REPAIRING THE FIRE DAMAGED NOTRE DAME BRIDGE

Thomas A. French, P.E.

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MSCE; Senior Structural Engineer; Hoyle, Tanner & Associates Inc.;

150 Dow Street, Manchester, NH 03101; tfrench@hta-nh.com
Phone (603) 669-5555; Fax (603) 669-4168
KEYWORDS
Bridge Repairs, Fire Damage, Disaster Management, Bridge Retrofit, Fire
Protection, Material Testing
BACKGROUND
On April 12, 2003 at approximately 4:00 pm EST a fire ignited underneath an
important bridge in the City of Manchester, New Hampshire. In the year and a half
since the fire, the investigation into fire has determined the official cause as arson.
Although the fire was intentionally set and caused major interruptions to traffic,
telephone lines, and some city fire department communications there is no evidence
that this was an act of terrorism. Since the terrorist attacks on our country, great
emphasis has been placed on protecting our infrastructure. Although there are
emergency plans in place and we take great precautions to prevent additional threats,
disasters (natural and man-made) are still going to occur.

Fig 1. Fire Crews Fight the Utility Duct Fire

Fire investigators determined that unidentified juveniles set a fire among the
belongings of a homeless couple that called the Notre Dame Bridge home. The fire
was started in a makeshift apartment constructed of wood pallets, plywood, carpeting,
and mattresses. The unfortunate thing for bridge owner Manchester Department of

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Public Works, was that this apartment had been constructed against the western
most concrete abutment and extended from the rip-rap lined ground slope up to the
underside of the bridges steel girder superstructure. Supported just inside the fascia
girder was a utility duct bank carrying telephone lines, cable television lines, and Fire
Department communication lines. This utility duct bank was constructed from twenty
fiber reinforced plastic (FRP) conduits.
Once ignited, the fire spread quickly through the shelter and did not take long to
impinge on the FRP conduits. Within minutes, the fire had created enough heat,
smoke, and flame that the conduits themselves caught fire. These conduits had not
been constructed of the self-extinguishing materials that are commonly used today.
THE NOTRE DAME BRIDGE
The Eastbound Notre Dame Bridge is one of two bridges that carry Bridge Street over
New Hampshires Central Turnpike, the Merrimack River, several parking lots, local
city streets and a railroad line. This bridge is an eleven-span, 470-meter (1544-foot)
long bridge with a concrete deck supported on steel girders. The bridge carries two
lanes of eastbound traffic and a single sidewalk along its southern side. The main
bridge spans are each approximately 47 meters (155 feet) long.

Fig 2. A View of the 11-span Notre Dame Bridge.

A consulting engineering firm designed the bridge in 1985 and construction was
completed under the direction of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation
(NHDOT) in 1988. Although the original design plans show provisions for the utility
duct bank, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company constructed it separately
through the provisions of a utility installation permit dated April 18, 1991.

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The bridge deck is a 200 mm (8) thick Portland Cement Concrete (PCC) slab with
epoxy coated AASHTO M31 (ASTM A615) GR 60 main reinforcing steel bars that
run perpendicular to traffic. The deck is supported on five steel girders made of
AASHTO M222 (ASTM A588) GR 50 painted steel. The girders are all welded plate
girders with 1524 mm (60-inch) deep, 14 mm (9/16-inch) thick web plates. The web
plates are stiffened by steel connection plates that are welded to both flanges as well
as along the entire height of the web. The connection plates have spaces raging from
6 meters (20 feet) to 7 meters (23 feet). Near the girder bearing points additional web
stiffening is provided by transverse stiffener plates also welded to the web and
flanges with a 2-meter (6-foot) spacing.
The utility duct bank is located between girders four and five directly beneath the
concrete sidewalk. The ducts are supported at 2.3-meter (7-6) intervals by steel
wide-flange beams welded to the girder webs with 200 mm (8) high steel plates.
THE DISASTER
The fire started at approximately 4:00 pm EST and was immediately reported to the
Manchester City Fire Department by a passing motorist as a brush fire under the
Notre Dame Bridge. When the first fire engine arrived approximately ten minutes
later, they quickly discovered that it was not a brush fire, but much more. The fire
had started among the belongings of a homeless couple that resided under the bridge.
Quickly the fire spread to the utility duct banks that carried telephone, cable TV and
fire department communication lines along the bridge. Bt the time the Fire
Department was able to begin to fight the fire it had already burned the first two spans
of the bridge. It moved quickly beyond the second pier out over the Merrimack
River. The rapid river water kept the fire department from mounting a successful
attack from the western bank and the fire grew toward the third pier. By 4:30 the fire
between the western abutment and pier no. 2 had been extinguished, but the fire over
the river was out of reach and burned uncontrolled.
As soon as the Fire Department arrived on scene they mobilized State Police Officers
to close the interstate and City Police Officers to close Bridge Street. During rush
hour on a Friday afternoon, the Central turnpike was full and the fire snarled traffic
for hours. The NH State Police and the NHDOT closed the turnpike and set up an
eight-km (five-mile) detour by 5:00 to reroute the nearly 12,000 vehicles per hour that
pass under the bridge.
The Fire Department set up crews on the eastern bank of the river and waited for the
fire to progress along the bridge until they could reach it with their water streams. By
5:00 the fire had reached the eastern side of the river and fire crews were able to
extinguish it. In about an hour the fire had burned along nearly 180 meters (600 feet)
of the bridge. Because the utility duct banks were located between the fourth and
fifth girders, the fire was contained to that bay of the bridge.

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THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

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At the moment the fire started, the president of the telephone company that now
owned the duct banks happened to be at City Hall. It did not take long for the
president to start receiving notice of service interruptions of customers west of the
bridge. The telephone lines that had burned provided communication service to over
10,000 customers. As soon as the fire started to consume the duct bank, all those
customers lostservice.
By 5:30 pm the Emergency Management Director had been contacted and he made
the decision to open the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This decision was
made, not only due to the damage to the bridge, but because of the loss of
communications west of the river. This loss of communications meant that all the
affected customers could not dial 911 in the event another emergency arose. By 6:00
the EOC was fully staffed by the chief of police, chief of fire, the health and traffic
department directors, superintendent of schools, chairman of the Board of Mayor and
Aldermen, and the Mayor.
Each EOC staff member was briefed on the incident and they quickly made decisions.
The telephone company president was brought into the meeting and offered to assist
in any way they could. By early evening the telephone company had strategically
distributed over 120 cell phones to emergency phone stations that were established on
the west side. Over 2,450 meters (8,000 feet) of replacement cable was ordered
and delivered from Massachusetts and New York. The EOC remained operational
throughout the night. It was decided that temporary telephone service must be
established.
By Saturday morning splice crews began to reestablish the
communication link across the river. Telephone crews worked around the clock
through the weekend and by Monday, over 2.5 km (1.5 miles) of temporary cable had
been installed and over 100,000 splices were made.
Shortly after the start of the fire, the Manchester Public Works Highway Department
was contacted and arrived at the bridge site. Because the fire was spreading quickly
the Director of Public Works immediately contacted the Citys Bridge Engineer,
Hoyle, Tanner and Associates, Inc. (HTA), to bring plans to the bridge so that the
Fire Department could determine what utilities were in the burning duct banks. The
plans were delivered to the Fire Chief by 4:20 pm and he was able to determine that it
was safe for the firefighters to extinguish the fire with water.
Once the fire was brought under control and the fire debris was being cleaned up, the
Highway Department set to work to decide if the bridge could be reopened to traffic.
The HTA bridge engineers worked off Fire Department ladders and made a brief
inspection of the fire damaged area. Since the fire was isolated to only the bay that
contained the duct banks, the associated damage was limited to that area. The bay
that was involved with the fire is located under the sidewalk and there was no damage
to areas that are subjected to vehicular traffic. The brief structural inspection was
completed and the damage was revealed to be limited to the concrete deck and the

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steel girders. The underside of the concrete deck had spalled and exposed some of
the reinforcing steel. The paint system on the girders had completely failed and both
of the girders near the fire showed signs of warping. The steel warping was isolated
to the web plates and appeared to be present between the transverse stiffeners and
connection plates. After the brief inspection it was determined that the bridge could
be reopened, but traffic restrictions were instituted until a more detailed analysis
could be performed. By 8:00 pm, one traffic lane on the bridge was reopened and
traffic on the Central Turnpike was reestablished.
POST DISASTER EVALUATION
Over the weekend following the fire, HTA personnel arranged for the use of the
NHDOT articulated bridge inspection bucket truck and staff. Personnel also studied
and reviewed bridge construction drawings to determine appropriate assessment
techniques and to identify key areas susceptible to fire damage and diminished load
carrying capacity.
Field Investigations
On Monday, April 15, representatives from HTA performed a close-up and detailed
field investigation of the fire damaged portions of the bridge.
During this investigation HTA
performed detailed inspections of the
underside of the concrete deck, the
structural steel, the utility supports and
conduits, the paint system, the bridge
shoes, the expansion joints, and the
bridge substructure near the fire area.
The findings are presented in the Fire
Assessment section of this paper.
Based on our original investigation and
published reports about fire damage to
concrete and steel, we determined that
Fig 3. Utility Bay Damaged By Fire
it was necessary to perform destructive
testing of the affected structural steel
girders. Existing research on fire-damaged steel indicates that if structural steel does
not exceed 650 C (1200 F), it is unlikely that any metallurgical changes will occur.
By inspecting the telephone lines that were inside the FRP conduits we found that in
many places the copper had fused together. Published literature indicates that the
melting temperature of copper is 1084 C (1984 F). Since the copper had melted in
many places we felt that it was likely that fire temperatures near the steel may have
exceeded the 650 C (1200 F) threshold. Therefore we felt that it was prudent to
remove steel samples for a metallurgical assessment. A structural analysis
determined that the removal of samples would not affect the load carrying capacity of
the girders as long as they were taken from strategically located low stress and low

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fatigue sites in the girder webs. Therefore,

with the assistance of a metallurgist, HTA
developed a steel removal plan.

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On Monday April 29, HTA hired a

subcontractor to perform the work of
removing steel samples from the webs of
the steel girders. During this removal,
temperatures were closely monitored to
ensure that the steel samples never
exceeded 93 C (200 F). The samples
were removed by using a plasma cutter
following a smooth steel template. The
samples were 100 mm X 200 mm (4 by
8) ovals with 50 mm (2) minimum radii.

Fig 4. Sample of Melted Copper

Telephone Cable

After the samples were removed, cut surfaces were ground smooth by a handheld
portable grinder.

Fig 5. Steel Sample Removal

Fig 6. Surface Preparation

Based on the assumption that the bridge would be reopened to traffic when the
metallurgical assessment was complete and that it would be several months before the
final repairs were completed, it was decided to place steel plates over the removal
areas. This decision was made for three reasons; 1) If traffic was placed on the
girders, the plates will arrest any fatigue problems that might develop. 2) The public
can see the holes since some of the samples were taken from an exterior girder.
Although the holes do not reduce the capacity of the girders, as a matter of public
perception it was best to cover them. 3) The plates that were installed could be
utilized as a final patch of the holes; however, they were installed in such a manner
that they could be removed if necessary during final repairs with no detrimental
effects to the bridge.

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On Tuesday, April 30, the same subcontractor was hired to install the plates over the
removal areas. The plates were cut from steel having the same properties as the steel
originally used to construct the girders. These oval plates measured 150 mm X 300
mm (6 by 12) and were welded in place with continuous 8 mm (5/16) fillet welds
around the entire circumference.

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Fire Assessment
As mentioned in the previous section, an assessment was performed on the concrete
deck, the structural steel, the paint system, utilities, deck joints, bridge shoes, and the
substructure. This section provides a brief description of each, along with
recommended repairs where needed.
Concrete deck

Fig 7. Spalled Concrete with Exposed

Reinforcing

The underside of the concrete deck

below the sidewalk was spalled. The
extent of spalling varied along the
length of the bridge from minor (10%
15% of surface area spalled) to
severe (80% surface area spalled). In
general, approximately 19 mm to 38
mm ( to 1) of concrete had
spalled off the underside of the
concrete deck.
There are some
locations (approximately 10 15
locations) where spalled concrete had
exposed primary reinforcing steel in
the deck. The exposed reinforcing
steel was generally in good condition
and did not show any signs of damage.

The spalled and unspalled areas of concrete were sounded by hammer and determined
to be in good condition. It was determined that all spalled areas of concrete and areas
of exposed reinforcing steel could be repaired as apposed to performing a complete
deck replacement. The repair included saw cutting around the damaged areas,
removing deteriorated concrete, sandblasting the underside of the deck (to remove
soot and other thin areas of damaged concrete), placement of epoxy coating over
exposed reinforcing steel, and patching the concrete with an anchored concrete mortar
patch material.
Based on our findings, we informed the owner that vibrations from vehicular traffic
could potentially cause any remaining loose concrete on the underside of the deck to
fall from the bridge onto the turnpike. Although we sounded the deck with a
hammer, we did so randomly. In light of this potential, we recommended that the

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City keep the traffic contained to one lane, along the northern side of the bridge
furthest away from the damaged section.
It was our professional judgment that the structural capacity of the concrete deck had
not been compromised. The concrete that spalled off was just cover concrete to
protect the primary reinforcing. The heat of and length of this fire precluded damage
to portions of the deck that may have reduced the structural capacity. We therefore
determined that the deck could still support its original design loads. However, the
patch repairs must be made to protect the reinforcing steel from the environment.
Structural Steel
During our visual inspection, damage to the
structural steel (girders number 4 and 5,
diaphragms, and utility support cross beams)
was found to be limited to the utility bay.
By inspection, the damage included steel
distortions and discoloration. There was no
evidence that steel outside the utility bay
was affected by the fire.
It appeared that the top and bottom flanges,
as well as vertical connection plates and
intermediate stiffeners of the girders
restrained the web plates. As the fire heated,
Fig 8. Web Distortion Measurements
this restraint caused a cupping or
distortion to occur in the web plates. Following procedures outlined in the
ANSI/AASHTO/AWS Bridge Welding Code, web distortion was measured at several
locations.
Girder number 5: The outside or fascia girder had suffered significant
distortion of the web plate. The magnitude of distortion varied from 9 mm to 17 mm
(3/8 to 11/16). No noticeable distortion was observed or measured on the top or
bottom flanges of this girder.
The Bridge Welding Code is the specification that governs bridge steel production.
This code specifies tolerances for cupping or web flatness when structural steel is
produced. For fascia girders of the configuration found on this bridge, the maximum
permissible distortion is 19 mm ().
Girder number 4: Significant distortion of girder number 4 was observed and
measured. This distortion varied from 9 mm to 21 mm (3/8 to 13/16). The maximum
permissible distortion based on interior girder criteria is 24 mm (15/16). No observed
or measurable distortion was found in the top or bottom flanges of this girder.

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For comparison purposes, observations and measurements were made of girders

number 1 and 3. Neither of these girders showed any visible signs of fire damage.
There were no observable or measurable distortions of girder number 1 and 3 webs or
flanges.
As mentioned in the field investigation section, based on our research, experience,
and prudent engineering judgment, we deemed it necessary to determine if the fire
had caused any metallurgical changes in the structural steel. Based on our
observations of the fire extinguishing
efforts, we felt that the fire might have
affected the steel in two different
ways. Portions of the steel were
heated and then cooled rapidly by the
fire department water. Other areas of
the steel were heated (possible even
hotter than the areas extinguished by
the fire department) and then cooled
more slowly. Both of these heat
affects can cause changes in the steel
metallurgy. Due to concerns that the
strength and ductility of the steel may
Fig 9. Fire Extinguishing Efforts
have been compromised we removed
and tested several steel samples.
Since our visible observations showed the girder webs to have the only noticeable fire
damage, steel samples were obtained from these areas for assessment. Samples were
removed from areas deemed to have received the greatest heat as well as from areas
deemed to have received the quickest cooling. Samples were delivered to NH
Materials Testing Laboratory, Inc. for analysis. Laboratory findings are summarized
in Table 1.
During our inspection of the structural steel, we made assessments of vertical
connection plates, intermediate stiffeners, and the field bolted connections. We found
no evidence of distortion or damage to any of these components.
Steel diaphragms, which are made up of angles and channels run transversely
between girders number 4 and 5. In addition, utility support beams, which consist of
small channels, also are located in the fire-damaged bay. No noticeable or
measurable damage or distortion was observed or measured in the diaphragms or
utility support beams.
Although it was our intent to find, measure, and document the greatest deformations
in the girders, it was possible that there were some areas that had deflections slightly
greater than allowable tolerances. In order to account for this, the construction
contract for repairs included provisions to perform a full survey of the girders and
heat straighten any areas that were found to be outside the allowable flatness

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tolerances. Also, during final repairs, the areas that samples were taken from had the
temporary plates removed. The holes then had a plate inserted into the web and a full
penetration groove weld was used. During construction, the complete detailed
inspection of the webs was performed and there were no areas found to be outside the
allowable flatness tolerances. The heat-straightening portion of the construction
contract was subsequently removed.
Table 1 Steel Sample Summary i

Location

Conditions

Girder #5, Span 4

25-3 East of Pier 3

Fascia Girder estimated

hottest point of the fire
(steel turned bluish color)
Interior Girder
estimated hottest point of
the fire
Fascia Girder largest
measured web
deflections, possibly
quenched by fire dept.
Interior Girder largest
measured web
deflections, possibly
quenched by fire dept.
(steel turned bluish color)
Fascia Girder very
likely quenched by fire
dept.

Girder #4, Span 4 810 East of Pier 3

Girder #5, Span 3

26-9 East of Pier 2

Girder #4, Span 3,

55-6 East of Pier 2

Girder #5, Span 2

16-9 East of Pier 1

Yield
MPa
(ksi)

Tensile
MPa
(ksi)

Elongation
in 50 mm
(2) (%)

360
(52.2)

527
(76.5)

33.7%

383
(55.5)

521
(75.6)

35.2%

392
(56.9)

569
(82.5)

31.8%

387
(56.2)

563
(81.7)

33.2%

345
(50.1)

496
(72.0)

36.4%

Based on our visual observations and the metallurgical assessment, we determined

thatthe only effect the fire had on the structural steel was to cause deformations in the
web steel plates. As shown in Table 1, the steel that was sampled and tested still met
the requirements of AASHTO M222 (ASTM A588) for the structural steel used when
constructing this bridge.
Paint System
The paint system in the area of the fire was severely damaged. Paint systems can fail
at temperatures much lower than was obtained during this fire. The paint on the
affected girders (Nos. 4 & 5) failed in two ways. On the sides towards the fire much

The minimum tensile requirements for AASHTO M222 (ASTM A588) GR 50 Steel are:
Yield = 345 MPa (50 ksi), Tensile = 485 MPa (70 ksi), Elongation in 50 mm (2) = 21%

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of the paint was consumed. This was

evident by the mottled markings that
were left on the steel.
On the sides away from the fire, the
steel reached temperatures that were
high enough to cause the paint to
debond from the steel. This is evident
by the large rolls of paint that
accumulated along the top of the
bottom flanges.
In various locations there is evidence
that the primer coats have failed as
well. Our recommendation to repair
the paint system was to clean the steel
in accordance with SSPC-SP 10, NearWhite Blast Cleaning and then apply
an approved paint system.

Fig 10. Paint Rolls in Flanges

Utilities
Ducts for the utilities and the structural
support system for the utility ducts
were damaged beyond repair by the
fire.
Damage consists of total
destruction and disintegration of the
twenty (20) FRP ducts that housed
utility cables as well as the steel and
fiberglass support system (bolts,
miscellaneous tubes, plates and
washers) that held the ducts in place.
The ducts and the support system were
totally removed and replaced.
Fig 11. Destruction of Utility Conduits
Deck Joints
Deck expansion joints are located in several places along this bridge. Only one of
these locations, over pier 1, was subjected to the fire. The deck joints allow
expansion through the use a modular strip seal expansion joint. This type of joint is
comprised of steel and rubber elements. Although the rubber elements were located
directly above the fire area, there did not appear to be any permanent damage to this
bridge joint. The rubber in the joints still appear to be soft and pliable and should
continue to work as they were designed to do. The deck joints did not require any
repairs.

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Bridge Shoes and Substructure

There was no damage to the
substructure or any of the bridge shoes
that were near the fire. While the fire
was burning, some of the liquid plastic
(from the utility ducts) dripped onto
the concrete piers and splashed onto
some of the bridge shoes. The bridge
shoes and concrete pier caps were
simply cleaned of the debris and no
further repairs were required.

Fig 12. Typical Debris on Top of Pier

REPAIRS AND RETROFITTING
In the 18 months following the fire, the City undertook an aggressive design and
construction schedule to return the bridge back to its pre-fire condition. The Citys
bridge engineer, HTA, prepared all the necessary construction plans, specifications,
and contracts in order to offer the repair contract to a competitive bid process. The
project was advertised, bid on, and the construction contract was executed by October
4, 2002.
Prior to the beginning of construction, the telephone company hired an independent
contractor to remove and dispose of all the remnants of the conduit and cables that
had once been within them.
The repair contract included the construction of a temporary containment structure
that surrounded the entire fire damaged area. This structure was used to keep the
work area heated, contain the debris from concrete removal, and as a containment to
keep the painting from effecting the traveling public or the environment. Once the
containment was erected, the design engineer and the contractor inspected the entire
underside of the concrete deck and mapped out all the areas for concrete removal.
The concrete was removed, the deck was sand blasted, an epoxy coated welded wire
fabric was anchored to the bottom of the deck, a corrosion inhibitor was applied, and
the concrete patching was completed using SIKA MonoTop 611.
All of the structural steel within the fire-damaged area was sand blasted to an SSPC10, Near-White Blast Cleaning and a three-coat paint system was reapplied. Even
though this bridge was only fourteen years old, test samples of the existing paint
system showed levels of lead and other heavy metals that exceed EPA regulations,
therefore a lead abatement program was developed and adhered to during the
repainting process.

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In order to prevent such a disaster from reoccurring, the City required the phone
company to install steel conduits between the abutment and the first pier. The
remainder of the conduit was replaced with Fiberglass Reinforced Epoxy conduit.
This conduit is self-extinguishing and exceeds the fire resistance requirements of U.L.
651 Section 17. As an added precaution, the City had the contractor install chain
link fencing around the abutment so that access can be controlled through a locked
gate.

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The construction project has been completed and the total cost was as follows:
Engineering $ 55,700
Construction $ 918,100
Const. Admin $ 40,000
Utility Replacement $1,250,000 est.
Total Project Cost:
$2,263,800
LESSONS LEARNED
After this disastrous fire the City realized just how vulnerable their infrastructure
system was. Like many cities across the nation, the City of Manchester has
undergone a change in the way they look at their vulnerabilities. They have
undertaken an effort to better understand their safety shortcomings. To that end they
have performed an assessment of their thirty-one bridges. This assessment focused
on areas such as the ones that existed on the Notre Dame Bridge that contributed to
the devastation that the arson fire had. Each bridge site was examined for undesirable
accessibility to critical areas, potential fire hazards such as deficient utility conduits,
and other areas that could create a potential for damage by vandalism.
Now that the assessment is completed the City is performing repairs on many of their
deficient bridges. On many bridges they are installing additional safety fencing and
securing bridge abutments and piers with locked gates. The City Police force has
increased their patrols of areas that are frequented by homeless people and are
vigilant for the construction of make shift shelters. On the few major bridges that
continue to carry utility conduits similar to the ones that were once on the Notre
Dame Bridge, the City is installing steel blast plates and insulation to prevent flame
and heat impingement from accessing the conduits.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the fire turned out to be a very costly lesson for the City of Manchester, the
results could have been much worse. It has been seen around the country, that major
hydrocarbon fires that occur under bridges have catastrophic results where entire
structures are lost and must be completely reconstructed. This fire, although much
smaller in scale than a fuel truck fire, had initial indications that it might require
major reconstruction of the bridge. Although the fire burned hot enough to melt
copper and warp the steel web plates, the air currents caused by the fire itself and the
heat radiating ability of the large web plates prevented the steel from undergoing any

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metallurgical changes. The temperature of the fire was great enough to increase pore
pressures in the concrete exceeding the concrete tensile strengths and spalling the
concrete along the lower mat of reinforcing. However, the fire did not affect the
strength of the remaining concrete and had no effect on the steel reinforcing.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
Bridge owners should take a serious look at the vulnerabilities of their infrastructure
system. Even if never faced with a potential terrorist threat, man-made disasters can
still occur. Their assessments should include an assessment of potential fire hazards,
potential vandalism, utility hazards and any other thing that could cause major
damage to a vulnerable bridge.
REFERENCES
Abrams, Melvin S. (1977). Performance of Concrete Structures Exposed to Fire,
Portland Cement Association, Skokie, Illinois.
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, (2000).
Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, Sixteenth Edition, 1996 as Amended
by the 2000 Interim Revisions, Washington, DC.
American Institute of Steel Construction, (1989). Manual of Steel Construction
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