tenuous at best. The
regime seemed to be teetering on the brink of annihilation.

By November 13, al-Qaeda forces, almost certainly with Osama bin Laden himself, had regrouped and
were concentrating their forces in the Tora Bora cave complex, 30 miles (50 km) southeast of Jalalabad, to
prepare for a stand against the anti-Taliban and American forces. Nearly 2000 al-Qaeda fighters fortified
themselves in positions within bunkers and caves, and by November 16, U.S. bombers began stepped up
pummeling of the mountain fortress. Around the same time, CIA and Special Forces operatives were
already at work in the area, enlisting and paying local warlords to join the fight and planning an attack on
the al-Qaeda base.

Just as the bombardment at Tora Bora was stepped up, the bloody siege of Konduz that began on
November 16 was continuing. Finally, after 9 days of heavy fighting and blistering American
bombardment, Taliban fighters surrendered to Northern Alliance forces on November 25.

Consolidation: the taking of Konduz and Kandahar

On November 25, the day that Taliban fighters holding out in Konduz finally surrendered and were being
herded into the Qala-e-Jangi prison complex near Mazar-I-Sharif, a few foreign Taliban attacked some
Northern Alliance guards, taking their weapons and opening fire. This incident soon triggered a widespread
revolt by 600 detained fighters at the prison, who began grabbing AK-47s, machine guns, and grenades and
attacking Northern Alliance troops. One American CIA operative who had been interrogating prisoners,
Mike Spann, was killed, marking the first American combat death in the war. The fighters soon seized the
southern half of the complex, once a medieval fortress. The revolt was finally put down after three days of
heavy strafing fire by AC-130 gunships and Black Hawk helicopters. Less than 100 of the several hundred
Taliban prisoners survived, and around 50 Northern Alliance soldiers were killed. The quashing of the
revolt marked the end of the combat in northern Afghanistan, where local Northern Alliance warlords were
now firmly in control.

By the end of November, Kandahar, the movement's birthplace, was the last remaining Taliban stronghold
and was coming under increasing pressure. Nearly 3,000 tribal fighters, led by Hamid Karzai, a
Westernized and polished loyalist of the former Afghan king (Zahir Shah), and Gul Agha Shirzai, the
governor of Kandahar before the Taliban seized power, put pressure on Taliban forces from the east and cut
off the northern Taliban supply lines to Kandahar. The threat of the Northern Alliance loomed in the north
and northeast. Meanwhile, the first significant U.S. combat troops had arrived. Nearly 1,000 Marines,
ferried in by CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, set up a Forward Operating Base in the desert south of
Kandahar on November 25. The first significant combat involving U.S. ground forces occurred a day later
when 15 armored vehicles approached the base and were attacked by helicopter gunships, destroying many
of them. Meanwhile, the airstrikes continued to pound Taliban positions inside the city, where Mullah
Omar was holed up. Omar, the Taliban leader, remained defiant despite the fact that his movement only
controlled 4 out of the 30 Afghan provinces by the end of November and called on his forces to fight to the
death.

As the Taliban teetered on the brink of losing their last bastion, the U.S. focus increased on the Tora Bora.
Local tribal militias, numbering over 2,000 strong and paid and organized by Special Forces and CIA
paramilitaries, continued to mass for an attack as heavy bombing continued of suspected al-Qaeda
positions. 100-200 civilians were reported killed when 25 bombs struck a village at the foot of the Tora
Bora and White Mountains region. On December 2, a group of 20 U.S. commandos was inserted by
helicopter to support the operation. On December 5, Afghan militia wrested control of the low ground
below the mountain caves from al-Qaeda fighters and set up tank positions to blast enemy forces. The al-
Qaeda fighters withdrew with mortars, rocket launchers, and assault rifles to higher fortified positions and
dug in for the battle.

By December 6, Omar finally began to signal that he was ready to surrender Kandahar to tribal forces. His
forces broken by heavy U.S. bombing and living constantly on the run within Kandahar to prevent himself
from becoming a target, even Mullah Omar's morale lagged. Recognizing that he could not hold on to
Kandahar much longer, he began signaling a willingness in negotiations to turn the city over to the tribal
leaders, assuming that he and his top men received some protection. The U.S. government rejected any
amnesty for Omar or any Taliban leaders. On December 7, Mullah Mohammad Omar slipped out of the
city of Kandahar with a group of his hardcore loyalists and moved northwest into the mountains of Uruzgan
province, reneging on the Taliban's promise to surrender their fighters and their weapons. He was last
reported seen driving off with a group of his fighters on a convoy of motorcycles. Other members of the
Taliban leadership fled into Pakistan through the remote passes of Paktia and Paktika provinces. However,
Kandahar, the last Taliban-controlled city, had fallen, and the majority of the Taliban fighters had
disbanded. The border town of Spin Boldak was surrendered on the same day, marking the end of Taliban
control in Afghanistan. The Afghan tribal forces under Gul Agha seized the city of Kandahar while the
Marines took control of the airport outside and established a U.S. base.

The Battle of Tora Bora: endgame deferred

The foreign al-Qaeda fighters were still holding out in the mountains of Tora Bora, however. Anti-Taliban
tribal militia continued a steady advance through the difficult terrain, backed by withering air strikes guided
in by U.S. Special Forces. Facing defeat and reluctant to fight fellow Muslims, the al-Qaeda forces agreed
to a truce to give them time to surrender their weapons. In retrospect, however, many believe that the truce
was a ruse to allow important al-Qaeda figures, including Osama bin Laden, to escape. On December 12,
the fighting flared again, probably initiated by a rear guard buying time for the main force's escape through
the White Mountains into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Once again, tribal forces backed by U.S. special
operations troops and air support pressed ahead against fortified al-Qaeda positions in caves and bunkers
scattered throughout the mountainous region. By December 17, the last cave complex had been taken and
their defenders overrun. A search of the area by U.S. forces continued into January, but no sign of bin
Laden or the al-Qaeda leadership emerged. It is almost unanimously believed that they had already slipped
away into the tribal areas of Pakistan to the south and east. It is estimated that around 200 of the al-Qaeda
fighters were killed during the battle, along with an unknown number of anti-Taliban tribal fighters. No
U.S. deaths were reported.

Following Tora Bora, U.S. forces and their Afghan allies consolidated their position in the country.
Following a Loya jirga or grand council of major Afghan factions, tribal leaders, and former exiles, an
interim Afghan government was established in Kabul under Hamid Karzai. U.S. forces established their
main base at Bagram airbase just north of Kabul. Kandahar airport also became an important U.S. base
area. Several outposts were established in eastern provinces to hunt for Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives. The
number of U.S-led coalition troops operating in the country would eventually grow to over 10,000.
Meanwhile, the Taliban and al-Qaeda had not yet given up. Al-Qaeda forces began regrouping in the
Shahi-Kot mountains of Paktia province throughout January and February of 2002. A Taliban fugitive in
Paktia province, Mullah Saifur Rehman, also began reconstituting some of his militia forces in support of
the anti-U.S. warriors. They totalled over 1,000 by the beginning of March of 2002. The intention of the
rebels was to use the region as a base area for launching guerrilla attacks and possibly a major offensive in
the style of the mujahedin who battled Soviet forces during the 1980s.

Operation Anaconda

U.S. and allied Afghan militia intelligence sources soon picked up on this buildup in Paktia province and
prepared a massive push to counter it. On March 2, 2002, U.S. and Afghan forces launched an offensive on
al-Qaeda and Taliban forces entrenched in the mountains of Shahi-Kot southeast of Gardez. The rebel
forces, who used small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars, were entrenched into caves and
bunkers in the hillsides at an altitude that was largely above 10,000 feet (3,000 m). They used "hit and run"
tactics, opening fire on the U.S. and Afghan forces and then retreating back into their caves and bunkers to
weather the return fire and persistent U.S. bombing raids. To compound the situation for the coalition
troops, U.S. commanders initially underestimated the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces as a last isolated pocket
of dead-enders numbering less than 200. It turned out that the guerrillas number over 1,000, perhaps as
high as 5,000 according to some estimates, and that they were receiving reinforcements.

By March 6, eight Americans and seven Afghan soldiers had been killed and reportedly 400 opposing
forces had also been killed in the fighting. The coalition casualties stemmed from a friendly fire incident
that killed one soldier, the downing of two helicopters by rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire
that killed seven soldiers, and the pinning down of U.S. forces being inserted into what was coined as
"Objective Ginger" that resulted in dozens of wounded. Ground fire from Afghan militia and American
forces in a number of skirmishes, along with heavy aerial bombardment, resulted in over 400 al-Qaeda and
Taliban rebels killed, according to U.S. estimates. However, fewer than 50 bodies were ever found.
Regardless of the correct number of guerrillas killed, it is clear that several hundred somehow escaped the
dragnet and melted away, almost certainly by moving in small groups along mountain trails to the tribal
areas across the border into Pakistan. The Pakistani forces meant to serve as a blocking force apparently
lacked either the will or the capability, or possibly both, to seal off the border.

In an incident of friendly fire on April 18, 2002, 4 Canadian soldiers were killed and eight others were
injured due to a bomb that was inadvertently dropped by an American F-16 fighter jet. It was alleged that
pilot Harry Schmidt dropped the bomb in self-defense while, in reality, the soldiers were on a military
exercise. See Afghanistan friendly fire incident.
Post-Anaconda operations

Following the battle at Shahi-Kot, it is believed that the al-Qaeda fighters established sanctuaries among
tribal protectors in Pakistan, from which they regained their strength and later began launching cross-border
raids on U.S. forces by the summer months of 2002. Guerrilla units, numbering between 5 and 25 men, still
regularly cross the border from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to fire rockets at U.S. bases and ambush
American convoys and patrols, as well as Afghan National Army troops, Afghan militia forces working
with the U.S-led coalition, and non-governmental organizations. The area around the U.S. base at Shkin in
Paktika province has seen some of the heaviest activity.

Meanwhile, Taliban forces continued to remain in hiding in the rural regions of the four southern provinces
that formed their heartland, Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzgan. In the wake of Operation Anaconda
the Pentagon requested that British Royal Marines who are highly trained in mountain warfare, be
deployed. They conducted a number of missions over several weeks with very limited results. The Taliban,
who during the summer of 2002 numbered in the hundreds, avoided combat with U.S. forces and their
Afghan allies as much as possible and melted away into the caves and tunnels of remote Afghan mountain
ranges or across the border into Pakistan during operations. This resulted in a number of fruitless missions
conducted by American and British forces, in which no combat occurred and no enemy forces were
captured or killed. Even with popular support (and it is not certain to what extent the coalition has obtained
it), and advanced surveillance technology, locating small bands of 5-10 men in the vast stretches of rugged
terrain that exist in southeastern Afghanistan and along the Pakistani border, and who are determined to
avoid contact, is an almost impossible task. This rather frustrating situation persisted throughout 2002.

Renewed Taliban insurgency

After managing to evade U.S. forces throughout the summer of 2002, the remnants of the Taliban gradually
began to regain their confidence and started to begin preparations to launch the insurgency that Mullah
Muhammad Omar had promised during the Taliban's last days in power. During September, Taliban forces
began a recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to launch a renewed "jihad" or
holy war against the Afghan government and the U.S-led coalition. Pamphlets distributed in secret during
the night also began to appear in many villages in the former Taliban heartland in southeastern Afghanistan
that called for jihad. Small mobile training camps were established along the border with Pakistan by al-
Qaeda and Taliban fugitives to train new recruits in guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, according to
Afghan sources and a United Nations report. Most of the new recruits were drawn from the madrassas or
religious schools of the tribal areas of Pakistan, from which the Taliban had originally arisen. Major bases,
a few with as many as 200 men, were created in the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan by the summer of
2003. Slipping across the long and rugged border in small groups is a relatively simple task, even with
heavy patrolling by security forces. The will of the Pakistani paramilitaries stationed at border crossings to
prevent such infiltration was called into question, and Pakistani military operations proved of little use.

The Taliban gradually reorganized and reconstituted their forces over the winter, preparing for a summer
offensive. They established a new mode of operation: gather into groups of around 50 to launch attacks on
isolated outposts and convoys of Afghan soldiers, police, or militia and then breaking up into groups of 5-
10 men to evade subsequent offensives. U.S. forces in the strategy were attacked indirectly, through rocket
attacks on bases and improvised mines planted in the roadside. To coordinate the strategy, Mullah Omar
named a 10-man leadership council for the resistance, with himself at the head. Five operational zones were
created, assigned to various Taliban commanders such as the key Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah, in
charge of Zabul province operations. Al-Qaeda forces in the east had a bolder strategy of concentrating on
the Americans and catching them when they could with elaborate ambushes.

The first sign that Taliban forces were regrouping came on January 28, when a band of 80 fighters allied
with the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami were discovered and assaulted by U.S. forces at the Adi Ghar cave
complex 15 miles (24 km) north of Spin Boldak. 18 rebels were reported killed and no U.S. casualties
reported. The site was suspected to be a base to funnel supplies and fighters from Pakistan. The first
isolated attacks by relatively large Taliban bands on Afghan targets also appeared around that time.

As the summer continued, the attacks gradually increased in frequency in the "Taliban heartland." Dozens
of Afghan government soldiers, non-governmental organization and humanitarian workers, and several
U.S. soldiers died in the raids, ambushes, and rocket attacks. In addition to the guerrilla attacks, Taliban
fighters began building up their forces in the district of Dai Chopan, a district in Zabul province that also
straddles Kandahar and Uruzgan and is at the very center of the Taliban heartland. Dai Chopan district is a
remote and sparsely populated corner of southeastern Afghanistan composed of towering, rocky mountains
interspersed with thin gorges. Taliban fighters decided it would be the perfect area to make a stand against
the Afghan government and the coalition forces. Over the course of the summer, perhaps the largest
concentration of Taliban militants gathered in the area since the fall of the regime, with up to 1,000
guerrillas regrouping. Over 220 people, including several dozen Afghan police, were killed in August of
2003 as Taliban fighters gained strength. The U.S. military is currently sustaining approximately one death
and four wounded per week in Afghanistan. One of the major reasons that U.S. forces are suffering such
light casualities as compared to Iraq is that they have a much lighter presence in Afghanistan. The
American strategy was never to mould Afghanistan as a model of Jeffersonian democracy but rather more
narrow.[citation needed] Their strategy was to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and destroy Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan. The U.S. military depended on the Northern Alliance, Mercenary Warlords for ground assault
and the Pakistani army for a blocking movement preventing Al-Qaeda and Taliban escape. [citation needed]
Unfortunately for the U.S. the interests of Pakistan and the Northern Alliance did not perfectly align with
the U.S. There was no significant blocking force by the Pakistani military across the border. [citation needed] The
warlords were easily bribed by Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces and the Northern Alliance was more interested
in consolidating their new found gains. For any chance of success the U.S. military needed 20,000 troops
for the blocking force across the Pakistani border and a further 10,000 troops for the assault on Tora-Bora.
[citation needed]

U.S and Afghan government forces, meanwhile, were preparing an offensive to root out the rebel forces.
During the last week of August, Afghan government forces backed by U.S troops and heavy American
aerial bombardment advanced upon Taliban positions within the mountain fortress. After a one-week battle,
Taliban forces were routed with up to 124 fighters (according to Afghan government estimates) killed.
Taliban spokesmen, however, denied the high casualty figure and U.S estimates were somewhat lower. By
the first week of September, however, Taliban forces had been scattered from their base at Dai-Chopan.

Psychological Warfare

According to an Australian TV report, the United States applied psychological pressure to force enemy
Taliban fighters out into the open. The report stated that members of the 173rd Airborne burned Taliban
bodies for hygenic reasons.

Psyop specialist Sgt. Jim Baker was recorded reading out a message to the Taliban:

"Attention, Taliban, you are all cowardly dogs. You allowed your fighters to be laid down facing west and
burned. You are too scared to retrieve their bodies. This just proves you are the lady boys we always
believed you to be."

Another soldier reportedly broadcast statements such as:

"You attack and run away like women. You call yourself Talibs but you are a disgrace to the Muslim
religion and you bring shame upon your family. Come and fight like men instead of the cowardly dogs you
are."

Reports of the effectiveness of such efforts are unclear.

According to a Japan Today report, U.S. authorities are investigating the incident to determine whether the
troops' efforts may have contravened the Geneva convention. [4]

Nature of the coalition

The first wave of attacks was carried out solely by American and British forces. On the second day, only
American forces participated. In addition to the United Kingdom, a number of other countries provided
support to the U.S.-led invasion. Although undoubtedly of practical value, in some cases it is generally seen
as primarily a moral statement. In rough order of level of contribution, these were:

• Canada (for full article, see Canada's role in the invasion of Afghanistan): about 2,500 troops, six
ships and six aircraft. Since 9/11, more than 15,000 Canadian personnel have served in
Afghanistan and the Gulf. Twenty ships have been deployed to date. An airbase is also maintained
in the Persian Gulf. Sources say that only 40 JTF2 Commandoes were deployed in the initial
stages of the war. However, a far larger number of Canadian soldiers is currently present in
Afghanistan, and will number over 2200 troops in 2006. Further and as of February 27, 2006, the
Canadian Forces have taken over the overall command of all Allied Forces in Southern
Afghanistan.
• Australia (Operation Slipper): about 300 SAS troops, air-to-air refueling tankers, Navy frigates,
two Orion electronic intelligence gathering aircraft, and F/A-18 fighter aircraft for Diego Garcia.
• United Kingdom (Operation Veritas): The naval element consisted of one aircraft carrier, one
amphibious ship, one destroyer, one frigate, three nuclear fleet submarines and seven Royal Fleet
Auxiliaries, SBS and No. 40 Commando (not deployed). The British Army provided the 22
Squadron SAS and later 1,800 troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The
Royal Air Force contributed Tristar and VC-10 tanker aircraft, E-3D Sentry surveillance and
control aircraft, Nimrod R1 surveillance aircraft, Nimrod MR2 maritime reconnaissance aircraft,
Canberra PR9 reconnaissance aircraft, C-130 Hercules air transport aircraft and Chinook
helicopters from 27 Squadron.
• New Zealand: 50 Special Air Service soldiers, two C-130 Hercules.
• France (opération Héraclès) :~ 4,500 troops including 3,500 for the Marine Nationale (one
CVBG), 600 for the Armée de l'Air) (~ 12 Mirage 2000, Mirage F1 and Mirage IV), 600 to
International Security Assistance Force; ~ 200 special forces for 2003.
• Germany: approximately 2,250 troops including special forces, naval vessels, NBC cleanup teams.
• Russia
• Italy
• The Netherlands
• Croatia, 50 military police in Kabul area. From 2006 will become 159.
• Czech Republic, special forces- 601st Special Forces Group - located at Camp Mauer. Assigned to
special recon tasks. Deployed on March 28, 2004, home on September 17, 2004, commanding
officer Col. Ondřej Páleník. Redeployment expected in 2006.
• Denmark: Special Forces and a C-130 transport aircraft. Six F-16 fighters were later deployed in
the EPAF force.
• Norway: six F-16 fighters, logistic teams, mine clearance teams, a special forces commando group
(MarineJaeger)and several C-130 transports.
• Bahrain: Naval vessels.
• Jordan
• Japan, in its first military deployment since World War II, contributed naval support for non-
combat reinforcement of the operation.
• Portugal: 115 Commandos and 37 air traffic controllers in Kabul.
• Poland: 93 soldiers including GROM special forces. Their tasks included engineering
reconnaissance, the construction of fortifications, mine removal and the transport of water and
fuel.
• Romania: 25 military police and a C-130 transport aircraft.
Note: this list is currently incomplete and almost certainly inaccurate (many countries refuse to specify the
whereabouts of their elite combat units and so forth)

Despite reluctance in the Arab states towards retaliation against the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, the
Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf offered support. Pakistan and Iran agreed to open borders to
receive the expected increased migration of refugees from Afghanistan. Earlier, Pakistan had supported the
Taliban, especially during the 1996-1998 period when they were establishing control- later relations
between the two were not as close. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan allocated three airbases to the United
States for the invasion of Afghanistan. Uzbekistan had allowed the U.S. to place troops on the ground as
well as use an airfield for humanitarian relief. 34 nations participate in the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan. [5]

Civilian Casualties of the invasion

Main articles: Coalition Casualties in Afghanistan and List of casualties of the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan

According to Jonathan Steele of The Guardian between 20,000 and 49,600 people may have died of the
consequences of the invasion. According to Marc W. Herold's Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States'
Aerial Bombing at least 3700 and probably closer to 5000 civilians were killed as a result of U.S.
bombing[6]. Herold's study omitted those killed indirectly, when air strikes cut off their access to hospitals,
food or electricity. Also exempt were bomb victims who later died of their injuries. When there were
different casualty figures from the same incident, in 90% of cases Professor Herold chose a lower figure.

Some people, however, dispute Herold's estimates. Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute
and Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives question Herold's heavy use of the Afghan Islamic
Press (the Taliban's official mouthpiece) and claim tallies provided them were suspicious. A contrary view
is that the Taliban would have been motivated to downplay casualties. Conetta also claims statistical errors
in Herold's study[7] [8]. Conetta's study puts total civilian casualties between 1000 and 1300 [9]. A Los
Angeles Times study put the number of collateral dead between 1,067 and 1,201.

Diplomatic efforts

Meetings of various Afghan leaders were organised by the United Nations and took place in Germany. The
Taliban was not included. These meetings produced an interim government and an agreement to allow a
United Nations peacekeeping force to enter Afghanistan.

Humanitarian efforts

It is estimated that in Afghanistan there are 1.5 million suffering from immediate starvation, as well as 7.5
million suffering as a result of the country's dire situation - the combination of civil war, drought-related
famine, and, to a large extent, the Taliban's oppressive regime and the U.S.-led invasion.

In Pakistan, the United Nations and private humanitarian organisations have begun gearing up for the
massive humanitarian effort necessary in addition to the already major refugee and food efforts. The United
Nations World Food Programme temporarily suspended activities within Afghanistan at the beginning of
the bombing attacks. The efforts have, as of early (December 2001), resumed with a daily distribution rate
of 3,000 tons a day. It is however estimated that 30,000 tons of food will be needed by (January 2002) to
provided sufficient relief to the impoverished masses.

By November 1, U.S. C-17s flying at 30,000 feet (10,000 m) had dropped 1,000,000 food and medicine
packets marked with an American flag. Doctors Without Borders called it an act of transparent propaganda
and said that using medicines without medical consultation is much more likely to cause harm than good.
Action Against Hunger head of operations in Afghanistan Thomas Gonnet said it was an "act of
marketing".

A further dangerous problem lies in the fact that the food packets are bright yellow in color; the same color
as unexploded bomblets from U.S. cluster bombs. Besides the color, the bombs are larger, made from
sturdy metal and plastic with only a Latin number written on them while relief packages are covered in
loose plastic wraps with pictures of usage and instructions in local alphabets on them.

Human rights abuses

The Dasht-i-Leili massacre allegedly occurred in December, 2001, when a number (disputed to be between
250 and 3,000) of Taliban prisoners were shot or suffocated to death in metal truck containers while being
transferred by U.S. and Northern Alliance soldiers from Kunduz to Sheberghan prison in northern
Afghanistan [10]. These claims are disputed by journalist Robert Young Pelton, who was present at the
time of the incident [11].

There are allegations that coalition soldiers tortured prisoners in interrogations; many complaints center on
the U.S. prison camp at Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [12].

Abdul Wali died on June 21, 2003, at a base near Asadabad. He was brutally beaten by former Army
Ranger and CIA contractor David Passaro, who was arrested on June 17, 2004, on four counts of assault
[13].

In 2004, the U.S.-based human rights organisation Human Rights Watch released a report entitled
'Enduring Freedom - Abuses by US Forces in Afghanistan', containing multiple allegations of abuse by
American forces.

In February 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union released documents they had obtained from the
United States Army which showed that, following the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Army in Afghanistan had
destroyed photographs which documented the abuse of prisoners in their custody. Pictures were taken in
the area of Fire Base Tycze, and around the villages of Gurjay and Sukhagen. The pictures were alleged to
have shown soldiers posing with hooded and bound detainees during mock executions.

See also: Bagram torture and prisoner abuse and Movement to impeach George W. Bush

Protests, demonstrations and rallies

Main article: Protests against the invasion of Afghanistan

Several small protests occurred in various cities and college campuses across the United States and in other
countries in the first days after the start of the bombing campaign. These were mainly peaceful but larger
protests and general strikes occurred in Pakistan, a previous Taliban ally. Some of these were suppressed
by police with casualties among the protesters. In both Islamic and non-Islamic nations, protests and rallies
of various sizes against the attack on Afghanistan took place.

Many protesters felt that the attack on Afghanistan was unjustified aggression. Some believed it would lead
to the deaths of many innocent people by preventing humanitarian aid workers from bringing food into the
country.

On October 7, there was a peace rally of 10,000 to 12,000 people in New York City. They marched from
Union Square to Times Square, cheering the police at the beginning of the march. The list of about twelve
speakers was cut to three or four by the police, and they were herded at the end into a one-lane-wide
"bullpen".
There was also a demonstration in London that organisers estimate was 100,000 people.

Disputable information and rumors

Coded messages in Osama bin Laden tapes

The U.S. government requested that national media check with the federal government first before
airing pre-recorded messages from Osama bin Laden, or not air those messages at all. The reasons
they gave were that bin Laden may be sending coded messages within the tapes (steganography),
and that the airing of such propaganda was inadvisable. The networks stated that they would
review the tapes before airing them.

Slogans and terms

• U.S. Government:
o Operation Enduring Freedom
o War on Terror
• Yahoo: "Allied Strikes"
• CNN: "America Strikes Back", "America's New War"
• MSNBC: "America Strikes Back"
• ABC: "America Strikes"
• NBC: "Taliban Attacked"
• New York Times: "America Attacks" & "A Nation Challenged"

Timelines of U.S. attacks on Afghanistan

2001

• October
• November
• December

2002

• January

See also: Afghanistan timeline, Invasions of Afghanistan, and History of Afghanistan since 1992

Footnotes

Note 1: The U.S. military campaign, led by U.S. general Tommy Franks, was initially given the name
Operation Infinite Justice but quickly renamed Operation Enduring Freedom due to objections from U.S.
and Afghan Muslim clerics of religious connotations —that only God could dispense "infinite justice."
British military operations against Afghanistan were codenamed "Operation Veritas."