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LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA

192ND REPORT

ON

PREVENTION OF VEXATIOUS LITIGATION

JUNE 2005

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Justice
M. JAGANNADHA RAO
Chairman

LAW COMMMISSION OF INDIA

SHASTRI BHAWAN
NEW DELHI-110 001
TEL : 23384475
FAX : (O11)23073864,23388870
E-mail : ch.ic@sb.nic.in
Residence :
1, JANPATH
NEW DELHI
TEL : 23019465

D.O.No.6(3)/105/2005-LC(LS)

June 7, 2005

Dear Shri Bhradwaj ji,

I have great pleasure in forwarding the 192nd Report of the Law
Commission on Prevention of Vexatious Litigation in our High Courts and
Courts subordinate to the High Courts. Earlier, law on this subject was
enacted in the former State of Madras and has been in force as the Madras
Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949, and also in the State of
Maharashtra wherein it is called the Maharashtra Vexatious Litigation
(Prevention) Act, 1971 but similar enactments have not been enacted in the
other States. The Law Commission, in its 189th Report on Revision of Court
Fee Structure (2004) has also recommended enacting a law on the subject
by the Parliament. The Commission has, therefore, taken up the subject in
detail in this Report. It has made an in depth study of the matter as enforced
in different jurisdictions.
The validity of the aforesaid Madras Act of 1949 was upheld by the
Supreme Court of India in P.H. Mawle vs. State of A.P.: (AIR 1965 SC
1827) and the Court pointed out the advantages of having such a law. It may
be observed that the Madras Act of 1949 and the Maharashtra Act of 1971
are based upon an old statute of England of 1896 and the law declared in
Grepe vs. Loam (1879) 39 ChD 168.
Several improvements have been
made in the law in that country, the latest provisions being sec 42 of the
(UK) Supreme Court Act, 1981. Under that Act, the English Courts have
decided a number of cases. In Attorney General vs. Banker 2000(1) F.L.R.
759, Lord Bingham explained the meaning of the words habitually and
persistently used in sec 42. The European Court in Application 11559 of
1985, H vs. UK: (1985) D&R 281 has also upheld the Vexatious Actions
(Scot Law) Act, 1898. The Ebert series of cases from 1999 to 2001 and the

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Bhamjee series of cases in 2003 in UK, decided by the Court of Appeal have
laid down the procedure to be followed so that the statutes do not offend the
principle of access to justice contained in Art 6 of the European
Convention. In Australia and New Zealand also laws on prevention of
vexatious litigation have been enacted. (Vide High Court Rules 1952 (Rule
63.6 of High Court of Australia; the Western Australia Vexatious
Proceedings Prevention Act, 2002; the Queensland Vexatious Litigants Act,
1981, etc.) There are also provisions in this behalf in sec 88 of the New
Zealand Judicature Act, 1908.
The main purpose of enacting the law on the subject is to prevent a
person from instituting or continuing vexatious proceedings habitually and
without reasonable ground in the High Courts and subordinate courts.
After considering various laws on the subject in Commonwealth
jurisdictions as also the aforesaid Indian statutes of Madras and Maharashtra,
we have recommended in the report that if a person is instituting or
continuing vexatious proceedings habitually and without reasonable
ground, the Advocate General or the Registrar of the High Court or the
person against whom such cases are filed (with leave of the High Court) may
move the High Court (in a Division Bench) to declare the person a
vexatious litigant. Once that declaration is made, it is published in the
Gazette and communicated to all subordinate courts. Thereafter, the person
so declared as the vexatious litigant, can file civil or criminal proceedings in
the High Court or subordinate courts only (i) with the leave of the High
Court or, (ii) (if he is filing such cases in the subordinate courts) with the
leave of the District and Sessions Court. These courts will examine whether
the proceedings proposed to be instituted or being continued, have a prima
facie ground and also whether they are not an abuse of the process of court.
If the leave is refused, the proposed or pending case filed by such person will
be dismissed by the court.
If the vexatious litigant files any such case
before a court without obtaining leave as required by the Act, the case will
be dismissed and costs will have to be awarded by the court in which such
proceedings are filed. In addition, the High Court which imposed the
condition of leave, if it thinks fit, may punish the vexatious litigant for
contempt of the High Court. However, the provisions of the proposed Act
will not be applicable to proceedings taken by the vexatious litigant in
defending himself against proceedings filed by other parties.
Similarly,
proceedings under Art 226 of the Constitution of India are also excluded
from its purview. The bar against vexatious litigant for taking out criminal

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proceedings is restricted to private complaints that he may propose to lodge

against others.
The proposed Act will be applicable to the whole of the India, except
the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It fills an important area where there has
been a vacuum in the past nearly five decades in this country. The
Commission feels that if the recommendations materialize into an Act, lawabiding citizens in the country will have legal protection from vexatious
litigations pursued against them, in the same manner as protection has been
available in the regions covered by the former State of Madras since 1949
and as available in the State of Maharashtra from 1971.
With regards,
Yours sincerely,
(Justice M. Jagannadha Rao)
Sri H.R. Bharadwaj
Honble Minister for Law and Justice
Government of India
Shastri Bhawan
NEW DELHI

INDEX

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Chapter

Title

Introductory

II

Existing State Enactments to Prevent

Vexatious Litigation (Madras, Maharashtra

Page Nos.

3 to 6
7 to 13

and Kerala)
III

Legislative Competence of Parliament to enact

The Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Law

14 to 17

IV

Curbs on Vexatious Litigation in United

Kingdom

18 to 44

V
54

Curbs on Vexatious Litigation in USA

VI

Curbs on Vexatious Litigation in Australia

And New Zealand

55 to 72

VII

Curbs on Vexatious Litigation in Canada

73 to 75

VIII

Recommendation for Preventing Vexatious

Litigation in India

76 to 94

45 to

Appendix I Draft Bill The Vexatious Litigation Prevention 95 to 101

Bill, 2005

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTORY
Earlier Reports of the Law Commission
In the 189th Report of the Law Commission of India on Revision of
Court-Fee Structure (February 2004), there was a reference to frivolous and
vexatious litigation. In the Introductory Chapter and in Chapter VI of that
Report, the Commission had occasion to refer to the constant demand for
increase in court fee to prevent frivolous or vexatious litigation.

The

Commission agreed with the critical remarks of Lord Macaulay made over
one hundred and fifty years ago in connection with the preamble to the
Bengal Regulation of 1795. The preamble to the said Regulation stated that
the purpose of prescribing higher court fee in the said Regulation was
intended to drive away vexatious litigation. But Lord Macaulay who was
then heading the Law Commission of pre-independent India disagreed with
the said statement in the preamble and said that the increase in court fee, if it
was intended to drive away vexatious litigation, it would also drive away
genuine and bona fide litigation. In his minutes dated 25th June, 1835 he
described the preamble as:
the most eminently absurd preamble, that was ever drawn.
He further stated that there was frivolous and vexatious litigation long before
the system of levying court fee came into vogue and it continued after the
levy also. He posed various questions:

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It is undoubtedly a great evil that frivolous and vexatious actions

should be instituted. But it is an evil for which the Government has
only itself and its agents to blame, and for which it has the power of
providing a most sufficient remedy ..

..

Why did dishonest plaintiffs apply to the Courts before the institution
fee was imposed? Evidently because they thought that they had a
chance of success. Does the institution of fee diminish that chance?
Not in the smallest degree. It neither makes pleadings clearer, nor the
law plain It will no doubt drive away dishonest plaintiffs who
cannot pay the fee. But it will also drive away honest plaintiff.
The views of Lord Macaulay were accepted in the 14th Report of the
Law Commission (Chapter 22, para 6) and it was observed:
29. The argument that it is necessary to impose high court fee to
prevent frivolous litigation, already referred to has no substance.
(para 29, Ch 22)
These views were further reiterated in the 128th Report of the Law
Commission on Cost of Litigation (1988) (para 3.6).
In Chapter VII of the 189th Report, the Law Commission proposed that
a separate law be made on the lines of the Madras Vexatious Litigation
(Prevention) Act, 1949 (Act VIII of 1949) and referred to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in P.H. Mawle vs. State of A.P: AIR 1965 SC 1827 in
regard to the applicability and validity of that Act and to other cases. Under
Recommendation 10, in Chapter IX, the Law Commission recommended:

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We recommend that, on the lines of the above mentioned Madras Act

VIII of 1949, a Central Act may be enacted to curb vexatious or
frivolous litigation.
That frivolous and vexatious litigation has to be separately tackled and
not by way of increase in court fee was also stated by the Supreme Court in
Secretary to Govt. of Madras vs. P.R. Sriramulu : 1996)(1) SCC 345 (p 351)
where it was observed as follows:
In the beginning the imposition of the (court) fee was nominal but in
the course of time, it was enhanced gradually under the impression
that it would prevent the institution of frivolous and groundless
litigation and as an effective deterrent to the abuse of process of the
Court without causing any impediment in the institution of just claims.
However significant this view may be that the levy of fees would have
a tendency to put a restraint on frivolous litigation, that view, at any
rate, had the merit of seeking to achieve a purpose which was believed
to have some relevance to the administration of justice. Since about
past two decades, the levy of court fee on higher scales would seem to
find its justification, nor in any purpose related to the sound
administration of justice but in the need of the State Government for
revenue as a means for recompense.
In the light of the recommendation in the 189th Report, referred to
above, the Commission has decided to deal with frivolous and vexatious
litigation in detail. It was, however, found that the special statutes which

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deal with prevention of vexatious litigation are different from those dealing
with frivolous litigation. The concepts are also quite different. As will be
seen in he ensuing chapter, vexatious litigation means habitually or
persistently filing cases on the issues in which have already been decided
once or more than once or against the same parties or their successors in
interest or against different parties. But so far as frivolous litigation is
concerned, a litigation may be frivolous,- without the need for persistent
filing of similar case,- even if it has no merits whatsoever and is intended to
harass the defendant or is an abuse of the process of the Court. Further, there
are some existing provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure like Order 6
Rule 16, Order 7 Rule 1, sec 35A etc. which deal with frivolous litigation.
It is also necessary to deal with vexatious criminal proceedings which now
fall under sec 250 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973.

Those

provisions may indeed have to be strengthened further. For these reasons we

are separating the issues and giving separate reports. Hence, it was decided
that two separate reports are necessary, one on preventing vexatious
litigation and another on restricting frivolous litigation.
We have, therefore, decided that this Report will deal with prevention
of vexatious litigation only. We shall following this up by a separate report
on restriction of frivolous litigation.

Chapter II
Existing State enactments to Prevent vexatious litigation
(Madras, Maharashtra and Kerala)

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Atleast in two States, Madras and Maharashtra there are statutes made
by the State Legislatures in 1949 and 1971 respectively, to declare a person
as a vexatious litigant and prevent him from initiating action in court unless
he obtains previous permission of a specified authority. In Kerala, a Bill has
been proposed.
To declare a person as a vexatious litigant and impose restriction on
his right to access to justice requires legislation on the subject. But, a
litigation, if it is found to be vexatious, can be stayed by the court under its
inherent powers. The statements referred to above lay down the procedural
aspects in regard to exercise of inherent power of the Court to prevent abuse
of its process.
Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) (Act 8 of 1949):
The above Act was designed to control vexatious litigation. It refers
to persons who habitually and without any reasonable ground, institute
vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Act,
provide for declaring a person as a vexatious litigant upon the application of
the Advocate General and once he is so declared, he cannot initiate any
action of a civil or criminal nature without prior leave of the Court. The
declaration will be published in the State Gazette. The following are the
relevant important provisions.
Section 2(1): If, on an application made by the Advocate General, the
High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and without any

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reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal,

in any court or courts, the High Court may, after giving that person an
opportunity of being heard, order that no proceedings civil or criminal,
shall be instituted by him in any Court
(i)

in the Presidency town, without the leave of the High Court;

and

(ii)

elsewhere, without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge.

(2)

.. .. .

Section 3: The leave referred to in section 2, sub section (1) shall

not be given in respect of any proceedings unless the High Court or, as
the case may be, the District and Sessions Judge, is satisfied that there
is prima facie ground for such proceedings.
Section 4: Any proceedings instituted by a person against whom an
order under section 2, subsection (1), has been made, without
obtaining the leave referred to in that sub section, shall be dismissed.
Provided that this section shall not apply to any proceedings
instituted for the purpose of obtaining such leave.
Section 5: A copy of every such order made under section 2,
subsection (1), shall be published in the Fort St. George Gazette.
The above provisions of the Madras Act were challenged as bad for want of
legislative competence and also as offending Arts 14 and 19 of the
Constitution of India. The said challenge was rejected by a Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in P.H. Mawle vs. State of A,.P. (AIR 1965 SC

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1827). Hidayatullah J (as he then was) pointed out that such legislation were
there in England, namely statutes 16 and 17 vict Ch 30 (1896), later replaced
by sec 51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Constitution Act, 1925)(15 &
16 Geo Vc. 49). (These laws have since been replaced by sec 42 of the
Supreme Court Act, 1981).
In the Supreme Court, an argument that the Madras legislature had no
competency as it was not covered by any entry in List II or List III of the
Government of India Act 1935 was rejected. It was stated that the subject of
the said legislation was covered by Entry 2 of List II (Jurisdiction and
powers of all Court except the Federal Court, with respect of the matters in
this List; procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts), and entry 2 of List III
(Criminal procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal
procedure at the date of passing of this Act) and Entry 4 of List II (Civil
procedure, including the law of Limitation and all matters included in the
Code of Civil Procedure at the date of passing this Act) of the VII Schedule
to the 1935 Act.
The Supreme Court, after upholding the legislative competence of the
Madras Legislature considered the validity vis--vis Art 14 and Art 19 of the
Constitution of India.

It was argued that Art 14 was attracted because

litigants were being divided into two classes and being discriminated. The
Supreme Court rejected the contention that
the litigants who are prevented from approaching the Court without
the sanction of the High Court etc. are a class by themselves. They are
described in the Act as persons who habitually and without

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reasonable cause file vexatious actions, civil or criminal. The Act is

not intended to deprive such a person of his right to go to Court. It
only creates a check so that the Court may examine the bona fides of
any claim before the opposite party is harassed. Such an Act was
passed in England, has been applied in several cases to prevent an
abuse of the process of Court. In its object, the Act promotes public
good because it cannot be claimed that it is an inviolable right of any
citizen to bring vexatious actions without control, either legislative or
administrative. The Act subserves public interest and the restraint that
it creates is designed to promote public good. The Act does not
prevent a person declared to be habitual litigant from bringing genuine
and bone fide actions.
vexatious.

It only seeks to cut-short attempt to be

In our judgment, the Act cannot be described as

unconstitutional or offending either Art 19 or Art 14.

Madras Act 8/49 is confined to old geographical areas of AP, Kerala and
Karnataka which were parts of Old Madras Province before the SR Act,
1956:
Another question that arose in P.H. Mawle vs. State of AP AIR 1965
SC 1827 referred to above was whether the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
was right in applying the provisions of the Madras Act 1949 to the cities of
Hyderabad and Secunderabad where the appellant was filing a number of
cases. The Supreme Court, after referring to sections 65 and 119 of the
States Re-organisation Act, 1956, held that the previous law in operation
before 1.11.56 in the respective parts of the newly formed State of Andhra
Pradesh was confined to the geographical limits in which it was operating

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before 1.11.56 and could not be extended to other geographical areas of the
new State of Andhra Pradesh unless this was done by the legislature of the
newly formed State of Andhra Pradesh.

The Madras Act, 1949 was,

therefore, held not applicable to the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad,

which were outside the territorial limits of the former State of Madras.
In the State of Kerala, a similar question arose in Advocate General vs.
T.A. Rajendran 1988(1) KLT and in Jose vs. Madhu: 1994(1) KLT 855 and
it was held that the Madras Act of 1949 was not applicable to the areas in the
State of Kerala except in regard to the North Malabar area which was part of
the composite State of Madras before 1.11.56.
Maharashtra Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1971 is confined to the
State of Maharashtra
This Act of 1971 is made applicable to fresh cases to be filed as well
as to pending actions. It is otherwise on the same lines as the Madras Act of
1949. Under this Act, the Advocate General can apply for declaring the
opposite party as a vexatious litigant, as per sec 2(j), but the applications
have to be filed on the Appellate Side of the High Court (see Rule 7 of the
Rules) and should be heard by a Division Bench of the Court and order of
the Court should be published as prescribed in the Act (published in the
Gazette) and be circulated to such courts as the High Court would order.
A person against whom an order under sec 2(i) was passed, could
apply for leave to institute the either to the High Court (on the original side)
or the High Court (on the appellate side) or to the District Judge or to the

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Sessions Judge, as the case may be, while instituting or continuing civil or
criminal proceedings.

Unless the courts above referred to, granted

permission for initiating or continuing the proceedings, the Court would not
take up the action on adjudication.
Kerala
So far as the State of Kerala is concerned, only the old Malabar area
was part of the former State of Madras before 1.11.56. As pointed while
discussing the applicability of the Madras Act of 1949, the said Act was
restricted in its territorial application only to the former State of Madras, here
the North Malabar part of the new State of Kerala (which was formed on
1.11.56). It was held in Advocate General vs. T.A. Rajendran: 1988(1) KLT
305 and Jose vs. Madhu: 1494(1) KLT 855 that it was not applicable to other
parts of the State of Kerala.
Therefore, the Kerala Law Reforms Committee has now recommended
a legislation on the same lines as the Madras Act of 1949 to be made
applicable to the entire State of Kerala. The Government brought forward
the Bill titled The Kerala Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Bill, 2002. It
applies to civil, criminal or other proceedings.
Section 2 of the proposed Kerala Act permits the Advocate General to
mave the High Court to declare a person as a vexatious litigant if he is
habitually and without any reasonable ground initiating vexatious
proceedings of a civil, criminal or of other nature in any court or courts. The
person has to obtain leave of the High Court if he is initiating a proceeding

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in the High Court or of the District Court if he is initiating a proceeding in

any other court. Section 6 requires the order to be published in the Gazette.
Section 3 requires the person to obtain leave of the High Court (in Division
Bench) or District Court, as the case may be, by establishing prima facie
grounds. Section 4 provides for an appeal to the Division Bench of the High
Court if the District Court refuses to grant permission to the vexatious
litigant. Section 7 declares that the Madras Act, 1949 shall cease to apply to
the Malabar District.
There are no such statutes in other States and that is the reason why
we are now recommending that Parliament make a law on the lines of the
Madras Act, 1949 and Maharashtra Act, 1971 so as to be applicable to all
States and Union Territories.

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Chapter III
Legislative competence of Parliament to enact the Vexatious Litigation
(Prevention) Law.
We have pointed out that currently there are legislations made in the
former State of Madras and in the State of Maharashtra on the subject of
Prevention of Vexatious Litigation.

There is also a Bill proposed in the

State of Kerala.
The constitutional validity of the Madras Act of 1949 has been upheld
by the Supreme Court in P.H. Mawle vs. State of A.P.: AIR 1965 SC 1827.
We are of the view that there is a great need to have a law on the same
subject for being applied to the whole of India, whereby a person can be
declared by a Division Bench of the High Court as a vexatious litigant if he
has been initiating vexatious litigation. In that event the Advocate General
of the State or such other law officer to be notified by the concerned State or
Union Territory could apply to the Division Bench of the High Court to
declare the person as a vexatious litigant, have the order published in the
Gazette and inform all the subordinate courts. Thereafter, he would not be
allowed to file any civil or criminal cases or any other type of case in the
High Court, except with the leave of the High Court or the District Court, as
the case may be.
It is, therefore, proposed to recommend the bringing into force of a
comprehensive legislation on prevention of vexatious litigation applicable to
all the States and Union Territories.

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We shall first examine the legislative competence of the Parliament to

legislate on this subject of vexatious litigation.
As we shall presently show, Parliament has necessary powers to make
a law on Prevention of Vexatious Litigation, applicable uniformly to all
States and Union Territories.
In this context, it is well to remember that the Supreme Court in P.H.
Mawle vs. State of AP: AIR 1965 SC 1827, dealing with the legislative
competence of the then State Legislature of Madras under the Government of
India Act, 1935 referred to Entry 2 of List II and Entries 2 and 4 of List III of
the VII Schedule of that Act.
In the Government of India Act, 1935, these Entries read as follows:
Entry 2 of List II: Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the
Federal Court, with respect to the matters in this List; procedure in
Rend and Revenue Courts.
Entry 2 of List III: Criminal procedure, including all matters included
in the criminal procedure at the date of the passing of this Act.
Entry 4 of List III: Civil procedure, including the law of Limitation
and all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the date of
commencement of this Act; the recovery in a Chief Commissioners
Province.

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The position under the Constitution of India, after the Constitution (42nd
Amendment) Act, 1976 (w.e.f. 3.1.77) is as follows:
List III: Concurrent List
Entry 2: Criminal procedures, including all matters included in the
Code of Criminal Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution.
Entry 11A: Administration of justice; constitution and organization of
all Courts, except the Supreme Court and the High court;
Entry 13 : Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code
of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution,
limitation and arbitration.
Entry 46: Jurisdictions and powers of all courts, except the Supreme
Court, with respect to any of the matter in this List.
It is to be noted that under the 42nd Amendment the words in Entry 3 of List
II of VII Schedule of the Constitution Administration of justice, constitution
and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High
Courts have been transferred to Entry 11A of the Concurrent List.
On the basis of the reasoning of the Supreme Court in P.H. Mawles
case holding in favour of the legislative power of the State Legislature of
Madras under Entry 2 of List II, Entries 2 and 4 of List III of the Government
of India Act, 1935, the position under the Constitution becomes clear.

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Civil and Criminal Procedures continue, even under the Constitution

of India in List III of VII Schedule, viz. Entry 2 and Entry 13. Further, the
broad entry of Administration of Justice which was in List II has been
shifted into the List III as Entry 11A by the 42nd Amendment. Entry 46 of
List III relates to jurisdiction and power of Courts (except Supreme Court).
In view of these Entries, it is clear that on the very reasoning of the Supreme
Court in P.H. Mawle, Parliament has ample power under Entries 2, 11A, 13
and 46 of List III to legislate on the subject of vexatious litigation, in both
civil and criminal jurisdictions, in as much as these entries cover the same
field as were covered by Entry 2 of List II and Entries 2 and 4 of List III of
VII Schedule to the Government of India, Act, 1935. Thus there is no
difficulty on the question of legislative competence of Parliament.

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Chapter IV
Curbs on Vexatious Litigation in United Kingdom
In England, principles based on inherent power of Court to prevent
abuse of process were coupled with legislation and rules to prevent frivolous
and vexatious litigation. We shall refer to these developments and the recent
case law on the subject wherein in some cases, after passing various restraint
orders, the Court felt compelled even to restrict the litigant from entering the
Royal Courts of Justice, under its inherent powers. The various steps which
can finally lead to such orders, if need be, have to be carefully examined
because the right to access to courts is today recognized as a basic right.
(See Ch. II of 189th Report).
1.

The Grepe vs. Loam Order (1879): Leave of Court for future
applications
The first step the Courts took under inherent powers goes back to

1879. An important principle was laid down in Grepe vs. Loam: (1879) 39
Ch. D. 168 and is still followed even now in the United Kingdom in recent
cases. The head note in the above case reads thus:
Repeated frivolous applications for the purpose of impeaching a
judgment having been made by the same parties, the Court of Appeals
made an order prohibiting any further application without leave of the
Court.

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In that case the first of the actions resulted in a judgment dated 5th
July 1879; the second action relating to the same property resulted in a
judgment dated 6th June, 1882. Notice of appeal against this judgment was
given by the infant defendants in 1883. The appeal was abandoned and by
order dated 9th April, 1884, the costs of respondents were ordered to be paid
by the next friend of appellants.
Thereafter in Nov. 1885, April 1886, June and July 1887, various
applications were made, some to the trial court and some to the appellate
court, seeking the setting aside of the judgment dated 6th June, 1882. All
were dismissed with costs.
A fresh case was started on 27th Oct. 1887 to arrest the minutes of
judgment in the second case.

Lindley LJ after stating that he had

recollection of a special type of order made in such cases earlier, passed the
following order which today is known as Grepe vs. Loam order:
That the said applicants or any of them be not allowed to make any
further applications in these actions or either of them to this Court or
to the Court below without leave of this Court being first obtained.
And if notice of any such applications shall be given without such
leave being obtained, the Respondents shall not be required to appear
upon such applications, and it shall be dismissed without being
heard.

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2.

Inherent powers: The Supreme Court Practice (UK)in its commentary

under Order 18 Rule 19 refers to inherent power of Courts to stay or

dismiss actions which are frivolous or vexatious. It states: (page 346)
Apart from the rule, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to stay or
dismiss actions, and to strike out pleadings which are vexatious or
frivolous, or in any way an abuse of the process of the Court, under
which it could deal with all the cases included in this Rule (Reichel vs.
Magrath (1889) 14. App.Cas 665.

Gleeson vs. J. Wippall & Co.

Ltd.: 1977(1) WLR 510. It can stay or dismiss actions, before the
hearing, which it holds to be frivolous or vexatious: Metropolitan
Bank vs. Pooley (1885) 10 App les 210. This jurisdiction is not
diminished by Order 18 Rule 19.
3.

(UK) Order 18 Rule 19 (R.S.C.): Striking off frivolous or vexatious

pleadings.
An order to strike off frivolous or vexatious pleadings can also be
passed where pleadings contain such pleas. The relevant provision in UK is
as follows:
Order 18 Rule 19 (1) The Court may, at any stage of the proceedings,
order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement of
any writ in the actions, or anything in any pleading or in the
endorsement, on the ground that
(a)

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case

may be; or

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24

(b)

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

(c)

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action;

or

(d)

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court; and

may order the actions to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to
be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

(2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under para (1)(a)

(3) .. ..

New Civil Procedure Rule 24.2 provides that the Court may give
summary judgment in favour of the defendant if it considers that the
claimant has no real prospect of succeeding in the claim.
There is considerable case law in UK under this Rule but we shall
refer to a few of them relevant for the subject of frivolous and vexatious
actions.
The expression frivolous or vexatious means cases which are
obviously frivolous or vexatious (Att. Gen of Duchy of Lancaster vs. L &
N W Rly (1892)3 Ch 274 (277). The expression includes proceedings which
are an abuse of the process: Ashmore vs. British Local Corp: (1990)(2) All
ER 981 (CA).

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25

UK Statutes to prevent vexatious litigation in 1896, 1925 and 1981:

The earliest statute in UK was Act 16 and 17, vict. Ch 30 (1896) and
was replaced by sec 51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. V.C 49).
That has now been replaced by sec 42 of the Supreme Court Act,
1981.

The 1981 Act is an improvement over the 1925 Act in several

respects. In particular, by the 1985 Amendment, the Court can now pass a
civil proceedings order or a criminal proceedings order or all
proceedings order, as the case may be, and no appeal would be allowed
from an order refusing leave. But, the Courts have said that the order under
sec. 42 is the last of the various other options open to the Court before such
an order is passed.
Section 42 (as amended by sec 24 of Prosecution of Offences Act,
1985), reads as follows:
Section 42: If, on an application made by the Attorney General under
this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually
and persistently and without reasonable ground

(a)

instituted vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High

Court or any inferior Court, and whether against the same
persons or against different persons; or

LatestLaws.com
26

(b)

made vexatious applications in any civil proceedings whether in

the High Court or any inferior Court and whether instituted by
him or another, or

(c)

instituted vexatious prosecutions (whether against the same

person or different persons),

the Court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of
being heard, make a civil proceedings order, a criminal proceedings order or
an all proceedings order.
(1A) In the section, civil proceedings order means an order that

(a)

no civil proceedings shall, without the leave of the High Court, be

instituted in any Court by the person against whom the order is
made;

(b)

any civil proceedings instituted by him in any Court before the

making of the order shall not be continued by him without the
leave of the High Court; and

(c)

no application (other than the one for leave under this suitor) shall
be made by him, in any civil proceedings instituted in any court by
any person without leave of the High Court;

Criminal proceedings order means an order that

(a)

no information shall be laid before a justice of the peace by the

person again whom the order is made without leave of the High
Court; and

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27

(b)

no application for leave to prefer a bill of indictment shall be made

by him without the leave of the High Court; and

all proceedings order means an order which has the combined effect of the
two other orders.
(2)

An order under sub section (1) may provide that it shall cease to have
effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in
force indefinitely.

(3)

Leave for institution or continuance of, or for the making an

application in, any civil proceedings by a person who is the subject of
an order for the time being in force under sub section (1), shall not be
given unless the High Court is satisfied that the proceedings or
applications are not an abuse of process of the Court in question and
that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application.

(3A) Leave for the laying of an information or for an application for leave
to prefer a bill of indictment by a person who is the subject of an order
for the time being in force under subsection (1), shall not be given
unless the High Court is satisfied that the institution of the prosecution
is not an abuse of the criminal process and that there are reasonable
grounds for the institution of the prosecution by the applicant.
(4)

No appeal shall lie from a decision of the High Court refusing leave
required by virtue of this section.

(5)

A copy of any order under sub section (1) shall be published in the
London Gazette.

What is meant by the words habitually and persistently:

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28

Lord Bingham explained in Attorney General vs. Banker: 2000(1)

FLR 759 the meaning of the words habitually and persistently (para 22) in
sec. 42(1) as follows:
The hallmark usually is that the plaintiff sues the same party
repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps
with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing
on defendants the burden of revisiting claim after claim; that the
claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with
minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, in actions against
successive parties who, if they were to be sued at all shall be joined in
the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges every
adverse decision on appeal, and that the claimant refuses to take any
notice of or give effect to order of the Court. The essential vice of
habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating where
earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and where on any rational and
objective assessment the time has come to stop.
Human Rights and Prevention of Vexatious Litigation:
We shall next refer to the rulings in UK and the European Court of
Human Rights where such prevention has been held not to violate the right
to access to justice as described in Art 6 of the European Convention.
Question has arisen in UK whether the provisions preventing or rather
regulating vexatious litigation offends Art 6 of the European Convention.

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29

European Commission on UK Act:

Art 6 of the European Convention guarantees a right to expeditious
determination of rights and obligations by an impartial and independent
judicial body. Question has arisen whether a provision like sec. 42 of the
Supreme Court Act 1981 is in violation of the Convention. In Golder vs.
United Kingdom: 1975(1) EHRR. 524, the European Commision on Human
Rights observed, in the course of a general survey of the subject, that in the
case of the United Kingdom, the provisions relating to curbing vexatious
litigation do not violate the citizens right to access to the Courts. It said:
Vexatious litigants in the United Kingdom are persons whom the
Courts treat specially because they have abused their right to access.
But, having been declared a vexatious litigant, it is open to a person to
prove to the Court that he has sustainable cause of action and he will
then be allowed to proceed. The control of vexatious litigants is
entirely in the hands of the Courts .

Such control must be

considered an acceptable form of judicial proceedings.

The Commission also held in Ashingdane vs. UK (1985) 7 EHRR 528 that
the right of access to courts is not absolute. In. Application 11559 of 1985,
H Vs. UK (1985) (45 D&R 281), the applicant challenged the provisions of
the vexatious Actions (Scot Law) Act, 1898.

Declaring the application

inadmissible, the Commission relied upon Golder and Ashingdane and on

the validity of the provision requiring leave of Court, and observed (p 285):

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30

The vexatious litigation order .. did not limit the applicants access
to court completely, but provided for a review of a senior Judge . of
any case the applicant wished to bring. The Commission considers
that such a review is not such as to deny the essence of the right of
access to court, indeed some form of regulation of a access to court is
necessary in the interests of the proper administration of justice and
must therefore, be regarded as a legitimate aim.
Three Human Rights cases Ebert, Mathews and Bhamjee
Chadwick and Buxton JJ in Ebert vs. Official Receiver 2001(3) ALL ER 942
(CA) decided a typical case in the Court of Appeal. They said, adverting to
the decisions of the European Court and the provisions requiring leave of
court in sec 42 of the 1981 Act, as follows:
The detailed and elaborate procedures operated under section 42 of
the 1981 Act respect the important ECHR values that procedures
relating to the assertion of rights should be under judicial rather than
administrative control; that an order inhibiting a citizens freedom
should not be made without detailed inquiry; that the citizen should be
able to revisit the issue in the context of new facts and of new
complaints that he wishes to make; and that each step should be the
subject of a separate judicial decision. The procedures also respect
proportionality in the general access to public resources, in that they
seek to prevent the monopolization of court services by a few litigants;
our aim, and the national arrangements to implement it, that the

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31

Strasbourg organs, applying the doctrine of merging of applications,

are likely to respect.
The Judges also pointed out that in H M Attorney General vs.
Mathews (The Times, 2 March 2001), the Divisional Court had also held that
the procedure leading to an order under sec 42 was in conformity with the
requirements of Art 6 of the European Convention.
In Bhamjee vs. David Fordstick: 2004 (1) WLR 88, the Master of
Rolls, Lord Phillips (speaking for himself, Brooke and Dyson JJ) explained
the law on the subject exhaustively.
He first referred to Ebert vs. Official Receiver 2001 EWCA Liv 340
(2002 (1) WLR 32) (25th July 2003) where the Court held that sec 42 was
convention compliant. The learned Judge referred to the observations of
Lord Woolf in Ebert vs. Venvil 1999(3) WLR 670 to a similar effect. The
cases under the Strasburg jurisprudence in Golder vs. UK (A/18) 1 EHRR
524: Ashingdane vs. UK (A/93)(1985) 7 EHRR 528; Tolstoy Miloslavask
vs UK (A/323)(1995) 20 EHRR 442 were referred to for the principle that a
court might regulate the access to justice in such a way that its processes are
not abused.
According to Lord Phillips, access to justice could be limited if two
conditions were satisfied:

LatestLaws.com
32

(i)

that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left
to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very
essence of the right is impaired;

(ii)

that a restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and there is a

reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be achieved.

It was pointed out that H vs. UK (1985) 45 D&R 281 of the European
Commission (already referred) upheld an order under the Vexatious Actions
(Scotland) Act, 1898 restraining a vexatious litigant from bringing an action
pursuant to an earlier order under the said Act.
Lord Phillips summarized the position under the following headings:
(i) Protective measures Strasbourg Jurisprudence; (ii) Protective measures,
Grepe vs. Loam; (iii) An extended Grepe vs. Loam order as passed by
Neuberger J approved by the Court of Appeal in Ebert vs. Vervil 1999(3)
WLR 670; (iv) Protective measures under sec 42; (v) Exceptional orders in
Att Gen vs. Ebert 2002(2) All ER 789; (vi) restraining the litigant from
entering the Royal Courts or from interfering with the Court or its staff, and
(vii) only paper procedure (i.e. no oral hearing) as in Taylor Landrena (2000)
QB 528.
An extended Grepe vs. Loam order (extended civil restraint order) is
one as passed in Ebert vs. Venvil, where the Court of Appeal restrained all
such activity by the person before the Court of Appeal, or in any Division of
the High Court or in any county Court. A High Court may make a similar
order in respect of any Division of the High Court or County Court. At the

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33

Country Court level, it could be done by a designated Judge. Lord Phillips

summarized the law as follows: (para 33)
It is, therefore, well established on authority that
(i)

This Court, like any Court, has an inherent jurisdiction to

protect its process from abuse;

(ii)

The categories of abuse will never be closed;

(iii)

No litigant has any substantive right to trouble the Court with

litigation which represents an abuse of its process;

(iv)

So long as the very essence of a litigants right to access the

Court is not extinguished, a Court has a right to regulate its
processes as it thinks fit (absent any statute or rule or practice
direction to the contrary effect) as its remedies are proportionate
to the identified abuse (whether it is existing or threatened);

(v)

One way in which a Court may legitimately regulate its

processes is by directing that the procedure be conducted in
writing (rather than by giving an oral hearing).
So far as the last of these matters is concerned, if a litigant
persistently makes applications or institutes actions that are
devoid of merit, then by his conduct, he will be disentitled to the
hearing that would otherwise be available as of right. We know
of no reasonable suggestion that the equivalent procedures in
the House of Lords or the European Court of Human Rights
itself, are not ECHR complaint.

Human Rights and restricting an existing right of appeal (ECHR and UK):

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34

This question of giving a right to appeal arises because several statutes

debar an appeal against an order declaring a person as a vexatious litigant.
Or where leave is refused for filing fresh actions.
In Bhamjee vs. David Fordstick 2000(1) WLR 88, Lord Phillips
referred to the Strasbourg principles in Belgian Linguistics case 1 EHRR
252, (283)(Para 9) where it was held that Art 6 did not guarantee a right of
appeal but that where it was granted there should be no discrimination unless
there was legitimate reason. The European Court had observed in that case
as follows:
Art 6 of the Convention does not compel States to institute a system
of appeal courts. A State which does set up such courts consequently
goes beyond its obligations under Article 6.

However, it would

violate that Article, read in conjunction with Art 14, were it to debar
certain persons from these remedies without a legitimate reason while
making them available to others in respect of the same type of
actions.
Lord Phillips said that where a litigant can be shown to have
persistently abused the processes of the court by making applications and
instituting proceedings which have been adjudged to be totally devoid of
merit, despite earlier restraints, this is a legitimate reason why the time
should come when he is limited to one chance of showing that the new
action he wishes to bring, or the new application he wishes to make, is not
totally devoid of merit. If it arguably has merit, then of course, it should be

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35

permitted to proceed in the usual way. Such a procedure of giving only one
chance and not allowing a second chance in appeal is valid. In Ebert vs.
Official Receiver 2001 EWCA (civ) 340: 2002(1) LR 320 (CA) the court
held that the equivalent statutory procedure in sec 42(4) of the 1981 Act was
convention compliant. Compare the approval of the European Commission
on Human Rights in H vs. K (1985) 45 D&R 281, which Buxton LJ cites in
para 8 of the judgment in Ebert vs. Official Receiver.
Lord Phillips then referred to the situations in which an appeal could
be foreclosed by judicial order (under section 42(4) refusing leave to appeal)
He said:
If a litigant subject to an extended civil restraint order or a general
civil restraint order, continues to make the requisite applications
pursuant to that order which are customarily dismissed on the grounds
that they are totally devoid of merit, a Judge may, if he thinks fit,
direct that if any further application is dismissed on the same grounds,
the decision will be final. Thereafter the appeal court will have no
jurisdiction to grant permission to appeal against any subsequent
refusal of permission
Such restrictions will be Strasbourg compliant, Lord Phillips held.
(i)

Ebert Series of cases:

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36

We shall now refer to the Ebert series of cases leading to the applicant
being banned from entry into Royal Courts for three years.

The cases

decided at different stages are also reported judgments.

Mr. Ebert was adjudicated bankrupt on 22nd July 1997. Since then he
directed himself, with great energy, to get the order annulled or to show, by
collateral litigation that he was a victim of conspiracy.
(i)

As his repeated applications in regard to the same subject were

vexatious, the Court initially passed a Grepe vs. Loam order asking him to
obtain leave before filing a new action. These orders were upheld by the
Court of Appeal on 30th March 1999 (see Ebert vs. Venvil: 1999(3) WLR
670 (Lord Woolf, Otton & Aldous JJ. Fresh applications for leave were
refused by Neuberger J and they were rejected on 26.8.99 (Ebert vs. Midland
Bank PLC: 1999 EWCA (civ) 2108.
(ii)

It was at that stage that the Attorney General applied and the Court felt

compelled to pass a sec 42 order.

Lewis and Silbert JJ in HM Attorney

General vs. Ebert 2000 EWHC Adnil 286 (7th July, 2000) passed orders
under sec 42 of the Supreme Court Act, declaring Mr. Ebert as a vexatious
litigant. A long series of vexatious cases initiated by Mr. Elbert were listed
out and an order was passed declaring him as a vexatious litigant and
requiring him to obtain prior leave for all future actions.

(The oral

arguments which are also reported show how vexatious Mr. Ebert was).
(iii)

Then in Ebert vs. Official Receiver 2001 EWCA (Liv) 209

(15.2.2001), two applications for leave to file appeal were rejected. The

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37

Court observed that the patience with which Neuberger J dealt with a series
of applications of Elbert was fair and open-minded. The Court of Appeal
heard and refused leave.
(iv)

Yet another application for leave to appeal was rejected by the Court

of Appeal in Ebert vs. Official Receiver: (2001) EWCA (Liv) 305 (20th Feb.
2001).
(v)

The human rights angle was gone into in Ebert vs. Official Receiver:

2001 EWCA (Liv) 340 and it was held that sec 42 of the Supreme Court Act,
1981 did not violate the right to access to courts and fair trial under Art 6 of
the Human Rights Convention.
(vi)

Thereafter, an order of considerable rarity was passed on 21 Sep. 2001

in Attorney General vs. Ebert: 2002(2) All ER 789, by Brooke and Harrison
JJ under inherent powers restraining Ebert from entering the Royal Courts of
Justice without permission. It was directed as follows:
The Courts supervising role extended beyond the mere regulation of
litigation and of litigants who had submitted themselves to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and included the regulation of
the manner in which the Court process could, in general, be utilized.
. in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, the court had the power to
retrain litigants from wasting the time of court staff and disturbing the
orderly conduct of Court processes in a completely obsessive pursuit
of their own litigation, taking it forward by one unmeritorious

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application after another and insisting that they should be afforded

priority over other litigants.
Holding that the Grepe vs. Loam orders and sec 42 were not sufficient, the
Court held that a separate order was necessary to prevent Ebert from
disturbing the conduct of court business. It said:
In the light of past conduct, there was no reason why Ebert should be
permitted to enter any part of the Royal Courts of Justice except to the
extent allowed for, in the injunction that would be granted. That
injunction would be limited to three years in the first instance. An
order limited in time would be a proportionate response to the
nuisance of which the Attorney-General made complaint.
As for precedents the Court referred to Ex p Leachman (16th Jan 1998) where
Simon Bordh LJ had directed that the litigant in that case should stop writing
letters to the staff for his case hearings and should write only to a designated
officer. In Binder vs. Binder (2000 CA) (9th March, 2000), orders were
passed protecting Court staff from harassment. Declaring a person as a
vexatious litigant was different from protecting the integrity of court
proceedings and protection of court staff. On facts, it was held that an
injunction for 3 years would be proportionate to the occasion.
(vii) Finally, Kennedy & Treacy JJ in Attorney General vs. Ebert: 2004
EWHC 1838 (Adm) allowed a further application by the Attorney General to
restrain Mr. Ebert from switching his activities to the criminal courts. An
application was filed by the Attorney General under sec 42 of Supreme Court

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39

Act, 1981 and was allowed as Mr. Ebert had started vexatious prosecutions
too.

The Court passed a Criminal Proceedings Order of indefinite

duration.
(ii)

Bhamjee series:

Ismail Abdullah Bhamjee cases: This was another vexatious litigant in UK

whose cases are widely reported. These cases involving Bhamjee are similar
to those relating to Mr. Elbert.
(i)

In Bhamjee vs. Fordstick (2003) EWCA 799 Brooke and Carnworth JJ

(14th May 2003) were dealing with nine applications by Mr. Bhamjee
including the one for permission to appeal for an extension of time within
which to appeal against an order made by Park J on 27th Jan 2003 in relation
to these cases filed by Mr. Bhamjee. The history of Bhamjee litigation
which started in Dec 99 was referred to. The dispute was with regard to
orders of the planning department refusing permission to allow him to use
his rear yard for car-washing; against the insurance company, Secretary of
State, five barristers, etc.
The court referred to statistics of increase in cases relating to
vexatious litigation coming before the courts filed with court fee exemption,
as follows (para 23)
Mr. Bhamjee is not alone in making persistent applications to this
court with the benefit of court fee exemptions. The court has been
handed a report by the Civil Appeals Office which identifies the
litigants in person by a letter. A litigant I will call A has made 23

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40

applications in the period since 1 January 2000. All of them have

been unsuccessful, all of these have been with benefit of fees
exemption. Litigant B has made 28 applications, 23 unsuccessful, 3
undetermined, all with the benefit of fee exemption. Litigant C has
made 12 applications, 11 of them unsuccessful, 1 undetermined and all
12 with benefit of fee exemption.

Litigant D has made 31

applications, 31 unsuccessful, 30 with the benefit of fee exemption.

Litigant E has made 15 applications, one of them successful, 13
unsuccessful, one undetermined, all with the benefit of fee exemption.
Litigant F has made 47 applications, one of them successful, 28
unsuccessful, 18 undetermined, with fee exemption 40 times. Litigant
G has made 22 applications, 19 unsuccessful, three undetermined,
with a fee exemption on each occasion.
Parliament altered the Access to Justice Act 1999 (which relates to legal aid)
with express purpose, as explained in Tanfern Ltd vs. Cameron
MacDonald: 2000(1) WLR 1311 (1319-20) of the need for preserving the
resources of the Court namely skilled Judges, lawyers and staff. The Court
observed: (para 26)
two Deputy Masters of the Court have to spend two hours each day
on Registry work determining and dealing with appellants notices.
Such applications have been increasing and totalled 200 in a year as stated in
Matlaszek vs. Bloom Comillan: 2003 EWCA (Civ) 154.

The Court of

Appeal then passed a restraint order against Bhamje as follows:

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41

I would order stay on all his current applications to this Court and
any applications he may lodge in future with the court until that
further hearing takes place.
While dismissing the three applications filed by Bhamjee for leave and
directing as above, the learned Judges Brooke and Carnworth directed that
the case be further referred to three Judges for deciding whether any other
sort of injunction should be issued to control Mr. Bhamjees future
activities.
(ii)

Bhamjee vs. Forsdick: 2004(1) WLR 88(CA) (25th July, 2003)

This case came before three Judges ad directed in the last Judgment.

We have already referred to this judgment by Lord Phillips MR and two

other learned Judges in extenso. Here we shall refer to the factual part of the
case and to other aspects.
In this case, the Court of Appeal passed an order, in addition to those
passed earlier, namely an extended civil restraint order, on an application by
five Barristers, whom Bhamjee had impleaded as respondents. Their only
fault was that they represented the opposite party successfully in the earlier
stages of the litigation.
After referring to the historical development of the inherent power
jurisdiction to curb vexatious actions which amounted to abuse of the
process of the Court (vide Cocker vs. Tempest (1840-41) 7 M&W 501,
Connelly vs. DPP 1964 A.C 1254, Bremcu Vulcan etc. vs. South India

LatestLaws.com
42

Shipping Corpn. 1891 AC 909, Taylor vs. Lawrence 2002(3) WLR 640), the
Court referred to the statement of Brooke J in AB and others vs. John Wyeth
& Brother Ltd. 1997(8) Med L.R 57 to the effect that the identification of the
classes of vexatious litigation is never closed. He referred to Taylor vs.
Lawrence 2003 QB 528 wherein it was held that it was open to the court,
under its inherent power, to re-open an earlier decision of the Court. The
Court of Appeal advocated to the step by step proceedings in paras 38, 3940, 41-42, 43-47. 48-51 and these were summarized again in para 53.
These final guidelines can be briefly stated as follows:
(a)

initially, an order could be passed under CRP 3.3 striking out the
action or applications, on the Courts own initiative, if it appears to
be totally devoid of merit.

(b)

then, if number of applications were dismissed as being without

merit, an order called the Grepe vs. Loam order could be passed
that no further applications in those proceedings without first
obtaining leave of the Court be filed. If no such leave is sought for,
such fresh applications could be dismissed.

(c)

If, there is persistent vexatious behaviour, a Judge of the Court of

Appeal or High Court or a designated Civil Judge in the County
Court should consider whether an extended civil restraint order
could be passed to be in force for a period of 2 years, restraining
him from instituting proceedings or making applications in the
Courts identified in the order or concerning any matters involving
or relating to or touching upon or leading to proceedings in which
it is made without permission of a Judge identified in the order.

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43

Any application should be made on paper and will be dealt with on

paper.
(d)

If such an order as stated in cl (c) is not found effective, a Judge of

the High Court or a designated Civil Judge in the County Court
should consider whether the time has come to make a general civil
restraint order against him. Such an order will have the same
effect as an extended civil restraint order except that it will cover
all proceedings or applications in the High Court, or in the
identified county court, and as the case may be,- where the relief is
claimed in a disguised fashion with a view to contend that it is not
covered by the order in cl (c) above. This could be for a period of
2 years.

(e)

If such an extended civil restraint order or a general civil

restraint order are not effective, and he is still moving applications
which are rejected as devoid of merit, the High Court or the
identified County Court may consider whether it is appropriate to
make any subsequent refusals of permission final. Thereafter,
any subsequent refusal of permission on the ground of the
proceedings or application being devoid of merit will not be
applicable unless the Judge who refuses permission himself grants
permission for appeal. These are under inherent powers.

(f)

The other party may indeed apply for the passing of any such
orders as stated above.

(g)

Finally, the Attorney General could move for a sec 42 order to

declare him as a vexatious litigant, get it published in Gazette.
Thereafter sec 42 order will govern.

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44

After laying down the above guidelines, the Court of Appeal referred
to the plea of the five Barristers. The Court held that the application of Mr.
Bhamjee for action against the lawyers for allegedly misleading the Court
was totally devoid of merit. The Court heard the counsel appearing for the
Barristers and Mr. Bhamjee. It was shocking that Mr. Bhamjee, instead of
trying to sustain his plea against the five Barristers, threatened to file cases
against the counsel who were appearing for these Barristers. The Court thus
said it was a fit case for an extended civil restraint order. It gave seven
directions:
(1)

For two years, claimant shall not make any further

application or take steps in the Court of Appeal, High Court
or District Registry or County Court against these five
Barristers and/or their representative in or out of or
concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching
upon or leading to these proceedings, without permission as
stated in para (2),.

(2)

He will apply to Master Bowman for permission to initiate

them and it will be dealt with on paper alone.

(3)

If he wishes to appeal against the decision of the Bowman,

he must seek permission from (a) Master Bowman, and
thereafter (b) from Park J, by following same procedure and
if they refuse leave, no application for leave will lie to the
Court of Appeal.

(4)

Any amendment or discharge of this order could be made

only by Park J, after initially writing to Master Bowman.
Disposal will be on paper alone.

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(5)

Anything done by Mr. Bhamjee against the five Barristers

can be ignored by them.

(6)

Mr. Bhamjee is not to apply before Master Bowman under

para (2) or seek permission to appeal as per para (3), without
giving notice

Barlow Lydl & Gilbert, six clear days in

advance.
(7)

If Master Bowman and/or Park J are not available for some

reason, another Master and/or Judge may be assigned by the
Vice-Chancellor

(8)
(9)

A penal notice should be incorporated

The above order will remain until an order is made under sec

42 and an order is passed under that section,- unlimited in time.

These various steps were referred to in order that the procedure did not
contravene the principle of access to justice contained in Art 6 of the
Convention.
(iii)

Alexander case:
HM Attorney General vs. Anthony Alexander: 2003 EWHC (Admn)
3076.
This was an application filed under sec 42 of the Supreme Court Act,

1981by the Attorney General after Mr. Alexander went on filing repeated
applications on the same subject without end even after Grepe vs. Loam
orders were passed. In para 42, Maurice Kay Mackay JJ observed:
It comes as no-surprise, against all this, to be told by Mr. Alexander,
as we have been today, that he has attended over 750 hearings in this

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building and has appeared before 50 High Court Judges and 29 Lord
Justices on Appeal.
Brooke LJ had described that Mr. Alexander was a menace.. to the proper
administration of Justice.
The Court of Appeal then passed an order under sec 42 without
limitation of time.
(4)

John Pepin case: In H.M. Attorney General vs. John Pepin: 2004

EWHC 1246 (Admn) the learned Judges, after referring to the innumerable
cases filed by Mr. Pepin held that only one specified case against Mr. P.C.
Walls was to be continued but that all the other options referred to in
Bhamjees case are otherwise not suitable at this stage and the only order
should be a civil proceedings order, under sec 42(1A) (a), (b) and (c) without
limit of time; and the grant of permission to continue the particular
proceeding against Mr. P.C. Walls is conditional on a senior counsel
certifying and agreeing to argue the case. In respect of all others, his remedy
is to seek permission under sec 42.
Conclusion: The above case law and statute of 1981 in UK (as amended in
1985) shows the care with which even vexatious litigants are dealt with after
the Courts were required to apply Art 6 of the European Convention.
Various steps have to be taken in UK as stated by Lord Phillips in Bhamjees
case and it is only, as a last resort that section 42 orders can be passed.
These cases are certainly good guidance before any order could be passed
under the legislation proposed in this Report.

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Chapter V
Curbs on vexatious litigation USA
We have selected statutes of a few States in USA, which are intended
to prevent vexatious litigation, with a view to understand the general nature
of such statutes in different States in USA.
In USA, there are provisions made requiring surety, or requiring prior
leave of Court, or for taking action for contempt of Court, if action is filed
disobeying the earlier orders requiring leave.
The statutes also provide for grant of stay pending the furnishing
security or the decision on the question whether a person is to be declared a
vexatious litigant.
The statutes also require that at least five cases on the subject must
have been lost by the litigant in the preceding seven years.
California
In the State of California, provisions of sec 39 of the Code of Civil
Procedure refer to vexatious litigation.
Section 391(a) defines litigation as civil litigation commenced in a
State or federal Court. Clause (b) defines vexatious litigant as follows:

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(b) Vexatious Litigant means a person who does any of the :

following:
(1)

In

the

immediately

preceding

seven-year

period,

has

commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five

litigations other than in a Small Claims Court that have been
(i) finally determined adversely to the person, or
(ii)

unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years

without having been brought to trial or hearing.

(2)

After a litigation has been finally determined against the person,

repeatedly re-litigates or attempts to litigate, in propria persona, either

(i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or
defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined, or
(ii)the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact
or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the
same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally
determined.
(3)

In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files

unmeritorious

motions,

pleadings,

or other

papers, conducts

unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or

solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
(4) Has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any State
or federal Court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the
same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurance.

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Section 391(c) defines security as an undertaking to assure payment which

may be reasonably incurred by the opposite party. Section 3(d) defines
plaintiff and sec 391(e) defines defendant.
Section 391.1 permits a defendant to move the Court for an order
requiring the plaintiff to furnish security on the ground that plaintiff is a
vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability that he will
prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant.
Section 391.2 provides that, at the hearing upon such motion, the
Court shall consider such evidence, oral or written, by witnesses or affidavit,
as may be material to the ground of the motion. No determination made by
the Court in determining or ruling the motion shall be or be deemed to be a
determination of any issue in the litigation or of the merits thereof.
Section 391.3 states that if, after such hearing, the Court determines
that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is no reasonable
probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the moving
defendant, the Court shall order the plaintiff to furnish, for the benefit of the
moving defendant, security in such amount and within such time as the Court
shall fix.
Section 391.4 states that if security is not furnished, the litigation shall
be dismissed as regards the moving defendant for whose benefit the security
was ordered.
Section 391.6 provides for stay of the litigation till the above
procedure is followed.

Section 391.7(a) says that, in addition to any other ruling provided in

this title, the Court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter

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a pre-filing order which prohibits the vexatious litigant from filing any new
litigation in the Court of the State in propria persone without first obtaining
leave of the presiding Judges of the Court where the litigation is proposed to
be filed. Disobedience of the order by a vexatious litigant may be punished
as a contempt of court.
Section 391.7(b) states that the presiding Judge shall permit the filing
of that litigation only if it appears that the litigation has merit and has not
been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. The presiding Judge may
condition the filing of the litigation upon the furnishing of securities for the
benefit of the defendants as provided in sec 391.3.
Section 391.7 states that the clerk may not file any litigation
presented by a vexatious litigant subject to a pre-filing order, unless the
vexatious litigant first obtains an order from the presiding Judge permitting
the filing. If the clerk mistakenly files the litigation without the order, any
party mayfile with the clerk and serve on the plaintiff and other parties, a
notice stating that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant subject to a pre-filing
order set forth in sub clause (a). The filing of the notice shall automatically
stay the litigation. The litigation shall be automatically dismissed unless the
plaintiff, within 10 days of the filing of that notice, obtains an order from the
presiding Judge permitting the filing of the litigation as set forth in sub
clause (b). If the presiding Judge issues an order permitting the filing, the
stay of the litigation shall remain in effect, and the defendants need not
plead, until 10 days after the defendants are served with a copy of the order.
Section 371.7(d) states that for the purposes of this section,
litigation includes any petition, application, or motion other than a
discovery motion, in a proceeding under the Family Code or Probate Code,
for any order.

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Section 371.7(e) states that the clerk of the Court shall provide the
Judicial Council, a copy of any pre-filing orders issued pursuant to sub
division (a). The Judicial Council shall maintain a record of vexatious
litigants subject to those pre-filing orders and shall annually disseminate a
list of those persons to the clerks of the Courts of this State.

Texas
The Civil Practice and Remedies Code, deals with vexatious litigant
in Chapter 11.
Section 11.001(1) defines defendant, clause (2) defines litigation;
clause (3) defines Local Administrative Judge; Clause (4) defines moving
defendant; clause (5) defines plaintiff.
Section 11.051 refers to Motion for determining plaintiff a vexatious
litigant and requesting security. It states that in a litigation in the State, the
defendant may, on or before the 90th day after the date the defendant files the
original answer or makes a special appearance, move the Court for an order:
(1)

determining the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant; and

(2)

requiring the plaintiff to furnish security.

Section 11.052(a), refers to stay of proceeding on filing of motion. It

states that on the filing of a motion under sec 11.051 the litigation is stayed
and moving defendant is not required to plead:
(1)

if the motion is denied, before the 10th day after the date it
is denied; or

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(2)

if the motion is granted, before the 10th day after the date
the moving defendant receives notice that the plaintiff has
furnished the required security.

Section 11.052(b) states that on the filing of a motion under sec

11.051, on or after the date the trial starts, the litigation is stayed for a period
the Court determines.
Section 11.053 refers to the hearing where evidence is taken orally or
by affidavit. It reads as follows:
Section 11.054: Criterion for finding plaintiff a vexatious litigant: It
states that a Court may find a plaintiff a vexatious litigant if the
defendant shows that there is not a reasonable probability that the
plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant and that:
(1)

the plaintiff, in the seven year period immediately preceding the

date the defendant makes the motion under sec. 11.051, has
commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona, at least five
litigations other than in a small claims court that have been
(A)

finally determined adversely to the plaintiff;

(B)

permitted to remain pending at least two years

without having been brought to trial or hearing; or

(C)

determined by a trial or appellate court to be

frivolous or groundless under the state or federal
laws or rules of precedence.

(2)

After a litigation has been finally determined against the plaintiff, the

plaintiff repeatedly re-litigates or attempts to re-litigate, in propria persona,

either:

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(A)

the validity of the determination against the same defendant as to

whom the litigation was finally determined; or

(B)

the cause of action, claim, controversy or any of the issues of fact

or law determined or concluded by the final determination against
the same defendant as to whom the litigation was finally
determined; or

(3)

the plaintiff has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by

a state or federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or

substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence.
Section 11.055 refers to the court ordering security and sec 11.056 to
the dismissal for failure to furnish security.
Section 11.057 refers to dismissal on merits and says that if the
litigation is dismissed on merits, the moving defendant can have recourse to
the security furnished by the plaintiff in an amount determined by the Court.
Then comes the procedure for prohibiting filing of new litigation.
This is stated in sec 11.101. It provides for punishment for contempt also. It
reads as follows:
Section 11.101 Prefiling order: contempt:
(a)

A court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party,

enter an order prohibiting a person from filing, in propria persona, a

new litigation in a Court in this State, if the Court finds, after notice
and hearing as provided by sub chapter B, that:
(1)

the person is a vexatious litigant; and

(2)

the local Administrative Judged of the Court in which the

person intends to file the litigation has not granted

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permission to the person under sec 11.102 to file the

litigation.
(b)

A person who disobeys an order under sub section (a) is subject

to contempt of Court
Section 11.102 mentions when permission may be granted by the Judge. It
states:
Section 11.102: Permission by Local Administrative Judge
(a) A local Administrative Judge may grant permission to a person
found to be a vexatious litigant under sec 11.101 to file a litigation
only if it appears to the Judge that the litigation;
(1)

has merit; or

(2)

has not been filed for the purpose of harassment or

delay.

(b) The local Administrative Judge may condition permission on the

furnishing of security for the benefit of the defendant as provided
in sub Chapter B.
Section 11.103 refers to Duties of Clerk: mistaken filing which is on
the same lines as in the California statute.
Section 11.104 refers to notice to office of Court Administrator and
dissemination of list of vexatious litigants to the clerks of the Courts of the
State.
It will be seen that the peculiarity of the statutes in US is to combine a
provision for ordering security from the plaintiff, in addition to declaring
him as a vexatious litigant. The statute gives a detailed definition of a
vexatious litigant, unlike the general provision under the UK Act of 1981.

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Another feature is about stay of proceedings.

The statutes provide for

dismissal of the litigation if security ordered is not furnished. They also

provide for dismissal of case on merits.

If the plaintiff who has been

declared a vexatious litigant and has been required to obtain prior permission
from a Judge before filing a fresh action, disobeys it and files a case without
such permission, he can be punished for contempt of Court. Though the
order declaring a person a vexatious litigant is circulated to other Courts, it
is possible that by mistake or oversight, the court staff registers a fresh case
filed by him without his obtaining prior permission, the said mistake can be
rectified and the plaintiff be required to obtain permission, staying the
matter. The US statutes also provide recognition of an order passed by Court
in another State, declaring a person as a vexatious litigant. These are the
special features of the laws relating to vexatious litigation in the States in
USA.

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Chapter VI
Curbs on Vexatious Litigation in Australia and New Zealand
In this Chapter, we shall refer to the efforts made in Australia and New
Zealand to prevent vexatious litigation.
Australia
In Australia, the High Court Rules of 1952 have a provision in Rule
63.6 to the following effect:
Rule 63.6: Vexatious proceedings:
(1)

Upon the application of a Law Officer, or the Australian

Government Solicitor or of the Principal Registrar of the Court,
the Court or a Justice, if satisfied that a person, or another
person in concert with that person, frequently and without
reasonable ground has instituted vexatious legal proceedings,
may, after hearing that person or that other person or giving
him an opportunity of being heard, order that he shall not,
without the leave of the Court or a Justice, begin any action,
appeal or other proceeding in the Court.

(2)

Leave shall not be given under this rule unless the Court or a
Justice is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the

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process of the Court and that there is prima facie ground for the
proceedings.
Western Australia
In Western Australia, they have the Vexatious Proceedings
Restriction Act, 2002. It contains 13 sections and a Schedule.
Section 3 defines Court as meaning the Supreme Court or a Judge of
the State Supreme Court, the District Court, or a District Judge.
Section 3 also defines the words institute proceedings as including:
(a)

in the case of civil proceedings, the taking of a step or the

making of an application which may be necessary in a particular case

before proceedings can be commenced against a party;
(b)

in the case of proceedings before a tribunal, the taking of a step

or the making of an application which may be necessary in a particular

case before proceedings can be commenced before the tribunal;
(c)

in the case of criminal proceedings, the commencement of

prosecution or the obtaining of a warrant for the arrest of an alleged

offender; and
(d)

in the case of civil or criminal proceedings, or proceedings

before a tribunal, the taking of a step or the making of an application

which may be necessary to commence an appeal in relation to the
proceedings or to a decision or determination made in the course of
the proceedings.

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Proceedings are also defined as including:

(a)

any cause, matter, action, suit, proceeding, trial, or inquiry of

any kind within the jurisdiction of any Court, including a Court of

summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal;
(b)

any proceedings, including interlocutory proceedings, taken in

connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a Court,

including a Court of summary jurisdiction or a tribunal; and
(c)

an appeal from a decision or determination, whether or not a

final decision or determination, of a Court, including a Court of

summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal.
Then, the words vexatious proceedings are defined as meaning the
following:
(a)

which are an abuse of the process of a Court or a tribunal;

(b)

instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for

any other wrongful purpose;

(c)

instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; or

(d)

conducted in a manner so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or

detriment, or achieve any other wrongful purpose.

This definition does not use the words habitually or persistently or
frequently litigatory as in UK or USA etc. This definition appears to be
much wider and appears also to cover frivolous cases.
Section 4 refers to Restriction of vexatious proceedings and reads as
follows:

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4(1) If a Court is satisfied that

(a)

person

has

instituted

or

conducted

vexatious

proceedings (whether before or after the commencement

of this Act); or
(b)

it is likely that the person will institute or conduct

vexatious proceedings,

the Court may make either or both of the following orders (c)

an order staying any proceedings, either as to the whole

or part of the proceedings, that have been instituted by
that person;

(d)

an order prohibiting that person from instituting

proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class, without
the leave of a Court or tribunal, as the case requires,
under sec 6(1)

(2)

An order under subsection (1) may be made by the Court on its

own motion or on the application of (a)

the Attorney General;

(b)

the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court or the

Principal Registrar of the District Court; or

(c)

with leave of the Court

(i)

a person against whom another person has

instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings, or

(ii)
(3)

a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.

The Court must not make an order under subsection (1) -

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(a)

staying any proceedings that have been instituted by a

person, either as to the whole or part of the proceedings;
or

(b)

prohibiting a person from instituting proceedings, or

proceedings of a particular class;

without hearing that person or giving that person an opportunity

of being heard.
The section 5 mentions the Effect of an order to stay proceedings or to
prohibit the institution of proceedings without leave. It states:
Section 5:
(1) Proceedings are not to be instituted in contravention of an order
under sec 4(1)(d).
(2) If
(a) despite subsection (1), proceedings are instituted in
contravention of an order under sec 4(1)(d); and
(b) those proceedings are struck out by a Court or tribunal in the
purported exercise of a power to strike out the proceedings,
the Court or tribunal has the power to award costs to the same
extent as if the proceedings had been brought and had been
struck out by the Court or tribunal.
(3) Costs awarded under subsection (2) are recoverable in the same
manner as if the proceedings would have been instituted in the
Court or tribunal and had been struck out by the Court or tribunal.
(4) A subpoena, summons to a witness, warrant, or process procured to
be issued by a person in any proceedings stayed by an order under
section 4(1)(c) or instituted by a person in contravention of an
order under section 4(1)(d) is of no force or effect in law.

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We have seen that in USA, in some State statutes, on such situations where a
vexatious litigant files a case without seeking leave, he can be punished for
contempt of Court. But here, costs can be imposed.
Section 6 deals with leave to institute proceedings. It reads thus:
Section 6:
(1) An application for leave to institute proceedings, or
proceedings of a particular class (in this section called the
proceedings), that is requested by an order under section 4
(1)(d) is to be made
(a) in the case of proceedings in the Supreme Court, to the
Supreme Court or a Judge;
(b) in the case of proceedings in the District Court, to the
District Court or a District Court Judge;
(c) in the case of proceedings before a local Co8rt, to a
local Court Judge; or
(d) in the case of proceedings in a Court of summary
jurisdiction, to a Magistrate; or
(e) in the case of proceedings before a tribunal, to the
tribunal,
and is to be accompanied by an affidavit in support of the
application.
(2) The Court or tribunal to which the application for leave is
made may dismiss the application even if the applicant does
not appear at a hearing of the application.

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(3) The affidavit accompanying the application for leave is to

list all the occasions on which the applicant has made an
application for leave under subsection (1) and to disclose all
facts material to the application, whether supporting or
adverse to the application, that are known to the applicant.
(4) Neither the application nor the affidant are to be served on
any other person unless the Court or tribunal orders under
subsection (6) that they are to be served on another person.
(5) The Court or tribunal is to dismiss the application for leave if
it considers that
(a) the affidavit does not disclose everything required by
subsection (3) to be disclosed;
(b) the proceedings are vexatious proceedings; or
(c) there is no prima facie ground for the proceedings.
(6) Before the Court or tribunal grants an application for leave,
it is to
(a) order that a copy of the application and accompanying
affidavit be served on
(i) the person against whom the proceedings are to be
instituted;
(ii) any person who made an application under sec. 4
(2)(c) in relation to the applicant; and
(iii) the Attorney General;
and
(b) give those persons an opportunity to oppose the
application for leave.

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(7) Leave is not to be granted unless the Court or tribunal is

satisfied that (a) the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings; and
(b) there is a prima facie ground for the proceedings.
(8) The applicant and persons referred to in subsection (6)(a)
are to be given an opportunity to be heard at the hearing of the
application for leave.
(9) At the hearing of the application for leave, the Court or
tribunal may receive as evidence any record of evidence given
or affidavit filed in connection with an application for leave
mentioned in subsection (3).
(10) The Court or tribunal may dispose of the application for
leave by
(a) dismissing the application; or
(b) granting leave to institute the proceedings, subject to
such conditions as the Court or tribunal thinks fit.
Section 7 provides for the situations under which the order
under sec. 4(1) staying or prohibiting a person, could be rescinded or
varied. It says:
Sec. 7: On the application of
(a) a person in respect of whom there is in force an order under
sec. 4(1) (i) staying any proceedings either as to the whole or part
of the proceedings, that have been instituted by that
person; or

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(ii) prohibiting that person from instituting proceedings,

or proceedings of a particular class, without the leave of
the Court or tribunal; or
(b) a person referred to in sec. 4(2),
the Court or a Judge of the Court in which the order was made,
may rescind or vary the order.
Section 8 deals with the question as to what would be that
procedure if Court/tribunal in one State passes an order against a
person and he proposes to go to the Court/tribunal in another State. Its
title is Restriction on a person who is a vexatious litigant in a Court
other than a Court of this State.
Sec. 8(1)

This section applies if, in the High Court or the

Federal Court of Australia, or in another State or a Territory

(a) there is in force in respect of a person a declaration that the
person is a vexatious litigant; or
(b) there is in force in respect of a person an order that the
person must not, without the leave of a Court, institute
proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class, in a Court
or tribunal or that any proceedings instituted by the person in
a Court or tribunal must not be continued by the person
without the leave of a Court or tribunal.
(2) While a declaration or order is in force (a) any proceedings, or proceedings of the particular class
referred to in the order, as the case may be, instituted by that
person in a Court or tribunal of this State are stayed and the

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provisions of this Act (other than sec. 7) apply, with all

necessary modifications, to and in relation to that person as if an
order staying any proceedings or proceedings of the particular
class referred to in the order, either as to the whole or part of the
proceedings, that have been instituted by that person had been
made under sec. 4(1)(c);
(b) the person is prohibited from instituting or proceedings of
the particular class referred to in the order, as the case may be,
in a Court or tribunal, as the case requires, under sec. 6 and the
provisions of this Act (other than sec. 7) apply, with all
necessary modifications, to and in relation to that person as if an
order prohibiting that person from instituting proceedings, or
proceedings of that particular class, as the case may be, without
the leave of a Court or tribunal had been made under sec. 4(1)
(d); and
(c) on the application of
(i) a person in respect of whom a declaration has been
made;
(ii) a person in respect of whom an order has been made;
or
(iii) a person referred to in sec. 4(2)
the Supreme Court may, in relation to the institution of
proceedings in a Court or tribunal of this State
(iv) rescind the declaration; or
(v) rescind or vary the order

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It appears that under sec 8, declarations or orders of the High

Court or Federal Court of Australia can be rescinded or modified by
the State Supreme Court, though in Australia, the State Supreme Court
is subordinate to the High Court.
Section 9 refers to publication of section 4(1) orders or
rescission/variation orders under sec 7 or 8(2)(C) IN THE Gazette. It states:
Section 9:
(1) If an order is made under sec 4(1), the Principal Registrar of the
Supreme Court or the principal Registrar of the District Court, as
the case may be, must publish a copy of the order in the Gazette.
(2) If an order is rescinded or raised under section 7 or 8(2)(c), the
Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court or the Principal Registrar
of the District Court, as the case may be, must give notice of the
rescission or variation in the Gazette.
Section 10 permits the Government to make Regulations, sec 11 deals with
repeal of the 1930 Act on the same subject and sec 12 deals with Saving and
transitional issues.
Section 1 deals with consequential amendments in the District Court
of Western Act, 1969, Liquor License Act, change in terminology.
Queensland:
In Queensland, the relevant Act is the Vexatious Litigants Act 1981.

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Section 2(1) of the Act defines legal proceedings as being any

cause, matter, action, suit or proceeding of any kind within the jurisdiction of
any court or tribunal and includes any proceedings taken in connection with
any such legal proceedings pending before any Court or tribunal. Section 2
also defines person declared to be a vexatious litigant as including a person
in respect of whom there is in force an order of a description first specified in
sec 7.
Section 2(1) also defines register as one kept at the registry of the
Supreme Court at Brisbane under sec 6.
Section 2(2) states that legal proceedings include an appeal, challenge,
review or the calling into question in anyway, a decision made under sec 9A
(6).
The following applications are not to be taken as legal proceedings
(i)

an application for variation mentioned in sec 3(3),

(iii)

an application for revocation mentioned in sec 4.

(iv)

an application for leave mentioned in ss 8, 9.

Declaration of vexatious litigants upon application by public officials is

covered by sec 3. Sec 3(1) provides that if the Supreme Court or a Judge in
satisfied that a person is frequently and without reasonable ground
instituted vexatious legal proceedings or procured vexatious subpoena,
summons to a witness, warrants or process to be issued or that any person
acting in concert with such a person has, without reasonable ground,
instituted vexatious legal proceedings or procured vexatious subpoena,

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summonses to a witness, warrants or process to be issued, the Supreme Court

or such Judge may, after hearing such person and, if the case requires it, such
other person, or giving him or her or them an opportunity of being heard, by
its, his or her order, declare such person and such other persons to be a
vexatious litigant.
Section 3(2) says that such an order under sec 3(1) shall be made only
upon the application of the Attorney General, the Solicitor-General, the
Crown Solicitor or the Registrar of the Supreme Court, Brisbane etc.
Section 3(3) states that the Supreme Court or a Judge thereof may
make an order under sec 3(1) so as to contain such conditions or
qualifications or to have such limited application as appear to it, him or her
to be appropriate and may, upon application of an official specified in sec 3
(2) or of the person declared to be a vexatious litigant vary the order so
made, by varying or rescinding the conditions or qualifications or limits to
which such an order is for the time being subject.
Section 4 deals with revocation of an order made under sec 3 and sec 5
provides for reinstatement of a declaration made under sec 3, within a period
of 5 years from the revocation order, legal proceedings are stayed, dismissed
or struck out, or being the issue of a subpoena, summons to a witness,
warrant or other process, are set aside as being vexatious, oppressive,
frivolous or are abuse of procedures of the Court/tribunal.
Section 6 refers to notification of the orders by Gazette and sec 7 says
that Court orders shall be deemed as declaration under the Act.

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Section 8 requires the person declared as a vexatious litigant to seek

leave before instituting or taking any legal proceedings. Sec 8(1A) says that
proceedings instituted or taken in contravention of sec 8(1) shall be invalid
and of no force or effect in law.
Section 8(2) prohibits, in such an event, the continuance of
proceedings already instituted. Section 8(2A) states that the section does not
apply to proceedings already started with leave. Otherwise, proceedings
already commenced require leave under sec 3.
Sections 8(4), (4A) deal with extension of period of limitation for
action if any application for leave is filed within the time limited..
Section 9 lays down

the procedure to be followed by vexatious

litigants to obtain leave from the Supreme Court, or a Judge thereof or a

District Judge or a Magistrate or a tribunal.

Section 9A refers to the

documents or steps to be taken before filing an application for leave in a

Court or tribunal.
Section 10 permits the Judge or Magistrate or other person hearing an
application for leave under sec 8 or 9 to impose conditions as to security for
costs, etc.
Section 11 says that leave shall not be granted under ss 8 or 9 unless it
is established that there is prima facie ground, or sufficient reason and there
is no abuse of process. Security for costs could also be ordered.

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Section 13 refers to the mode of service of document by or on behalf

of the vexatious litigant or person acting in concert. In the proceedings
taken by or against a vexatious litigant, service has to be effected by a
solicitor, or his employee or duly appointed bailiff etc.
Section 15 states that documents in contravention of the Act are not
required to be accepted.
Section 16 deals with issue of bench warrants and sec 17 with setting
aside proceedings ex parte.
Other sections of the Act are not being referred to as they are not that
important.
New Zealand:
Section 88A of the Judicature Act, 1908 relates to Restriction on
institution of vexatious actions and reads as follows:
Section 88A:

(1)

If, on an application made by the Attorney-

General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person
has persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted
vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any
inferior Court, and whether against the same person or against
different persons, the Court may, after hearing that person or giving
him an opportunity of being heard, order that no civil proceeding or no

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civil proceeding against any particular person or persons shall, without

the leave of the High Court or a Judge thereof, be instituted by him in
any Court and that any civil proceeding instituted by him in any Court
before the making of the order, shall not be continued by him without
such leave.
(2)

Leave may be granted subject to such conditions, (if any) as the

Court or Judge thinks fit and shall not be granted unless the Court or
Judge is satisfied that the proceeding is not an abuse of the process of
the Court and that there is prima facie ground for the proceeding.
(3)

No appeal shall lie from an order granting or refusing leave.

We may also refer to sec 477 of the High Court Rules (Part 5) relating
to stay or dismissal. That section reads:
Section 477: Summary stay or dismissal:
When in any proceeding, it appears to the Court that in relation to the
proceeding generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding
(a)

No reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or

(b)

The proceeding is frivolous or vexatious, or

(c)

The proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court,

the Court may order that the proceeding be stayed or dismissed

generally or in relation to any claim for relief of the proceeding.
The Harassment Act, 1997: (NZ)

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Section 32 of this Act again deals with vexatious proceedings. It reads

thus
Section 32 Vexatious Proceedings:
(1) A Court may dismiss any proceedings before it under this Act if
it is satisfied that they are frivolous or vexatious or are abuse of
the procedure of the Court.
(2) If a Court is satisfied that a person has persistently instituted
vexatious proceedings under this Act (whether against the same
person or against different persons) the Court may make an
order prohibiting that person from commencing any proceedings
under this Act, or proceeding of any special kind or against any
specified person, without leave of the Court.
(3) A Court must not make an order under subsection (2)
prohibiting a person from commencing proceedings without
giving that person an opportunity to be heard.
(4) Nothing in this section applies in respect of criminal
proceedings;
(5) Nothing in this section limits any other power of the Court to
dismiss proceedings.
New Zealand Law Commission:
We may here refer to the fact that in May 2000, the New Zealand Law
Commission has given an exhaustive Report (42 pages) on the subject of
Costs in Criminal Cases.

We are not going into details as it is not

necessary for the purpose of the present Report.

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Chapter VII
Curbs on Vexatious Litigation in Canada
In Canada there are specific statutory provisions in the Federal system
which deal with prevention of vexatious proceedings.
Section 40 of the Federal Courts Act (R.S. 1985, (F-7) reads as
follows:
Section 40:

(1)

If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal

Court is satisfied on application, that a person has persistently

instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a
vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be
instituted by the person in that Court or that a proceeding previously
instituted by the person in that Court not be continued, except by leave
of that Court.
(2)

An application under sub section (1) may be made only with the

consent of the Attorney General of Canada, who is entitled to be heard

on the application and on any application made under subsection (3).
(3)

A person against whom a Court has made an order under sub

section (1) may apply to the Court for rescission of the order or for
leave to institute or continue a proceeding.
(4)

If an application is made to a Court under sub section (3) for

leave to institute or continue a proceeding, the Court may grant leave

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if it is satisfied that the proceeding is not an abuse of process and that

there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding.
(5)

A decision of the Court under sub section (4) is final and is not

subject to appeal.
In addition, in the Codes of Procedure, there are provisions similar to Order
7 Rule 11 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure. For example, in British
Columbia, Rule 19(24)(9) of the British Columbia Rules of Court permit the
Court to strike off or direct amendment of the whole or any part of an
endorsement, pleading, petition or other document in certain circumstances.
It reads as follows:
Rule 19(24): At any stage of a proceeding, the Court may order to be
struck out or amended the whole or any part of an endorsement,
pleading, petition or other document on the ground that
(a)

it discloses no reasonable claim or defence as the case

may be, or

(b)

it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious, or

(c)

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial or

hearing of the proceeding, or

(d)

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court and

may grant judgment or order for the proceedings to be
stayed or dismissed and may order the costs of the
application to be paid as between solicitor and client.

In Ontario, Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil

560/84) states as follows:

Procedure, (O.Reg.

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Rule 21.01: (1) A party may move before a Judge,

(a)

for the determination, before trial, of a question of law

raised by a pleading in an action where the determination
of the question may dispose of all or part of the action,
substantially, shorten the trial or result in a substantial
saving of costs; or

(b)

to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no

reasonable cause or action or defence.

and the Judge may grant an order or grant judgment

accordingly.
(2)

No evidence is admissible on a motion,

(a)

under clause (1)(a), except with leave of a Judge or

consent of the parties;

(b)

under clause 1(b).

In Carey Canada Inc vs. George Earnest Hunt 1990(2) SCR 959, the
Canadian Supreme Court referred to the rulings under the English law
in regard to striking out frivolous and vexatious pleadings or where no
cause of action is shown. Wilson J observed that:
the Court has a right to stop an action at this stage if it is
wantonly brought without a shadow of an excuse, so that to
permit the action to go through its ordinary stages upto trial
would be to allow the defendant to be vexed under the form of
legal process where there could not, at any stage, be any doubt
that the action was baseless.

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Chapter VIII
Recommendations for Preventing Vexatious Litigation in India
We have already referred in Chapter II, to the existing laws on
prevention of vexatious litigation in the former State of Madras and in the
State of Maharashtra, namely, the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention)
Act (Act 8 of 1949) and the Maharashtra Vexatious Litigation (Prevention)
Act (Act XLVIII of 1971).

The title of the Madras Act of 1949 has been

amended vide Tamil Nadu Adaptation of Laws Order, 1969 and now known
as Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 (TN Act 8 of 1949). In other
chapters, we have referred to the statutory position and case law in other
countries. In the 189th Report on Revision of Court Fee Structure, the Law
Commission recommended (Recommendation No.10) for enacting a Central
legislation on the subject.

Now, we will discuss various provisions

necessary in that Act. We shall now refer to particular aspects of the various
legislations and formulate our recommendations.
(1)

Both the Madras and Maharashtra Acts referred to above, apply to

initiation of civil as well as criminal proceedings.

While the Madras Act

does not apply to seeking leave for continuation of pending proceedings, the
Maharashtra Act requires leave to be obtained to continue pending
proceedings also, in case a person is declared a vexatious litigant during the
pendency of such proceedings.

In fact, in other countries too, the laws

prescribe the need for leave for continuing pending proceedings. This being
the current position, we are of the view that once a person is declared to be a
vexatious litigant, the proposed law should require leave not only to initiate

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civil or criminal proceedings but for continuing any civil or criminal

proceedings which had already been commenced before the person was
declared a vexatious litigant. In such pending proceedings, the person who
is declared vexatious litigant, shall have to apply seeking leave to continue
the said proceedings.
(2)

So far as the Court to which application can be made for declaring a

person as a vexatious litigant, the Madras Act requires that application be

made to the High Court. In Maharashtra, sec. 2(1) of the Act of 1971 refers
to the High Court while Rule 7 of the Rules of 1976 made by the Bombay
High Court, requires the application to be filed on the Appellate side of the
Bombay High Court and that it shall be heard by a Division Bench.
We are of the view that the application in this regard should be filed in
the High Court and be dealt with by the High Court in a Division Bench.
(3)

As to the grounds to be alleged and established for declaring a person

as a vexatious litigant, both Acts use the words habitually and without
reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings.

They do not use the

word persistent, which word is used in sec. 42 of the UK Act of 1981 and
in other countries.
In UK (see Chapter IV), sec. 42 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 (as
amended by sec. 24 of the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985) uses the
words habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground.
This is one aspect to be considered.

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In the States in USA another method is employed (see Chapter V). In

California, it is required to prove that in the preceding seven year period,
the person has commenced, prosecuted or maintained propria persona at least
five litigations other than in a small claims Court that have been (i) finally
determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain
pending at least for two years without having been brought to trial or
hearing.
In Texas, the provision is similar but with a further condition that such
litigations must have been determined by a trial or appellate Court to be
frivolous or groundless under the State or federal laws or rules of procedure.
In Australia (see Chapter VI), the High Court Rules, 1952 (Rule 6.3.0)
require proof that the person frequently and without reasonable ground has
instituted vexatious legal proceedings.
In Western Australia, sec. 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Prevention
Act, 2002, defines vexatious proceedings as those
(a)

which are an abuse of the process of a Court or tribunal;

(b)

instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for

any other wrongful purpose;

(c)

instituted or pursued without reasonable cause; or

(d)

conducted in a manner so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or

detriment, or achieve any other wrongful purpose

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In Queensland, sec. 3 of the Vexatious Litigant Act, 1981 requires

proof that the person had frequently and without reasonable ground
instituted vexatious legal proceedings.
In New Zealand, sec. 88A of the Judicature Act, 1908 uses the words
persistently and without any reasonable ground.
In Canada, sec. 40 of the Federal Courts Act, 1985 uses the words
persistently instituted vexatious proceedings.
After examining the above statutes, we are not inclined to go by the
test of seven cases in five years as adopted in some States in USA. So far as
the Supreme Court Act of 1981 (UK) is concerned, it uses the words
habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground while Western
Australia gives some examples of vexatious litigation as stated in sub-paras
(a) to (d) of sec. 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Prevention Act, 2002.
Question is whether, in addition to the word habitually, we should
also use the word persistently.

We have seen in Chapter IV that Lord

Bingham has explained the meaning of the words habitually and

persistently in Attorney General v. Banker: 2000 (1) FLR 759 while
interpreting sec. 42 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 as follows:
The hallmark usually is that the plaintiff sues the same party
repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps
with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing
on defendants the burden of revisiting claim after claim; that the

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claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with

minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, in actions against
successive parties who, if they were to be sued at all shall be joined in
the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges every
adverse decision on appeal, and that the claimant refused to take any
notice of or give effect to orders of Court.

The essential vice of

habitual and persistent litigant is keeping on and on litigating where

earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and where on any rational and
objective assessment the time has come to stop
After considering the matter in depth, we are not inclined to add the
word persistently for the reasons we propose to give.

In our view, the

words habitually and persistently convey more or less the same meaning.
In the very case in P.H. Mawle (AIR 1965 SC 1827), decided with reference
to the Madras Act of 1949, the Supreme Court observed (para 7):
The Act, which was passed by the Madras Provincial Legislature in
1949 conferred jurisdiction upon the Madras High Court to deal with
cases of habitual litigants who were persistently filing vexatious
actions and were guilty of an abuse of the process of Court
Further, in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar: 1984 (3) SCC 14,
dealing with sec. 2(d)(iv) of Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981, the majority
held that the word habitually also means persistently.
observed:

The Court

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The expression habitually means repeatedly or persistently.

It

implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts.

Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and
dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an influence of habit. It
connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind
referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar
acts or omissions

Because the idea of habit involves an

element of persistence and tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of

the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of
the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are
committed with a long interval of time between them, they cannot be
treated as habitual ones
The above interpretation of the word habitual has been followed in a
number of cases by the Supreme Court, the latest being in Vijay Amba Das
Diware v. Balakrishna Waman Dande: 2000 (4) SCC 126, where while
considering sec. 13(3) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent
Control Order, 1948, the learned Judges relied on the meaning of the words
habitually in Ramanatha Iyers Law Lexicon (2nd Ed).

In the said

Lexicon, the meanings of the words habit and habitual are stated as
follows:
Habit:

Settled tendency or practice; mental constitution. The

word habit implies a tendency or capacity resulting from frequent

repetition of the same acts.
imply frequent practice or use.

The word by habit and habitually

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Habitual constant, customary; addicted to a special habit.

The Court thereafter observed: (para 9)
Therefore, the expression habitual would mean repeatedly or
persistently and implies a thread of continuity stringing together
similar repeated acts. An isolated default of rent would not mean that
the tenant was a habitual defaulter.
Thus, we find that the word habitually includes a persistent
behaviour.
So far as the word persistently is concerned, Ramanatha Iyer in his
Law Lexicon says:
Persistently connotes some degree of continuance or repetition. A
person may persist in the same default or persistently commit a series
of defaults: Re Arctic Engineering Ltd 1986 (2) All ER 346 (Ch. D)
In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that it is not
necessary to use both the words habitually and persistently.

The words

which have been used in the Madras and Maharashtra Acts, namely,
habitually and without reasonable cause are sufficient.
(4)

In the Maharashtra Act, it also uses the words habitually and without

reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceeding civil or criminal, in any

court whether against the same person or against different person.

The

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Madras Act of 1949 does not use the words, whether against the same
person or different person.

The UK Act (sec. 42) also uses these words.

In our view, it will be more appropriate to use these words also, i.e.
whether against the same person or different person.
(5)

As to who should file an application in the High Court to declare a

person as a vexatious litigant, the Madras and Maharashtra Acts permit the
Advocate General to file the application in the High Court.
In England, under sec. 42 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981, the
application is to be filed by the Attorney General.
In Australia, as per the High Court Rules, 1952, the application can be
filed by a Law Officer, or the Australian Government Solicitor or the
Principal Registrar of the Court.
In Western Australia, sec. 4(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings
Prevention Act, 2002 provides that an application can be filed by (a) the
Attorney General, (b) Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court or the
Principal Registrar of the District Court, or (c) with leave of Court by a
person against whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious
proceedings, or (ii) a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.
In New Zealand, under sec. 88A of the Judicature Act, 1908, the
application has to be filed by the Attorney General.

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In US, in California, under sec. 391.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

even the defendant can move the Court but that is for an order requiring
security on the ground that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.
In Texas, sec. 11.051 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is on
the same lines as in California.
In Canada, under sec. 40(2) of the Federal Courts Act, 1985, the
application may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of
Canada, who is entitled to be heard on the application.
In the light of the above provisions, the question arises as to what
recommendations have to be made to enable applications to be filed for
declaring a person as a vexatious litigant.

We are of the view that the

Advocate General of the State and in the absence of an office of Advocate

General (as in Delhi High Court), a Senior Advocate nominated by the High
Court, should be entitled to file the application.
We are also of the view that the Registrar General of the High Court
should also be empowered to file an application. In addition, we are also of
the view that a person against whom another person has instituted or
conducted vexatious proceeding must also be entitled, with leave of the
Division Bench of the High Court, to file an application to declare the
opposite party as a vexatious litigant.

In such cases, the Court must also

hear the Advocate General or the Senior Counsel nominated by it (where

there is no office of Advocate General).
person against whom the application is made.

The Court must also hear the

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(6)

Next question is as to what type of orders the High Court should pass

in the applications.

The High Court will, in such an application, after

hearing the parties referred to above, no doubt decide whether the opposite
party is a vexatious litigant.

But it shall also have to direct that the person

so declared shall not initiate any civil or criminal proceedings, or if already

instituted, shall not continue the same in the High Court or in any Court
under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court without obtaining leave.
(This will cover cases where a High Court has jurisdiction over more than
one State/Union Territory).

The order will include a direction that no civil

or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued by a vexatious

litigant
(a)

in the case of proceedings in the High Court, without leave of the

High Court, and

(b)

in the case of proceedings in the District and Sessions Court or in

any Court under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court,
without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge.

The above Courts are described as appropriate Courts in the further

discussion in this Chapter.
But, in the following cases, it shall not be necessary for the vexatious
litigant to obtain leave for instituting or continuing the proceedings:
(a)

where the vexatious litigant proposes to institute a proceeding in

the appropriate court for the purpose of obtaining leave;

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(b)

where in any matter instituted against the vexatious litigant, such

litigant proposes to file or continue any recourse by way of
defending himself;

(c)

where in a proceeding instituted or continued by such vexatious

litigant after obtaining leave from the appropriate court, the said
litigant proposes to file or take appropriate further proceedings.

(7)

We shall now refer to the circumstances under which leave can be

granted or refused.

We find the following procedures in various

jurisdictions.
In the Madras Act, 1949, it is stated in sec. 3 that leave shall not be
given in respect of any proceeding which may be filed by the vexatious
litigant unless the Court before which the leave application is filed finds a
prima facie ground for such proceedings.
The Maharashtra Act, 1971 refers to two conditions.

Sec. 2(2) states

that leave shall not be given unless the Court is satisfied that the proceedings
are (a) not an abuse of the process of the Court, and (b) there is prima facie
ground for the proceedings.
Sec. 42(3) of the UK Supreme Court Act, 1981 uses the words unless
the High Court is satisfied that the proceedings or applications are not an
abuse of the Court in question and that there are reasonable grounds for the
proceedings or application.

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In USA, in California, sec. 391.7(b) uses the words only if it appears

that the litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of
harassment or delay.
In Texas, sec. 11.102 also requires leave to be granted only if the case
has merits or has not been filed for the purpose of harassment or delay.
In Australia, sec. 63.6 of the High Court Rules, 1985 uses the words
unless the Court of Justice is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse
of the process of the Court and that there is prima facie ground for the
proceedings.
In Western Australia, sec. 6(7) of the Act of 2002 states that the Court
must be satisfied that the proceedings are not vexatious and there is prima
facie ground.

Vexatious is defined in sec. 3 as being either abuse of

process or instituted to harass or annoy or to cause delay or detriment or for

any wrongful purpose or without reasonable ground or conducted in a
manner to harass or annoy or cause delay or detriment.
In Queensland, sec. 11 of the Act of 1981 refers to prima facie ground
or sufficient reason and also that there is no abuse of process of Court.
In New Zealand, sec. 88A(2) of the 1908 Act says leave is to be
granted only if the Court is satisfied that the proceeding is not an abuse of
process of Court and there is prima facie ground in the proceedings.

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In Canada, in the 1985 Act, sec. 40(4) also refers to the proceedings
not being an abuse of process of Court and there being reasonable grounds
for the proceedings.
On a consideration of the above statutes, we prefer the words in the
Maharashtra Statute of 1971 which says that leave shall not be granted
unless the Court is satisfied that the proceeding is not an abuse of process of
Court and there are also reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(The

Madras Act, 1949 does not refer to the other condition that the proceeding
should not be an abuse of process of Court).
(8)

A provision for modification or rescission of an order declaring a

person as vexatious litigant is not contained in the Madras and Maharashtra

Acts.

Question arises whether it is necessary to have a separate provision.

In sec. 7 of the Western Australia Act of 2002, it is stated that where,

in respect of a vexatious litigant, a proceeding is stayed as he is prohibited

from filing fresh cases, except with leave, the Court may, on the application
of the said vexatious litigant, rescind or vary the order.
We do not think such an express provision is necessary inasmuch as
the Court which passed an order declaring a person as a vexatious litigant
can always rescind or modify it, if there is change of circumstances under its
inherent power and in that case it has to hear the party at whose instance the
person was declared vexatious litigant, as also the Advocate General or other
Senior Counsel nominated by the High Court (where there is no office of
Advocate General).

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(9)

Question arises as to the consequences of filing a case or continuing a

case without obtaining leave.

It has been debated as to what action is to be taken against a person
(who is declared as a vexatious litigant and who is directed to obtain prior
leave for initiating or continuing an action) but who violates the order and
either initiates or continues a case, in violation of the order, without
obtaining leave and without disclosure of the existence of an order against
him.
Sec. 4 of the Madras Act of 1949 states that such proceedings be
dismissed. The only exception where leave has not to be obtained is an
application seeking leave.
Sec. 3 of the Maharashtra Act, 1971 is also on identical terms.
There does not appear to be any specific provision in the UK Act of
1981 but in USA, in California, sec. 391.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
permits the Court to take action for contempt of Court. In Texas, sec. 11.101
of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code also permits the Court to take
proceedings for contempt of Court.
In Western Australia, sec. 5 of the Act of 2002 permits imposition of
costs and the striking out of the proceedings.

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We are of the view that in such a situation as mentioned above, the

Court in which the proceedings are so instituted or continued without
obtaining leave in spite of an earlier direction to obtain leave, the Court
should have power to dismiss the proceedings and also award costs against
the person who is in such violation.

This is the action that can be taken by

the Court in which the person has instituted a case or is continuing a case
without leave.

But, the High Court which declared the person as a

vexatious litigant and which imposed the condition that he should obtain
prior leave, must take action for contempt of Court for violation of its order.
Of course, it must be made clear that no leave is required for filing an
application for leave.
(10) As to the right of appeal against an order declaring a person as a
vexatious litigant and directing him not to initiate/continue proceedings
without leave, inasmuch as we are recommending that such orders shall be
passed only by a Division Bench of the High Court, it is not necessary to
provide for any further right of appeal.

Parties can always move the

Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India.

(11) Almost all statutes provide for a gazette publication of the order of the
Court declaring a person as a vexatious litigant. But, when in some States
the subordinate Courts are in hundreds, it is possible that all the Courts do
not have access to the gazettes.

We are, therefore, of the view that

whenever the Division Bench of the High Court passes such an order as
stated above, a copy of the order must be communicated to all the
subordinate Courts within its supervisory jurisdiction.

In addition to a

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Gazette notification, it may also be permissible for the High Court to give
directions for publication of its order in any other manner it deems fit.
(12) As to extension of period of limitation, the Madras and Maharashtra
Acts make no special provision. If the High Court restrains a person from
initiating a proceeding, and the person has to apply for leave before the
appropriate Court as stated above, there may be cases where the suit may, in
some cases, get barred by limitation by the time leave is granted.
Question is whether any special exemption or extension of time is
necessary.
Sec. 15(1) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 provides that in
computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for the
execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed
by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order,
the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was
withdrawn, shall be excluded.
Likewise, under sec. 470(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
it is stated that where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an
offence has been stayed by an injunction or order, then, in computing the
period of limitation, the period of the continuance of the injunction or order,
the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was
withdrawn, shall be excluded.

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In view of the above provisions, we are of the view that it is not

necessary to make any special provision for exemption or extension of time
in the proposed Act.
(13) Cases in more than one State can raise problems. Let us assume that
the High Court in State A has passed an order declaring a person as a
vexatious litigant and prohibited him from initiating or continuing any
case, civil or criminal, in any Court subordinate to it, without obtaining leave
from the appropriate Court. Can the person so declared and so prohibited by
injunction, bring or continue an action in any Court which is under the
supervisory jurisdiction of another High Court?
In such a situation, in our view, the opposite party against whom the
case, civil or criminal, has been initiated or is being continued in another
State, or the Advocate General or the Registrar General of the High Court
can move the High Court in which such proceeding is instituted or continued
or instituted or continued in a Court which is subordinate to the High Court,
to pass a similar order declaring the person concerned as a vexatious litigant
and to direct him to seek leave for continuing that case or for initiating any
fresh case in any Court within the supervisory jurisdiction of that High
Court.
(14) Before concluding, we may advert to certain exceptions such as where
a person who has been declared as vexatious litigant, wants to move for
anticipatory bail or is arrested and wants to file an application for habeas
corpus or for bail.

To require a person to seek prior leave in such cases

would, in our view, be violative of basic right to liberty as guaranteed in Art.

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21 of the Constitution of India.

In order to see that such cases are not

covered by the word criminal proceeding, we recommend that a definition

of criminal proceeding be inserted to the effect that a criminal proceeding
means the commencement or institution or continuation of a proceeding
seeking prosecution by way of complaint.

Likewise, in so far as civil

proceedings are concerned, we should exclude proceedings under 226 of the

Constitution of India, because basically our intention is to stop vexatious
civil litigation which start with suits.
We recommend accordingly.
In order to concretize our recommendations in legislative form, a Draft
Bill, namely, the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Bill, 2005 is appended as
Annexure I in this Report.

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We place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Dr. S.

Muralidhar, Part-time Member of the Law Commission.

(Justice M. Jagannadha Rao)

Chairman

(Dr. K.N. Chaturvedi)

Member-Secretary
Dated: 7th June, 2005

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Annexure I
The Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Bill, 2005
A
BILL
to prevent the institution or continuance of vexatious proceedings,
civil and criminal, in the High Courts and Courts subordinate thereto.
Whereas, it is expedient to prevent the institution or continuance of
vexatious proceedings, civil and criminal, in the High Courts and in the
courts subordinate to the High Courts;
BE it enacted in the Fifty-Sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows:1.

Short title, extent and commencement:

(1)

This Act may be called The Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act,

2005.

(2)

It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and

Kashmir.

(3)

It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may,
by notification in the Official Gazette specify.

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2.

Declaration of a person as a vexatious litigant:

(1)

An application under sub-section (2) for declaring a person as a

vexatious litigant, may be filed (a) by the Advocate General or in absence of office of Advocate
General, by a Senior Advocate nominated by the High Court in
this behalf; or
(b) by the Registrar General of the High Court; or
(c) with the leave of the High Court, by a person against whom
another person has instituted or conducted proceedings, civil or
criminal.
(2)

If, on an application filed under subsection (1), the High Court is

satisfied that any person has habitually and without any reasonable
ground instituted vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal, in any court
whether against the same person or against different persons, the High
Court may, after giving the person who has instituted such
proceedings, an opportunity of being heard, declare that person as a
vexatious litigant and shall also order as stated under subsection (1) of
section 3.

(3)

When an application is filed by any person referred to in clause (b) or

(c) of subsection (1), the Advocate General or, in the absence of such
an office, a Senior Advocate nominated by the High Court in this
behalf, as the case may be, shall also be heard on the application.

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(4)

Application filed under subsection (1) shall be heard by the High

Court in a Division Bench.

3.

Leave of Court necessary for vexatious litigant to institute or continue

any civil or criminal proceedings:

(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), when the High Court under
subsection (2) of section 2 or under subsection (2) of section 6 declares a
person as a vexatious litigant, it shall also order that (a) no proceeding, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by the said person
in the High Court or any other court subordinate to that High Court;
and
(b) no proceeding, civil or criminal, if already instituted by the said person
in the High Court or any other court subordinate to that High Court,
shall be continued by him,
without obtaining leave of the appropriate Court or Judge referred to in
subsection (3).
(2)

It shall not be necessary for the person declared as a vexatious litigant

to obtain leave in the following cases:

(a)

where such person is instituting a proceeding in the appropriate

Court or before the appropriate Judge for the purpose of obtaining
leave;

(b)

where, in any matter instituted against him, such person proposes

to file or take appropriate proceedings to defend himself;

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(c)

where, in a proceeding instituted or continued by such person after

obtaining leave from the appropriate Court or the Judge, the said
person proposes to file or take appropriate further proceedings.

(3)

In this section and in section 5, the appropriate Court or appropriate

Judge means (a)

the High Court, in the case of a proceeding proposed to be filed or

continued by the person declared as a vexatious litigant in the High
Court;

(b)

the District & Sessions Judge, in the case of proceeding in any

other Court subordinate to the High Court.

(4) Leave shall not be granted unless the appropriate Court or the appropriate
Judge, as the case may be, is satisfied that the proceedings are not an
abuse of the process of the Court and that there is prima facie ground in
the proceedings proposed to be instituted or continued by the person
declared as a vexatious litigant.
Explanation: In this section and section 5, (a) institution or continuation of civil or criminal proceedings does not
include proceedings instituted or continued under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
(b) institution or continuation of criminal proceedings means the
commencement or institution or continuation of a proceeding seeking
prosecution by filing a complaint before a Criminal Court.

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4.

Publication and Communication of Order:

(1)

A copy of every order made, under subsection (2) of section 2, declaring any person as a vexatious
litigant,
shall be published in the Official Gazette and may also be published in
such other manner as the High Court may direct.

(2) Every order referred in subsection (1) shall also be communicated to all
the courts subordinate to the High Court which passed such order.
5.

Proceedings, civil or criminal, instituted or continued without leave of

the appropriate Court to be dismissed and other consequences:

(1)

Any proceedings, civil or criminal, instituted or continued in any court

by a person against whom an order under subsection (1) of section 3
has been made without obtaining the leave required to be obtained
from the appropriate Court or appropriate Judge, shall be dismissed by
the said court.

(2)

The court while dismissing the proceedings under subsection (1) shall,
in addition, further direct such vexatious litigant to pay costs.

(3)

Every person referred to in subsection (1) who has instituted or

continued any proceeding without leave as aforesaid, may also be

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liable for punishment for contempt of the High Court which had
passed the order under subsection (1) of section 3.

6.

Declaration and order by more than one High Court:

(1)

Where any person against whom an order under subsection (1) of

section 3 has been made by a High Court, institutes or continues any
proceeding, civil or criminal, in another High Court or in a Court
subordinate to such High Court, then the persons referred to in
subsection (1) of section 2 may make an application to such High
Court for declaring such person as a vexatious litigant.

(2)

If, on an application filed under subsection (1), the High Court is

satisfied that any person has been declared as a vexatious litigant
under subsection (2) of section 2, by another High Court, the High
Court may after giving an opportunity of being heard to the person
who has instituted or continued any proceeding, civil or criminal,
declare that person as a vexatious litigant and shall also order as stated
under subsection (1) of section 3.

(3)

Where an application under subsection (1) is filed, the provisions of

subsections (3) and (4) of section 2, and sections 3, 4 and 5 shall apply
in relation to such application.

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7.

Power to make Rules:

The High Court may frame rules for the purpose of implementing the
provisions of this Act.

8.

Saving:
The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation
of the provisions of any other law providing for striking out vexatious
pleadings or prevention of abuse of process of law, or which require
consent, sanction or approval in any form of any other authority for
the institution or continuance of any civil or criminal proceeding.