Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia, Jr.

243 SCRA 436 Business Organization Corporation Law Corporate Nationality Public
Utility Nationality Requirement in Nationalized Areas of Activity
In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was
made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was
the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An
agreement was then made between the government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement
was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957, amended
by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e.,
railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is completed shall be turned over
to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years,
it was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium.
Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign
corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public
utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of
activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC
Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT
Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will not become the owner of a public utility
hence, the question of its nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation cannot
own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be owning are the
facilities that it will be building for the EDSA railway project. There is no prohibition against a
foreign corporation to own facilities used for a public utility. Further, it cannot be said that
EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one operating the public utility for it will be DOTC that will
operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one exacting fees from the people for the use
of the railway and from the proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT
Consortium. All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the facilities and receive
rent from the use thereof by the government for 25 years it will not operate the railway
transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose of building
a public utility it does not automatically mean that it is operating a public utility. The moment

for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise,
certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC
leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of
lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition
was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is
violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's
reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have
funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing
because they were not parties to the contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on Rreal parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same
one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense
be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in
a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the
Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at
issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL
PARTIES in INTEREST.

Lozada vs COMELEC (G.R. No. L-59068)

Posted: July 24, 2011 in Case Digests, Political Law
0
FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the
COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa
(IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution
which provides: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen
months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a
special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect
the Member to serve the unexpired term. COMELEC opposes the petition alleging,
substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are
not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does
not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the
latters decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section
11 of the New Constitution which reads: Any decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. There is in this case no
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this
Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision,
which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the
Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where
vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang
Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this
power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has
to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the

expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from
the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not
IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative
body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus.
What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was
intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the
IBP.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the
REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings,
not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed
certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use
savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation
Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve
the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually
savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who
may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be
given authority.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region
against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and
asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental
legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O.
192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have
set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule
upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the
state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly
withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract
is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.

Kilosbayan, Inc. v Guingona (Constitution)

Kilosbayan, Inc. v Guingona, Corona GR No. 113375 May 5, 1994
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.cralaw
Davide, Jr., J:

FACTS:
(1) Petitioners contend that denial by the Office of the President of its protest and
the statement of

Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop
Malacaang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in
February 1994, KI LOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this
petition.
In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that:
. . . X X THE OFFICE OF THE PRESI DENT, ACTING THROUGH RESPONDENTS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS, AND THE PCSO GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEI R DI SCRETI ON AND/OR FUN CTI
ONS TANTAMOUN T TO LACK OF JURISDI CTI ON AND/OR AUTHORI TY IN
RESPECTIVELY:
(A) APPROVING THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT TO, AND
(B) ENTERING INTO THE SO-CALLED "CONTRACT OF LEASE" WITH, RESPONDENT
PGMC FOR THE INSTALLATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATI ON OF THE ON-LINE
LOTTERY AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED AND/OR AUTHORIZED
UNDER THE SAID CONTRACT, CONSI DERING THAT:
a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from holding
and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity";
b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is
required before
Any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications
system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned
and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public
service, like the said telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign
Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042)to install, establish and operate the on-line lot to and
telecommunications systems.
(2) Public respondents Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, J r., Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of
lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration,
association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly
devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested
with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or
contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of itspurposes and objectives."
ISSUE:
(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and
(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract
of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC)is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid.
RATIO:
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be
allowed since the privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries,
or other similar activities is a franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a
settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of
rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against
the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the
common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly
and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful
provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is
withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-72119
May 29, 1987
Facts:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is

invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due course to this
Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the
latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service
eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the
alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular
information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Issues:
a.
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged to produce the
information regarding the eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
the Health Department of Cebu City?
b.
Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to
information?
Ruling:
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody
of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the
agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of
access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has
been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in
an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ."
(87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every

denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the

courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is
no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term
that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives,
or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
b. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law
which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case,
the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil
service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm
or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles
for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of
Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest

G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
Ponente: Regalado, J.:
Facts:
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for
the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed
a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease
contract conditions.
2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the
petitioner Bugnay Construction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market
building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City
assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city.
Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest
NO.
1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no
disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private
party which will fund the planned construction of the market building.

Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980

Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of
January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired.
He claimed that the afore cited provision was directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation.
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidacy of a
person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction
and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent
COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is
contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a
"bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and the
election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing

2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine
judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed
for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been
adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would
require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved
and the imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement,
while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a
reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there
is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself
tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither
does it permit such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the
objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision
that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as
a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.

Joya, et al. vs. PCGG

GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Facts: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by
then Pres.
Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christies of New York to auction
off Old Masters Paintings and the 18th and 19 th century silverware alleged to be part
of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf
of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG
from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule.
Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned
with the preservation and protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that the
paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and the
people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art alleging that they have
been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law, they have
the legal personality to restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to their
public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV
of the Constitution and RA 4846.
Issue: Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to
exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
Held: NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, because
they are not the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation
established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to

the Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot
prosper because what the petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act
because it is constitutionally infirmed not because they are after the fulfilment of a
positive duty required of the respondent public officials which is the only ground for
a writ of mandamus to be issued. The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well since
the items in question were acquired from private sources and not with public money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as this case. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin
the respondents from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date
which had long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic.
Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount
public interest is involved. However, there is no such justification in this
petition. Petition dismissed.
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and
other consolidated cases)
I.

THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No.
5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over
the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006
on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which
was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M.
on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials
for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited
as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II.

THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made

pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a

validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]

justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of
inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily

Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search
and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses

he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states
that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is
on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may
be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were
violated by the CIDG operatives.

Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority

Facts:Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and
44 of RepublicAct No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of
Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on
Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January
1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first,
he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy
that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal
structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of
illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past."
1
As a taxpayer, he allege t hat "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public
funds are properly and lawfully disbursed."
2
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He
maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the
essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving
the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or
controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the
petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper
party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted
upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very
lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are
not constitutionality in firm.
Issue :Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

Held: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of

an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of
the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented.
8
To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b)the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional
question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.
9
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. It is easily discernible in the
instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no
actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the
capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from
performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner
because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged
sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power
is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."

Pormento Vs Estrada Case digest

Facts: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph
Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was
denied by COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc.
Issue: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010
elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states: "[t]he President shall not
be eligible for any reelection."
Held: There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the
second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection"
will be premised on a person second election as President.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President
who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today.

Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case.
Private respondent was not elected President in the May 10, 2010 election. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a persons second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by the Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties. As such,
one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule,
the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
When a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered moot
when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is
likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the Court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 election, the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento vs. Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada and Commission
on Elections. G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010.

LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]
FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn
Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as
Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties
who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she
lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In
the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental

and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and
has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a naturalborn citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They
went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her
father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an
election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification
case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to
disqualification based on citizenship.
RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one
person should be in accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the
law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the
representative designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate
denaturalization proceeding.
2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had
taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23,
2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer
the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC
underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.
3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure.

Case Digest: Mariano v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118627
Ponente: Puno, J.

07 March 1995

FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as
taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854
was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed
city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on
specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions
2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article
X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys
acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to
extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the
Constitution
3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a
highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as
the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of
Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on
the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig;
on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did
not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was
meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

1. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and
the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continue exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the
following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the
issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these
events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among
the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue.
1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress
may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless
otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment of the law.

SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970 [Judicial Power]
FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his
graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor
students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who
composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that
the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has
become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there
was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a
tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a
remedy against judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of
judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In
order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a
tribunal for hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and
render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the
judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is,
and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine

when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication.


them.

The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasijudicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be
a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is
brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine
PACU vs Sec of educ
95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No.
2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the
ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be
secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a
private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must
be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain
textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution,
and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said
right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and
government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue
delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or
the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted
to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it
suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the
said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental
objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic
conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of
private education was intended by the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This
is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

Daza v. Singson
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of
this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner
and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the
LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal
from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the
Commission on Appointments
HELD:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing
as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President
of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered

under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission
shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire
in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions
not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent
shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body
pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.